Location: Caucasus

Trade Diversification, Export Complexity, and Structural Transformation in the South Caucasus and Central Asia

Posted on March 30, 2026 | Policy Papers

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This policy paper examines trade diversification, export sophistication, and economic complexity in the South Caucasus and Central Asia during 2019–2024. Using detailed product-level trade data, it assesses how concentrated or diversified countries’ exports and imports are, as well as changes in the sophistication of the products they export. Evidence from the Atlas of Economic Complexity is also used to evaluate diversification opportunities based on countries’ productive capabilities. 

The results reveal substantial heterogeneity across the region. Georgia and Kazakhstan maintain relatively diversified export structures, while Armenia and Azerbaijan exhibit increasing export concentration. Export sophistication improves modestly in several countries, particularly Armenia and Uzbekistan. Overall, the findings suggest gradual but uneven structural transformation across the region, with diversification into more complex export sectors remaining limited.

Introduction

International trade plays a central role in shaping economic growth and macroeconomic stability in the South Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA). The economies of the region are highly open, with trade flows accounting for a large share of GDP in most countries. This strong integration into global markets creates important opportunities for growth, but it also exposes these economies to fluctuations in global demand, commodity prices, and international supply chains, potentially with drastic consequences.

This exposure has become particularly concerning in the context of the global economic environment since 2019. A series of major shocks—including the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East—have disrupted global supply chains, energy markets, and transport corridors. At the same time, geopolitical tensions and shifting industrial and trade policies have increased global policy uncertainty. Frequent changes in tariff policies and strategic trade measures by major economies, including the United States, have further contributed to an increasingly uncertain global trading environment.

In this context, the resilience of national economies depends not only on the scale of trade but also on its structure. Countries with concentrated export baskets or strong dependence on a small number of trading partners are typically more vulnerable to external shocks. By contrast, economies with diversified exports and greater participation in higher-value production tend to be more resilient and better positioned for long-term growth. Three related concepts—trade diversification, product sophistication, and economic complexity—provide useful tools for evaluating these structural characteristics. Diversification captures the breadth of the export basket; product sophistication reflects the income and knowledge intensity of exported goods; and economic complexity reflects the broader productive capabilities that underpin them.

This research brief examines the trade structures of the South Caucasus and Central Asian countries through these three dimensions. Using detailed product-level international trade data, the analysis evaluates export and import diversification, the income and technological content of export baskets, and the broader productive capabilities reflected in economic complexity indicators. By comparing patterns across countries and over time, the brief provides new insights into how the region’s economies are positioned to navigate an increasingly uncertain global trading environment.

Stylized Facts: External Balances and Trade Structure

Recent data highlight two closely related characteristics of South Caucasus and Central Asian economies: substantial variation in external balances and strong exposure to international trade. Current account positions differ significantly across the region and fluctuate over time, reflecting differences in export structures, commodity dependence, and import demand (Figure 1). Resource-rich economies such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan periodically record sizable surpluses driven largely by oil and natural gas exports, while several other economies experience persistent deficits associated with narrower export bases and higher reliance on imports. Particularly large deficits were observed in the Kyrgyz Republic during 2022–2023, illustrating the sensitivity of smaller economies to shifts in trade flows and external demand. These dynamics are closely linked to the high degree of trade openness observed across the region: smaller economies such as Georgia, Armenia, and the Kyrgyz Republic exhibit particularly high trade-to-GDP ratios, while larger economies such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan show somewhat lower—but still substantial—levels of trade exposure.

Figure 1. Current Account as a percentage share of GDP (2019-2025)

Source: Authors’ calculations, IMF

Figure 2 summarizes the geographic composition of trade across the region and highlights the continued importance of a relatively small number of external partners. The European Union, Russia, China, and other CIS economies dominate both export destinations and import sources. Comparing 2019 and 2024, several broad regional shifts emerge. On the export side, the European Union increased its relative importance as a destination for many exports—particularly energy and resource-based products; exports directed to Russia and other CIS markets also grew in importance after 2022. In turn, the share going to the residual category of other countries fell substantially. On the import side, Russia and China strengthened their positions as key suppliers across much of the region, reflecting geographic proximity, established transport corridors, and China’s growing role in regional trade. Imports from the European Union remained important, especially for machinery, equipment, and higher-value manufactured goods.

Overall, despite some adjustments between 2019 and 2024, the region’s trade patterns remain concentrated among a relatively small group of partners. This concentration increases exposure to destination-specific shocks and may weaken trade resilience. It is therefore important to assess not only how diversified exports are, but also how sophisticated and capability-intensive they are, since these characteristics affect an economy’s ability to adapt and redirect trade over time.

Figure 2. Geographic Structure of Regional Exports and Imports for South Caucasus and Central Asian economies, 2019 vs. 2024

Source: Authors’ Calculation, UN Comtrade. Note: Shares of major partner groups (European Union, Russia, China, CIS, and other countries) in total exports and imports of South Caucasus and Central Asian economies.

Methodology

To analyse the structure and evolution of trade patterns, the study employs four complementary indicators: the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), the Theil index, the export sophistication indicators PRODY and EXPY, and the Economic Complexity Index (ECI). These indicators capture different aspects of trade structures, including concentration, diversification, technological sophistication, and productive capabilities embedded in economies.

Trade concentration is first evaluated using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI). The index measures the extent to which a country’s exports or imports are concentrated across products. In this study, the index is calculated at the HS-4 product level, allowing for a detailed assessment of trade structures.

The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index is defined as:
\[
HHI_i^X = \sum_{k=1}^{N} \left(s_{ik}^X\right)^2
\]
\[
HHI_i^M = \sum_{k=1}^{N} \left(s_{ik}^M\right)^2
\]

where
\[
s_{ik}^X = \frac{X_{ik}}{X_i}
\]
\[
s_{ik}^M = \frac{M_{ik}}{M_i}
\]

Here

  • $s_{ik}^X$ = the share of the product in country ’s total exports
  • $s_{ik}^M$ = the share of the product in country ’s total imports
  • $X_{ik}$ denotes exports of the product  by country
  • $M_{ik}$ denotes imports of the product  by country
  • $X_i$ denotes the total exports of country
  • $M_i$ denotes the total imports of country

The index ranges between 0 and 1. Values close to zero indicate highly diversified trade structures, while values approaching one suggest strong concentration in a limited number of products.

The HHI provides a simple summary of whether trade is concentrated in a small number of products or partners. To complement this, the analysis also uses the Theil index, which captures how unevenly trade is distributed across all destinations or product categories. This distinction matters because similar levels of overall concentration can mask different underlying structures. In plain terms, the Theil index compares the observed trade distribution with a benchmark of equal shares across all categories: a value of zero indicates perfect equality, and the more uneven the distribution, the higher the index. As a result, comparing the two indicators allows a more nuanced assessment of whether concentration changes reflect dominance by a few categories or broader structural shifts in trade patterns.

Unlike the HHI, the Theil index can also be decomposed into within-group and between-group components, which helps identify the sources of concentration. The Theil index for exports and imports is defined as:
\[
T_i^X = \sum_{k=1}^{N} s_{ik}^X \ln\left(\frac{s_{ik}^X}{\bar{s}}\right)
\]
\[
T_i^M = \sum_{k=1}^{N} s_{ik}^M \ln\left(\frac{s_{ik}^M}{\bar{s}}\right)
\]
where
\[\quad \bar{s} = \frac{1}{N}
\]
and N represents the total number of HS-4 products, so that the terms in brackets measure how far the actual share allocation is from the equal share one. Higher values of the Theil index indicate greater concentration of trade across products, while lower values indicate higher diversification. Compared with the HHI, the Theil index has the advantage of being decomposable into within-sector and between-sector components. That is, the HHI can be broken down into group-specific contributions, but it does not provide the same standard additive decomposition with equally clear interpretation. allowing a more detailed examination of diversification patterns. The policy paper assesses export and import concentration using the HHI and Theil indices not only by product categories but also by trading partner countries (in the formulas above, products are replaced by countries).

While the HHI and Theil indices measure concentration and diversification, they do not say much about the type of goods a country exports. To capture this dimension, the analysis uses the PRODY and EXPY indicators introduced by Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007). These indicators assess the sophistication of a country’s export bundle, inferring it from the characteristics of the countries that export the respective products. In particular, a product receives a higher PRODY value when it is exported more intensively by higher-income economies. A country’s EXPY then summarizes the sophistication of its overall export basket by taking a weighted average of the PRODY values of the goods it exports.

More specifically, the PRODY index measures the income content of a product and is calculated as the weighted average of the GDP per capita of countries exporting that product:

\[
PRODY_k = \sum_{c} \theta_{ck} \, Y_c
\]

where

\[
\theta_{ck} = \frac{\frac{X_{ck}}{X_c}}{\sum_{c’} \left(\frac{X_{c’k}}{X_{c’}}\right)}
\]

Here

  • $Y_c$ denotes GDP per capita of country $c$,
  • $X_{ck}$ denotes exports of product $k$ by country $c$,
  • $X_c$ denotes total exports of country $c$,

In plain terms, PRODY asks whether a product is typically associated with richer or poorer exporters.

The PRODY calculation gives more weight to countries for which a product is relatively important in the export basket. This prevents the measure from being driven by very small or incidental exports. As a result, a product receives a high PRODY score when it is a meaningful export to richer economies, not merely when it appears in their trade data.

The weights $\theta_{ck}$ capture the relative importance of the product k  in each country’s export basket. Products exported primarily by high-income economies, therefore, receive higher PRODY values.

Using the PRODY values of individual products, the sophistication of a country’s export basket is measured using the EXPY index:

\[
EXPY_i = \sum_{k} \left(\frac{X_{ik}}{X_i}\right) PRODY_k
\]

EXPY applies the same logic at the country level: it shows whether a country’s export basket is tilted toward products that are more commonly exported by higher-income economies. Higher EXPY values, therefore, suggest a more sophisticated export structure – they indicate that the country exports goods that are typically produced by higher-income economies.

Unlike the HHI, PRODY and EXPY do not lie between 0 and 1. Their values are expressed on the scale of the underlying income measure used in the data, so they are most informative in comparative terms across countries and over time. Also, empirical applications frequently use the natural logarithm of EXPY. This transformation reduces skewness and facilitates interpretation in regression analysis.

Finally, to capture the deeper productive capabilities embedded in economies, the analysis incorporates the Economic Complexity Index (ECI) developed by the Harvard Growth Lab and published in the Atlas of Economic Complexity. The ECI measures the knowledge intensity of an economy by combining information on the diversity of products a country exports and the ubiquity of those products across countries.

The calculation begins with the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) indicator:
\[
RCA_{ck} = \frac{\dfrac{X_{ck}}{X_c}}{\dfrac{\sum_{c} X_{ck}}{\sum_{c} X_c}}
\]
where

  • $X_{ck}$ denotes exports of product $k$ by country $c$,
  • $X_c$ denotes total exports of country $c$.

Countries are considered competitive exporters of product k if their revealed comparative advantage in that product exceeds 1. Based on this country–product matrix relationship, economic complexity is inferred from two simple ideas: diversity and ubiquity. Diversity refers to the number of different products a country can export competitively. Ubiquity refers to how many countries can export a given product competitively. Economies tend to be ranked as more complex (have a higher value of ECI) when they export a broad range of products that relatively few other countries can produce, because this indicates a deeper and more versatile set of productive capabilities.

Taken together, these indicators provide a comprehensive framework for analysing trade structures. The HHI and Theil indices measure trade concentration and diversification at the HS-4 product level for both exports and imports (as well as concentration by countries), the PRODY and EXPY indicators capture the income sophistication of export baskets, and the Economic Complexity Index reflects the underlying productive capabilities of national economies.

Results

The HHI results reveal significant cross-country differences in export diversification. Georgia and Kazakhstan consistently exhibit the lowest export concentration by destination country across the period, with HHI values remaining below 0.15. Although both countries experience a gradual increase in concentration over time, their exports remain comparatively diversified across destination countries relative to the rest of the region.

In contrast, Armenia and Azerbaijan show a noticeable increase in export concentration by destination country after 2021. Armenia’s export HHI rises sharply and remains close to the upper benchmark threshold by 2024, suggesting that exports became increasingly reliant on a smaller set of countries. Azerbaijan also shows a temporary increase in export concentration around 2022, followed by a modest decline by 2024, indicating partial normalization after the peak of external shocks.

The Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan exhibit persistently higher average export concentration by destination country than other countries in the region. Kyrgyzstan reaches particularly high levels during the early pandemic years and remains relatively concentrated thereafter. Uzbekistan also maintains a relatively high concentration, although its export structure shows some signs of gradual diversification toward the end of the period. Tajikistan remains in the intermediate range, with export concentration by country relatively stable across years.

Import concentration patterns differ from those of exports. Several countries maintain relatively diversified import structures by source country throughout the period. Georgia and Azerbaijan show consistently low import HHI values, indicating broad import structures. However, for some other countries in the region, import concentration increases sharply during the shock period. Kazakhstan experiences a substantial increase during 2020–2022, followed by a return to lower levels in subsequent years. Armenia also records a sharp increase in import concentration in 2024, suggesting increased reliance on a narrower set of partner countries. Kyrgyzstan shows a gradual increase toward the end of the sample period.

Figure 3. HHI of Export by Country, 2019–2024

Source: Author’s Calculation, UN Comtrade

Figure 4. HHI of Import by Country, 2019–2024

Source: Author’s Calculation, UN Comtrade

Examining concentration at the HS4 product level provides additional insight into the structure of trade baskets. Changes in overall HHI may arise either because the product distribution becomes more uneven or because a small number of product categories become temporarily dominant.

The HS4-product level export results (Figure 5) reveal substantial cross-country variation in product concentration. Azerbaijan remains the most concentrated exporter throughout the period. Although the figure shows some decline in concentration in the earlier years, this change is not sustained, and the country’s export basket remains heavily concentrated in a narrow set of products. Kazakhstan also shows a relatively high concentration, although the decline after 2022 suggests some gradual diversification. In contrast, Georgia and Tajikistan maintain consistently low HHI values, indicating relatively diversified export baskets across HS4 product categories. Armenia and Uzbekistan remain in the intermediate range, although Armenia shows an increase in concentration in 2024.

Import concentration at the HS4 product level (Figure 6) remains generally lower than export concentration but exhibits greater volatility across countries. Most economies maintain relatively diversified import baskets, with HHI values typically below 0.05–0.06. However, several temporary spikes are visible. Armenia records a sharp increase in import concentration in 2024, suggesting growing reliance on a narrower set of imported goods. Kyrgyzstan experiences a pronounced spike in 2023, while Georgia shows a moderate increase during 2022–2023, then stabilizes. These fluctuations likely reflect temporary supply disruptions, shifts in trade routes, or changes in import demand during periods of economic and geopolitical shocks.

Figure 5. HHI of Export by HS4 Product Categories, 2019–2024

Source: Author’s Calculation, UN Comtrade

Figure 6. HHI of Import by HS4 Product Categories, 2019–2024

Source: Author’s Calculation, UN Comtrade

The country-level Theil index largely reinforces the message from the HHI analysis: across the region, recent changes in export concentration have been driven mainly by shifts in the distribution of exports across destination markets rather than by a restructuring of export baskets.

Armenia shows the clearest increase in geographic concentration, while Azerbaijan also remains relatively concentrated despite some normalization after the 2022 spike. Georgia remains the most geographically diversified case, and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan show only moderate changes over time. Overall, the Theil results add nuance rather than overturning the HHI findings: they suggest that the main source of recent concentration has been unevenness across partner countries, not a uniform narrowing of export structures across all economies.

