Location: Ukraine

Critical Minerals and the New Geopolitics of the Green Transition: Insights from Energy Talk 2026

Posted on April 22, 2026 | Policy Brief

The green transition promises to reduce Europe’s dangerous dependence on fossil fuels often produced in autocratic states, but it may also create new strategic dependencies. Technologies central to decarbonization — such as batteries, wind turbines, electric vehicles, and solar panels — rely on critical minerals whose mining and processing remain highly concentrated.

At the 2026 Energy Talk, “Critical Minerals and the New Geopolitics of the Green Transition”, organised by the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) in collaboration with the FREE Network, leading researchers and industry representatives examined these tensions from three perspectives: the geopolitical significance of Ukraine’s mineral endowment; the regulatory and distributional challenges of Sweden’s mining sector; and the sustainability and competitiveness pressures facing European firms in critical mineral supply chains. This policy brief summarises the main takeaways from the event.

Background

A central promise of the green transition is to reduce Europe’s exposure to geopolitical risk. For decades, dependence on fossil fuels — concentrated in a handful of autocratic or semi-autocratic states — had made European democracies structurally vulnerable to political coercion. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 brought that vulnerability into sharp relief, accelerating a shift toward renewable energy that climate advocacy alone had struggled to achieve. For the first time, the moral case for decarbonisation and the strategic case for energy security pointed in the same direction.

Yet as the transition accelerates, a new question has moved to the centre of European policy debate: are we escaping one dependency only to construct another? The technologies at the heart of decarbonisation — batteries, wind turbines, electric vehicles, solar panels — depend on critical minerals whose deposits are geographically concentrated and whose processing is dominated, to a degree that should give pause, by a single external power. The logic is uncomfortably familiar. The material has changed; the structural problem has not.

At the same time, many of the raw materials needed for the green transition are known to exist in Europe. What is lacking is not geological potential but a clear idea of how to navigate trade-offs between economic and possibly environmental costs in developing capacity in Europe, and potential future strategic vulnerabilities.

This policy brief grows out of the 2026 Energy Talk, Critical Minerals and the New Geopolitics of the Green Transition, organised by the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) in collaboration with the FREE Network. The event brought together leading researchers and industry representatives to examine these tensions from three angles: the geopolitical stakes surrounding Ukraine’s significant but embattled mineral endowment; the regulatory and distributional obstacles that prevent Sweden — despite its considerable deposits — from translating geological wealth into production; and the sustainability and competitiveness pressures bearing down on European firms operating in critical mineral supply chains.

From Fossil Fuel Dependency to Mineral Dependency: The Geopolitical Stakes

Jesper Roine, Adjunct Professor at Stockholm School of Economics and Deputy Director of SITE, opened by framing critical minerals as a central geopolitical challenge of the green transition. As Roine noted, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 succeeded in making resource dependency an urgent political issue in a way that years of climate advocacy had not. The transition to renewables offers structural relief: unlike fossil fuels, often concentrated in autocratic states, wind and sunlight are globally distributed. Yet the minerals required to build renewable infrastructure are themselves geographically concentrated, and their processing is, to an alarming degree, dominated by a single power. Europe risks replacing one form of dependency with another unless it navigates this landscape carefully.

Jiayi Zhou, Senior Researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), provided a broader geopolitical perspective, drawing on two recent SIPRI reports. She argued that critical minerals have undergone a threefold transformation: politicisation, securitisation, and militarisation. What began as industrial policy to reduce dependence on Chinese processing has increasingly shifted toward zero-sum security arguments and, more recently, into direct links with conflict dynamics — in Ukraine, the DRC, and in Trump-era manoeuvres around Greenland and Venezuela. This fragmentation risks slowing the green transition globally and squeezing resource-rich developing countries caught between great powers. One discussed example was the US reportedly considering withholding HIV aid to Zambia unless it expanded access to minerals for American investors — a dynamic Zhou called a race to the bottom.

Ukraine’s Mineral Potential and the Imperative of Industrial Integration

Zhou went on to argue that Ukraine sits at the intersection of these pressures. Russian-occupied territories are estimated to contain 40 to 50 per cent of the assessed value of Ukraine’s critical mineral deposits. Russia’s 2024 Minerals Development Plan explicitly targets integrating those resources into the Russian economy, while the US-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund extends preferential access to American investors amid simultaneous US outreach to Russia on business opportunities. Zhou concluded that the EU is the least equipped among the great powers to compete in a world of militarised resource mercantilism, though it retains normative and standards-based appeal. Ukraine risks becoming a casualty of great-power competition rather than a beneficiary.

Olha Evstigneeva, PhD researcher in climate economics at the Institute for Economics and Forecasting of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Development Director at the Ukrainian Association of Renewable Energy, and Decarbonisation Expert, spoke from Kyiv. She described Ukraine as undergoing an accelerated and involuntary transition that other countries have yet to fully engage with. The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism already affects roughly 20 per cent of Ukraine’s exports, with around 70 per cent now directed to the EU. “This is no longer about going green,” she noted, but about “controlling value chains, markets, and industrial competitiveness.” Despite losing 30 to 40 gigawatts of generation capacity as a result of the war, Ukraine has continued to advance its climate and EU integration agenda. This includes 61 per cent implementation of EU renewable energy legislation, roughly 85 per cent alignment with its 2030 targets, and the fastest deployment of energy storage in Europe.

On minerals, Evstigneeva urged realism. Ukraine holds significant reserves of lithium, graphite, titanium, manganese, and iron ore, but much of the underlying geological data dates from the 1980s and 1990s and falls short of current investment standards. Confirming a single deposit requires USD 100-300 million and 10-12 years, an especially difficult task under wartime conditions. Ukraine’s lithium is hard-rock spodumene, which requires more energy-intensive processing at a time when the electricity system is severely damaged. The strategic question, she argued, is not whether Ukraine has resources, but whether it will remain a raw material supplier or become part of Europe’s industrial base. She proposed a phased model: extraction and primary processing first, refining and components next, and full battery value-chain integration over time. She also noted that Ukraine’s rapidly expanding drone industry and broader military technology sector are creating domestic demand for many of these same materials. In this sense, critical minerals are no longer just about energy transition but also about technological sovereignty.

Sweden: The Gap Between Mineral Potential and Mining Reality

Sweden holds some of Europe’s most significant mineral deposits, including rare earth elements, iron ore, copper, nickel, and lithium. Alongside Finland, Norway, and Greenland, it has the potential to supply a substantial share of the critical raw materials Europe requires. Yet turning that geological potential into production has proved persistently difficult. The presentations by Maria Sunér, CEO of Svemin, the Swedish Association of Mines, Mineral and Metal Producers, and Daniel Spiro, Professor of Economics at Uppsala University, pointed to a common diagnosis: Sweden has the geology, the institutions, and the technological capactity, but lacks a regulatory and distributional framework that allows mining to work for investors, local communities, and the state alike.

Sunér set Sweden’s mining sector within a broader European context. Europe produces only around 3 per cent of the raw materials it consumes, while accounting for 25 per cent of global production. Sweden alone accounts for 90 per cent of the EU’s iron ore production, yet Europe still imports 70 per cent of its iron ore needs. China, meanwhile, dominates key processing stages, including over 60 per cent of cobalt processing and more than 90 per cent of rare earth refining. The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act set targets of 10 per cent domestic extraction and 40 per cent domestic processing, but Sunér argued that these are unlikely to be reached under current conditions. Sweden has just 13 active metal mines, and the most recent opened only two years ago, the first in more than a decade. Environmental permitting alone can take seven years, and a full mining project typically takes 15 to 35 years from exploration to production. Four fully permitted mines are currently still seeking final financing. According to Sunér, the main obstacles are the regulatory framework and limited access to capital, particularly for early-stage projects, an area in which Sweden lacks the financing culture found in countries such as Canada or Australia.

Spiro approached the issue from an economic perspective and identified two structural barriers. First, local communities and landowners have little incentive to support extraction. Under Sweden’s current system, landowners receive only 0.15 per cent of the value of minerals extracted from their land, while bearing the environmental costs of hosting a mine. Their main source of leverage, therefore, lies in delaying projects through the regulatory process rather than in negotiated compensation. Second, private investment is discouraged by a hold-up problem: exploration involves high upfront costs and uncertain returns, while a highly profitable discovery may trigger political pressure to revise the tax or royalty regime after the fact. Such uncertainty weakens incentives for long-term investment. The result is a paradox: Sweden has favourable geology, political stability, high human capital, and one of the world’s more generous investor profit-sharing systems, yet private investment remains limited, and firms still argue that conditions are not attractive enough.

To break this deadlock, Spiro outlined three regulatory alternatives. The first is state-led exploration and extraction, with revenues redistributed to local communities. This could help address both the hold-up problem and local opposition, though potentially at the cost of efficiency. The second would require local communities and landowners to conduct exploration themselves, giving them ownership of any discoveries and thereby aligning their interests with project outcomes. The third — Spiro’s preferred approach — adapts elements of the Norwegian model: exploration and investment would be susbsidised by a set percentage, matched by an equivalent excess-profit tax to preserve investment neutrality; a nationally owned company would participare as co-investor to increase transparency and reduce the risk of retroactive rule changes; revenues would be shared with host communities; and projects would be required to carry comprehensive environmental insurance covering long-term liabilities after mine closure.

In the discussion, Sunér challenged some of Spiro’s premises. She noted that Sweden’s environmental code is already among the strictest in the world, and cited polling suggesting that around half of Swedes would accept living near a mine. She also emphasised that 90 to 97 per cent of mine employees at most Swedish sites are local residents. Still, both speakers agreed that the core question remains unresolved: how to ensure that host communities genuinely benefit from large extractive investments. In this respect, mining reflects a broader challenge that Sweden shares with other sectors affected by large-scale industrial projects.

European Firms: Navigating Competitiveness, Sustainability and Geopolitics

Aaron Maltais, Senior Research Fellow at the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI), presented findings from a 2026 paper in Business Strategy and the Environment, based on interviews with companies downstream in critical mineral supply chains, including utilities, wind and solar firms, battery manufacturers, EV producers, and defence companies. He began with a striking illustration of the material intensity of modern technologies: a single 171-gram smartphone requires around 125 kilograms of mined rock. Scaled to the batteries and clean technologies needed for the green transition, the resulting material demands are staggering.

The firms interviewed were broadly committed to sustainable supply chain management and often saw synergies between sustainability and competitiveness. As one battery-sector respondent put it: “You can’t sell on one end a product for the energy transition and pollute endlessly on the other.” Companies identified human rights, conflict minerals, forced labour, and carbon emissions as key priorities, although the discussion also revealed a tendency to focus more heavily on carbon, partly due to data availability. Corporate practice has also evolved, from reactive controversy management to more systematic risk prioritisation, and from auditing first-tier suppliers to engaging more directly with upstream mining companies. Recycling of critical raw materials was widely viewed as important, but current capacity remains far below what is needed. Europe has roughly one-tenth of the recycling capacity required to meet its 2031 targets, and many planned projects face financing and technical barriers.

