Location: Russia

The Middle Corridor: A Useful Option, Not a Replacement

Geoeconomic concerns have made routes that avoid Russia a priority. The Middle Corridor – the land route connecting China to Europe while bypassing Russia – is the main land example. The history of energy transit shows both why such projects attract support and why many struggle. The recent interest in the Middle Corridor is due to the recent growth in traffic; freight has grown five- to tenfold since 2021. But this is from a very small base. Russia-transit rail still carries about 90% of China–EU rail freight, and sea carries the great majority of the total trade. Because of physical and institutional limits, the corridor will remain a small share of total China–EU trade, even if its role were to continue to grow. It deserves targeted support as insurance against disruption, and to increase connectivity and development in the South Caucasus and Central Asian region. But it is important to keep in perspective the role it can play in aggregate trade between China and Europe. More important changes are more likely to come at sea.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the so-called Middle Corridor has moved from the margins of transport policy to the center of attention. The route runs from China through Kazakhstan, across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, and on through Georgia to Turkey and Europe; see Figure 1. Sometimes other alternatives are included, such as routes through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and also through Armenia, but the common point is routes that avoid Russia. The EU has pledged billions of euros for connectivity with Central Asia, the World Bank has backed an upgrade of Kazakhstan’s railways, China has begun to engage with the route, and freight has grown from roughly 0.5–0.84 million tons in 2021 to about 4.5–5 million tons in 2024–25 (the exact figures vary across sources and also depend on the metrics used, but the bottom line remains: the growth has been 5-10 times the volume since 2021).

Figure 1. The Middle Corridor

Source: https://middlecorridor.com/en/route

Recent events have brought increased attention to the route and its importance. Poland’s closure of its border with Belarus in September 2025 briefly stopped most China–EU rail traffic, and attacks in the Red Sea and disruptions around Hormuz have raised doubts about the sea lanes. Also, recent events around Georgian harbors, such as the delay of the Anaklia deep-sea port can be seen in light of the Middle Corridor discussion. It is tempting to read these developments as a new trade route displacing the old ones. This brief argues for a more cautious reading.

A Geoeconomic World: Lessons from Energy Transit

The interest in the Middle Corridor is an example of a broader shift. Policy makers and academics alike are trying to navigate a new world order. The “flat” world of just-in-time global production and transport chains is giving way to a more complicated one in which resources, production capacity and geography can all be “weaponized”. Interest in geoeconomics, the use of economic means for strategic ends, has grown accordingly (Hirschman, 1945; Farrell and Newman, 2019; Aiyar et al., 2023a, 2023b; Mohr and Trebesch, 2025; Snower, 2026a, 2026b).

For those who study Eastern Europe and Russia, and energy and resource economics in the region in particular, this perspective is not entirely new. Control over chokepoints in transit routes has long been central to strategic concerns, and energy transit offers a long record of how geography becomes leverage. Three lessons stand out.

Transit Creates Rents and Exposure on Both Sides

Russia has repeatedly used gas and oil transit as a bargaining chip and to influence neighboring states. Just to give a few examples from the past decades: gas flows through Ukraine were stopped for a few days in January 2006 and for almost two weeks in January 2009, affecting more than 20 countries (Bloomberg, 2025); in 2006 Russia also shut the oil pipeline to Lithuania’s Mažeikių refinery (UNIAN, 2008); disputes with Belarus in 2004, 2007 and 2010 interrupted transit twice, gas in 2004 and oil in 2007 (OIES, 2010). Moscow said it was moving neighbors from subsidized to market prices, while many European politicians saw political pressure (RFE/RL, 2010). Leverage also ran the other way. Ukraine declined to renew the gas transit contract, which expired on 1 January 2025 after carrying 148 bcm in five years and paying Ukraine about $6.2 billion in fees (GasUA, 2025). Incidents such as these created a concern for European energy security, leading to important research attempting to quantify this (Le Coq and Paltseva, 2009).

Those Who Depend on Transit Try to Bypass It

Russia’s answer to its disputes with transit states was to propose, and later build, pipelines that avoid them, such as Nord Stream under the Baltic and TurkStream across the Black Sea (UNIAN, 2008; Bloomberg, 2025). The search for routes that avoided Russia followed the same logic, including the routes that overlap with the Middle Corridor, such as the Nabucco pipeline.

Political Ambition Does Not Replace a Commercial Anchor

The Nabucco pipeline, meant to bring Caspian gas to Europe without crossing Russia, was abandoned in June 2013 when the Shah Deniz II consortium chose the shorter and cheaper Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (Elcano, 2013). The chosen pipeline had lower capacity than Nabucco would have had, and EU member states were divided, with several signing bilateral deals with Russia on the rival South Stream project (ECFR, 2014). The Southern Gas Corridor was built, but in a smaller form than its political backers had hoped.

Each lesson has a counterpart in the Middle Corridor: transit states that gain rents and leverage, users with options and a rival with an interest in complicating them, and a gap between political support and commercial viability.

What to Make of the Interest in the Middle Corridor

Before 2022 the northern route through Russia and Belarus carried up to 86% of China–EU rail freight, while the Middle Corridor carried less than 1%. In 2025 about 90% of China–EU rail freight still crossed into the EU via Belarus and Poland, and the Middle Corridor’s capacity is only about 5–6% of the northern route’s (see, e.g. Atlantic Council, 2025). Seen in this light, the recent interest in the Middle Corridor has three drivers.

As in the energy case, the route also redistributes leverage. Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Türkiye become transit states with rents to gain and pressures to manage, and Armenia may join them. The policy question is how much of the old geoeconomics the new route can actually change. The rest of this brief takes up that question: what has happened so far, how large the corridor is in proportion to the alternatives, what limits its growth, and what follows for policy.

What Has Happened

The corridor is growing steadily, and two episodes, the Polish border closure and the Georgian port saga, show both its value and its limits.

Current Volumes

Container traffic on the route totalled 53,574 TEU in January–August 2026, up 11% from 48,326 TEU a year earlier, carried on 265 container block trains. About 80% moved westward, and only 20% back to the east (Times of Central Asia, 2026; Report.az, 2026, citing Azerbaijan Railways’ ADY Express). Industry sources cited in October 2025 put monthly capacity at under 10,000 TEU, against demand of about 40,000 TEU (Times of Central Asia, 2025).

The Polish Border Closure, September 2025

Poland closed its border with Belarus on 12 September 2025, after Russian–Belarusian exercises and a drone incursion, and reopened it two weeks later. About 90% of China–EU rail freight passes through the crossing at Małaszewicze, so the closure stopped most of the flow, with more than 130 trains stranded. China’s response was mainly diplomatic: Foreign Minister Wang Yi went to Warsaw and Politburo member Li Xi to Minsk (Times of Central Asia, 2025). Some forwarders offered the southern route as a contingency, and a Chinese carrier sent a container ship through the Arctic that month, but the alternatives absorbed only single-digit percentages of the flow (GetTransport, 2026). The disruption came from a transit state acting on security grounds, a reminder that transit leverage is not Russia’s alone.

Georgia and New Branches

Georgia is the gateway to Europe and the most visible bottleneck. The Anaklia deep-sea port has been delayed by a decade of political dispute. In July 2026, Georgia announced that its Chinese-led partner had exited, with first operations now targeted for 2029 and no confirmed operator (OC Media, 2026). Two additions would widen the corridor: the US-brokered TRIPP route through Armenia, which bypasses Georgia and could open around 2028, and a southern entry point via Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Both add redundancy rather than a different order of magnitude.

Keeping Proportions

Even spectacular growth would leave the Middle Corridor a small share of China–EU trade, because the routes it competes with start from a vastly larger base, see Table 1.

Table 1. Relative scale of routes between China and the EU

Route Rough scale Note
Sea (all China–EU) Over 90% of volume Estimate; the default mode for bulk and most containers
Rail via Belarus and Poland (Northern route) About €25 bln in 2024, 3.7% of EU–China trade by value About 90% of China–EU trains cross at Małaszewicze
Rail via the Middle Corridor About 54,000 TEU in Jan–Aug 2026; 4.5–5 mln tons in 2025 (all cargo types) A minor share even within rail

Source: Northern route figures come from Asia Times, and Middle Corridor figures come from Times of Central Asia, 2026; the sea share is approximate.

Three points follow.

  1. Russia transit is still the main land route. Rail through Belarus has not been legally blocked and remains the cheapest, fastest and highest-capacity option. Volumes dipped in 2025, partly because of the Polish closure and partly because sea freight regained price competitiveness (Upply, 2026), not because traffic moved south.
  2. Fast growth from a small base is compatible with a small share. If the Middle Corridor reached one-third of the northern route’s current value, it would be about 1% of EU–China trade, and matching the northern route would be about 3.7%. Sea would still carry the great majority.
  3. Rail suits particular cargo. High-value, time-sensitive goods and e-commerce, not bulk, which limits how much can shift to land.

