Location: Poland

How Polarised Is Support for Ukraine Across Europe?

Posted on May 18, 2026 | Policy Brief

20260518 How Polarised Is Support for Ukraine Image 01

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 triggered broad public support across Western democracies. Since then, support in the United States has declined and become sharply partisan. In this policy brief, we use Eurobarometer data from 2022 to 2024 to show that while overall support for Ukraine remains high in the European Union, it has declined over time and become more politically polarised. We introduce a polarisation index to compare trends across countries and over time. There is substantial heterogeneity: while support remains close to universal in some countries, such as Sweden, others have seen marked increases in polarisation, with support weakening particularly on the far right. We find that higher inflation is associated with greater polarisation for costly policies, such as sanctions against Russia, but not for humanitarian aid. Finally, we present suggestive evidence that polarisation in support for sanctions may reflect domestic political debate.

From Consensus to Polarisation?

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 prompted widespread public support for Ukraine on both sides of the Atlantic. According to a PEW survey less than one month after the invasion, only 7% of Americans (9% of Republicans and 5% of Democrats) said the US is providing too much support to Ukraine (PEW, 2022). Two years later, overall support dropped significantly and support for Ukraine became politically polarised: with 47% of Republicans but only 13% of Democrats saying that the US is providing too much support (PEW, 2024).

In this brief, we use microdata from Eurobarometer covering over 185,000 respondents to evaluate whether the same trends are present in the EU. We show that support for Ukraine remained relatively high and stable across Europe from 2022 to 2024. This finding is consistent with other surveys that report resilient support among Europeans despite pessimism about the war’s likely outcome (Krastev and Leonard 2024) and personal costs in terms of inflation (Demertzis et al. 2023). Our brief focuses specifically on political cleavages within countries. We show that policies supporting Ukraine have become increasingly polarising in some countries and evaluate potential drivers of that polarisation.

Support for Ukraine Across the Political Spectrum

Figure 1 shows support for economic sanctions against Russia (Panel A) and humanitarian aid for Ukraine (Panel B) in the EU, by respondents’ self-reported left–right political placement in the Eurobarometer (for details on this measure, see also Lehne and Zhuang, 2023b). Support for Ukraine was high across the political spectrum in the immediate aftermath of the invasion, but declined in the latest Eurobarometer data from October 2024. The sharpest declines occur on the far right, especially for economic sanctions against Russia.

Figure 1A. Support for economic sanctions against Russia

Figure 1B. Support for humanitarian aid to Ukraine

Source: Eurobarometer and authors’ calculations.
This chart shows the mean support for each measure in April 2022 (in blue) and October 2024 (in red) in the EU. Based on binary transformations of Eurobarometer questions on support for each measure; dots show means and bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

A similar pattern holds for military aid to Ukraine, though the average level of support is lower (not shown). Support for humanitarian aid is uniformly higher and less politically polarising; even among respondents on the very far right, more than three-quarters are in favour.

This overall pattern masks large heterogeneity across countries. Figure 2 shows support for sanctions against Russia in four European countries: Sweden, Poland, Greece and France. In Sweden, support for sanctions is close to universal, broadly uniform across the political spectrum, and has changed little in the two years since the start of the war. Similarly, in Poland, support remains very high but declines in 2024 among respondents on the centre-right. Support varies more with political leaning in countries such as France and Greece. While support for sanctions was relatively high in France in 2022, especially in the centre, it has declined markedly on the right. This pattern is repeated across many other European countries, including Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy. By contrast, in Greece, support for sanctions was comparatively lower to begin with and declined further over time. In Greece, as in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Latvia and Slovakia, support is particularly weak on the left.

Figure 2. Political Polarisation in Support for Sanctions across four European countries

2a. Sweden

2b. Poland

2c. France

2d. Greece

Source: Eurobarometer and authors’ calculations.
This chart shows mean support for sanctions against Russia in April 2022 (in blue) and October 2024 (in red) in (a) Sweden, (b) Poland, (c) France and (d) Greece. Based on binary transformations of Eurobarometer questions on support for each measure; dots show means and bars indicate standard deviations.

A Political Polarisation Index

In order to compare how politicised support for Ukraine is across countries and over time, we  develop a polarisation index (see technical note for details). This measures the extent to which each self-reported ideology group’s support for a policy differs from the country-wide average (in other words, how far the dots in Figure 1 lie from a horizontal line).  The index ranges from 0 (all groups share the same position on sanctions) to 1 (groups hold opposing positions that are perfectly predicted by political ideology). Comparing the same country over time, there are two factors that change the index: (i) within an ideology group, average support for a policy may change, and (ii) the size of ideology groups (and their weight in the index) may change as the distribution of political views in the country evolves.

Comparing across countries, the index does not depend on the left-right gradient of support. While France and Greece show opposite patterns in Figure 2, they score similarly on the sanctions polarisation index in October 2024 (0.16 and 0.15, respectively). For Sweden, Figure 2 shows much greater consensus across the political spectrum, which translates into a significantly lower polarisation score: 0.05.

We find that some policies are associated with greater polarisation than others. There is widespread support in the EU for providing humanitarian aid and welcoming refugees from Ukraine, and polarisation scores are lower for these measures than for financial aid, military aid, sanctions on Russia or Ukraine becoming an EU candidate country. At the same time, looking at the EU as a whole, there has been an upwards trend in polarisation across all measures (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Political Polarisation Indices for different policies supporting Ukraine

Source: Eurobarometer and authors’ calculations.
This chart shows the EU-average political polarisation index for six different policies supporting Ukraine. The EU average is constructed using population weights. Survey waves are unevenly spaced across time. Some policies are not asked about in some waves.

Figure 4 shows which countries are driving the increase in polarisation. It plots the polarisation score for sanctions in April 2022 (shortly after the full-scale invasion) against the corresponding score in October 2024 (the latest wave for which data are available). Austria, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia show the greatest increase in polarisation over this period. Views on sanctions are also increasingly aligned with political cleavages in France, Germany, and Hungary. By contrast, Latvia shows a significant decline in polarisation while in Finland, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, and Sweden polarisation remained at very low levels more than two years into the war.

Figure 4. Political Polarisation Index for Sanctions against Russia 2022 vs 2024

Source: Eurobarometer and authors’ calculations.
This chart shows the political polarisation index for support for sanctions against Russia from the Eurobarometer data in October 2024 on the y-axis against the polarisation index in April 2022 on the x-axis. Includes all EU27 countries.

Drivers of Political Polarisation

In the next section, we show how political polarisation in support for Ukraine is related to the economy and domestic politics.

Polarisation and Price Increases

Figure 5 shows how political polarisation and inflation are related across countries in the EU. Political polarisation in support for sanctions against Russia at the end of 2024 tended to be higher in countries where prices increased faster between 2022 and 2024. As the cost of living increased, the issue of Russian sanctions became a point of contention between voters of different political leanings. Some political parties also started to capitalise on this issue to gain support. In contrast, there has been widespread agreement on the need for humanitarian aid to Ukraine and this was unaffected by the state of the economy.

Figure 5. Political Polarisation and Inflation

Source: Eurobarometer, Eurostat and authors’ calculations.
This chart shows the polarisation index for support for sanctions against Russia (in blue) and humanitarian aid for Ukraine (in red) from the Eurobarometer data in October 2024 against the average annual HICP inflation rate between 2022 and 2024 in percentage points. Includes all EU27 countries.

Polarisation and Elections

In Figure 6, we show how the polarisation index for support for sanctions against Russia (blue) and humanitarian aid for Ukraine (red) evolves around elections. Political polarisation for sanctions increases slightly around election periods, suggesting heightened debate on this issue. In contrast, polarisation in support for humanitarian aid shows little change over the election cycle.

Figure 6. Political Polarisation and Elections

Source: Eurobarometer, PPEG, Manifesto Project and authors’ calculations.
This chart shows the polarisation index for support for sanctions against Russia (blue) and humanitarian aid for Ukraine (red) in the two years before and after national parliamentary elections. Dots show means and bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. This is based on an unbalanced sample of EU countries with a lower house election between April 2022 and October 2024. For each country, only the closest election is used.

A Tale of Three Countries

Political parties play an important role in shaping the political discourse around Russia’s war on Ukraine. They are likely to both influence and be influenced by their voters’ attitudes towards supporting Ukraine.

In this section, we present a case study of three European countries that had elections between 2022 and 2024 and where parties have mentioned Russia in their manifestos according to data from the Manifesto project (see also Lehne and Zhuang, 2023a).

In Sweden, support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression has been consistently high along all dimensions and among voters across the political spectrum. In the Swedish elections in September 2022, six out of eight parties (including all three major parties) mentioned Russia in their party manifestos, and all supported sanctions against Russia.

Russia was also mentioned in the party manifestos of many of the parties contesting the French election in June 2022. But in France, the far-right Rassemblement Nationale broke with the other political parties and struck a more conciliatory tone towards Russia. For instance, they stated that they “… will be seeking an alliance with Russia on certain fundamental issues: European security, which cannot exist without Russia; the fight against terrorism, which Russia has fought more consistently than any other power; and convergence in the handling of major regional issues impacting France …” (Manifesto Project). This divergence is mirrored in voter attitudes. Support for sanctions against Russia has declined over time in France, especially amongst voters on the far right of the political spectrum.

In Greece, political support for sanctions against Russia is lower than in many other European countries has been declining over time. Political polarisation in support for Ukraine increased, especially around the elections in May and June 2023. Few of the political parties mentioned Russia directly in their manifestos, and then mostly in conjunction with rising prices and effects on the Greek economy.

Figure 7. Political Polarisation in Support for Ukraine

7a. Sanctions against Russia

7b. Humanitarian Aid for Ukraine

Source: Eurobarometer, Manifesto Project and authors’ calculations.
These charts show political polarisation in support for sanctions against Russia (Panel A) and humanitarian aid for Ukraine (Panel B) in France, Greece and Sweden. Vertical dashed lines show the timing of national parliamentary elections.

Conclusion

Public support for Ukraine remains high in the EU, but there are worrying signs of fragmentation. While some countries continue to exhibit broad consensus in supporting Ukraine across multiple policies, other countries have seen declining support as the debate has become aligned with domestic political cleavages. Sanctions against Russia and military aid to Ukraine have become increasingly contentious, while there is broader agreement on the need for humanitarian aid. In many countries, it is particularly voters on the far-right of the political spectrum who have become less supportive of policies supporting Ukraine.

Our analysis highlights two areas of fragility in the consensus around support for sanctions against Russia. We see some indication that the domestic political debate can drive polarisation in opinions on sanctions against Russia, with the salience of these issues increasing around elections, particularly when parties competing in the elections have different policy platforms.

Another source of fragility is the economic cost of sanctions. Countries that experienced larger increases in prices since 2022 exhibit greater political disagreement over sanctions, suggesting that economic costs can shape the political sustainability of support for Ukraine. Recent increases in energy prices, linked to the war in Iran, may further amplify political polarisation around sanctions against Russia.

Despite these pressures, clear majorities across most EU countries continue to support Ukraine, especially when it comes to humanitarian aid and welcoming refugees. European solidarity has so far proven resilient in the face of growing external pressures.

Technical note:

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Migration Shocks and Voting: Evidence from Ukrainian Migration to Poland

Posted on May 11, 2026 | Policy Brief

20240128 Ukrainian Refugees Image 05

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine triggered two massive inflows of Ukrainians into Poland: conflict-induced labor migration from 2014 onward and a mass refugee inflow after the Russian full-scale invasion in February 2022. We study how local exposure to each shock reshaped voting in Poland. The findings show that greater exposure to labor migrants reduced support for conservative parties in the short run and subsequently shifted voters toward pro-redistribution parties. Both migration waves reduced far-right voting, but this effect emerged only after Ukrainian migrants became salient in public debate and the far-right Konfederacja party adopted anti-Ukrainian rhetoric. The backlash against the far-right is about ten times stronger in areas more exposed to refugees than in areas more exposed to labor migrants.

Two Migration Waves, One Origin Country

Europe has absorbed several large migration waves over the past decade, often followed by a shift to the right in domestic politics. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to the largest war-induced migration in recent European history, and many of the new arrivals have settled in post-communist countries that had long been sources of emigration rather than destinations. Poland stands out: between 2014 and 2023, it experienced two unexpected and very different waves of Ukrainian migration, which provides a rare opportunity to see how distinct types of migration affect local politics.

Before February 2022, Russia’s 2014 aggression and the economic turmoil it produced pushed large numbers of Ukrainian workers into Poland. While these migrants were not necessarily low-skilled, they mostly filled low- and medium-skilled positions, complementing rather than competing with Poland’s abundant supply of highly educated workers (Zuchowski 2025). Crucially, they had no access to Polish social benefits. The situation changed abruptly after Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Over a million Ukrainian refugees, mostly women and children fleeing an immediate threat to their lives, arrived in Poland. Under the EU Temporary Protection Directive, they received unrestricted access to the Polish labor market and to a broad set of social benefits. About 90 percent of Polish society supported taking in Ukrainian refugees in the immediate aftermath of the invasion. However, as war fatigue set in, the far-right Konfederacja party increasingly relied on anti-Ukrainian rhetoric, which became one of the defining features of its 2023 parliamentary campaign.

Measuring the Local Political Effects

We use county-level data to study how local exposure to each shock changed voting patterns in the Polish parliamentary elections of 2015, 2019, and 2023. Polish counties differ substantially in the number of Ukrainian workers and refugees they received, and we compare the change in vote shares since 2011 between counties with more and less exposure. Because migrants are not randomly distributed across counties, simply correlating migrant inflows with local outcomes could confuse cause and effect. For instance, migrants may settle where labor markets are already expanding. Thus, to isolate the causal effect of immigration, we use three instruments that predict where migrants settled for reasons unrelated to local economic conditions:  the distance to historical hotspots of Ukrainian networks created by the 1947 forced resettlement “Akcja Wisla”, the distance to the nearest Polish-Ukrainian border crossing, and a novel instrument based on the distance to the Polish cities that co-hosted UEFA Euro 2012. The intuition is that each of these instruments drew Ukrainians to certain locations through ethnic networks, lower travel costs, or the connections and visibility that the tournament generated, yet these historical and geographic features had no direct impact on contemporary voting behavior, allowing us to attribute observed effects to the migrant inflows. We classify Polish parties into three non-exclusive groups: conservative (versus liberal), pro-redistribution (versus pro-free market), and far-right (versus non-far-right).

Labor Migration: Away from Conservatives, Then Toward Redistribution

Figure 1 shows the estimated effect of local exposure to Ukrainian labor migrants on voting for the three party groups in the 2015, 2019, and 2023 parliamentary elections. The pattern is clearest for conservative parties: in the first election after the 2014 inflow, a one percentage point increase in the local share of Ukrainian workers is associated with a decrease in the combined conservative vote share of about 0.3 percentage points. For pro-redistribution parties, we detect no statistically significant movement in 2015, but by 2019, the same exposure corresponds to an increase of 0.7 to 0.9 percentage points. In other words, exposure to Ukrainian labor migrants first moved voters away from conservative parties and, over time, pulled them toward parties that promise more redistribution. Voting for far-right parties follows a different pattern. Through 2019, we detect no effect, even though Ukrainian workers had been arriving since 2014. Only in 2023, after Russia’s full-scale invasion made Ukrainian migration highly visible in public debate, does a negative effect on far-right voting emerge, with a one percentage point increase in the local share of labor migrants reducing far-right support by 0.15 to 0.27 percentage points. Empirical evidence on mechanisms from local labor markets provides an intuitive explanation for the first two results: counties more exposed to Ukrainian labor migrants experienced rising wages and falling unemployment, so voters first rewarded openness and then sought a stronger social safety net for themselves, knowing that labor migrants did not themselves draw on Polish social benefits.

Figure 1. Ukrainian labor migration and vote shares in Polish parliamentary elections (2015, 2019, 2023)

Source: Mykhailyshyna and Zuchowski (2026), Figure 2. Each point reports the estimated change in the local vote share of pro-redistribution, conservative, or far-right parties for a 1-percentage-point increase in the local share of Ukrainian labor migrants, using OLS and three instrumental-variables specifications (Akcja Wisla, Euro 2012, and Border). Bars show 95 percent confidence intervals.