At the product level, the Theil index points to a more nuanced picture. In several countries, product-level inequality declines or remains moderate even when destination-country concentration rises, suggesting that geographic concentration and product concentration do not always move together. This is especially important for interpretation: an economy may become more dependent on a smaller set of trading partners while still maintaining or even broadening the composition of its export basket. Azerbaijan remains the clearest case of persistently high product concentration, whereas Georgia continues to display a relatively diversified product structure.

In cases where the Theil and HHI measures differ somewhat, the gap likely reflects that the HHI is more sensitive to dominant categories, whereas the Theil index captures unevenness across the full distribution of trade shares.

The product-level Theil index (Figure 7) also provides additional insights into the composition of export baskets. Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan show noticeable declines in product-level inequality between 2019 and 2024, suggesting some diversification across product categories despite rising geographic concentration. This pattern indicates that while exports may increasingly rely on fewer destination countries, the underlying product composition has broadened.

In contrast, Azerbaijan maintains a relatively high product concentration, which is fully consistent with the HS4-product level HHI results showing the highest export concentration across product categories in the region. Georgia shows a slight increase in product-level inequality, although overall concentration remains relatively low compared to most other countries, confirming the diversified structure observed in the HHI product-level analysis.

Overall, the Theil index results reinforce the conclusions drawn from the HHI analysis while providing additional insight into the drivers of concentration. The evidence suggests that recent changes in trade structures across the South Caucasus and Central Asia are driven primarily by shifts in geographic export patterns rather than by widespread narrowing of product specialization. In several countries, product diversification appears to be improving even as exports become more concentrated across trading partners.

Figure 7. Theil Index by Country and Product Categories, 2019 and 2024

Source: Author’s Calculation, UN Comtrade. Note: Higher values indicate greater concentration in the distribution of products.

Export sophistication is measured by the EXPY index, with higher values indicating that a country exports products typically produced by higher-income economies.

Between 2019 and 2024, export sophistication increases for most countries in the region, although the magnitude of change varies (Figure 8). Armenia shows the largest improvement in EXPY, suggesting a shift toward higher-value exports. Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic also show moderate increases in export sophistication. In contrast, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan experience only modest changes, indicating relatively stable export structures over the period.

Importantly, increases in export sophistication should be interpreted alongside changes in concentration indicators. When EXPY increases while export concentration remains low or declines, the improvement reflects broader structural upgrading. However, when increases in EXPY coincide with rising concentration, the shift may reflect specialization in a smaller number of higher-value products rather than broad-based diversification.

Figure 8. Export Sophistication (EXPY), 2019 and 2024

Source: Author’s Calculation, UN Comtrade. Note: Higher values indicate a more sophisticated export basket.

The previous indicators evaluate diversification and sophistication based on observed trade patterns. An additional perspective on structural transformation can be obtained by examining future diversification opportunities, using the feasibility analysis derived from the Atlas of Economic Complexity Index (ECI) developed by the Growth Lab at Harvard University (see Figure 9). This framework maps potential export opportunities based on the relationship between product sophistication and proximity to existing productive capabilities.

Figure 9. Economic Complexity Index (ECI), 2012- 2024

Source: Growth Lab at Harvard University

Across the South Caucasus and Central Asia, the feasibility analysis reveals substantial heterogeneity in the pace and depth of structural transformation. Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan show the most pronounced improvements in economic complexity over time, suggesting that a growing number of technologically more sophisticated products are becoming feasible given existing productive capabilities. This pattern indicates a widening diversification frontier and reflects the accumulation of capabilities that can support expansion into more complex sectors.

These findings are broadly consistent with the earlier results on export sophistication (EXPY), which also show noticeable improvements in Armenia and moderate gains in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. At the same time, the concentration indicators provide an important qualification. While Armenia shows rising export sophistication, the HHI and Theil indices indicate increasing export concentration in recent years. This suggests that structural upgrading may be occurring alongside a narrowing export base, implying that diversification into complex products has not yet become broad-based. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan present a more balanced picture, with modest improvements in sophistication accompanied by relatively stable or moderate concentration levels, which is more consistent with gradual structural diversification.

Georgia and Kyrgyzstan display more incremental dynamics in the ECI analysis. Their export structures have become somewhat more sophisticated, but diversification largely occurs within sectors that remain relatively close to their existing productive structures and only moderately more complex than current exports. This pattern aligns with the earlier results showing relatively stable concentration indicators and only modest increases in export sophistication, pointing to gradual capability accumulation rather than rapid structural upgrading.

In contrast, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan remain more constrained by relatively low levels of economic complexity. In these economies, the distribution of feasible products remains concentrated in lower-complexity segments of the product space, and many technologically more sophisticated activities remain distant from their current capability base. This result is partly consistent with the earlier findings from concentration indicators: Tajikistan’s export structure remains relatively stable but limited in diversification, while Azerbaijan’s export structure continues to be influenced by resource-based specialization. As a result, the set of feasible diversification opportunities remains narrower and concentrated in sectors with relatively limited technological sophistication.

Overall, the ECI analysis complements the empirical results obtained from HHI, Theil, and EXPY indicators. While some countries in the region demonstrate signs of capability accumulation and gradual upgrading, the results suggest that structural transformation remains uneven across the region. In several cases, improvements in export sophistication occur alongside persistent concentration in a limited number of products, indicating that diversification into more complex sectors has not yet translated into broad-based structural change.

Conclusion

This brief examined the evolution of trade diversification, export sophistication, and structural transformation in the South Caucasus and Central Asia between 2019 and 2024. The results show substantial cross-country differences. While some economies maintain relatively diversified export structures, others remain more dependent on a narrow set of products. Export sophistication has improved modestly in several countries, but in some cases, this has coincided with rising export concentration. This does not necessarily indicate a negative development: such a pattern may reflect successful specialization based on comparative advantage or upgrading into higher-value activities. However, when sophistication gains are concentrated in a small number of products or markets, the resulting export structure may remain vulnerable to external shocks and less supportive of broad-based structural transformation.

The analysis also points to uneven progress in productive capabilities across the region. Some countries are gradually expanding the range of products they can competitively produce, while others remain constrained by narrower capability bases.

These results highlight the nuanced relationship between diversification, sophistication, and economic complexity. Diversifying into more complex sectors can strengthen economic resilience by broadening the range of activities an economy can rely on, reducing dependence on a limited set of simple or commodity-based exports, and enhancing the capacity to adapt to changes in demand, prices, or trade routes. In this context, the key policy challenge is not diversification for its own sake, but fostering the development of productive capabilities that enable more sophisticated, adaptable, and resilient export structures over time.

References

  • Balland, P.-A., Boschma, R., Crespo, J., & Rigby, D. (2019). Smart specialization policy in the European Union: relatedness, knowledge complexity and regional diversification. Regional Studies, 53(9), 1252–1268.
  • Brummitt, C. D., Gómez-Lievano, A., Hausmann, R., & Bonds, M. H. (2018). Machine-learned patterns suggest that diversification drives economic development.
  • Hausmann, R., Hwang, J., & Rodrik, D. (2007). What you export matters. Journal of Economic Growth, 12(1), 1–25.
  • Hausmann, R., Hidalgo, C., Bustos, S., Coscia, M., Chung, S., Jimenez, J., Simoes, A., & Yıldırım, M. (2014). The Atlas of Economic Complexity: Mapping Paths to Prosperity. MIT Press.
  • Hidalgo, C. A., & Hausmann, R. (2009). The building blocks of economic complexity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106(26), 10570–10575.
  • International Monetary Fund. (various years). Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia.
  • Neffke, F., Hartog, M., Boschma, R., & Henning, M. (2018). Agents of structural change: The role of firms and entrepreneurs in regional diversification.
  • Rodrik, D. (2006). What’s so special about China’s exports? China & World Economy, 14(5), 1–19.
  • World Bank. (2020). Central Asia Trade: Structural Transformation and Diversification.
  • Harvard Growth Lab. (2024). Atlas of Economic Complexity – Feasibility Analysis.
  • United Nations Comtrade Database. (2024). International Trade Statistics.
  • World Bank. (2023). World Development Indicators.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Gender Gap in Life Expectancy and Its Socio-Economic Implications

Posted on October 1, 2024 | FROGEE PROJECT, Policy Brief

Silhouetted crowd of people walking in a public square, symbolizing societal impacts of the gender gap in life expectancy.

Today women live longer than men virtually in every country of the world. Although scientists still struggle to fully explain this disparity, the most prominent sources of this gender inequality are biological and behavioral. From an evolutionary point of view, female longevity was more advantageous for offspring survival. This resulted in a higher frequency of non-fatal diseases among women and in a later onset of fatal conditions. The observed high variation in the longevity gap across countries, however, points towards an important role of social and behavioral arguments. These include higher consumption of alcohol, tobacco, and fats among men as well as a generally riskier behavior. The gender gap in life expectancy often reaches 6-12 percent of the average human lifespan and has remained stubbornly stable in many countries. Lower life expectancy among men is an important social concern on its own and has significant consequences for the well-being of their surviving partners and the economy as a whole. It is an important, yet under-discussed type of gender inequality.

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Gender Gap in Life Expectancy and Its Socio-Economic Implications

Today, women on average live longer than men across the globe. Despite the universality of this basic qualitative fact, the gender gap in life expectancy (GGLE) varies a lot across countries (as well as over time) and scientists have only a limited understanding of the causes of this variation (Rochelle et al., 2015). Regardless of the reasons for this discrepancy, it has sizable economic and financial implications. Abnormal male mortality makes a dent in the labour force in nations where GGLE happens to be the highest, while at the same time, large GGLE might contribute to a divergence in male and female discount factors with implications for employment and pension savings. Large discrepancies in life expectancy translate into a higher incidence of widowhood and a longer time in which women live as widows. The gender gap in life expectancy is one of the less frequently discussed dimensions of gender inequality, and while it clearly has negative implications for men, lower male longevity has also substantial negative consequences for women and society as a whole.

Figure A. Gender gap in life expectancy across selected countries

Source: World Bank.

The earliest available reliable data on the relative longevity of men and women shows that the gender gap in life expectancy is not a new phenomenon. In the middle of the 19th century, women in Scandinavian countries outlived men by 3-5 years (Rochelle et al., 2015), and Bavarian nuns enjoyed an additional 1.1 years of life, relative to the monks (Luy, 2003). At the beginning of the 20th century, relative higher female longevity became universal as women started to live longer than men in almost every country (Barford et al., 2006). GGLE appears to be a complex phenomenon with no single factor able to fully explain it. Scientists from various fields such as anthropology, evolutionary biology, genetics, medical science, and economics have made numerous attempts to study the mechanisms behind this gender disparity. Their discoveries typically fall into one of two groups: biological and behavioural. Noteworthy, GGLE seems to be fairly unrelated to the basic economic fundamentals such as GDP per capita which in turn has a strong association with the level of healthcare, overall life expectancy, and human development index (Rochelle et al., 2015). Figure B presents the (lack of) association between GDP per capita and GGLE in a cross-section of countries. The data shows large heterogeneity, especially at low-income levels, and virtually no association from middle-level GDP per capita onwards.

Figure B. Association between gender gap in life expectancy and GDP per capita

Source: World Bank.

Biological Factors

The main intuition behind female superior longevity provided by evolutionary biologists is based on the idea that the offspring’s survival rates disproportionally benefited from the presence of their mothers and grandmothers. The female hormone estrogen is known to lower the risks of cardiovascular disease. Women also have a better immune system which helps them avoid a number of life-threatening diseases, while also making them more likely to suffer from (non-fatal) autoimmune diseases (Schünemann et al., 2017). The basic genetic advantage of females comes from the mere fact of them having two X chromosomes and thus avoiding a number of diseases stemming from Y chromosome defects (Holden, 1987; Austad, 2006; Oksuzyan et al., 2008).

Despite a number of biological factors contributing to female longevity, it is well known that, on average, women have poorer health than men at the same age. This counterintuitive phenomenon is called the morbidity-mortality paradox (Kulminski et al., 2008). Figure C shows the estimated cumulative health deficits for both genders and their average life expectancies in the Canadian population, based on a study by Schünemann et al. (2017). It shows that at any age, women tend to have poorer health yet lower mortality rates than men. This paradox can be explained by two factors: women tend to suffer more from non-fatal diseases, and the onset of fatal diseases occurs later in life for women compared to men.

Figure C. Health deficits and life expectancy for Canadian men and women

Source: Schünemann et al. (2017). Note: Men: solid line; Women: dashed line; Circles: life expectancy at age 20.

Behavioural Factors

Given the large variation in GGLE, biological factors clearly cannot be the only driving force. Worldwide, men are three times more likely to die from road traffic injuries and two times more likely to drown than women (WHO, 2002). According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the average ratio of male-to-female completed suicides among the 183 surveyed countries is 3.78 (WHO, 2024). Schünemann et al. (2017) find that differences in behaviour can explain 3.2 out of 4.6 years of GGLE observed on average in developed countries. Statistics clearly show that men engage in unhealthy behaviours such as smoking and alcohol consumption much more often than women (Rochelle et al., 2015). Men are also more likely to be obese. Alcohol consumption plays a special role among behavioural contributors to the GGLE. A study based on data from 30 European countries found that alcohol consumption accounted for 10 to 20 percent of GGLE in Western Europe and for 20 to 30 percent in Eastern Europe (McCartney et al., 2011). Another group of authors has focused their research on Central and Eastern European countries between 1965 and 2012. They have estimated that throughout that time period between 15 and 19 percent of the GGLE can be attributed to alcohol (Trias-Llimós & Janssen, 2018). On the other hand, tobacco is estimated to be responsible for up to 30 percent and 20 percent of the gender gap in mortality in Eastern Europe and the rest of Europe, respectively (McCartney et al., 2011).

Another factor potentially decreasing male longevity is participation in risk-taking activities stemming from extreme events such as wars and military activities, high-risk jobs, and seemingly unnecessary health-hazardous actions. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no rigorous research quantifying the contribution of these factors to the reduced male longevity. It is also plausible that the relative importance of these factors varies substantially by country and historical period.

Gender inequality and social gender norms also negatively affect men. Although women suffer from depression more frequently than men (Albert, 2015; Kuehner, 2017), it is men who commit most suicides. One study finds that men with lower masculinity (measured with a range of questions on social norms and gender role orientation) are less likely to suffer from coronary heart disease (Hunt et al., 2007). Finally, evidence shows that men are less likely to utilize medical care when facing the same health conditions as women and that they are also less likely to conduct regular medical check-ups (Trias-Llimós & Janssen, 2018).

It is possible to hypothesize that behavioural factors of premature male deaths may also be seen as biological ones with, for example, risky behaviour being somehow coded in male DNA. But this hypothesis may have only very limited truth to it as we observe how male longevity and GGLE vary between countries and even within countries over relatively short periods of time.

Economic Implications

Premature male mortality decreases the total labour force of one of the world leaders in GGLE, Belarus, by at least 4 percent (author’s own calculation, based on WHO data). Similar numbers for other developed nations range from 1 to 3 percent. Premature mortality, on average, costs European countries 1.2 percent of GDP, with 70 percent of these losses attributable to male excess mortality. If male premature mortality could be avoided, Sweden would gain 0.3 percent of GDP, Poland would gain 1.7 percent of GDP, while Latvia and Lithuania – countries with the highest GGLE in the EU – would each gain around 2.3 percent of GDP (Łyszczarz, 2019). Large disparities in the expected longevity also mean that women should anticipate longer post-retirement lives. Combined with the gender employment and pay gap, this implies that either women need to devote a larger percentage of their earnings to retirement savings or retirement systems need to include provisions to secure material support for surviving spouses. Since in most of the retirement systems the value of pensions is calculated using average, not gender-specific, life expectancy, the ensuing differences may result in a perception that men are not getting their fair share from accumulated contributions.