Why the Corridor Will Not Scale into a Replacement

The binding constraints are physical, financial, and institutional, and none can be removed quickly.

  • Capacity and cost. Monthly capacity is under 10,000 TEU, and the World Bank estimates that upgrades will cost $27–29 billion over 15 years (Times of Central Asia. 2025).
  • Multiple handovers. Cargo changes mode and jurisdiction several times, and each handover adds delay and risk. Border and customs congestion is common, including on the Chinese–Kazakh border.
  • Georgian ports. Until a deep-water port operates, the western sea leg cannot use the largest Black Sea vessels.
  • Directional imbalance. About 80% of container traffic runs westward, while return trips on the China–Europe rail network as a whole now match outbound trips (GetTransport, 2026). That weakens the corridor’s commercial case without subsidies.

The Bigger Picture: Sea Routes and the Arctic

The larger uncertainty for China–EU trade lies at sea, where the choice between Suez, the Cape and an Arctic lane will matter far more than anything on the Caspian. After the Red Sea attacks the Cape became the default for many carriers, and prices eased once supply chains adjusted (Upply, 2026).

The Northern Sea Route is the most talked-about new option. In summer 2026 Sea Legend launched what it calls the first scheduled seasonal container service between China and northern Europe, with eight roughly weekly sailings and a targeted transit of 20–22 days, about 15 days faster than Suez on a Shanghai–Rotterdam voyage (Cyprus Mail, 2026; Arctic Today, 2026).

The evidence so far supports reading it as a growing seasonal complement, not yet a replacement for southern lanes. Announced container capacity this season is about 20,000 TEU, small beside Asia–Europe flows of many millions of TEU (approximate), and the season runs only from roughly July to October. The route also follows Russia’s coast, requires Rosatom (Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation) permits, and in 2026 relies partly on Russian nuclear icebreakers (Port de Barcelona, 2026), so it is not a way around Russian influence. If global warming and investment continue, the Arctic could matter far more in the 2030s, which is another reason to keep the Middle Corridor in proportion.

Policy Implications

The Middle Corridor deserves targeted support as insurance against disruption, but policy should not assume that it can replace routes through Russia or the sea.

  1. Frame it as resilience, not replacement. The 2025 episode showed that the northern route has a single point of failure and that the alternatives absorb only a small fraction of the flow. The goal is an alternative good enough to cushion a shock.
  2. Fund the binding bottlenecks first, and insist on a commercial anchor. Border and customs procedures, Caspian and Georgian port capacity and rail throughput are likely to offer the best returns. Nabucco and Anaklia are warnings against large, politically driven projects without a committed supplier or operator.
  3. Plan for transit-state risk on every route. The energy record shows that leverage over transit runs in several directions, and the Polish closure shows that it is not Russia’s alone. Contingency plans for the northern route, and spreading risk across several transit states, matter more than hoping the Middle Corridor can absorb a closure.
  4. Be aware of the backhaul problem. The corridor’s economics also depend on European and Turkish cargo going east. At current levels the lower west to east demand for freight capacity increases cost for this route.
  5. Build a common evidence base. Operators should agree consistent statistics, in tons and TEU, with shared definitions.
  6. Keep the maritime picture in view. Red Sea security, Suez recovery and Arctic shipping will shape China–EU trade far more than any land corridor in the foreseeable future.

Notes on Data and Sources

The proportions in this brief are robust to the uncertainty in the data, but individual figures should be quoted with care.

  • Units and baselines. Tons include bulk, while TEU counts containers only. Sources put 2021 freight at roughly 0.5–0.84 million tons, so the rise to 4.5–5 million is five- to tenfold.
  • Container volumes. The ADY Express count (53,574 TEU in January–August 2026, about 80,000 annualised) is lower than the 130,000–300,000 TEU a year found in some commercial datasets that define the route more broadly. The conclusion holds under either.
  • Train counts. The 265 Middle Corridor block trains in January–August 2026 (about 400 annualised) compare with 20,022 China–Europe train trips in 2025 on all routes, roughly 2%, though definitions differ.

References

Internet sources

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

TRACER Index Offers New Benchmark for Global Sanctions Compliance

A new analytical tool is providing policymakers with a more comprehensive way to evaluate sanctions enforcement. The TRACER Index, published by the Sanctions on Russia initiative, measures how effectively countries implement export restrictions while accounting for the structural factors that influence sanctions evasion risks.

Unlike traditional rankings that focus solely on trade outcomes, the TRACER Index separates a country’s institutional capacity from the external conditions that may affect sanctions compliance. As a result, it offers a more nuanced assessment of where enforcement systems perform well and where vulnerabilities remain.

How the TRACER Index Measures Sanctions Compliance

The TRACER Index evaluates 38 countries using 85 indicators organized into four complementary pillars. Together, these indicators measure both enforcement capacity and structural exposure to sanctions evasion.

The four pillars include:

  • Legal Frameworks: assessing the strength and enforceability of sanctions legislation, judicial effectiveness, and legal penalties.
  • Government Enforcement: measuring customs controls, financial oversight, anti-corruption systems, and regulatory enforcement.
  • Corporate Compliance: evaluating the tools available to businesses and financial institutions for sanctions screening, due diligence, and reporting.
  • Structural Constraints: capturing geographic, logistical, and economic factors that may increase the risk of sanctions circumvention regardless of institutional quality.

According to the project, separating these dimensions allows policymakers to distinguish between countries with weak enforcement institutions and those facing inherently higher risks because of their geographic location or trade structure.

A Diagnostic Tool for Better Policy

The developers describe TRACER as more than a country ranking. Instead, it serves as a diagnostic framework that helps governments identify specific strengths and weaknesses within their sanctions enforcement systems.

The index recognizes that observed trade outcomes alone cannot explain sanctions’ effectiveness. Trade diversion may occur because of institutional shortcomings, but it can also result from structural factors outside the immediate control of national authorities. By accounting for both, TRACER aims to provide a fairer comparison across countries.

Moreover, the framework helps policymakers prioritize reforms by identifying areas where improvements in legislation, enforcement capacity, corporate compliance, or institutional coordination could strengthen sanctions implementation.

Why It Matters

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, sanctions enforcement has become increasingly important for limiting access to restricted goods and technologies. However, implementation varies across jurisdictions, and countries face different levels of exposure to sanctions evasion.

The TRACER Index provides an evidence-based approach for understanding these differences. By combining institutional indicators with structural risk factors, it offers governments, researchers, and compliance professionals a practical tool for evaluating sanctions effectiveness and identifying where additional policy attention may be needed.

As sanctions regimes continue to evolve, analytical frameworks such as TRACER may play an increasingly important role in supporting international coordination and improving enforcement outcomes.

Further Reading

Towards a Russian Internet?

The internet enables information and opinions to flow rapidly and at low cost, including across national borders. It allows individuals to coordinate collective action on an unprecedented scale. Many authoritarian governments, therefore, seek to control the online information environment. This policy brief examines the evolution of internet control in Russia and documents how censorship and network disruptions have intensified since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Drawing on three complementary datasets—Access Now’s Shutdown Tracker Optimization Project (STOP), the Internet Outage Detection and Analysis (IODA) initiative, and the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI)—we document a sharp increase in internet disruptions, platform blocking, and website censorship in Russia since 2022. We argue that this expansion of censorship was enabled by a longer-term shift from a relatively decentralized system of internet regulation towards a centralised infrastructure capable of monitoring, filtering, and controlling internet traffic at scale.

The Online War

The Russian government has been fighting its war against Ukraine on multiple fronts: aside from the battlefield in Ukraine, there is also an online front at home. Since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, the Kremlin has sought to control how the war is presented to the Russian public. Within weeks of the invasion, Russia blocked Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter, and restricted access to numerous foreign and independent media outlets. In the years that followed, restrictions expanded to include VPN services and specific features of messaging platforms such as WhatsApp and Telegram.

These measures are not isolated events. Rather, they represent the latest stage in a broader effort to control the Russian internet. Over the past decade, Russia has gradually built the legal and technical infrastructure needed to monitor, filter, and disrupt online communications. The war in Ukraine has revealed the extent of these capabilities and accelerated their deployment.

This brief examines how internet control in Russia has evolved in recent years. We discuss the challenges of measuring internet censorship and analyse evidence from three complementary datasets. Together, these measures show a sharp increase in internet disruptions, platform restrictions, and censorship since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Why Control the Internet?

The internet has transformed the way information is produced, shared, and consumed. It allows information and opinions to spread rapidly at low cost, including across national borders, and enables individuals to coordinate collective action on an unprecedented scale. For an authoritarian government, the internet allows the spread of information that contradicts official narratives and can facilitate political opposition. The role of social media in mobilising protests during the Arab Spring highlighted the power of the internet.