Refugees: A Sharp Backlash Against the Far-right

The picture looks very different for the 2022 refugee inflow, summarized in Figure 2. Local exposure to Ukrainian refugees has no statistically significant effect on either the conservative or the pro-redistribution vote share in 2023. The null effect on redistribution fits the fact that, unlike earlier labor migrants, Ukrainian refugees were eligible for Polish social benefits: expanding redistribution would be shared with migrants rather than captured only by natives. The null effect on conservatives likely reflects the broad cross-party solidarity with Ukraine in the immediate aftermath of the invasion, with both conservative and liberal parties initially taking a similar pro-refugee stance. What shows up strongly is an effect on the far-right: a one-percentage-point increase in the local share of Ukrainian refugees reduces the far-right vote share by 1.1 to 1.9 percentage points, roughly ten times the corresponding effect for labor migrants. The most likely explanation combines political salience with direct contact. During the 2023 campaign, the far-right Konfederacja party made opposition to Ukrainian refugees a central theme, using slogans such as “Poland only for Poles” and attacking government spending on refugee aid. In counties with more direct exposure to refugees, that rhetoric appears to have backfired: voters who had personally seen Ukrainian refugees integrate into local labor markets and daily life became less, not more, receptive to anti-Ukrainian messaging, a pattern consistent with Allport’s contact hypothesis (Allport 1954).

Figure 2. Ukrainian refugee inflow and vote shares in the 2023 Polish parliamentary election

Source: Mykhailyshyna and Zuchowski (2026), Figure 3. Each point reports the estimated change in the local vote share of pro-redistribution, conservative, or far-right parties for a one percentage point increase in the local share of Ukrainian refugees (based on PESEL registrations), using OLS and three instrumental-variable specifications (Akcja Wisla, Euro 2012, and Border). Bars show 95 percent confidence intervals.

Conclusion

Ukrainian migration to Poland shows that the political effect of immigration depends not only on how many migrants arrive but also on who they are, how they integrate into local labor markets, and how salient they become in national debate. Labor migrants who complemented Polish workers moved voters away from conservatives and, over time, toward pro-redistribution parties. Refugees who were highly visible, eligible for social benefits, and explicitly targeted by far-right rhetoric triggered a strong backlash against the far-right in areas with direct contact. These results cut against the assumption that migrant inflows mechanically strengthen anti-immigrant parties: under the right conditions, local contact and a positive economic experience can push voters in the opposite direction. For policymakers designing refugee and migration frameworks in the EU and beyond, the Polish case suggests that integration into local labor markets, clear rules on access to benefits, and the nature of political discourse around migrants matter at least as much as the sheer scale of inflows.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Post-2020 Belarusian Permanent Migration to the EU and Beyond: An Empirical Assessment

Posted on April 27, 2026 | Policy Brief

Minsk International Airport facade with a passenger aircraft reflected in the glass.

Following the 2020 presidential election, Belarus experienced a sharp increase in outward migration, primarily to the European Union, with Poland and Lithuania becoming the main destination countries. However, the official migration statistics suffer from limitations and inconsistencies. The brief provides an empirical assessment of the scale of Belarusian migration after 2020. The results indicate that 400–418 thousand Belarusians live and/or work in the EU, Russia, and Georgia. The migration significantly affects host countries’ labour markets and social systems, particularly in Poland. In turn, for Belarus, it represents substantial forgone economic potential, with estimated output losses exceeding 3.4% of GDP.

Introduction

After the 2020 presidential election in Belarus, outward migration increased significantly. Belarusian citizens left the country for both political and economic reasons, with the European Union, particularly Poland and Lithuania, becoming one of the main destinations. Belarusian migrants have become a significant source of labour supply in Poland and Lithuania, helping alleviate labour shortages in economies experiencing demographic decline. At the same time, a sizable outward migration is likely to affect both Belarus’ demographic dynamics and the economic outcomes. In this sense, estimating the number of Belarusians residing abroad is important for both host countries and Belarus itself. However, precise data on the number of Belarusians moving abroad after 2020 remains limited.

Existing international estimates provide only a partial picture. The World Migration Report includes both recent migrants and migrants who left Belarus decades ago and later acquired citizenship in other countries (WMR, 2024). It also relies on migration statistics that are not fully comparable across countries and are often available only with a time lag. As a result, these estimates do not capture the most recent migration wave that occurred after 2020.

Belarusian national statistics also underestimate migration flows, as they mainly record individuals who officially leave the country to work abroad under formal employment contracts (MIARB, 2025) .

This policy brief aims to address this gap by providing estimates of migration from Belarus between 2020 and 2024, based on data on residence permits issued in recipient countries, national migration statistics, information on citizenship acquisition, and open-source data. It accesses the number of Belarusian migrants in the main emigration destinations, namely the European Union, Russia, and Georgia, and discusses the implications for the host countries and Belarus.

Assessing Belarusian Migration to the EU

One of the most commonly used sources for analysing migration flows to the European Union is Eurostat data on the number of first permits. These permits indicate that a foreign national has received authorisation for a long-term stay in an EU country for the first time, typically for more than three months. They include various categories such as work permits, study permits, and other forms, including long-term visas. In many cases, the number of first permits corresponds broadly to the number of migrants entering and residing in a country. However, in some countries, there are significant differences between the number of first permits issued and the actual number of migrants. For example, this concerns Poland’s issuance of Poland Business Harbor Visas to Belarusians. The visa allowed Belarusians to live and work in Poland. However, not all visa recipients moved to the country. Many used it for short-term tourism and did not subsequently obtain temporary residence permits.

According to European statistics, more than 90 percent of first permits issued to Belarusian citizens in recent years were granted by Poland and Lithuania. For this reason, estimating the number of Belarusians residing in these two countries is central to assessing the scale of Belarusian migration to the EU.

Lithuania

Assessing the number of Belarusians residing in Lithuania is relevant in light of the ongoing demographic decline and its implications for labour supply. Fertility in Lithuania remains well below replacement level—around 1.1 children per woman in 2024—while population ageing continues to reduce the size of the workforce (Statistics Lithuania; IMF, 2024). The current labour market situation is relatively tight, with unemployment around 7% in 2024. Migration helps mitigate some labour market pressures without constituting a major source of labour supply (European Commission, 2025).

In this context, Belarusians have become the second-largest migrant group in Lithuania. Their numbers increased markedly after 2020, rising from fewer than 18 thousand at the end of 2019 (Migracijos metraštis, 2020) to 57.5 thousand by the end of 2024 (Imigrantai Lietuvoje, 2026).

Estimating the number of Belarusian residents in Lithuania is relatively straightforward because the Migration Department of the Ministry of Interior Affairs publishes detailed statistics on foreigners residing in the country. These data show a close relationship between the number of first permits issued and the growth in the Belarusian population in Lithuania. Between 2020 and 2023, the number of Belarusians living in Lithuania increased slightly less than the number of first permits issued, partly because some individuals work in Lithuania on a rotational basis while continuing to reside in Belarus. An exception occurred in 2022, when the Belarusian population in Lithuania increased more rapidly than the number of first permits issued to Belarusians following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the expansion of humanitarian migration channels. Since 2024, the number of Belarusians residing in Lithuania has declined, partly due to the tightening of migration policy (EMT, 2025).

Poland

Compared with Lithuania, Poland has stronger labour demand and even tighter labour market conditions, with significant dependence on migration. Despite a similarly low fertility rate (1.099 in 2024), unemployment remains low at 5.6% (November 2025), even with over one million foreign workers already present (Statistics Poland, 2025, 2026). Combined with population ageing and mounting pressures on social security and healthcare systems, this results in a structurally higher demand for migrant labour than in Lithuania. Against this backdrop, Belarusians—now the second-largest group of foreign workers after Ukrainians—play an important role. Only among social security contributors, their number has more than tripled in recent years – from 42.8 thousand in 2020 to 134.8 thousand in 2024 (ZUS).

However, accurately assessing the scale of Belarusian migration is challenging. Official statistics do not provide a direct measure of Belarusian residents. First residence permits significantly overestimate migration: between 2020 and 2024, Poland issued more than 874 thousand permits to Belarusian citizens, but many were used for short-term mobility rather than permanent relocation. Figure 1 illustrates the gap between the number of first permits issued and the number of residence permits held. At the same time, residence permit data underestimate the true population. Approximately 125 thousand Belarusians held valid residence permits at the end of 2024, increasing to 141.2 thousand at the beginning of 2026; however, these figures exclude individuals awaiting decisions, whose applications may take months or years to process while they remain in the country (USC, 2026).

Importantly, statistics based on social security contributions also underestimate the total number of Belarusians permanently residing in Poland, as they exclude non-working spouses, children, students, pensioners, and other inactive groups. At the same time, combining different administrative datasets would lead to double-counting, as the same individuals may appear in multiple categories—for example, as residence permit holders, applicants awaiting decisions, and recipients of social benefits—meaning that simple aggregation would inflate the total. As a result, neither the number of permits issued nor administrative records alone provide an accurate estimate of the Belarusian population in Poland.

Approaches to Determining the Number of Belarusians in Poland

Luzgina (2025a) suggests two approaches to estimate the number of Belarusians residing in Poland.

The first approach—the gender-statistical approach—is based on estimating the number of Belarusians permanently residing in Poland by taking into account the gender structure of Belarusian citizens holding documents for permanent stay in Poland, as well as estimating the number of young Belarusians under 18, using statistical data on recipients of the 800+ child benefit, which until 2026 was paid to all children under 18. The estimate based on this approach suggests that as of the end of 2024, between 172.8 and 181.1 thousand Belarusians permanently resided in Poland.

Figure 1. Dynamics of issuing first permits and residence permits by Poland to Belarusian citizens: thousands of people.

Source: Urząd do spraw cudzoziemców; Eurostat. Note: First permits are permits issued for initial entry, including long-term visas. Resident permits include temporary residence permits, permanent residence permits, blue cards, and residence cards—that is, permits foreigners obtain for residence in the country after they’ve already entered. Due to the fact that many Belarusians received Poland Business Harbor visas (first permits), but did not use them to obtain a residence permit in Poland, the number of residence permits issued is lower than the number of first permits.

The second approach—the socio-demographic approach—is used to verify the accuracy of these estimates. This approach is based on the analysis of statistics on social security contributions, the age structure of Belarusians in Poland, and their employment status. Key components include data on the number of taxpayers, children under 18, and Belarusians aged 18 and older who are not employed in the Polish labour market. According to this second approach, the number of Belarusians residing in Poland at the end of 2024 ranged from 175.6 to 188.5 thousand individuals.

Thus, based on both approaches, between 172.8 and 188.5 thousand Belarusian citizens entitled to permanent stay were permanently residing in Poland at the end of 2024.

The Total Number of Belarusians in the EU

Based on the above assessment of the total number of Belarusians residing in Poland, the known number residing in Lithuania, and the number who obtained first permits in other countries, it is possible to estimate the number of Belarusian citizens residing in the European Union. If EU statistics are considered, it can be noted that over the period 2016–2024, the share of first residence permits issued by EU countries excluding Lithuania and Poland averaged 7%. We can assume that the number of Belarusians residing in EU countries outside Poland and Lithuania approximately corresponds to this proportion.

In this regard, the total number of Belarusians residing in the EU at the end of 2024 was calculated assuming that approximately 93% of Belarusian citizens migrated to Lithuania and Poland. This results in an estimate of 247.6 thousand to 264.5 thousand individuals.

Based on available data on Polish citizenship obtained by Belarusians in 2020–2024, the total number of Belarusian citizens who do not yet hold citizenship or who obtained it relatively recently but permanently reside in the EU is between 265 thousand and 282 thousand individuals. Moreover, the majority of these individuals relocated to the EU in 2020–2024, a period marked by a significant increase in the number of first residence permits issued to Belarusians, primarily by Poland and Lithuania.

Migration Outside of the EU

Belarusians actively migrate not only to EU countries but also to other states such as Russia and Georgia. It is not possible to calculate how many Belarusian citizens currently live and work in Russia due to the absence of customs and border barriers and the lack of additional labour market legalisation requirements for citizens of the Union State. Nevertheless, there are general figures on the employment of Belarusians in the Russian labour market. As of 2023, approximately 124 thousand Belarusians were employed in Russia. An additional more than 12,000 resided in Georgia (Luzgina, 2025b). Taking these data into account, together with data for EU countries, between 400 and 418 thousand Belarusian citizens lived and worked outside Belarus. This amounts to approximately 4.5% of the country’s total population.

Implications of Belarusian Migration for Belarus

Together with data for EU countries, between 400 and 418 thousand Belarusian citizens lived and worked outside Belarus. This amounts to approximately 4.5% of the country’s total population. Estimating the share of Belarusians of working age (16–60 years) living and working in the countries under study based on the gender-age structure of Belarusians in Poland yields approximately 355 thousand individuals. This corresponds to more than 6% of the country’s total working-age population.

The forgone economic opportunities resulting from the emigration of working-age individuals can be assessed using the Solow growth accounting framework. The potential economic impact of the emigration of working-age Belarusians can be approximated as a static output loss, assuming that capital and total factor productivity remain unchanged. Based on the share of labour compensation in GDP at current national prices for Belarus in 2023 (0.57), and the estimated 6% reduction in the working-age population residing abroad, the immediate reduction in GDP may reach up to 3.42% (PWT 11.0).

Conclusion

Belarusians constitute the second-largest group of foreign nationals in Poland and Lithuania after Ukrainians. Belarusians also make a positive contribution to the labour markets of other EU countries, as well as to those of Russia and Georgia. Consequently, their residence in the host countries has a tangible impact not only on the labour market but also on social security systems, budget, and other sectors of the economy. Accurate data on the number of migrants, their age structure, and their participation in economic activity enable more effective forecasting of pressures on social systems and facilitate better planning of migrant integration into the host country’s economy.

In Belarus itself, the long-term emigration of working-age citizens and their families remains insufficiently accounted for, which distorts assessments of the country’s internal demographic situation and associated economic losses. Large-scale migration, including flows to Russia and Georgia, indicates that up to 6% of the working-age population currently resides outside the country, which, all else being equal, may reduce potential GDP growth by more than 3.42%.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Consequences of Disability from the Perspective of Time Allocation

Posted on April 20, 2026 | Policy Brief

A significant proportion of the economics literature on the consequences of disability focuses on its implications for labor market activity and the effects of programs dedicated to supporting the disabled. This focus leaves out fundamental aspects of disability, and poor health more generally, which play a crucial role in directly determining individual and social welfare. In this policy brief, we report key results from a recent paper in which we examine the implications of disability from the perspective of time use (Hamermesh and Myck, 2025). Our analysis is based on the data from the American and the Polish Time Use Surveys and is complemented with time use information from several other countries. We examine how disability affects the variety of activities performed during the day by older individuals and how it changes the amount of time spent on the main, most common activities. Using information on how people value variety, we provide monetary estimates of the time cost of disability.

Introduction

Having a physical disability may in many ways restrict opportunities. Disability reduces employment, labor force participation, and work hours; it has negative consequences for earnings and thus consumption and wealth. It affects happiness, partly through labor-market effects, and partly through its inherent impact. A substantial body of literature has examined the interaction of disability and labor market outcomes with a particular focus on the implications of disability support and labor market activity (Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001; Autor and Duggan, 2003; Kruse et al., 2018). While there are also studies on disability and overall welfare measures (Meyer and Kok, 2019; Deshpande et al. 2021), little is known about how disability affects details of people’s daily routines beyond labor market decisions. We address this gap in a recent paper (Hamermesh and Myck, 2025) in which we look at the implications of physical disability through the lens of time use.

Since utility is jointly determined by income and time, disability-related changes in how people allocate their time during the day may significantly affect their well-being. These effects will be especially important for older people, since they are more likely to have a physical disability and less likely to be working for pay than others. Understanding how disability affects time use may also be informative about policies that ease the daily lives of people with a disability. A physical disability imposes a constraint on how a person spends his/her time. Some things become more difficult, perhaps even impossible, to do, essentially raising the amount of time spent on that activity needed to achieve a given amount of satisfaction from it. For other activities, the rise in the cost of time inputs may be less; but other than passive leisure and passive personal activities, it is difficult to think of endeavors whose cost is not raised by a physical disability. Physical disability could also make switching activities more difficult, which means that additional time spent on certain activities adds nothing to the person’s utility. If so, disability will, in this case, again lead to fewer activities being undertaken. Because variety in time use rises with income (Gronau and Hamermesh, 2008), if supported by the data, these arguments underlie an additional dimension of the loss engendered by a disability.