Policy Recommendations

To successfully limit the extent of the GGLE and to effectively address its consequences, more research is needed in the area of differential gender mortality. In the medical research dimension, it is noteworthy that, historically, women have been under-represented in recruitment into clinical trials, reporting of gender-disaggregated data in research has been low, and a larger amount of research funding has been allocated to “male diseases” (Holdcroft, 2007; Mirin, 2021). At the same time, the missing link research-wise is the peculiar discrepancy between a likely better understanding of male body and health and the poorer utilization of this knowledge.

The existing literature suggests several possible interventions that may substantially reduce premature male mortality. Among the top preventable behavioural factors are smoking and excessive alcohol consumption. Many studies point out substantial country differences in the contribution of these two factors to GGLE (McCartney, 2011), which might indicate that gender differences in alcohol and nicotine abuse may be amplified by the prevailing gender roles in a given society (Wilsnack et al., 2000). Since the other key factors impairing male longevity are stress and risky behaviour, it seems that a broader societal change away from the traditional gender norms is needed. As country differences in GGLE suggest, higher male mortality is mainly driven by behaviours often influenced by societies and policies. This gives hope that higher male mortality could be reduced as we move towards greater gender equality, and give more support to risk-reducing policies.

While the fundamental biological differences contributing to the GGLE cannot be changed, special attention should be devoted to improving healthcare utilization among men and to increasingly including the effects of sex and gender in medical research on health and disease (Holdcoft, 2007; Mirin, 2021; McGregor et al., 2016, Regitz-Zagrosek & Seeland, 2012).

References

About FROGEE Policy Briefs

FROGEE Policy Briefs is a special series aimed at providing overviews and the popularization of economic research related to gender equality issues. Debates around policies related to gender equality are often highly politicized. We believe that using arguments derived from the most up to date research-based knowledge would help us build a more fruitful discussion of policy proposals and in the end achieve better outcomes.

The aim of the briefs is to improve the understanding of research-based arguments and their implications, by covering the key theories and the most important findings in areas of special interest to the current debate. The briefs start with short general overviews of a given theme, which are followed by a presentation of country-specific contexts, specific policy challenges, implemented reforms and a discussion of other policy options.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Gender Equality and Women’s Economic Empowerment in Times of Crisis

Posted on January 22, 2024 | FROGEE PROJECT, Policy Brief

20240122 Gender Equality Image 01

On October 19-20, 2023, the International School of Economics at Tbilisi State University Policy Institute (ISET Policy Institute), in partnership with the Forum for Research on Gender Economics (FROGEE), organized the conference “Gender Equality and Women’s Economic Empowerment in Times of Crisis”. The conference addressed critical issues surrounding gender equality and women’s economic empowerment. By bringing together academics and practitioners from various sectors it served as a dynamic platform for knowledge sharing and collaboration on actionable solutions and commitments to address multifaceted challenges faced by women globally. This policy brief outlines the keynote, academic and other presentations and discussions featured at the conference.

Introduction

Gender equality and women’s economic empowerment are vital issues that have gained increasing global attention in recent years. Their significance is even more pronounced in times of crisis, such as during economic downturns or global health emergencies. Such challenging circumstances often exacerbate existing gender disparities and vulnerabilities, making it crucial to address the specific challenges women face in accessing economic opportunities and resources. Discussions on these matters delve into the complex intersection of gender equality and economic empowerment and how empowering women economically can contribute to more resilient and equitable societies.

The October 19-20 conference was aimed at examining and addressing the various aspects of gender equality and female empowerment. The conference begun with opening introductions by Tamar Sulukhia, Eva Atterlöv and Kaori Ishikawa (see the participant list at the end for all associations). Following the opening remarks were two distinctive keynote presentations, a policy panel discussion, and academic presentations. This policy brief summarizes the key takeaways from the conference.

Keynote Addresses

The conference’s first keynote speaker, Elizabeth Brainerd, deliberated on the impact of World War II on marriage and fertility among Russian women. Brainerd show that the war affected these women’s lives for decades, leading to lower rates of marriage and fertility and higher out-of-wedlock births and divorce rates in urban areas than would have been the case in absence of the war. These effects were likely exacerbated by a war and post-war institutional environment that encouraged nonmarital births (in part by expanding the child benefit program) and increased the cost of binding commitments through marriage, particularly for men (absolving fathers of any financial or legal responsibility for children fathered outside marriage). As shown by Brainerd the shock to sex ratios in the Soviet Union due to World War II was among the largest experienced by any country in the twentieth century. In this sense, the effect on Russian women and men was unique and arguably not directly relevant to other countries or time periods. Yet, highly unbalanced sex ratios characterize many populations – whether due to war, immigration and emigration, or preferences for sons etc., – and the analysis can therefore shed light on the effects of sex ratio imbalance also in other contexts. Brainerd’s work supports the conclusion that sex ratios matter for marital and fertility outcomes, both on the marriage market itself and within marriage. The insights from the Soviet Union also highlights that the institutional context matters for determining both the size and direction of the sex ratio’s impact on marriage markets and family formations.

In the conferences second keynote presentation, Maria Floro discussed the findings from a time-allocation survey in Georgia. Evident from the results, women’s work differs from men’s in the sense that women more often perform unpaid household tasks, and since they are primarily responsible for household and caregiving duties, including childcare and elderly care. Such combined responsibilities, coupled with working in typically low-paid jobs can negatively affect women’s physical and mental wellbeing. As the data shows, 66 percent of Georgia’s population engage in unpaid domestic work, with women (88.3 percent) and men (39.6 percent) participating at starkly different rates. Rural women’s participation is the highest, at 90,3 percent. On average, the Georgian population spends 2.1 hours per day on unpaid domestic services for household and family members – with a large gender disparity. In general, the time spent per day by men is 0.7 hours while, in contrast, the time spent by women on these activities is 5 times higher in rural areas (3.6 hours) and 4.7 times higher in urban areas (3.2 hours). Women working full time spend 2.7 hours per day on unpaid domestic services, five times higher than the 0.5 hours spent by men working full time. For all areas of residence, the time spent on unpaid domestic services by women increases with age up until 64 years of age when the numbers drop. Further, women’s time spent on unpaid caregiving work (0.9 hours per day) is 4.5 times higher than the time spent by men. Even for full time working women, the daily time spent on unpaid caregiving work (0.6 hours) is three times higher than that of their male counterparts (0.2 hours). Women who have completed a higher level of education spend higher time on unpaid caregiving services (0.9-1.1 hours per day) than those with a lower level of education (0.4-0.7 hours per day). The difference in women’s and men’s time spent on unpaid caregiving work is greatest for Georgians aged 25-44. Such unequal sharing of household and caregiving responsibilities limits women’s job prospects and is a major reason behind their low participation rate in the labor force, as well as the gender pay gap.

The South Caucasus Gender Equality Index

Following the keynote presentations, Davit Keshelava, presented the ISET Policy Institute’s most recent work on the South Caucasus Gender Equality Index (SCGEI). The index, developed by ISET Policy Institute in close collaboration with Swiss Cooperation Office in Georgia and updated on an annual basis, draws inspiration from the European Institute for Gender Equality’s Gender Equality Index. It comprises of six domains: work, money, knowledge, time, power, and health, alongside eleven subdomains and nineteen indicators.

The index is calculated for three South Caucasus countries, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, and nine benchmark countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia. The 2023 edition, mainly based on data from 2021-2022, reveals that within the South Caucasus Armenia is ahead concerning gender equality in the work domain, while Georgia trails behind its regional counterparts. Gender equality in the work domain is lower in the South Caucasus (64.0) than in the baseline countries (67.3).

Georgia stands out as the South Caucasus leader in gender equality within the money domain but significantly trails the baseline countries (South Caucasus – 51.1 vs. baseline countries – 80.5). This discrepancy is the most prominent across all six domains. Azerbaijan leads in the knowledge domain (with Armenia displaying the greatest inequality), yet the South Caucasus slightly outpaces baseline countries in this domain (South Caucasus – 59 and baseline countries – 58.8). This is however the sole equality domain where the South Caucasus surpasses the benchmark countries.

Georgia and Armenia exhibit higher equality in the power domain than Azerbaijan while, in the time domain, Georgia takes the lead in the South Caucasus. In the health domain, Armenia leads in equality, although the difference in index values is marginal.

In the overall index, Georgia emerges as the regional leader in gender equality (60.4), followed by Armenia (57.5) and Azerbaijan (53.0). However, South Caucasus countries as a whole have a lower index (55.4) than the baseline countries (64.1).

Panel Discussion: Topics and Takeaways

The SCGEI presentation was followed by a policy panel discussion, moderated by Tamar Sulukhia and including the panelists Nino Okribelashvili, Nino Chelidze, Nani Bendeliani and Nino Lortkipanidze. The panelists discussed gender inequalities in different areas such as within academia and the tech industry as well as the role of women during crises and the progress made in Georgia towards ensuring gender equality.

Nino Okribelashvili deliberated on the role of women in academia emphasizing that gender inequalities in higher education attainment become obvious when looking at the representation of women across different fields of science. The share of women in subjects such as social work, education and nursing is more than 80 percent, while it is 20 percent in subjects such as computer science, electrical engineering and mechanical engineering. Science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) oriented institutions are still generally perceived as male dominated. The second glaring gap concerns the representativeness of women in higher rank and leadership positions in academia, where women remain underrepresented in academic and professorial positions across all subjects.

While Nino Okribelashvili discussed the role of women in academia in general, Nino Lortkipanidze focused specifically on the tech industry. She discussed the industry’s potential to create job opportunities for women through various strategies and initiatives such as STEM education and training, diverse hiring practices, leadership development and flexible work policies – including remote work possibilities. Lortkipanidze emphasized that with the right support and opportunities, the rapidly growing tech industry could allow working mothers to thrive in their careers while also enjoying the advantages of a family-friendly work environment.

Shifting the focus to women in times of crisis, Nino Chelidze emphasized the aggravated impact of war on women using the example of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Chelidze highlighted the need for urgent, coordinated action from the donor community to address the challenges of internally displaced persons, most of whom are women and children.

The panel discussion wrapped up with Nani Bendeliani highlighting Georgia’s advancements in gender equality and female empowerment over the past three decades. Bendeliani mentioned different institutional mechanisms adopted in the country for the advancement of women alongside legislative initiatives implemented in different areas concerning for instance maternity and paternity leave, changes to the labor code and the election code. According to Bendeliani, the progress towards gender equality is visible but slow, with available data and multiple assessments showing there is still much to be done.

Academic Presentations

The remainder of the conference was comprised of several academic sessions all contributing to the overall theme of multifaceted gender-related issues. The topics, as detailed below, were: gender disparities in the labor market, violence against women, gender dynamics during the Covid-19 pandemic, the gender divide in education, women in academia and female empowerment and access to services.

Gender Disparities on the Labor Market

The presenters focused on gender disparities on the labor market, exploring aspects such as the implications of labor protection regulations on both men and women, biases and discrimination in employment and wage negotiation, and the impact of female labor force participation on the advancement of women’s rights.

In his presentation, Michal Myck outlined the consequences of labor protection policies in Poland for employees within four years of retirement (regulation that protects them against layoffs, a lowering of their wages or adjustment of their responsibilities). Preliminary results indicate no economically or statistically significant adverse impacts on the employment of men and women approaching labor protection eligibility. These findings suggest that either the anticipated negative effects are absent, or that any concerns employers may have harbored regarding prospective employment protection were counteracted by robust labor demand during the reform period. The general conclusion is that extending protection to specific groups of workers, both men and women, does not necessarily lead to the adverse outcomes often highlighted in standard economic theory.

While Michal Myck focused on labor protection regulations, Francisco Lagos addressed the topic of weight-related employment discrimination and its impact on hiring outcomes. In an experiment, job applications accompanied either by a facial photo of a normal-weight person or by a photo of the same person manipulated to look overweight were sent out to real job opening across 12 occupations in Spain. The results reveal a significant disparity in callback rates for weight-manipulated male applicants, who received fewer callbacks compared to their normal-weight counterparts, with a more pronounced effect in female-dominated occupations. Conversely, weight-manipulated female applicants experienced a slight increase in callbacks, particularly in female-dominated fields. For men, the weight manipulation effect is attributed to the overweight making them appear less attractive, which translates into an attractiveness wage premium. On the contrary the findings for women suggest evidence of an attractiveness penalty, which is also combined with a weight penalty.

The topics of discrimination and biases were also central to Ramon Cobo Reyes Cano’s presentation, which outlined the results of a field experiment on anticipated discrimination and wage negotiation. The findings show that female applicants ask for a lower salary than male applicants in the baseline treatment group – when the full name of the applicant is visible. In the main treatment group, when the gender of the applicant was no longer visible to the employer, the wage requested by female applicants increased by 86 percent, whereas male applicants’ wage requests were 18 percent lower. Evidently, the gender gap in requested wages completely disappears (and even slightly reverses) when the applicants know that their sex is not visible for the potential employer.

The presentations on gender inequalities in the labor market were concluded by Nisar Ahmad, who empirically investigate the impact of women’s labor force participation on women’s rights.  In general, female labor force participation has a positive effect on women’s rights in countries with at least some legal economic rights for women. In countries where women’s rights are extremely limited or non-existent, female labor force participation has a negative or negligible impact on women’s rights.

Violence Against Women

In the academic session devoted to violence against women, the presenters elaborated on the primary factors influencing such violence in various countries at different time periods, including during the Covid-19 pandemic.

Monika Oczkowska explores how social norms, values, and stereotypes determine beliefs about abuse, including recognition of abuse, what is considered as abuse, whether abuse is ever justified, and societal consent towards gender-based discrimination. In countries where gender inequality is rampant, reported rates of abuse in standard surveys are sensitive to the socio-economic status and beliefs about gender norms of the participants, highlighting a high scale of variation in the perception of gender-based discrimination in Central and Eastern Europe.

These findings are in line with the results presented by Salome Gelashvili, who consider potential determinants of gender-based violence (GBV) in South Caucasus. According to the research, key factors contributing to GBV in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia include alcohol abuse, social stigma, being a member of a marginalized groups, a pervasive patriarchal culture, adherence to traditional gender roles, a high level of bureaucracy when reporting GBV to the police, generally weak legal support, limited awareness about various forms of GBV, and economic factors such as financial dependence on an abusive partner.

Similar outcomes, but with more emphasis put on norms and the patriarchal system, were found by Reina Shehi, who assesses gender-based violence in Albania. The results show that the patriarchal system and gender-based norms are the two main factors contributing to gender-based violence. However, there is a growing awareness of the importance of patriarchal institutions and gender norms when addressing GBV in Albania.

Violence against women increase in times of crisis, as shown by Velan Nirmala, who studies women’s empowerment and intimate partner violence (IPV) in India. The findings reveal that, regardless of socio-economic factors, the main types of IPV during the Covid-19 lockdown were physical and emotional violence. The results also highlight that a large majority of victims, regardless of education, wealth, region, household structure, religion, and caste, do not disclose the abuse due to societal taboos.

Gender Dynamics During the Covid-19 Pandemic

The unequal effect from the Covid-19 pandemic was further examined in an academic session in which the presenters keyed in on repercussions of the pandemic on women in terms of employment outcomes, decisions related to time allocation, and the division of unpaid household labor.

