Tag: diversification

Agricultural Subsidies: The Case of Georgia

Fresh apples, pears, and grapes at a local market benefiting from agricultural subsidies in Georgia.

This brief explores the role of government subsidy programs in Georgia’s agricultural sector, with a focus on grapes, apples, and hazelnuts. These subsidies play a significant role in providing social assistance to the sector and in supporting farmers; however, their long-term impact on industry growth remains a subject of discussion. Key challenges include ensuring product quality, enhancing productivity, and expanding market opportunities, particularly regarding export market concentration and infrastructure constraints.

Introduction

Governments have historically intervened in agricultural markets under the pretext of promoting food security. At first, interventions aimed to provide affordable food for rapidly growing urban populations, afterwards more emphasis was put on enhancing agricultural productivity. Nowadays, agriculture remains a priority for policymakers due to its role in promoting inclusive growth and reducing poverty. Additionally, renewed concerns about food security have further driven these policy efforts (Gautam, 2015).

One of the key instruments of these interventions are subsidies in different forms – such as various input subsidies, price supports, and trade interventions. While their use has been widespread, the economic effectiveness of subsidies continues to be heavily debated. Economic theory suggests that subsidies are useful in resolving market failures; however, even in this case, the actual effect of subsidies is highly dependent on the specific implementation. Further, in many other cases, subsidies have led to distortions and have been detrimental to countries’ own economic interests (Gautam, 2015).

Another important concern arises from the political economy of subsidies use. Widening rural-urban income disparities create political pressure to implement measures that support the livelihoods of the large agricultural population. Subsidies, due to their visibility, are a convenient instrument to increase political support from this population group. Further, subsidies offer immediate or near-immediate gains to recipients, whereas public capital investments take longer to deliver results, therefore subsidies are often used as a political instrument. Since political decision-making is typically driven by short-term considerations, often aligned with electoral cycles, long-term investments do not always align with political incentives (Gautam, 2015).

Box 1. Subsidies

Subsidies are financial assistance provided by governments to support or promote specific sectors, industries, or activities within the economy. They can take various forms, including direct cash payments, tax relief, low-interest loans, and in-kind support, such as the provision of goods and services at below-market prices. Subsidies play a significant role as a tool in government expenditure policy. They influence resource allocation decisions, income distribution, and expenditure efficiency (Schwartz & Clements, 1999).

In the case of Georgia, subsidies are the main instrument for support to the agricultural sector, with direct subsidies accounting on average 45 percent of total government expenditure in the sector (2014-2024). The government provides subsidies for most of the country’s main crops, including wheat, grapes, hazelnut, tangerines and apples.

Given the scope of this policy brief, only subsidies for major perennial crops – grapes, hazelnuts and apples – are discussed. This as as the wheat sector involves additional food security considerations and due to lack of data for tangerines. Among perennial crops grapes have the highest share of total production (46 percent, including both white and red grapes), followed by tangerines at 14 percent, apples at 10 percent, and hazelnuts at 8 percent (2023, Geostat).

This policy brief firstly explains the Georgian context in more detail, followed by sub-sections discussing each major perennial crop sector, ending with conclusions and policy recommendations.

The Georgian Context

Agriculture plays a crucial role in Georgia’s economy. As of 2024, 39 percent of the population resides in rural areas (Geostat, 2024), where agriculture serves as the primary source of income. The sector employs the largest share of the country’s workforce—17 percent (Geostat, 2023)—yet it contributes to only 7 percent of Georgia’s GDP (Geostat, 2023).  At the same time, the disparity in income, and other major socio-economic indicators between the rural (agricultural) and urban population is large. For example, in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, the average monthly nominal earnings are 78 percent higher than the average for the rest of Georgia. Additionally, Tbilisi accounts for 70 percent of the total value added generated in the country (Geostat, 2023).

In recent year, the country has undertaken significant efforts to modernize and improve the agricultural sector, yet significant challenges remain. Georgian agriculture is largely characterized by small, fragmented family farms focused on subsistence farming with restricted market access. They are highly vulnerable to weather conditions, yet there is little awareness of or adoption of insurance and risk mitigation measures (State Audit Office of Georgia, 2023). Traditional farming methods remain dominant, with limited use of modern technology. Additionally, most farmers operate on a small scale and lack cooperation and coordination, further hindering efficiency and competitiveness. As a result, they often struggle with low productivity and have difficulty producing high-quality products in stable quantities. Lastly, a high dependency on the Russian market for most agricultural products poses significant risks, as Russia is not a stable trade partner.

Given this context, agricultural subsidies are a highly important topic in Georgia. The Georgian government implements various subsidy programs to support agricultural sectors such as fruit production, viticulture, hazelnut farming, and wheat production. These initiatives aim to promote the sales of grapes, non-standard apples, and tangerines, enhance hazelnut production, and ensure food security by subsidizing essential staples like wheat, particularly during the Covid-19 pandemic.

Starting from 2014 to 2024 (Figure 1), the share of subsidies in total agricultural expenditure has followed an increasing trend, ranging from 21.4 percent in 2014 to peaking at 67.5 percent in 2021. In 2024 the respective share is 54.1 percent.  A decline occurred in 2022–2023, following the stabilization of the Covid-19 pandemic. Apart from this, the share of subsidies within agricultural expenditures has been increasing over the last ten years.

Figure 1. Total and subsidy expenditures on agriculture, million GEL (2014-2024)

Source: Geostat, 2025.

While these programs are designed to assist farmers and increase sales, how these subsidies support in addressing the mentioned structural challenges – therefore advancing the effectiveness of the sector – is under question.

The Grape Subsidy Programs

The grape subsidy programs in Georgia are primarily aimed at supporting viticulture in key wine-producing regions, such as Kakheti, Racha-Lechkhumi, and Kvemo Svaneti. These subsidies were designed to stabilize farmers’ incomes and ensure smooth harvests, to guarantee that even lower-quality grapes will be sold, particularly for grape varieties used in wine production. In general, the government uses two types of subsidies: direct and indirect. Direct subsidies involve paying farmers a certain amount of money per kilogram of grapes. Indirect subsidies are implemented through state-owned companies that are responsible for purchasing grapes from farmers.

Georgia’s grape subsidy program (direct subsidies) was introduced in 2008 and has been implemented every year except for in 2018 and 2019. Starting from 2014, the government provided substantial direct financial support to grape producers. However, starting in 2017, direct subsidies began to decline sharply, and by 2018–2019, the government announced that it would no longer directly subsidize the grape harvest. However, during this period, the state’s grape purchasing program remained in place, purchasing any surplus grapes left on the market after private acquisitions.

The Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 prompted a renewed surge in subsidies, with financial support reaching its highest levels in years. This elevated support continued until 2022 but was significantly reduced again in 2023 (by 63 percent), following a decline in production (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Grape production, subsidies and wine exports (2014-2023)

Source: Geostat, 2025.

Grape production has generally followed an upward trend, with record harvests in 2019 and 2020. Given the absence of direct subsidies in 2017 and 2018, the effect of subsidies on production levels is questionable. In more recent years, production has become more volatile, displaying a noticeable decline by 2023.

