Location: France

Does News Coverage of Violence Against Women Affect Its Judicial Treatment?

Posted on July 11, 2024 |

On September 17, Maëlle Stricot, PhD. student from Paris School of Economics, will present her working paper entitled “Does news coverage of violence against women affect its judicial treatment? Evidence from France” at SSE and online via Zoom.

Working Paper: Does News Coverage of Violence Against Women Affect Its Judicial Treatment? Evidence From France

This paper explores how news coverage of violence against women (VAW) affects the reporting and judicial treatment of sexual and domestic violence. I combine high-frequency data on French TV news content with rich novel administrative data on almost all cases handled by the criminal justice system in France. I document a relatively low level of prosecution of perpetrators of VAW, as well as limited coverage of such violence on TV news, but significant changes have occurred over the last decade. Exploiting the quasi-random timing of news in the short run, I next estimate the effect of TV news coverage of VAW on each stage of the legal process – namely reporting, prosecution and sentencing decisions. First, news on VAW crimes have a relatively small impact on the propensity to report sexual or domestic violence. Second, prosecutors are less likely to dismiss a case after news coverage of VAW crimes. The effect amounts to a 2% increase in prosecutions of perpetrators of VAW in the week following the news coverage, mainly for domestic violence and cases that were on the verge of being dismissed. Third, sentencing decisions made by judges are not affected by news coverage of VAW. These findings imply that documenting and talking about VAW is important to raise prosecution and effectively combat this violence.

About the Speaker

Maëlle Stricot is a PhD student at the Paris School of Economics and Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne.

Maëlle Stricot’s research primarily focuses on violence against women. She is currently studying the impact of media and public policies on the prevalence, reporting, and judicial treatment of sexual and domestic violence, with a particular focus on France. She is also interested in the criminal justice system, especially the long-term economic effects of incarceration.

Previously, she worked as a research assistant at the French Institute of Public Policy (IPP) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), where she contributed to projects related to health and employment.

Research Interests: Gender Economics, Crime Economics, Political Economy of the Media, Labour Economics, Health Economics

Nuclear Energy Renaissance: Powering Sweden’s Climate Policy

Posted on April 15, 2024 | Policy Brief

Cooling towers of a nuclear power plant releasing steam into a clear blue sky representing nuclear energy in Sweden.

Sweden’s Nuclear Energy Expansion: Is It the Key to Net-Zero Emissions by 2045?

The Swedish government has placed nuclear energy at the forefront of its climate policies, aiming for two new reactors to be operational by 2035 and a total of ten new reactors by 2045. This policy brief explores whether the large-scale expansion of nuclear energy in Sweden is an environmentally and economically viable solution to achieve the nation’s goal of net-zero emissions by 2045. To assess this, we examine three critical factors: potential emission reductions, the cost-effectiveness of nuclear power, and the feasibility of the proposed construction timelines.

As a case study, we compare Sweden’s approach to nuclear energy with the successful nuclear build-out in France during the 1970s. France significantly reduced its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions while reaping economic benefits, with an average reactor construction time of about six years. However, the situation in Sweden’s nuclear energy sector today differs from France in the 1970s. Sweden already has a low-carbon electricity grid, and the costs of alternative zero-carbon energy sources, such as wind and solar, have dropped considerably. Additionally, the construction costs and timelines for nuclear reactors in Sweden have increased compared to historical norms.

Thus, while nuclear energy in Sweden may contribute to modest emission reductions, the abatement costs are high, and reactor construction is expected to take much longer—up to two or three times longer than France’s build-out. This raises questions about whether Sweden’s nuclear expansion can effectively support the country’s ambitious climate goals.

A Renewed Focus on Nuclear Energy

When the current government in Sweden, led by Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson, came into power in 2022, they swiftly made changes to Sweden’s environment and climate policies. The Ministry of Environment was abolished, transport fuel taxes were reduced, and the energy policy objective was changed from “100 percent renewable” to “100 percent fossil free”, emphasizing that nuclear energy was now the cornerstone in the government’s goal of reaching net zero emissions (Government Office 2023, Swedish Government 2023). This marked a new turn in Sweden’s relationship with nuclear energy: from the construction of four different nuclear power plants in the 1970s – of which three remain operational today – to the national referendum on nuclear energy in 1980, where it was decided that no new nuclear reactors should be built and that existing reactors were to be phased-out by 2010 (Jasper 1990).

Today’s renewed focus on nuclear energy, especially as a climate mitigation policy tool is, however, not unique to Sweden. As of 2022, the European Commission labels nuclear reactor construction as a “green investment”, the US has included production tax credits for nuclear energy in their 2023 climate bill the Inflation Reduction Act, and France’s President Macron is pushing for a “nuclear renaissance” in his vision of a low-carbon future for Europe (Gröndahl 2022; Bistline, Mehrotra, and Wolfram 2023; Alderman 2022).

France As a Case Study

In the 1970s, France conducted an unprecedented expansion of nuclear energy, which offers valuable insights for Sweden’s contemporary nuclear ambitions. Relying heavily on imported oil for their energy needs, France enacted a drastic shift in energy policy following the 1973 oil crisis. In the subsequent decade, France ordered and began the construction of 51 new nuclear reactors. The new energy policy – dubbed the Messmer Plan – was summarized by the slogan: “All electric, all nuclear” (Hecht 2009).

To support the expansion of new reactors, the French government made use of loan guarantees and public financing (Jasper 1990). A similar strategy has recently been proposed by the Swedish government, with suggested loan guarantees of up to 400 billion kronor (around $40 billion) to support the construction of new reactors (Persson 2022).

France’s Emissions Reductions and Abatement Costs

To make causal estimates of the environmental and economic effects of France’s large-scale expansion of nuclear energy, we need a counterfactual to compare with. In a recent working paper – titled Industrial Policy and Decarbonization: The Case of Nuclear Energy in France – I, together with Jared Finnegan from University College London, construct this counterfactual as a weighted combination of suitable control countries. These countries resemble France’s economy and energy profile in the 1960s and early 1970s, however, they did not push for nuclear energy following the first oil crisis. Our weighted average comprises five European countries: Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, Portugal, and Germany, with falling weights in that same order.

Figure 1 depicts per capita emissions of CO2 from electricity and heat production in France and its counterfactual – ‘synthetic France’ – from 1960 to 2005. The large push for nuclear energy led to substantial emission reductions, an average reduction of 62 percent, or close to 1 metric ton of CO2 per capita, in the years after 1980.

Figure 1. CO2 emissions from electricity and heat in France and synthetic France, 1960-2005.

Andersson and Finnegan (2024).