In response, many authoritarian governments have sought to exert greater control over the internet. China is the most advanced example of state control over the online information environment. Through its “Great Firewall”, the Chinese government controls access to foreign information and platforms, while influencing and monitoring domestic online activity through censorship, regulation, and the cooperation of domestic technology companies.

Russia has historically taken a different approach. Until recently, Russians retained access to many Western platforms, and internet censorship was implemented in a relatively decentralized manner by internet service providers. Rather than constructing a separate internet from the outset, Russia sought to control information flows while remaining integrated with the global internet.

Authoritarian Trade-offs

Why might the Russian government have followed this light-touch approach, and why change course now? The literature in economics and political science describes two trade-offs an authoritarian government faces when deciding how much control to exert over the internet.

The first is economic. Describing the ‘dictator’s dilemma,’ Kedzie (1997) writes, “it may now be virtually impossible for any country to maintain an open economy for expansion while remaining closed to democratic ideas“. Estimates of the economic cost of internet shutdowns support this argument. One estimate suggests that government-imposed outages cost the global economy $19.7 billion in the year 2025 (Migliano 2026).

The second is informational. Egorov et al. (2009) argue that an authoritarian government that constrains free media and communication flows too aggressively cuts itself off from information required to govern effectively. Local bureaucrats have no incentive to perform in the absence of reliable independent monitoring. King et al. (2013) provide empirical evidence for this in the context of Chinese social media censorship. They find that censors allow (potentially informative) criticism of the government but specifically target posts that could give rise to collective action.

Controlling the narrative around a prolonged, costly war necessitates a greater level of intervention. The censorship strategies discussed below can be viewed through the lens of a government seeking new ways to navigate both trade-offs.

Tracking Internet Shutdowns

Identifying government-imposed internet shutdowns is challenging. Affected users will typically have no way of verifying the extent or true cause of an outage, and their ability to report it in real-time may itself be curtailed. As a result, organizations that monitor internet shutdowns use very different methodologies. In our brief, we will describe three of the most prominent publicly available datasets that attempt to track disruptions to internet services worldwide.

Access Now, a member of the #KeepItOn coalition, provides a publicly available dataset of internet shutdowns through its Shutdown Tracker Optimization Project (STOP). The distinguishing feature of STOP is that it establishes intent. It combines technical data on internet connectivity with either official government statements or information provided by informed insiders. STOP records various types of technical disruption: from full blackouts to throttling and partial service restrictions. However, a measured disruption of internet services is only recorded as a shutdown event if it can be traced back to deliberate government intervention with a high degree of confidence. The advantage of this approach is that one can be confident that each instance in the data reflects a deliberate government-induced shutdown. The limitation is that the dataset likely undercounts shutdowns in data-scarce or highly repressive environments where establishing intent is not always possible.

Figure 1 plots internet shutdowns in Russia, and for comparison, the FREE network member countries from 2016 to 2025. The chart is dominated by the sharp upward trend in Russia, starting in 2021, and accelerating after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. There is also an increase in Ukraine after the invasion; which includes both Russian actions that disrupted connectivity and Ukrainian measures to block specific Russian platforms. Similarly, Latvia imposed nationwide blocks of two Russian platforms after the start of the invasion. The chart also shows the internet blackouts in Belarus amid widespread protests following the 2020 election.

Figure 1. Internet shutdown events in FREE Network countries (2016-2025)

Source: Access Now, KeepItOn STOP (2016-2025) and authors’ calculations.
Note: This chart shows the number of distinct intentional internet shutdown events active during each quarter in countries of the SIDA Free Network. (Sweden, Georgia, Moldova, and Poland are excluded from the graph because no shutdown events were recorded for them over this period.)  An internet shutdown is defined as an intentional disruption of internet or electronic communications, rendering them inaccessible or effectively unusable, for a specific population or within a location, often to exert control over the flow of information (Access Now, KIO). A shutdown event can result from third-party interventions rather than be intended by the country’s government.

Figure 2 uses the same dataset to illustrate which social media and online messaging platforms were most affected by the increase in government control of the internet in Russia. Relative to China, Russia used to exert only ‘light-touch’ control over the internet, as seen in the first panel of the figure. From 2016 to 2021, the social media and online messaging platforms in the chart were largely unaffected by shutdown events. The second panel shows that since early 2022, all of these platforms have experienced shutdown events, and in the case of Facebook, Twitter/X, and Instagram, there have been active blocks throughout the entire period.

Figure 2. Platform service disruptions in Russia (2016 – 2025)

Source:  Access Now, KeepItOn STOP Dataset (2016-2025) and authors’ calculations. Note: This graph details the platforms affected by internet shutdowns in Russia (See Figure 1). Each bar shows the percentage of days in the period when at least one shutdown event affected the platform in Russia.

As discussed, the STOP dataset likely undercounts internet shutdowns. We therefore evaluate whether alternative measures show the same upward trend for Russia.

Our second dataset comes from the Internet Outage Detection and Analysis (IODA) initiative at Georgia Tech, which monitors global internet connectivity using three complementary technical signals to detect when networks go offline. IODA identifies outages at the country, regional, or network level and records their duration and severity. Importantly, unlike STOP, IODA detects outages but not their cause. An outage may reflect deliberate government action or infrastructure failure.

Panel (a) of Figure 3 compares the IODA measure of outages with the STOP measure of internet shutdowns for Russia. The IODA measure (right axis) is roughly 100 times as high as the STOP measure in any given period, as IODA records all detected disruptions regardless of intentionality. That said, the IODA data corroborate the finding that internet disruptions have become ever more frequent in Russia, with significant increases in 2024 and 2025.

Our third dataset comes from the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), which focuses on censorship rather than outages. OONI relies on volunteers running tests through an open-source app, generating measurements of whether specific websites, messaging platforms, and circumvention tools are accessible or blocked.

Figure 3. Trend in internet disruption and online censorship in Russia (2022-2025)

a. Count of internet disruptions

b. Rate of websites and apps censorship

Source: Access Now KeepItOn STOP (KIO), Internet Outage Detection and Analysis (IODA), Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), and authors’ calculations.
Note: Panel (a) shows STOP internet shutdown events in the blue line, which records intentional disruptions of internet or electronic communication (KIO, see Figure 1), and IODA internet outages in the orange line, which are abnormal simultaneous drops in 2 or more signals measuring internet connectivity, intentional or accidental. IODA outages are filtered to only include events lasting more than 2 hours to match the KIO restriction. The red line shows a twelve-month moving average of IODA outages. Panel (b) shows online censorship rates for websites and messaging apps, measured by the monthly rate of anomalies recorded by OONI. An anomaly is detected when a measurement presents signs of potential network interference (such as the blocking of a website or app). Messaging apps data derive from OONI messaging platform availability tests (WhatsApp, Telegram, Signal, Facebook Messenger), and website data from OONI Web Connectivity tests on individual websites’ availability. Days and platforms or websites with fewer than 5 measurements are excluded for reliability.

It does so by comparing results over the user’s network against a control server, with divergences flagged as potential interference. The main limitation is uneven coverage over time, a consequence of the volunteer-based approach, though the total number of daily measurements is always known.

Panel (b) of Figure 3 plots anomaly rates for websites and messaging apps as experienced by Russian users since the start of 2022. Both lines show a clear upward trend, indicating that Russian users are increasingly encountering websites and apps that are blocked in Russia but available elsewhere.

The Centralisation of Russian Internet Control

While Russia has always exerted some degree of control over the internet, it has historically relied on what Ramesh et al. (2020) call a decentralised model. Since 2012, Russia’s internet regulator, Roskomnadzor, has maintained a national blocklist of websites and required Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to restrict their users’ access to these websites. As ISPs were granted full discretion over how to comply, the blocking mechanisms and their effectiveness reportedly varied significantly across websites and providers.  The attempted blocking of Telegram in 2018 exposed the limitations of Russia’s decentralized approach to internet censorship. To enforce the ban, Roskomnadzor blocked millions of IP addresses associated with Amazon and Google cloud services, leading to widespread disruption of unrelated online services, while failing to prevent Russian users from accessing Telegram.

Since then, Russia has moved towards a more centralised model of internet governance, aimed at increasing state control over its domestic internet and reducing dependence on the global network. In 2019, the “Sovereign Internet Law” (or  “Law on Sustainable Runet”) came into force, which provided the Russian state the legal and technical tools to centrally monitor, filter and reroute internet traffic. The law requires ISPs to install TSPU (Tekhnicheskie Sredstva Protivodeystviya Ugrozam, or “technical means of countering threats”) devices on their networks, or face fines. These devices allow the government to track and manage internet traffic across private networks in a centralised manner (Human Rights Watch 2025).