EU legislation was broadly welcomed for harmonising standards and reinforcing the credibility of sustainability requirements. At the same time, companies pointed to an overlapping and sometimes contradictory regulatory landscape. For example, pressure to meet EU fleet-emissions targets could lead automakers to relax supply chain sustainability standards to source enough vehicles quickly. Geopolitical dependency was another major concern, particularly where firms saw little real alternative to Chinese suppliers. Firms are responding through vertical integration and longer-term purchase agreements, but these measures do not eliminate underlying structural dependencies. Maltais concluded that the EU needs greater policy coherence across industrial strategy, due diligence legislation, and sustainability objectives, alongside stronger international standards and more credible multi-stakeholder initiatives with genuine civil society participation.

Concluding Remarks

The picture that emerges from the day’s discussions could easily be read as cause for alarm — yet the event pointed toward pragmatism rather than pessimism. The trajectory of Europe’s green transition, while broadly positive, is neither assured nor without risk. Resource endowments are the easier part. Governance, institutions, investment frameworks, distributional fairness, and political will are what determine whether mineral wealth becomes a foundation for resilience — or a new source of vulnerability.

Speakers

  • Jesper Roine – Adjunct Professor, Stockholm School of Economics; Deputy Director, SITE
  • Jiayi Zhou – Senior Researcher, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
  • Olha Evstigneeva – PhD Researcher in Climate Economics, Institute for Economics and Forecasting, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine; Development Director at the Ukrainian Association of Renewable Energy and Decarbonisation Expert
  • Maria Sunér – CEO, Svemin, the Swedish Association of Mines, Mineral and Metal Producers
  • Daniel Spiro – Professor of Economics, Uppsala University
  • Aaron Maltais – Senior Research Fellow, Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI)
  • Chloé Le Coq – Professor, Paris Panthéon-Assas University; Research Fellow, SITE (Moderator)

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Antagonistic Information Threats: Lessons from Ukraine

Posted on March 16, 2026 | Policy Brief

Control room with multiple broadcast monitors showing a political speech, illustrating “antagonistic information threats” in modern media environments.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine highlights how modern conflict increasingly relies on antagonistic information threats alongside military force. This policy brief examines how such threats operate and what lessons they offer for European resilience. First, it outlines a framework through which hostile actors gradually weaken societies’ capacity to interpret events and trust institutions. Second, the brief analyzes Ukrainian cyber operations, highlighting that sustained defensive investment can reduce destructive impact even as attack activity intensifies. The brief further examines the economic implications, showing that antagonistic threats create continuous fiscal pressure as monitoring, detection, and incident response become permanent public expenditures rather than temporary crisis measures. Finally, the brief draws policy implications for Europe, stressing the need to treat cyber and information resilience as macro-critical infrastructure and to strengthen coordination across policy domains.

Introduction

Ukraine’s experience since the full-scale invasion of 2022 illustrates how antagonistic threats operate in contemporary conflict. The war demonstrates that modern confrontation extends far beyond conventional military force. Instead, it functions as a hybrid system in which military, informational, economic, and political instruments are combined into a coordinated architecture of pressure. While this dynamic is most visible in active war, its underlying mechanisms are not confined to the battlefield. Similar forms of antagonistic pressure are increasingly directed at European societies despite the absence of open military confrontation.

Within this broader system, information threats have become particularly significant, largely due to technological change and the digitalization of communication. Networked information environments allow hostile actors to combine cyber operations, disinformation campaigns, and other forms of manipulation at low cost and large scale, amplifying the effects of other forms of pressure. Information operations can shape how events are interpreted, undermine institutional trust, and influence political behavior, often reinforcing technical disruption or economic coercion.

This brief focuses on antagonistic information threats — hostile activities that include disinformation campaigns, cyber operations, and other forms of manipulation targeting the information environment. We first outline a structural framework for understanding the targets and effects of such threats. We then examine how cyber operations have been used in Ukraine and assess their associated costs. The brief concludes with policy lessons relevant for strengthening resilience in European societies.

Layers of Antagonistic Information Influence

Understanding antagonistic information threats requires moving beyond viewing disinformation or cyber incidents as isolated events. Instead, these activities form a structured and multi-layered architecture of pressure aimed at gradually degrading democratic governance. Rather than aiming for immediate institutional breakdown, these operations gradually weaken a society’s capacity to interpret events, trust institutions, and act collectively across four interconnected layers: cognitive, institutional, informational, and behavioral. This four-layer framing synthesizes Ukraine’s wartime practice with established research on cognitive warfare and decision-making manipulation, hybrid warfare, and institutional effectiveness (NATO STO, n.d.; Havlík & Horáček, 2026; Tsybulska, 2023; World Bank, 2017).

At the cognitive layer, hostile actors target how individuals interpret reality, shaping threat perception, responsibility attribution, and identity boundaries. This dynamic is well documented in research on cognitive warfare and reflexive control, which demonstrates that perception manipulation can redirect strategic decision-making without direct confrontation (Havlík & Horáček, 2026; Thomas, 2004). By exploiting uncertainty, fear, and emotional triggers, adversaries influence how citizens understand crises before institutional responses even occur. Cognitive distortion thus lays the foundation for broader destabilization.

At the institutional layer, hostile actors target trust in government, elections, and public authority. Evidence from hybrid warfare analysis demonstrates that weakening institutional legitimacy degrades both crisis response and democratic resilience (OECD, 2022; World Bank, 2017). As Tsybulska (2023) argues, delegitimization, rather than outright destruction, is often the central objective of a hybrid strategy. When public trust erodes, policy implementation fragments, and crisis communication loses authority.

The informational layer addresses narrative dominance and agenda-setting. Hostile actors use saturation, repetition, and cross-platform amplification to ensure that adversarial frames define the terms of public debate (McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Paul & Matthews, 2016). The goal is not simply to spread falsehoods but to normalize certain interpretations over time, embedding them into how societies process political reality (Tsybulska, 2024).

Finally, the behavioral layer translates perception and narrative control into observable outcomes, from voting behavior and protest mobilization to compliance with policy measures and support for defense decisions. Research on misinformation and political behavior demonstrates that even marginal shifts in turnout, polarization, or policy support can generate significant strategic consequences (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). Behavioral influence does not require majority conversion; small distortions at scale can reshape political outcomes.

Ukraine’s post-2022 experience shows that antagonistic information threats function as a long-term governance pressure system, designed for erosion. This is why recognizing the layered architecture of these threats is essential for building durable resilience.

Threats at the Operational Level: Lessons from Ukraine

Ukraine’s wartime experience illustrates how antagonistic information threats operate in practice, particularly through cyber operations. Unlike kinetic warfare, cyber operations continue even during ceasefires: they are relatively low-cost, scalable, and persistent, generating both technical disruption and information that can later be exploited in influence campaigns.

The Computer Emergency Response Team of Ukraine (CERT-UA) recorded 4,315 cyber incidents in 2024, nearly a 70% increase over 2023 and more than triple the 2021 level (SSSCIP/CERT-UA, 2025c). In the first half of 2025 alone, incidents increased by a further 17% (SSSCIP/CERT-UA, 2025b). These figures reflect strategic structural pressure, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Registered cyber incidents in Ukraine, 2021–2024

Source: CERT-UA / State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine (SSSCIP), Russian Cyber Operations: Analytics for the Second Half of 2024.At the same time, a parallel trend deserves attention: while overall incident volume rose sharply, critical and high-severity incidents declined by 94% between 2022 and 2024 (SSSCIP/CERT-UA, 2025a). Ukrainian authorities attribute this to strengthened monitoring networks, early detection mechanisms, and international cooperation. The policy conclusion is clear: sustained defensive investment reduces destructive impact even as attack frequency increases.

The operational model has also evolved. Rather than prioritizing spectacular disruption, campaigns increasingly emphasize persistent access, credential theft, and selective data exfiltration, so-called ‘steal and go’ tactics (SSSCIP/CERT-UA, 2025b). The objective is chronic degradation rather than dramatic collapse. Data theft supports later narrative exploitation; minor disruption normalizes instability; repeated low-grade incidents strain administrative capacity.

This shift aligns with the broader strategic goal identified in Ukrainian cybersecurity reporting: producing distrust, paralysis, delayed response, societal fatigue, and long-term strategic advantage. The sectoral and methodological breakdown confirms this pattern (Table 2).

Table 2. Target sectors and attack methods in Ukraine in 2024

Source: CERT-UA/SSSCIP, Russian Cyber Operations: Analytics for the Second Half of 2024. Sector figures are incident counts; method figures reflect malware-specific incidents.

Artificial intelligence (AI) further accelerates this dynamic. Large-scale content saturation campaigns, such as the Pravda/Portal Kombat network, have been documented flooding digital ecosystems and targeting AI retrieval environments (American Sunlight Project, 2025; Sadeghi & Blachez, 2025). While academic debate continues over the scale of LLM manipulation (Alyukov et al., 2025), the strategic investment in content flooding is well documented.

Generative AI reduces the marginal cost of producing multilingual disinformation. CERT-UA has also identified indications of AI-assisted scripting in phishing and malware deployment (SSSCIP/CERT-UA, 2025b). As Havlík and Horáček (2026) warn, AI increasingly enables the precision targeting of cognitive vulnerabilities, thereby compressing defenders’ response time.

These dynamics illustrate how cyber operations generate effects across the four layers of antagonistic information influence identified earlier. Repeated incidents and data leaks shape the informational environment; narrative exploitation of stolen or manipulated data affects how events are cognitively interpreted; persistent disruptions undermine institutional credibility and crisis response; and accumulated uncertainty ultimately influences political and societal behavior.

Crucially, antagonistic information threats do not operate alone. They are part of a synchronized system of persistent pressure. Cyber operations, Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference, economic coercion, electronic warfare, and kinetic activity are integrated into a unified strategy. Ukrainian authorities report temporal synchronization between cyber intrusions, energy-sector targeting, and missile strikes (SSSCIP/CERT-UA, 2025a). Narrative campaigns frame events before and after disruption; cyber operations generate exploitable material; economic pressure increases uncertainty; kinetic or electronic actions amplify fear. The compound effect exceeds what any single domain could achieve on its own.

Ukrainian experience highlights vulnerabilities relevant for Europe more broadly. Hybrid pressure operates as a synchronized, multi-domain system in which military, informational, economic, and political instruments reinforce one another. European governance, however, addresses these domains through separate institutional channels. Energy security, cyber defence, strategic communications, and democratic resilience are managed in distinct policy silos with different authorities and threat perceptions. This fragmentation creates exploitable gaps: an adversary operating through tightly coordinated cross-domain pressure can exploit exactly the delays and blind spots that institutional separation produces.

The lesson from Ukraine is therefore not limited to wartime resilience. Even without open conflict, antagonistic actors can pursue gradual systemic pressure by targeting infrastructure, information, economic vulnerabilities, and institutional trust simultaneously. Effective resilience, therefore, requires moving beyond sectoral responses toward integrated governance capable of anticipating and responding to coordinated cross-domain pressure.