Wine exports, a crucial part of Georgia’s economy, have grown steadily, with volumes peaking in 2022, and persisting at high levels ever since. Export revenues have also increased consistently, reaching an all-time high in 2024, according to preliminary data.

The main destination for the Georgian wine sector is CIS countries. Russia accounts for the largest share among the CIS, with an average of 75.4 percent, between 2014-2024. Russia’s share has been increasing in recent years, reaching 85.8 percent in 2024 (among CIS countries). The average share of exports to the EU of total exports is 10 percent (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Wine exports by country groups (2014-2024)

Source: Geostat, 2025.

Although subsidies played a key role in revitalizing Georgia’s wine industry following the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially as grape production and processing have increased over the years, their long-term impact have been problematic (Ghvanidze, Bitsch, Hanf, & Svanidze, 2020). Since subsidies were introduced in 2008, Georgia’s grape market has become heavily distorted, with prices shaped by government support rather than supply and demand dynamics.

Even though a significant portion of government funding for the sector is allocated to subsidies, the way in which subsidies affect grape production levels is not obvious. Other sector insufficiencies, such as quality issues and exporting market diversification are inadequately addressed. Grape quality remains a key issue, as farmers lack incentives to improve production practices, knowing that the government will purchase their yield regardless. Additionally, Georgia’s heavy reliance on its main export partner, Russia, poses significant risks, and the share of exports to EU countries has not seen substantial growth. Overall, since the subsidies aim to stabilize producers’ income rather than to address structural issues in the sector, they may be considered social support.

The Apple Subsidy Program

The apple subsidy program in Georgia was introduced in 2014 to support the sale of non-standard apples after market prices dropped to a record low 0.02 GEL. Non-standard apples are damaged fruits that fall from trees due to wind, hail, or other natural factors. Typically unfit for direct consumption, these lower-quality apples are primarily used by factories to produce apple concentrate. The program aimed to stabilize prices and provide financial relief to farmers. Processing companies received financial support for each kilogram of non-standard apples purchased.

The program was discontinued between 2015 and 2019, before it resumed in 2020. The number of companies involved in purchasing non-standard apples for further processing ranges from 12 to15 over the years.

As for apple production levels, although there were significant production surges in 2016, 2018, and 2020, these increases have been volatile and unstable.

Figure 4. Apple production, subsidies and exports (2014-2023)

Source: Geostat, 2025.

In terms of exports, the volume increased sharply between 2018 and 2019, reaching its peak in 2021 before gradually declining. Most apple exports are directed to CIS countries, with Russia accounting for an average of 94 percent between 2018 and 2024. In contrast, the EU’s share remains minimal, averaging less than 1 percent, with no exports recorded to the EU in half of the considered years.

Figure 5. Apple exports by country group (2014-2024)

Source: Geostat, 2025.

While apple production is highly vulnerable to weather conditions, the adoption of insurance remains low. The provided subsidy program supports farmers in producing lower-quality non-standard apples, thus limiting the incentives to enhance product quality, productivity, or production practices, as farmers rely on the government to purchase their produce regardless. Similar to the grape industry, government support in the apple market functions more as a social assistance rather than a tool for industry advancement.

The Hazelnut Subsidy Program

Georgia introduced the Hazelnut Production Support Program in 2022 to enhance competitiveness, assist farmers, and improve disease management. The program registered hazelnut orchards in a national cadaster, enabling better monitoring and targeted support, to subsidize the purchase of pesticides and agrochemicals essential for hazelnut care and cultivation. The program has continued in 2023 and 2024, with subsidies amounting 22 and 22.6 million GEL, respectively.

Hazelnut production in Georgia has been highly volatile in the past decade. The sector experienced its most severe crisis in 2017-2018 when fungal diseases and an Asian stink bug (Pharosana) invasion devastated yields. Consequently, both the quantity and quality of hazelnut production declined. In 2019, the production began to recover, peaking in 2021. However, unfavorable weather conditions resulted in a decline in 2022, with only a partial rebound in 2023.

Figure 6. Hazelnut production and exports (2014-2023)

Source: Geostat, 2025.

Hazelnut is mainly exported to EU countries, with an average share of 65.3 percent, between 2014 and 2024. The share of CIS countries in this period is 20.2 percent. However, the share exported to EU countries has been declining 2023 and 2024, to 52.4 and 56.7 percent, respectively.

Figure 7. Hazelnut exports by country group (2014-2024)

Source: Geostat, 2025.

The subsidy scheme in the hazelnut sector seems to be more targeted at the issues the sector is facing, compared to the other discussed programs. The effects are however yet to be explored as the program began in 2022. However, several challenges remain, such as insufficient technical facilities for drying and storing goods essential for ensuring the quality of products (Gelashvili, Deisadze & Seturidze, 2023).

Conclusion and Recommendations

Although the government of Georgia provides substantial support for the agricultural sector, it still suffers from various challenges. Product quality, high vulnerability to weather events and export dependency on unstable partners are major issues for the grape and apple sectors. Further, the effectiveness of the direct financial support and the corresponding incentives within these sectors can be questioned.

For these crops, the subsidy programs seem to function more as social assistance rather than tools for industry development. In the grape sector, guaranteed government purchases reduce incentives for farmers to improve grape quality. Similarly, the apple subsidy program encourages the cultivation of non-standard apples, as farmers rely on state-backed purchases rather than market-driven quality improvements. Apple production has also shown significant volatility over the years, further highlighting the sector’s instability.

Additionally, heavy dependence on Russia as a primary export market for these crops presents economic risks. Diversification, particularly to the EU, has remained limited.

As for the hazelnut sector, the subsidy program aims to address some of the structural challenges, while this sector also relies less on the Russian market. However, some issues with infrastructural equipment remain unresolved.

Overall, the share of subsidies in agriculture is very high; further, the design of the programs mainly prioritizes short-term income stability for farmers rather than long-term market competitiveness and sectoral development. To address the discussed systemic challenges, it is essential to develop targeted policies tailored to the specific needs of each sector. While the priorities may differ across each crop, several key areas require focused attention:

  • Quality of Products – Enhancing product quality through ensuring food safety standards, improved farming and manufacturing practices, and better regulatory frameworks can help increase competitiveness in both domestic and international markets.
  • Market Diversification – Strengthening ties with new international partners and improving branding strategies can help industries access new markets and reduce risks associated with economic or political fluctuations in dominant trade partners.
  • Infrastructure Development – Poor infrastructure remains a challenge for the sector. Investments in post-harvest drying and storage facilities, as well as modern machinery and equipment, will enhance efficiency, reduce losses, and improve product quality.
  • Adoption of innovative farming practices– Adopting innovative farming practices boosts productivity, lowers costs, and enhances sustainability. It helps farmers adapt to changing weather conditions, making agriculture more efficient, environmentally friendly, and resilient.

By addressing these fundamental issues, policies can play a role in contributing to the long-term stability and growth of the agricultural sector, ultimately strengthening the economy and increasing global competitiveness.