Disability and Allocation of Time in Time Use Surveys

To examine the implications of disability on how people allocate their time, we take advantage of time use studies from the US (ATUS) and Poland (PolTUS) and complement them with results based on studies from several other countries. Individuals in these studies are asked to complete detailed diaries with information on how they spent their day, usually with well over a hundred activity categories assigned to each of the 144 10-minute slots in the 24 hours covered by the survey diary. On top of the information about how people spend their day, the two surveys include information on self-assessed disability status (in the case of the US data) and on the official certified disability status (in the PolTUS data). Our analysis focuses on older people who are no longer active on the labor market (aged 70+ in the US, 65+ in Poland), for whom we have detailed time use information as well as other necessary basic characteristics, such as age, marital status, ethnicity, education, etc.

In the first step of the analysis, we use samples of all adults to aggregate reported non-work activities into four categories of the most common things people do: activities that, on average, take over 10 minutes per day, more than 5, 2, and 1 minute per day. We then use these categories to examine how a physical disability, conditional on a number of socio-demographic characteristics, affects the time spent on these activities (“total time in category”) and the number of activities within the categories performed on the survey day (“# activities in category”). The summary of results is presented in Table 1.

 Table 1. Relation of Temporal Variety and Disability Status, Older Nonworkers in the USA (ATUS) and Poland (PolTUS)

Source: Hamermesh and Myck (2025). Notes: reported coefficient values on disability measures; controls include standard demographic characteristics, household composition, time, and regional controls. Standard errors reported in parentheses below the parameter estimates. ATUS: N=11,188, PolTUS: N = 14,180 diaries, 7,090 individuals. Total number of activities per category: ATUS: 13, 24, 46, 74; PolTUS: 16, 30, 47, 71. For details see Hamermesh and Myck (2025).

Older individuals in the US and Poland with a self-assessed (US) or certified disability (PL) engage in a reduced number of activities per day compared to those with no disability. The reduction ranges from 0.4 to 1.0 activity in the US, depending on the category, which corresponds to a decline in variety from about 6.6 to 10.3 percent. In Poland, the reductions are smaller – from 0.3 to 0.4, corresponding to declines of between 3.5 and 4.3 percent. ATUS estimates also suggest that older disabled Americans spend more time in each of the four sets of activities than do those without a disability.

These results are confirmed in our analysis using time use surveys from Canada, France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, which are all available in the Multinational Time Use Study (MTUS) database. While countries use slightly different definitions of disability, and there are country-specific differences in how individuals allocate their time during a typical day, in all countries except for the UK, we find consistent results that older non-workers with a disability/health issue enjoy less variety in their time use than those without a disability. The estimated differences are as high as 17 percent in Italy and 18 percent in Spain.

Evaluating the Monetary Cost of Disability Using Its Effect on Time Use Variety

The above results show that having a disability is associated with fewer different activities undertaken during a day.  Our additional analysis for the US, based on a proposed “sesqui difference” estimator, supports a claim that this relationship is likely to be causal (for details see Hamermesh and Myck, 2025). Thus, in a framework that recognizes the joint roles of time and income for well-being, by reducing the temporal variety that a person can enjoy, a disability directly reduces living standards. While we cannot infer the change in utility from the imposition of these extra costs and the loss in variety, we can ask how much compensation (income) would allow the person with the disability (and thus less time variety) to achieve the same variety in time use as an otherwise identical non-disabled individual.

For this purpose, we re-estimate our models for the data from the US, Poland, Canada, the UK, France, and Spain, using smaller samples for which we also have details about people’s household incomes. The summary of results is reported in Table 2. As the dependent variable we use the group of the top 46 and 47 most common activities in the US and Poland, respectively, and the aggregated activity categories available in the MTUS datasets for the other countries (see Table 2 notes for details). We find positive and statistically significant relations of income to time variety in all of the examined countries and confirm earlier results on the relationship between time use variety and disability measures. We then use the results to compute the monetary compensation C relative to the mean average annual income of older non-workers, YAVE, that would equalize the temporal variety enjoyed by people with/without a disability:

where the αj are the estimated relationships of disability status and income to the variety of time use.  The final row in Table 2 shows the estimate of C in each of the six countries. It ranges from a low of 61 percent of average annual income (the U.K.) to nearly five times average annual income (the U.S.). The weighted average of the six estimates is 2.24.

Table 2. Relationship of Disability Status and Income to Temporal Variety: U.S., Poland, Canada, U.K., France, and Spain

Source: Hamermesh and Myck (2025). Notes: Time use activity category grouping: US top 46 categories; Poland: top 47; Canada, UK, Italy, and Spain, respectively: 55, 54, 44, and 52 aggregate categories available in MTUS database. For Poland: two time use diaries for each of 6059 individuals. Vectors of controls include standard demographic characteristics, excluding educational attainment, given very high correlation of education with household income. Standard errors reported in parentheses below the parameter estimates. For details see Hamermesh and Myck (2025).

Conclusions

In a recent paper, we demonstrated that a physical disability is related to how a person spends time. Fewer different things are done, so that on average each activity undertaken consumes more of the individual’s time (Hamermesh and Myck, 2025). Looking into more details, we find that more time is spent sleeping and watching television, and less is devoted to activities that require active participation, such as cooking, cleaning, and attending religious services. That older people with disabilities engage in fewer activities than otherwise identical individuals implies a loss of well-being because people generally find variety enjoyable— being able to perform more activities on a usual day is income-superior. Indeed, taking the average of the estimates for six different countries, we find that it would take more than twice the value of people’s annual income to compensate them for the loss of time-use variety of someone with disability compared to an older person without it.

With disability rates among older people in the range of 20-50 percent, depending on age, a better understanding of the different dimensions of utility loss that result from it seems necessary to specify appropriate policy recommendations. By analyzing how a disability is related to the time use of older people, we have opened a large variety of questions and areas for future research that will add to our understanding of the impact of disabilities. A comprehensive approach to the consequences of disability, going beyond the limitations at the workplace and beyond the expense of medical interventions, is necessary to structure policies focused on relaxing time constraints and thus, among other things, allowing those with disabilities to enjoy a greater variety of activities.

Acknowledgement

Michał Myck acknowledges the support of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida.

References:

  • Acemoglu, D., Angrist, J. (2001). Consequences of employment protection? The case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Journal of Political Economy, 109, 915-57.
  • Autor, D., and Duggan, M. (2003). The rise in the disability rolls and the decline in unemployment,  Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 157-206.
  • Deshpande, M., Gross, T., Su, Y. (2021). Disability and distress: The effect of disability programs on financial outcomes, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 13, 151–78.
  • Gronau, R., Hamermesh, D. (2008). The demand for variety: A household production perspective, Review of Economics and Statistics, 90, 562-72.
  • Hamermesh, D., Myck, M. (2025). The Time Cost of a Disability, Journal of Health Economics, 104, 103079, doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2025.103079.
  • Kruse, D., Schur, L., Rogers, S., Ameri, M. (2018). Why do workers with disabilities earn less? Occupational job requirements and disability discrimination, British Journal of Industrial Relations, 56, 798-834.
  • Meyer, B., Kok, W. (2019). Disabilities, earnings, income, and consumption, Journal of Public Economics, 171, 51-69

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Suggested Reading

Entrepreneurial Dynamism, Resilience, and Institutional Constraints in Belarus

Posted on December 15, 2025 | Policy Brief

Belarus entrepreneurial resilience shown through a busy street food market with food trucks and people socializing in an urban industrial setting

Entrepreneurial activity in Belarus has shown notable resilience amid economic and institutional challenges. Drawing on Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) data from 2019, 2021, and 2024, this policy brief traces key shifts in entrepreneurial attitudes, motivations, and behavior. The findings reveal a transition from necessity-driven to opportunity- and purpose-oriented entrepreneurship, alongside persistent institutional constraints and rising regulatory uncertainty. The brief outlines policy directions to support entrepreneurship as a driver of economic resilience and individual autonomy in Belarus.

Dynamics of Key Indicators

Recent years in Belarus have been marked by institutional fragility and increasing state involvement in the economy. Against this backdrop, the evolution of entrepreneurship – a key attribute of the market economy approach, and one of the drivers of the Belarusian economic performance in 2010-2020 (Beroc, 2024), is of significant interest. Closely connected, and no less interesting, is the question of the dynamics in societal attitudes towards entrepreneurship.

A valuable lens for understanding these changes is offered by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), a research project that provides annual survey data on entrepreneurial activity across countries. This brief uses GEM survey data of Belarusian residents aged 18–64 (n = 2,000), representative by sex, age, and region, to examine the dynamics of entrepreneurial attitudes, motivations, and behavior in recent years.

Table 1 overviews the evolution of entrepreneurial intentions, perceived opportunities, and self-confidence. It compares the results from 2019, 2021, and 2024, with particular attention to developments between 2021 and 2024, revealing how Belarusian entrepreneurs continue to adapt to shifting economic and regulatory conditions.  During this period, perceived opportunities to start a business rose by 21.9 pp, and the perceived ease of starting a business increased by 13.6 pp, signaling an improved entry environment. In line with these shifts, entrepreneurial intentions expanded by 8.6 pp.

The composition of activity also evolved. Within Total Early-stage Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA), the export-oriented share declined by 5.4 pp, potentially reflecting reorientation toward domestic markets and/or heightened external constraints, while the share of ventures employing 6–19 workers increased by 5.1 pp, indicating an expansion of small teams.

Motivational profiles shifted toward purpose- and legacy-driven entrepreneurship: the share citing a desire to “make the world a better place” rose by 10.6 pp and “continue a family tradition” by 5.8 pp, whereas “provide an income source” fell by 18.2 pp. Taken together, these movements suggest a more confident, mission-oriented, and domestically focused entrepreneurial landscape.

Table 1. Key performance indicators

Source: GEM-Belarus, 2019, 2021, and 2024. All values are percentages; changes denote percentage points (pp).

Societal Attitudes Toward Entrepreneurship

GEM assesses societal attitudes among working-age adults across several dimensions:

  • (i) entrepreneurship as a desirable career choice;
  • (ii) perceived social status of successful entrepreneurs; and
  • (iii) perceptions of how public media portray entrepreneurship.

Figure 1 compares individuals involved in entrepreneurial activity and those not involved in 2019, 2021, and 2024.

Among the involved, perceptions have generally trended upward across all three indicators. Views of entrepreneurship as a good career and the social status of successful entrepreneurs both show steady improvement over the past five years, while attitudes toward media portrayal follow a more fluctuating pattern—declining during the pandemic period and recovering substantially by 2024. Among those who were not involved, the pattern is similar but at lower levels.

Overall, attitudes are consistently favorable and trending upward across both groups, with especially notable post-2021 improvements in perceived social status and media portrayal.

Figure 1. Perceptions of entrepreneurship by involvement in entrepreneurship (% of adults aged 18–64)

Source: GEM-Belarus, 2019, 2021, and 2024.

Entrepreneurial Self-Perception Characteristics

The level of entrepreneurial self-perception helps explain why some individuals decide to start a business while others do not. Tracking its evolution over time allows us to assess the dynamics of societal perceptions of hardships associated with an entrepreneurial career, which reflects both subjective attitudes and actual barriers.

Figure 2 presents the indicators assessing the perceived favorability of conditions for starting a business, the perception of having the knowledge, skills, and experience necessary to launch a new venture, and the fear of failure.

Figure 2. Characteristics of entrepreneurial self-perception (% of adults aged 18–64)

Source: GEM-Belarus, 2019, 2021, and 2024.

Perceptions of favorable conditions in Belarus improved markedly from 2019/2021. Among non-entrepreneurs, 44% expect good opportunities in the next six months (24–29% in 2019–2021). Among entrepreneurs, 55% view conditions as favorable (31–39% previously). Still, the share of all adults rating external conditions as favorable remains below half, at 47%.

As expected, perceived capability is higher among entrepreneurs: in 2024, 85% of entrepreneurs and 41% of non-entrepreneurs report sufficient knowledge and skills. Fear of failure is more common among non-entrepreneurs (55%, unchanged from 2021); among entrepreneurs, it fell by 7 pp to 48% in 2024.

Perceptions of Entrepreneurship Across Countries

To better understand the dynamics above, we conduct a comparative analysis of Belarus and its neighboring countries, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. It allows us to situate Belarus within a broader regional context and assess whether its entrepreneurial attitudes differ meaningfully from those of neighboring countries.

The comparative analysis of entrepreneurial self-perception demonstrates similar characteristics across these countries (Figure 3): roughly half of their population report having the knowledge, skills, and experience necessary to start a business. At the same time, about half of respondents cite fear of failure as a barrier to starting a business, with the lowest share recorded in Latvia (45%) and the highest in Poland (55%).

Regarding the perceived favorability of conditions for starting a business (perception of opportunities), responses vary across countries: only 36% of the population in Ukraine sees good opportunities for business creation, while in Poland this share reaches 74%. In Belarus, Lithuania, and Latvia, perceptions are similar, with 40–50% of respondents rating the external environment as favorable for business start-up.

Notable cross-country differences also appear in perceptions of successful business stories in the media and in the attractiveness of entrepreneurship as a career choice. Interestingly, the most negative assessments on these two indicators in 2024 were recorded in Poland.

Figure 3. Attitudes toward entrepreneurship in Belarus compared with reference countries

Source: Global GEM report 2024–2025.

Conversely, Belarus shows the highest share of adults who consider entrepreneurship a good career choice (79%), while Lithuania leads in positive assessments of media coverage of entrepreneurship (75%). In all countries, respondents generally agree that entrepreneurs enjoy a high social status and respect. The lowest share of agreement is observed in Lithuania (59%), and the highest in Belarus (78%).

Discussion and Policy Recommеndations

GEM-2024 findings confirm notable resilience of the Belarusian private sector: early-stage entrepreneurship and the pool of potential founders are expanding, and motivations are shifting from necessity toward opportunity and purpose. Entrepreneurs increasingly view business creation as a vehicle for autonomy and social contribution, even under growing institutional and regulatory constraints.

This resilience is by all means a positive development – a strong private sector is vital not only for growth but for long-term sovereignty and democratic progress (Audretsch and Moog, 2022) Entrepreneurship in Belarus functions as a sphere of independent self-realization; supporting it means supporting the most autonomous and productive part of society (Marozau, 2023; Daneyko, Panasevich and Marozau, 2023).

Yet, this dynamism unfolds within a fragile environment where excessive regulation, political risk, and legal uncertainty remain major barriers. The tension between societal resilience and institutional fragility is the defining feature of Belarusian entrepreneurship today, and it may threaten the positive momentum in entrepreneurship tomorrow.

Against this background, practical steps to strengthen resilience can be pursued by different stakeholder groups:

Domestic stakeholders (entrepreneurs and associations)

  • Build and strengthen professional and peer networks—at home and within the diaspora—for mentoring, collaboration, and mutual support.
  • Amplify diverse success stories (including non-tech and small-scale ventures) to normalize entrepreneurial risk-taking and inspire new entrants.

External stakeholders (international organizations, donor agencies, and diaspora networks)

  • Expand access to grants, concessional finance, and investment for Belarusian-led and EU-oriented enterprises.
  • Provide tailored mentoring and training on international markets, sustainable business practices, and ESG standards.
  • Support transnational business education and exchange programs—such as MBA tracks and mobility initiatives—to preserve skills and networks.

In a more enabling institutional context, the state could also play a constructive role in fostering entrepreneurship. Under different political conditions, supportive public policies could help unlock the sector’s potential—for instance, by reducing bureaucratic burdens, ensuring predictable taxation, guaranteeing property rights, and recognizing the private sector as a source of innovation and employment. While such measures remain aspirational in the current environment, articulating them highlights what would be required for entrepreneurship to become a pillar of inclusive and sustainable development.

Without an enabling, predictable environment, Belarus risks losing its entrepreneurial potential. In turn, strengthening and safeguarding the entrepreneurial momentum would lay the groundwork for a future trajectory of greater openness, stability, and self-determination.