Economic Costs of Antagonistic Information Threats

Antagonistic information threats are persistent and structurally embedded, which means their economic implications extend beyond isolated incidents. Ukraine’s experience provides a rare empirical case showing how these costs accumulate and how sustained investment can mitigate them. Hybrid pressure does not produce only one-off destruction; it generates continuous fiscal demand. Monitoring, detection, and incident response systems have therefore become permanent budget items rather than crisis expenditures.

In 2024 alone, national monitoring systems processed hundreds of billions of telemetry events, identified around 3 million security events, and confirmed 1,042 cyber incidents requiring formal response (SSSCIP, 2024). These figures illustrate that antagonistic threats impose a constant administrative and financial burden, underscoring the fiscal consequences of inaction.

Ukraine’s cybersecurity market reached approximately 138 million USD in 2024, having quadrupled over eight years (SSSCIP, 2024). This growth reflects systemic adaptation under sustained pressure rather than discretionary digital modernization. The statistics in Table 1 show that investment did not eliminate the threat, but it fundamentally reduced its destructive impact. The burden falls disproportionately on public administration. With 76% of recorded incidents targeting government, local authorities, and the defense-industrial sector, the fiscal weight of cybersecurity concentrates where the budgets are most constrained. In this way, the institutions most essential to democratic governance bear the highest cost of defence.

Beyond direct-response spending, antagonistic threats impose systemic economic costs. Insurance premiums rise while cyber coverage narrows; compliance costs increase under frameworks such as NIS2, and procurement and crisis coordination become slower and more complex. As public administration becomes a primary target, trust and institutional credibility weaken, raising coordination costs across markets and public systems. As a result, governance efficiency itself becomes economically vulnerable.

At the same time, the costs of inaction are substantial. At the European level, ENISA estimates total cyber-related losses over five years at approximately €300 billion, with Germany alone reporting €205.9 billion in losses in 2023 (Nagy, 2023). While these figures do not isolate state-linked hybrid operations, they indicate the fiscal environment in which antagonistic threats operate and suggest a scale of what unmitigated exposure would cost.

The EU’s persistent security workforce deficit of 260,000 to 500,000 specialists (ENISA, 2024) further constrains the capacity for the type of sustained defensive investment that Ukraine’s experience shows to be effective.

Table 3 highlights a central policy lesson. In Ukraine, both the number of detected threats and the capacity to identify them increased sharply, while the share of destructive incidents declined significantly. This demonstrates that rising incident volume does not necessarily translate into rising damage. It thus indicates that the economic trade-off is not between security spending and fiscal savings, but between investing in preventive resilience and absorbing escalating systemic costs.

Table 3. The Returns on Sustained Investment, Ukraine

Sources: CERT-UA/SSSCIP (2025a, 2025b, 2025c); SSSCIP (2024); ENISA (2024); Howden (2025).

In economic terms, resilience reduces the probability of high-impact shocks, whereas delayed investment merely defers their costs. For European policymakers, cyber and information resilience must be treated as macro-critical infrastructure, with financial consequences extending well beyond IT systems into fiscal stability, labour markets, and long-term growth.

Conclusions

Ukraine’s experience since 2022 demonstrates that antagonistic information threats must be treated as a systemic governance challenge, not just a communication problem. Operating simultaneously across cognitive, institutional, informational, and behavioral layers, these threats aim to erode decision-making capacity rather than trigger immediate collapse. The strategic objective is gradual fragmentation of perception, trust, narrative coherence, and ultimately political action. For policymakers, the implication is straightforward: resilience must be built across all four layers.

Moreover, Ukraine’s operational data demonstrates that antagonistic information threats are persistent, adaptive, AI-accelerated, and strategically synchronized. Resilience must therefore be systemic, coordinated, and anticipatory, not reactive and sector-bound.

Ukrainian experience shows that sustained investment did not eliminate cyber pressure, but it dramatically reduced high-severity impact while expanding detection capacity. At the same time, the burden of defense falls disproportionately on public administration. Treating resilience spending as macro-critical infrastructure investment could be part of the solution.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Sweden Supports Ukraine with a Record Aid Pledge

Posted on February 20, 2026 | Videos

Torbjörn Becker speaking on stage during a European Parliament event with EU and Swedish flags in the background.

Sweden supports Ukraine with €10.7 billion in aid, marking the largest pledge to another country in modern Swedish history. Four years after Russia’s full-scale invasion, Swedish political, military, and economic leaders met at Kulturhuset in Stockholm on February 16, 2026. Their message was clear: backing Ukraine strengthens Sweden’s own security and Europe’s stability.

Torbjörn Becker, Director of the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), joined senior officials to discuss how military innovation and economic endurance shape the war and might impact its outcome. As Sweden’s support for Ukraine continues, attention is shifting to both battlefield technology and financial resilience.

Technology Transforming Ukraine’s Front Lines

The war has evolved at a remarkable speed. Sweden’s Minister for Defence, Pål Jonson, described a battlefield defined by drones, satellites, and electronic warfare. As a result, troops can no longer hide easily. Innovation cycles that once took years now unfold within months.

Vice Admiral Eva Skoog Haslum warned that the front lines remain extremely dangerous. She described parts of the battlefield as “kill zones,” where constant surveillance and precision strikes limit movement. Meanwhile, Ukraine has weakened Russia’s naval presence in the Black Sea by using smaller, flexible systems instead of traditional large warships.

Swedish military equipment has played a significant role. The CV90 combat vehicle and Archer artillery system have performed effectively in combat. Designed for harsh northern conditions and to counter Russian systems, they have proven highly relevant in Ukraine.

Economic Pressure and Long-Term Advantage

Although military developments matter, economic endurance may decide the war. Becker emphasized that while Russia’s economy is much larger than Ukraine’s, the combined economic power of the EU and the United States far outweighs Russia.

“Russia’s economy is roughly ten times the size of Ukraine’s. But compared to the EU and the United States together, it is closer to 1 to 20. If political support holds, the resources are there to sustain Ukraine over time,” Becker explained.

Russia depends heavily on oil revenues. Therefore, when oil prices fall or sanctions tighten, state income drops. At the same time, Russia relies increasingly on China for advanced technology components. According to Becker, this dependence creates long-term vulnerability.

Interest rates in Russia have climbed to around 20–25 percent. Such high rates strain banks and businesses. Over time, financial instability could weaken Russia’s ability to finance the war.

Planning for Ukraine’s Economic Recovery

Ukraine also faces serious fiscal challenges. The country spends more than half of its state budget on defense. Public debt now exceeds 100 percent of GDP. As a result, debt restructuring will likely be necessary.

Becker pointed to roughly USD 300 billion in frozen Russian central bank reserves held abroad. Using these funds could provide a stronger financial foundation for rebuilding Ukraine. “The main obstacle is not technical or legal,” Becker said. “It is about political coordination and will.”

As Sweden’s support for Ukraine continues, European leaders are rethinking both defense strategy and economic resilience. The lessons learned from this war will likely shape European security policy for years to come.

Key Conclusions on Sweden’s Support for Ukraine

  • Russia’s war economy faces mounting pressure from high interest rates and shrinking reserves.
  • Western economic strength gives Ukraine a structural long-term advantage.
  • Oil revenues remain central to Russia’s fiscal stability.
  • Frozen Russian central bank assets could help fund Ukraine’s reconstruction.

Further Reading on Sanctions Against Russia and Economic Pressure

Energy exports remain the backbone of Russia’s economy and a tool of geopolitical leverage. Sanctions targeting this sector aim to reduce state revenue and limit Moscow’s influence abroad.

Visit the Sanctions Portal Evidence Base to explore research on energy sanctions against Russia. You can also review the Timeline of Western Sanctions and Russian Countermeasures to see how both sides have adapted since the full-scale invasion.

Explore SITE’s research articles, policy briefs, datasets, reports, and additional publications on the SITE website, and subscribe to the newsletter to stay informed about important updates.

What Europe Can Learn From Ukraine’s Battle Against Information Aggression

Posted on February 13, 2026 | News

Panelists and moderators at Stockholm School of Economics discussing Ukraine Information Aggression during an academic event.

On 12 February 2026, the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), the Center for Statecraft and Strategic Communication (CSSC) at SSE, and the Swedish Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce in Scandinavia (SUCC) hosted a high-level seminar on how democracies should respond to information aggression and hybrid threats. The event brought together Ukrainian officials, researchers, and business experts to share lessons from more than a decade of confronting Russia’s information warfare. As a result, the discussion offered guidance for European policymakers, regulators, and civil society leaders.

Ukraine’s Experience with Information Aggression

For Ukraine, information aggression is a daily reality rather than a theoretical risk. Since 2014, hostile disinformation, manipulation, and psychological pressure have preceded and accompanied every major escalation of Russia’s war. Consequently, Ukraine has learned that shifts in the information space often signal impending military, economic, or cyber shocks.

Experts from SITE, CSSC, and SUCC emphasized that information aggression is not merely a media issue, but also a matter of security, economic stability, and governance. They further stressed that universities and policy institutes play a critical role in transforming frontline experience into practical guidance.

In their opening remarks, SITE Director Torbjörn Becker and CSSC Director Rikard Westerberg argued that information operations must be treated as a core component of modern conflict. Ukrainian diplomats noted that information warfare often shapes alliances and delays international responses long before tanks move. Ignoring information aggression, therefore, leaves democracies divided, unprepared, and economically vulnerable.

Analysis and Key Insights

Narratives, Trust, and the Cognitive Battlefield

Keynote speaker Liubov Tsybulska, Director of the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security in Ukraine, described the information space as a central battlefield. She showed how narrative flooding, dehumanisation, and strategic ambiguity can erode trust and break alliances over time. In this context, perception becomes as important as territory.

Therefore, trust in institutions, media, and expert communities is both the main target and the main defence. Long-term investment in institutional credibility and transparent decision-making is crucial. In addition, Ukraine’s experience shows that early detection of hostile narratives, rapid factual responses, and careful avoidance of amplifying false content are vital tools.

Institutions and Digital Resilience

Advisor Natalia Mishyna from Ukraine’s State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection focused on institutional adaptation. Ukraine has strengthened digital infrastructure protection, electoral security, and crisis communication across government and civil society. As a result, the country has built faster incident response and clearer lines of responsibility.

For Europe, the key lesson is that cybersecurity, strategic communication, and public outreach must be integrated rather than separated into silos. Many EU states have hybrid threat or cyber units. However, coordination often remains fragmented and reactive. Therefore, more unified structures that link technical security with clear public messaging are needed.

Markets, Media, and Incentives

Associate Professor Carlos Diaz Ruiz from Hanken School of Economics added a market-based view. He underlined that information aggression exploits weaknesses in media and platform business models. Sensational and polarising content can be rewarded by advertising systems even when it harms democratic resilience.

Consequently, regulatory frameworks, competition policy, and platform governance all influence how hostile narratives spread. Responses cannot treat media and technology firms as passive channels. Instead, they must align private-sector incentives with the broader goal of information resilience.