References

  • Gautam, M. (2015). Agricultural Subsidies: Resurging Interest in a Perennial Debate. Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics.
  • Gelashvili, S., Deisadze, S., & Seturidze, E. (2022). An Overview of the Georgian Wine Sector.
  • Gelashvili, S., Deisadze, S., & Seturidze, E. (2023). Overview of the hazelnut sector in Georgia: past trends and the way forward. Tbilisi: ISET Policy Institute.
  • Ghvanidze, S., Bitsch, L., Hanf, J. H., & Svanidze, M. (2020). “The Cradle of Wine Civilization” – Current Developments in the Wine Industry of the Caucasus. Caucasus Analytical Digest, 117, 9-15.
  • Jayne, T., & Rashid, S. (2013). Input Subsidy Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Synthesis of Recent Evidence. Agricultural Economics, 44, 547-562.
  • Schwartz, G., & Clements, B. (1999). Government subsidies. Journal of Economic Surveys, 13(2), 119-148. doi:10.1111/1467-6419.00079
  • State Audit Office of Georgia. (2023). Audit Report on the Development and Management of the State Agricultural Insurance Program.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Energy Security at a Cost: The Ripple Effects of the Baltics’ Desynchronization from the BRELL Network

High-voltage power lines in a foggy landscape representing the desynchronization of the BRELL network.

The Baltic States’ desynchronization from the BRELL network on February 7, 2025, cut ties with Russia and Belarus, ending electricity trade. Though the transition was smooth with no outages, recent underwater cable disruptions have highlighted vulnerabilities, raising energy security concerns. These events underscore the importance of both diversifying and decentralizing power systems, drawing lessons from Ukraine’s electricity market, which has remained operational despite sustained Russian attacks.

The Baltics’ power system was part of a large Russian-operated synchronous electricity system known as BRELL, which connected the electricity transmission systems of Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (Figure 1). The desynchronization from BRELL and the integration into the European grid have been discussed since 2007, when the Prime Ministers of the Baltic States declared desynchronization as the region’s strategic priority. In 2018, a decision was made to join the Continental European Synchronous Area through a connection with Poland, leading to significant investments – financially supported by the European Commission – to ensure adequate infrastructure. Fully committing to their priority, the Baltic’s desynchronized completely from BRELL on February 7th, 2025.

Figure 1. The BRELL power ring

Source: Karčiauskas (2023)

A Successful Physical (De)synchronization

The desynchronization process proceeded smoothly, with no blackouts. This success was anticipated, given the project’s meticulous planning over several years. A comparable example is Ukraine, which disconnected from the Russian and Belarusian power systems less than a month after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. Ukraine then synchronized with the Continental European power grid ENTSO-E, an event that had been in preparation since 2017.

After the desynchronization, the Baltic states temporarily operated in island mode, relying entirely on domestic generation for all grid operations. To maintain system stability, the commercial capacity of interconnectors with the Nordics (whose regional group is not part of the Continental European Synchronous Area) was reduced, ensuring they could serve as reserves in case of major generator outages. The NordBalt cable is one such connector linking Sweden’s SE4 region and Lithuania.

However, conditions are gradually returning to normal. As of February 17, 2025, 700 MW is now available for commercial trading, as shown in Figure 2. Despite this progress, the commercial trading capacity of the interconnector with Poland (the LitPol line) remains heavily restricted and is primarily used to maintain system stability.

Figure 2. Day-ahead commercial transfer capacities on the Nordic interconnectors around the desynchronization

Source: Nord Pool

The Baltic region’s synchronization with the European grid is currently achieved through a 400 kV overhead power line connecting Lithuania and Poland. A second link, the Harmony Link, an underground cable, is planned to become operational by 2030. This makes the existing interconnection an essential part of regional infrastructure and a potential security risk, particularly given the recent sabotage of cables in the Baltic Sea. In response to these threats, Lithuania has increased surveillance of the NordBalt cable. The country’s prime minister has estimated the cost of securing the Baltic cables at €32-34 million,  seeking EU support for its funding. The government has also strengthened the protection measures. Initially, security was outsourced to a private security company, but plans are in place for the country’s Public Security Service (Viešojo saugumo tarnyba) to take over in spring 2025. Further, in preparation for the Baltics’ full desynchronization, the Polish Transmission System Operator deployed helicopters to patrol the interconnection, to enhance the security of the infrastructure.

From Trade Interruption to Infrastructure Sabotage

The most significant short-term impact of the desynchronization from the BRELL is the limitation of electricity trade for the Baltic states. The desynchronization has affected reserve balancing in the Baltic region, forcing the three states to rely more on their internal generation for system stability. This has resulted in reduced generation capacity for commercial trade, as the states must be prepared to again operate in island mode in case of an outage on the LitPol cable. Until February 19, 2025, the LitPol line remained unused for commercial trading. However, gradual increases are expected to eventually allow for 150 MW commercial trade between the Polish area and the Baltics, a significant reduction from the 500 MW previously available. This limited trading capacity could lead to higher prices in the Baltics, as the region is a net importer of electricity.

This is not the first time the Baltics have faced trade disruptions. In November 2020, after the construction of a Belarusian nuclear power plant near the Lithuanian border, Lithuania, followed by Latvia and Estonia, limited commercial electricity exchanges with Russia and Belarus. Furthermore, on May 15, 2022, electricity trade between Russia and Finland was halted, followed by the closure of the Kaliningrad-Lithuania connection the next day. While this event led to no blackouts, it clearly impacted the region’s price volatility (Lazarczyk & Le Coq, 2023).

Recently, the region has experienced sabotage to underwater interconnectors, significantly impacting electricity trade between the Nordics and the Baltics. On December 25, 2024, the Estlink 2 cable, one of two connections between Finland and Estonia, was cut, reducing transmission capacity between the two regions. Repair costs are expected to reach several million Euros. As disclosed via Nord Pool’s Urgent Market Message, repairs are expected to last until August 2025 – stressing the system. As Estlink 2 is offline, the Baltic system is not fully operating. If another major component fails, there may be insufficient capacity to maintain grid stability, increasing the risk of outages or the need for emergency interventions.

With the complete disconnection from the Russian and Belarusian power grids, Russia no longer has direct control over the Baltic electricity trade, effectively eliminating the risk of trade disruptions from Russia. However, a new energy threat has emerged: infrastructure sabotage. Although the perpetrators of recent sabotage incidents have not been clearly identified, both Lazarczyk & Le Coq (2023) and Fang et al. (2024) emphasize Russia’s strategic incentives to engage in such actions to maintain its geopolitical influence and discourage neighboring countries from reducing their energy dependence. Sabotaging critical infrastructure presents another efficient method of weaponizing electricity, particularly in the current context of limited Nord Pool imports and the Baltic States’ insufficient integration with the broader European grid.

From Diversification to Decentralization: Responses to Electricity Infrastructure Threats

The Baltic States have diversified their domestic energy supply sources to address the electricity infrastructure threat. In 2024, Estonia’s parliament approved the development of nuclear energy, with Fermi Energia planning to build two 300 MW light-water reactors. Other projects include a hydrogen-ready gas plant in Narva, which is expected to be completed by 2029, as well as an expansion of wind power capacity. While there was some support for extending the use of oil-fired plants in Estonia, their competitiveness has been undermined by high carbon prices and the closure of domestic oil fields. Elering, the Estonian Transmission system operator, has also begun long-term procurement to acquire 500 MW of new generation and storage for frequency management to ensure reserve capacity.