TSPUs first attracted attention in 2021 when access to Twitter was throttled, but their impact has since become more widespread (Xue et al., 2021). In February 2023, OONI and the Russian digital rights organisation Roskomsvoboda reported that numerous media outlets and websites with critical coverage of the Russian war in Ukraine had been blocked in 2022. In a striking contrast to previous decentralised censorship practices, these restrictions were implemented simultaneously across internet providers. Figure 4, originally published by OONI, illustrates the simultaneous blocking of the Human Rights Watch website after it was added to Roskomnadzor’s blocklist on April 17, 2022. The figure shows that users across multiple networks lost access at the same time. The OONI report also highlights that providers are now using the same technical methods to enforce central directives, illustrating the widespread effective use of TSPUs.

Figure 4: Network interference in Russia

Source: Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), Roskomsvoboda, How Internet censorship changed in Russia during the 1st year of military conflict in Ukraine.
Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) which presented the largest volume of anomalies (more than 1,200 anomalies) in the testing of www.hrw.org in Russia between 1st January 2022 to 20th February 2023. An anomaly is detected when a measurement presents signs of potential network interference (such as the blocking of a website or app).

Recent restrictions on Telegram provide further evidence of their efficacy. In contrast to the failed block in 2018, most Russian users are now unable to access the app without VPNs or other workarounds.

The capabilities of TSPUs extend far beyond individual website blocking. Recent reports suggest that instead of just targeting specific parts of the internet, they are now used to impose temporary, near-total internet blackouts. These cut users off from much of the global internet, while preserving access to a whitelist of Russian government websites and fully cooperative platforms (Human Rights Watch, 2026). In doing so, TSPU moves Russia closer to the Chinese model of internet control, increasing the state’s ability to manage internet traffic centrally.

Conclusion

In recent years, Russia’s strategy towards internet censorship has changed profoundly. The decentralised, relatively light-touch approach, with unrestricted access to many Western platforms, has been abandoned. The government has acquired the legal and technical capability to exert tight, centralised control over service providers, and every indicator we have analysed in this brief makes clear that it is using these powers ever more aggressively.

The incremental nature of these changes and their technical sophistication mean that Russia’s internet control cannot be equated with the blunt tool of country- or region-wide shutdowns as used by authoritarian governments in other parts of the world. These types of internet shutdowns are highly visible to domestic and international users and spark outrage. Russia’s strategy is more insidious. Its citizens’ access to the global internet has been shutting down, year by year and month by month. Individual users’ experience of these changes is fragmented, making a collective response difficult.  Russia is on its way to creating and controlling its very own version of the internet.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Russia’s Economy Reaches a Critical Stage, New Report Finds

Russia’s economy is entering a more fragile phase despite avoiding collapse since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, according to a new report by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy and the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics. The report argues that slowing growth, shrinking fiscal reserves, rising financial risks, and increasing dependence on China are reshaping Russia’s long-term economic outlook.

Russia’s Economy Faces Growing Structural Pressures

Four years after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the report titled “Endgame: The State of the Russian Economy” concludes that Russia’s economy has become increasingly vulnerable, even though it has avoided the dramatic collapse predicted early in the conflict.

The authors argue that headline economic indicators mask deeper structural weaknesses. Economic growth has slowed sharply, while the economy has become increasingly dependent on defense-related production. At the same time, civilian investment has stagnated, labor shortages have intensified, and trade volumes have fallen to their lowest level in more than a decade.

According to the report, Russia’s official 2026 growth forecast has been reduced to just 0.4%, with the economy contracting by 0.3% during the first quarter of 2026 despite a substantial increase in government spending. The authors also question whether official inflation and growth statistics fully reflect current economic conditions.

Russia’s Fiscal Buffers Continue to Shrink

One of the report’s central findings is the rapid depletion of Russia’s financial reserves. Before the war, Russia relied heavily on its National Wealth Fund to cushion economic shocks. However, liquid assets in the fund have fallen from 6.5% of GDP before the invasion to just 1.8% by April 2026, leaving far less fiscal flexibility. Meanwhile, Russia’s fiscal position has deteriorated rapidly.

The report notes that the first-quarter 2026 budget deficit exceeded the government’s full-year target, while oil and gas revenues declined sharply because of sanctions, lower export volumes, and damage to energy infrastructure. Although higher global oil prices have provided temporary relief, the authors argue that these gains are unlikely to offset deeper structural challenges.

In addition, the report highlights rising corporate debt, increasing pressure on banks, and continued reliance on high interest rates to contain inflation, creating significant macroeconomic tensions.

China’s Role In Russia’s Economy Continues To Expand

The report identifies China as Russia’s most important economic partner since Western sanctions were imposed. China now accounts for approximately 35% of Russia’s total foreign trade, compared with a much smaller share before the invasion. At the same time, Chinese suppliers have become increasingly important for machinery, electronics, industrial equipment, and dual-use technologies that support Russia’s manufacturing and defense sectors.

Researchers argue that this relationship is becoming increasingly asymmetric. Russia has become more dependent on China for trade, finance, and technology, while China has gained stronger bargaining power by purchasing Russian commodities at discounted prices and expanding its influence over strategic supply chains.

The report also notes that China supplies more than 60% of the critical military-related components reaching Russia, either directly or through intermediary trade networks.

Authors Call For Stronger Sanctions Enforcement

Rather than arguing that existing sanctions have failed, the report suggests that enforcement remains uneven. The authors contend that Russia’s ability to finance its war increasingly depends on export earnings from hydrocarbons. Consequently, they recommend tighter monitoring of sanctions, stronger action against the so-called shadow tanker fleet, expanded export controls, and broader use of secondary sanctions targeting companies that facilitate sanctions evasion.

The report also proposes that Europe consider introducing a Ukraine Support Tariff on remaining imports from Russia. According to the authors, such a measure could simultaneously reduce Russian export revenues while generating additional resources for Ukraine’s reconstruction.

Why It Matters

The report argues that Russia’s economy is entering a more constrained phase rather than facing an immediate collapse. Although military spending has supported economic activity, the authors contend that shrinking fiscal reserves, mounting financial pressures, labor shortages, and growing dependence on China could weaken Russia’s long-term economic resilience. They conclude that future developments will depend largely on export revenues, sanctions enforcement, and broader geopolitical dynamics.

According to the authors, Russia’s mounting economic weaknesses also create an opportunity for Western governments to strengthen the effectiveness of existing policy measures. The report identifies oil and gas export revenues as the main source of financing for Russia’s war effort and calls for stricter implementation and enforcement of current sanctions.

“Price cap enforcement must take center stage in sanctions policy. This includes renewed efforts to limit Russia‘s shadow fleet,” argues Torbjörn Becker, Director of the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics and co-author of the report.

For European policymakers, the findings reinforce the importance of sustained sanctions enforcement, coordinated export controls, and continued monitoring of Russia’s evolving economic position.

About the Report

The Kiel Report, “Endgame: The State of the Russian Economy,” brings together leading international experts on the Russian economy. The report includes the following contributions:

  • Russia’s economic endgame, Torbjörn Becker and Moritz Schularick
  • Why economists get the Russian economy “wrong” and how we can think about sanctions, Torbjörn Becker
  • The limits on Russia’s war financing and the energy windfall, Matthew C. Klein
  • The China-Russia asymmetric partnership: Implications for Europe, Alicia García-Herrero, Elina Ribakova, and Lucas Risinger
  • China’s role in supplying Russia with sanctioned products, Konstantin Egorov
  • Regional convergence in Russian regions during the war, Iikka Korhonen

Further Reading

Endgame: The State of the Russian Economy

Four years into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, questions about the sustainability of the Russian war economy are becoming increasingly urgent. While headline indicators have often suggested resilience, leading economists argue that deeper structural weaknesses are emerging, including depleted fiscal buffers, slowing growth, rising dependence on China, and mounting pressure on export revenues.

To discuss these developments and the findings of the new Kiel Report, CEPR is hosting a webinar that brings together leading experts on Russia’s economic outlook and the policy options available to Europe and its partners.

Featured Panelists from the FREE Network 

  • Torbjörn Becker, Director, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE).
  • Elina Ribakova, Kyiv School of Economics, Peterson Institute for International Economics, and Bruegel.
  • Lucas Risinger, KSE Institute.

What Will Be Discussed?

The webinar will explore:

  • Whether Russia can continue to sustain its war effort under increasing economic strain.
  • The growing strategic and economic dependence of Russia on China.
  • The role of energy exports and commodity revenues in financing the war.
  • How Europe can strengthen sanctions and economic measures to increase pressure on the Kremlin.
  • What an economic “endgame” for Russia could look like and what it means for policymakers.