Key Lessons from Ukraine for Europe

Across the seminar, several concise lessons for Europe emerged:

  • Information aggression is a systemic risk that affects security, markets, and social cohesion.
  • Trust and credibility are core defence assets, not soft add-ons.
  • Civil society and state coordination are essential for response and recovery.
  • International cooperation is necessary, as information threats ignore borders.

Taken together, these insights show that information aggression is a persistent strategic challenge embedded in wider hybrid warfare, not a temporary disturbance.

Why It Matters

Implications for European Democracies

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, hybrid operations against European societies have become more frequent and complex. These include cyber attacks, targeted narrative campaigns, and energy-related disinformation. Ukraine’s experience illustrates the cost of underestimating such activities.

When information aggression goes unchecked, it can reduce support for sanctions and military assistance. It can also deepen social polarisation and weaken trust in elections, public health measures, and climate policy. Therefore, national security strategies, risk assessments, and crisis exercises must include the information dimension as a central pillar.

Policy and Governance Priorities

The EU has already launched frameworks to counter hybrid threats, yet implementation often lags behind the pace of attacks. Ukraine’s experience suggests three priorities for Europe.

  • First, countries should embed information resilience into total defence and security planning, not just media policy.
  • Second, rules for online platforms, political advertising, and data use should explicitly consider how they can be misused by information aggression.
  • Third, cross-border strategic communication must improve, as hostile narratives are rarely limited to one country.

At the same time, responses must stay grounded in democratic values. Heavy-handed censorship can damage the trust that democracies seek to protect. Consequently, transparency, accountability, and open engagement with citizens are essential elements of any credible strategy.

Conclusion: Building Information Resilience

The SSE seminar delivered a clear message: Europe cannot afford to ignore information aggression. Ukraine’s experience shows that early recognition, coordinated action, and sustained investment in trust-building can limit long-term damage from hybrid campaigns.

Going forward, European governments, businesses, and civil society organisations will need to treat information resilience as a continuous task. Moreover, deeper cooperation with Ukrainian institutions and experts can help Europe avoid repeating costly mistakes. By convening diplomacy, security, research, and business communities, SSE and its partners contribute to a growing community of practice on countering information aggression. In this way, they highlight that defending the information space is now central to protecting open and resilient European societies.

Suggested Additional Resources

  • EUvsDisinfo: East Stratcom Task Force, a team of experts with a background mainly in communications, journalism, social sciences, and Russian studies. Part of the EU’s diplomatic service, which is led by the EU’s High Representative.
  • NATO StratCom COE: Contributes to improved strategic communications capabilities within NATO and Allied nations. Strategic communication is an integral part of the efforts to achieve the Alliance’s political and military objectives, thus it is increasingly important that the Alliance communicates in an appropriate, timely, accurate and responsive manner on its evolving roles, objectives, and missions.
  • Hybrid CoE: The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats is an autonomous, network-based international expert organization dedicated to addressing hybrid threats.

Suggested Policy Briefs

  • Ukraine and NATO – Evidence from Public Opinion Surveys. This policy brief analyzes how public opinion in Ukraine has shifted over time toward unprecedented support for NATO membership—especially in response to repeated Russian aggression—and examines regional differences and the broader societal implications of this change.
  • Russia’s Data Warfare. This policy brief discusses how, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Kremlin has systematically withheld and obscured key economic statistics to hinder transparency and analysis of its economy and the effects of sanctions as part of a broader disinformation strategy, and explores alternative ways to assess Russia’s economic performance despite the lack of reliable official data.
  • Trending? Social Media Attention on Russia’s War in Ukraine. This policy brief examines how social media attention to Russia’s war in Ukraine, especially trending hashtags on platforms like X/Twitter across 62 countries, has fluctuated over time, revealing patterns of global public engagement and interest in the conflict beyond traditional news coverage.

Development Day 2025: Ukraine’s and Moldova’s Path Towards EU Membership

Posted on January 12, 2026 | Policy Brief

Speaker presenting at SITE 2025 Development Day conference on EU accession Ukraine Moldova, highlighting Ukraine’s and Moldova’s path toward EU membership.

The European Union’s enlargement policy has re-emerged as a central geopolitical instrument in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine and sustained destabilization efforts in its neighbourhood. For Ukraine and Moldova, EU accession is no longer a distant aspiration, but an existential strategic choice tied to security, economic development, and democratic survival. At this year’s SITE Development Day, policymakers, researchers, and practitioners gathered to take stock of where the two countries stand on their accession paths, which challenges risk undermining progress, and what role the EU and international partners can play in sustaining momentum. This policy brief synthesizes key insights from the conference discussions, focusing on three interlinked dimensions of accession: economic preconditions and foreign financing, democratic resilience under hybrid threats, and human capital development.

Introduction

The EU accession process continues to enjoy strong political and societal support in both Ukraine and Moldova, despite the profound challenges each country faces. Opening the conference, Dag Hartelius, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, emphasized that both countries have demonstrated sustained commitment to European integration, while underlining the need for stable, reliable, and predictable engagement from European partners. In Ukraine, Russia’s full-scale invasion has consolidated a broad societal consensus around a European future, with support for EU accession remaining high despite the immense economic and human costs of war. Moldova, meanwhile, has reaffirmed its European course through the election of a strong pro-EU parliamentary majority, even as it remains exposed to significant geopolitical pressure, as highlighted by Carolina Perebinos, State Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Moldova.

Yet, speakers stressed that political support should not be taken for granted. As noted by Vadym Halaichuk, First Deputy Chair of the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the EU of the Verkhovna Rada, prolonged delays, blocked negotiations, or unclear signals from the EU risk creating space for Eurosceptic narratives, particularly as wartime economic hardship persists in Ukraine.

Participants mentioned the risk of a “Balkan trap,” where candidate countries remain in prolonged negotiations despite credible reform progress. For Ukraine and Moldova, time is a critical factor.

Economic Outlook and Foreign Aid

Economic resilience is a central pillar of sustained support for EU accession. Ukraine’s economy has been recovering since the initial collapse in 2022, but the recovery remains slow and uneven across sectors. Wartime destruction, disrupted supply chains, labor shortages due to large-scale displacement, and rising defense needs continue to constrain growth. As discussed at the conference, Ukraine requires predictable external support to maintain macroeconomic stability and finance reconstruction.

In Moldova, decades of low growth, repeated external shocks, and adverse demographic trends, including population decline and ageing, have left the economy vulnerable. While macroeconomic stability has improved and inflation has fallen to historically low levels, productivity remains low and the economy insufficiently diversified, underscoring the need for greater access to capital and investment opportunities. At the same time, business sentiment has improved, with recent survey evidence (Partnerships for New Economy, 2025) suggesting that most firms believe the country is moving in the right direction and that the business community places significant importance on EU integration.

The economies of Ukraine and Moldova remain critically dependent on foreign support, but there is a need to adapt to a changing landscape for development cooperation. Potential reductions in traditional official development assistance, particularly from major bilateral donors, increase the importance of mobilising private capital, diaspora resources, and blended finance instruments. However, private investors continue to perceive Ukraine and Moldova as high-risk environments, often overestimating political and sovereign risk relative to actual default rates and recovery outcomes. Expanding guarantees and de-risking instruments in the form of EU grants for public sector projects and providing technical assistance to develop bankable projects are critical to narrowing this perception gap. Across both cases, conference participants stressed that EU accession is perceived not only as a political anchor but also as a central mechanism for addressing long-standing economic constraints.

Democratic Resilience and Hybrid Threats

A defining feature of both accession processes is the persistent pressure from Russian hybrid warfare. Moldova’s recent elections illustrated the breadth of these tactics, ranging from vote-buying schemes and disinformation to energy manipulation and attempts to overwhelm law enforcement institutions. Ukraine faces similar challenges under more extreme conditions, as democratic governance continues under martial law and constant security threats.

While corruption remains a serious concern, participants emphasized that institutions have been strengthened rather than collapsed despite the challenging circumstances. In Ukraine, anti-corruption agencies continue to function, and political scandals have not displaced the broader reform agenda or public support for European integration. Moldova’s experience demonstrates that coordinated institutional cooperation with European partners can significantly enhance the state’s ability to counter hybrid interference.

Crucially, supporting democratic resilience in Ukraine and Moldova is a core European interest, with direct implications for EU security, democratic stability, and the integrity of the enlargement process itself.

Human Capital Development

Investments in human capital are critical for long-term growth and development, yet brain drain is a major concern in both Ukraine and Moldova. Survey evidence indicates that many students are choosing to study abroad, driven by a combination of security concerns, education quality, and economic factors (see Vaskovska, 2025). At the same time, many students express willingness to return, with EU accession perceived as a key condition for long-term stability and opportunity.

Strengthening demand for skills—through private-sector involvement and public-sector capacity building—was seen as essential to raising returns to local education. Moreover, speakers stressed the importance of treating the diaspora as an asset rather than a loss, and supporting targeted mobility schemes, professional networks, and research and teaching initiatives that facilitate knowledge transfer. Comparative reflections on Poland’s accession underscored that human capital and public infrastructure investments can start a path to sustained convergence even before formal membership.

Conclusion

Discussions at the conference underscored that Ukraine and Moldova have demonstrated a high degree of political commitment and societal support for EU accession under exceptionally challenging conditions. At the same time, the sustainability of this support depends on the credibility, pace, and predictability of the accession process. Prolonged uncertainty, blocked negotiations, or reduced predictability of foreign assistance risk creating space for Eurosceptic narratives.

Both countries face significant structural economic constraints and heightened financing needs, while private investment remains constrained by elevated risk perceptions. Addressing these challenges requires not only continued macroeconomic and financial support but also targeted assistance to develop bankable investment opportunities and reduce perceived risks. Effective implementation of reforms—particularly at the local level—and efforts to retain and mobilise human capital depend on sustained institutional cooperation, strengthened local capacity, and a visible European presence on the ground.

For the EU, supporting Ukraine and Moldova is of strategic self-interest. As emphasized throughout the conference, integration is not merely an enlargement decision — it is a long-term investment in Europe’s economic stability, democratic resilience, and security.

References

List of Participants

  • Torbjörn Becker, Director of SITE
  • Raj M. Desai, Professor of International Development at Georgetown University
  • Stefan Falk, Director, Swedfund Project Accelerator
  • Kata Fredheim, Executive Vice President of Partnerships and Strategy, SSE Riga
  • Vadym Halaichuk, First Deputy Chair of the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the EU of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
  • Dag Hartelius, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Anders Olofsgård, Deputy Director of SITE
  • Klara Lindström, Analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS)
  • Michal Myck, Director at CenEA, Szczecin
  • Anders Olofsgård, Deputy Director of SITE
  • Carolina Perebinos, State Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Moldova
  • Dumitru Pintea, Expert at Partnerships for New Economy, Chisinau
  • Rustam Romaniuc, Associate Professor at Montpellier Business School
  • Nataliia Shapoval, Chairman of KSE Institute
  • Tobias Thyberg, Deputy Director General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
  • Viorel Ursu, Moldovan Ambassador to Sweden
  • Anhelina Vaskovska, International Relations Specialist

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Strengthening Human Capital: How Ukraine and Moldova Can Retain and Reconnect Their Students

Posted on December 22, 2025 | Policy Brief

As more young people from Ukraine and Moldova choose to study abroad, the question of whether internationally educated youth return home has significant implications for demographic sustainability and economic growth. This policy brief presents findings from a survey of young people from Ukraine and Moldova. It outlines their motivations and considerations when deciding whether to study in their home countries or abroad, as well as what it would take for states to transform potential “brain drain” into “brain gain”. The survey data reveal a generation of young people facing constraints and uncertainty, yet still willing to invest in their societies. The analysis highlights a dual task facing both states: They need to offer high-quality education for students who choose to study domestically, while also maintaining meaningful ties with students and graduates educated abroad. Meeting these challenges means contributing to national resilience and human capital development.