However, diversification alone will not be sufficient to address the challenges currently faced by the Baltic States. Incidents like the cutting of underwater cables underscore the growing need to decentralize the power system. Large, centralized power plants are more vulnerable to targeted attacks compared to decentralized energy systems. As a result, connected microgrids seem to be a viable solution for future energy resilience, as they can maintain functionality even when localized damage occurs. Again, Ukraine’s experience demonstrates the benefits of decentralization. Since the onset of the war, Ukraine has faced both physical and cyberattacks but has strengthened its energy resilience by decentralizing its system and expanding wind and solar power (Eurelectric, 2025). This approach has proven effective: while a single missile could destroy a nearly gigawatt-scale power plant, it would only damage an individual wind turbine or a small section of solar panels, significantly limiting the overall impact.

The desynchronization of the Baltic States from the BRELL network marked a complete break with Russia and Belarus, effectively ending any possibility of electricity trade between these countries and the Baltic region. This transition was successfully completed without any power outages. While the primary goal was to enhance energy security in the Baltics, several challenges remain, as highlighted in this policy brief. Recent disruptions to underwater cables, as well as Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s electricity market, underscore the urgent need for both diversification and decentralization to strengthen the region’s energy security. While energy supply diversification reduces supply chain dependencies, decentralization enhances resilience against targeted attacks, creating a more robust and flexible energy system.

References

  • Eurelectric, 2025, Redefining Energy Security In the age of electricity, Lexicon.
  • Fang, S., Jaffe, A. M., Loch-Temzelides, T., and C.L. Prete. (2024). Electricity grids and geopolitics: A game-theoretic analysis of the synchronization of the Baltic States’ electricity networks with Continental Europe. Energy Policy, 188, 114068.
  • Karčiauskas, J. (2023). Lithuania External Relations Briefing: Synchronization of the Baltic Electricity Network and Breaking Dependence on Russian Energy Market. China CEE Institude Weekly Briefing 2023 Eylül4, 3.
  • Lazarczyk, E. and Le Coq, C. (2023). Power coming for Russia and Baltic Sea region’s energy security, Energiforsk report.
  • Lazarczyk, E. and Le Coq, C. (2022). Can the Baltic States Do Without Russian Electricity?, FREE Policy Brief.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Gender Diversity and Firm Innovation in Post-Communist Economies

diverse group of professionals, including men and women, engaged in an innovation-focused business meeting, promoting gender diversity and collaboration.

This policy brief examines how gender diversity in key organizational positions—owners and employees—affects firm innovation outcomes in post-communist economies. Utilizing Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) data, we analyze the impact of gender diversity through the Doing-Using-Interacting innovation framework. Our findings suggest that gender diversity enhances innovation through two primary channels: managerial practices (Doing) and technology adoption (Using). Policymakers and business leaders in post-communist settings must recognize these pathways and develop strategies to harness the benefits of diversity-driven innovation.

Why Gender Diversity Matters

Gender diversity has emerged as a crucial factor in shaping organizational innovation and performance. Previous research has highlighted the significant role of gender in managerial practices and decision-making processes and demonstrated that a balanced gender composition, particularly in leadership roles, positively impacts an enterprise’s performance (Ruiz-Jiménez and Fuentes-Fuentes, 2016; Tonoyan and Boudreaux, 2023). Gender diversity can enhance problem recognition and problem-solving capabilities, which are critical for innovation. Moreover, gender-diverse teams exhibit superior decision-making, creativity, and adaptability, which contribute to the development of innovative products and strategies (Tonoyan, Boudreaux, 2023; Østergaard et al., 2011). Conversely, homogeneous teams often suffer from limited idea generation, weaker interpersonal dynamics, and lack of constructive conflict, leading to missed opportunities for innovation. However, the impact of gender diversity on innovation is not uniformly positive and depends on how diversity is managed within organizations. Factors such as industry type, organizational culture, team dynamics, and institutional context influence whether gender diversity enhances or hinders innovation (Joshi et al., 2015, Machokoto et al., 2020).

Recently, a sizable literature has been devoted to understanding the role of gender diversity as an innovation driver in emerging economies, where firm innovation remains lower than in advanced economies (Chkir et al., 2021), and gender diversity practices differ from those in the developed world. In particular, research has established that also in emerging economies firms with gender-diverse ownership or top management demonstrate higher innovation output and that the impact of gender diversity on innovation is stronger in less-advanced emerging economies (Machokoto et al., 2023, Tonoyan, Boudreaux, 2023). As concerns the impact of gender diversity among employees the results on innovation in an emerging country context have been mixed (see e.g., Na and Shin, 2019 and Madison, et al., 2022). However, the empirical channels through which gender diversity influences innovation in emerging economies are still not well understood.

This brief contributes to this understanding in the particular context of post-communist economies. It examines the impact of gender diversity on innovation within a DUI (learning-by-doing, by-using, and by-interacting) framework. This framework, introduced by Jensen et al. (2007), highlights the critical role of experiential and interaction-based learning in fostering innovation, and is particularly relevant in contexts with limited R&D resources, such as post-communist economies.

Our results show that gender diversity enhances innovation by strengthening learning-by-doing and learning-by-using processes. These insights can help shape policies and workplace strategies that promote gender equality and, in turn, foster innovation in these economies.

DUI and Gender Diversity

Traditionally, innovation has been closely linked to the STI (Science, Technology, and Innovation) framework. The STI mode emphasizes that innovation is driven by science and technology and is based on R&D, scientific human capital that increases a company’s absorptive capacity, research infrastructure, and connections with scientific partners Instead, the Doing-Using-Interacting (DUI) mode is based on non-scientific innovation drivers including practice, experience, experimentation, specialization in production, product customization, interaction and network. The DUI mode refers to the exchange of experiences and know-how that involve a large component of tacit knowledge. It is particularly relevant in contexts with limited R&D resources, such as post-communist economies, where practical and collaborative approaches are essential for innovation.

We argue that gender diversity within organizations can significantly enhance the DUI drivers of innovation by introducing varied perspectives, experiences, and collaborative dynamics. Learning-by-doing involves acquiring knowledge and skills through hands-on experience, routines, and iterative problem-solving in daily work activities. Gender-diverse teams can contribute to this process by offering a wider range of practical insights and approaches.  Learning-by-using driver focuses on the utilization and adaptation of technologies, machines, and equipment, as well as analyzing user feedback and customizing products to meet diverse needs. Gender diversity may enhance this aspect by integrating varied user experiences and preferences into the innovation process. Women and men may bring different insights into how technologies are used and adapted, leading to more comprehensive analyses of user needs and improved product development strategies. Learning-by-interacting occurs through communication among supply chain actors.  Innovation can also be a result of interactions, networks, informal relationships and organizational collaborations within and between organizations. Gender-diverse teams are better equipped to build inclusive relationships and foster trust within these networks. Varied communication styles and interpersonal dynamics enhance collaborative problem-solving and knowledge exchange. Diversity not only facilitates stronger connections with external stakeholders but also improves internal coordination, making organizations more adaptable and innovative.