References

  • Audretsch, D. B., & Moog, P. (2022). Democracy and entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 46(2), 368-392.
  • Daneyko, P., Panasevich, V. & Marozau, R. (2023). Evolution of economic values in Belarus (in Russian). BEROC Policy Paper Series, PP no. 118.
  • GEM (2024). Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2024/2025 Global Report: Entrepreneurship Reality Check. London: GEM.
  • GEM Belarus (2020). Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Report GEM Belarus 2019-2020.
  • GEM Belarus (2022). Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Report GEM Belarus 2021-2022.
  • Marozau, R. (2023). Belarusian business in turbulent times. FREE Policy Brief

Acknowledgements

The study underlying this policy brief was made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). BEROC acknowledges support by Pyxera Global, whose financial and technical assistance for INNOVATE is part of a USAID-funded activity to support the innovation-based economy and private sector growth in Belarus.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

How the Combination of Income and the Quality of Local Conditions Affects Well-being in Old Age

Posted on October 13, 2025 | Policy Brief

Elderly couple sitting on a park bench, enjoying a peaceful moment together, symbolizing financial stability and income well-being in Poland.

Contemporaneous income and the quality of local living conditions have both received recognition in the literature as important determinants of subjective well-being. However, little is known about their joint impact and the possible moderating influence each may have on the relationship with the well-being of the other. In a recent study (Myck et al. 2025), we investigated the role of income and quality of local area on different dimensions of well-being of older adults in Poland. Our findings show that a higher quality of local conditions amplifies the association between income and well-being, which implies that high-income older individuals tend to benefit more from improved local conditions. Our findings suggest that low incomes may constrain older people from taking advantage of local public services, and thus draw attention to policies aimed at improving access to these services, especially in low-income, peripheral areas. While the results also point towards broad benefits of targeted income transfers, it is notable that their effective translation into higher well-being strongly varies with the quality of municipal local conditions.

Introduction

As most developed countries face rapid population ageing, governments continue to seek effective policies to support older adults. Identifying effective policy solutions remains vital in supporting different population groups, including the growing group of older citizens. In this brief, we present a summary of results from a recent study (Myck et al. 2025), in which we examine the role of the combination of incomes and local conditions for the well-being of older individuals. The analysis is conducted on data from Poland, a country characterised by rapid population ageing and a recent prioritisation of monetary transfers in the policy mix, with much less attention given to the financing of local and centrally funded public services. The analysis aims at understanding the role of the quality of local conditions for the well-being of older individuals, and at identifying how the level of income modifies this role. In other words, we examine if higher income affects individual well-being differently in high- compared to low-quality regions.

Subjective well-being has for a long time been examined in relation to individual socio-economic characteristics, like education, health, material conditions and social relations (Layard 2006, Dolan et al. 2008). Many authors have also stressed the importance of the local environment and the quality of public services (Aslam and Corrado 2012), although the influence of local conditions on well-being has been documented mostly at high levels of aggregation (countries or large sub-national regions; Perovic and Golem 2010; Colombo et al. 2018). Principally, though, the combined implications of local conditions and the material situation at the individual level on well-being remain largely underexplored. In our study we explore granular local conditions at the level of municipalities, allowing us to examine the relationship accounting for significant within-country differences in a shared institutional framework. Such disaggregation seems especially important in analysing the quality of life of the older population due to the likely relevance of local health and care services, high-quality transport options, local safety, green spaces and other public services.

Individual and Local Factors

To examine the direct and moderating roles of local conditions on well-being and their relation with income, we rely on a combination of individual- and local-level data (for methodological details, see Myck et al., 2025).

The individual-level data comes from the Polish part of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). This dataset provides detailed information on health, labour market activity, material situation and social relations of individuals aged 50 years and above for almost all European countries. In addition to the usual socio-demographic information (age, gender, education, marital status, and income), SHARE collects several self-reported measures of physical and mental health, as well as a number of broad dimensions of quality of life. One such measure is CASP, which aims to capture the quality of life among older individuals in four important dimensions:  Control, Autonomy, Self-realisation and Pleasure. With twelve questions (three for each dimension), each participant evaluates how often they feel in a certain way or experience certain situations. The final outcome is a summed score in the range of 12 to 48, with higher values indicating a higher quality of life.

For the purpose of our analysis, the individual dataset has been augmented with regional-level information. To capture as much variation in the quality of local conditions as possible, we rely on 14 indicators collected either at the municipal or county level (respectively, the bottom and middle tiers of the administrative division of Poland). They represent the quality of localities in terms of economic factors, housing infrastructure, green spaces and health services. Given the high correlation between these regional variables, they have been combined into a single local quality index using principal component analysis (PCA). The index is calculated on the municipality level, with higher values representing better quality of local conditions. Figure 1 below shows the spatial distribution of the index across all Polish municipalities, highlighting significant regional differences in the local quality of life in Poland, particularly between the Western and Eastern parts of the country.

The Role of Income and Local Conditions for Individual Well-being

We examine the relationship between well-being, contemporaneous household income, and local conditions in a panel random effects regression, controlling for an extensive vector of covariates. Our results confirm a strong positive association between income and well-being, with a 100 per cent increase in disposable income corresponding to increases of up to 0.66 points on the CASP scale. While this may seem small, given the scale of the CASP measure, the effect is similar to that of being employed relative to being retired (0.56 CASP points), married relative to being widowed (0.78), and very close to the average difference in CASP between men and women, conditional on other controls (0.57).

Figure 1. Distribution of the index capturing the quality of local conditions at the municipality level in Poland

Note: Municipality borders are in white, regional borders in yellow. Source: Myck et al. (2025).

We also find that the regional index is positively correlated with well-being. Importantly, though, since income and the quality of regional conditions are strongly correlated, we examine the importance of their interaction in the well-being regression. This facilitates the investigation of the differential reaction of well-being to income for different values of the index (and vice versa). In Figures 2a and 2b we present average marginal effects of each one of the variables as calculated at different percentile levels of the other.

The results indicate noticeable variation in the strength of the association between income and well-being, depending on the quality of local conditions (Fig. 2a). Income seems to matter little at the lower end of the distribution of the regional index and much more in localities of better quality.

Figure 2. Average marginal effects (AME) of income and the regional index on well-being

a) AME of log(Income) across distribution of the regional index

b) AME of the regional index across the distribution of log(Income)

Note: Figures show point estimates of AMEs and the corresponding 90% confidence intervals. Well-being is measured with a CASP score of 12-48. Source: Myck et al. (2025).

While the growing role of income as local conditions improve might seem surprising, it well aligns with the fact that consumption of some publicly provided goods and services is dependent on or related to income: apart from the obvious examples such as culture, more important dimension of access to public services might relate to the areas where rich and poor people live, the quality of public transport and easy access to highly localized public services.

Strong positive effects of regional quality on well-being are also observed among respondents with the highest incomes (Fig. 2b). The association for low-income individuals cannot be statistically differentiated from zero.

Conclusion

The results of our study suggest that for high-income older individuals in Poland, better local conditions are reflected more strongly in their well-being compared to that of low-income residents. For the poorest older individuals, improvements in local conditions have little or no bearing on their well-being. At the same time, increases in income are associated more strongly with well-being in areas with the highest levels of quality of local conditions.

The policy implications of our results thus highlight the detrimental consequences of the combination of low income and poor quality local conditions for individual well-being and the challenges to improving the latter. Our results suggest that effective policies aimed at increasing the well-being of older adults require a careful combination of direct and indirect measures, or otherwise a combination of support focused on income transfers with provision of, and better access to, the relevant range of public goods and services.

Our results also point towards targeted rather than simple universal income transfers: greater income increases are needed in low-quality areas compared to top-quality ones to secure the same change in well-being. Moreover, the fact that local quality translates differently into well-being for the rich and the poor suggests that there are significant disparities in access to local services by income level. This, in turn, calls for developments in access and mobility opportunities and investments in local public services to ensure better access to these services among low-income residents. Local policies in high-quality areas should become more sensitive to the needs of poorer older inhabitants, while improvement of local conditions in low-quality regions needs to accompany direct transfer policies for these to effectively translate into a higher quality of life of older individuals.

Acknowledgement

The authors acknowledge the support from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida.

The original study (Myck et al. 2025) was financed through a joint grant of the Polish National Science Centre (NCN, project no: 2018/31/G/HS4/01511) and the German Research Foundation (DFG, project no: BR 38.6816-1) in the international Beethoven Classic 3 funding scheme (project AGE-WELL).

References

  • Alesina, A., Di Tella, R. and MacCulloch, R., 2004. Inequality and happiness: are Europeans and Americans different? Journal of Public Economics, 88 (9–10), 2009–2042.
  • Aslam, A. and Corrado, L., 2012. The geography of well-being. Journal of Economic Geography, 12 (3), 627–649.
  • Colombo, E., Rotondi, V. and Stanca, L., 2018. Macroeconomic conditions and well-being: do social interactions matter? Applied Economics, 50 (28), 3029–3038.
  • Myck, M., Oczkowska, M. and Kulati, E., 2025. Income and well-being in old age: The role of local contextual factors. The Journal of the Economics of Ageing, 30, 100551.
  • Perovic, L. M. and Golem, S., 2010. Investigating Macroeconomic Determinants of Happiness in Transition Countries: How Important Is Government Expenditure? Eastern European Economics, 48 (4), 59–75.
  • Rossouw, S. and Pacheco, G., 2012. Measuring Non-Economic Quality of Life on a Sub-National Level: A Case Study of New Zealand. Journal of Happiness Studies, 13 (3), 439–454.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Towards European Union Membership: Poland’s EU Pre-accession Funds and Infrastructure Development

Posted on October 6, 2025 | Policy Brief, Policy Papers

European Union flag waving during a public demonstration, symbolizing support and integration efforts related to EU Pre-Accession Funds.

In advance of formal membership, candidate countries are offered three pillars of EU assistance: trade concessions, stabilization and association agreements and financial support. These instruments aim both to prepare candidates economically, politically and administratively, and to signal accession’s benefits to their populations. In this paper we describe the channels in which the third pillar – the EU pre-accession funds – affected Poland’s economic and institutional development ahead of its 2004 membership. The funds were designed to accelerate institutional transformation, modernize agriculture, strengthen rural communities, improve transport networks, and promote environmental protection. In Poland, between the mid-1990s and 2003, they supported extensive investments that produced unprecedented improvements in technical infrastructure. Poland’s accession referendum in 2003 turned decisively in favor of EU membership, despite strong regional variation in support. While no causal evidence is available, we argue that without the EU-funded infrastructural transformation, its outcome would have been less certain. For current EU candidate countries, Poland serves as an excellent example of how targeted external financial assistance can support structural transformation ahead of integration with the EU.

Introduction

Seven countries are currently eligible to receive financial support through the European Union’s Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III): Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Türkiye. The funding allocated within the program for the 2021–2027 period amounts to 14.162 billion EUR (in 2021 prices; European Commission, 2024). IPA III is the successor to the former two IPA editions, which have provided support exceeding 24 billion EUR since 2007 to countries in the then EU enlargement region. IPA aims to support countries that have entered a pathway to EU membership, expected in the foreseeable future, to facilitate progressive alignment with EU rules, values, and various standards and policies enforced in the European Union before they become full members. It constitutes one of the pillars of assistance offered by the EU to countries with a prospect of membership, with trade concessions and stabilization and association agreements (SAAs) serving as the other two.

Next in line to obtain financial help through the pre-accession funding are Moldova and Ukraine, both of which were granted candidate status by the European Council fairly recently. While they have already started their accession negotiations and may benefit from trade concessions and SAAs, they still need to fulfill certain requirements to be eligible for IPA. Though formally also a candidate since late 2023, the accession process of Georgia is currently suspended due to concerns about democratic backsliding, implementation of controversial laws and disputed parliamentary elections.

In this paper, we examine Poland’s experience in utilizing the funding available prior to the 2004 EU enlargement to undergo important structural and systemic changes. Given the goals of the funding, we discuss the evolution of a number of economic indicators which can serve as evidence of the socio-economic advancement that occurred in Poland in the years leading to its EU accession. These examples illustrate different dimensions of development that societies in countries embarking on the EU accession process could benefit from on their way towards full integration.

EU Pre-accession Funding Options in the 1990s

Together with nine other countries, mainly from the Eastern European region and the former communist bloc (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia), Poland joined the EU in 2004. It was the largest enlargement of the European community both in terms of the number of new countries and population-wise.

On the pathway to EU membership, these candidates benefited from a coordinated set of financial instruments designed to accelerate their political, economic, and institutional development. During the 1990s and early 2000s, three programs offered financial assistance: Phare, SAPARD, and ISPA. Each addressed a different strategic challenge that candidates faced during their accession period – many of which underwent the transition from centrally planned to free market economies.

From the pool of soon-to-be EU members, Hungary and Poland were the first among the post-communist Central and Eastern European countries to formally start the accession process as early as 1994 (Cyprus and Malta applied in 1990). These two countries also inaugurated the distribution of financial assistance among the EU applicants. They became the first beneficiaries of the Phare program, which concentrated on supporting public administration reform, improving institutional capacity, and preparing regions for effective absorption of EU structural funds. It also helped modernize local infrastructure and provided targeted assistance to sectors undergoing major restructuring. Phare was soon extended to cover all other candidate countries.

The second initiative – SAPARD, concentrated on the needs of the agricultural sector and rural communities. The goal was to raise the competitiveness of local farming and modernize food production.

The third program, ISPA, funded major environmental and transportation initiatives.

These three programs helped close the gap between the candidate countries and older EU member states by improving infrastructure and enhancing the functioning of their institutions. Formally, they also helped ensure that the new members met EU strict standards and legal directives and built the foundations for their long-term cohesion. More detailed descriptions of the objectives of each program, with a special focus on Poland, are included in Box 1.

Figure 1 presents the annual expenditures between 1990 and 2003 within each of the three analyzed instruments provided by the European Union to Poland (bars, left axis). With connected lines, we show the scope of each program in cumulative amounts over time (right axis). During the 1990s, the budget spent on Poland under the Phare program was kept under 200 million EUR annually (in the last year of the decade, it increased to almost 300 million EUR). However, after the program’s restructuring since the beginning of the 2000s, annual spending through this instrument doubled. Among the three, Phare was the major funding source for Poland, as the country received a total of 3.5 billion EUR until 2003 (equivalent to 1.9% of the Polish GDP in 2003) – almost five times more than under the SAPARD program. Poland also obtained the highest total amount of funding of all candidate countries at the time, corresponding to 30% of the overall provided financial assistance (Kawecka-Wyrzykowska & Ambroziak 2006).

Figure 1. Values of  EU pre-accession funds in Poland

Source: Own compilation based on Tables 3, 4, 6 from Kawecka-Wyrzykowska & Ambroziak (2006). Note: in 2003 prices.

In 2000, ISPA and SAPARD were introduced to further support specific areas identified during the 1990s as critical and requiring targeted funding – the agricultural sector, initiatives to enhance the transportation network, and environmental protection. Through SAPARD, projects related to farming and rural infrastructure received approximately 150 million EUR per year in Poland, accumulating to 700 million EUR over the four-year period until 2003. Since one of the prerequisites in SAPARD was national co-funding of ca. 25% of the public contribution in the investments, overall 1.1 bn EUR (0.6% of the 2003 GDP) of public money was committed to different projects in Poland through this instrument (ARiMR 2025; investments consisted in 50% of private resources).

Projects supported within ISPA on average obtained 300 million EUR annually in Poland, with total spending reaching 1.4 billion EUR until 2003 (0.8% of the 2003 GDP). Poland was still the major beneficiary of these two types of financial support, though the total share of the funding received within each of them was much lower than in the Phare program, respectively 32% in SAPARD and 34% in ISPA (Kawecka-Wyrzykowska & Ambroziak 2006).

 

Box 1. Financial instruments offered in the 1990s on the pathway to EU membership: Phare, SAPARD, ISPA

Originally known as Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring of the Economy, Phare was launched in 1989 at a pivotal moment in European history. Initially designed to support the two countries in their transition from communism to democracy and a market economy, Phare quickly expanded to cover other parts of Central and Eastern Europe. Its mission was not only to help rebuild economies, but also to support political democratization. At first, it operated through national programs, but as regional cooperation gained importance, Phare introduced international initiatives to foster cross-border collaboration. The evolving challenges faced by the transforming countries led to a significant change in the program’s operation in the late 1990s. Financial support was now focused on two main pillars: investment in essential infrastructure, which consumed about 70 per cent of resources, and institutional development, which received the remaining 30 per cent. Poland benefited from several specialized initiatives within Phare. Socio-Economic Cohesion focused on modernizing regional infrastructure and preparing Polish regions to efficiently absorb EU structural funds. Cross-Border Cooperation strengthened ties between Poland and its neighbors. Institutional Building contributed to more efficient and transparent public administration.