Introduction

Across Ukraine and Moldova, an increasing number of young people are choosing to pursue their studies abroad in search of high-quality education, international experiences, and stronger career prospects. The challenge for the two states is to encourage the return of the internationally educated youth to halt the loss of much-needed human capital. Two countries already face labour shortages and ageing populations. One-way student emigration risks weakening their innovation potential and slowing economic development, just as EU integration efforts intensify. Yet, with the right policies, this mobility can be turned from a “brain drain” into a “brain gain”.

This policy brief addresses two questions. First, how do individual, structural, political, and security-related factors shape the decisions of young people from Ukraine and Moldova to study at home or abroad? And second, under what conditions are students studying abroad willing to return, and what would it take for states to transform potential “brain drain” into “brain gain”?

To answer these questions, the analysis draws on a survey of young people from Ukraine and Moldova who studied domestically and/or abroad. The survey, which included multiple-choice and open-ended questions, collected responses from 118 individuals originally from either country (N = 236). These findings, complemented by several in-depth interviews with students and academics (conducted separately from the survey), provide insight into how young people from Ukraine and Moldova chose their study destination countries and how their states can better support and engage them at home and abroad.

Ukraine: Educational Choices and Emigration Under Wartime Conditions

Background: By October 2025, Russian attacks had damaged or destroyed 38% of Ukraine’s university facilities (Mykhailova, 2025). Despite the war, universities continue to expand student opportunities, strengthen institutions, and align with EU standards. To mitigate brain drain and performance risks, they draw on government, private-sector, and international support. Participation in Erasmus+, European Universities Alliances, and Horizon Europe helps build institutional capacity and sustain research funding (ERUA, 2025; European Commission, 2024).

In almost four years of full-scale war, the young generation in Ukraine had to adapt to new realities, where war became a backdrop to their formative years. For many, student life now means managing a “war-life balance”: attending classes in shelters, studying through power outages, fundraising for their friends and lecturers in the armed forces, and helping clean campuses after nighttime attacks.

Following the Russian invasion in 2022, the number of Ukrainian students enrolled in Western universities (EU, UK, USA, Canada) increased by 47% in the 2022/2023 academic year compared to the previous one, with Poland being the country with the largest share of Ukrainian students, accounting for 40% of the 115,000 Ukrainian students enrolled in Western higher education institutions in 2023/2024 (Stadnyi, 2025). This number is likely to rise further, given that 350,990 Ukrainian refugees aged 14–17 were living in Europe in September 2025 (Eurostat, 2025).

Survey responses: Students who chose to study in Ukraine highlighted the balance of education quality and affordability, as well as the convenience of staying close to family. Many also felt a strong patriotic commitment to contributing to Ukraine’s future and believed their chosen fields offered good opportunities at home.

Interviewees who had studied both in Ukraine and, at another stage of their education, abroad, noted that international experience broadened their expertise. They valued mobility programmes, double degrees, multicultural cohorts, and Erasmus exchanges. When reflecting on what could be improved in Ukrainian higher education, students prioritised more student-centred and practice-oriented teaching, such as interactive methods, discussion-based seminars, and case-based learning. They stressed the need for better access to international research databases, electronic libraries, and up-to-date literature, which remains limited in many universities. Interviewees also called for stronger career centres, internship programmes, company-based thesis projects, and mentorship.

More broadly, respondents argued that improving Ukrainian higher education requires increased investment in research, modernised infrastructure, deeper links with the private sector, and a stronger emphasis on critical thinking, analytical skills, and interdisciplinarity.

Safety has become one of the key determinants in the educational choices of Ukrainian adolescents, as parents encourage their children to seek safety abroad. However, a decisive factor for student migration is development and opportunities, rather than safety, according to the conducted survey (Figure 1). This finding is also consistent with the Index of the Future: Professional Expectations and Development of Adolescents in Ukraine (Shymanskyi et al., 2025, p.16).

Figure 1. Importance of different factors for Ukrainian students who chose to study abroad

Source: Primary survey data collected for this policy brief.

Speaking about the conditions under which they would be willing to return, respondents mentioned broader structural factors, including security and better career prospects in Ukraine after graduation (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Long-term return intentions of Ukrainian students studying abroad

Source: Primary survey data collected for this policy brief.

For many, Ukraine’s accession to the EU would signal long-term stability and opportunity (Figure 3). One interviewee described their participation in the Create Ukraine initiative, which brings internationally trained Ukrainians to work in government advisory teams on twelve-month placements. This example illustrates how targeted return schemes can channel international expertise into the public sector.

Figure 3. Perceptions of how Ukraine’s potential EU accession would affect opportunities for young people

Source: Primary survey data collected for this policy brief.

Student Mobility in Moldova

Background. Moldova faces an acute challenge of emigration, which results in a shrinking labour force, demographic imbalance, and growing pressure on the country’s social and economic systems. Emigration also affects the education sector, as universities operate with shrinking student cohorts and a shortage of qualified staff. While over 60,000 students are enrolled in 16 higher education institutions in the Republic of Moldova, approximately 14,000 Moldovan students pursue their education in the EU, and four out of five of them are in Romania (Munteanu, 2024; Moldpres, 2025). Economic challenges drive the emigration of young people, who leave in search of more stable career prospects and higher wages (Całus, 2025).

Moldova undertakes a variety of education reforms aimed at reducing incentives for students to leave in search of better-quality studies. Recent measures include simplifying the recognition of foreign degrees, increasing scholarships, expanding dual-education programmes, and launching a national online admissions platform (Eurydice, 2025). EU support reinforces these efforts by modernising university governance, improving labour-market relevance, expanding international cooperation, and strengthening research and innovation (Council of Europe, 2025).

Over the past decade, Moldova has also expanded its engagement with the diaspora, particularly in higher education, to promote knowledge exchange and professional networks (Baltag, Bostan & Plamadeala, 2023). Initiatives include short-term skills-transfer schemes that bring diaspora professionals into Moldovan universities for teaching, mentoring, or consultancy (Bureau for Relations with Diaspora, 2022). These efforts acknowledge that full return migration is unlikely in the near future, but circular mobility and diaspora engagement offer alternatives.

Survey responses. Moldovan students said they chose to study at home because of affordability, accessibility, and the relevance of local programmes. They valued learning in a familiar language and culture, and many hoped to build their futures in Moldova because of family ties and a desire to contribute to the country’s development. However, their educational decisions are shaped by political stability and economic prospects. Those who stay or return form a highly engaged group, actively involved in volunteer work, community projects, and local NGOs. By contrast, students open to leaving cited a weak job market, low wages, and limited opportunities, seeing study or work abroad as offering better prospects.

Students with experience in both systems emphasised the need for more practical learning, internships, company partnerships, real-world projects, and a wider range of electives, as well as stronger career guidance and mobility opportunities. Moldovan students studying abroad said they would be more attracted to domestic universities if curricula were modernised, programmes diversified, and links to the labour market strengthened. Many students abroad remain unsure about returning or plan to stay abroad due to low salaries, limited career prospects, weak institutions, and broader political and economic uncertainty in Moldova (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Long-term return intentions of Moldovan students studying abroad

Source: Primary survey data collected for this policy brief.

Similarly to Ukraine, the young population views the prospect of Moldova’s EU accession as a sign of economic growth, political stability, and improved business and career opportunities, which may motivate them to return and confidently build their future in Moldova. The majority of respondents agree that Moldova’s EU membership will improve opportunities for young people in the country (Figure 5). One of the interviewees shared, “Over time, if we reach that standard of living, I wouldn’t need to look for it elsewhere, because I would have it at home.” EU membership could help reverse the “brain drain,” depending on the pace of domestic economic transformation and the government’s ability to leverage integration to grow high-value industries that retain talent and boost economic growth (Gherasim, 2024).

Figure 5. Perceptions of how Moldova’s potential EU accession would affect opportunities for young people

Source: Primary survey data collected for this policy brief.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

In Ukraine, young people make their educational choices amid war and uncertainty. In Moldova, their decisions whether to study domestically or abroad are shaped by structural conditions. But in both countries, youth demonstrate a strong sense of identity, civic commitment, and desire to contribute to their countries’ future. Therefore, supporting these students requires a dual strategy: strengthening domestic higher education systems while maintaining close ties with those who pursue opportunities abroad.

For students who choose to remain in Ukraine or Moldova, the priority is ensuring that higher education institutions provide quality and relevance. At the same time, students abroad should be viewed as a community whose expertise, networks, and global experiences can play an important role in national development. Diaspora-engagement programmes implemented in Moldova are increasingly relevant to Ukraine to help maintain meaningful connections with human capital abroad.

The survey and interview data presented above suggest the following policy recommendations, relevant for both countries and reflecting the needs and expectations of young people.

Key recommendations:

  1. Keep strengthening the quality and relevance of higher education at home:
    1. Modernise curricula and enhance teaching quality by shifting toward methods that prioritise critical thinking and applied skills.
    2. Strengthen institutional capacity through international partnerships and expand the variety of courses and programmes to better match labour-market needs, including the development of joint courses that enhance relevance and quality.
    3. Promote career services through university-employer partnerships, internship programmes, company-based thesis projects and mentorship schemes that help students transition into the labour market.
  2. Maintain meaningful connections with students and young professionals abroad:
    1. Develop diaspora networks connecting students abroad with universities and employers at home.
    2. Promote public sector and private sector programmes that integrate internationally trained young professionals.
    3. Expand short-term exchanges: visiting fellowships, research collaborations, consultancy roles.

Mobilising the potential of young people in Ukraine and Moldova is essential for long-term resilience, EU integration, and economic growth. In turn, investing in education quality, labour market development, and diaspora engagement is a strategic investment in national development and human capital. Ultimately, retaining and reconnecting talent depends on broader security, political, and economic developments, especially progress on EU integration and successful reforms.

Acknowledgement

The author thanks Tatiana Cantarji and Cristina Varzari, students at the State University of Moldova, for their valuable assistance in distributing the online questionnaire among Moldovan students and conducting interviews. The author is also grateful to all survey participants and interviewees for sharing their time and insights.