Moreover, Figure 1 shows that six years elapsed from the energy policy change until emission reductions began. This time delay matches the average construction time of around six years (75 months on average) for the more than 50 reactors that were constructed in France following the announcement of the Messmer Plan in 1974.

Table 1. Data for abatement cost estimates.

Andersson and Finnegan (2024).

Lastly, these large and relatively swift emission reductions in France were achieved at a net economic gain. Table 1 lists the data used to compute the average abatement cost (AAC): the total expenses incurred for the new policy (relative to the counterfactual scenario), divided by the CO2 emissions reduction.

The net average abatement cost of -$20 per ton of CO2 is a result of the lower cost of electricity production (here represented by the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE)) of new nuclear energy during the time-period, compared to the main alternative, namely coal, – the primary energy source in counterfactual synthetic France. LCOE encompasses the complete range of expenses incurred over a power plant’s life cycle, from initial construction and operation to maintenance, fuel, decommissioning, and waste handling. Accurately calculated, LCOE provides a standardized metric for comparing the costs of energy production across different technologies, countries, and time periods (IEA 2015).

Abatement Costs and Timelines Today

Today, more than 50 years after the first oil crisis, many factors that made France’s expansion of nuclear energy a success are markedly different. For example, the cost of wind and solar energy – the other two prominent zero-carbon technologies – has plummeted (IEA 2020). Further, construction costs and timelines for new nuclear reactors in Europe have steadily increased since the 1970s (Lévêque 2015).

Figure 2 depicts the LCOE for the main electricity generating technologies between 2009 and 2023 (Bilicic and Scroggins 2023). The data is for the US, but the magnitudes and differences between technologies are similar in Europe. There are two important aspects of this figure. First, after having by far the highest levelized cost in 2009, the price of solar has dropped by more than 80 percent and is today, together with wind energy, the least-cost option. Second, the cost of nuclear has steadily increased, contrary to how technology cost typically evolves over time, meriting nuclear power the “a very strange beast” label (Lévêque, 2015, p. 44). By 2023, new nuclear power had the highest levelized cost of all energy technologies.

Regarding the construction time of nuclear reactors, these have steadily increased in both Europe and the US. The reactor Okiluoto 3 in Finland went into commercial operation last year but took 18 years to construct. Similarly, the reactor Flamanville 3 in France is still not finished, despite construction beginning 17 years ago. The reactors Hinkley Point C in the UK were initiated in 2016 and, after repeated delays, are projected to be ready for operation in 2027 at the earliest (Lawson 2022). Similarly, in the US, construction times have at least doubled since the first round of reactors were built. These lengthened constructions times are a consequence of stricter safety regulations and larger and more complex reactor designs (Lévêque, 2015). If these average construction times of 12-18 years are the new norm, Sweden will, in fact, not have two new reactors in place by 2035. Further, it would need to begin construction rather soon if the goal of having ten new reactors by 2045 is to be achieved.

Figure 2. Levelized Cost of Electricity, 2009-2023.

Source: Bilicic and Scroggins (2023).

Sweden’s Potential Emission Reductions

The rising costs and extended construction times for new reactors are notable concerns, yet the crucial measure of Sweden’s new climate policy is its capacity to reach net zero emissions across all sectors. Figure 3 depicts per capita emissions of CO2 from electricity and heat production in Sweden and OECD countries between 1960 and 2018.

Figure 3. Sweden vs. the OECD average.

Source: IEA (2022).

In 2018, the OECD’s per capita CO2 emissions from electricity and heat averaged slightly over 2 metric tons. In comparison, Sweden’s per capita emissions at 0.7 metric tons are low and represent only 20 percent of total per capita emissions. Hence, the potential for substantial emission cuts through nuclear expansion is limited. By contrast, Sweden’s transport sector, with CO2 emissions more than two times larger than the emissions from electricity and heat, presents a greater chance for impactful reductions. Yet, current policies of reduced transport fuel taxes are likely to increase emissions. The electrification of transportation could leverage the benefits of nuclear energy for climate mitigation, but broader policies are then needed to accelerate the adoption of electric vehicles.

Conclusion: Sweden’s Nuclear Energy Renaissance and Its Impact on Climate Policy

As Sweden rewrites its energy and climate policies, nuclear energy is placed front and center – a position it has not held since the 1970s. Yet, while nuclear energy may experience a renaissance in Sweden, it will not be the panacea for reaching net zero emissions the current government is hoping for. Expected emission reductions will be modest, abatement costs will be relatively high and, if recent European experiences are to be considered an indicator, the aspirational timelines are likely to be missed.

Considering these aspects, it’s imperative for Sweden to adopt a broader mix of climate policies to address sectors such as transportation – responsible for most of the country’s emissions. Pairing the nuclear ambitions with incentives for an accelerated electrification of transportation could enhance the prospects of achieving net zero emissions by 2045.

References

  • Alderman, L. (2022). France Announces Major Nuclear Power Buildup. The New York Times. February 10, 2022.
  • Andersson, J. and Finnegan, J. (2024). Industrial Policy and Decarbonization: The Case of Nuclear Energy in France. Working Paper.
  • Bilicic, G. and Scroggins, S. (2023). 2023 Levelized Cost of Energy+. Lazard.
  • Bistline, J., Mehrotra, N. and Wolfram, C. (2023). Economic Implications of the Climate Provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act. Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.
  • Government Office. (2023). De första 100 dagarna: Samarbetsprojekt klimat och energi. Stockholm, January 25, 2023.
  • Gröndahl, M-P. (2022). Thierry Breton: ’Il faudra investir 500 milliards d’euros dans les centrales nucléaires de nouvelle génération’.  Le Journal du Dimanche January 09, 2022.
  • Hecht, G. (2009). The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II. MIT Press.
  • IEA. (2015). Projected Costs of Generating Electricity: 2015 Edition. International Energy Agency. Paris.
  • IEA. (2020). Projected Costs of Generating Electricity: 2020 Edition. International Energy Agency. Paris.
  • IEA. (2022). Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Energy (2022 Edition). International Energy Agency. Paris.
  • Jasper, J. M. (1990). Nuclear politics: Energy and the state in the United States, Sweden, and France, vol 1126. Princeton University Press.
  • Lawson, A. (2022). Boss of Hinkley Point C blames pandemic disruption for 3bn delay. The Guardian. May 20, 2022.
  • Lévêque, F. (2015). The economics and uncertainties of nuclear power. Cambridge University Press.
  • Persson, I. (2022). Allt du behöver veta om ’Tidöavtalet. SVT Nyheter. 14 October, 2022.
  • Swedish Government. (2023). Regeringens proposition 2023/24:28 Sänkning av reduktionsplikten för bensin och diesel. State Documents, Sweden. Stockholm, October 12, 2023.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Spillover Effects from the Nordic Model of Prostitution Legislation

Posted on April 24, 2023 | Policy Brief

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In recent years several European countries alongside Canada and Israel have adopted the so-called Nordic model of prostitution legislation to try and reduce the risk of sexual exploitation. While the reforms directly affect the regulation of the domestic sex market, their effects may also spill over to other outcomes in nearby areas and internationally – for example affecting sex tourism flows. Making use of data on tourism flows and Google searches, a new study examines the causal effect from the implementation of the reform in four different countries on sex tourism in popular destinations. The findings indicate that domestic reforms increase sex tourism, calling for the design of policies to account also for these adverse effects.

