Author: ln

The relationship between education and labor market opportunities: the case of Ukraine

Education and labour market policy brief image

Author: Hanna Vakhitova, KSE and Tom Coupe, KSE

This brief is based on a research project that analyses the extent to which the educational system in Ukraine contributes to better local employment opportunities, hence diminishing the outflows. According to the results, additional year of education increases the chance of finding a job by 2-3%. However, the effect of education on wages is small, especially when compared to other transition countries (1-5% wage premium for a year of education). In addition, while in 8 out of 10 countries education has zero or positive impact on the probability of starting a business, this impact is negative and significant in Ukraine. *)

Reputation for Quality and Entry in Procurement: Is there a Trade-Off?

20140224 Reputation for Quality and Entry Image 01

How much weight should be given to past performance indicators when selecting contractors? Does a large weight assigned to suppliers’ previous performance deter entry by new, innovative suppliers that have no track records for the very reason that they are new? If yes, how should we take this into account when designing procurements for firms or governments? This note describes recent research that sheds light on these questions crucial for every government and organization.

Introduction

How should past performance be accounted for when selecting (public or private) contractors? On one hand, giving large weight to suppliers’ previous performance in assigning contracts may improve incentives in procurement; on the other hand, it may deter entry by new, innovative suppliers for the very reason that they are new. Are there ways to structure procurement rules and procedures to minimize or eliminate these costs? How can well performing suppliers be rewarded, but not at the expense of losing the most innovative start-ups, that could pose important positive externalities on the buyer and on society overall? These questions are important ones and every procurement manager, in the private and public sector, should know how to answer, or at least how to think about, them. Unfortunately, if one looks at the leading management and operations textbooks, or at public procurement textbooks, it is hard to find a line that could help in making these crucial decisions. The only procurement book that at least mentions these crucial questions, to our knowledge, is the Handbook of Procurement (2006; see Ch. 18, by Dellarocas et al.). However, even that handbook falls short in providing evidence-based or – more generally – research-based guidance for these questions. This is the case because there is practically no research dealing with these everyday problems. One recent exception is an experimental study recently undertaken by Butler, Carbone, Conzo and Spagnolo (2013) that will be discussed in depth in the reminder of this brief.

Public Policy Relevance  

Before getting into the results of this recent study, let me provide some background information that will give an idea of the relevance of these questions for public policy.

Public procurement currently accounts for between 15% and 20% of the GDP in developed countries (see http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/pcp/key_en.html).  In 2011, the total public procurement market in the EU – i.e. the purchases of goods, services and public works by governments and public utilities – reached a size of approximately €2,500 billion, corresponding to 19 percent of GDP (see e.g. http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/modernising_rules/public-procurement-indicators-2011_en.pdf). As Table 1 below shows, despite year-to-year fluctuations, there has been an overall increase in procurement expenditures relative to 2007 levels, both absolutely and proportionately. The increasing shift in focus in EU innovation policies, from “push-based” mechanisms like R&D subsidies/tax breaks towards demand-led “pull” mechanisms, like Pre-Commercial Procurement, is likely to further increase the volume of this market.

Table 1: Total EU procurement expenditure on works, goods and services
 
In EUR billion

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2,178.55

2,263.62

2,346.00

2,416.52

2,405.89

 
As a % of GDP

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

17.6

18.1

20.0

19.7

19.0

Source: DG MARKT. 2011. Public Procurement Indicators.

The enormous size of this market notwithstanding, we know relatively little about whether, when, and how buyers should use reputational indicators based on past performance in selecting among sellers, and whether the use of such indicators necessarily reduces the ability of new sellers—i.e., sellers with no history of past performance—to enter the market.

It is well known that reputational mechanisms that reward past performance are important governance tools that complement (and sometimes substitute for) contracts in private transactions (Calzolari and Spagnolo 2009). Private buyers, however, are typically only concerned about the price and quality of the good they buy. Regulators in charge of public procurement, instead, are usually also concerned that the public procurement process is transparent and open for obvious accountability reasons. The need to prevent favoritism and corruption has led lawmakers around the world to ensure that open and transparent auctions where bidders are treated equally—even when in some crucial dimensions they have very different track records—are used whenever possible.