Join the Event

Join the webinar on 15 June 2026 at 17:15 and hear directly from some of the leading experts on the Russian economy and sanctions policy. Register for the CEPR webinar.

Torbjörn Becker: EU Loan Counterbalance Rising Russian Oil Revenues

Despite continuing revenue from oil sales bolstering Russia’s war economy, the European Union’s recently approved financial support for Ukraine could help balance economic power, Torbjörn Becker told Corren. The analysis highlights how a €90 billion EU loan package may offset the advantage Vladimir Putin gains from high oil prices and sales abroad.

The article in Corren explains that EU member states agreed to unblock a major financial aid package for Kyiv after political deadlock over pipeline deliveries and vetoes from Hungary and Slovakia. Two-thirds of the €90 billion support is earmarked for military equipment and defense needs, while the remaining funds are meant to stabilize Ukraine’s state budget. Torbjörn Becker, Director of the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), described the loan as “completely necessary” for Ukraine to both manage fiscal pressures and sustain its defense capacity.

Becker highlighted that without such backing, Russia’s surging oil income, which has nearly doubled due to higher global prices, would leave Ukraine at a stark economic and strategic disadvantage. He noted that while Ukraine’s dependence on U.S. support has lessened, continued fiscal and military backing from the EU is critical, especially as Kyiv must use much of the loan funds to procure equipment, primarily from U.S. suppliers.

In context, the EU’s decision to proceed with the €90 billion loan package came after long negotiations over whether to leverage frozen Russian central bank assets. Ultimately, EU leaders opted to finance the support by tapping joint borrowing capacity rather than directly using immobilized Russian funds, a compromise that ensured timely deliveries and circumvented political hurdles.

To read the full article featuring Torbjörn Becker’s perspective on how the EU’s financial strategy may counterbalance Russian oil revenue gains, visit Corren’s original report.

Further Reading: In-Depth Analysis of Russia Sanctions and the Ukraine War Economy

For deeper context on the Ukraine war economy and sanctions impacts, explore our Sanctions on Russia & Russian Economic Retaliation portal:

This hub gathers insights, data, and expert analysis on how sanctions shape the conflict’s economic dynamics.

Further Reading: Inside Russia’s Wartime Economy

For deeper insight into Russia’s economic outlook and the impact of sanctions, explore SITE’s report, “Financing the Russian War Economy.” This report examines Russia’s fiscal pressures, wartime financing strategies, and long-term growth risks under sustained sanctions.

The report expands on the themes highlighted by Torbjörn Becker and provides data-driven insight into the sustainability of Russia’s wartime economy, offering essential context for policymakers, researchers, and journalists.

Kyiv School of Economics: Ukraine Drones Disrupt Russia’s Oil Revenues

Ukrainian drone strikes are increasingly undermining Russia’s ability to capitalize on high global oil prices. In a recent Financial Times article, analysts examined how repeated attacks on key Baltic export terminals, including Primorsk and Ust-Luga, are disrupting flows and cutting into Moscow’s energy windfall. The report highlights how these strikes are exposing weaknesses in Russia’s infrastructure and defense systems amid a prolonged war.

Borys Dodonov, Head of Energy and Climate Studies at the Kyiv School of Economics, estimated that the attacks cost Russian energy exporters roughly $970 million in just one week. Dodonov’s analysis underscores the growing economic impact of Ukraine’s drone campaign, showing how targeted disruptions can directly reduce Russia’s export revenues despite elevated oil prices.

The Financial Times article also explored the broader implications for global markets and regional security. It noted sharp declines in naphtha exports from Ust-Luga and rising concerns over supply disruptions. The article further described how Russian companies are increasingly forced to fund their own anti-drone defenses, revealing systemic gaps in state protection and adding pressure on the domestic industry.

Learn more about how Ukraine’s drones dent Russia’s war-fuelled oil windfall in the FT article.

Further Reading: Russian Oil Tracker

The Russian Oil Tracker, a monthly report by the KSE Institute, monitors Russia’s oil exports, revenues, and the effectiveness of international sanctions. It combines data on export volumes, prices, shipping activity, and the use of “shadow fleet” tankers to estimate how much revenue Russia earns from oil and how sanctions impact its war financing. The tracker also evaluates compliance with policies such as the G7 price cap and highlights enforcement gaps, market trends, and key buyers like India and China. By providing monthly, data-driven insights, it serves as a key tool for policymakers and analysts assessing the real economic impact of sanctions on Russia’s energy sector.

Read the latest Russian Oil Tracker: “Export volumes and revenues collapse in February; as war in Iran drives oil prices”.

The Hormuz Blockade: Winners, Losers, and Vulnerabilities

This policy paper presents calculations and modeling of how oil producers and consumers in selected countries may be affected by the de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. We study two scenarios: one where strategic inventories cushion the effects, and one where inventories have run out. Russia profits substantially, equivalent to 6-11% of GDP, driven by higher global oil prices and a potential reduction in the sanctions-induced discount on Russian oil. Net oil importers lose – most substantially India, to some extent China, and to a lesser extent Europe. Within Europe, most countries lose, with the exception of Norway and possibly Estonia. Gulf countries generally lose since they cannot export their oil. Surprisingly, Saudi Arabia can make a net profit by earning high prices for oil redirected to its western ports.
We also analyze oil inventories to measure importers’ vulnerability. India is by far the most vulnerable among larger economies, due to limited storage, high net imports, and an oil-intensive economy. China is less vulnerable, and Europe is the least. Finally, we discuss how the crisis may trigger a macroeconomic recession, reshape long-run oil demand, destabilize OPEC, and create domestic tensions between those who gain and those who lose from an oil-price shock.

Introduction

Since the end of February, the Strait of Hormuz has been almost fully closed for oil transports. Under normal circumstances, around 20% of the global supply passes through the Strait. In this policy paper, we present rough calculations and modeling of how producers and consumers of oil in selected countries may be affected by the de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. We then briefly discuss some potential implications and uncertainties on the longer-run effects of the current crisis. A caveat throughout the analysis is that both the conflict and the oil market are evolving rapidly. The assessments and choices are based on our best judgment at the time of writing.

Disruption Scenarios – Short and Medium Term

The model we use to assess the changes in consumer surplus and producer profits is a simple supply and demand model of oil. It is akin to Gars et al. (2025), which studies how different countries would be impacted by a Russian oil-export restriction, i.e, a supply shock. In this policy paper, the restriction of supply comes instead from a reduction of the exports of countries inside the Strait of Hormuz. In the appendix, we describe the data and methods we use and briefly discuss their limitations.
Table 1 shows the key parameters for the situation before the disruption and for our two disruption scenarios. Before the war, the affected Gulf countries exported 21 mb/d, of which 18 mb/d is seaborne through the Strait of Hormuz. In our blockade scenarios, exports from Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Qatar are zero, since they have no alternative routes. Saudi Arabia has a pipeline to the Red Sea that normally runs at 2 mb/d; we assume this can be increased to 5 mb/d in our analysis. The UAE has a pipeline bypassing the strait that normally runs at 1.1 mb/d; we assume this flow can be increased to 1.8 mb/d.[1] Consequently, the supply disruption from the Gulf is the seaborne oil that cannot be redirected via pipelines, and this is a flow of 14.2 mb/d in both our short and medium-term scenarios. Since we assume that the domestic consumption in the Gulf states is unaffected (see Appendix), we do not include it in our analysis.
Our short-term scenario reflects the period in which non-Gulf countries have inventories to draw from, while our medium-term scenario reflects the situation in which all inventories are depleted. In the short-term scenario, we assume inventory draws of 5 mb/d.[2] Furthermore, a minor part of the disruption is compensated for by increased production in non-Gulf countries.[3] The final global supply disruption is 8.5 mb/d in the short-term scenario and 13.1 mb/d in the medium term. The model then yields a global oil price of 120 $/b in the short term and 158 $/b in the medium term.

Finally, in the pre-war scenario, we assume a total Russian sales discount of 20 $/b on Russian oil to China and India due to sanctions, while Russian exports to other countries have no discount. The total discount has two components, the buyer’s discount and transport cost premium. China and India receive the buyer’s discount of 10 $/b, while intermediaries receive the transport cost component of 10 $/b. In the disruption scenarios, we assume that the discount disappears due to relaxed sanctions. This is a key uncertainty in our analysis.[5]

Table 1: Quantities and prices (data and model) in different scenarios

[4]. Gulf domestic production/consumption is 8.31 mb/d in all scenarios.