Introduction

Since 1999, when Sweden introduced the so-called Nordic model of prostitution legislation, similar legislation has been introduced in Canada, Iceland, Ireland, France, Norway, and most recently Israel. While the legislation design differs between countries (for an overview see Perrotta Berlin and Spagnolo, 2019), the common foundation is to effectively criminalize the purchase but not the selling of sexual services. The introduction of such reforms aims at battling human trafficking and reducing the risk of exploitation. While the effect from the asymmetric prostitution legislation has been found to increase rape incidence in Sweden (Ciacci, 2018), when it comes to the sex market the Nordic model is mainly thought to affect it in two contrasting ways. Firstly, it may suppress domestic supply, which could result in people travelling to destinations where prostitution is not criminalized. Secondly, it might affect the general view on prostitution (Kotsadam and Jakobsson, 2011), thus reducing domestic demand as well as international sex tourism.

Sex tourism is associated with human trafficking, child exploitation and increased spread of sexually transmitted diseases (Herold and Van Kerkwijk, 1992; Brooks and Heaslip, 2019; Newman et al. 2011). Despite this, few studies have explored the impact of prostitution laws on the practice – in part due to measurement difficulties.

This brief presents evidence from a forthcoming paper by Perrotta Berlin and Latour on sex tourism patterns following the implementation of the reform in four different countries.

Quantifying Sex Tourism

Perrotta Berlin and Latour use tourism patterns and Google searches to quantify sex tourism flows, in order to evaluate the effect from changes in prostitution legislation in Canada, France, Ireland and Norway. Specifically, they use data on the number of monthly tourist arrivals to Thailand and The Philippines, and weekly Google searches originating from the above-mentioned reform countries for popular sex-tourism and other tourism destinations, including attractions within cities. German tourism data and Google searches originating from France as well as Google searches originating in the US are used to estimate the effect on sex tourism to bordering countries (France to Germany and US to Canada, respectively). To evaluate the respective effects, they identify treated and control groups for each considered setting, and proceed to compare data between these groups before and after the reform (in line with the so-called difference-in-differences specification, as pioneered by Card and Krueger, 1994). In the following sections, each of these specifications and the subsequent results are discussed.

Evident Spillover Effects

Thailand and The Philippines

For Thailand and The Philippines, monthly data was available on tourist arrivals differentiated by country of origin from 2013 to 2020 and from 2008 to 2020, respectively. The underlying assumption is that, absent a prostitution legislation reform in the four considered countries (Canada, Ireland, France and Norway), the tourism flows from the country in question to Thailand and The Philippines would have remained the same over time. Thus, the change in the number of tourist inflow (out of which an unknown number are sex tourists) from the country in question – when compared to the number of tourists from other countries used as the control group – can be interpreted as a causal effect from the legislative reform on sex tourism.

The results show that, when compared to tourists arriving from other countries, the number of tourists arriving from one of the countries having recently implemented the Nordic model increased by 0.312 and 0.158 standard deviation points for The Philippines and Thailand respectively. Figure 1 below illustrates the results from an event study specification, in which the reform dates in the four different countries are aligned at 0, depicting how the increase is spread over the two years following the reform.

Figure 1. Number of tourists before and after the reform, The Philippines to the left and Thailand to the right.

Notes: The horizontal axis is the time variable. Time is normalized such that 0 is the month when the reform came into force. On the left panel the vertical axis is the number of tourist arrivals to The Philippines from reform countries in deviation from control countries. On the right panel the vertical axis is the number of tourist arrivals to Thailand from reform countries in deviation from control countries.

France-Germany Border

In Germany, the legislative status of prostitution is determined at the level of municipality. For the analysis, German municipalities where prostitution is to some extent legal were considered to form the treatment group and municipalities where it is illegal constituted the control group. The outcomes of interest were i) tourists travelling to German municipalities of interest, and ii) Google searches from France for the same municipalities.

The analysis shows an increase in foreign tourism to the treatment municipalities following the implementation of the Nordic model of prostitution legislation in France.  At the same time, no changes in domestic tourism was detected. The conclusion that the increase in foreign tourism is driven by an increase in French tourists, by which one could then argue the implemented reform to increase cross-border sex tourism, was validated by the analysis of French Google searches. In these data it can be seen that distant German municipalities where prostitution is legal become relatively more interesting in French Google searches after the reform compared to municipalities where prostitution is illegal.

Figure 2. Searches of German municipalities originated in France relative their distance from the French border.

Notes: The vertical axis is the weekly index of Google Trends for searches for municipalities in Germany originated in France. The horizontal axis is distance from the French border. The red line shows that the slope decreased, i.e. distance became more salient for municipalities with illegal prostitution after the reform.

Canada-US Border

Data on Google searches for Canadian municipalities from one year before to one year after the reform in Canada were considered for the analysis. Searches originate in different US states, which also differ in the extent to which purchase of sexual services is legally punishable. The length of imprisonment in each US state determines whether a state was considered treated – when the length of imprisonment equals or exceeds that in Canada following the reform – or control. Results show that after the introduction of the Canadian reform, Google searches for Canadian municipalities dropped, in particular, in US states with high punishments for purchase of sexual services – most likely those where sex tourism to Canada used to originate before the reform. The results from the event study is depicted in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3. Number of searches of Canadian cities before and after the reform, deseasoned.

Notes: The horizontal axis is the time variable. Time is normalized such that 0 is the month when the reform came into force. The vertical axis is the number of searches from US states with high punishments in deviation from control states.

Sex Tourism Destinations

Finally, Google Searches for sex tourism destinations were considered as the outcome variable with the underlying idea being that – in the absence of a legislative change in the four considered countries – the difference in number of searches for sex tourism vs tourism destinations would have been the same over time. Sex tourism destinations were defined in two alternative ways: first, a list of popular destinations was selected within countries where prostitution is legal; second, this list was augmented with information from websites that list popular destinations for sex tourism, regardless of the legal status of prostitution in that country.