The Relevance of DUI in Post-Communist Economies

Post-communist economies share a common institutional history of centrally planned systems, which shaped their innovation landscapes. The collapse of the Soviet Union triggered major economic, social, and technological transformations. While the Soviet model had a strong science and technology sector, it prioritized large-scale projects over market-driven innovation. Its linear innovation model focused on R&D but overlooked user needs, market dynamics, and interactive learning.

During the transition, these economies faced significant challenges, including limited financial capital, weak innovation management, and outdated technology. However, they retained a highly educated workforce, which became a key asset for innovation. Many post-communist economies now operate behind the technology frontier and rely heavily on imported technologies, making it essential to adopt innovation models that emphasize practical, collaborative learning over traditional R&D investments (Apanasovich et al., 2016; Marozau et al., 2021).

Most in-country analyses on modes of innovation have primarily focused on developed market economies. However, a study on Belarus (Apanasovich et al., 2016) found that the DUI mode is more effective than the STI mode in generating product innovation. This suggests that firms in post-communist economies may benefit more from hands-on, experience-based innovation than R&D-driven strategies. In this context, the DUI mode of innovation thus plays a crucial role by facilitating technology adoption, adaptation, and productivity growth. Gender diversity, in turn, may further enhance the effectiveness of the DUI drivers, as argued above.

Data and Method

Our analysis is based on a dataset of 2,871 enterprises across 22 post-communist countries from BEEPS (EBRD, 2020). BEEPS is one of the most comprehensive firm-level datasets available for post-communist economies, providing rich information on innovation, gender diversity, and institutional constraints.

The study utilizes generalized structural regression models with an ordinal output variable to assess the relationships between gender diversity, DUI drivers, R&D activities, and product innovation (see Figure 1). Innovation output is categorized by novelty as; no innovation (0), new-to-firm innovation (1), or new-to-market innovation (2). The indicators of DUI drivers used in the empirical specification follow Alhusen et al. (2021) and Apanasovich (2016). In particular, Doing represents managerial practices, including performance monitoring, employee awareness of production targets, performance-based incentives, strategic planning, and quality certifications. Using captures firms’ investments in innovation-enabling resources, such as purchasing new or upgraded machinery, licensing foreign technologies, and implementing formal employee training programs. Interacting reflects the extent of collaboration with external partners, including business memberships, trade associations, supplier relationships, and managerial stakeholder meetings.

Figure 1. Generalized structural equation model

We also consider R&D activities (RnD), measured through expenditures on acquiring external knowledge, in-house research and development, and contracted R&D engagements. Additionally, gender diversity is incorporated as a key explanatory variable, using the Blau index (Blau, 1977; Tonoyan & Boudreaux, 2023) to measure diversity in firm ownership (Blau_owners) and workforce composition (Blau_empl), where 0 indicates no diversity and 0.5 represents a balanced gender representation. These two variables were incorporated one by one (Model 1 and Model 2) and together (Model 3).

Our control variables include enterprise age (lnAge), firm size (lnSize), employee education levels (Univ_degree), foreign direct investment (FDI), CEO experience (LnCEO_experience), and whether the enterprise operates in the manufacturing sector. The Global Innovation Index (GII) score is used to account for the broader national innovation environment.

Results

The results of our empirical analysis are provided in Table 1 below.

The DUI drivers and the explicit R&D measure consistently show a positive and statistically significant relationship with innovation output. Gender diversity significantly enhances the DUI drivers that fuel innovation. Ownership diversity positively influences the Using driver by promoting technology adoption and employee training. Workforce diversity strengthens the Doing driver by improving managerial practices, such as performance monitoring and quality assurance. This suggests that a gender diverse workforce is better equipped to absorb, integrate, and apply knowledge – enhancing creativity and problem solving – ultimately fostering a more innovative work environment.

Table 1. Structural Regression Model Results

Additionally, our results indicate that larger and older firms, as well as those with foreign equity exhibit higher levels of DUI activity, underscoring also the role of organizational characteristics for innovation.

Conclusion

This policy brief highlights the role of gender diversity for firm innovation in post-communist economies. Our findings indicate that gender diversity enhances key innovation processes through the DUI drivers. Specifically, workforce diversity strengthens managerial practices (Doing), while ownership diversity promotes technology adoption and employee training (Using). These insights suggest that gender diversity indirectly contributes to innovation by improving decision-making, knowledge absorption, and organizational learning. By implementing policies that support inclusive leadership and workforce development, post-communist economies can unlock the potential of diverse teams, strengthening their competitiveness and innovation capacity in the global market.

Workforce development initiatives should focus on offering leadership and innovation training to diversify teams. To create gender equal opportunities, family-friendly workplace policies, such as childcare support and flexible work hours, could be implemented. Mentorship programs could also enhance women’s representation at decision-making levels. Importantly, policies in post-communist economies should go beyond traditional R&D approaches by fostering experiential and interaction-based learning and promoting teamwork practices that leverage diverse perspectives to maximize the impact of diversity on innovation.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Why the National Bank of Georgia Is Ditching Dollars for Gold

Gold bars on US dollar bills representing Georgia's recent acquisition of gold valued at 500 million dollars to diversify reserves

The National Bank of Georgia (NBG) recently acquired 7 tons of high-quality monetary gold valued at 500 million dollars, constituting approximately 11 percent of the banks’ total reserves. This marked the first occasion that Georgia acquired gold for its reserves since regaining its independence. The acquisition is a significant event, prompted by the NBG’s stated aim to enhance diversification amidst increased global geopolitical risks. However, diversification is just one of the reasons many countries are extensively purchasing gold. Another reason for increasing gold reserves is to lessen one’s reliance on the US dollar and to protect against sanctions, as seen with Russia and Belarus following the annexation of Crimea. While the NBG’s gold acquisition aligns with economic rationale, recent domestic developments suggest other motives. Actions like sanctions on political figures, anti-Western rhetoric, and recent legislation (the Law of Transparency of Foreign Influence), diverging Georgia from an EU pathway call for speculation that the gold purchase is driven by fear a of potential sanctions and as a preparedness strategy.

Introduction

The National Bank of Georgia (NBG) has broken new ground by adding gold to the country’s international reserves for the first time ever. Georgia has thus become the first country in the South Caucasus to purchase gold for its reserves. In line with its Board’s decision on March 1, 2024, the NBG procured 7 tons of the highest quality (999.9) monetary gold. The acquisition, valued at 500 million US dollars, took the form of internationally standardized gold bars, purchased from the London gold bar market and currently stored in London. Presently, the acquired gold represents approximately 11 percent of the NBG’s international reserves (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. NBG’s Official Reserve Assets and Other Foreign Currency Assets, 2023-2024.

Bar chart showing Georgia's reserve assets breakdown by type, including securities, dollars, gold, IMF reserve position, and other reserve assets, for the years 2023 and 2024.