The Special Accession Program for Agriculture and Rural Development, SAPARD, was established in 1999 to help transform the agricultural sectors and rural economies of ten countries aspiring to join the EU at the time. The goal was to prepare farmers and food processors to meet strict EU sanitary and veterinary standards. In Poland, SAPARD played a major role given the country’s vast rural landscape and the important role of agriculture in the economy – accounting for 7% of the GDP in 1995 (CSO 2014). Around 75% of the total budget was allocated from EU funds, with the remainder covered by national co-financing. However, the rules required an own contribution from each beneficiary, thus around half of the total value of all investments realized through SAPARD was private capital (Supreme Audit Office, 2002). SAPARD in Poland focused on, on the one hand, the modernization of agriculture and, on the other, on rural development. A large part of the program went into modernizing agricultural holdings, supporting farmers in buying new machinery, improving farm buildings, and upgrading agricultural production to meet EU standards. Equally important was the modernization of food processing industries, like meat, dairy, fruits and vegetables. Another significant part of the program concentrated on infrastructure in rural communities — building roads, sewage systems, and improving basic services. To encourage economic diversification, assistance was provided to develop non-farming businesses and create new job opportunities outside of agriculture (EU Council, 1999a).

Created in 1999, the main goal of ISPA was to finance large-scale projects in two critical sectors: transportation and environmental protection. Projects selected for funding were typically expensive, exceeding 5 million EUR, and had a strategic, national or at least regional impact (EU Council, 1999b). From the society’s perspective, these initiatives improved living standards, protected public health and the natural environment and promoted sustainable development. In the environmental sector, ISPA focused mainly on critical areas, including improving the quality of drinking water, building modern sewage treatment plants, managing waste more efficiently, and reducing air pollution. Given the EU’s strict environmental directives, addressing these issues was a fundamental condition for accession. ISPA concentrated also on modernizing and expanding major roadways and railway lines, especially those which were signified as part of the Trans-European Transport Network. Improved transport connections facilitated trade, mobility, and regional development, essential for increasing economic competitiveness and tightening of physical linkage with the rest of Europe.

The total amount of received funding was only one of the factors that may have played a role in the scope and pace of overall socio-economic changes in Poland. Importantly, the spatial distribution of investments provided a unique opportunity to reduce the geographical inequalities deeply rooted in Polish history and related, in particular, to the partitions of Poland lasting from the late 1700s till the end of World War I (Becker et al. 2016; Grosfeld & Zhuravskaya 2015). The eastern regions of Poland were historically much less developed, with the agricultural sector maintaining a critical position in economic activity and employment.

To illustrate the differences in regional distribution of the funding, we use a number of indicators related to investments realized with the help of the SAPARD instrument – which was specifically targeted at supporting infrastructure in rural areas and advancements in the agricultural sector. In Figure 2, we present three measures of investment allocation – the total (public+private) value of investments completed in each region (a), total value of investments per capita (b), and per hectare of agricultural land (c). Depending on the analyzed indicator, we obtain a slightly different picture of the distribution of the investments in SAPARD throughout the country. It appears that the Western regions of Poland received the least funding from SAPARD, whereas the Eastern and most rural regions were less successful in securing the funding. In all three cases, though, the Wielkopolskie Voivodship – a region in the Central-Western part of Poland – stands out as the one that collected the highest funding not only overall, but also when calculated per inhabitant or, most crucially, per area of agricultural land.

Figure 2. Spatial distribution of the SAPARD investments in Poland, total amount (public+private) for the period 2000-2003

Source: Own compilation based on Table 7.2 from Rudnicki (2008). Note: Converted from PLN to EUR using 4PLN/EUR exchange rate; c) per hectare of agricultural land. As compared to Fig. 1 the amounts for SAPARD include private resources spent

The most likely reason behind the particular allocation of the funding is related to the application process. The total amount of the funding was granted to Poland with limited distributional guidelines, and the funds were allocated on the first-come, first-served basis (ARiMR 2003). The maps in Figure 2 suggest that farmers, agricultural producers and manufacturers, and rural municipalities in Wielkopolskie region were quick and efficient when it came to funding applications. The scale and scope of the investments, though – looking at the three different measures – shows the flow of substantial benefits to all central and eastern regions.

Infrastructural Metamorphosis of Poland in the 1990s

As described above, an exceptional stream of additional funds from the EU was directed to Poland from the early days of its transition. The funding programs evolved with time during the 1990s and became more specialized closer to EU accession to address the specific needs of the candidate countries. While causal evidence of the impact of EU pre-accession funds on evolving infrastructure remains scarce and is methodologically challenging (with just a few exceptions on more recent pre-accession funding schemes, like Denti 2013), a simple overview of a number of key indicators might serve as strong suggestive evidence that the funds actually made a significant difference. In this part of the paper, we take a closer look at some examples of Polish infrastructure that underwent enormous progress in the late 1990s and early 2000s. We stipulate that the EU funding played a crucial role in the acceleration of this development.

All three analyzed EU instruments – Phare, SAPARD and ISPA – shared some common objectives, for instance, increasing access to clean water in the population, reducing pollution in lakes, rivers, and the sea, and improving road conditions, especially the low-rank ones in remote, rural areas. In Figures 3-5, we present the scale of improvement observed in these three areas on the lowest level of regional disaggregation, namely, in Polish municipalities. We compare the three selected indicators over almost a decade, between 1995, the initial year of data availability, and 2004.

We begin with Figure 3, which depicts the expansion of the water pipe network measured in kilometers per 1,000 inhabitants in each municipality. As specified in the legend, the darker the green category, the higher the density of the water pipe network. The rapid expansion of the network between 1995 and 2004 is evident, especially in some parts of the country. Most often, the upgrade to the top category happened in regions that lagged well behind the rest of the country in 1995. Here, the notable examples are the central regions of Poland (Kujawsko-Pomorskie and Lodzkie Voivodships, including the northern part of the Mazowieckie Voivodship) and the north-eastern frontiers (Podlaskie and Warminsko-Mazurskie Voivodships).

Figure 3. Length of the water pipe system (in km) per 1000 inhabitants in Polish municipalities in 1995 and 2004

Source: Own compilation based on the statistics from the CSO Local Data Bank (BDL); Geodata: National Register of Boundaries (PRG). Note: The legend is based on 2004 data: the two top and bottom categories in the legend cover 10% of observations each, and the rest of the categories cover 20% of observations each. Municipality borders marked in white, voivodship borders in yellow. Poland underwent an important administrative reform in 1999, when 49 voivodships were aggregated into the current 16. For the year 1995, we use the post-reform voivodship division of the country. Between 1995 and 2004, only negligible administrative changes took place at the municipal level.

In Figure 4, we show the share of the population enjoying access to sewage treatment plant services. The progress over time in this respect was related, on the one hand, to the construction of new treatment facilities and, on the other, to the concurrent expansion of the sewage pipeline network, which resulted in a higher share of users for the existing wastewater treatment plants. The increase in the usage of the treatment plants over time is striking, especially given that at the starting point, in 1995, only a limited number of municipalities had a wastewater treatment plant in operation. These municipalities were mainly concentrated in the northwestern corner of Poland and in the southwestern region of Silesia.

In comparison to the water pipe system in Figure 3, the development of sewage treatment plant access was concentrated in regions that were already ahead of the rest of Poland in 1995 – specifically, the northwestern and southwestern ones. However, a substantial increase in access to sewage treatment services is also visible in central and eastern parts of Poland, where in 1995 plants offering these services were extremely rare. This particular type of development can also be viewed from the perspective of the extent of pollution reduction in Poland’s internal waters. The number of scientific reports documented a sharp decline in biochemical factors of industrial, agricultural and household origin, hazardous to both humans and the environment, commonly polluting Polish rivers and lakes in the 1990s (Gorski et al, 2017; Marszelewski & Piasecki, 2020).

Figure 4. Number of residents connected to sewage treatment plants per 1000 inhabitants in Polish municipalities in 1995 and 2004

Source: see Figure 3. Note: The legend is based on 2004 data: due to high prevalence of zeros the bottom category in the legend covers 30% of observations, the rest of categories cover 10% of observations each. Municipality borders marked in white, voivodship borders in yellow (see Notes in Figure 3 for details).

The third pair of maps (Figure 5) illustrates the development of the country’s road network. The Figure shows the expansion and modernization of the lower rank roads administered by municipalities, which seem particularly important from the point of view of day-to-day transportation and quality of life of local populations.

Figure 5. Length of the municipality road network (in km) per 1000 inhabitants in Polish municipalities in 1995 and 2004

Source and Note: see Figure 3.

The data in Figure 5 cover both paved or hard-surfaced roads and dirt roads. One point to keep in mind here is that with an overall development of a municipality and of the neighboring region, the status of the municipality’s small-scale road may be updated to a higher rank, administered by the county or even by the voivodship. Figure 5 does not account for such an update of rank (in the Figure of roads), so the numbers presented are likely to represent a lower bound of the actual advancement. The maps in Figure 5 compare the length of municipal roads per 1000 inhabitants in 1995 and 2004. While a significant improvement in the road system is visible almost all over the country, the central regions seem to have gained the most, at least when it comes to this particular type of roads.

Investments and Development vs. Public Perception

Overall, all three figures above demonstrate that during the decade before Poland integrated with the EU, significant progress was achieved in terms of improving the quality of life, increasing accessibility of public utilities, reducing environmental degradation and capturing sustainable urban development. Substantial investments in rural areas had an important impact on reducing regional disparities.

Another important observation when examining all three figures together is that, while advancement occurred throughout the country, the bulk of improvement in each of the considered aspects was concentrated in slightly different parts of it, and almost all Polish municipalities recorded an important inflow of investments related to the pre-accession funding. While again we cannot provide any causal evidence, below we confront the spatial distribution of infrastructural modernization from Figures 3-5 with public support for joining the EU expressed in the referendum organized in 2003, a year before accession.

Figure 6. Support for the EU accession in the referendum in 2003

Source: Own compilation based on the statistics from the National Electoral Commission; Geodata: National Register of Boundaries (PRG). Note: The bottom category in the legend covers municipalities that voted against EU integration (12.3% of observations), the rest of the categories cover 25% of the remaining observations each. Municipality borders marked in white, voivodship borders in yellow.

In Figure 6, we present the results of the vote on the municipal level, with darker blue shades indicating higher support for EU membership. The map clearly highlights high geographical variation in support for European integration, with much stronger proportions of votes in favor of EU membership in western and northern Poland. In contrast, the support in central and eastern Poland was substantially lower, reflecting a higher degree of skepticism towards the benefits of the EU. Clearly, many factors influenced people’s choices at the time of the referendum. They depended on their economic conditions, the degree of exposure to relations with Western European countries, the level of awareness of the potential gains from integration, as well as fears concerning the future of local economies and those related to cultural influences.

Just by looking at the map of support, it is impossible to say much about the degree to which the EU pre-accession funds affected the outcome of the referendum. For that, we would need to know more about the dynamics of support across regions. Yet, while the share of votes in favor of integration in many eastern municipalities was below 50%, people in a substantial majority of localities expressed overwhelming support for joining the EU. The result of the referendum was 77,45% in favor. Although no causal analysis linked the results to EU pre-accession funds, the scale of investment and its visibility, as well as its tangible effects – the direct translation of EU funds into daily quality of life all across Poland, are very likely to have turned many people’s votes in the EU’s favor.

Conclusion

Since the early 1990s, on the path to EU membership in 2004, Poland, like other candidate countries, received generous European pre-accession financial assistance. The combination of three financial instruments in operation at the time – Phare, SAPARD, and ISPA – enabled Poland to make substantial investments in key economic sectors, including public administration, agriculture, environmental protection, and physical infrastructure. The early launch of the Phare program prepared Poland to follow various EU standards and prerequisites, and contributed to the implementation of the cohesion policy. Initiation of assistance within SAPARD and ISPA instruments since 2000 strengthened the rural economy and competitiveness of Polish agriculture, and allowed for modernization of the transportation and environmental infrastructure. In pre-accession assistance, Poland received a total of 5.5 billion euro (over 3% of the 2003 GDP), by far the highest support provided to the candidate countries at the time.

Substantial investments made during the 1990s and early 2000s, largely covered by pre-accession financial aid, had a remarkable impact on the quality of existing infrastructure in Poland. Kilometers of roads were built and renovated in Polish municipalities, thousands of households acquired a connection with the water pipe network, and hundreds of wastewater treatment plants were constructed. This is only a small subset of selected advancements that can be demonstrated using quantitative data collected in a comparable way over time. Numerous other types of infrastructure received substantial investments to support development, modernization or enhancement. On top of that, all these improvements have likely contributed to further spill-over effects through higher levels of regional growth, a boost in the labor market with the creation of new jobs, a reduction of unemployment, or enhanced labor productivity. All these changes, taken together, played a key role in determining the overall quality of life for the Polish population, reducing regional economic inequalities, and improving the quality of the local natural environment, etc.

The distribution of support for Poland’s accession to the EU, as reflected in the 2003 referendum results, differed significantly by region. Enthusiasm for the EU was significantly lower in the eastern parts of the country, while residents of many western municipalities voted overwhelmingly in favor of membership. Yet, even at a very fine geographical distribution, we see only a relatively small group of municipalities – 12.3% – where less than 50% of residents voted in favor of EU membership, and the overall outcome across the country was a decisive “YES”. Thus, although the substantial advancement in infrastructural development all across the country did not convince the majority of residents in each and every locality, the number and geographical scope of those voting in favor was very decisive. It is impossible to say how high/low the support would have been without the received support. Yet, given the scale of the resulting changes in various basic dimensions of quality of life, it seems safe to say that, thanks to the funds, many voters looked at the future integration with a higher degree of appreciation. Naturally, other factors played a role in determining people’s decisions in the referendum, with economic conditions and prospects for socio-economic development being just one factor, albeit a likely important one.

Pre-accession funds in the current candidate countries, how they are used, distributed, and how they change people’s daily lives, will again prove important in showcasing the benefits of integration. At the same time, to secure the kind of support that the Polish population expressed in the 2003 referendum, it will be important to also highlight the broader benefits of integration and address fears and concerns of various population groups.

The experience of Poland and other member countries from Central and Eastern Europe can serve not only as an example of the benefits of pre-accession funds, which we studied in this policy paper. The countries’ socio-economic success and the changes in the quality of life, both before and after accession, should be seen as a clear case of fundamental changes, which would have been highly unlikely had the countries decided to stay out of the European Union.

Acknowledgement

The authors acknowledge the support from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida. We are grateful to Patryk Markowski for his assistance in preparing this analysis and detailed background research.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

The Polish Presidential Elections 2025: Can the Democratic Coalition Complete Their 2023 Victory?

Posted on May 26, 2025 | Policy Brief

Presidential Palace, Warsaw, Poland - representing the Polish Presidential Elections 2025.

It is safe to say that the outcome of the second round of the Polish presidential elections, scheduled for June 1, 2025, will determine the potential for significant structural reforms in the country in the coming years. The two candidates are: Karol Nawrocki, officially declared as a ‘civic candidate’ (though for all practical purposes associated with the previous government’s Law and Justice party, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – PiS), and Rafał Trzaskowski representing the main coalition party in the current government, the Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska), which came to power after the parliamentary elections in October 2023. In the first round of the 2025 presidential election, which took place on May 18, 2025, Rafał Trzaskowski came first with 31.4 percent of the votes and Karol Nawrocki second with 29.5 percent. This policy brief explores the mechanisms through which the Polish President can influence current policy, using past economic initiatives as illustrative examples. It also examines the results of the first round of the election in greater depth and highlights key areas where reforms would likely face significant obstacles, were Karol Nawrocki to win the decisive second round.

What Can the Polish President Do?

Although elected in a popular vote, the Polish President’s power in terms of influence on policies is highly limited. The President acts as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland and is officially responsible for representing Poland on the international arena. However, most of the executive power in Poland lies with the government, which in turn requires the support of the Parliament.