Nabamita Dutta presented work on gender inequality in employment during Covid-19 related lockdowns in India. The results show that during the pandemic, women were, in general, 8 percent less likely to be employed than men. While return migrants generally suffered less in terms of finding alternative jobs, being a female return migrant, increased the probability of joblessness to about 17 percent. For female return migrants belonging to marginalized castes, the probability of joblessness was about 10 percent, an interesting result considering that women belonging to marginalized castes (but not being return migrants) experience a higher likelihood of being unemployed then women that are not part of marginalized castes.

Anne Devlin further elaborated on this topic, assessing the economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on people living in disadvantaged areas in Ireland. The results indicate that Pandemic Unemployment Payment (PUP) rates were higher in more deprived areas during lockdown periods and that woman, on average, receive PUP for a slightly longer duration than men. Further, female unemployment has a negative and statistically significant relationship with the length of PUP claims. The findings show that average PUP durations tend to be shorter in areas with a higher share of individuals with lower education levels, and in areas with historically higher levels of female unemployment.

Jacklyn Makaaru Arinaitwe presented work on how gender, culture, norms, and practices contributed to the unequal distribution of unpaid care work during Covid-19 in Uganda. The findings reveal that there are policy gaps in addressing the issue, as current policies don’t acknowledge the value of unpaid care work at a personal and national level. This lack of recognition and failure to come up with new ways to reduce or share women’s disproportionate burden of unpaid care work creates obstacles to girls’ education and hinder women’s economic empowerment in Uganda.

Also, on the topic of the Covid-19 pandemic impacts on women, Alessandro Toppeta presented work on the impacts of the pandemic on the role of parental beliefs in England. The results show that parents believe that the time they spend with their children is more valuable and less risky than the time children spend in formal childcare or with friends and that parents’ beliefs can predict the choices they make in investing time with their children. Further, the findings align with previous indications of the increased burden on women’s time experienced during the pandemic being a consequence of limited availability of alternative childcare options.

The Gender Divide in Education

Within the topic of gender in education, the presenters delved into the connection between education and gender roles and the importance of parental education for children’s education.

Sumit S. Deole presented work on the causal impact of education on gender role attitudes based on evidence from European datasets. The results suggest that an additional year of education prompts egalitarian gender role attitudes. Furthermore, the impact of increases in education is particularly prominent among women and, to some extent, in urban areas.

Fethiye Burcu Türkmen-Ceylan focus specifically on the importance of maternal education for children’s education in Turkey. Preliminary results indicate that maternal education has a distinctive positive impact on households’ budget allocation for children’s education among Turkish households.

Saumya Kumar also presented work on the importance of maternal education, considering the impacts of paternal education as well. The presented research finds that both maternal and paternal education reduce the gender gap in educational enrollment. However, having an educated mother is more important when it comes to increasing girls’ enrollment as compared to boys’ enrollment. The research also indicates that as mothers’ education levels rise, there is a greater increase in spendings on education for both boys and girls.

Further on the gender divide within education, Lubna Naz deliberated on how drought affects school attendance in rural Pakistan. The income decline caused by drought leads to a four-month decrease in schooling for all children, and a six-month decrease for boys. Asset ownership also has a negative impact on school attendance, suggesting a possible reverse causality or Simpson’s paradox. The combined effect of asset ownership and drought, however, has a positive impact on school attendance, Naz concluded.

Women in Academia

Gender inequalities are apparent also in the academic sphere. Liis Roosaar’s research looks into the impact of having children on women’s careers within academia. Roosaar find that becoming a mother doesn’t impact earnings per hour, but that mother’s do work fewer hours. More than four years after having a child, women in academia have lost the equivalent of two years of full-time work. Interestingly, men don’t face the same reduction in work hours after becoming fathers. The study also reveals that the career setback for women in academia after having a child is shorter compared to the general population. However, female academics experience a decline in citations as a consequence of the reduced working hours.

Barbara Będowska-Sójka’s research on women in academia focus on female representation on editorial boards of finance journals.  According to Będowska-Sójka women account for 20 percent of all editors on average, with considerable variance between countries. When it comes to editor’s affiliations they are strongly concentrated in the United States, and to a lesser extent in the United Kingdom. Additionally, a small number of extremely well-connected editors sit on many boards. The gender ratio is consistent in substructures for editors that are better connected (have so-called a high degree of centrality in terms of network analysis) or editors who serve on a large number of boards, yet men outnumber women.

Female Empowerment and Access to Services

Although their research focuses on distinct topics, Fazle Rabbi and Ulrich Wohak both presented research on the overarching theme of women’s empowerment and enhanced access to goods and services.

In his paper, Fazle Rabbi and his co-authors consider a new way to support marginalized individuals, most of whom are women, through the introduction of a new donation model where development agencies provide goats to project beneficiaries. Goat ownership might help beneficiaries generate income and devote more time to education. The research results show that the proposed donation model significantly enhances the economic empowerment of participants, providing them a steady income, better access to education, and more access to the financial system – with the results being more pronounced for women.

Ulrich Wohak evaluated tampon tax reforms (efforts to reduce the taxation of menstrual hygiene products, including tampons, pads, and menstrual cups) as a means to address gender-based tax discrimination. Using transaction-level scanner data, the study finds that when countries lower their standard VAT rates, the extent to which these reductions are passed on to consumers ranges from 57 percent to 119 percent.

Concluding Remarks

The ISET conference “Gender Equality and Women’s Economic Empowerment in Time of Crisis” brought together diverse voices, perspectives, and expertise from various sectors to engage in discussions and knowledge sharing on how to advance gender equality in times of normality and in times of crises. The conference also served as a platform to inspire actionable solutions and commitments to address the multifaceted challenges women face worldwide.

List of Participants

  • Alessandro Toppeta – Assistant Professor at SOFI, Stockholm University, Sweden. “Parental Beliefs, Perceived Health Risks, and Time Investment in Children: Evidence from COVID-19” (in collaboration with Gabriella Conti and Michele Giannola).
  • Anne Devlin – Research Fellow, Economic and Social Research Institute, Ireland. “The Impact of COVID-19 on Women’s Employment in Ireland” (in collaboration with Adele Whelan, Seamus McGuinnes, Paul Redmond).
  • Aswathi Rebecca Asok – PhD Fellow, University of Portsmouth, United Kingdom. “Unveiling Gendered Dimensions of “Volunteerism”: The COVID-19 Story of Kerala, India”.
  • Barbara Będowska-Sójka – Head of Department, Poznań University of Economics and Business, Poland. “Editorial boards of finance journals: the gender gap and social networks” (in collaboration with Claudia Tarantola, C., Mare, C., Ozturkkal, B., Paccagnini, A., Perri, R., Pisoni, G., Shala, A., Skaftad´ottir, H., K.).
  • Davit Keshelava – Lead Economist, ISET Policy Institute.
  • Elizabeth Brainerd – Susan and Barton Winokur Professor of Economics and Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies, Brandeis University.
  • Eva Atterlöv – Deputy Head of Development Cooperation, Embassy of Sweden.
  • Fazle Rabbi – Deputy Head of School of Business, Crown Institute of Higher Education, Australia. “From Goats to Education: An Innovative Approach to Community Empowerment” (in collaboration with Laurel Jackson and Zahid Hasan).
  • Fethiye Burcu Türkmen-Ceylan – Research Fellow, Ahi Evran University, Turkey. “Educate a Woman, And You Educate a Generation: How Does Maternal Education Affect Intro Household Resource Allocation for Education among the Children?” (in collaboration with Ulucan, H., Çakmak, S.).
  • Francisco Lagos – Professor of Economics, Georgetown University, USA. “Weight, Attractiveness, and Gender when Hiring: a Field Experiment in Spain” (in collaboration with Catarina Goulão, Juan Antonio Lacomba, and Dan-Olof Rooth).
  • Jacklyn Makaaru Arinaitwe – Director, Ace Policy Research Institute, Uganda. “Gender, culture, norms, and practices that promote gender gaps in the allocation of time to unpaid domestic work in the context of COVID-19 in Uganda” (in collaboration with Twinomugisha David).
  • Kaori Ishikawa – UN Women Country Representative to Georgia.
  • Liis Roosaar – Lecturer at the Chair of Economic Modelling, University of Tartu, Estonia. “Child penalty in academia: Event study estimate” (in collaboration with Jaan Masso, Jaanika Meriküll, Kärt Rõigas, and Tiiu Paas).
  • Lubna Naz – Associate Professor, Institute of Business Administration. Pakistan. “Left High and Dry: Gendered impacts of Drought on school attainment in Rural Pakistan”.
  • Maria Floro – Professor Emerita Economics, American University in Washington, DC.
  • Michal Myck – Director, Centre for Economic Analysis (CenEA), Poland. “Pre-retirement employment protection: no harm when times are good” (in collaboration with Paweł Chrostek, and Krzysztof Karbownik).
  • Monika Oczkowska – Senior Research Economist, CenEA, Poland. “Patterns of harassment and violence against women in Central and Eastern Europe. The role of the socio-economic context and gender norms in international comparisons” (in collaboration with Kajetan Trzcinski and Michal Myck).
  • Nabamita Dutta – Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin-La Crosse, USA. “Lockdown and Rural Joblessness in India: Gender Inequality in Employment?” (in collaboration with Kar, S.).
  • Nani Bendeliani – Project Analyst, UN Women Georgia.
  • Nino Chelidze – Program Director of Women’s Initiative for Security and Equity at Mercy Corps.
  • Nino Lortkipanidze – Women in Tech Ambassador for Georgia and Chief Innovation Officer at The Crossroads.
  • Nino Okribelashvili – Vice Rector for Research at Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University.
  • Ramon Cobo Reyes Cano – Professor of Economics, Georgetown University, USA. “Anticipated Discrimination and Wage Negotiation: A Field Experiment” (in collaboration with Gary Charness and Simone Meraglia).
  • Reina Shehi – Primary Appointment Lecturer, Epoka University, Albania. “Patterns of Geographic Gender-Based Violence in Albania” (in collaboration with Endi Tirana and Ajsela Toci).
  • Salome Gelashvili – Lead Economist, ISET Policy Institute, Georgia. “Gender-based violence in the South Caucasus” (in collaboration with Lobjanidze, G., Seturidze, E., Shubitidze I.).
  • Saumya Kumar – Assistant Professor (Economics), University of Delhi, India. “Gender Differential in Parental Investment in Education: A Study of the Factors Determining Children’s and Adolescents’ Educational Investment in India” (in collaboration with Jawaharlal Nehru).
  • Sumit S. Deole – Scientific Assistant, Trier University, Germany. “The Causal Impact of Education on Gender Role Attitudes: Evidence from European Datasets” (in collaboration with Zeydanli, T.).
  • Tamar Sulukhia – Director ISET and ISET Policy Institute.
  • Ulrich Wohak – Teaching and Research Associate, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Austria. Free the Period? Evaluating Tampon Tax Reforms using Transaction-Level Scanner Data (in collaboration with Kinnl, K.).
  • Velan Nirmala – Professor of Economics, Pondicherry University, India. “Women Empowerment and Intimate Partner Violence in India” (in collaboration with Lusome, R).

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Insights and Research Shared at the 2023 FREE Network Retreat

Posted on October 3, 2023 | Policy Brief

FREE network retreat Image from the conference

The 2023 FREE Network Retreat, an annual face-to-face event for members of the FREE Network, gathered its representatives to share and exchange research ideas and to discuss its institutes’ respective work and joint efforts within the Network. An academic session highlighted multiple overarching areas of interest and opportunities for research collaboration and included a plenary session on topics ranging from theoretical underpinning of Vladimir Putin’s regime to climate change beliefs and to consumer behaviour in credit markets. A session addressing the respective institute’s work during the last year also demonstrated the importance and relevance of the FREE Network’s joint initiatives on gender, democracy and media, and climate change and environment: FROGEE, FROMDEE and FREECE. This brief gives a short outline of the plenary session and an overview of some further topics covered during the conference.  

The Academic Day

The Academic Day consisted partly of a plenary session and partly of an academic session. The academic session was outlined to demonstrate the wide spectrum of research interests within the network and to promote and highlight the opportunities for research collaboration. Designed as a series of poster sessions, each organized around a common research theme, it allowed for an exchange of ideas between presenting researchers and the audience while displaying the overlap of the various research interests across the institutes. At the same time, the poster session combined the broad range of topics within 10 overarching subjects (trade, gender, migration and education, public economics, energy, labor, political economy and development, macro, conflict, and theory and auctions).

The plenary session further illustrated the wide variety of topics the FREE Network researchers’ work on. During the plenary session, three distinguished presentations were held, summarized in what follows.

“Why Did Putin Invade Ukraine? – A Theory of Degenerate Autocracy”

Firstly, Konstantin Sonin, Professor at the University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy, gave a presentation of his working paper (with Georgy Egorov, Northwestern University) in which the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine is explained through a theoretical framework on dictators’ decision-making in degenerate autocracies.

Sonin outlined how the beliefs about Ukraine in Kremlin, prior to the invasion, were factually wrong. For example, Kremlin believed that Ukraine, despite plenty of facts pointing in the opposite direction, lacked a stable government and had an incapable army. Further, it was believed that the US and Europe wouldn’t care about Ukraine and that Russian troops would be welcomed as liberators – the latter exemplified by the fact that Russia sent police and not the army during the first phase of the invasion. He also stressed that the decision to invade Ukraine is likely to have disastrous consequences for Vladimir Putin, his regime, and for Russia as a whole. This is, however, not the first example of a disastrous decision made by a leader of an autocratic regime, leading up to the question: What explains such choices that should not rationally have been made? And how can leaders make them in highly institutionalized environments where they are surrounded by councils and advisors who are supposed to possess the best expertise?

The model presented by Sonin assumes a leader in such highly institutionalized environment that wishes to stay in power and whose decisions are based on input from subordinates. The subordinates differ in level of their expertise and the leader thus chooses the quality of advice that he receives through his choice of subordinates.  In turn, while giving advice to the leader, the subordinate considers two factors: the vulnerability of the leader and their own prospects should the leader fall. In equilibrium there is a tradeoff as competent subordinates are also less loyal (since a more competent person might know when to switch alliances and have better prospects if the regime changes).

The leader also has access to repression as an instrument. Repression decreases his changes to be overthrown but raises the stakes for a potential future power struggle, as a leader with a history of repression is more likely to be repressed by his successor.

This interaction creates a feedback loop. If a dictator chooses repression, he feels more endangered, and he then chooses a more loyal subordinate who is less likely to deceive him for personal gain under a potential new regime. However, this leads to the appointment of less competent subordinates whereafter the information that flows to the leader becomes less and less reliable – as illustrated by Kremlin’s beliefs about Ukraine prior to the war.

There are three types of paths in equilibrium, Sonin explained; 1. “stable autocracy”, with leaders altering in power and choosing peaceful paths without repressions 2. “degenerate autocracy” – where the incumbent and opponent first replace each other peacefully and then slide into the repression-based change of power (until one of them dies and the story repeats), and 3. “consecutive degenerate autocracy” – where each power struggle is followed by repression.

Concluding his presentation, Sonin highlighted that in a degenerate autocracy such as Russia, individual decisions by the leader are rarely crucial due to the high level of institutionalization. However, as shown by the model, the leader is inevitably faced with a situation where he is surrounded by incompetent loyalists feeding him bad intel and setting him up to make disastrous decisions – most recently displayed in Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine.