Source: The National Bank of Georgia.

The NBG emphasizes in its official statement that the acquisition of gold is not merely symbolic but rather reflects a deliberate strategy of diversifying NBG’s portfolio and enhancing its resilience to external shocks. The NBG’s decision was made during a period marked by significant economic and political events both within and outside Georgia. Key among these were global and regional geopolitical tensions that amplified concerns about economic downturns and rising inflation. The Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 led to stagflation across many countries, including Georgia. Despite some recovery in GDP, high inflation continued into 2021. Furthermore, the Russian war on Ukraine disrupted supply chains, and pushed global inflation to a 24-year high 8.7 percent  in 2022. In response, stringent monetary policies aimed at controlling inflation were implemented across both developing and advanced economies. Looking ahead, there is an expectation of a shift toward more expansionary monetary policies that should help lower interest rates (and lower yields on assets held by central banks). These global conditions provide context for the NBG’s strategic focus on diversification.

However, alongside these economic events, Georgia also faces significant political challenges. Since the beginning of Russia’s war in Ukraine in 2022, political tensions in Georgia have escalated. Notable actions such as the U.S. imposing sanctions on influential Georgian figures, including judges and the former chief prosecutor, have, among other things, intensified scrutiny into the Russian influence in Georgia. Concerns about the independence of the Central Bank, which changed the rule of handling sanctions applications for Georgia’s citizens, and legislative initiatives like the Law of Transparency of Foreign Influence, which undermines Georgia’s EU accession ambitions, have triggered reactions from the country’s partners and massive public protests. Moreover, anti-Western rhetoric from the ruling party has raised concerns. In addition, the parliament of Georgia recently approved an amendment to the Tax Cide, a so-called ‘law on offshores’. The opaque nature of the law, as well as the context and speed at which it was advanced, sparked outcry and conjecture about its true purpose. These elements lead to speculation that the decision to purchase gold may be motivated by a desire for greater autonomy or a fear of potential sanctions, rather than purely economic reasons.

In the context of the above, this policy brief seeks to explore the motivations behind gold acquisitions by Central Banks, drawing on the experiences of both developed and developing countries. It aims to review existing literature that explores various reasons for gold acquisitions, providing a comprehensive analysis of economic and potentially non-economic factors influencing such decisions.

The Return of Gold in Global Finance

Over the past decade, central bank gold reserves have significantly increased, reversing a 40-year trend of decline. The shift that began around the time of the 2008-09 Global Financial Crisis is depicted in Figures 2 and 3, highlighting the transition from a pre-crisis period of more countries selling gold, to a post-crisis period where more countries have been purchasing gold.

Figure 2. Gold Holdings in Official Reserve Assets, 1999-2022 (million fine Troy ounces).

Line chart showing gold holdings in official reserve assets from 1999 to 2022 in million fine Troy ounces, reflecting Georgia's diversification efforts with dollars and gold.

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

Figure 3. Number of Countries Purchasing/Selling Monetary Gold, 2000-2021 (at least 1 metric ton of gold in a given year).

Bar chart showing the number of countries purchasing and selling at least 1 metric ton of gold annually from 2000 to 2021, relevant to Georgia's dollar and gold reserves.

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.

In 2023, central banks added a considerable amount of gold to their reserves. The largest purchases have been reported for China, Poland, and Singapore, with these nations collectively dominating the gold buying landscape during the year.

China is one of the top buyers of gold worldwide. In 2023, the People’s Bank of China  emerged as the top gold purchaser globally, adding a record 225 tonnes to its reserves, the highest yearly increase since at least 1977, bringing its total gold reserves to 2,235 tonnes. Despite this significant addition, gold still represents only 4 percent of China’s extensive international reserves.

The National Bank of Poland was another significant buyer in 2023, acquiring 130 tonnes of gold, which boosted its reserves by 57 percent to 359 tonnes, surpassing its initial target and reaching the bank’s highest recorded annual level.

Other central banks, including the Monetary Authority of Singapore, the Central Bank of Libya, and the Czech National Bank, also increased their gold holdings, albeit on a smaller scale. These purchases reflect a broader trend of central banks diversifying their reserves and enhancing financial security amidst global economic uncertainties.

Conversely, the National Bank of Kazakhstan and the Central Bank of Uzbekistan were notable sellers, actively managing their substantial gold reserves in response to domestic production and market conditions. The Central Bank of Bolivia and the Central Bank of Turkey also reduced their gold holdings, primarily to address domestic financial needs.

The U.S. continues to hold the world’s largest gold reserve (25.4 percent of total gold reserves), which underscores the metal’s enduring appeal as a store of value among the world’s leading economies. The U.S. is followed by Germany at 10.5 percent, and Italy and France at 7.6 percent respectively. At present, around one-eighth of the world’s currency reserves comprise of gold, with central banks collectively holding 20 percent of the global gold supply (NBG, 2024).

Why Central Banks are Buying Gold Again

A 2023 World Gold Council survey (on central banks revealed five key motivations for holding gold reserves: (1) historical precedent (77 percent of respondents), (2) crisis resilience (74 percent), (3) long-term value preservation (74 percent), (4) portfolio diversification (70 percent), and (5) sovereign risk mitigation (68 percent). Notably, emerging markets placed a higher emphasis (61 percent) on gold as a “geopolitical diversifier“ compared to developed economies (45 percent).

However, the increasing use of the SWIFT system for sanctions enforcement (e.g., Iran in 2015 and Russia in 2022) has introduced a new factor influencing gold purchases of some governments: safeguarding against sanctions (Arslanalp, Eichengreen and Simpson-Bell, 2023).

In addition, Arslanalp, Eichengreen, and Simpson-Bell (2023) conclude that central banks’ decisions to acquire gold are primarily driven by the following factors; inflation, the use of floating exchange rates, a nation’s fiscal stability, the threat of sanctions, and the degree of trade openness (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. Determinants of Gold Shares in Emerging Market and Developing Economies.

Source: Arslanalp, Eichengreen, and Simpson-Bell (2023).

Gold as a Hedging Instrument

Gold is considered a safe haven and an attractive asset in periods of significant economic, financial, and geopolitical uncertainty (Beckman, Berger, & Czudaj, 2019). This is particularly relevant when returns on reserve currencies are low, a scenario prevalent in recent years.

A hedge against inflation: Inflation presents a significant challenge for central banks, as it erodes the purchasing power of a nation’s currency. Gold has been a long-standing consideration for central banks as a potential inflation hedge. Its price often exhibits an inverse relationship with the value of the US dollar, meaning it tends to appreciate as the dollar depreciates. This phenomenon can be attributed to two primary factors: (1) increased demand during inflationary periods; and (2) gold tends to have intrinsic value unlike currencies (Stonex Bullion, 2024).

Diversification of portfolio: Diversification is a cornerstone principle of portfolio management. It involves allocating investments across various asset classes to mitigate risk. Gold, with its negative correlation to traditional assets like stocks and bonds, can be a valuable tool for portfolio diversification. In simpler terms, when stock prices decline, gold prices often move in the opposite direction, offering a potential hedge against market downturns (see Figure 5).