 

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Entrepreneurial Dynamism, Resilience, and Institutional Constraints in Belarus

Posted on December 15, 2025 | Policy Brief

Belarus entrepreneurial resilience shown through a busy street food market with food trucks and people socializing in an urban industrial setting

Entrepreneurial activity in Belarus has shown notable resilience amid economic and institutional challenges. Drawing on Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) data from 2019, 2021, and 2024, this policy brief traces key shifts in entrepreneurial attitudes, motivations, and behavior. The findings reveal a transition from necessity-driven to opportunity- and purpose-oriented entrepreneurship, alongside persistent institutional constraints and rising regulatory uncertainty. The brief outlines policy directions to support entrepreneurship as a driver of economic resilience and individual autonomy in Belarus.

Dynamics of Key Indicators

Recent years in Belarus have been marked by institutional fragility and increasing state involvement in the economy. Against this backdrop, the evolution of entrepreneurship – a key attribute of the market economy approach, and one of the drivers of the Belarusian economic performance in 2010-2020 (Beroc, 2024), is of significant interest. Closely connected, and no less interesting, is the question of the dynamics in societal attitudes towards entrepreneurship.

A valuable lens for understanding these changes is offered by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), a research project that provides annual survey data on entrepreneurial activity across countries. This brief uses GEM survey data of Belarusian residents aged 18–64 (n = 2,000), representative by sex, age, and region, to examine the dynamics of entrepreneurial attitudes, motivations, and behavior in recent years.

Table 1 overviews the evolution of entrepreneurial intentions, perceived opportunities, and self-confidence. It compares the results from 2019, 2021, and 2024, with particular attention to developments between 2021 and 2024, revealing how Belarusian entrepreneurs continue to adapt to shifting economic and regulatory conditions.  During this period, perceived opportunities to start a business rose by 21.9 pp, and the perceived ease of starting a business increased by 13.6 pp, signaling an improved entry environment. In line with these shifts, entrepreneurial intentions expanded by 8.6 pp.

The composition of activity also evolved. Within Total Early-stage Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA), the export-oriented share declined by 5.4 pp, potentially reflecting reorientation toward domestic markets and/or heightened external constraints, while the share of ventures employing 6–19 workers increased by 5.1 pp, indicating an expansion of small teams.

Motivational profiles shifted toward purpose- and legacy-driven entrepreneurship: the share citing a desire to “make the world a better place” rose by 10.6 pp and “continue a family tradition” by 5.8 pp, whereas “provide an income source” fell by 18.2 pp. Taken together, these movements suggest a more confident, mission-oriented, and domestically focused entrepreneurial landscape.

Table 1. Key performance indicators

Source: GEM-Belarus, 2019, 2021, and 2024. All values are percentages; changes denote percentage points (pp).

Societal Attitudes Toward Entrepreneurship

GEM assesses societal attitudes among working-age adults across several dimensions:

  • (i) entrepreneurship as a desirable career choice;
  • (ii) perceived social status of successful entrepreneurs; and
  • (iii) perceptions of how public media portray entrepreneurship.

Figure 1 compares individuals involved in entrepreneurial activity and those not involved in 2019, 2021, and 2024.

Among the involved, perceptions have generally trended upward across all three indicators. Views of entrepreneurship as a good career and the social status of successful entrepreneurs both show steady improvement over the past five years, while attitudes toward media portrayal follow a more fluctuating pattern—declining during the pandemic period and recovering substantially by 2024. Among those who were not involved, the pattern is similar but at lower levels.

Overall, attitudes are consistently favorable and trending upward across both groups, with especially notable post-2021 improvements in perceived social status and media portrayal.

Figure 1. Perceptions of entrepreneurship by involvement in entrepreneurship (% of adults aged 18–64)

Source: GEM-Belarus, 2019, 2021, and 2024.

Entrepreneurial Self-Perception Characteristics

The level of entrepreneurial self-perception helps explain why some individuals decide to start a business while others do not. Tracking its evolution over time allows us to assess the dynamics of societal perceptions of hardships associated with an entrepreneurial career, which reflects both subjective attitudes and actual barriers.

Figure 2 presents the indicators assessing the perceived favorability of conditions for starting a business, the perception of having the knowledge, skills, and experience necessary to launch a new venture, and the fear of failure.

Figure 2. Characteristics of entrepreneurial self-perception (% of adults aged 18–64)

Source: GEM-Belarus, 2019, 2021, and 2024.

Perceptions of favorable conditions in Belarus improved markedly from 2019/2021. Among non-entrepreneurs, 44% expect good opportunities in the next six months (24–29% in 2019–2021). Among entrepreneurs, 55% view conditions as favorable (31–39% previously). Still, the share of all adults rating external conditions as favorable remains below half, at 47%.

As expected, perceived capability is higher among entrepreneurs: in 2024, 85% of entrepreneurs and 41% of non-entrepreneurs report sufficient knowledge and skills. Fear of failure is more common among non-entrepreneurs (55%, unchanged from 2021); among entrepreneurs, it fell by 7 pp to 48% in 2024.

Perceptions of Entrepreneurship Across Countries

To better understand the dynamics above, we conduct a comparative analysis of Belarus and its neighboring countries, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. It allows us to situate Belarus within a broader regional context and assess whether its entrepreneurial attitudes differ meaningfully from those of neighboring countries.

The comparative analysis of entrepreneurial self-perception demonstrates similar characteristics across these countries (Figure 3): roughly half of their population report having the knowledge, skills, and experience necessary to start a business. At the same time, about half of respondents cite fear of failure as a barrier to starting a business, with the lowest share recorded in Latvia (45%) and the highest in Poland (55%).

Regarding the perceived favorability of conditions for starting a business (perception of opportunities), responses vary across countries: only 36% of the population in Ukraine sees good opportunities for business creation, while in Poland this share reaches 74%. In Belarus, Lithuania, and Latvia, perceptions are similar, with 40–50% of respondents rating the external environment as favorable for business start-up.

Notable cross-country differences also appear in perceptions of successful business stories in the media and in the attractiveness of entrepreneurship as a career choice. Interestingly, the most negative assessments on these two indicators in 2024 were recorded in Poland.

Figure 3. Attitudes toward entrepreneurship in Belarus compared with reference countries

Source: Global GEM report 2024–2025.

Conversely, Belarus shows the highest share of adults who consider entrepreneurship a good career choice (79%), while Lithuania leads in positive assessments of media coverage of entrepreneurship (75%). In all countries, respondents generally agree that entrepreneurs enjoy a high social status and respect. The lowest share of agreement is observed in Lithuania (59%), and the highest in Belarus (78%).

Discussion and Policy Recommеndations

GEM-2024 findings confirm notable resilience of the Belarusian private sector: early-stage entrepreneurship and the pool of potential founders are expanding, and motivations are shifting from necessity toward opportunity and purpose. Entrepreneurs increasingly view business creation as a vehicle for autonomy and social contribution, even under growing institutional and regulatory constraints.

This resilience is by all means a positive development – a strong private sector is vital not only for growth but for long-term sovereignty and democratic progress (Audretsch and Moog, 2022) Entrepreneurship in Belarus functions as a sphere of independent self-realization; supporting it means supporting the most autonomous and productive part of society (Marozau, 2023; Daneyko, Panasevich and Marozau, 2023).

Yet, this dynamism unfolds within a fragile environment where excessive regulation, political risk, and legal uncertainty remain major barriers. The tension between societal resilience and institutional fragility is the defining feature of Belarusian entrepreneurship today, and it may threaten the positive momentum in entrepreneurship tomorrow.

Against this background, practical steps to strengthen resilience can be pursued by different stakeholder groups:

Domestic stakeholders (entrepreneurs and associations)

  • Build and strengthen professional and peer networks—at home and within the diaspora—for mentoring, collaboration, and mutual support.
  • Amplify diverse success stories (including non-tech and small-scale ventures) to normalize entrepreneurial risk-taking and inspire new entrants.

External stakeholders (international organizations, donor agencies, and diaspora networks)

  • Expand access to grants, concessional finance, and investment for Belarusian-led and EU-oriented enterprises.
  • Provide tailored mentoring and training on international markets, sustainable business practices, and ESG standards.
  • Support transnational business education and exchange programs—such as MBA tracks and mobility initiatives—to preserve skills and networks.

In a more enabling institutional context, the state could also play a constructive role in fostering entrepreneurship. Under different political conditions, supportive public policies could help unlock the sector’s potential—for instance, by reducing bureaucratic burdens, ensuring predictable taxation, guaranteeing property rights, and recognizing the private sector as a source of innovation and employment. While such measures remain aspirational in the current environment, articulating them highlights what would be required for entrepreneurship to become a pillar of inclusive and sustainable development.

Without an enabling, predictable environment, Belarus risks losing its entrepreneurial potential. In turn, strengthening and safeguarding the entrepreneurial momentum would lay the groundwork for a future trajectory of greater openness, stability, and self-determination.

References

  • Audretsch, D. B., & Moog, P. (2022). Democracy and entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 46(2), 368-392.
  • Daneyko, P., Panasevich, V. & Marozau, R. (2023). Evolution of economic values in Belarus (in Russian). BEROC Policy Paper Series, PP no. 118.
  • GEM (2024). Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2024/2025 Global Report: Entrepreneurship Reality Check. London: GEM.
  • GEM Belarus (2020). Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Report GEM Belarus 2019-2020.
  • GEM Belarus (2022). Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Report GEM Belarus 2021-2022.
  • Marozau, R. (2023). Belarusian business in turbulent times. FREE Policy Brief

Acknowledgements

The study underlying this policy brief was made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). BEROC acknowledges support by Pyxera Global, whose financial and technical assistance for INNOVATE is part of a USAID-funded activity to support the innovation-based economy and private sector growth in Belarus.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Humanitarian Demining and Ukraine’s Recovery: Lessons Yet to Learn

Posted on December 1, 2025 | Policy Brief

This policy brief examines how land mine action underpins Ukraine’s reconstruction and economic renewal. It outlines the current scale of contamination and the national humanitarian demining strategy. The brief also reviews international experience from countries around the world, discussing the economic recovery driven by demining and the economic efficiency of mine action. It documents significant variation in direct mine action costs across countries and contexts, complicating the assessment of these costs in the case of Ukraine. The brief also discusses the indirect costs arising from systemic inefficiencies in Ukraine’s demining effort, including fragmented governance, shortages of qualified personnel, outdated standards, and security constraints. It concludes that Ukraine’s success in transforming demining into a catalyst for recovery depends on effective coordination, data-driven planning, gender inclusion, and the adoption of best international practices.

Understanding the Scale and Current Need for Humanitarian Demining in Ukraine

As of mid-2025, approximately 137,000 km² of Ukrainian land remains potentially contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). While this is a reduction from 174,000 km² at the end of 2022, Ukraine remains one of the most mine-contaminated countries in the world (Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, 2023; UDA, 2025).

The problem of demining is multidimensional, encompassing both humanitarian and economic consequences. More than six million people currently live in at-risk areas, and the number of mine incidents has already exceeded one thousand. Without addressing the problem, the number of victims could rise to more than 9,000 by 2030 (Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, 2023). Contamination affects some of the world’s most fertile agricultural regions, as well as energy, transport, and residential zones.