Results: Winners and Losers of a Blockade in the Short Run

Figures 1-3 show the results of a blockade scenario in the short run, that is, with inventory draws. Figure 1 depicts producer profit increase (dark) and consumer loss (light), both relative to GDP, for selected countries and groups of countries. The total of these (production minus consumption) constitutes the country’s change in net gains and is marked by the black bar. As can be seen, Russia profits considerably from the blockade. This is mainly due to the general price effect and to a lesser degree due to the assumed disappearance of the discount on its oil. The US profits marginally since it is a slight net exporter. EU+ (EU, Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, and UK) and OECD- in total lose marginally.[6] China loses more and India loses substantially. The reason for this pattern is that both China and India have a higher oil intensity than EU+ and that they lose both due to the world oil price increasing and due to the assumed elimination of the discount on Russian oil.

Figure 1: Producer profit and consumer loss, relative to GDP, induced by a blockade when inventory draws add 5 mb/d to the global market.

Figure 2 shows the equivalent producer profits and consumer losses broken down for the EU+ group. Notably, nearly all countries make net losses, with the major exception of Norway and the minor exception of Estonia.

Figure 2: Producer profit and consumer loss, relative to GDP, induced by a blockade when inventory draws add 5 mb/d to the global market.

Figure 3 shows the producer loss in the Gulf countries subject to the blockade. Most of them lose considerably from the blockade. The exception is Saudi Arabia, which enjoys a profit increase on the oil it does manage to export through its Western ports. This attenuates the loss it makes when not being able to export through its Eastern ports in the Gulf.

Figure 3: Lost export revenues for the Gulf states, relative to GDP, induced by a blockade, with inventory draws of 5 mb/d to the market.

Results: Winners and losers of the blockade after inventories have run out

Figures 4-6 show the results of a blockade scenario in the medium run. We here use the same parameters and quantities as in the short run, with the difference that we set inventory draws to zero. This is meant to capture the effects after the inventories have run out. This may happen should the blockade last for, say, 12 months. Here the price increases to 158 $/b. The transition between the previous short-run scenarios and the medium-run scenario will likely come gradually as the inventories are emptied.
Figure 4 shows the producer-profit increase (dark) and consumer loss (light), again relative to GDP, for selected countries. The results are similar to those in the short run, just more pronounced, so producers make larger profits and consumers make larger losses. Most pronounced is that Russia makes a net profit increase of around 11% of GDP while India’s consumers bear a cost equivalent to roughly 4% of GDP.

Figure 4: Producer profit and consumer loss, relative to GDP, induced by a blockade when there are no inventory draws.

Figure 5 shows the breakdown for the countries in EU+. The results are akin to those in the short run, but again more pronounced.

Figure 5: Producer profit and consumer loss, relative to GDP, induced by a blockade when there are no inventory draws.

Figure 6 shows the profit losses in the countries subject to the blockade. The difference to the short run is that now Saudi Arabia enjoys an even higher price effect on its western oil, so in total makes a substantial profit. Furthermore, the price effect is strong enough to make the United Arab Emirates increase its profits.

Figure 6: Lost export revenues for the Gulf states, relative to GDP, induced by a blockade, when there are no inventory draws.

Results: Inventories and Oil Reliance

In total, global oil inventories (crude and products) are estimated at 8210 mb as of January 2026, according to the IEA March 2026 Oil Market Report and other sources. Around half, 4088 mb, is held by OECD countries. OECD Europe holds 1285 mb, and the United States holds 1700 mb. China holds 1200 mb, India 250 mb, and other non-OECD countries hold 693 mb. Some of these consist of governments’ strategic reserves, while others consist of commercial stocks. Oil on water is estimated at 2000 mb. This is oil on tankers, either for storage or on the way to a buyer. Ignoring oil on water, the inventories could in theory cover 60 days of world consumption or around 400 days of disrupted supply due to the blockade.
On 11 March, the IEA and its 32 member countries decided to release 400 mb from their emergency stocks of 1200 mb and 600 mb of industry stocks held under government obligations. 400 mb is equivalent to 28 days of lost exports due to the blockade. In our short-term scenario, we assumed a draw of 5 mb/d. 1200 mb of emergency inventories would last for 240 days with such a draw. Under a slower release, of say 2 mb/d, the release will last for longer, but will then, of course, replace less of the blocked oil.
The oil released through this IEA decision will be released to the global market. It should thus have the same effects as increased production, benefiting any consumers of oil, wherever they reside. Should the blockade outlast this time span, and under the uncooperative nature of the current geopolitical landscape, it is, however, conceivable that some countries will choose to prioritize supplies for their own markets. In such a scenario, each country or geopolitical block may treat itself as an isolated market.
We briefly look here at how vulnerable different groups of countries would be to such a development. Figure 7 shows for select countries and groups of countries how much storage they have relative to their net imports. The values imply how many days of imports their storage can cover.[7] India could cover the shortest period of a disruption, followed by China.

Figure 7: Oil inventories divided by daily net imports.
Figure 8 shows oil consumption expenditures as a share of GDP in the pre-blockade scenario. This captures how reliant different economies are on oil. India has the most oil-intensive economy, while EU+ has the lowest oil intensity among these economies.

Figure 8: Oil intensity defined as oil expenditures divided by GDP pre-blockade.


Figure 9 shows an index of vulnerability that takes into account both how oil-intensive and how import-dependent the economies are. More precisely, it calculates as (net imports/storage)*(oil consumption expenditures/GDP). Here we clearly see that India is by far the most vulnerable: it has very high imports, low storage, and has an oil-intensive industry structure. EU+ is less vulnerable thanks to its economy having low oil intensity.

Figure 9: Vulnerability index defined as oil intensity multiplied by net imports relative to inventories.

Discussion of Further Considerations and Effects

Model Scenario Outcomes Vs Current Market Expectations:

Since the war started, global oil prices have been extremely volatile and have increased significantly. At the time of writing, Brent stands above $100/b.[8] A likely key driver of market movements is shifting assessments of how long the war and the de facto blockade will last. The current, relatively low price compared to our short- and medium-term scenarios (which assume prolonged disruptions), as well as sharply falling futures prices, indicates that the market expects a relatively short disruption. Our results thus show that if the disruption proves more persistent than currently priced by the market, oil prices could increase substantially from current levels, with significant implications for both energy markets and the broader macroeconomy.

Macroeconomic Effects and Inflation:

Our analysis is confined to the direct impact of the blockade on consumers and producers in various countries. The oil market is, however, large and fundamental in the sense that it constitutes a large share of GDP, and oil is an essential input to many production processes and economic activities. This means that a price shock can (and most likely will) spread throughout the macroeconomy in the form of inflation, reduced demand, and macroeconomic implications. Historically, such events have had profound effects (e.g., the oil shocks of the 1970s). While today’s economy is relatively less reliant on oil than it was then, the current disruption is larger. These contagious effects can happen both within a country (domestic buyers of oil-intensive products raise prices) or between countries (imports become expensive). This is not captured by our analysis but may ultimately become more serious and long-lasting than the initial direct effects.

Tensions Within Countries:

It is important to note that a country that on net gains from the blockade may still experience serious internal tensions since parts of its society gain (oil producers) while other parts lose (oil consumers). The net effects are informative to the extent that a country can reconcile these tensions, either by redistribution (such as in Norway), a high government take (such as in Russia and Norway), or by simply having a political system which can ignore the losers.

A Possible Excessive Rebound Effect:

Another factor not captured by the analysis is that the blocked countries have relatively flexible production allowing them to scale it up or down. This means that some of the oil they do not sell today because of the blockade can be sold tomorrow. Hence, over time they may recover some losses. Importantly, when the blockade disappears or easens, their exports of oil may be larger than Business as usual, implying excess supply and a substantial price drop. This may destabilize the world economy in the opposite direction of what we see now. Countering this, countries may start replenishing their storage.

Long-run Structuring of Oil Demand and Supply:

Following the oil-supply shocks in the 70s, importers of oil and more generally energy-intensive industries made substantial investments into alternative energy sources and into energy efficiency. We may, rationally, expect a similar change following this blockade should it last. But there are also forces pulling in the opposite direction. After the energy disruptions and price surges following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, some countries (not least in the EU) decided to roll back fuel taxes (Gars et al., 2022). The motive for that was to mitigate the increased price facing consumers. Notably, many of these tax reductions remained even after the global oil price fell back. Basic economic theory would suggest an importer should keep fuel taxes when facing a supply disruption and use the proceeds to make transfers to the population. In particular, realizing oil supply shocks do occur, especially in a rivalrous geopolitical world, an oil importer should make efforts to reduce long-run reliance on oil. In the longer run this may benefit China who has a large market share in green technologies and associated materials.
Another pathway, not mutually exclusive with reducing demand, is that countries would increase domestic oil production where possible. Even though it is difficult to fully insulate an economy from global price shocks, the effects could be mitigated.