The results from this analysis are less clear, varying with the definition of sex tourism destinations and with the country of origin. But by and large they showed, if anything, that the interest in sex tourism destination countries decreased after the reform. This might indicate a change in attitudes towards lower acceptance of sex trade in general in the countries where the reform was implemented.

Conclusion

Prostitution legislation reforms affect the domestic sex market and have potential cross-border and international spillover effects. One such impact from criminalizing the purchase of sexual services domestically is increased levels of sex tourism, which might in turn impose adverse effects on the destination countries.

Filling a research gap by studying the effect from introducing asymmetric prostitution laws on sex tourism, Perrotta Berlin and Latour find evidence suggesting that harsher domestic regulation, while potentially changing attitudes in the general population (as indicated by Google Searches) also, in specific cases, increases, the outflow of tourists to destinations with less stringent laws.

After the introduction of the Nordic model, Norway has imposed legislation prohibiting their citizens to purchase sexual services even in countries where it is legal and implemented awareness campaigns on the detrimental effects of sex tourism on local populations. Given that sex tourism is associated with human trafficking, child exploitation and increased spread of sexually transmitted diseases, the results call for other countries to follow suit with domestic prostitution legislation taking on a more global approach to achieve greater effectiveness.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

The Cost of Air Pollution for Workers and Firms

Posted on February 21, 2022 |

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Air pollution is detrimental to individual health, including for the working-age population. How do health effects on workers translate into economic costs? Join the SITE Brown Bag Seminar with Marion Leroutier, a post-doctoral Researcher at the Mistra Center for Sustainable Markets (Misum), and learn more.

Pm2.5 Levels Below the WHO Thresholds and Its Effects on Health

Marion Leroutier and Hélène Ollivier, in their research paper “The Cost of air pollution for workers and firms: Evidence from sickness leave episodes”, use French administrative data on sickness leave episodes matched with employer-employee data and rich pollution and weather data. Authors exploit short-term variations in wind direction as an instrument for exposure to particulate matter (PM2.5) pollution. Their analysis shows that a one standard deviation increase in weekly exposure to PM2.5 increases the share of workers starting a sickness leave that week by 5%. The effect increases to 10% for workers with initially poorer health status.

Authors suggest that over the 2009-2015 period, keeping PM2.5 levels below the WHO thresholds would have avoided about 2.2 million days of sick leave each year. This would have saved €45 million in publicly-funded benefits and €117 million in employer-funded benefits. In preliminary plant-level analyses, authors fail to detect an effect of pollution on the number of workers in the plant and the annual number of hours worked: plants may adapt to pollution-induced absenteeism by decreasing output rather than increasing overtime or hiring more individuals.

Marion Leroutier, Researcher at the Mistra Centre for Sustainable Markets

Marion Leroutier is a post-doctoral Researcher at the Mistra Centre for Sustainable Markets (Misum), at Stockholm School of Economics (SSE). Marion is an applied environmental economist focusing on two major environmental issues, ambient air pollution and climate change. She is particularly interested in how to better integrate the health impacts of climate (in)action in environmental policy-making, with an emphasis on related inequality issues. She is also affiliated with SSE’s Department of Economics.

Registration 

The link to the seminar will be distributed by invitation only. If you are interested to attend the seminar – please contact site@hhs.se. Follow the instructions below: Type the subject box with “Brown bag seminar *INSERT SEMINAR TITLE*” and indicate your affiliation and field of interest. For registered applicants, a Zoom link will be provided prior to the event via email with further instructions.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed during events, seminars and conferences are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

The Nordic Model of Prostitution Legislation: Health, Violence and Spillover Effects

Posted on April 21, 2019 | Policy Brief

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An emerging literature is studying, with the help of new types of data and clever identification strategies, the effects of different legislative measures regulating the market for sexual services. The primary target of such measures are arguably the participants in the market, prostitutes and their clients, and law and order concerns in their immediate vicinity. In a new research project, we mean to shift the spotlight on potential broader spillovers from these policies, both to other outcomes and other countries. In their presence, we cannot understand the full impact of a law change if we limit our analysis to the prostitution market in that country alone. We focus on a particular model of prostitution legislation, first adopted in Sweden in 1999 and known since as the Nordic model.

The Nordic model

The debate on prostitution legislation shares clear similarities with the standard arguments put forward for or against alcohol prohibition or drug liberalization. The criminalization of an activity is most likely shrinking the corresponding market, because it increases the cost of participation. It also functions as a signal of what a society deems acceptable or not, and coordinates behavior to potentially change social norms. At the same time, however, it pushes the remaining market into the darkness, where criminal activity potentially increases. In the specific case of the prostitution market, what is particularly feared is an increased risk of violence and general worsening of conditions for the potentially fewer sex workers.

When, in 1999, Sweden enacted the first asymmetric criminalization of prostitution, whereby buyers but not sellers of sexual services are punished, a third way between criminalization and legalization seemed to appear. This legislation would still give a clear signal on societal values, but at the same time protect the, in large part female and in large part exploited, sex workers. The model proved very successful in deterring street prostitution, and, under the catchy name of the “Nordic model”, has subsequently been adopted by Norway, Iceland, Canada, and France. It is currently under consideration in further countries as well.

This is where most reports and policy evaluations stop. In a new project at SITE, involving an international research cooperation, we propose to investigate the impacts of this legislation beyond the participants in the prostitution market. Specifically, we encompass other outcomes such as gender-based violence, health outcomes and online behavior, both within Sweden and other countries that implemented the reform, but also, most importantly, across their borders. The idea is that law changes in one country may also affect the demand and supply of prostitution in other countries, especially but not exclusively those bordering the country that enacts the law change. Two possible channels for such cross-border effects are sex tourism and human trafficking.

This brief summarizes the preliminary evidence we collected so far.