The funding needs are substantial. According to UNDP (2024), Ukraine’s total demining bill could reach USD 34–35 billion, requiring tens of thousands of trained specialists. As of early 2025, Ukraine has more than 4,500 sappers and deminers, but this number remains far below national needs. Experts emphasize that the workforce must increase significantly to ensure the timely clearance of contaminated territories. At present, approximately 87 mine-action operators are active in Ukraine, encompassing government bodies, private companies, humanitarian organizations, and international partners (UN Women Ukraine, 2025).

At the same time, the potential economic benefits of demining are immense. According to the TBI (2024) estimates, Ukraine loses about USD 11.2 billion each year (compared to 2021) due to mine contamination. Frontline regions such as Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv are particularly exposed, experiencing a reduction in exports of USD 8.9 billion and a loss of regional tax revenues of USD 1.1 billion annually.

In addressing the problem, the government has recently adopted a National Mine Action Strategy until 2033, which aims to clear about 80% of the de-occupied territories within 10 years (Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, 2024). However, this ambitious plan faces serious systemic challenges, including the dispersion of power among government agencies, insufficient and inconsistent funding, and delays in public procurement and tender processes (UDA, 2025). Thus, humanitarian demining stands at the crossroads of Ukraine’s security and economic recovery, affecting how quickly the country can restore farmland, rebuild infrastructure, and attract investment. Its success depends on efficient resource use, data-driven planning, and the adoption of proven international practices. The following sections examine global experience and economic efficiency in mine action, as well as the key challenges Ukraine must address to achieve tangible and sustainable recovery.

Evidence and Lessons from Global Experience

The problem of humanitarian demining is widespread globally, affecting dozens of post-conflict states across Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Many of these countries, such as Afghanistan, Mozambique, Eritrea, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia, have already undergone large-scale clearance operations and provide tangible evidence of how demining drives economic recovery and social stabilization.

In Afghanistan, humanitarian demining produced wide-ranging socio-economic benefits. It vastly improved mobility and access to resources and markets, served as a prerequisite for broader development initiatives, restored agricultural productivity and employment, and positively influenced mental health and community relations by reducing fear, enabling return, and rebuilding trust within affected populations (UNMAS, 2021).

In Mozambique, large-scale railway clearance reopened a key regional trade corridor, creating more than 400 jobs. The operation restored transport connectivity, enabled the renewal of coal exports, and stimulated agricultural and industrial recovery in the surrounding areas (Lundberg, 2006). In Eritrea, humanitarian demining enabled the return of more than 20,000 refugees within a year, which allowed about 29 villages to resume crop cultivation and schooling; casualty rates for both residents and livestock fell to zero, restoring local food security and rural incomes (Lundberg, 2006).

Sudan offers a contrasting case, where political and logistical barriers pushed costs to nearly USD 45 per m² (Bolton, 2008). Despite high costs, the reopened transport corridors and access to markets demonstrated substantial humanitarian and trade benefits, underscoring that elevated expenditure in complex terrains can still deliver strong socio-economic returns.

Post-war European experiences reinforce these findings. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, humanitarian demining has served as a foundation for sustainable socio-economic recovery, enabling the rebuilding of housing and infrastructure, reducing flood risks, restoring agricultural and forest productivity, improving access to water, and ensuring safe mobility essential for trade and community development (GICHD & UNDP, 2022). Similarly, mine clearance in Croatia has been pivotal to national recovery, restoring access to agricultural and forest land, enabling infrastructure and EU-funded development projects, and supporting tourism and investment in previously contaminated regions (Mine Action Review, 2021).

Collectively, these cases demonstrate that the economic dividends of demining are consistent across contexts. Clearing mines enables agricultural revival, facilitates transport and trade, lowers accident-related health costs, and strengthens confidence in governance. However, incomplete data and fragmented decision-making might delay land release and inflate costs.

For Ukraine, where contamination covers more than 137,000 km² of high-value farmland and industrial zones, these global lessons confirm that mine action must be integrated as a central pillar of the reconstruction process.

Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Humanitarian Demining: Indicators and Limitations

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, in its recent report, defines efficiency in demining as “a measure of how economically resources or inputs are converted to results” (GICHD, 2023, p. 6). In humanitarian demining, this means achieving the maximum area of land safely released or the largest number of explosive items cleared using the least possible resources, without compromising safety. Efficiency, however, differs from effectiveness which is defined in the report as “the extent to which the intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance” (GICHD, 2023, p.6).

Yet, the quantitative framework developed by GICHD primarily focuses on efficiency indicators, particularly cost-based metrics such as cost per square meter of land released, cost per square meter of land fully cleared, and cost per explosive item found. This narrow focus allows for financial comparison but risks overlooking effectiveness dimensions such as the humanitarian, developmental, and social outcomes of mine clearance.

To operationalize this concept, the GICHD study developed a framework of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) to measure economic efficiency across 17 mine-affected countries between 2015 and 2019 (GICHD, 2023, pp.14-17). Three indicators are identified as central for assessing the financial efficiency of mine action operations:

  1. Cost per square metre of land released – measuring the overall cost of returning territory to productive use, encompassing land cleared, reduced, and cancelled. A lower value indicates greater cost efficiency in land release and better-targeted survey and clearance operations.
  2. Cost per square metre of land cleared – reflecting the technical cost of full clearance, which is higher due to intensive labour, equipment, and safety requirements.
  3. Cost per explosive item found – linking financial inputs to tangible outputs, i.e., the average expenditure needed to locate and neutralize one explosive ordnance.

These metrics allow analysts and policymakers to assess how funds are transformed into measurable clearance outcomes. However, as GICHD (2023) stresses, they should be used for internal evaluation and planning, not for direct comparison between countries. Differences in contamination types, topography, labour costs, access, and national data systems make cross-country benchmarking misleading. The report explicitly cautions that “no country should be considered as having a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ performance in terms of operational efficiency purely on the basis of the KPI values” (GICHD, 2023, p.21). Even similar indicators can yield different implications depending on whether operations are clearance-driven (activity-based) or survey-driven (decision-based). To illustrate the scale and variation in demining costs globally, Table 1 presents key indicators of humanitarian demining costs as of 30 November 2022.

As shown in Table 1, costs per square meter of released territory range from USD 0.02/m² (Thailand) to USD 5.87/m² (Lebanon), i.e., a 293-fold difference. Similarly, the cost per explosive item ranged from USD 274 (Sri Lanka) to USD 13,450 (Croatia) (Rohozian, 2024). Such disparities illustrate that comparing “price per m²” without context or establishing the “benchmark” in the field is quite problematic.

Table 1. Key indicators of the cost of demining across countries, as of 30 Nov. 2022

State  Cost per square meter of territory released from the local socio-economic system, USD Cost per square meter of territory that has been cleared in the local socio-economic system, USD Cost of a single found explosive item in the local socio-economic system, USD
Angola 0,32 7,88 9042
Afghanistan 0,79 1,48 911
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0,36 19,06 6059
Vietnam 0,28 0,65 500
Western Sahara 0,41 0,51 2183
Zimbabwe 1,89 4,49 289
Iraq 0,81 1,32 4437
Cambodia 0,22 0,37 678
Laos 0,99 0,99 356
Lebanon 5,87 10,65 2204
South Sudan 0,49 4,07 5667
Serbia 1,07 1,96 9757
Sudan 2,89 5,78 457
Tajikistan 1,29 1,98 1721
Thailand 0,02 2,25 281
Croatia 1,03 1,23 13450
Sri Lanka 2,26 3,65 274

Source: Rohozian, 2024.

Moreover, the study acknowledges limitations in data standardisation and completeness. Variations in how organisations record and report costs affect comparability. Aggregated national averages can obscure contextual factors such as contamination density or security conditions. For these reasons, GICHD recommends interpreting efficiency metrics in conjunction with qualitative information, including terrain, contamination type, and labour structure, and always balancing cost-efficiency with safety and effectiveness.

However, drawing on global patterns and Ukraine’s official USD 34–35 billion cost estimate, we can expect Ukraine to fall within the middle range of international demining costs. It will likely be more expensive than low-cost cases in Asian contexts but substantially below the extreme-cost cases, such as Lebanon, due to its terrain, institutional capacity, and ability to scale mechanized clearance.

Challenges in Ukraine’s Humanitarian Demining

In addition to the substantial direct costs of humanitarian demining, it is essential to understand the indirect costs generated by systemic inefficiencies, i.e., costs that arise not from clearance itself, but from delays, duplication, weak coordination, and different shortages.

A review of Ukraine’s current mine-action landscape allows us to identify the main structural challenges that contribute to elevated indirect costs. These include fragmented governance, incomplete and inconsistent data, security-related access constraints, and a shortage of trained personnel.

One of the most pressing challenges is the fragmentation of coordination and governance. Responsibilities remain dispersed across numerous actors, including the Ministry of Defence, the State Emergency Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Economy, the National Mine Action Authority, and over 20 accredited NGOs and private contractors.

According to the UDA (2025), this overlap of mandates and inconsistent prioritisation frameworks frequently results in duplicated surveys and delayed task approvals, reducing efficiency and transparency. At the same time, the idea of consolidating all authority within a single centralised body would risk excessive concentration of power and reduced accountability. A more effective path forward would be to strengthen the existing Mine Action Center’s coordinating role while maintaining clear institutional separation between policymaking and operational implementation, ensuring transparency, competition, and sustained donor confidence.

A persistent shortage of qualified personnel represents one of the most critical challenges to scaling up humanitarian demining in Ukraine. According to UNDP (2025), the country currently employs around 4,500 trained deminers, while full national recovery will require at least 10,000 professionals over the next decade (TBI, 2024). The workforce is under pressure from wartime mobilization, which diverts potential recruits to defense roles, and from a shortage of experienced supervisors and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) specialists, limiting the number of teams that can safely operate simultaneously. The National Mine Action Strategy for the Period up to 2033 (Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, 2024) further acknowledges that Ukraine’s training system is inadequate for the sector’s needs.

Current state-level training for the profession of “Sapper (demining)” follows military-oriented standards that demand extensive time and resources but offer limited relevance to humanitarian operations. Only ten educational institutions are licensed to train deminers, and only a few conduct active courses. To close this capacity gap, the Strategy calls for expanding domestic training infrastructure, establishing accredited qualification centers, recognizing informal and partial training, and developing new professional standards tailored to humanitarian demining.

Another set of pressing challenges in Ukraine’s humanitarian demining effort concerns data deficits and security limitations. Incomplete and inconsistent mapping of hazardous areas continues to undermine planning and coordination. According to the Ministry of Economy (2023), Ukraine inherited multiple legacy databases using different coordinate systems and lacking harmonized metadata, resulting in duplication and delays in verifying “released” land. The absence of a unified digital mine-action information management system constrains both operational oversight and donor transparency. As Rohozian (2024) observes, such imperfect information leads to “erroneous management decisions” that increase total costs and prolong recovery.

In addition, large areas in the east and south remain off-limits due to ongoing hostilities, unexploded ordnance, and damaged infrastructure. Fluctuating front lines, dense contamination, and logistical barriers raise insurance and hazard-pay costs, shorten fieldwork periods, and cause rapid equipment deterioration.