The trend in the US

The costs of limiting discretion to ensure public buyers’ accountability – such as the possibly large cost of not allowing reputational forces to complement incomplete procurement contracts – were stressed by Kelman (1990), who pushed for a deep reform of the US procurement system when he was the head of public procurement during the Clinton administration. The reform was targeted at reducing the rigidity of procurement rules in the Federal Acquisition Regulations and allowing public buyers to adopt more flexible purchasing practices common in the private sector, including giving more weight to suppliers’ past performance. Since the Federal Acquisitions Streamlining Act of 1994, US federal departments and agencies are expected to record past contractors’ performance evaluations and share them through common platforms for use in future contractor selection.

However, the US Senate recently expressed the apparently widespread concern that past performance-based selection criteria could hinder new and small businesses’ ability to enter and compete effectively, leading to an intriguing, but inconclusive report by the General Accountability Office.

This is not to say that US regulators were not concerned with the ability of small and medium enterprises (SME) – sometimes the most innovative part of the economy – to enter public procurement markets. In the US, this long-held concern led to large programs like the Small Business Act, with its rules limiting the bundling of public demand in very large procurements and establishing the Small Business Agency, and the ‘set aside’ (procurement only open to SMEs) common in many types of procurement auctions. However, the worry that past-performance based selection may contribute to the exclusion of novel and smaller firms only arose in the last couple of years.

The (opposite) trend in the EU

The European Union has instead been moving precisely in the opposite direction. An important concern driving procurement regulation in Europe since the Treaty of Rome has been helping the process of common market integration by increasing cross-border procurement, i.e., the amount of goods and services each EU Member State buys from contractors based in other states. The EU Procurement Directives that coordinate public procurement regulation in the various European states have been limiting the use of past-performance information in the process of selecting among offers—a feature that came under broad attack during the 2011 consultation for the revision of the EU Directives (see Replies to the Consultation on the 2011 EU Green Book on Public Procurement regulation). The EU regulators appear to have been always convinced that using reputational indicators as a criteria for selecting contractors leads to manipulations in favour of local incumbents, at the expense of cross-border procurement and market integration.  (see e.g., http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/modernising_rules/consultations/index_en.htm).

Only very recently – now that the US is moving towards reconsidering the effects, and possibly limiting the use of past-performance indicators – has the EU started to move (again in the opposite direction to the US) towards leaving more space to these indicators, perhaps as a reaction to the comments they received in recent consultations.

Finally, to have an idea of the lack of research-based knowledge guiding policy in this field, note that in some cases EU regulation already acknowledges the crucial importance of past-performance based reputation for some types of procurement. For example, the European Research Council (ERC) provides funding to top researchers in Europe, who are selected through peer review, and the track record of the researchers is usually the main awarding criterion. ERC funding is distributed almost exclusively based on reputation criteria in order to support the best and the brightest. Other European instruments for the procurement of research, such as the FET-OPEN program, are based on a strictly enforced, completely anonymous evaluation instead, without obvious reasons justifying this opposite approach. On the dedicated homepage of these programs it states: “The anonymity policy applied to short proposals has changed and is strictly applied. The part B of a short STREP proposal may not include the name of any organization involved in the consortium nor any other information that could identify an applicant. Furthermore, strictly no bibliographic references are permitted.”

Reputation and Entry in Procurement

In a recent research paper (Butler, Carbone, Conzo and Spagnolo, 2013) we have been trying to fill at least part of this knowledge gap and offer some initial evidence-based guidelines for future policy.