Figure 5. How Gold Performs During Recession, 1970-2022.

Source: Bhutada (2022).

Hedge against geopolitical risks: de Besten, Di Casola and Habib (2023) suggest that geopolitical factors may have influenced gold acquisitions for some central banks in 2022. A positive correlation appears to exist between changes in a country’s gold reserves and its geopolitical proximity to China and Russia (compared to the U.S.) for countries actively acquiring gold reserves. This pattern is particularly evident in Belarus and some Central Asian economies, suggesting they may have increased their gold holdings based on geopolitical considerations.

Low or Negative Interest Rates: When interest rates on major reserve currencies like the US dollar are low or negative, it reduces the opportunity cost of holding gold (gold is a passive asset that does not generate periodic income, dividends, and interest benefits). In other words, gold becomes a more attractive option compared to traditional investments that offer minimal or no returns. The prevailing low-interest rate environment, particularly for major reserve currencies like the US dollar, has diminished the opportunity cost of holding gold.

This phenomenon applies to both advanced economies and emerging market economies (EMDEs). Notably, EMDEs with significant dollar-denominated debt are particularly sensitive to fluctuations in US interest rates. Arslanalp, Eichengreen, and Simpson-Bell (2023) conclude that reserve managers are increasingly incorporating gold into their portfolios when returns on reserve currencies are low. Figure 6 illustrates the inverse relationship between the price of gold and the inflation-adjusted 10-year yield.

Figure 6. Gold Price and Inflation-Adjusted 10-Year Yield.

Source: Bloomberg, U.S. Global Investors.

In addition to its aforementioned advantages, gold offers central banks a long-term investment opportunity despite its lack of interest payments, unlike traditional securities. While gold exhibits short-term price volatility, its historical price trend suggests a long-term upward trajectory (see Figure 7).

Figure 7. Gold Price per Troy Ounce (approximately 31.1 grams), in USD.

Source: World Gold Council.

Gold as a Safeguard Against Sanctions

Gold is perceived as a secure and desirable reserve asset in situations where countries face financial sanctions or the risk of asset freezes and seizures (see Table 1). The decision by G7 countries to freeze the foreign exchange reserves of the Bank of Russia in 2022 highlighted the importance of holding reserves in a form less vulnerable to sanctions. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Bank of Russia intensified its gold purchases. By 2021, it had confirmed that its gold reserves were fully vaulted domestically. The imposition of sanctions on Russia, which restrict banks from engaging in most transactions with Russian counterparts and limit the Bank of Russia’s access to international financial markets, further underscores the appeal of gold as a safeguard.

While the recent sanctions imposed by G7 countries, which limit Russian banks from conducting most business with their counterparts and restrict the Bank of Russia from accessing its reserves in foreign banks, are an extreme example, similar sanctions have previously impacted or threatened financial operations of other nations’ central banks and governments. This situation raises the question of whether the risk of sanctions has influenced the observed trend of countries’ increasing their gold reserves (IMF, International Financial Statistics, 2022).

Table 1. Top 10 Annual Increases in the Share of Gold in Reserves, 2000-2021.

Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics; Global Sanctions Database (GSDB). Note: Excludes countries with central bank gold purchases from domestic producers.

As outlined in Arslanalp, Eichengreen and Simpson-Bell (2023), there were eight active diversifiers into gold in 2021, each purchasing at least 1 million troy ounces (Kazakhstan, Belarus, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Hungary, Iraq, Argentina, Qatar), exhibiting distinct international economic or political concerns. Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Uzbekistan maintain ties with Russia through the Eurasian Economic Union. Turkey has faced sanctions from both the European Union and the U.S. Iraq has experienced disputes with the U.S., while Hungary has faced similar issues with the European Union. In 2017-21, Qatar was subjected to a travel and economic embargo by Saudi Arabia and neighboring countries. Argentina may have had concerns about asset seizures by foreign courts due to sovereign debt disputes.

Furthermore, according to the Economist (2022), gold is costly to transport, store, and protect. It is expensive to use in transactions and doesn’t earn interest. However, it can be lent out like currencies in a central bank’s reserves. When lent out or used in swaps (where gold is exchanged for currency at agreed dates), it can generate returns. But banks prefer gold to be stored in specific places like the Bank of England or the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which brings back the risk of sanctions. For instance, During the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the subsequent hostage crisis, the United States froze Iranian assets, including the gold reserves held in U.S. banks (Arslanalp, Eichengreen  and Simpson-Bell, 2023). The National Bank of Georgia intends to transport its acquired gold from England to Georgia for storage, which could potentially reduce storage costs, but further decrease liquidity.

Arslanalp, Eichengreen, and Simpson-Bell (2023) conclude that since the early 2000s, half of the significant year-over-year increases in central bank gold reserves can be attributed to the threat of sanctions. By examining an indicator that tracks financial sanctions by major economies like the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, and Japan, all key issuers of reserve currencies, the authors have confirmed a positive correlation between such sanctions and the proportion of reserves held in gold. Furthermore, their findings suggest that multilateral sanctions imposed by these countries collectively have a more pronounced effect on increasing gold reserves than unilateral sanctions. This is likely because unilateral sanctions allow room for shifting reserves into the currencies of other non-sanctioning nations, whereas multilateral sanctions increase the risks associated with holding foreign exchange reserves, thus making gold a more attractive option.

The NBG’s Historic Decision

The National Bank of Georgia’s (NBG) recent acquisition of gold for its reserves is likely motivated by a desire to diversify its portfolio and hedge against inflation and geopolitical risks. However, recent developments in Georgia raise questions about the timing of this policy decision, bringing political considerations into the picture.

Among these developments is the 2023 suspension of the IMF program for Georgia, due to concerns about the NBG’s governance (Intellinews, 2023). The amendments to the NBG law in June 2023, which created a new First Deputy and Acting Governor position – superseding the existing succession framework – contradicted IMF Safeguards recommendations and raised concerns about increased political influence (International Monetary Fund, 2024). How the recent gold purchase reflect on the future of IMF cooperation is thus a relevant question to ask.

Another ground for concern is the recent approval by the Georgian Parliament of the anti-democratic “Foreign Influence Transparency” law and the anti-Western rhetoric of the ruling party, which have sparked intensive public protests. European partners warn that the law will not align with Georgia’s European Union aspirations and that it could potentially hinder the country’s advancement on the EU pathway. Rather, the law might distance Georgia from the EU. This law has also increased the concerns for further sanctions on members of the ruling party, government officials, and individuals engaging in anti-West and anti-EU propaganda.