Violence

The focus on the role of policies is a recent but rapidly growing addition to the economic literature on prostitution. The risk of violence, both for the participants and within the neighboring geographic areas, is a natural area of concern for policy in relation to the sex market, and to criminal activities in general. To improve on cross-country comparisons and draw causal links from policies to outcomes, the most robust contributions in this area focus on natural experiments. Cunningham and Shah (2018) study an unintentional, and therefore unexpected and temporary, decriminalization of indoor prostitution in Rhode Island, and find that reported rape offences fall by 30%. Cunningham and coauthors (2019) also look at the geographic expansion of the erotic services section of Craigslist, a popular advertisements website, before online solicitation was banned in 2018. The possibility to use online platforms for their work, by allowing prostitutes to keep mostly indoors, and screen their potential clients to a larger extent, appears to have been very beneficial: the study finds lower female homicide rates by 10-17% when and where the service was available. Ciacci and Sviatschi (2018) find that the opening in a neighborhood of indoor prostitution establishments decreases sex crime by 7-13%, with no effect on other types of crime, arguing that the reduction is mostly driven by potential sex offenders resorting to the establishments, instead, to satisfy their needs. What is common to these studies is the finding that allowing the sex market to exist in some form is beneficial for outsiders, while indoor prostitution is safer for the sex workers themselves.

Preliminary findings from our project (Berlin et al., 2019 a) are consistent with this. We base our strategy on a comparison, within Sweden, between counties that are above or below average in terms of representation of women among police force and elected officials (we refer to them as treated and control counties, respectively). Both these indicators have been found in previous studies to drive greater reporting and lower incidence of crimes against women (Iyer et al., 2012; Miller and Segal, 2018). Looking at population-wide rates of violence against women in Sweden, we observe an increase in assaults committed by acquaintances indoors by about 10% and an increase in rapes indoors by more than 20% in treated as compared to control counties. Since the reform is argued to have eliminated street prostitution, and pushed the remaining sex trade indoors, violence against prostitutes will be counted in the indoor assaults statistic. However, in treated counties, where we observe the increase in violent crimes against women, we at the same time find fewer convictions for buying sex. We argue therefore that the increase in assaults we observe is not likely in the context of the sex market, but rather indicates increased violence against non-prostitutes from frustrated former customers, in other words a negative externality of deterring prostitution. In order to distinguish whether this increase is only in reported or actually committed crimes, we look at hospitalizations of women for injuries that are related to sexual interactions. If we think that seeking hospital care is less sensitive than reporting a violent man to the police, the series of hospitalizations should be closer to the true violence than the convictions. Although numbers are small and differences not significant, hospitalizations spike up in treated counties directly after the reform, as Figure 1 shows. All in all, our preliminary evidence from Sweden suggests that intimate partner violence and violence on women in general might have increased as a consequence of the “Nordic model”.

Figure 1. Hospitalizations of women

Source: Hospitalizations of women for injuries related to sex, from Berlin et al. (2019 a).

Other outcomes

Besides violence, health outcomes are also a policy relevant objective with the regulation of prostitution. Indicators such as the spread of sexually transmitted infections serve the double purpose of giving a rough indication of the changes in the size of the sexual market while at the same time enabling inference on the work environment and general living conditions for prostitutes. In a companion paper, which is underway, we examine these statistics for Sweden and Norway, in terms of within country changes but also with a mind to capture potential cross-border spillovers between the two countries.

Cross-border spillovers

In another working paper (Berlin et al., 2019 b) we study the reform enacted in France on April 13th, 2016, which removed the punishment for solicitation of prostitution (previously set to two months imprisonment plus a fine) and introduced instead a range of fines for the purchasing of sexual services, thereby, pushing the punishment to the side of the buyer. In order to study the cross-border effect of this change, we focus on the German Bundesländer bordering France: Baden-Württemberg, Saarland and Rheinland-Pfalz. The national law in Germany generally allows prostitution, but gives federal states the right to regulate it on a more detailed level. This generates variation at the level of the Gemeinde, the administrative division corresponding roughly to a municipality. The idea behind our analysis is to compare municipalities where prostitution is at least in part allowed with municipalities where it is banned (we refer to them as treated and control municipalities, respectively). Our preliminary results show that foreign tourism to cities where prostitution is at least partly legal increased after the reform more than to those completely overlapping with a Sperrbezirk, i.e. an area in which prostitution is banned. However, so does domestic tourism. This might be seen as a threat to our interpretation, since we can’t connect this increase directly to the French reform, unless we can show that there is a dynamic adjustment of the supply of sexual services, which also attracts domestic flows. We can’t isolate tourism from France in this data, so we go a step further by looking at online behavior.

Google searches

A key contribution of this project is to gather new data that haven’t been analyzed to date in the existing literature. In particular, we collected detailed data on Google searches originating in France using as keywords different German cities. The idea is to capture potential deviations of search trends over time driven by prostitute customers who after the legislative change find it more attractive to look for sexual services across the German border. Preliminary findings show that after the policy change there is a larger increase in search activity for cities closer to the French border relative to cities further away. While searches are generally downward trending over time, the trend is slowed after the French reform, and this effect is stronger the closer a city is to the border, although intermittently significant. Figure 2 reports the differential increase in searches (with 95% confidence intervals) as related to the distance from the border. The negative relationship between size of the impact and distance to the border is consistent when controlling for city and time fixed effects. However, further analysis is needed in order to validate the results and control for confounding factors.

Figure 2. Google searches for German cities before and after the French reform

Source: Google Search data on searches originating in France for cities closer to VS farther from the German border than the indicated distance (in km).

We are currently repeating the same exercise at the French borders with Belgium and Spain, with searches originating in Norway around the time of the Norwegian reform (2009), and at the US-Canada border around the time of the Canadian reform (2014).

Conclusion

When adopting a version of the Nordic model in 2014, the Canadian Department of Justice stated that the “overall objectives [of the reform] are to:

  • Protect those who sell their own sexual services;
  • Protect communities, and especially children, from the harms caused by prostitution; and
  • Reduce the demand for prostitution and its incidence.”

Research seems to show that restrictions on the sexual services market, rather than the sex trade itself, have substantial negative impacts on communities and sex workers. Nevertheless, it is understandable that legislators in many countries, sharing similar concerns and expectations as expressed by the Canadian DoJ, find it unattractive to legalize prostitution. What our project points to, then, is that when considering various forms of criminalization, it is crucial to understand how best to pursue each of these objectives. Taking into account side-effects, or spillovers, such as the ones we highlight above, might reveal the need for complementary policies, in order to avoid unexpected and counterproductive consequences.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Energy Demand Management: Insights from Behavioral Economics

Posted on October 22, 2018 | Policy Brief

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It has long been recognized that consumers fail to choose the cheapest and most efficient energy-consuming investments due to a range of market and non-market failures. This has become known as the ‘Energy Efficiency Gap’.  However, there is currently a growing interest in terms of understanding on how consumers make decisions that involve an energy consumption component, and whether the efficiency of their decisions can be improved by changing the market incentives and governmental regulation. Meeting this interest, the most recent SITE Energy Talk was devoted to Demand Side Management.  SITE invited Eleanor Denny, Associate Professor of Economics at Trinity College Dublin, and Natalya Volchkova, Assistant Professor at the New Economic School (NES) in Moscwo and Policy Director at the Center for Economic and Financial Research  (CEFIR) to discuss the Demand Side Management process. The aim of this brief is to present the principles of Demand Side Management and discuss a few implemented programs in Europe, based on the discussions  during this  SITE Energy Talk.