Thus, addressing these interconnected challenges is essential to accelerate Ukraine’s reconstruction and ensure that mine action effectively supports the safe return of communities, the revival of agricultural production, and the broader recovery of the national economy.

The Role of Women in Humanitarian Demining

The role of women in Ukraine’s humanitarian demining sector deserves special attention, as they have become an integral part of the national workforce serving as deminers, team leaders, and technical-survey dog handlers. Their growing participation reflects both professional competence and the importance of gender-inclusive recovery efforts (UN Women Ukraine, 2025).

However, until 2017, Ukrainian legislation classified demining as a “dangerous profession,” barring women from formal employment in this field (Ministry of Health of Ukraine, 2017). Following sustained advocacy by international organizations, this restriction was lifted, granting women official access to mine-action professions. Since then, the number of women in operational and leadership roles has grown steadily.

Nevertheless, persistent stereotypes suggesting that demining is unsuitable for women have been disproved by practice, as reported by UN Women Ukraine, 2025. In practice, modern safety protocols and technologies such as drones and remotely operated vehicles allow women and men to perform tasks under equal safety conditions.

Following the lifting of the employment ban in 2017, which opened demining professions to women, mine-action organizations began reconsidering how to better meet women’s practical needs in the field. Recognizing that protective gear and uniforms had long been designed for men, many operators are now adapting equipment to fit women’s bodies, enhancing both comfort and operational efficiency.

These findings further demonstrate that gender-inclusive employment contributes to a reconstruction process that benefits all citizens and fosters social recovery based on principles of equity and shared responsibility.

Conclusions

In conclusion, humanitarian demining represents a strategic prerequisite for Ukraine’s reconstruction, food security, and long-term economic recovery. International experience demonstrates that mine clearance delivers substantial socio-economic dividends by restoring access to land, enabling trade, and rebuilding local livelihoods. However, the economic efficiency of mine action cannot be measured through simple cross-country comparisons. Costs per square meter or per explosive item differ widely depending on terrain, contamination density, labor costs, and institutional frameworks. Therefore, efficiency should be evaluated in context, i.e., by how well resources are transformed into measurable recovery outcomes without compromising safety or inclusiveness.

For Ukraine, transforming demining into a genuine driver of recovery requires addressing several domestic challenges. Fragmented governance and overlapping mandates continue to reduce coordination and transparency, while limited training capacity and workforce shortages constrain operational progress. Inconsistent data systems and incomplete mapping impede strategic planning, and security conditions still restrict access to large contaminated areas in the east and south of Ukraine. Overcoming these barriers will require strengthening the coordinating role of the National Mine Action Center and expanding professional education and certification programs.

Equally important, the growing participation of women in mine action deserves special recognition. Since the 2017 reform that lifted employment restrictions, women have become active as deminers, team leaders, and survey specialists, demonstrating both competence and leadership in this traditionally male-dominated field. Promoting gender-balanced participation will strengthen Ukraine’s mine action capacity and align reconstruction with broader principles of equality and social inclusion.

Thus, ensuring that clearance efforts are efficient, transparent, data-driven, and inclusive will determine how effectively Ukraine can restore productive land, rebuild infrastructure, and regain investor confidence.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Saving Lives During War: How to Make Evacuation Messages More Effective

Posted on November 26, 2025 | Policy Brief

When war threatens civilian populations, effective evacuation messages can mean the difference between life and death. Drawing on a controlled survey experiment conducted with 2,006 Ukrainians during the 2022 Russian invasion, we find that providing clear evacuation plans dramatically improves a message’s perceived effectiveness, while sophisticated message framing makes little difference. Our results indicate that people facing war are not naive about dangers—they need practical information on how to escape, not persuasion about why they should leave. This is especially true for those who do not have the means to evacuate autonomously. These findings offer guidance for authorities and humanitarian organizations: focus on providing concrete evacuation logistics rather than crafting perfect messaging.

The Life-or-Death Challenge of Wartime Evacuations

Each year, tens of thousands of civilians die in armed conflicts worldwide. Many of these deaths could be prevented through timely evacuations from danger zones. Yet despite imminent threats, many civilians hesitate to leave their homes. Understanding how to increase the effectiveness of evacuation messages has become a critical challenge for saving lives.

In July 2022, five months into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we conducted the first experimental study testing the effectiveness of evacuation messages during an active war. Working with 2,006 Ukrainians from regions directly affected by combat, focusing on areas that experienced occupation, shelling, and ground fighting, we tested two fundamental approaches to improving evacuation messaging.

Figure 1. Surveyed regions with the relative share of respondents.

Source: Martinez et al. (2025)

 

Testing What Works: Plans vs. Persuasion

Our experiment compared two strategies:

Strategy 1: Persuasive Nudges

We tested different message framings inspired by behavioral economics, emphasizing either the gains from evacuating (saving lives) or losses from staying (risking death), and highlighting either deteriorating living conditions or benefits to military effectiveness. These techniques have proven effective in other contexts, from increasing vaccination rates to promoting energy conservation.

Strategy 2: Practical Evacuation Plans

We tested whether adding concrete evacuation instructions improved message effectiveness. Half of our messages included specific details: free buses available at designated locations, phone numbers for reserving seats, and clear departure times.

Participants evaluated how effective each message would be in convincing residents of their city to evacuate, using a scale from 0 (completely ineffective) to 10 (very effective).

Key Finding: People Need Logistics, Not Persuasion

Our results deliver a clear message for policymakers and humanitarian organizations:

Providing evacuation plans works

Messages that included concrete evacuation plans were rated approximately 5% more effective than those without. This improvement is both statistically significant and practically meaningful—in Donetsk oblast alone, where 350,000 civilians remained in Ukrainian-controlled areas during our study, a 5% increase in evacuation rates could mean 17,500 additional lives moved to safety.

Message framing makes little difference

Surprisingly, none of our carefully crafted persuasive messages performed better than a simple, standard evacuation notice. Whether we emphasized gains or losses, living conditions or military benefits, the framing made no significant difference to perceived effectiveness.

Different groups respond differently

The evacuation plan’s effect was strongest among those who had not previously evacuated, which is exactly the population authorities most need to reach. This particular segment of the population is characterized by lower financial means and, therefore, a lower likelihood of owning a car, which turned out to be a crucial factor when it comes to timely evacuations. Finally, women responded more strongly to evacuation plans than men.

Figure 2. Experimental Treatment Effects.

Source: Martinez et al. (2025)

Understanding the Psychology of War Zone Evacuations

Why do practical plans matter more than persuasive messaging? Our findings suggest that people experiencing war are far from naive about the dangers they face. Among our respondents:

  • 82% perceived real risk of death or injury from missile strikes
  • 40% had already evacuated at least once
  • 50% of those who stayed had considered evacuating

Which seems to suggest that the barrier is not understanding risk—it is knowing how to act on it. Our correlational analysis supports this interpretation: those offered transportation during the early invasion were 12-18 percentage points more likely to evacuate, while simply receiving evacuation information showed weaker effects.

Policy Recommendations

Based on our findings, we recommend that authorities and humanitarian organizations prioritize the following:

  1. Focus resources on logistics, not messaging

Instead of investing in sophisticated communication strategies, dedicate resources to organizing concrete evacuation support: transportation, clear meeting points, advance booking systems, and designated evacuation routes.

  1. Provide specific, actionable information

Every evacuation message should include: exact locations for transportation pickup, specific departure times, contact information for coordination, clear instructions for what evacuees can bring, and confirmation of free transportation.

  1. Target messages strategically

Prioritize delivering evacuation plans to those who have not previously evacuated, women who show higher responsiveness to organized evacuations, and areas where residents lack personal evacuation plans, that is most likely in the lower socio-economic status neighborhoods.

  1. Act on timing

Our research captured a relatively stable period in the conflict. During acute escalations, rapid deployment of evacuation logistics likely matters even more than message optimization.

Implications Beyond Ukraine

While our study focused on Ukraine, approximately 50 active conflicts worldwide threaten civilian populations. Our findings suggest a fundamental shift in how international organizations approach emergency evacuations: from persuasion to facilitation.

The lesson is sobering, but actionable. People facing mortal danger do not need convincing that threats are real. They need practical help escaping them. This insight should reshape how humanitarian organizations allocate resources, how militaries plan for civilian protection, and how governments prepare for crisis scenarios.

Conclusion

Effective evacuation during war is not about finding the perfect words; it is about providing clear paths to safety. Our research suggests that even simple additions of logistical information can meaningfully improve an evacuation message’s perceived effectiveness. In contexts where every percentage point of improved evacuation rates translates to lives saved, focusing on practical evacuation support over persuasive messaging represents both an evidence-based and morally imperative policy choice. For the millions of civilians who may face evacuation decisions in current and future conflicts, the message from our research is clear: authorities must move beyond telling people to leave and start showing them exactly how.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Strengthening Ukraine: Sharing Knowledge for a Sustainable Future

Posted on November 3, 2025 |

HROMADA Conference 2025 banner with sunset view over Kyiv and the Motherland Monument, highlighting the theme Strengthening Ukraine: Sharing Knowledge for a Sustainable Future focused on Ukraine Wartime Innovation.

The HROMADA Conference 2025 brings together leading experts to discuss Ukraine’s reconstruction and reform. Hosted by the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) at the Stockholm School of Economics, the event highlights how collaboration, research, and policy innovation can accelerate Ukraine’s sustainable recovery.

Exploring Key Challenges and Opportunities

Ukraine stands at a crucial crossroads in its path toward stability and prosperity. Therefore, the conference focuses on governance, demographics, and energy as pillars for building a more resilient society. Moreover, discussions will emphasize how effective policy and regional collaboration can support Ukraine’s long-term integration with Europe.

Panels Focused on Ukraine Reconstruction

Torbjörn Becker, Director of SITE, and Ulrik Tideström, Sweden’s Special Envoy for Ukraine, will deliver the opening remarks.

The HROMADA Conference 2025 program features three dynamic panels designed to tackle Ukraine’s most urgent priorities:

  • Ukraine–Nordic–Baltic Dialogue on Energy Transition and Security – This panel explores how regional partnerships can strengthen Ukraine’s energy independence and security.
  • Demographics, Mobility, and Return – Experts will analyze population trends, labor mobility, and opportunities for return migration.
  • Public Administration for Reconstruction and European Integration – The discussion will focus on modern governance reforms essential for rebuilding trust and efficiency.

Keynote Insight: Sanctions and the Russian Economy

Maria Perrotta Berlin, Assistant Professor at SITE, will deliver the keynote address. She will explain how international sanctions have reshaped Russia’s economy and what that means for Ukraine’s recovery strategy. Her insights aim to connect economic policy with the realities of post-war reconstruction.

Join the Conversation

The HROMADA Conference strengthens academic and policy collaboration between Ukraine and its Nordic–Baltic partners. To participate, please register through the HROMADA webpage for full program details and venue information. Once registered, attendees will receive all necessary access details directly.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed during events and conferences are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.