“Facing the Hard Truth: Evidence from Climate Change Ignorance”

Pamela Campa, Associate Professor at Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, gave the conference’s second presentation, which detailed her work (with Ferenc Szucz, Stockholm University) on climate change skepticism.

Campa opened her talk with the current paradox regarding climate change, where, in the scientific community there is a strong consensus about the existence of climate change, but in society at large, skepticism is largely prevalent. This can be exemplified by one quarter of the US population not believing in global warming in 2023, and Europeans not believing in the fact that humans are the main driver of climate change.

According to Campa, the key question to answer is therefore “Why does ignorance about climate change persist among the public – in spite of the overwhelming evidence?”. One possible explanation may be a deficit in comprehension; people simply don’t understand the complexity of climate change and thus follow biased media and/ or politicians more or less sponsored by lobbyists. However, research have shown scientifical literacy to be quite uncorrelated with climate change denial, contradicting the above explanation. The second hypothesis, and of focus in the study, instead revolve around the concept of information avoidance. To test the hypothesis that people actively avoid climate change information, the authors key in on coal mining communities in the US having been exposed to negative shocks in the form of layoffs. These communities are of interest given their strong sense of identity and the fact that they are directly affected by the green transition. Arguably, a layoff shock would negatively affect not only their economy, but also pose a threat to their perceived identity. Given the context, it can thus be assumed that these communities to a larger extent would avoid information on climate change and information post-shock to restore the threatened identity.

The authors consider US counties experiencing mass layoff (more than 30 percent of mining jobs lost between 2014 and 2017) as treated counties, finding that in these counties, learning about climate change is 30 to 40 percent lower than in counties having experienced no mass layoffs. To account for the fact that the layoff itself may cause changes in learning, the authors also consider an instrument variable analysis in which gas prices are exploited as instrument for the layoffs – once again displaying the fact that people in affected communities believe climate change to be caused by humans to a lesser extent, when compared to counties in which no mass layoffs had occurred.

Interestingly, when controlling with other industries with somewhat similar characteristics (such as metal mining), the drop in climate change learning disappears, feeding in the notion of “identity-based information avoidance”.

The lack of support for and consensus among the public of the ongoing climate change and its drivers might pose a threat for the green transition as well as reduce personal effort to reduce the carbon footprint, Campa concluded.

“Consumer Credit with Over-Optimistic Borrowers”

In the plenary session’s last presentation, Igor Livshits, Economic Advisor and Economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, presented his working paper (with Florian Exler, University of Vienna, James MacGee, Bank of Canada and Michèle Tertilt, Mannheimer University) on consumer credit and borrower’s behaviour.

There has been much debate on whether and how to regulate consumer credit products to limit misuse of credit. In 2009/2010 several initiatives and regulations (such as the 2009 Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act) were introduced with the aim of protecting consumers and borrowers from arguments that sellers of credit products exploit lack of information and cognitive capacity of borrowers. There is however a lack of evaluation of such arguments and subsequent regulations, which Livshits explained to be the motivation behind the paper.

The paper differentiates between over-optimistic borrowers (behaviour borrowers) and rational borrowers (rationalists). While both types face the same risks, behaviour borrowers are more prone to shocks and are at the same time unaware of these worse risks (i.e., they believe they are rationalists). Focusing on these types of borrowers, the paper introduces a model in which the lenders endogenously price credit based on beliefs about the borrower type. Households decide whether to spend or save and if to file for bankruptcy in an environment in which they are faced with earning shocks and expense shocks.

In this structural model of unsecured lending and default, Livshits finds that behavioral borrowers’ “risky” behaviour negatively affects rationalists since both types are pooled together and, thus rationalists are overpaying to cover for the behaviour borrowers. A calibration of the model also suggests that behavioral borrowers borrow too much and file for bankruptcy too little and too late.

Livshits argued that the model does not provide evidence of the notion that borrowers need protection from lenders, but rather that borrowers need to be protected from themselves. In fact, had behaviour borrowers been made aware of the fact that they are overly optimistic about the actual state of their future incomes, they would borrow 15 percent less.

To address the increased risks behaviour borrowers take at the cost of rationalists, policies such as default made easier, taxation on borrowing, financial literacy efforts and score-dependent borrowing limits could all be considered. Such policies may lower debt and reduce bankruptcy filings but as they may also reduce welfare and exhibit scaling difficulties.

Updates from the Institutes

During the Retreat, the respective institutes shared the previous year’s work, and updates within the FREE Network’s three joint projects were also presented. These go under the acronyms of FROMDEE (Forum for Research on Media and Democracy in Eastern Europe), FREECE (Forum for Research on Eastern Europe; Climate and the Environment) and FROGEE (Forum for Research on Gender Economics in Eastern Europe), and address areas of great relevance in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. Researchers from all FREE Network institutes work on these topics, with the most recent policy paper written in coordination by SITE, KSE and CenEA (with expert Maja Bosnic, Niras International Consulting). The policy paper focuses on the gender dimension of the reconstruction of Ukraine – putting emphasis on the necessity of gender budgeting principles throughout the various parts of reconstruction.  An upcoming joint research paper will consider the effects of gasoline price increase on household income across the Network’s countries, written under the FREECE umbrella.

The three themes of gender, media and democracy, and environment and climate are not only purely research topics within the institutes. They also reflect developments and challenges that the institutes to a various extent face in the respective contexts in which they operate. The work focusing on the reconstruction of Ukraine is an excellent example of an area that encompasses all three.

Another example of the relevance of the three themes features prominently in one of the institutes’ most tangible contribution to their respective societies: their education programs. Nataliia Shapoval, Vice President for Policy Research at Kyiv School of Economics (KSE), emphasized how KSE has – amid Russia’s war on Ukraine – managed to greatly expand. Over the past year, KSE has launched 8 new bachelor’s and master’s programs, some of which are directly targeted at ensuring postwar reconstruction competence. On a similar note, Lev Lvovskiy, Academic Director at the Belarusian Research and Outreach Center (BEROC) mentioned the likelihood of next year being able to offer students a bachelor’s program in economics and several business courses in Vilnius – BEROC’S new location. BEROC’s effort in providing quality education in economics to Belarus’ exile youth is considered a fundamental investment in the future of the country – providing a competent leading class capable of installing democracy and fair elections in Belarus once the current regime is gone. The emphasis on education was further highlighted by Salome Gelashvili, Practice Head, Agriculture & rural policy at the International School of Economics Policy Institute (ISET-PI) who not only mentioned the opening of a master’s program in Finance at ISET but also the fact that an increasing number of students who’ve recently graduated from PhD’s abroad are now returning to Georgia. Such investments into education are necessary to counter Russian propaganda in the region all three agreed, emphasizing the need to continually stem Russia’s negative influence in the region. This investment into education is also important to hinder countries from sliding away from democratic values – realized in Belarus and threatening in Georgia.

To further delve into the issues of democratic backsliding, a tendency that has been recently observed not only in the region but also more widely across the globe, FROMDEE will organize an academic conference in Stockholm on October 13th, 2023.

Concluding Remarks

The 2023 FREE Network Retreat provided a great opportunity for the Networks’ participants to jointly take part of new research and to share experiences, opportunities, and knowledge amongst each other. The Retreat also served as reminder of the importance of continuously supporting economic and democratic development, through research, policy work, and networking, in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.

List of Presenters

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Lessons From the FROGEE Conference “The Playing Field in Academia: Why Are Women Still Underrepresented?”

Posted on September 25, 2023 | FROGEE PROJECT

Image of dark university area with two men representing women underrepresented in academia

Despite an increase in women’s representation since the beginning of the 20th century, women remain underrepresented in academia and other high-skilled professions. Academia has been prone to gender disparities both within and across fields as well as across academic ranks. In an endeavour to examine and address the underrepresentation of women in the academic profession, the Centre of Economic Analysis (CenEA), together with the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) and other partners of the Forum for Research on Gender Economics (FROGEE) at the FREE Network, organized the two-day conference “The playing field in academia: Why are women still underrepresented?”, in Warsaw June 21-22, 2023. This brief offers insights from the presentations and panel discussions held at the conference.

To date, there are few, if any, high-skilled professions exhibiting gender balance, and academia is no exception. Consequently, this imbalance has been subject to increased multidisciplinary research attention, exploring its origins and potential remedies. However, attaining a comprehensive understanding of gender disparities remains a challenge. For instance, much remains to be learnt about their long-run dynamics, a subject addressed by Carlo Schwarz, in one of the conference’s keynote lectures.

A Century of Progress

Carlo Schwarz (in joint work with Alessandro Iaria and Fabian Waldinger, 2022) trace the evolution of gender gaps in academia across a variety of domains at the global level throughout the 20th Century. Facilitated by an unprecedentedly large database of nearly 500,000 academics, spanning 130 countries and supplemented by publication and citation data, the authors specifically examine gender imbalances in recruitment, publishing, citation patterns, and promotions.

They find that in 1900 women constituted roughly 1 percent of all hires in academia (226 women, with only 113 hired as full professors). By 1969 the share of female academics had risen to about 6.6 percent, and by the year 2000 it had grown to approximately 17 percent. These rates varied across disciplines, institutions, and countries. For instance, teaching-centric disciplines such as pedagogy and linguistics, exhibited higher representation relative to research-oriented ones.

The research subsequently reveals a hump-shaped evolution of the gender gap in academic output – starting small before peaking at 45 percentage points fewer publications by women in 1969, thereafter declining to 20 percentage points. These publication disparities were also found to share a U-shaped relationship with the share of women in academia, indicating the interconnectedness of gender gaps.

The authors also address gender gaps in citations, identified by the use of a novel machine learning approach, forecasting a paper’s citations had it been written by a man. The results indicate a progressive reduction in the citation gap during the 20th century, decreasing from 27 percentage points (pre-WW1) to 14 percentage points (interwar) and eventually to 8 percentage points (post-WW2) fewer citations of papers by female relative to male academics. These gender gaps in academic output reiterated current evidence from Mexico, presented at the conference by Diana Terrazas-Santamaria, showing that women are associated with lower citation rates. Terrazas-Santamaria attribute the low rates to gender differences in both the number of publications and duration of academic careers.

The work by Iaria, Schwarz and Waldinger (2022) further showcase the gender disparities in career advancement in academia, which similarly decreased over the years.  At the point of the greatest gender disparity, women required an approximately 6 percentage points better publication record to have the same promotion probabilities as their male counterparts.

The Leaky, Dry Pipeline

In the conference’s second keynote, Sarah Smith highlighted how academia, much like other professional occupations, exhibits a leaky pipeline. This is a phenomenon characterized by a declining representation of women as they ascend through the academic hierarchy. When examining specific fields, Smith’s results indicate that the gender disparities in economics much more closely align with those observed in STEM fields (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) than other social science disciplines. Furthermore, the economics’ field illustrate a significant lack of diversity among its new entrants. This phenomenon, referred to as the dry pipeline, generates future cohort implications, as they result in less demographically representative cohorts from which future professors can be recruited (see Stewart et al., 2009).

The cross-disciplinary comparison of the dry pipeline addressed in the keynote, contest the mathematical rigor of economics as a barrier to entry, as mathematics itself demonstrated higher women representation at A-level and undergraduate levels. In a following discussion panel, which focused on ensuring a fair start in academia (comprised of Yaroslava Babych, Alessandra Casarico, Federica Braccioli and Marta Gmurek, and moderated by Maria Perrotta Berlin), the panellists acknowledged that deeply engrained social expectations, gender trained behaviours and a lack of awareness constitute some of the persistent hindrances to the (early) involvement of women in specific fields, and the academic profession in general.

Additional factors influencing the gender balance in recruitment and promotion are gendered references, and the presence or absence of shared research interests between candidates and recruitment panels. These themes were extensively investigated in the work presented by Alessandra Casarico on the conference’s opening day. Specifically, results from collaborative work with Audinga Baltrunaite and Lucia Rizzica, highlight that grindstone words (e.g., “determined”, “hardworking”, etc.) are frequently used in recommendation letters to describe female candidates, while standout words (e.g., “excellent”, “strongest” etc.) typify male candidates’ references. Compared to their male counterparts, women are also shown to be more inclined to accentuate personality traits when serving as referees. This added to a broader literature demonstrating that female candidates’ recommendation letters frequently exhibit brevity, raise doubts, carry a weak tone, and emphasize candidates’ interpersonal skills and personality traits rather than their ability. Moreover, separate results from Casarico’s work (with Piera Bello and Debora Nozza) illustrate that research similarity between the recruiting committee and the candidate predict the likelihood of recruitment. The authors argue that the relationship is indicative of a bias against women if – as shown by the authors – women are less likely to be the candidates with the highest similarity.

In her presentation, Anne Sophie Lassen offered a different factor that may contribute to the attrition in the pipeline: the influence of parenthood on academic careers. Results from her work (with Ria Ivandić) indicate that while parenthood does not significantly influence graduation rates, it extends doctoral studies by an average of 7 months for women. Moreover, Lassen highlighted a declining trend of remaining in academia after becoming a parent, particularly pronounced among women.

More Areas of Imbalance

The remaining conference presentations and panel discussions explored additional domains of gender imbalances within academia. Iga Magda showcased evidence from her joint work with Jacek Bieliński, Marzena Feldy and Anna Knapińska of gender differences in remuneration during the early stages of an academic career, substantiating a gap within a year of graduation. These disparities endure throughout respondents’ careers and are contingent on the field of study – largest among engineering and technology graduates and lowest among those from the humanities and arts fields. Furthermore, it was observed that productivity plays a negligible role in the identified pay gaps, as its impact is similar for both genders.

The panel composed of Eleni Chatzichritou, Marta Łazarowicz-Kowalik, Jesper Roine and Joanna Wolszczak-Derlacz, and moderated by Michał Myck, deliberated on exposed disparities in the application for, and the success rates in attaining research funding in Poland and Europe – as seen in the National Science Centre (NCN) and the European Research Council research grants, respectively. The discussion highlighted how quantitative measures used in the allocation of research funding are riddled with subjective criteria that often benefit male academics. They also recognized how quests to allocate funds to the most successful candidate inadvertently penalize women with career breaks.

Another panel including Lev Lvovskiy, Carlo Schwarz, Sarah Smith, Marieke Bos and Joanna Tyrowicz, and moderated by Pamela Campa, lauded the growing objective data shedding light on gender inequalities in academia. The panellists discussed current challenges in identifying and quantifying aspects of gender disparities. For instance, currently used proxies do not allow to capture more subtle disparities, like microaggressions faced by female academics from students – emphasizing the need for more individual level survey data.

The panels were further enriched by personal anecdotes and filled with retrospective advice shared by both early career and established academics. To contextualize the above, a few cases from the FREE Network countries follow.

Evidence From Within the FREE Network

Yaroslava Babych shared insights concerning women in higher education in Georgia and other countries of the South Caucasus. Preliminary findings of her study confirm the presence of gender inequality in academia, evident in disparities in access to higher education as well as gender segregation across both fields and countries. Notably, women comprise a majority of the graduates in bachelor’s and master’s of art programs, whereas higher research-level programs such as doctors of science, and top echelons of the academic hierarchy remain predominantly male. Moreover, female academic output is found to be lower than that of male counterparts.

Lev Lvovskiy discussed the case of Belarus, highlighting the influence of the Soviet legacy. A significant factor linked to this legacy is exploiting university enrolment to circumvent compulsory conscription of men, allowing male university admissions to serve a secondary purpose beyond acquiring knowledge. This increases the perceived opportunity cost of enrolling a woman. Lvovskiy further documented the academic trajectories of Belarusians, revealing a majority of women at college and doctoral levels, but being underrepresented among doctoral graduates. The results further indicate significant cross-disciplinary gender disparities, with humanities having close to 80 percent women representation and engineering and information and technology (IT) fields having less than 30 percent women representation.