The Effect on Opec Cooperation:

The blockade and, in particular, Iran’s attacks on its neighbors’ oil production is a stress test for OPEC. How cooperation will evolve is difficult to predict. One possibility is that Iran is formally or informally left out of OPEC. Another is that Russia breaks out of OPEC+ or that the whole organization collapses. True, key members of OPEC (e.g., Iran and Saudi Arabia) have been regional adversaries for many years. But the escalation during this war is a substantial step into an open conflict.

Conclusion

This policy paper has – based on simple modeling of the oil market, – analyzed the immediate economic effects of the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz across countries and producers and consumers of oil. The effects are substantial, in particular for Russia (which profits significantly, 6-11% of GDP) and India (which incurs costs of around 2-4% of GDP). Europe is less affected compared to other countries and regions (0.5-2% of GDP), despite being a net importer of oil. This is thanks to its economy having low oil intensity. The US gains on net, since it is a net exporter of oil, but its consumers are subject to costs of around 1-2% of GDP due to its economy being oil-intensive. Perhaps surprisingly, even some of the Gulf countries can profit from the blockade if they manage to redirect their exports to ports outside the Strait of Hormuz.
The analysis shows that the existence and usage of oil inventories are of great importance. The inventories can only cover the supply disruption for about a year, or, if they are to last longer, replace only a small part of the shortage from the Gulf. If and when these inventories run out, the economic effects will be substantially larger. The inventories are not spread evenly: India is very vulnerable to a shortage, while the EU is much less vulnerable.
The blockade puts the oil market under substantial stress. The paper attempts to gauge the direct effects, which are by themselves very uncertain. The indirect and longer-run effects are naturally even more uncertain and may be even more severe, as discussed in the report.

References

  • Gars, J., Spiro, D. and Wachtmeister, H., 2022. The effect of European fuel-tax cuts on the oil income of Russia. Nature Energy, 7(10), pp.989-997.
  • Gars, J., Spiro, D. and Wachtmeister, H., 2025. Winners and losers of a Russian oil-export restriction. Public Choice, pp.1-31.
  • Kilian, L., Rapson, D. and Schipper, B., 2024. The impact of the 2022 oil embargo and price cap on russian oil prices. The Energy Journal, p.01956574251414076.
  • Spiro, D., Wachtmeister, H. and Gars, J., 2025. Assessing the impacts of oil sanctions on Russia. Energy Policy, 206, p.114739.

Appendix: Data, Method, and Its Limitations

We use data on oil production and consumption of different countries (from US EIA for 2024, the most recent year for which the full data set is available) to parameterize a model and compare how they fare without and with a blockade. For GDP, we use World Bank data for 2024.
The model used to assess the changes in consumer surplus and producer profits is a simple supply and demand model of oil. It is akin to Gars et al. (2025) , but with the restriction of supply coming from a reduction of the exports of countries inside the Strait of Hormuz rather than sanctions on Russia. We assume demand elasticity is the same in all countries at -0.2 and a supply elasticity of 0.02.[9] For the short-run analysis, we assume an inventory draw of 5 mb/d. We abstract from the profits made when selling these. These assumptions are crude and naturally do not capture all the effects and nuances, some of which we discuss at the end of the brief.
The model implicitly assumes that oil on the market can be traded and rotated freely. In other words, even if the blocked oil was originally bound to, say, China, supplies from elsewhere will be redirected to China until prices equalize across destinations. Consequently, our analysis focuses on the price effects of the blockade, and this price effect is assumed to apply equally across countries (though see the discussion below about the discount on Russian oil).
To analyze the impact on the Gulf countries directly affected by the blockade, we need to take a stance on what happens in their domestic oil markets. When these countries cannot export their oil, their domestic market will face excess supply. The producers in these countries can then either reduce production or flood their domestic market with oil. Since these countries are overwhelmingly net-exporters of oil, their domestic market cannot absorb all the excess supply that is stuck behind the blockade. Furthermore, these countries have historically had low domestic oil prices, making it unlikely that prices could fall much further and increase consumption significantly. We therefore assume that domestic consumption remains unchanged and that producers instead reduce excess production. Based on this assumption, we measure the effects on these countries as lost export revenues. Note that these countries’ production costs are rather low, so lost export revenues are nearly equivalent to profit losses. In analyzing profit gains in other producing countries, we base the costs implicitly on a constant-elasticity supply function. Hence, we do not take into account possible country differences with respect to this cost change, or if their costs would imply a non-constant elasticity. This is a simplification, but without greater loss of precision, since the main source of increasing profits is that the oil price goes up rather than from increased production (this follows from the supply elasticity being very low).

Footnotes

  • [1] We deem the assumed redirected volumes as optimistic, as such flows have not been seen historically, and that both routes could be targeted in a prolonged conflict. ”.
  • [2] On 11 March, IEA members decided to release 400 mb of their inventories. At a release speed of 5 mb/d that will last for 80 days.
  • [3] This increase is endogenously generated by the model. The increase is 0.7 mb/d and 1.1 mb/d in the short- and the medium-run scenario respectively.
  • [4] Gulf domestic production/consumption is 8.31 mb/d in all scenarios.
  • [5] In January 2026 the total discount on Russian oil was around 30 $/b. This discount consisted of a transport cost premium and a buyer’s discount at the importer’s port. Both of these were driven by sanctions and bargaining power (see Spiro et al., 2025; Kilian et al., 2025) which we assume have disappeared under the blockade. This is a key uncertainty. Should the discount not disappear, our results overstate Russian gains, and the losses for China and India.
  • [6] OECD- consists of OECD except EU+ and US: Canada, Chile, Mexico, Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and Turkiye.
  • [7] Russia and US are net exporters so they do not, in theory, rely on storage should the market become fragmented. Hence we omit them from the figure. In practice, the US and Russia may still be vulnerable as they, especially the US, rely on both imports and exports of various kinds of crude and products to optimize refineries and production, etc.
  • [8]Many physical crude benchmark prices are even higher, as well as certain refined products, indicating a stressed oil market under volatile reconfiguration.
  • [9]We view these parameter assumptions as conservative in the sense that it implies assuming the oil market is more adaptable than it may be in practice. Estimates of demand elasticity in the literature are typically -0.125, though there are reasons to believe elasticity is higher for larger price shocks and due to new technologies making a switch between energy sources easier.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Do Election Results Shape Legitimacy Perceptions in Autocracy?

Elections remain a central feature of many authoritarian regimes despite widespread manipulation and limited political competition. Using a survey experiment with a nationally representative sample of Russian voters, this study examines whether improving perceptions of legitimacy can help explain why autocrats hold elections. The results show that information about high turnout increases trust in government, while information about low turnout reduces it, with effects driven by government supporters and individuals who believe in election integrity. This suggests that authoritarian leaders may use elections and reported electoral outcomes strategically to reinforce legitimacy among their support base and manage public perceptions over time.

Puzzle of Autocratic Elections

In recent decades, many authoritarian regimes have increasingly adopted institutions resembling those of democracies, particularly elections (Guriev and Treisman, 2019). Autocrats often organize multiparty elections and invite international observers, even as they manipulate outcomes through widespread fraud. This combination raises an important puzzle: if elections do not truly determine political power, why do authoritarian leaders hold them?

A large body of research has examined how authoritarian elections are organized (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Gehlbach et al., 2016; Egorov and Sonin, 2020), including strategies such as limiting competition (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Egorov and Sonin, 2021), managing media and information (Egorov et al., 2009; Edmond, 2013), and using elections to signal regime strength or monitor elites (Gehlbach and Simpser, 2015). However, less is known about whether these elections actually shape voters’ perceptions of government legitimacy (Dukalskis and Gerschewski, 2017).

One seemingly straightforward way to approach this question is to look at the relationship between electoral participation and trust in government, a key measure of political legitimacy. For example, across OECD countries, higher turnout is strongly correlated with greater trust in national governments (Figure 1). However, this descriptive pattern does not establish causality. Economic conditions may simultaneously shape both trust and electoral outcomes, creating omitted variable bias, while legitimacy itself may influence participation, leading to reverse causality.

These limitations point to the need for causal evidence on whether election results influence perceptions of legitimacy, particularly in non-democratic settings. The importance of such evidence is underscored by recent policy interest, including a commissioned report for the European Parliament on authoritarian legitimation through elections (Demmelhuber and Youngs, 2023). This policy brief presents findings from a recent study that addresses this issue, using a Russian election as a case study.

Figure 1. Trust in government and voter turnout in parliamentary elections in OECD countries (2017-2020)

Note: Trust is measured as a percentage of the population over 15 years old who answered ”Yes” to the following question in a nationally representative survey: “In this country, do you have confidence in the national government?” (Source: OECD). Turnout is the percentage of the registered voting population who voted in the last parliamentary election (Source: IDEA). Countries with compulsory voting are excluded.

Survey Experiment

To causally assess whether reported election outcomes influence perceptions of government legitimacy, the study implemented a survey experiment using a nationally representative sample of 1,603 Russian voters. The central feature of the design was a randomized information treatment that generated exogenous variation in respondents’ exposure to election results.