The study

We build a simple model of repeated procurement with limited enforcement and potential entry and implement it in the laboratory. We focus on reputation as an incentive system to limit moral hazard in the quality dimension as well as on the effect of reputation on selection through entry. We assume that some costly-to-produce quality dimension of supply, although observable to the parties, is too costly to verify for a court to be governed through explicit contracting and is therefore left to reputational governance. We make the additional assumption that there is a potential entrant firm that is more efficient than all incumbent firms. In this context, we study how quality, price, entry and welfare change with the introduction of a simple and transparent reputational mechanism. This mechanism rewards an incumbent firm that chooses to provide (costly) high-quality production with a bid subsidy in the subsequent procurement auction, and may also award a bid subsidy (of varying size) to an entrant with no history of production.

Note that in the case of public procurement and of firms’ vendor rating systems, we are talking about reputational mechanisms based on public rules, known and accepted by suppliers. Formal mechanisms and rules give commitment power to the buyer and can be designed in many different ways. A common mistake is to assume that reputational mechanisms must be designed along the line of the eBay feedback system, in which new sellers start with “zero reputation”. However, a buyer with some commitment power concerning the rules for information aggregation and diffusion and for selecting suppliers may well award a positive rating to new entrants—e.g. the maximum possible rating, or the average rating in the market, putting entrants at less of a disadvantage—and ensure that this is taken into account by the scoring rule that selects the contractor, even if the contractor has never before interacted with the buyer. Indeed, private corporations often have vendor rating systems in which all suppliers start off with the same maximal reputational capital—a given number of points—and then lose points when performing poorly and are suspended for some time if their reputational capital falls below a certain low threshold. This type of vendor rating system creates an advantage for new suppliers, most likely stimulating rather than hindering entry, suggesting that it is possible to design a reputational mechanism in public procurement that simultaneously sustains quality and entry.

The results

First of all, the study shows that concerns about reputation-based selection hindering entry are justified: naively introducing a “standard” reputational mechanism in which only good past performance is rewarded with a bid subsidy in the following procurement auction increases quality provision, but it also significantly reduces entry.

In contrast to this first result, the study goes on to show that properly designed reputational mechanisms in which new entrants, with no history of past performance, are awarded a moderate or high reputation score—as is often done in the private sector—actually foster rather than hinder entry while, at the same time, delivering a substantial increase in high quality goods provision.

The third important result of this study is that the total cost to buyers (buyer’s transfer) does not increase when a reputational mechanism is introduced, even though (costly) quality provision increases. The introduction of bid subsidies for good past performance appears to benefit the buyer/taxpayer by increasing competition for incumbency, driving winning bids down sufficiently to offset the potential increase in procurement costs due to bid subsidies.

Conclusions

Considered together, the findings in Butler et al. (2013) suggest that there need not be a trade-off between reputation and entry in procurement, and that the debates both in the EU and the US are rather misplaced. The results suggest that the dual goals of providing incentives for quality provision and increasing entry and cross-border procurement – in the EU or elsewhere – are achievable through an appropriately designed reputational mechanism. Policy makers should therefore probably stop quarrelling about whether a generic past-performance based reputational mechanism should be introduced, and instead focus on how such a mechanism should be designed.

References

  • Butler Jeff, Carbone Enrica, Conzo Pierluigi and Giancarlo Spagnolo. 2013. “Reputation and Enty in Procurement.” CEPR Discussion Paper No. 9651.
  • Calzolari, Giacomo and Giancarlo Spagnolo. 2009. “Relational Contracts and Competitive Screening.”  CEPR Discussion paper No. 7434.
  • European Commission. 2011. Green Paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement policy Towards a more efficient European Procurement Market. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/index_en.htm
  • European Commission. 2011. Green Paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement policy Towards a more efficient European Procurement Market. Synthesis of Replies.  Available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2011/public_procurement/synthesis_document_en.pdf
  • Government Accountability Office. 2011. (GAO-12-102R, Oct. 18, 2011). Prior Experience and Past Performance as Evaluation Criteria in the Award of Federal Construction Contracts. Available at  http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-102R
  • Kelman, Steven. 1990.  Procurement and Public Management: The Fear of Discretion and the Quality of Government Performance: American Enterprise Institute Press.
  • Yukins, Christoher. 2008. “Are IDIQS Inefficient? Sharing Lessons with European Framework Contracting.” Public Contract Law Journal,  37(3): 545-568.