For the last two decades, climate change policies have mostly been focused on the energy supply side, constantly encouraging new investments in renewables. But reducing energy demand may be as effective. Indeed, Denny and O’Malley (2010) found that investing 100MW in wind power is equivalent, in terms of emissions, to a decrease in demand of 50MW. Hence, there is a clear benefit of promoting energy saving. This has been the central point of different Demand Side Management (DSM) programs that may diversely focus on building management systems, demand response programs, dynamic pricing, energy storage systems, interruptible load programs and temporary use of renewable energy. The goal of these programs is to lower energy demand or, at least, smoothen the electricity demand over the day (i.e. remove peak-hour segments of demand to off-peak hours) as illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1 – Smoothing electricity demand during the day

A behavioral framework

DSM encompasses initiatives, technologies and installations that encourage energy users to optimize their consumption. However, the task does not seem easy, given the well-documented energy efficiency gap problem (e.g. Allcott & Greenstone, 2012 or Frederiks et al., 2015): consumers do not always choose the most energy efficient investments, despite potential monetary saving. One reason why might be that energy savings per se are not enough to trigger investment in energy efficient solutions or products. As Denny mentioned in her presentation, consumers will invest when the total  private benefits are higher than the costs of investment. This trade-off can be summarized by the following equation:

This equation illustrates that any DSM design should take into account both non-monetary benefits and consumers’ time preferences. The non-monetary benefits, such as improved comfort, construction and installation time, but also warm glow (i.e. positive feeling of doing something good) or social comparison, may play a major role. Moreover, the consumers’ time preferences (reflected here by the discount rate ) are also crucial in the adoption of energy efficient products. In particular, if consumers have present biased preferences, they would rather choose a product with a lower cost today and greater future cost than the reverse (i.e. higher cost today with lower future cost). Since energy-efficient products often require higher upfront investment, consumers that are impatient for immediate gains, may never choose energy efficient products.

Ultimately, it is an empirical (and context specific) question when and why DSM programs can reduce the energy efficiency gap. We describe below some DSM programs that have been implemented and discuss their impact.

Smart meters, a powerful DSM tool

A common DSM program is the installation of smart meters, which measure consumption and can automatically regulate it. The adoption of smart meters allows real-time consumption measures, unlike traditional meters that only permitted load profiling (i.e. periodic information of the customer’s electricity use).

Figure 2 – Energy Intensity in Europe

As illustrated in Figure 2, many European countries have implemented smart meter deployment programs. Interestingly, most of those countries have a relatively high level of energy efficiency (proxied by the energy intensity indicator of final energy consumption). On the contrary, in the Balkans and non-EU Eastern Europe countries, which fare poorly on the energy intensity performance scale, no smart meter rollout programs seem to be implemented.

Following the European Commission (EC) directive of 2009 (Directive 2009/72/EC), twenty-two EU members will have smart meter deployment programs for electricity and gas by 2020 (see Figure 2).  These programs are targeting end-users of energy, e.g. households that represent 29% of the current EU-28’s energy consumption, industries (36.9%) and services (29.8%) (EEA). With this rollout plan, a reduction of 9% in households’ annual energy consumption is expected.

The situation across the member states is however very different. Spain was one of the first EU countries to implement meters in 1988 for industries with demand over 5MW. All the meters will be changed at the end of 2018. 27 million euros for a 30-year investment in smart meter installations is forecasted (EC, 2013). Sweden started to implement smart meter rollout in 2003 and 5.2 million monthly-reading meters were installed by 2009. Vattenfall, one of the major utilities in Sweden, assessed their savings up to 12 euros per installed smart meter (Söderbom, 2012). Similarly in the United Kingdom, the Smart Metering Implementation Programme (SMIP) is estimated to bring an overall £7.2 billion (8.2 billion euros) net benefit over 20 years, mainly from energy saving (OFGEM, 2010). In general, smart metering has been effective, but its effectiveness may diminish over time (Carroll et al, 2014).

From smart-meter to real-time pricing

The idea of real-time pricing for electricity consumers is not new. Borenstein and Holland (2005) and Joskow and Tirole (2006) argue that this price scheme would lead to a more efficient allocation, with lower deadweight loss than under invariant pricing.

By providing detailed information about real-time consumption, smart meters enable energy producers to adopt dynamic pricing strategies. The increasing adoption of smart meters across Europe will likely increase the share of real-time-pricing consumers, as well as the efficiency gains. With the digitalization of the economy, it is likely that smart metering will grow. Indeed, Erdinc (2014) calculates that the economic impact of smart homes on in-home appliances could result in a 33% energy-bill reduction, due to differences in shift potential of appliances.

In 2004, the UK adopted a time-of-use programme called Economy 10, which provides lower tariffs during 10 hours of off-peak periods – split between night, afternoon and evening – for electrically charged and thermal storage heaters. The smart time-of-use tariffs involving daily variation in prices were only introduced in 2017.

Likewise, France’s main electricity provider EDF, implemented Tempo tariff for 350,000 residential customers and more than 100,000 small business customers. Based on a colour system to indicate whether or not the hour is a peak period, customers can automatically or manually monitor their consumption by controlling connection and disconnection of separate water and space-heating circuits. With this program, users reduced their electricity bills by 10% on average.

In Russia, the “consumptions threshold” program discussed by Natalya Volchkova, gave different prices for different consumption thresholds. But it seems that the consumers’ behaviour did not change. This might be due to the thresholds being too low, and an adjusted program should be launched in 2019.

Joskow and Tirole (2007), argue that an optimal electricity demand response program should include some rationing of price-insensitive consumers. Indeed, voluntary interruptible load programs have been launched, mainly targeting energy intensive industries that are consuming energy on a 24/7 basis. These programs consist of rewarding users financially to voluntarily be on standby. For instance, interruptible programmes in Italy apply a lump-sum compensation of 150,000 euros/MWh/year for 10 interruptions and 3000 euros/MW for each additional interruption (Torriti et al., 2010).