That said, the past ten years of Polish politics—the years under the outgoing President Andrzej Duda—have shown that a government with only a narrow parliamentary majority can be highly dependent on the President. Its effectiveness may be either enhanced by a cooperative President or significantly constrained through the use of the presidential veto on legislative initiatives.

Andrzej Duda, who was picked as a surprise candidate to represent the Law and Justice party—in a similar manner to Karol Nawrocki today— won the elections in 2015. He facilitated a series of destructive reforms in the areas of the judiciary, education, and the labor market in the years Law and Justice party headed the government; later he blocked many of the current government’s efforts to reverse those policies.

The outcome of the vote on June 1, 2025, will therefore be crucial for the prospects of a clear return to democratic standards in Poland, and for the deeper structural reforms needed to place the Polish economy on a long-term development path. The winning candidate will also either facilitate coordinated efforts in international policy and joint European initiatives, or act to obstruct the current government’s actions in this area—including key policies related to support for Ukraine.

The President’s Influence on Economic Policy: Electoral Promises vs. Implementation

The limited executive power of the Polish President does not stop the candidates from coming forward with rich electoral programmes. These cover many areas outside of the President’s direct sphere of influence, including economic policies.

Using Andrzej Duda’s presidency as an example, it seems that while some of these are eventually implemented (although typically not without political frictions involving the Parliament) others tend to be more of electoral slogans than areas of real concern:

In 2015, Andrzej Duda campaigned on two major economic initiatives: lowering the retirement age and substantially increasing the main income tax allowance. In the first case, he came forward with a legislative proposal to the Parliament almost immediately after being elected, aimed at restoring the lower retirement age of 60 for women and 65 for men. Although the government had campaigned on the same reform before taking office, the Parliament froze Duda’s initiative for a year in an effort to introduce less drastic changes to pension eligibility criteria. Eventually, political considerations and the weight of the 2015 electoral promises prevailed. As a result, Poland is the only EU country with as big as a five-year gap in the retirement age between men and women. The electoral tax reduction proposal was, however, quickly abandoned. As shown in a recent commentary (Myck et al. 2025a), Duda not only failed to deliver on this promise but, over his ten-year presidency, largely ignored tax policy altogether—both in terms of initiating legislation and engaging in public debate on fiscal matters.

Initiatives by earlier presidents also show that while Polish presidents are always dependent on the Parliament, they can exert some influence over economic policy. For example, Bronisław Komorowski (in office 2010-2015) put forward a legislative initiative to change tax regulations for families with children, which the government later took on board. While the government’s implemented regulations differed from Komorowski’s proposal, they were still in line with his objectives (Myck et al. 2013).

These examples clearly illustrate that the success of any initiative from the president’s office ultimately depends on the parliamentary majority the President is able to mobilize. Based on the electoral promises of this year’s top candidates, such a majority seems highly unlikely regarding one of the major electoral promises of Law and Justice’s candidate, Karol Nawrocki. Nawrocki has proposed a substantial income tax reduction for families with 2 or more children, designed in a way that would heavily benefit the richest families (Myck et al. 2025b). The reform is estimated to cost about 19bn PLN (0.5 percent of GDP) per year, with over 60 percent of the total amount benefiting families in the top income quintile. Such a measure is extremely unlikely to gain support not only from the current government, but also—given its distributional consequences—from within Nawrocki’s own political base. One way to interpret this is that much like the deep tax cuts proposed by Andrzej Duda in 2015, Nawrocki’s tax proposal bears the hallmarks of a simple and appealing campaign slogan that is likely to be forgotten, whether or not he wins the election.

The First Round Results and Final Vote Prospects

While Rafał Trzaskowski placed first in the initial round of voting on May 18, 2025, the difference between the top two candidates came down to only 1.8 percentage points. This suggests a very close race in the second round and intensive electoral campaigning in the days leading up to the election. How close the runoff will be depends on the split of votes among those who supported other candidates in the first round, as well as their participation levels in the second round.

In the first round the top seven candidates collected 96.1 percent of the votes in total. Two candidates representing the current coalition parties received 5.0 percent (Szymon Hołownia) and 4.2 percent (Magdalena Biejat) of the votes, respectively. Two other main right-wing candidates collected a combined 21.2 percent: Sławomir Mentzen (Konfederacja party) received 14.8 percent, and Grzegorz Braun (Wolność party) received 6.3 percent. Adrian Zandberg, representing the left-wing opposition (Razem party), received 4.9 percent.

If those who voted for the government coalition candidates fully shift their votes to Trzaskowski in the second round, he could count for about 40.6 percent of the vote – still far short of the necessary majority. To secure the win, he would need to collect some support from both the left and the right. However, it is unlikely that voters in either of these cases unilaterally shift support to one of the top candidates.

As shown in Figure 1 below the main candidates will have to make strong appeals to the youngest voters (aged 18-29), the majority of whom supported Mentzen (34.8 percent) and Zandberg (18.7 percent). Trzaskowski is more likely to attract support from women and better educated voters. Based on the results of the first round, Nawrocki, can count on voters with less than tertiary education and on slightly more votes from men. While Biejat and Hołownia have already publicly endorsed  Trzaskowski, the other candidates have so far refrained from making any declarations of support.

The public debate ahead of the second round is likely to focus on military and economic security, migration and support for Ukraine (including its refugee population in Poland). The final round of the 2025 presidential race in Poland is likely to be extremely close and highly polarising.

Figure 1. Poll results from the first round in the Polish Presidential Elections 2025, by demographics

Source: TVP info. Note: Late poll results by IPSOS, based on the results from 90 percent of the polling stations.

Completing the 2023 Parliamentary Victory

The democratic, pro-European coalition that won a parliamentary majority in October 2023 has so far only been partly successful in restoring the rule of law and a functioning system of checks and balances after their dismantling by the previous government. Other electoral promises from 2023—such as the liberalization of abortion rules, legislation on same-sex partnerships, and reform of the public media—remain to be implemented.  The government implemented some important changes in the public media and judiciary, but broader reforms were either vetoed by President Duda or postponed due to the likelihood of his opposition.

On a number of occasions Duda also used a procedure called ‘preventive control’. Under such procedure, legislation is sent to the Constitutional Tribunal before the President decides whether to sign it or not. Since the Constitutional Tribunal has been central to controversies over judicial reforms introduced by the previous government, such decisions are simply another form of delaying the implementation of new legislation. There is thus little doubt that Rafał Trzaskowski’s victory on June 1st, 2025, is essential for the current government. It would enable reforms crucial for the return of the rule of law, for bringing back the Polish legal system in line with decisions of the European Court of Justice, and for advancing other major reforms in public media, women’s and minority rights, and more. From this point of view Karol Nawrocki’s win on June 1st, 2025, is key for the parties of the previous government, to stop these fundamentally important reforms.

The current government is facing important challenges in many policy areas and effective  cooperation with the new President will be fundamental. Given the current level of government debt and high budget deficits, it will have to take significant steps to consolidate public finances. At the same time, it has committed to increasing spending on healthcare and education, while maintaining one of the highest levels of military spending among NATO countries.  The government must also handle the challenges of demographic ageing and migration flows – all in the context of the continuing Russian aggression in Ukraine, and the overall global uncertainly. Even with strong presidential support, tackling all these issues will be challenging.Facing them under an antagonistic Head of State—in the case of Nawrocki’s victory—would not only make the government’s task significantly harder, it with also have serious implications for medium-term political stability in Poland and potentially other European countries.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Human Capital Loss Among Belarusian and Ukrainian Migrants to the EU

Posted on March 31, 2025 | Policy Brief

Silhouettes of construction workers on scaffolding at sunset, symbolizing underemployment among human capital migrants in the EU.

This policy brief examines the underutilization of human capital among involuntary migrants from Ukraine and Belarus in Poland and Lithuania. Focusing on those who migrated after 2020 (Belarus) and 2022 (Ukraine), the brief investigates the factors influencing the conversion of their pre-migration skills into gainful employment in their host countries. Our findings show that despite many migrants possessing high levels of education and professional qualifications, structural barriers and low convertibility of their skills, hinder their full labor market integration. This skill underutilization not only limits migrants’ professional growth and earning potential but also deprives the host countries of valuable skills and potential economic gains.

Effective labor market integration substantially benefits both host and sending countries and migrants themselves. For host nations, successful integration can alleviate critical skill shortages, boost productivity, and drive economic growth (Boubtane, Dumont, & Rault, 2016; Boubtane, 2019; Engler, Giesing, & Kraehnert, 2023; Bernstein et al., 2022). Conversely, inadequate integration leads to underemployment, diminished potential, and economic inefficiency. Countries of origin can benefit from remittances, the return of migrants with enhanced skills, and strengthened international economic ties. However, poor integration risks an uncompensated “brain drain” (Reinhold & Thom, 2009; Barrett & O’Connell, 2001; Iara, 2006; Barrett & Goggin, 2010; Co, Gang, & Yun, 2000). For migrants, the ability to continue their careers means higher earnings and less stress from the acquisition of a new profession, while the non-utilization of existing skills results in their depreciation, potentially causing permanent wage reductions even upon return to the home country (Bowman & Myers, 1967).

Migrants can be broadly categorized into voluntary migrants or forced migrants. Voluntary migrants assess labor market prospects beforehand and often possess convertible human capital – one that can be used in a new labor market. This group often includes professionals like IT specialists and scientists and those in low-skilled but highly transferable professions. Forced migrants, on the contrary, may be utterly unprepared for changes in jurisdiction and possess skills of limited transferability. For example, even highly specialized professions requiring extensive training and substantial human capital, such as lawyers, officials, and teachers, often prove “non-convertible“ (Duleep & Regets, 1999). These individuals’ skills are frequently country specific.

Low convertibility of skills generates significant negative consequences. Highly educated professionals, for instance, may find themselves relegated to low-paying, unskilled jobs, unable to leverage their expertise. This hinders their professional development and deprives host countries of valuable skills and potential contributions to economic growth. Addressing these mismatches is crucial for maximizing the benefits of migration for stakeholders in both home and host countries.

Forced Migration from Belarus and Ukraine

The political crisis in Belarus, starting with the contested 2020 presidential elections, led to widespread repression and significant forced migration. Belarus’s role in supporting Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine exacerbated this situation, resulting in approximately 300,000 Belarusians seeking refuge in the European Union (Eurostat). This number accounts for a substantial proportion of the country’s 9 million population and its approximately 5 million-strong labor force (Belstat).

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine triggered the most significant wave of migration in Ukrainian history, with over 6 million of the pre-war 44 million population fleeing to the EU (UNHCR). About 90 percent of the initial refugees were women and children due to a mobilization law preventing most men aged 18 to 60 from leaving (UNHCR).

Online Survey and Migrant Differences

To better understand the situation of migrants, their integration into the EU labor market, and to develop data-driven recommendations for improving their conditions, the CIVITTA agency, in partnership with BEROC, conducted an online survey in the summer of 2024. This brief is based on the survey results. The survey includes responses from 616 Ukrainian nationals who migrated to Poland or Lithuania after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as well as 173 Belarusian migrants who left their home country after 2020. The research focuses on individuals aged 28 to 42, providing insights into their experiences and challenges in the labor market in their host countries. While we acknowledge the sample’s limitations in terms of representativeness, we believe the findings provide valuable insights into the specific challenges faced by involuntary migrants and their adaptation strategies in the new labor market.

Key differences characterize these migration waves. Ukrainian migration comprises of more women, while Belarusian migrants show a more balanced gender distribution, with 47 percent women in our sample versus 62 percent for Ukrainians. Family separation is also notable, as 91 percent of married Belarusians live with their spouses, compared to only 75 percent of Ukrainians (due to the mobilization law).

Survey respondents from both groups possess high levels of human capital with 60 percent of Ukrainians and 90 percent of Belarusians holding higher education degrees. Among Belarusians, 94 percent had over five years of work experience before migration, with and 79 percent of Ukrainians stating the same.

Ukrainian return intentions are split: 38 percent plan to return, 19 percent will not, and the rest are undecided. An end to the war and changes in Russian foreign policy would increase return rates to 70 percent. For Belarusians, 35 percent plan to return, 38 percent will not, and the rest are undecided. Education level is key, as less-educated Belarusians are more likely to stay abroad. An end to repression would increase the share of those Belarusians who want to return to 70 percent, and a regime change would increase this percentage to 82 percent.

Factors Conditioning Human Capital Loss

As expected, due to the involuntary nature of migration of the two groups in focus, a large fraction of survey participants reported losing their profession after migration. As Figure one shows, 48 percent of Belarusians and 63 percent of Ukrainians in our sample reported full loss of their prior careers. The lower percentage of Ukrainians fully retaining their careers (23 percent) compared to Belarusians (44 percent) could be attributed to several factors, including the more recent and disruptive nature of the Russo-Ukrainian war leading to more significant displacement and challenges in finding comparable work. The higher percentage of Ukrainians starting their careers from scratch (49 percent compared to 29 percent among Belarusians) also supports this idea.

Figure 1. Preservation of careers in the EU

Source: Authors’ computations based on survey data.

To foster an evidence-based discussions on the smooth integration of migrants into the EU labor market and the prevention of human capital loss, it is crucial to examine the individual factors that influence career continuity for Belarusian and Ukrainian migrants. We therefore utilize a logistic regression model to identify key predictors that increase the likelihood of migrants remaining in their profession after relocating to Poland and Lithuania.

In our quantitative analysis, an outcome binary variable for staying in the profession is equal to 1 if an individual either “continued career started in a home country (in the same position)” or “remained in the same profession but started working in a position lower than the one held before emigration.” As predictors, we consider a set of sociodemographic variables reasonably related to the probability of staying in the profession and dummy variables for the most common spheres of employment (see Table 1).

Table 1. Overview of model variables

Who Maintains Their Career After Emigration?

Based on the regression coefficients in Table 2, we can identify characteristics related to losing career-specific human capital. In our regression, we control for both home and host country factors. One noteworthy finding is that, while Ukrainian migrants in our sample report significantly higher rates of career loss than Belarusian migrants, nationality itself does not emerge as a significant predictor of career loss once other characteristics are accounted for.

Our results also show that the probability of staying in a profession is higher among men, those with more extended work experience and higher income before emigration, and those who were invited to a host country by an employer. The same holds for entrepreneurs, those who do not plan to return, and those employed in the fields of Architecture & Engineering and Information and Communication Technologies.

Table 2. Results of regression analysis

Note: *** Significant at the .001 level. ** Significant at the .01 level. * Significant at the .05 level.

Conclusion

Several conclusions and policy advice can be derived from the survey results.

The higher likelihood of entrepreneurs staying in their profession suggests that supporting migrant entrepreneurship can be a valuable strategy to retain human capital. This can be done, for example, by:

  • Providing access to resources, mentorship, and funding for migrant entrepreneurs.
  • Streamlining the procedures for migrants to start and operate businesses.
  • Facilitating access to capital for migrant-owned businesses.

The research highlights the disproportionate impact of human capital loss on women.  Therefore, policies should include gender-specific programs that address women’s unique challenges in integrating into new labor markets. This could include:

  • Skills retraining and certification programs: Designed to align women’s existing skills with the demands of the host country’s labor market, with consideration for childcare needs and other barriers women may face.
  • Connecting women migrants with established professionals in their fields to facilitate knowledge transfer and career guidance.
  • Language training programs: Tailored to the specific needs of women, potentially incorporating childcare support to enable participation.

The study highlights the positive role of international companies in supporting employee relocation. Respondents who were invited by an employer demonstrated the most successful integration into the new labor market. To enhance and strengthen these networks, policies may focus on:

  • Encouraging corporations to hire and train migrant workers, potentially through tax breaks or other incentives. This could include partnerships with migrant-serving organizations to connect companies with qualified candidates.
  • Developing digital platforms that connect migrants with diaspora networks, potential employers, and relevant resources.

In addition, policies should address the non-recognition of foreign qualifications, simplifying and expediting the procedures for recognizing foreign degrees and professional certifications. Initiatives to create targeted training programs could complement such policies and allow migrants to quickly acquire any missing skills or certifications required by the host country’s professional bodies. These policy measures would enhance the utilization of migrants’ human capital, benefiting both migrants and host countries while also supporting sending countries. This could be achieved by fostering a successful diaspora or facilitating productive reintegration in the case of return migration.