Monika Oczkowska provided evidence of gender disparities in Poland. Findings from the country reveal an overrepresentation of women graduates from bachelor through doctoral levels, and relative parity at post-doctoral level, but lower proportions at habilitation, associate professor, and professor levels. These general results confirm the higher detail findings presented by Karolina Goraus-Tanska on the first day of the conference. Results from Goraus-Tanska’s work (with Jacek Lewkowicz and Krzysztof Szczygielski) suggest that the drop-off among female academics from habilitation levels is not attributed to higher output expectations for women, but rather stems from the impact of parenthood.

Oczkowska further demonstrated that female academics in Poland are characterized by fewer international collaborations and lower levels of international output. Polish female academics were also showcased to engage in more international mobility during their doctoral studies relative to men, with the converse holding true after obtaining a doctoral degree. A potential explanation for this mobility decline among female academics, could be the increased burden of familial responsibilities at the post-doctoral and higher levels. Moreover, fewer women were reported to have applied for NCN grants and were underrepresented among the beneficiaries of these calls. Lastly, female academics in Poland record significantly lower total project costs relative to their male counterparts.

‘Plugging’ the Leak

In light of the aforementioned, what measures can be taken to address the gender imbalances in academia? As summarized by Sarah Smith, early initiatives have involved tracking women representation (e.g., in admissions, progression, hiring, etc.) within departments and/or institutions to identify where in the pipeline their progress is impeded. Attempted initiatives include formulation of seminar guidelines to overcome unfair experiences, as well as using gender-blind recruiting and objective hiring criteria to equalize hiring opportunities. Some other efforts, such as diverse recruitment panels have been unsuccessfully adopted, as they seem to embolden hostile male recruiters and load female panellists with unrewarded administration tasks. Conversely, mentoring has helped women build networks, publish more, and advance professionally. Awareness raising campaigns have reduced disparities in teaching evaluations and remain vital in addressing the dry pipeline and both transparent workload allocation and rewarding of administrative tasks have been shown to reduce promotion gaps in academia. In addition to the above, initiatives such as fostering gender-neutral networking opportunities, collaborations and a more diverse faculty were also deliberated during the conference.

Concluding Remarks

The conference advanced dialogue on societal and structural constraints to gender equality in academia and provided a platform to exchange ideas on how the shared objective of a more inclusive and equitable academic environment can be achieved. While the challenges remain abundant, and the costs associated not always negligible, it remains crucial to assess achievements, such as those resulting from mentoring and awareness intervention initiatives and recognize that further opportunities to enhance equity within the profession exist.

Additional Material

Seminar Programme 21.06.2023

Seminar Participants – short bios

Conference Programme 22.06.2023

Conference Participants – short bios

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Would a Higher Minimum Wage Meaningfully Affect Poverty Levels Among Women? – A Simulation Case from Georgia

Posted on February 27, 2023 | Policy Brief

20230227 Would a Higher Minimum Wage Image 01

In economic literature the effect of minimum wage on the labour market and its relevance as an anti-poverty, equality-enhancing policy tool, is a matter of vigorous debate. The focus of this policy brief is a hypothetical effect on poverty rates, particularly among women, following an increase in the minimum wage in Georgia. A simulation exercise (Babych et al., 2022) by the ISET-PI research team shows that, in Georgia, a potential increase in the minimum wage is likely to result in an overall positive albeit small reduction in poverty rates in general. At the same time, women are likely to gain more from such minimum wage policy than men. The findings are consistent with the literature claiming that a minimum wage increase alone may not result in meaningful poverty reduction. Any minimum wage increase should thus be enhanced by other policies such as training programs increasing labor force participation among women. 

Many countries around the world have enacted minimum wage laws. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO) “Minimum wages can be one element of a policy to overcome poverty and reduce inequality, including those between men and women” (ILO, 2023). In economic literature, the minimum wage debate has been particularly acute, with pros and cons of the minimum wage increases, their effect on the labor market, and their relevance as an anti-poverty and equality-enhancing policy tool fiercely contested in empirical studies and simulation studies. In this policy brief, we focus on the effect of a minimum wage increase in Georgia on poverty rates, and in particular poverty rates among women.

Minimum Wage Effects

According to the European Commission (2020) a number of benefits is associated with the introduction of minimum wage. These benefits include a reduction in in-work poverty, wage inequality and the gender pay gap, among others.

International evidence, however, cautions against considering an increase in minimum wage as the silver bullet to end poverty. A 2019 report by the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2019) shows that the incidence of poverty among the working poor is comparable to the incidence of poverty among individuals outside of the labor market. Therefore, even if an increase in minimum wages would lift all working poor out of poverty, a substantial number of poor would remain.

Moreover, minimum wage can have a potential adverse effect on employment of the most vulnerable by deterring firms from hiring low-wage, low-skilled labor (Neumark, 2018).  The adverse employment effect will be stronger if current wages correspond more closely to the real productivity of labor. In such scenario companies would lose by retaining low-productivity workers and, likely respond to the increase in minimum wage by laying off workers, resulting in the loss of wages, rather than in their increase. On the other hand, if salaries are lower than the real productivity of the less productive workers, companies might still be able to profit from employing them and will not be forced to lay them off, resulting in a wage increase for low-wage workers.

Whether – and to what extent – the introduction of a minimum wage reduces poverty and/or assists low-income households then depends on how many individuals are going to lose their jobs, how many workers will maintain their jobs and receive a higher wage, and where these winners and losers are positioned along the distribution of family incomes.

With regard to employment effects, the results are not perfectly homogeneous. On the one hand, a large body of evidence suggests that minimum wages do lower the number of jobs accessible to low-skill employees (Sabia, Burkhauser and Hansen, 2012; Sotomayor, 2021; Neumark, 2018) On the other hand, some scholars argue that once the study design is changed to take into account the non-random distribution of minimum wage policies in different parts of the country in question, the “disemployment effect” of minimum wage policies (considering the example of United States) largely disappear (Allegretto et al., 2013; Dube et al., 2010).

With regards to poverty, a number of studies look at minimum wage as an anti-poverty policy tool for developing countries and consider its effectiveness in reducing poverty and/or inequality. For example, a study by Sotomayor (2021) suggests that poverty and income inequality in Brazil decreased by 2.8 and 2.4 percent respectively within three months of a minimum wage increase. Effects diminished with time, particularly for bottom-sensitive distribution measures, a process that is consistent with resulting job losses being more frequent among poorer households. The fact that the subsequent yearly increase in the minimum wage in Brazil resulted in a renewed drop in poverty and inequality shows that possible unemployment costs might be outweighed by benefits in the form of higher pay among working persons and – potentially – by positive spillover effects such as increased overall consumption.

Minimum Wage and Female Poverty

As in the case of poverty in general, there is some discrepancy in the literature on whether a minimum wage increase would help reduce poverty among women. Single mothers have been the focus of research in this regard since they are typically the most vulnerable low-wage workers, likely to be hurt by the loss of employment following an increase/ introduction of a minimum wage. Burkhauser and Sabia (2007) argue that the minimum wage increases in the U.S. (1988-2003) did not have any effect on the overall poverty rates, on the poverty rates among the working poor, or on poverty among single mothers. They argue that an increase in Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which provides a wage subsidy to workers depending on income level, tax filing status, and the number of children, would have a higher impact on poverty, in particular among single mothers.

In the meantime, Neumark and Wascher (2011) find that EITC and minimum wage reinforce each other’s positive effect for single women with children (boosting both employment and earnings), but negatively affects childless single women and minority men. Another study on the U.S. (Sabia, 2008) looked at the effect of minimum wage increases on the welfare of single mothers, finding that most of them were unaffected as they earned above-minimum wage. Single mothers with low-education levels did not see an increase in net incomes due to the negative effect on employment and hours worked: for low-skilled individuals, a 10 percent increase in minimum wage resulted in an 8.8 percent decline in employment and an 11.8 percent reduction in hours worked.

Yet another study (DeFina, 2008) focus on child poverty rates and show that minimum wage increases have a positive (reducing) impact on child poverty in female-headed families. The effect is small but significant (a 10 percent increase in the minimum wage decreases child poverty rates by 1.8 percentage points), controlling for other factors.

Ultimately, the effect of minimum wage on poverty among women or female-headed households is somewhat ambiguous. It depends on the poverty threshold used, other policy instruments (such as the EITC), existing incentives to enter employment and how, in the specific country of interest, labor laws may affect the employer’s cost of hiring (e.g. for France, see Laroque and Salanie, 2002).

The discussion is however relevant for countries like Georgia, where the wage gap between men and women is quite large, and where more women than men tend to work in low-wage and vulnerable jobs. While the overall poverty gap between men and women in Georgia is insignificant (mainly because poverty is measured at the household level), the gap becomes apparent when comparing female-headed households to male-headed ones. The poverty rates in the former case are nearly 2 percentage points higher in Georgia (20 percent vs. 18.3 percent in 2021). The poverty rates are the highest among households with only adult women (39.3 percent for all-female households vs. 20.1 percent overall in 2018).

A Simulation of a Minimum Wage Raise in Georgia

The Georgian minimum wage legislation dates back to 1999. The presidential decree N 351 from June 4, 1999 states that the minimum (monthly) wage that is to be set in Georgia is equal to 20 GEL (with some specific exceptions in the public sector). This is a non-binding threshold.  Therefore, one has to think carefully what consequences might arise from raising the minimum wage to a much higher level. In addition to previously discussed aspects, one issue to keep in mind is the different average wages across different regions in Georgia. For example, a national minimum wage increase might have more of an impact in poorer regions, where both wages and incomes are lower, while it may still be non-binding in Tbilisi.

The ISET-PI research team (Babych et al., 2022) use Georgian micro data from the Labor Force Survey (LFS) and the Household Integrated Expenditure Survey (HIES), to simulate the effect of instituting a nation-wide minimum wage on both employment and poverty rates in different regions of Georgia. One focus area of the study was to analyze the effects of a minimum wage increase on female poverty. As with any exercise using a simulation approach, this study is subject to limitations imposed by the assumptions used, e.g. how much labor demand would respond to changes in the minimum wage, etc. The study considered two hypothetical thresholds of the minimum wage; 250 and 350 GEL respectively.

Figure 1. Share of private sector employees earning below certain thresholds, by gender, 2021.

Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Labor Force Survey (Geostat, 2021).

The expected household income after the minimum wage increase was calculated and then compared to the poverty threshold (for each household in a standard way, using the “adult equivalence” scale). According to this methodology, any person who lives in a household which falls below the poverty threshold is considered to be poor. A “working poor” household is defined as a household below the poverty threshold where at least one adult is working.

Figure 1 shows that there is a substantial share of both men and women whose monthly wage income falls below the hypothetical minimum wage thresholds. In addition, women are more than two times as likely to be earning below these thresholds. However, the possible impact from an increased minimum wage on female vs. male poverty is not clear-cut. Since many women are part of larger households which include adult males, their possible income losses/gains may be counterbalanced by income gains/losses of male family members, leaving the overall effect on household income ambiguous.

In addition, poverty rates are not likely to be much affected by a minimum wage increase if most poor households are “non-working poor” (where adult family members are either unemployed or outside of the labor force), a consideration particularly relevant for Georgia. The share of poor individuals who live in “working poor” households (with at least one household member employed) is just 41 percent nationally (and 35 percent in rural areas), meaning that close to 60 percent of poor individuals nationwide (and 65 percent in rural areas) are not likely to be directly affected by minimum wage increases.

Female vs. Male Poverty: Scenarios Following a Minimum Wage Increase

As one can see in Figure 2, increased minimum wages tend to reduce poverty, but the impact is not larger than one percentage point. Not surprisingly, females benefit more than males (0.3 and 0.8 percentage points vs. 0.2 and 0.9 percentage points poverty reduction for men and women respectively, under different threshold scenarios).  The maximum positive impact on poverty reduction is observed under a higher minimum wage threshold.

Figure 2. Estimated impact on poverty rates, based on the national subsistence minimum.

Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Household Integrated Expenditure Survey (Geostat, 2021).

The impact of an increased minimum wage on the expected median consumption of households doesn’t exceed a few percentage points either, as illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Median monthly consumption per “equivalent adult” in the household under the status quo and minimum wage scenarios, 2021.

Source: Authors’ calculations based on the Household Integrated Expenditure Survey (Geostat, 2021).

The impact is greatest in urban areas other than Tbilisi (between a 2.5 percent and a 4.2 percent increase in median consumption relative to the status quo). The lower impact in Tbilisi is most likely driven by relatively higher wages, while the low impact in rural areas is likely driven by lower participation in wage employment.

Conclusions

In the hypothetical case of Georgia, an impact of a minimum wage increase on poverty rates is expected to be limited, in line with the literature. In our study this finding is mostly driven by the fact that only a relatively small share of poor individuals live in “working poor” households (about 40 percent, nationally). The remaining 60 percent of poor individuals will be unaffected by the reform.

The quantitative impact on female and male poverty is estimated to be low, although the female poverty rate reduction is somewhat larger than among males.

It is important to note that the analysis doesn’t consider possible differential impacts on different groups of vulnerable families, such as families with small children and single mothers with small children. Some reasons to why groups of households may or may not be affected by the hypothetical minimum wage increase, based on their employment status and other factors, have been discussed above.

Another important point is that our exercise should not be seen as an argument against an increase of the minimum wage in Georgia. Instead, it suggests that such a reform would not have much of an impact if done in isolation. Indeed, the existing literature on minimum wage seems to be in consensus on the fact that minimum wage policies would be more impactful if supplemented by the following measures:

  • Maintain and expand targeted social assistance to groups that do not benefit or that are losing jobs/incomes as a result of the minimum wage changes
  • Have job re-training programs in place to help laid-off workers
  • Have human capital investment programs in place to increase workers’ productivity, in particular for low-productivity sectors
  • Consider other support instruments targeted toward the most affected groups of the population such as single working mothers etc.

These recommendations should be incorporated in the policy making regarding minimum wages in Georgia.

Acknowledgement

We are grateful to Expertise France for financially supporting the original report (Babych et al., 2022), which features some of the results and points raised in this policy brief.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed during events and conferences are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

An Overview of the Georgian Wine Sector

Posted on November 21, 2022 | Policy Brief

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Georgia has an 8000-year-old winemaking tradition, making the country the first known location of grape winemaking in the world. In this policy brief we analyze and discuss major characteristics of the wine sector in Georgia, government policies regarding the sector and major outcomes of such policies. The brief provides recommendations on how to ensure sustainable development of the sector in a competitive, dynamic environment.

Introduction

The Georgian winemaking tradition is 8000 years old, making Georgia the world’s first known location of grape winemaking. There are many traditions associated with Georgian winemaking. One of them is ‘Rtveli’ – the grape harvest that usually starts in September and continues throughout the autumn season, accompanied with feasts and celebrations. According to data from the National Wine Agency, the annual production of grapes in Georgia is on average 223.6 thousand tones (for the last ten-years), with most grapes being processed into wine (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Grape Processing (2013-2021)

Source: National Wine Agency, 2022. Note: Some producers do not participate In Rtveli and the total annual quantity of processed grape in the country might therefore be higher than the numbers presented in the figure.