Green Energy: A Solution For Climate Change?

20140203 FREE Network Policy Brief Image

This brief discusses the economic and political problems of so called green energy, a topic discussed at the 7th Energy Day recently organized by SITE. Green energy may be the only credible and feasible way to reduce carbon dioxide emission in the near future. However, a shift to a “greener” energy mix poses economic and political challenges which may impair the needed investments. This problem is further exacerbated by free-riding mechanisms associated with green energy investment. We suggest that investing and consuming renewable energies at the local level may be a way to internalize some the costs of the green energy.

There is a pressing need to cut pollution and the emission of greenhouse gases in the face of climate change and environmental damage. Since 1950s, global greenhouse gas emissions grew more than 5 times, and per capita emissions more than doubled.

Figure 1: Global CO2 Emissions from Fossil-Fuel Burning, Cement Manufacture, and Gas Flaring.
GreenEnergy020214_figure1Source: Boden, T.A., G. Marland, and R.J. Andres. 2010. Global, Regional, and National Fossil-Fuel CO2 Emissions. Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge
 

A substantial part of this growth in emissions, and associated global warming, is driven by human activity. In particular, the model experiments aimed at reproducing the dynamics of temperature change fail to consistently predict the recent years of temperature increase unless anthropogenic influence on the greenhouse emissions is taken into account.

Figure 2. Separating Human and Natural Influences on Climate.
The blue band shows how global average temperatures would have changed due to natural forces only, as simulated by climate models. The red band shows model projections of the effects of human and natural forces combined. The black line shows actual observed global average temperatures. Source: Global Climate Change Impacts in the United States, T. R. Karl, J. M. Melillo, and T. C. Peterson (eds.). Cambridge University Press, 2009.
 

With this perspective, it is not surprising that in the last decades investment in environmentally friendly energy has become one of the most common ways to address this issue around the world. However a shift to a “greener” energy mix is inevitably costly. The objective of this brief is to discuss economic as well as political costs of green energy. We do so by summarizing and extending the discussion that took place during the SITE 7th Energy Day which took place in November 2013 and was devoted to the challenges of green energy.

The Kaya Identity: Green energy, one of many possibilities

 A frequently used approach when analyzing drivers of emissions is the so called Kaya Identity, originally developed by energy economist Yoichi Kaya. It relates global carbon dioxide emissions (CO2) from human activity to the level of economic activity (GDP), total world population (Pop), the energy intensity of economic activity and the carbon intensity of that energy use. The relationship can be summarized as the following identity (see Bradshaw (2013) for a detailed discussion on this topic):

CO2 emission = carbon intensity (CO2/E) * energy intensity (E/GDP) *GDP per capita (GDP/Pop) * Pop

The impact of these “Kaya” factors on the world carbon dioxide emissions varies, both across factors and over time. Figure 3 gives the International Energy Agency’s estimates for the period 1990-2035.

Figure 3. Impacts of four Kaya factors on world carbon dioxide emissions, 1990-2035 (index: 2007 = 1.0).
Source: International Energy Outlook IEA 2010
 

As is evident from the Kaya identity, greener energy represents only one possible solution to tackle environmental damage. The decomposition of the different components shown in figure 3 suggests that most of the future growth of emissions is predicted to come from increased output per capita and an increasing population. But taking actions to reduce these are not on the policy agenda in most countries. The two remaining alternatives then seem to be reducing energy intensity or the carbon content of economic activity.

Reducing energy intensity is often prescribed as the key solution and it is easy to see why this would be a preferred alternative for policy makers. It suggests that we need not cut back on standard and at the same time we would not have to alter the energy mix because increased efficiency in energy use will take care the needed reductions. It does indeed seem plausible that energy efficiency will continue to develop, in particular based on technological innovation, but there are problems with relying on this solution alone. First, as can be seen in figure 3, projections already include an optimistic development for this factor. Second, reducing energy intensity requires changing consumer behavior. Research suggests both that inducing such change is surprisingly difficult and also that changed behavior has a tendency of not lasting in the longer term (see for example Hunt and Rogers, 2013).