References

  • Barrett, A., & Goggin, J. (2010). Returning to the question of a wage premium for returning migrants. National Institute Economic Review, 213, R43–R51. https://doi.org/10.1177/0027950110389752
  • Barrett, A., & O’Connell, P. J. (2001). Does training generally work? The returns to in-company training. ILR Review, 54(3), 647–662. https://doi.org/10.1177/001979390105400403
  • Bernstein, S., Diamond, R., McQuade, T. J., & Pousada, B. (2022). The contribution of high-skilled immigrants to innovation in the United States (No. w30797). National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w30797
  • Boubtane, E. (2019). The economic effects of immigration for host countries. L’Economie politique, 84(4), 72–83. https://doi.org/10.3917/leco.084.0072
  • Boubtane, E., Dumont, J.-C., & Rault, C. (2016). Immigration and economic growth in the OECD countries 1986–2006. Oxford Economic Papers, 68(2), 340–360. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpv024
  • Bowman, M. J., & Myers, R. G. (1967). Schooling, experience, and gains and losses in human capital through migration. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 62(319), 875–898. https://doi.org/10.2307/2283723
  • Co, C. Y., Gang, I. N., & Yun, M.-S. (2000). Returns to returning. Journal of Population Economics, 13, 57–79. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001480050121
  • Duleep, H. O., & Regets, M. C. (1999). Immigrants and human-capital investment. American Economic Review, 89(2), 186–191. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.2.186
  • Engler, P., Giesing, Y., & Kraehnert, K. (2023). The macroeconomic effects of large immigration waves. IAB-Discussion Paper. https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-239271
  • Iara, A. (2006). Skill diffusion in temporary migration? Returns to Western European working experience in the EU accession countries (Development Studies Working Paper No. 210). Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=921492
  • Reinhold, S., & Thom, K. (2009). Temporary migration and skill upgrading: Evidence from Mexican migrants. University of Mannheim, unpublished manuscript.
  • UNHCR. (n.d.). Operational Data Portal. https://data.unhcr.org/

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Three Years On – Ukrainians in Poland after Russia’s 2022 Invasion

Posted on February 21, 2025 | Policy Papers

Ukrainians in Poland rallying in Kraków, waving Ukrainian and Polish flags.

The wave of Ukrainian refugees that followed the full-scale Russian invasion on February 24th, 2022, was met in Poland with unprecedented levels of support and solidarity. According to data from the Polish Household Budget Survey, 70 percent of households offered some help to Ukrainians in Poland, and over 10 percent (1.3 million households) provided direct personal assistance. Overall, by early 2025, 1.9 million refugees had registered in the dedicated social security registry (PESEL-UKR system), and 1 million continue to be registered as residing in Poland. Drawing on other data sources, we argue in this policy paper that the latter figure is highly overstated, giving rise to unjustified criticisms of low school enrolment among Ukrainian children and low rates of labour market activity among adult refugees. We highlight the risks that these critical voices may become prominent in the ongoing campaign ahead of the Polish presidential elections. During the crucial months of prospective peace negotiations, when presidential candidates are appealing for voters’ support, we argue that the public debate in Poland concerning Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees ought to be grounded in reliable evidence.

Polish Support for Ukraine: Shifts in Public Attitudes, and Policy Challenges Amid War and Elections

The dramatic events of late February 2022 shook the populations across Ukraine, Europe and the world. The objective of the massive, full-scale Russian aggression was clear – to rapidly take over Kyiv, force Ukraine to surrender and take over full control of the country thus subjugating it into Kremlin’s rule. Three years later, while thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians have lost their lives, and while Russia has imposed a massive economic and social burden on Ukraine, its key objective has badly failed and remains far from being realised. This thanks to the commitment of the Ukrainian government, the country’s army and the mobilisation of the Ukrainian population. In turn, the country’s resistance would not have been possible without substantial support from the outside, primarily from countries in the European Union and the U.S. International aid from governments to Ukraine between February 2022 and October 2024 amounted to over €230 billion (bn) with the largest part contributed by the US (€88 bn), the European Commission and European Council (€45 bn) and Germany (€16 bn). Proportional to 2021 GDP levels, the highest support came from Estonia (2.20 percent), Denmark (2.02 percent) and Lithuania (1.68 percent) (Kiel Institute, 2024). Support for Ukraine has come in many forms – military, material, financial, political and diplomatic. The international community has also imposed substantial economic and political sanctions against Russia, and has excluded it from many international forums, marginalising its voice in international discussions and meetings.

On top of that, Ukraine’s neighbours and many Western countries opened their borders and welcomed a massive wave of refugees escaping the immediate military invasion in the east and north of Ukraine, seeking safety from continued bomb and drone attacks on the entire country, and running away from the risk of a complete Russian take-over. It is estimated that up to 8 million Ukrainians left the country in the first months after the full-scale war started, initially moving mainly to Poland, Romania and Slovakia (Polish Economic Institute, 2022; UNCHR, 2022). At the same time the Russian aggression resulted in internal displacement of more than 3.6 million Ukrainians (IOM UN Migration, 2024). While many of the international and internal refugees have since returned, over 6.8 million Ukrainians still reside outside of Ukraine’s borders (UNCHR, 2025).

The wake of the war was met with an unprecedented wave of support among the Polish population (Duszczyk and Kaczmarczyk, 2022). We use data from one of the largest representative Polish surveys – the Household Budget Survey 2022 and 2023 – to show the degree of involvement among Polish households in direct and indirect support to Ukrainian refugees. We also show that declarative general sympathy towards Ukrainians reached over 50 percent in 2023 –  twice as high compared to 16 years earlier. This support has by now fallen close to the levels from just before the full-scale war (40 percent). As the immediate need for help has become less urgent, and the refugees have organised their lives in Poland, the involvement of Polish households in supporting the Ukrainian population has also declined. At its peak at the beginning of the war the proportion of Polish households that were actively involved in helping the Ukrainian population reached nearly 70 percent, with over 10 percent (i.e. more than 1.3 million) of the households providing direct assistance to the refugees.

In this policy paper we call into question some of the official data on the number of Ukrainian refugees who continue to reside in Poland (almost 1 million) (EUROSTAT, 2025). We argue that inconsistency across different sources with regard to precise numbers – such as likely inflated refugee count in the official social security register – may be used  to build unfavourable claims against the refugees and the Ukrainian cause overall, as arguments and narratives develop based on marginal anecdotal evidence and incorrect statistics. As the new U.S. administration tries – in its own way – to bring an end to the war, Ukraine will need continued strong support from all Western allies to end the war on favourable terms for Ukraine and to get significant additional help to rebuild the country. Ukraine’s safety and economic security will depend on Western military guarantees and closer integration with the EU. All of this requires the support of populations in these countries, which gets increasingly undermined by internal disputes and external political interferences.

As negotiations to end the war begin to take shape, Poland enters a crucial electoral campaign ahead of its May 2025 presidential elections. This combination is likely to place the Ukrainian question among the top issues on the local agenda. At the same time, there is a risk  that the extent of support towards Ukraine and Ukrainian residents in Poland will be used in the battle for electoral votes. We argue that any debate around this topic should draw on reliable, up to date data sources. In this regard, the  government should provide more information to clarify data inconsistencies, to shed more light on the situation among Ukrainian citizens currently residing in Poland, and to ensure that any doubtful narratives raised in the public debate are quickly addressed.

Ukrainian sovereignty, its peaceful development and prosperity are very much in the interest of both Poland and the rest of Europe. Therefore, the Polish government must provide arguments to reinvigorate the support for Ukraine among its population. This will be fundamental to ensure Ukraine’s military success and stability, to guarantee the mutual benefits of integration of the Ukrainian population in Poland, and for the future economic cooperation with Ukraine in the prospective enlarged European Union.

The Outbreak of the Full-Scale War: Ukrainians in Poland

In the first couple of months after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24th  2022, over 2 million refugees fled to Poland through the common land border, with as many as 1.3 million people crossing the border during the first two weeks of the war (Figure 1a). The exact number of refugees who arrived in Poland is difficult to gauge as some people left Ukraine via the border with Romania or Slovakia and could have entered Poland across the uncontrolled borders of the Schengen area.

BOX 1. Ukrainian citizens in Poland before the war in 2022

Before February 24, 2022, the migration of Ukrainian citizens to Poland was regulated by existing legal mechanisms concerning all foreigners coming from non-EU countries (European Parliament, 2010). Migrants could apply for a temporary residence permit for a maximum of three years, most often in connection with prearranged employment or education (Sejm RP, 2013). Since 2017 Ukrainian citizens with biometric passports could travel to Poland and other EU countries without a visa, but their stay was limited to 90 days (European Parliament, 2017). Access to the Polish social transfer system for migrants and their families was strictly regulated and limited. Labor migrants and temporary visitors under the visa-free regime had no right to public benefits or healthcare (Sejm RP, 2003).

At the time, application for refugee status was possible, but required undergoing a lengthy and burdensome asylum procedure. Those with refugee status granted had access to public transfers and healthcare (Sejm RP, 2003).

In accordance with the European regulations of Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001, the Polish government responded to the refugee crisis by establishing a special residence status for those fleeing the war. The regulations were introduced as early as  March 12, 2022, and as a result, all Ukrainian refugees who arrived in Poland since 24 February could register themselves (and their family members) in a special social security registry, the so-called PESEL-UKR (Sejm RP, 2022). This registration immediately provided the refugees with an official status of temporary protection and legalized their stay in Poland until a specified date, which – as the war continued – has been regularly extended. In comparison to other, non-EU migrants, the PESEL-UKR status grants the refugees simplified access to the Polish labour market and gives them access to public healthcare and social transfers – including general support available to all legal residents, as well as special financial and non-monetary aid targeted specifically at refugees (Duszczyk and Kaczmarczyk, 2022). The registration process was streamlined and widely accessible in all municipality offices throughout Poland and resulted in rapid registration of the majority that had arrived to Poland since February 24, 2022. By the end of June 2022, 1.2 million individuals had registered for the PESEL-UKR status. The number grew to 1.4 million by October 2022 and continued to grow to 1.9 million registrations by January 2025. As evident from Figure 1b not all of those who crossed the Polish border (or arrived in Poland having left Ukraine through a different country) stayed in the country. Some continued their journey to other EU countries and beyond, while some decided to return to Ukraine. It is worth noting though that of all the registrations carried out by the end of 2024, nearly half happened in the first 8 weeks following the invasion.

Figure 1. Number of Ukrainian citizens crossing the border between Poland and Ukraine and registering for PESEL-UKR, 2021-2024

Note: Weekly data on crossings via all land borders with Ukraine.
Source: Open Data Portal (2025a, 2025b).

A notable and important legal change was introduced in October 2022, whereby individuals are automatically withdrawn from the PESEL-UKR registry after a period of 30 days when they (1) leave Poland, (2) apply for a residence permit, or (3) apply for international protection status (Sejm RP, 2022). This change is the reason for the substantial drop in the number of registered refugees at the end of 2022, with over 400 000 individual withdrawals (Figure 1b). This change in legislation was aimed at estimating more precisely the number of Ukrainian refugees currently residing in Poland. However, since withdrawals from the system require that departures from the territory of Poland are officially recorded at the border, or follow a parallel registration in another EU country, or are recorded as departures from the Schengen area through another country, the numbers in the system may still be far from the actual number of refugees currently residing in Poland.

Since late 2022 the number of registered Ukrainian refugees in Poland has been fairly stable at slightly below 1 million. Similarly, the shares of different age cohorts have not changed. In Figure 2 we show the split of those in the PESEL-UKR registry by age. Children under the age of 18 account for about 40 percent of all refugees, of which 30 percent are in schooling age (7-17). 7 percent of the refugees are aged 62 years or older. Among those aged 18-61 years old, 70 percent are women. It is worth noting that out of about half a million children recorded in the first 7 months, almost 400 000 are still registered in the PESEL-UKR registry, a number that has been stable since the end of 2022. As we show below, these values are significantly higher compared to the number of refugee children reported by two other administrative sources. This in turn casts doubt on the reliability of the estimates of the total number of Ukrainian refugees in Poland.

Figure 2. Ukrainian citizens registered with PESEL-UKR, by age group

Note: Based on registered year of birth, age as of 2025.
Source: Open Data Portal (2025b).

Where Are All the Registered Children?

To check the reliability of the PESEL-UKR registry data, we match the information from the registry with information from school registers provided by the Ministry of National Education, and the number of children benefitting from social transfers provided by the Social Insurance Institution (ZUS). As evident in Figure 3, the number of registered school-age children in the PESEL-UKR registry and the number of those who are officially registered in Polish schools significantly differ, and the difference seems stable over time. According to school records, most of the Ukrainian parents promptly enrolled their children in schools right after their arrival in Poland – about 120 000 pupils joined Polish schools as early as March 2022. The numbers grew in September 2024, which followed the introduction of obligatory schooling for all Ukrainian children aged between 7 and 17  (Sejm RP, 2024), with online classes in Ukraine permitted only for those in their final year. When we compare data for late 2024 and early 2025, we see that while about 270 000 children aged 7-17 were registered in the PESEL-UKR database, only 152 000 attended Polish schools – resulting in a very low enrolment rate of about 56 percent – raising legitimate concerns over the children’s academic and social development (see for example CEO, 2024).

Figure 3. Number of school-age children among Ukrainian refugees

Note: School registrations: all school types except preschool education, post-secondary schools, schools for adults and grades in which children are at least 18 years old. Ukrainian refugees only. Child benefit data points as reported in June, October and December.
Source: Open Data Portal (2025b, 2025c); information on 800+ benefit recipients: unpublished data from the Social Insurance Institution (ZUS).

As evident from Figure 3 though, from late 2023 all the way until early 2025, the ‘800+ benefit’ (which is a universal child benefit paid to all children aged 0-17) was paid to around 150 000 Ukrainian refugee children aged 7-17. Given the ease of claiming the benefit, and the relatively high value of the transfers (about 23 percent of net minimum wage per child per month), it seems very unlikely that so many families would opt out of the support. Looking at the close match between the numbers from ZUS and from the Ministry of Education, the more likely interpretation of the figures is not that children stay away from school and fail to claim social transfers, but rather that far fewer children continue to reside in Poland.

An additional argument supporting the inaccuracy of the PESEL-UKR data comes from a report published by the Narodowy Bank Polski (the Polish Central Bank) (NBP, 2024). Using information from a large survey conducted among Ukrainians living in Poland the report shows that 83 percent of school-age children in refugee families were enrolled in either a Polish or a Ukrainian school physically based in Poland. This is very far from the 56 percent rate calculated with reference to administrative data, again suggesting that the PESEL-UKR numbers of school-age children are highly inflated. If that is the case, not only the number of refugee children but the overall PESEL-UKR numbers (992 000 by January 2025) should be called into question.

How Many of the Registered Adults Are Active on the Labor Market?

The accuracy of the overall number of refugees is important because it is one of the key references for policy discussions. While international regulations specify that victims of war and conflict are granted the same basic rights and privileges as other legal residents, including access to the labour market, healthcare and other public services (Duszczyk et al., 2023), negative sentiments towards Ukrainian citizens have recently grown in Poland. Further, various restrictions on access to public support for Ukrainian refugees have already been publicly discussed and proposed in Parliament. These sentiments feed on the claims of fraudulent behaviour, unwillingness to engage in official employment and crowding out of public services for Polish nationals. Such claims about Ukrainians are spread more easily if not met by accurate numbers.

Figure 4. Number of Ukrainian men and women contributing to pension insurance in Poland

Note: ‘Other countries’ refers to other registered foreigners.
Source: Social Insurance Institution ZUS (2024).