Wine is one of the top export commodities for Georgia. It constituted 21 percent of the total Georgian agricultural export value in 2021 (Geostat, 2022). Since 2012 wine exports have, on average, grown 21 percent in quantitative terms, and by 22 percent in value (Figure 2). The average price per ton varies from 3 thousand USD to 3.9 thousand USD (Figure 2). Exports of still wine in containers holding 2 liters or less constitute, on average, 96 percent of the total export value.

Figure 2. Georgian Wine Exports (2012-2021)

Source: Geostat, 2022.

The main destination market for exporting Georgian wine is the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries which account for, on average, 78 percent of the export value (2012-2021). The corresponding share for EU countries is 10 percent. As of 2021, the top export destinations are Russia (55 percent), Ukraine (11 percent), China (7 percent), Belarus (5 percent), Poland (6 percent), and Kazakhstan (4 percent).  While Russia is still a top market for Georgian wine, Russia’s share of Georgian wine exports declined after Russia imposed an embargo on Georgian wines in 2006. The embargo forced market diversification and even after the reopening of the Russian market and Georgian wine exports shifting back towards Russia, its share declined from 87 percent in 2005 to 55 percent in 2021.

While there are more than 400 indigenous grape varieties in Georgia, only a few grape varieties are well commercialized as most of the exported wines are made of Rkatsiteli, Mtsvane, Kisi, and Saperavi grape varieties (Granik, 2019).

Government Policy in the Wine Sector

The Government of Georgia (GoG) actively supports the wine sector through the National Wine Agency, established in 2012 under the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Agriculture (MEPA). The National Wine Agency implements Georgia’s viticulture support programs through: i) control of wine production quality and certification procedures; ii) promotion and spread of knowledge of Georgian wine; iii) promotion of export potential growth; iv) research and development of Georgian wine and wine culture; v) creation of a national registry of vineyards; and vi) promotion of organized vintage (Rtveli) conduction (National Wine Agency, 2022).

During 2014-2016, the GoG’s spending on the wine sector (including grape subsidies, promotion of Georgian wine, and awareness increasing campaigns) amounted to 63 million GEL, or 22.8 million USD (As of November 1, 2022, 1 USD = 2.76 GEL according to the National Bank of Georgia). Out of the spending, illustrated in Figure 3, around 40-50 percent was allocated to grape subsidies implemented under the activities of iv) (as mentioned above).

There are two types of subsidies used by the GoG– direct and indirect. Direct subsidies imply cash payments to producers per kilogram of grapes. As for indirect subsidies, they entail state owned companies purchase grapes from farmers.

Starting from 2017, the GoG decided to abandon the subsidiary scheme and decrease its spending on of the wine sector.  The corresponding figure reached a minimum of 9.2 million GEL (3.3 million USD) in 2018. Meanwhile, the grape production has been increasing, reaching its highest level in 2020 (317 thousand tons). In 2020, the GoG resumed subsidizing grape harvests to support the wine sector as part of the crisis plan aimed at tackling economic challenges following the Covid-19 pandemic. The corresponding spending in the wine sector increased from 16.7 million GEL (around 6 million USD) in 2019 to 113.4 million GEL (41 million USD) in 2020, out of which the largest share (91 percent) went to grape subsidies. In 2021, the GoG continued its extensive support to the wine sector and the corresponding spending increased by 44 percent, compared to 2020. The largest share again went to grape subsidies (90 percent).

Figure 3. Grape Production and Government Spending on the Wine Sector (2014-2021)

Source: Ministry of Finance of Georgia, National Statistics Office of Georgia, Author’s Calculations, 2022.

In 2022, the GoG have continued subsidizing the grape harvest to help farmers and wine producers sell their products. During Rtveli 2022, wine companies are receiving a subsidy if they purchase and process at least 100 tons of green Rkatsiteli or Kakhuri grape varieties grown in the Kakheti region, and if the company pays at least 0.90 GEL per kilogram for the fruit. If these two conditions are satisfied, 0.35 GEL is subsidized from a total of 0.9 GEL per kilogram of grapes purchased (ISET Policy Institute, 2022). Moreover, the GoG provides a subsidy of 4 GEL per kilogram for Alksandrouli and Mujuretuli grapes (unique grape varieties from the Khvanchkara “micro-zone” of the north-western Racha-Lechkhumi and Kvemo Svaneti regions), if the buying company pays at least 7 GEL per kilogram for those varieties (Administration of the Government of Georgia, 2022). Overall, about 150 million GEL (54.2 million USD), has been allocated to grape subsidies in 2022.

Policy Recommendations

Although the National Wine Agency is supposed to implement support programs in various areas like quality control, market diversification, promotion and R&D, these areas lack funding, as most of the Agency’s funds are spent on subsidies. Given that the production and processing of grapes have increased over the years, subsidies have been playing a significant role in reviving the wine sector after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Mamardashvili et al., 2020).  However, since the sector is subsidized as of 2008, the grape market in Georgia is heavily distorted. Prices are formed, not on the bases of supply and demand but on subsidies, which help industries survive in critical moments, but overall prevent increases in quality and fair competition. They further lead to overproduction, inefficient distribution of state support and preferential treatment of industries (Desadze, Gelashvili, and Katsia, 2020). After years of subsidizing the sector, it is hard to remove the subsidy and face the social and political consequences of such action.

Nonetheless, in order to support the sustainable development of the sector, it is recommended to:

  1. Replace the direct state subsidy with a different type of support (if any), directed towards overcoming systemic challenges in the sector related to the research and development of indigenous grape varieties and their commercialization level.
  2. Further promote Georgian wine on international markets to diversify export destination markets and ensure low dependence on unstable markets like the Russian market. Although wine exporters have in recent years entered new markets, to further strengthen their positions at those markets, it is vital to:
    • ensure high quality production through producers’ adherence to food safety standards.
    • promote digitalization – e-certification for trade and distribution, block chain technology for easier traceability and contracting, e-labels providing extensive information about wine etc. – enabling producers to competitively operate in the dynamic environment (Tach, 2021)
    • identify niche markets (e.g. biodynamic wine) and support innovation within these sectors to ensure competitiveness of the wine sector in the long-term (Deisadze and Livny, 2016).

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Higher Education and Research in times of War and Peace: Key Insights from the 2022 FREE Network Conference

Posted on September 26, 2022 | Policy Brief

20220925 Higher Education and Research Image 02

More than thirty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Europe is struck with war following the Russian aggression on Ukraine. Russia’s war on Ukraine entails lost human capital, both in actual lives lost and due to major disruptions to key functions of the society, such as education and research. In light of this, the FREE Network, together with the Centre for Economic Analysis (CenEA) and the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), hosted the public conference “Higher Education and Research in War and Peace“ in Warsaw on the 10th of September 2022. This policy brief is based on the presentations and panel discussions held during the conference.

The large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine has disrupted an entire society, including the education system, with Ukrainian schools just recently partially welcoming back students to the classrooms for the first time since the 25th of February 2022. Closing schools has severe impacts on a population, as highlighted by the recent Covid-19 pandemic. The lockdown and closure of schools around the world following the virus have had and will continue to have massively negative consequences globally, with severe losses in human capital due to lost years of education. This is especially in countries where access to online education is limited or of poor quality. Inequalities also rise following the closure of schools and girls return to school in fewer numbers than their male counterparts. The disruption to the Ukrainian education system will result in lost human capital and lowered levels of knowledge among the population. The war has further restricted access to relevant information for many Ukrainians but also for Russians, making people susceptible to the increased Russian propaganda and misinformation about the war on Ukraine depicted within and outside of Russia.

In light of this, the FREE Network gathered representatives from its affiliated institutions and other relevant actors in the region to discuss the relevance and necessity of continued support for higher education and research within social sciences in Ukraine, and more broadly in Eastern Europe and post-Soviet countries. The conference and the overarching theme related back not only to the original ambition of the FREE Network, namely to support outstanding academia within economics and relate it to policy work but also to the current situation in Europe and the existing threat from Russia to this objective.

This brief will initially cover the work carried out by the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE) in response to the Russian aggression, followed by thoughts on Russia’s role in the evolution of knowledge and human capital in the region. The brief continues by covering the benefits and positive outcomes of investments into education and research and lastly concludes with reflections on the role of the FREE Network.

The Kyiv School of Economics’ Response to the Russian Aggression

The war on Ukraine put the spotlight on the importance of high-quality academic institutions as a safety net for the government to maintain vital functions to society. The Vice President for Policy Research at KSE, Nataliia Shapoval, gave a brief overview of how KSE’s work has changed since the Russian war on Ukraine and its implications. Shapoval initially painted a picture of the disruption to the Ukrainian society caused by the Russian aggression, explaining how KSE stepped up during the first months of the war, in some areas doing the work of ministries. While the government has mainly taken back some duties, the KSE is still providing policy advice in areas related to the effects of sanctions, estimates of damages, and food security among others. KSE is also highly active within the areas of education and health, working with Ukrainian schools through the KSE Charitable Foundation (KSE CF) to ensure students can safely return to the classrooms.

Another important aspect of the work carried out by KSE concerns spreading knowledge about and shedding light on the situation in Ukraine. Through the various networks, by talking to colleagues within academia but also to the media, KSE is trying to explain what has happened and is still happening in Ukraine. According to Shapoval, there is a need for delivering correct information and to keep attention fixed on the situation in Ukraine such that people are kept aware of what is going on in the region.

Shapoval also regularly returned to the role of education and research for the present and future Ukraine. According to Shapoval, avoiding brain drain and ensuring Ukrainians are equipped with the necessary knowledge is key to rebuilding a future Ukraine founded on well-functioning democratic institutions. To facilitate this, the KSE is offering two programs, Memory and Conflict Studies (a multidisciplinary field concerned with how the past can be understood and remembered, and how it might impact the present transformation of societies) and Urban Studies, both aimed at covering the future need for competence within these fields. Further mentioned by Shapoval is the fact that, due to the war, many Ukrainians have left the country and are being educated elsewhere. While this partially ensures intellectual human capital is not lost, these students must be kept anchored to Ukraine through networks to ensure they will return back to help rebuild Ukraine. This is especially important in order to counter the ongoing evolution in Russia.

Thoughts on the Role of Russia in the Region

While the recent developments in Ukraine have of course disrupted education and research in more severe and tangible ways, the situation for independent researchers in Russia has also deteriorated. Torbjörn Becker, Director of SITE, emphasized how several Russian colleagues in exile still collaborate with the FREE Network on policy work and research. Becker also further stressed how they will be paramount once Ukraine wins the war, as will the role of partnerships for a future transformation of the Russian society. Acknowledging that there are many Russians (especially amongst academics in exile) who oppose the war, Shapoval however stressed the disturbing fact that many Russians do seem to support the Russian aggression and that the role of Russia as a destructive force in the region cannot be understated. This was seconded by Tamara Sulukhia, Director of the International School of Economics at Tbilisi State University (ISET). Sulukhia argued that Russian politics slow down and disturbs the free states within the region, and hampers organizations and countries from moving in the right direction in regard to democracy, economic evolution and integration toward Europe. Both Shapoval and Sulukhia reminded the audience that even with a Ukrainian victory, and this in a war which is defining the future of democracy in the region, Russia will persist. Russia has proven time and again, by effectively occupying 23 percent of Georgia as of 2008, with the occupation of Crimea in 2014 and with the most recent war on Ukraine, to be a real military threat to post-Soviet countries. Even though Russia losing the war would shift the power dynamics in the region, the ever-present threat of Russia is not only of a military character. Russia also attempts to impact education, research and knowledge more generally by promoting a Soviet-style education and by altering reality through propaganda and false information.

While discussing the current situation of higher education within economics in Belarus, Dzmitry Kruk, Deputy Academic Director of the Belarusian Economic Research and Outreach Center (BEROC), regularly came back to the negative impacts from Russia on the quality of education and research. Where the western style education is free but also differential, Soviet-style education is centred around learning how to fulfil instructions, according to Kruk. The Belarusian educational system is anchored to Russia and as a result Belarusians today have what Kruk referred to as a “spoilt mental map”. The necessity of free education and research outside the Russian alternative (which is mainly published in Russian and with a post-Marxist view of the world) is vital in order to equip people with the tools to respond to the new types of dictatorship evident in the region. Young people within academia who have experienced freedom and have had the opportunity of thinking for themselves will also be vital on the future path toward democracy. Kruk’s opinions were furthered by Shapoval stating how education must and should counter the risk of brainwashing in the region and in the world as a whole. Shapoval argued the necessity of countering propaganda with the help not only of education but also the legislation of media and social media and enforcement of international laws in general. The necessity of ensuring new values for intellectuals and students in times to come is of paramount value and, according to Shapoval, as important to halting the Russian imperialist visions today as it was some thirty years ago. Shapoval further argued that the threat from Russia’s ambitions should be met not only with education and research but also through installing a sense of hope and prosperity among young people.

Investments into Education and Research as a Safeguard and Development Driver

While countries within the turbulent region differ, not least in regard to overall political ambitions and structure, in most of them investments into education and research have been paying off. KSE’s expertise allowed it to work closely with the Ukrainian government, standing strong in their fight against Russia. The impact from investments into education and research in the region is also evident in both Georgia and Latvia.

Sulukhia argued ISET to be, and to have been, a key contributor to human capital among Georgians as well as others in the Caucasus region. Sulukhia argued this to be especially important when under occupation, mentioning how Georgia has, since the occupation of the two regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in all ways possible tried to ensure that the human capital of internally displaced people is not lost. ISET have ten folded its intake of students and is today providing world-class education in the Georgian language, effectively counteracting brain drain. Post-graduates are working in major institutions providing relevant knowledge and competence in key areas of not only the Georgian society but also other countries in the Caucasus. A similar picture was painted by Anders Paalzow, Rector at Stockholm School of Economics in Riga (SSE Riga). Paalzow specifically pointed out how the investments in education made in Latvia in the 1990s have truly paid off, with graduates having been absorbed into relevant parts of the Latvian society and the Baltics for decades.

Having previous students in key positions in society to ensure sound policy work (such as good fiscal and audit control of the countries in question etc.) is however not the only benefit of investing in education and research within the region. As emphasized by Sulukhia, institutes within the FREE Network and other networks alike are strategically vital in the sense that they ensure knowledge and evidence for policy makers and as they convey evidence-based messages for the general public. This is especially important in a time when the message of the developmental direction for the countries within the region has to be reinforced in order to stand against Russian misinformation and propaganda as well as voices questioning the benefits of European integration. Sulukhia emphasized how it is of importance that the relevance of education and research is rooted among the people and not only within academia to evade the risk of preaching to the choir. Vlad Mykhnenko, Fellow at St. Peter’s College at the University of Oxford, further argued it is necessary for academia to be much more policy oriented than what is the reality today. Researchers should comment on political events and public policy to ensure the outreach of knowledge and information, not just to help the public have a greater understanding of complex issues but also to help inform experts. According to Myhnenko, other researchers are keen on getting context-relevant knowledge and insights from economists working within the region.

The necessity of communicating the outcomes from investments within economics education and research and more broadly within social sciences was a recurring theme during the conference. Presenting the University’s engagement in various programs such as Erasmus+, Horizon Europe, The European Strategy for Universities etc., Professor Agnieszka Chłoń-Domińczak from the Warsaw School of Economics (WSE) outlined the importance of funding from the EU. Chłoń-Domińczak highlighted how EU support has enabled greater partnerships and internationalization and pointed out that while the transfer of knowledge and internationalization of students and researchers are of the essence, there is a need for also ensuring capacity building among other staff when building sound institutions. Internationalization through the exchange as a hedge against brain drain and as a means of improving the quality of academia was further emphasized by Michal Myck, Director of CenEA.