After completing the initial socio-demographic questions, respondents reported their prior political participation as well as their recollections of how past elections were conducted and their outcomes. Respondents were then randomly assigned to one of five treatment arms and asked to evaluate a hypothetical government formed after an upcoming election, with information about the election outcome randomly varied across treatment arms.

A control group received no information about hypothetical election results. Two groups were informed only about hypothetical voter turnout, which was presented as either low (38%) or high (66%). Two additional groups received information about turnout, either low or high, combined with a high vote share for the leading party (72%).

Following the information treatment, respondents reported their levels of trust in government, perceptions of whether the government represented national and personal interests, and their approval of and willingness to comply with hypothetical laws. These outcomes served as proxies for different dimensions of political legitimacy.

Election Outcomes Shape Trust in Government – but Only for Incumbent Supporters

By comparing responses across treatment groups, the experiment isolated the causal impact of election outcomes on legitimacy perceptions while holding constant respondents’ other characteristics. Respondents exposed to information about low turnout express significantly lower trust in government compared to those who received no information. On average, low turnout reduces trust by approximately 0.77 points on a ten-point scale, equivalent to about 0.25 standard deviations. In contrast, exposure to high turnout increases trust by around 0.68 points, or 0.22 standard deviations.

Providing additional information about the ruling party’s vote share does not significantly alter these effects. When high vote share information was combined with low turnout, trust increased slightly by 0.07 points, while adding vote share information to high turnout reduced trust by about 0.40 points; neither difference is statistically significant.

The impact of turnout information is highly heterogeneous. The observed effects are driven by individuals who expressed support for the ruling party, United Russia. Among these respondents, low turnout substantially lowers trust, while high turnout leads to a significant increase in trust. In contrast, opposition supporters do not update their perceptions in response to any of the information treatments: their trust levels remain statistically indistinguishable from those of the control group.

Moreover, the study examines heterogeneity based on baseline perceptions of electoral fraud. Before administering the information treatments, respondents were asked how frequently they believed irregularities in vote counting occur in Russian elections. Individuals who reported frequent violations are likely to view election outcomes as non-transparent and therefore to distrust official results, suggesting that information about turnout and vote share should have limited impact on their perceptions. Consistent with this expectation, no significant effect of turnout information on trust in government is observed among respondents who report a higher frequency of such violations.

Figure 2. Effect of information on trust relative to the control group

Note: This plot shows the effects of information treatments on trust in government relative to receiving no information (control group). Black circles are coefficient estimates for each group, with horizontal lines showing 95% confidence intervals.

Mechanisms: Expectation Shock and Anchoring

To examine how election information affects perceived legitimacy, the study relies on respondents’ reported recollections of past election results, including turnout and leading party performance. These prior beliefs provide a baseline against which new information is interpreted, as respondents tend to anchor their expectations about future elections to what they remember from previous ones.

When information about hypothetical election outcomes is presented, it generates exogenous shocks to these expectations. The magnitude and direction of each shock is defined as the difference between a respondent’s prior belief and the reported hypothetical outcome. By varying turnout between low and high values and combining turnout with high ruling party results, the experiment produced both positive and negative expectation shocks.

The results indicate that positive shocks, when the reported turnout exceeds prior beliefs, increase legitimacy across treatment groups, while negative shocks, when reported turnout is below the expected one, decrease legitimacy regardless of the treatment arm.

These findings suggest that election outcomes shape legitimacy by generating expectation shocks, and that respondents anchor beliefs about future elections to their perceptions of past results; in the absence of such anchoring, deviations between reported outcomes and respondents’ priors would have had little effect.

However, in the case of the leading party’s vote share, the resulting shock was rather small: an average respondent reported recalling the past vote share as 65%, while the value used in the information treatments was 72%. If respondents indeed anchor expectations about future election outcomes to past results, this may explain the absence of an additional effect of the vote share information, as the treatment did not generate a sufficiently strong expectation shock.

Conclusion

Do election results affect an autocrat’s perceived legitimacy? Using a survey experiment with a nationally representative sample of Russian voters, this study provides evidence that information about election outcomes can shape trust in government in an authoritarian setting. The results show that exposure to high (low) voter turnout increases (decreases) trust in government, with these effects concentrated among government supporters and individuals who believe elections are generally fair. This pattern suggests that autocrats may have limited ability to influence opposition supporters and instead rely on reinforcing legitimacy within their existing support base.

In addition, because voters anchor their expectations to past results, autocrats may be incentivized to generate higher outcomes while exercising caution in revealing lower ones in future elections. This underscores the role of autocratic elections as a tool to manage public perceptions over time.

The results of this study show that information about election outcomes holds strategic significance in non-democracies, as it can shape perceptions of government legitimacy. Policymakers should therefore prioritize support for independent media that provide credible information about election outcomes, even when results in authoritarian contexts appear predictable.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Sweden Supports Ukraine with a Record Aid Pledge

Torbjörn Becker speaking on stage during a European Parliament event with EU and Swedish flags in the background.

Sweden supports Ukraine with €10.7 billion in aid, marking the largest pledge to another country in modern Swedish history. Four years after Russia’s full-scale invasion, Swedish political, military, and economic leaders met at Kulturhuset in Stockholm on February 16, 2026. Their message was clear: backing Ukraine strengthens Sweden’s own security and Europe’s stability.

Torbjörn Becker, Director of the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), joined senior officials to discuss how military innovation and economic endurance shape the war and might impact its outcome. As Sweden’s support for Ukraine continues, attention is shifting to both battlefield technology and financial resilience.

Technology Transforming Ukraine’s Front Lines

The war has evolved at a remarkable speed. Sweden’s Minister for Defence, Pål Jonson, described a battlefield defined by drones, satellites, and electronic warfare. As a result, troops can no longer hide easily. Innovation cycles that once took years now unfold within months.

Vice Admiral Eva Skoog Haslum warned that the front lines remain extremely dangerous. She described parts of the battlefield as “kill zones,” where constant surveillance and precision strikes limit movement. Meanwhile, Ukraine has weakened Russia’s naval presence in the Black Sea by using smaller, flexible systems instead of traditional large warships.

Swedish military equipment has played a significant role. The CV90 combat vehicle and Archer artillery system have performed effectively in combat. Designed for harsh northern conditions and to counter Russian systems, they have proven highly relevant in Ukraine.

Economic Pressure and Long-Term Advantage

Although military developments matter, economic endurance may decide the war. Becker emphasized that while Russia’s economy is much larger than Ukraine’s, the combined economic power of the EU and the United States far outweighs Russia.

“Russia’s economy is roughly ten times the size of Ukraine’s. But compared to the EU and the United States together, it is closer to 1 to 20. If political support holds, the resources are there to sustain Ukraine over time,” Becker explained.

Russia depends heavily on oil revenues. Therefore, when oil prices fall or sanctions tighten, state income drops. At the same time, Russia relies increasingly on China for advanced technology components. According to Becker, this dependence creates long-term vulnerability.

Interest rates in Russia have climbed to around 20–25 percent. Such high rates strain banks and businesses. Over time, financial instability could weaken Russia’s ability to finance the war.

Planning for Ukraine’s Economic Recovery

Ukraine also faces serious fiscal challenges. The country spends more than half of its state budget on defense. Public debt now exceeds 100 percent of GDP. As a result, debt restructuring will likely be necessary.

Becker pointed to roughly USD 300 billion in frozen Russian central bank reserves held abroad. Using these funds could provide a stronger financial foundation for rebuilding Ukraine. “The main obstacle is not technical or legal,” Becker said. “It is about political coordination and will.”

As Sweden’s support for Ukraine continues, European leaders are rethinking both defense strategy and economic resilience. The lessons learned from this war will likely shape European security policy for years to come.

Key Conclusions on Sweden’s Support for Ukraine

  • Russia’s war economy faces mounting pressure from high interest rates and shrinking reserves.
  • Western economic strength gives Ukraine a structural long-term advantage.
  • Oil revenues remain central to Russia’s fiscal stability.
  • Frozen Russian central bank assets could help fund Ukraine’s reconstruction.

Further Reading on Sanctions Against Russia and Economic Pressure

Energy exports remain the backbone of Russia’s economy and a tool of geopolitical leverage. Sanctions targeting this sector aim to reduce state revenue and limit Moscow’s influence abroad.

Visit the Sanctions Portal Evidence Base to explore research on energy sanctions against Russia. You can also review the Timeline of Western Sanctions and Russian Countermeasures to see how both sides have adapted since the full-scale invasion.

Explore SITE’s research articles, policy briefs, datasets, reports, and additional publications on the SITE website, and subscribe to the newsletter to stay informed about important updates.