Looking at labour market activity, the number of Ukrainians who were officially active on the Polish labour market (as employees, self-employed or receiving unemployment benefit) and who thus paid pension contributions to social security in December 2023 stood at 759 000 (see Figure 4). Of those 396 000 were men and 363 000 were women. While ZUS, the Social Insurance Institution, does not distinguish between migrants (those with the right to stay before February 24th, 2022) and refugees (with PESEL-UKR status) it seems safe to assume that those who registered in the ZUS database in 2022 and 2023 belong to the latter group. The difference between the number of Ukrainians contributing to social security in December 2021 and December 2023 is 132 000 and, as seen in Figure 4, the additional numbers of those registered differ only for Ukrainian women. New Ukrainian male refugees certainly also appear in the database in 2022 and 2023, but their number is difficult to estimate as some earlier migrants returned to Ukraine after the outbreak of the war, and as a result the net effect of men between 2021 and 2023 is essentially zero. Focusing on women, we can compare the number of new registrations in the ZUS database to the total number of women aged 18-59 (excluding students) in the PESEL-UKR database (about 335 000 in December 2023). Such a ratio would suggest that only about 40 percent of female Ukrainian refugees are formally contracted on the Polish labour market (on contracts paying social security contributions). This is much lower than the values presented in the NBP report (2024), suggesting that in July 2024, around 70 percent of the adult war refugees were working and further 19 percent were looking for a job. This comparison once again suggests that the PESEL-UKR numbers are significantly inflated.

Addressing the public concerns with regard to school enrolment and labour market activity with correct figures could help counter the growing negative sentiments towards Ukrainians in Poland as well as towards the overall support for the process of securing peace in Ukraine and integrating it closer with Poland and the EU. In the next section we show that when the full-scale war started in February 2022, not only the sentiments were strongly in favour of supporting Ukraine. Additionally, the level of engagement of the Polish population in actively assisting Ukrainian refugees was truly unprecedented.

Individual Support in Response to the Outbreak of the War

In the first few weeks after the full-scale Russian invasion the Polish society almost uniformly united in providing help and assistance to Ukrainians affected by the war. The Polish Economic Institute estimated that during the first 3 months the financial, humanitarian and material help provided by the Polish society alone reached 9-10 billion PLN, which corresponded to 0.34-0.38 percent of Poland’s GDP (Baszczak et al. 2022). Polish private businesses were also quick to join the assistance efforts, donating money, food, medical and other specialized equipment, and providing services such as transportation, insurance, and education free of charge (WEI 2023). Until May 2022, 53 percent of Polish enterprises engaged in different kinds of relief or support.

The assistance to refugees has been documented in numerous anecdotes, formal reports and extensive media coverage. The scale of support is also reflected in the Polish Household Budget Survey, a regular household survey conducted by the Central Statistical Office. Already in the first quarter of 2022 the survey included several questions related to the assistance given by the interviewed households to Ukrainian refugees. These questions were then included in the survey throughout 2022 and 2023. As shown in Figure 5, when the inflow of refugees from Ukraine started in late February 2022, nearly 70 percent of Polish households offered some form of assistance. Most of this help took the form of gifts and money transfers, but 10.4 percent, i.e. over 1.3 million Polish households, offered direct help such as transport, providing an overnight stay, delivering goods to accommodation venues, etc. The fraction of those offering assistance stayed very high through the first half of 2022, and 23 percent of Polish households still provided some form of assistance in the last quarter of 2022 (Figure 5). As the war stalled, and the Ukrainian population settled and became more independent, and the Polish government took official responsibility of assisting those still in need, the level of direct support from households fell. However, in late 2023 9 percent of Polish households still continued to provide some form of assistance. What is really special about the initial wave of support is that the positive attitudes towards the refugees and the Ukrainian cause were nearly universal. As seen in Figure 6, assistance was offered by high and low educated households (79 and 59 percent), those living in large cities and in rural areas (73 and 68 percent), the young and the old (66 and 63 percent). Households who declared good material conditions were more likely to offer help (75 percent), but even among those who declared difficulties with their financial status 41 percent came forward to offer some assistance.

Figure 5. Polish households engaged in assisting Ukrainian refugees, 2022-2023 (by quarter)

Note: Help covers support and transfers to individuals and institutions in Ukraine as well as to Ukrainian refugees in Poland. “Personal assistance” – direct help to refugees (with job search, doctor’s visits, public matters, language lessons, translation, etc.), “Other help” – help at the border, in reception points, temporary accommodation points, gift collection points, transportation, hosting or subletting own housing free of charge, blood donation.
Source: own compilation based on the Polish Household Budget Surveys 2022-2023.

Figure 6. Polish households engaged in assisting Ukrainian refugees (any help) in the first quarter of 2022, by household characteristics

Notes: Urban status – A: rural area, B: city below 100 000 inhabitants, C: city over 100 000 inhabitants. Material situation (self-assessed) – D: bad or rather bad material situation, E: average material situation, F: good or rather good material situation. Age of head of household – G: 18-29, H: 30-59, I: 60 and older. Education of head of household – J: lower than secondary, K: secondary or postsecondary, L: tertiary. Source: own compilation based on the Polish Household Budget Survey 2022.

It is worth noting also that by the time the full-scale war broke out in February 2022 the sentiments among the Polish population towards Ukrainians had improved compared to attitudes in the 1990s and early 2000s. These sentiments have been regularly surveyed by the Public Opinion Research Center CBOS, and we summarize them in Figure 7. As evident, in the early 1990s the proportion of Poles declaring positive sentiments towards Ukrainians was very low. It steadily increased until  about 2017 and then grew rapidly from 2018 till 2020. In 2022 the sentiments towards Ukrainians reached their peak, with over 50 percent of Poles declaring fondness towards them – on par with nations such as Lithuania and Slovakia. At the same time positive attitudes towards Russians reached an all-time low of 6 percent. Positive sentiments towards Ukrainians declined in 2024 – the last year for which the data is available – but even after the drop they are still high when compared with attitudes before 2023.

While the general positive sentiments towards Ukrainians in Poland has improved over the years, 2022 was truly unique when it comes to attitudes toward Ukrainian refugees (see Figure 8). Between 2015 and 2018, i.e. after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, around 50-60 percent of Poles declared that refugees from the conflict areas in Ukraine should be welcomed in Poland. When the same question was asked again in March 2022, 95 percent agreed that Ukrainian refugees should be welcomed in Poland and nearly 60 percent declared that they ‘definitely’ agreed with such a policy. However, the proportion of Poles in support of welcoming Ukrainian refugees has decreased. In late 2024 the share was more or less back at the level prior to the full-scale war, i.e. at over 50 percent.

Figure 7. Share of survey participants declaring fondness towards foreigners of different origin

Source: The Public Opinion Research Center CBOS (2024a).

Figure 8. Opinion survey: If Poland should accept Ukrainian refugees coming from the conflict territories

Note: The surveys were discontinued between 2018 and 2022.
Source: Public Opinion Research Center CBOS (2024b).

Why Have Sentiments Shifted?

At the crucial time of a possible long-awaited end to the Russian invasion, when coordinated support of Western governments will be essential to secure a just and long-lasting solution, the willingness of these governments to firmly stand behind Ukraine will, to a large extent, depend on the sentiments among their voters. Thus, the wavering enthusiasm for the Ukrainian cause in countries such as Poland can be seen as a worrying sign, in particular given how high the level of support was in the early days of the invasion. This support will be particularly important over the next few months, given the likely period of intensive international negotiations and the battle for votes in the upcoming Polish presidential elections.

It is not unusual to try to put the blame for various unfortunate developments on external forces, including global trends, external conflicts and all things ‘foreign’. Thus, the fact that many people in various countries, including Poland, blame their perceived worsened economic conditions on the consequences of the war and the related influx of Ukrainian refugees is far from surprising. While some politicians might want to explain the complex broad context, others will take advantage of these sentiments and continue to fuel the negative discourse. With that in mind, three main topics have been particularly visible in the public debate in Poland:

  • access to social transfers, in particular to the ‘800+’ child benefit for Ukrainian refugees
  • Ukrainian refugees’ participation in the Polish labour market and tax contributions to the local budget
  • risks to particular groups of interest, most prominently reflected in Poland by the crisis surrounding imported Ukrainian grain (see Box 2)

The first two issues are strongly related to the general approach to immigration and integration of migrants in the Polish society. The popular media discourse – in traditional and social media – tends to focus on instances of abuse of social support and public services, and to build up negative sentiments along the lines of supposed unwillingness to engage in legal economic activity among those who have settled in Poland. While one can certainly identify anecdotes which selectively confirm all sorts of misbehaviour, the overall evidence would clearly reject such claims. As discussed, the surveys conducted by the NBP show that a significant majority of migrants and refugees from Ukraine find legal employment in Poland. Further research based on administrative data demonstrates that many Ukrainians establish and successfully run their businesses in Poland (Polish Economic Institute, 2024). Between January 2022 and June 2024 Ukrainian migrants and refugees established almost 60 000 enterprises in Poland, and as Vézina et al. (2025) argue, these firms did not crowd out Polish businesses, meaning they represent a true value added to the national and local economies.

Recent public discussions, however, have focused on the combination of employment and benefit claims. The debate started with two parliamentary initiatives by the right wing Konfederacja and Prawo i Sprawiedliwość opposition parties and was then picked up by the leading government party’s presidential candidate, Rafał Trzaskowski (money.pl, 2025). The proposed legislative changes are broadly similar, suggesting that access to the main child benefits – the ‘800+ benefit’ – should be limited to those refugee families where at least one of the parents is formally employed. Such conditionality does not apply to Polish families, and according to current legislation, to no other families legally residing in Poland (Konfederacja, 2025; Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, 2025). The supposed aim of the changes would be to, first of all, limit fraudulent claims among those who no longer reside in Poland, and secondly, to restrict access to the benefits to those who contribute with their taxes to the public budget only. On both counts the policy seems badly misconceived. As shown above, the ‘800+’ claims closely match the numbers of children officially registered in Polish schools, far below the numbers registered in the PESEL-UKR database. Moreover, such a policy is unlikely to lead to much higher employment among refugee parents. The benefit is universal and received by all families regardless of employment status or income; previous research has shown a similar benefit to have negligible effects on employment (see for example: Myck and Trzcinski, 2019). Therefore, the most likely reason for some refugee parents to not take up work is not unwillingness, but rather other constraints – constraints which will not change as a result of the proposed restrictions. Most Ukrainian families who fled the war are mothers whose partners could not join them due to military restrictions on the mobility of Ukrainian men. While many women settled and found jobs, family obligations may significantly limit some refugee’s options for regular employment. For these families, withdrawing the eligibility for the ‘800+ benefit’ would be a significant loss of income with potentially dire consequences for their children. It is thus difficult to understand the initiatives as anything other than attempts to address the growing critical sentiments towards the refugees to gain support among voters who are convinced by the anecdotal narrative. As argued above – with the exception of anecdotes – there is very little evidence in support of such legislative changes. Even from the point of view of potential budgetary gains, the proposed limitations on benefit claims would impose heavy administrative costs which would likely exceed any resulting savings. The politicians coming forward with such proposals would be well advised to consider data from various sources and avoid raising issues which have a clear potential to fuel negative sentiments towards refugees and migrants.

BOX 2. The dispute over the Ukrainian grain

In February 2022, Russia’s full-scale invasion destabilized the Ukrainian market, in particular the agricultural sector, due to blocked exports through the Black Sea. To enable exports, so-called Solidarity Lanes were established, including corridors crossing Poland (European Commission 2022). However, Poland was not prepared to handle and re-export large volumes of Ukrainian agricultural products, due to insufficient capacity of Polish sea ports (farmer.pl, 2023; for such quantities experts argue that road transport is unprofitable; Kupczak, 2023). This led to a surplus of grain in multiple storehouses throughout the country, especially in Southeastern Poland. Overall, Polish grain stocks increased by over 250 percent, from 3.8 to almost 10 million tones (Supreme Audit Office, 2023).

The drastic surplus of grain, together with much lower prices for Ukrainian crops, led to a dramatic price drop—one could buy mixed Polish-Ukrainian grain for half the price it cost the previous year (rp.pl, 2023). Apart from its impact on quantity and price, Ukrainian grain drew public attention also due to concerns regarding its quality (money.pl, 2023). Imported agricultural and food articles must undergo rigorous quality controls at the border, depending on their purpose – human consumption, animal fodder or cultivation, conducted by the respective state inspection office. Random controls held in 2022 by the Food Articles Inspection revealed that 2.4 percent of the grain samples were banned from entering the market (rp.pl, 2023).

According to a report by the Supreme Audit Office (2023), controls run by the Veterinarian Inspection were drastically limited as of May 2022 which allowed poor quality fodder grain to enter the Polish market (Supreme Audit Office 2023). Since technical grain – used in the production of biofuels, insulating materials or oils – is exempt from border quality controls, its imports and sale as consumable grain could be particularly profitable. Several incidents of such forgery were subject to investigation confirming that large quantities of technical grain originating from Ukraine were sold as consumable to Polish companies (gov.pl, 2024).

The tightened border controls that followed, resulted in multiday delays in the transportation of food products from Ukraine. To mitigate these constraints an agreement was reached, and, as of March 8, 2023, grain transit through Poland to other final destinations (within EU or to a third country via Polish ports) is exempt from border controls at the Polish-Ukrainian border and sealed by the National Revenue Administration. These seals can be removed only at the final destination (gov.pl, 2023a).

Throughout this period Polish farmers held demonstrations opposing the influx of Ukrainian grain. The border crossings with Ukraine were temporarily blocked by protests aimed at disrupting the flow of goods. The symbolic dumping of Ukrainian grain on the ground at the Medyka border crossing resulted in a famously cited statement by the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that this event may be seen as evidence of the “erosion of solidarity” with Ukraine (BBC, 2024).

After the EU-level temporary embargo on four types of grains and oil seeds from Ukraine was lifted in mid-September 2023 (which was in effect since May 2023), Ukraine agreed to introduce export measures to avoid grain surges (European Commission, 2023). Nevertheless, Poland administered a unilateral ban on selected products and their derivatives (gov.pl, 2023b), which led Ukraine to file a complaint with the World Trade Organization (WTO, 2023). While the ban still applies (gov.pl, 2025), the Polish government has on multiple occasions actively sought to convince the EU to include wheat (and other grains) among the crops covered by the quotas under the EU-level 2022 regulation on temporary trade liberalization with Ukraine (the Autonomous Trade Measures Regulation; OKOpress, 2024; European Commission, 2024).

Conclusions

Considering the current approach by the U.S. administration under President Donald Trump, Ukraine’s position in the prospective negotiations will strongly depend on the support it can gather from its European allies. This in turn is likely to reflect the sentiments towards the Ukrainian cause among European voters. In Poland, where critically important presidential elections are scheduled for May 2025, the importance of these sentiments might be particularly salient. On the one hand, the candidates are likely to voice support for Ukraine to secure peace and stability in the region. On the other hand, they may appeal for support among voters who are critical of the generous approach of Polish public institutions towards Ukrainian refugees.

As shown in this policy paper, the critical voices highlighting instances of abuse of privileges granted to refugees are largely unfounded, and much of the critical discourse is linked to – in our view – highly inaccurate numbers of officially registered refugees with the PESEL-UKR status system. The government would do a service to the quality of the debate about Ukrainian refugees in Poland, and at the same time defuse some of the critical claims, by verifying the PESEL-UKR database.

Using administrative data on school enrolment and benefit claims we show that these match almost perfectly, with around 150 000 children aged 7-17 in both registries in late 2024. This is far less than the 270 000 children in this age group registered in the PESEL-UKR database and assumed to be residing in Poland. Similarly, survey data suggests that about 70 percent of Ukrainian refugees are active on the Polish labour market. This proportion is much lower when official data based on social security contributions is compared to the total number of adult refugees in the PESEL-UKR registry. The comparison once again suggests that the figures in the latter database are significantly overstated. It is thus very unlikely that the number of Ukrainian refugees in Poland is as high as the numbers officially reported in the registry (992 000 in January 2025).

The accuracy of the numbers is important for several reasons, and the ability to address various critical claims in the public debate is only one of them. At the time of an electoral campaign ahead of a highly significant presidential election, this reason, however, may prove fundamental to avoid further polarization of the debate about continued support for Ukrainian refugees in Poland. It is also crucial for securing strong support for Ukraine by the Polish government in the coming challenging months of peace negotiations. While it is likely impossible to restore the level of positive attitudes toward Ukrainian citizens seen in Poland in February and March 2022, that degree of solidarity should serve as a foundation for a deepened relationship between the two countries.

Acknowledgement

The authors acknowledge the support from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida. We are grateful to Patryk Markowski for helpful research assistance. The Polish Household Budget Survey data (2022, 2023) used in the analysis was provided by Statistics Poland (Główny Urząd Statystyczny). We are grateful to the Social Insurance Institution ZUS (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych) for providing us with unpublished data on child benefit recipients.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.