Nudging with energy labelling

Energy labelling has been also part of DSM. Since the EC Directives on Ecodesign and Energy Labelling (Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU), energy-consuming products should be labelled according to their level of energy efficiency. For Ireland, Eleanor Denny has tested how labelling electrical in-home appliances may affect consumers’ decisions, like purchasing electrical appliances or buying a house. First, Denny and co-authors have nudged buyers of appliances, providing different information regarding future energy bills saving. They find that highly educated people, middle income and landlords are more likely to be concerned with energy-efficiency rates, rather than high-income people.

In another randomized control trial, Denny and co-authors manipulate information on the energy efficiency label for a housing purchase. In Ireland, landlords are charged for energy bills even when they rent out their property. The preliminary findings are that landlords informed about the annual energy cost of their houses are willing to pay 2,608 euros for a one step improvement in the letter rating – the EU label rating for buildings ranges from A to G – compared to the landlords that do not receive the information (see CONSEED project).

Similar to the European Directive, the 2009 Russian Energy efficiency law includes compulsory energy efficiency labels for some goods and improvements of the building standards (EBRD, 2011). Volchkova and co-authors run a randomized controlled experiment on the monetary incentives to buy energy efficient products. In 2016, people in the Moscow region received a voucher with randomly assigned discounts (-30%, -50% or -70%- for the purchase of LED bulbs. Vouchers were used very little, irrespective of the income. It seems that consumption habits and not so much monetary rewards were the main driver of LED bulb purchase.

How can DSM be improved?

Any demand response program requires some demand elasticity. For example, smart meters and dynamic pricing only improve electricity consumption efficiency if demand is price elastic. As Jessoe and Rapson (2014) show, one should provide detailed information (e.g. insights on non-price attributes, real-time feedback on in-home displays) to try to increase demand elasticity. Hence it seems that  the low adoption of energy efficient goods is partly due to a lack of information or biased information received by the consumers. First, it is difficult for many to translate energy savings in kWh in monetary terms. Second, many consumers focus on the short-term purchase cost and discount heavily the long run energy saving. These information inefficiencies can, in principle, be diminished by private actors and/or governmental regulation. Denny mentioned the possibility of displaying monetary benefits on labels in consumers’ decision-making in order to improve energy cost salience. For instance, in the US or Japan, the usage cost information is also displayed in monetary terms. Moreover, lifetime usage cost (i.e. cost of ownership) should also be given to the customers since it has been shown that displaying lifetime energy consumption information has significantly higher effect than presenting annual information  (Hutton & Wilkie 1980; Kaenzig 2010).

Summing up, DSM programs, including those with a behavioral framework, are an important tool for regulators, households and industries helping to meet emissions reduction targets, significantly decrease demand for energy and use energy more efficiently.

References

  • Allcott, Hunt ; Greenstone, Michael. 2012. “Is There an Energy Efficiency Gap?”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 26 (1): 3-28.
  • Borenstein, Severin; Holland, Stephen. 2005. “On The Efficiency Of Competitive Electricity Markets With Time-Invariant Retail Prices”, Rand Journal of Economics, 36(3), 469-493.
  • Carroll, James; Lyons, Seán; Denny, Eleanor. 2014. “Reducing household electricity demand through smart metering: The role of improved information about energy saving,” Energy Economics, 45(C), 234-243.
  • Denny, Eleanor; O’Malley, Mark. 2010. “Base-load cycling on a system with significant wind penetration”, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 2.25, 1088-1097.
  • Erdinc, Ozan. 2014. “Economic impacts of small-scale own generating and storage units, and electric vehicles under different demand response strategies for smart households”, Applied Energy, 126(C), 142-150.
  • European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. “The low carbon transition”. Chapter 3 Effective policies to induce mitigation (2011).
  • European Commission. Electricity Directive 2009/92. Annex I.
  • European Commission. Ecodesign and Energy Labelling Framework directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU.
  • European Commission. “From Smart Meters to Smart Consumers”, Promoting best practices in innovative smart metering services to the European regions (2013).
  • European Commission. “Benchmarking smart metering deployment in the EU-27 with a focus on electricity” (2014).
  • European Environment Agency. Data on Final energy consumption of electricity by sector and Energy intensity.
  • Frederiks, Elisha R.; Stenner, Karen; Hobman, Elizabeth V. 2015. “Household energy use: Applying behavioural economics to understand consumer decision-making and behaviour”, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 41(C), 1385-1394.
  • Hutton, Bruce R.; Wilkie, William L. 1980. “Life Cycle Cost: A New Form of Consumer Information.” Journal of Consumer Research, 6(4), 349-60.
  • Jessoe, Katrina; Rapson, David. 2014. “Knowledge is (less) power: experimental evidence from residential energy use”, American Economic Review, 104(4), 1417-1438.
  • Joskow, Paul; Tirole, Jean. 2006. “Retail Electricity Competition“, Rand Journal of Economics, 37(4), 799-815.
  • Joskow, Paul; Tirole, Jean. 2007. “Reliability and Competitive Electricity Markets”, Rand Journal of Economics, 38(1), 60-84.
  • Kaenzig, Josef; Wüstenhagen, Rolf. 2010. “The Effect of Life Cycle Cost Information on Consumer Investment Decisions Regarding Eco‐Innovation”, Journal of Industrial Ecology, 14(1), 121-136.
  • OFGEM. “Smart Metering Implementation Programme” (2010).
  • Söderbom, J. “Smart Meter roll out experiences”, Vattenfall (2012).
  • Torriti, Jacopo; Hassan, Mohamed G.; Leach, Matthew. 2010. “Demand response experience in Europe: Policies, programmes and implementation”, Energy, 35(4), 1575-1583.

Project links

Eleanor Denny and co-authors’ European research projects:

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Electoral Competition and Political Selection

Posted on January 18, 2016 | Policy Brief

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Research in political economy has recently rediscovered that individuals, and not only institutions, matter for economic outcomes: not all politicians are of the same quality. Competition in the political market may have another virtue than its traditional disciplining role: it may favor the selection of good politicians. In a recent paper, Marijn Verschelde and I study the (time-varying) relationship between political competition and the quality of French deputies.

Note: this column draws heavily on a paper written with Marijn Verschelde, which is available here. The figures are taken from it.

How to design the political selection mechanism in order to favor the emergence of “good” politicians? The traditional public-choice literature emphasized the role of institutions in shaping the behavior of politicians, but have paid little attention, if any, to the individual decision maker. From this point of view, it is purely illusive to seek for “morally superior agents who will use their powers in some public interest” (Buchanan, 1989): all politicians are purely self-interested agents who have to be incentivized to act in accordance with voters’ preferences.

However, a recent stream of empirical papers provides evidence that individual politicians matter for economic outcomes (Besley et al., 2011; Jones and Olken, 2005). In other words, as suggested by common sense, they are not all cut from the same cloth. This emphasizes the need not only to shape institutions in order to discipline incumbent politicians, but also to select “good” decision makers.