Furthermore, the recent amendment of the Tax Code, the so-called “offshores law” allows for tax-free funds transfers from offshore zones to Georgia. This, combined with other developments, raises questions about whether the government is preparing for potential sanctions, should its relationship with Russia continue to strengthen.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this policy brief highlights that central banks’ acquisition of gold reserves, especially in emerging economies, is motivated by a combination of economic and political factors. The economic incentives include the need for portfolio diversification and protection against inflation and geopolitical instabilities, a trend that became more pronounced following the 2008 global financial crisis. Politically, the accumulation of gold serves as a strategic move to lessen dependency on the U.S. dollar and as a defensive measure against potential international sanctions, as highlighted by the post-2014 geopolitical shifts following Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

In 2024, Georgia purchased gold for the first time since regaining its independence. While its gold purchasing strategy seems to align with these economic motives, the recent domestic political dynamics suggest a deeper, possibly strategic political rationale by the National Bank of Georgia. The imposition of U.S. sanctions on key figures, and recent legislative actions deviating from European Union standards, all amidst increasing anti-Western sentiment, indicate that the NBG’s gold acquisitions might also be driven by a quest for greater safeguard against potential future sanctions. Thus, while economic reasons for the purchase are significant, the political underpinnings in the NBG’s recent actions raise numerous unanswered questions.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

 

The Economic Complexity of Transition Economies

FREE Network Policy Brief Featured Image 01

‘Diversification’ is a constant concern of policy-makers in resource rich economies, but measurement of diversification can be hard. The recently formulated Economic Complexity Index (ECI) is a promising predictor of economic development characterizing the overall complexity and diversity of the economy as a system. The ECI is based on the diversity and ubiquity of a country’s exports. This brief uses ECI to discuss the economic diversity of transition economies in the post-Soviet decades, and the relationship between economic diversification and per capita income.

The search for and construction of appropriate predictors of economic development are among the main goals of economists and policy-makers. Education, infrastructure, rule of law, and quality of governance are all among the commonly used indicators based on inputs. The recently formulated Economic Complexity Index (Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009) is a new promising predictor of economic development characterizing the overall complexity and diversity of the economy as a system.

Indeed, the importance of production and trade diversification for economic development has been highlighted by the economic literature. Numerous studies have found a positive relationship between diversified and complex export structure, income per capita and growth (Cadot et al., 2011; Hesse, 2006; Hausmann et al., 2007). In line with this, Hausmann et al. (2014) demonstrate the predictive properties of the ECI for economic development and GDP per capita, which implies that the ECI can serve as a useful complement to the input-based measures for policy analysis by reasoning from current outputs to future outputs.

This brief uses the ECI to discuss the evolution of economic diversification, its relationship to per capita income in transition economies in the post-Soviet decades, and its policy implications.

How is economic complexity measured?

The economic complexity index (ECI) is a novel measure that reflects the diversity and ubiquity of a country’s exports. The index considers the number of products a country exports with revealed comparative advantage and how many other countries in the world export such goods. If a country exports a high number of goods and few other countries export these products, then its economy is diversified (a wide range of exports products) and sophisticated (only a few other countries are able to export these goods). Thus, the measure tries to capture not a specific aspect of the economy, but rather its overall sophistication.

For example, Japan, Switzerland, Germany and Sweden have been in a varying order at the top of the ranking of the Economic Complexity Index from 2008 until 2013. This means that these countries export a large number of highly sophisticated products.

In contrast, Tajikistan is among the countries at the bottom of the world ranking by the ECI with raw aluminum, raw cotton and ores making up 85% of all Tajikistan’s exports in 2013. However, not only are Tajikistan’s exports concentrated among very few narrow products, these products are also ubiquitous and the ability to export them does not require knowledge and skills that can be used in the production and exports of many other products.

As the index for each country is constructed relative to other countries’ exports, it is comparable over time.

What can we learn from the economic complexity of transition economies?

The economic complexity index can serve as a useful indicator for understanding transition economies in the post-Soviet period. A strong relationship between GDP per capita and economic complexity is found in the sample of transition economies in Figure 1. This figure presents the relationship for the last year for which data is available for the sample of 13 post-Soviet states and Poland. As can be seen in Figure 1, the economic complexity is positively related to income per capita. This is especially true for Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Russia, who all have higher than average economic complexity and high levels of per capita income. While Belarus and Ukraine also have diverse and complex economies, they have somewhat lower income per capita than the first group.

Figure 1. Economic Complexity and GDP per capita

Figure1Source: Data on GDP per capita is from the World Bank, and the data on the Economic Complexity Index is from the Observatory of Economic Complexity.

Natural resource-rich, or rather, oil-rich countries are the exception from the abovementioned correlation. Most transition countries with below than average economic complexity are characterized by low income per capita levels, except for Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, which are oil-rich countries. Still, the overall picture is straightforward: countries with a complex export structure have a higher level of income.

One of the advantages of a systemic measure like export complexity is its straightforward policy application. The overall diversity and sophistication of the economy can thus be a complementary measure for the assessment of economic progress and development to GDP and GDP per capita, which are more susceptible to the volatile factors such as commodity prices.

Figure 2 shows the development of economic complexity for 14 post-Soviet countries and Poland between 1994 and 2013 (due to data availability issues, only one year is available for Armenia).

First, we see that the economic complexity has diverged over time, although there is some similarity in the rankings among countries over time. The initial closeness is likely related to the planned nature of the Soviet economy that aimed to distribute production among Soviet Republics. In the post-Soviet context, however, the more complex economies (Estonia, Belarus, Lithuania, Ukraine, Latvia, Russia) kept or increased their sophistication and diversity of exports. Poland is the leading economy in terms of complexity, both in the beginning and towards the end of the sample period. Belarus, the second most complex economy in 2013 and the most complex economy in several years prior, shows an increasing trend in its sophistication of exports. Although its GDP per capita is noticeably lower than what would be expected from such a sophisticated economy, the complex production structure may explain its ability to withstand a permanent high inflation and external macroeconomic shocks. Some others, e.g., Tajikistan and Azerbaijan, saw a decreasing trend in economic complexity; Georgia and Kazakhstan, notably, lost in economic complexity but also in their ranking among their peers.

Figure 2. Economic Complexity of Transition Economies

Figure2Source: Data on GDP per capita is from the World Bank, and the data on the Economic Complexity Index is from the Observatory of Economic Complexity.

Conclusion

This brief revisited the economic complexity of transition economies and its evolution since the 1990s. The post-Soviet and other transition countries have had diverging economic development paths: Some have managed to build complex production economies, while others’ comparative advantage remains in raw materials. These differences are also reflected in their income levels.

Across the world, economic diversification is associated with higher per-capita income. As the brief showed, this relationship also holds for the post-Soviet countries; policy-makers should take economic diversification seriously. Increasing economic complexity may well pave the path to higher income levels.

References

  • Cadot, O., Carrère, C., & Strauss-Kahn, V. (2011). Export diversification: What’s behind the hump?. Review of Economics and Statistics, 93(2), 590-605.
  • Hausmann, R., Hidalgo, C. A., Bustos, S., Coscia, M., Simoes, A., & Yildirim, M. A. (2014). The atlas of economic complexity: Mapping paths to prosperity. Mit Press.
  • Hausmann, R., Hwang, J., & Rodrik, D. (2007). What you export matters. Journal of economic growth, 12(1), 1-25.
  • Hesse, H. (2006). Export diversification and economic growth. World Bank, Washington, DC.
  • Hidalgo, C. A., & Hausmann, R. (2009). The building blocks of economic complexity. proceedings of the national academy of sciences, 106(26), 10570-10575.