Chłoń-Domińczak, alongside Paalzow and the Swedish Ambassador to Poland, Stefan Gullgren, further argued the necessity to bridge between business and academia. This, especially as investments in social sciences, as compared to investments in natural sciences or technology cannot be commercialized. Additionally, the former havs payoffs in the long run which lowers investment incentives for firms making it even more crucial to communicate the large benefits to society of investments into the sphere. Ensuring consistent and continued support requires not only a good connection to businesses but also proper legal structures in place. As argued by Gullgren, the Swedish model with private businesses funding about 70 percent of research and education in Sweden, is made possible largely thanks to the fact that many investments are funnelled through foundations that are exempt from taxation when set up to finance research grants and education. Thus, one should consider not only business, academia and investors when thinking about future funding for research and education, but the legislative framework as well, especially in contexts such as the future rebuild of Ukraine.

As for how the benefits from investments into social sciences best are communicated, opinions shifted among participants throughout the day. On the one hand, Becker’s argument of being visible not only in traditional media but on social media alike was met by Shapoval, highlighting the need for a regulatory framework for both platforms. On the other hand, Myhnenko’s argument for more policy oriented and outreaching research was met by Kruk claiming there is a risk of researchers within economics deviating too far from research within the field. Kruk also addressed the argument of being available on social media by countering that in his view, researchers should refrain from work based on what generates clicks or reads.

The Relevance of the FREE Network in times of War

Considering the evidence brought forth during the conference by colleagues within the FREE Network, be it the suppression of BEROC in their efforts of founding a School of Economics in Belarus, the effects on the KSE from the war on Ukraine, or the rise of anti-European expressions in Georgia, the necessity of the network was at the end of the day perhaps clearer than ever. As highlighted by virtually all speakers during the conference, internationalization through networks such as the FREE Network fosters open minds, allows for improvements within all aspects of academia, and enables the exchange of thoughts, ideas and experiences. Although the heterogeneity of the region should not be overlooked and investments made in accordance with this, the similarities between the countries within the FREE Network outnumber the differences. The immediate threat from Russia must be met with knowledge and fact-based information as well as high-quality education and research being made available among the population in the region as a whole. To ensure a continued transition within the region, the risk of brain drain must be evaded through continuous support to the social sciences, as these have the power to truly transform nations.

Concluding Remarks

The FREE Network public conference in Warsaw was the first in-person conference since the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. The benefits of meeting in person were however overshadowed by the ongoing Russian aggression on Ukraine and ultimately on democratic ideals, including those of independent academia. We hope to welcome all FREE Network institutes to next year’s conference in Kyiv, to further discuss how outstanding education and research can help rebuild a sovereign Ukraine.

List of Participants

  • Torbjörn Becker, Director of SITE
  • Agnieszka Chłoń-Domińczak, Professor at WSE
  • Stefan Gullgren, Swedish Ambassador to Poland
  • Dzmitry Kruk, Deputy Academic Director, BEROC
  • Michal Myck, Director of CenEA
  • Vlad Mykhnenko, Fellow, St. Peter’s College, University of Oxford
  • Anders Paalzow, Rector SSE Riga
  • Nataliia Shapoval, Vice President for Policy Research at KSE
  • Tamara Sulukhia, Director of ISET

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Addressing the COVID-19 Pandemic: Vaccination Efforts in FREE Network Countries

Posted on March 1, 2021 | Policy Brief

Preparing Covid Vaccine on Pink Surface representing COVID-19 vaccination

There are great expectations that vaccinations will enable a return to normality from Covid-19. However, there is massive variation in vaccination efforts, vaccine access, and attitudes to vaccination in the population across countries. This policy brief compares the situation in a number of countries in Eastern Europe, the Baltics, the Caucasus region, and Sweden. The brief is based on the insights shared at a recent webinar “Addressing the COVID-19 pandemic: Vaccination efforts in FREE Network countries” organized by the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics.

Introduction

As of February 16, 2021, the total number of confirmed COVID-19 deaths across the globe has reached 2.45 million according to Our World in Data (2021).  Rapid implementation of vaccination programs that extend to major parts of the population is of paramount importance, not only from a global health perspective, but also in terms of economic, political, and social implications.

Eastern Europe is no exception. Although many countries in the region had a relatively low level of infections during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in the spring of 2020, all have by now been severely affected. Vaccination plays a key role for these economies to bounce back, especially as many of them depend on tourism, trade, and other sectors that have been particularly hurt by social distancing restrictions.

 Figure 1. Cumulative confirmed COVID-19 cases (top panel) and deaths per million (bottom panel) in the FREE Network region

Source: John Hopkins University CSSE COVID-19 visualizations: Ourworldindata.org/coronavirus

Against this background, the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics invited representatives of the FREE Network countries to discuss the current vaccination efforts happening in Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and the Caucasus (the represented countries were Belarus, Georgia, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Sweden, and Ukraine). This brief summarizes the main points raised in this event.

Vaccination Status

In Latvia, Poland, and Sweden, the second wave of infections started to pick up in November 2020 and peaked according to most COVID-19 impact measures in early 2021. As all three countries are members of the EU and take part in its coordinated efforts, they have all received vaccines from the same suppliers (i.e. Astra/Zeneca, Moderna, and Pfizer/BioNTech).

Latvia had problems early on with getting the vaccination process off the ground. The health minister was blamed for the slow start since he declined orders from Pfizer/BioNTech in the early stages, and was forced to resign. As of February 16, two doses per 100 people have been distributed primarily to medical staff, social care workers, and key-state officials.

Figure 2. Cumulative COVID-19 vaccination doses per 100 people

Source: Our world in data, last updated February 24th, 2021. This is counted as a single dose, and may not equal the total number of people vaccinated. Visualizations: Ourworldindata.org/coronavirus

With the first phase starting in late December, Sweden has by February 16th, 2021, fully vaccinated 1,05% of the population while experiencing serious problems with delivery and implementation. As planning and delivery of vaccines are centralized while the implementation is decided regionally, there have been some unclarities regarding who stands accountable for issues that emerge. Guidelines, issued by the Public Health Agency of Sweden, for how to prioritize different groups have been changed a couple of times. Currently, the (non-binding) recommendation is to prioritize vaccinating people living in elderly care homes, as well as personnel working with this group, followed by those above 65 years of age, health care workers, and other risk groups.

Looking at regional statistics there are significant differences in vaccinating people across regions with an average of 70% usage rate of delivered vaccines, and with lows at 40-60%, see figure 3. Reasons for this remain unclear.

Figure 3. Distributed relative to delivered vaccines across counties (län) in Sweden.

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data collected by the Public Health Agency of Sweden. Last updated February 14th, 2021.

Poland has so far been somewhat more efficient than Sweden in its vaccination efforts. Despite turbulent political events over the last couple of months, it has managed to distribute 5.7 doses per 100 people. The country has just finished the first phase of the national vaccination plan, which focused on vaccinating healthcare personnel, and has now entered the second phase with a shifted focus towards elderly care homes, people above 60 years of age, military, and teachers.

Among the countries that are not members of the EU, and thus, not taking part in its coordinated vaccination efforts, the vaccination statuses are more diverse.

Russia was fast in developing and approving the Sputnik V vaccine. The country started vaccinating in early December, although only people in the age of 18-60 in prioritized occupations such as health care workers, people living and working in nursing homes, teachers, and military. At the start of 2021, the program extended to people above 60 and, on January 16, all adults were given the possibility to register themselves and get vaccinated within one week. There are no precise data at the moment, but the fraction of the population vaccinated is likely to be higher than 1%.

Others in the region have faced greater challenges in signing contracts with vaccine suppliers. Georgia and Ukraine are still waiting to secure deliveries and have not yet started to vaccinate. Being outside the EU agreements and with public and political mistrust towards Sputnik V and Russia alternatives are being explored. Georgia has ordered vaccines through the COVAX platform (co-led by Gavi, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) and WHO) but there are concerns about potential delays in deliveries. In terms of prioritizing groups once vaccinations can start, both Ukraine and Georgia have set similar priorities as other countries, with extra focus on health-care and essential workers, age-related risk groups, and people with chronic illnesses.

While Belarus’ official figures on the death toll have been widely perceived as unrealistic from the beginning, the most accurate and recent data shows an excess deaths rate of about 20% in July. The country has no precise data on vaccinations, but some reports have emerged based on interviews with government officials in the Belarusian media. These suggest that around 20,000 imported doses of Sputnik V have been distributed mainly to medical professionals and an additional 120,000-140,000 doses have been promised by Russia.

Main Challenges

The discussion during the Q&A session at the webinar concerned the economic and political implications of vaccinations in the region.

Pavlo Kovtoniuk, the Head of Health Economics Center at KSE in Ukraine, stressed the importance of a coordinated vaccination effort in Europe with regards to geopolitics. There is a clear EU vs Non-EU divide in the vaccination status across European countries. The limited vaccine availability in Non-EU countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus offers opportunities for more influential nations like Russia and China to pressure and affect domestic policy in these countries.

Also highlighting the fact that no one is safe until everybody is safe, Lev Lvovskiy, Senior Research Fellow at BEROC in Minsk, noted that vaccination efforts in Europe are important for recovery in small open economies like Belarus as many of its trade partners currently have imposed temporary import restrictions.

Similar to the political crisis happening alongside the pandemic in Belarus, the challenges we see in Poland – protests against the recent developments regarding abortion rights and attempts by the government to limit free media – have deflated the urgency to vaccinate in terms of its future economic and political implications, according to Michal Myck, director of CenEA in Szczecin.

Looking forward, another major challenge for the region is vaccine skepticism. Not only do many countries have to build proper infrastructure that can administer vaccines at the required scale and pace, but also make sure that people actually show up. In Latvia, Poland, Georgia, Russia, and Ukraine, polls show that less than 50% of the population are ready to vaccinate. Sergejs Gubin, Research Fellow at BICEPS in Riga, highlighted that there can be systematic variation in the willingness to vaccinate within countries as e.g. Russian-speaking natives in Latvia have been found to be less prone to vaccinate on average. Also, most of the skepticism in Georgia has been more directed towards the Chinese and Russian vaccine than towards those approved by the EU, according to Yaroslava Babych who is lead economist at ISET in Tbilisi.

Even though vaccine skepticism is an issue in Russia too, Natalya Volchkova, Director of CEFIR at New Economic School in Moscow, pointed to the positive impact of “bandwagon effects” in vaccination efforts. When one person gets vaccinated, that person can spread more accurate information about the vaccine to their social circle, resulting in fewer and fewer people being skeptical as the share of vaccinated grows. In such a scenario vaccine skepticism can fade away over time, even if initial estimates suggest it is high in the population.

Concluding Remarks

Almost exactly a year has passed since Covid-19 was declared a pandemic. The economic and social consequences have been enormous. Now vaccines – developed faster than expected – promise a way out of the crisis. But major challenges, of different types and magnitudes across the globe, still remain. As the seminar highlighted, there are important differences across transition countries. Some countries (such as Russia) have secured vaccines by developing them, but still face challenges in producing and distributing vaccines. Others have secured deliveries through the joint effort by the EU, but this has also had its costs in terms of a somewhat slower process (compared to some of the countries acting on their own) and sharing within the EU. For some other countries, like Belarus, Ukraine, and Georgia, the vaccination is yet to be started. All in all, the choice and availability of vaccines across the region illustrates how economic and geopolitical questions remain important. Finally, for many of the region countries vaccine skepticism and information as well as disinformation are important determinants in distributing vaccines. Summing up, the combination of these factors once again reminds us that how to best get back from the pandemic is truly a multidisciplinary question.

List of Participants

  • Iurii Ganychenko, Senior researcher at Kyiv School of Economics (KSE/Ukraine)
  • Jesper Roine, Professor at Stockholm School of Economics (SSE) and Deputy Director at the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE/ Sweden)
  • Lev Lvovskiy, Senior Research Fellow at the Belarusian Economic Research and Outreach Center (BEROC/ Belarus)
  • Michal Myck, Director of the Centre for Economic Analysis (CenEA/ Poland)
  • Natalya Volchkova, Director of the Centre for Economic and Financial Research  ­New Economic School (CEFIR NES/ Russia)
  • Pavlo Kovtoniuk, Head of Health Economics Center at Kyiv School of Economics (KSE/Ukraine)
  • Sergej Gubin, Research Fellow at the Baltic International Centre for Economic Policy Studies (BICEPS/ Latvia)
  • Yaroslava V. Babych, Lead Economist at ISET Policy Institute (ISET PI/ Georgia)

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Video of the FREE Network webinar “Addressing the Covid-19 Pandemic: Vaccination Efforts in Free Network Countries“

Addressing the Covid-19 Pandemic: Vaccination Efforts in Free Network Countries

Posted on February 3, 2021 |

COVID-19 mask and vaccine bottle representing vaccination efforts

COVID-19 vaccination efforts are now starting in several countries around the globe and many believe that this is the way out of the pandemic crisis. The Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) in collaboration with the FREE Network is delighted to invite you to a webinar to share insights and knowledge about how countries in Eastern Europe and around the Baltics are handling the vaccination efforts against the COVID-19 crisis.

How Are Countries in Eastern Europe, Around the Baltic Sea, and in the Caucasus Managing Vaccination Efforts?

With the pandemic still ongoing around the world and in many cases having entered both a second and third wave of infections and deaths—vaccination is urgently needed. Since the first vaccines against COVID-19 were approved, governments around the world are now pushing forward with the vaccination efforts – all with different strategies and methods. How are countries in Eastern Europe, around the Baltic Sea region and in the Caucasus region managing vaccination efforts in their countries and what are the key factors of success and failure? How different are the strategies?

Since the FREE Network includes research and policy institutes in Belarus (BEROC), Latvia (BICEPS), Russia (CEFIR at NES), Poland (CenEA), Georgia (ISET PI), Ukraine (KSE) and Sweden (SITE) the upcoming webinar will provide a comprehensive regional perspective on the vaccination efforts of different strategies implemented in these countries. Furthermore, the webinar will also shed light on how people have responded to vaccination offers; how other countries are being portrayed in the national media; and what the current discussions focus on.

The webinar is part of a series of online discussions aiming to provide a regional overview updates as well as in-depth analysis of specific topics related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Join the webinar, learn more about the vaccination efforts in FREE Network countries and ask questions directly to distinguished panelists and experts:

Speakers

  • Iurii Ganychenko, Senior researcher at Kyiv School of Economics (KSE/Ukraine)
  • Jesper Roine, Professor at the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE/ Sweden)
  • Lev Lvovskiy, Senior Research Fellow at the Belarusian Economic Research and Outreach Center (BEROC/ Belarus)
  • Michal Myck, Director of the Centre for Economic Analysis (CenEA/ Poland)
  • Natalya Volchkova, Director of the Centre for Economic and Financial Research at New Economic School (CEFIR at NES/ Russia)
  • Pavlo Kovtonyuk, Head of Health Economics Center at Kyiv School of Economics (KSE/Ukraine)
  • Sergejs Gubins, Research Fellow at the Baltic International Centre for Economic Policy Studies (BICEPS/ Latvia)
  • Yaroslava V. Babych, Lead Economist at ISET Policy Institute (ISET PI/ Georgia)

Chair/Moderator

  • Torbjörn Becker, Director of the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE)

Register here

RSVP Date: Thursday, February 11, 2021, 10:00am – 12:00pm (CET, Sweden)

Location: Online. A link to the webinar will be sent to you 4-5 hours ahead of the start of the webinar.

Registration: Will remain open until the start of the webinar.