Several determinants have been shown to affect political selection: the wage of politicians (Besley, 2004; Messner and Polborn, 2004), the transparency of politics (Mattozzi and Merlo, 2007), the institutional flexibility (Acemoglu et al., 2010), and reservation quotas (Besley et al., 2005; Besley et al., 2013). In addition to a well-known disciplining effect (for instance Stigler, 1972, and Becker, 1983), electoral competition is also likely to enhance this selection process as well (Galasso and Nannicini, 2011): competition pushes parties to select candidates of good quality in order to seduce neutral voters, who, contrary to partisans, are sensitive to the quality of the candidates. As recruiting experts are difficult, hence costly, parties will allocate them in the most contested districts only.

In a recent paper, Marijn Verschelde and I investigate the relationship between quality and competition in the case of the French National Assembly. Measuring the quality of politicians is not straightforward. A wide theoretical definition of quality is a combination of competence and motivation. Such a broad definition is challenging to operationalize in empirical work. Some papers approximate quality by variables like level of schooling and experience of politicians (Baltrunaite et al., 2014; Besley et al., 2011; Kotakorpi and Poutvaara, 2011), while others use their absenteeism rate or vote attendance (Galasso and Nannicini, 2011; Gagliarducci and Nannicini, 2013). We innovate by proposing a measure of quality based on productivity, i.e., on what deputies actually do. We gathered from the Assemblée Nationale archive all the information that has been systematically collected over the years for each deputy and for each year from 1958 to 2012: (i) propositions of law, (ii) oral questions, (iii) reports, and (iv) debates in which the deputy has been involved in. From these four aspects of parliamentary work, we compute a composite indicator of productivity (bounded between 0 and 1, higher values indicating higher performance). To measure political competition, we use a measure based on a Herfindahl index of the vote shares at the first round (bounded between 0 and 1, larger values indicating stiffer competition).

Figure 1. Estimated Productivity Conditional on Competition

fig1

We document a strong effect of competition on deputies’ productivity, in accordance with the theoretical framework. Figure 1 displays the estimated level of productivity as a function of the degree of competition, controlling for personal (age, schooling, etc.) and political (party, committee, and the likes) variables. Everything else equal, a deputy elected in the a priori most contested district is estimated to reach a productivity close to 0.8, while if she is elected in a safe district her productivity is estimated to be at most 0.6. This means that the productivity of deputies can vary by up to 30% depending on the degree of contestability. This relation holds even after minimizing problems of potential reversed causality and controlling for reelection incentives, indicating that we actually observe a selection effect.

Considering the time span of our dataset, it is interesting to observe how the positive relationship between electoral competition and political selection evolved over time. The most noticeable evolution over the second part of the XXth century in France is certainly the ideological convergence after the 80’s, marked with the reconciliation of the Socialist Party with the market and the rise of the Pensée unique (“one track thinking”, Knapp and Wright, 2001). Such an evolution should have decreased ideological voting and produced more competence-based elections, hence increasing the effect of competition on quality.

Figure 2. Effect of Competition over Time

fig2

However, we uncover a clear inverse-U shaped evolution. Figure 2 plots the effect of competition conditional on the year: the effect of electoral competition sharply increased till the 1980’s, but it has continuously decreased since then. How to explain this pattern? A possible explanation is the increased voters volatility, i.e., a higher unpredictability in voters’ behavior. If at first sight this phenomenon indicates an increase in the share of neutral voters, this is however not necessarily the case. Instead of moving from partisanship to neutrality, it is possible that supporters of a party A at election t turn into supporters of party B at election t+1. Partisans disappointed by the behavior of their party while in office might provide an unconditional support to the competing party at the next election. This is consistent with the fact that not any party succeeded to win two national elections in a row since the 80’s.

Conclusion

Our analysis point out a clear positive relationship between electoral competition and the quality of the French deputies, measured by a composite indicator of productivity. Overall, deputies elected in contested districts tend to perform better than others. From a public policy perspective, this result suggests that reforms enhancing political competition (for instance by redistricting jurisdiction in a proper way or by ensuring a fair access to media to competing parties) should be supported. However, we observe that the impact of competition increased till the 80’s, but continuously decreases since then. This opens the door for a vast research agenda, as it indicate that drivers of an efficient selection mechanism are not necessarily stable over time.

▪

 

References

  • Acemoglu, D., Egorov, G., Sonin, K., 2010. Political selection and persistence of bad government. Quarterly Journal of Economics 125 (4), 1511-1575.
  • Becker, G.S., 1983. A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 97, 371-400.
  • Baltrunaite, A., Bello, P., Casarico, A., Profeta, P., 2014. Gender quotas and the quality of politicians. Journal of Public Economics 118, 62–74.
  • Besley, T., Montalvo, J., Reynal-Querol, M., 2011. Do educated leaders matter? Economic Journal 121, 205-227.
  • Besley, T., Pande, R., Rao, V., 2005. Political selection and the quality of government: Evidence from south india. PEPP/8, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
  • Besley, T., Folke, O., Persson, T., Rickne, J., 2013. Gender quotas and the crisis of the mediocre man: Theory and evidence from sweden. IFN Working Paper 985.
  • Buchanan, J., 1989. Constitutional Economics, Explorations into Constutional Economics. College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press.
  • Gagliarducci, S., Nannicini, T., 2013. Do better paid politicians perform better? disentangling incentives from selection. Journal of the European Economic Association 11 (2), 369-398.
  • Galasso, V., Nannicini, T., 2011. Competing on good politicians. American Political Science Review 105 (1), 79-99.
  • Gavoille, N., Verschelde, M., 2015. Electoral competition and political selection: An analysis of the productivity of French politicians, 1958-2012. Condorcet Center working paper series.
  • Jones, B., Olken, B., 2005. Do leaders matter? National leadership and growth since World War II. Quarterly Journal of Economics 120 (3), 835-864.
  • Knapp, A., Wright, V., 2001. The governmentand politics of France. Routledge.
  • Kotakorpi, K., Poutvaara, P., 2011. Pay for politicians and candidate selection: An empirical analysis. Journal of Public Economics 95, 877–885.
  • Messner, M., Polborn, M., 2004. Paying politicians. Journal of Public Economics 88, 2423-2445.
  • Mattozzi, A., Merlo, A., 2007. The transparency of politics and the quality of politicians. American Economic Review 97 (2), 311-315.
  • Stigler, G., 1972. Economic competition and political competition. Public Choice 13, 91–106.