Taken together this suggests that reducing carbon intensity, that is, investing in “green energy”, may be the most important change when trying to cut CO2 emissions in the near future. This solution may also bring additional benefits. For example, once up and running, renewable energy production would not require a supply of inputs, thereby ensuring long-term sustainability. Renewable energy would allow the countries to diversify their energy portfolio, positively contributing to their energy security. Finally, renewables are geographically more dispersed than carbon-based fuels. This could contribute to strengthening user countries’ energy security.

The multiple dimensions of the green energy costs

There are, however, various costs associated with green energy. These are direct and indirect as well as economic and political. An obvious direct cost comes from the installment of a new technology, and modification of the existing network. In addition, investing in green energy is usually considered riskier than investing in conventional energy. As a consequence, government subsidies or guaranties to attract private investors (such as a feed-in tariff for the wind energy providers) have to be (and have been) provided by the state. Another concern with many types of green energy, especially wind power, is that the power generation can be highly intermittent. As a result, such renewable power generation requires backup technologies (such as open-cycle gas generation which have high carbon emissions), to be on stand-by to real-time match demand and supply. All of this may contribute to an energy price increase for the final consumers. Another component of massive green energy promotion and subsidization by the state is that it lowers the market share of the traditional energy providers, leading to costly (and likely unpopular) reallocation of labor and capital.

All of the above suggests that costly green energy decisions are difficult to “sell” to voters who face substantial instantaneous costs of green energy transition, but do not (immediately) enjoy future benefits of cleaner environment. This, coupled with the potentially short horizon of politicians (as compared to the horizon for the green energy benefits), risks undermining the political incentives to invest in the green alternatives. Moreover, green-motivated politicians are likely to face resistance from significant counter-lobbying by affected energy-intensive industries as well as by incumbent energy providers, which further increases the direct political costs of green energy.

There are also some indirect costs, or negative externalities, associated with green energy, some of which are not immediately obvious. For example, due to electricity network interconnection across countries, the intermittency of wind power affects the energy supply security not only locally but also at the regional level. A local congestion problem may thus become a regional costly problem. Furthermore, it is not obvious that investing in greener energy in some parts of the world, such as EU, would reduce aggregate world carbon dioxide emissions. Indeed the reduced demand for “dirty” carbon energy in Europe would reduce its world price, making it more affordable for countries with weaker environmental standards, which may respond by increasing their “dirty” energy consumption. Last, but not least, adopting a green policy may also have indirect political costs at intergovernmental level. For example, recent research shows that being the first country to adopt green energy policy may weaken its position in case of a collective agreement to reduce pollution (see Harstad, 2012).

The local solution

Summing up, lowering carbon intensity seems like an important component in reducing CO2 emissions with large benefits in terms of being long-run sustainable and low cost once the initial investments have been made. But there are also clear costs to governments, especially in the short-run, and also technological constraints with integrating green alternatives into a centralized electricity grid. Some of these problems make it especially difficult to agree on governmental and intergovernmental levels.

An interesting alternative possibility comes from facilitating the introduction of green alternatives on a smaller scale and on a more local level. It may seem paradoxical but the easiest way of introducing green alternatives may be in places that for various reasons are not yet connected to a centralized system or where gradual, initially small scale, introduction is possible. There are several examples of successful projects of this type (e.g., at SITE 7th Energy Day such projects were discussed by Fredrik Svinhufvud, in case of Ukraine, and Grigory Dudarev, in case of Russia).

The main challenge seems to be how to deal with the unevenness of energy production from sources such as wind or solar. In general, development of storage capacity seems to be of crucial importance, but this does not necessarily need to rely on advancements of battery technology. There are other ingenious examples of green storage technologies that have successfully been tried out in small scale. One such solution is using excess capacity when conditions are good to pump water into an elevated basin that acts as a reserve hydro-source of energy when wind or solar do not produce enough. The extent of the impact of such local solutions on reducing CO2 emissions is yet to be investigated.

References