Tag: soviet economic structure

Russia’s Counter Sanctions: Forward to the Past!

Posted on May 12, 2025 | Policy Brief

Since February 2022, Russia has introduced a series of counter sanctions in response to the international sanctions introduced following the country’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. These measures aimed to counteract external economic pressure while shielding the domestic economy from further destabilization. However, their broad implementation has led to mixed effects across various sectors while simultaneously increasing the administrative burden. This policy brief argues that Russia’s countersanctions reinforced state control over key industries, worsened market competition and fiscal sustainability, which contributed to a systematic move towards a planned economy.

Russia’s Counter Sanctions and the Expansion of State Control

Since February 2022, Russia has introduced a series of countersanctions in response to the international sanctions imposed following its invasion of Ukraine. A broad range of economic, financial, and trade restrictions have been implemented, including nationalization of foreign assets, price control, capital flow restrictions, export bans, and state-directed subsidies – all aimed at mitigating external economic pressure while reinforcing state control over key industries (Garant, 2025).

While it is widely accepted that, in times of crisis, governments may intervene in the economy to provide necessary support, such intervention should remain limited in scope and duration. Prolonged state involvement, particularly through subsidies and market controls, can distort price signals, crowd out private investment, and erode the foundations of competitive market dynamics (Friedman, 2020).

In the case of Russia, intensive government economic interventions, specifically after 2022, have led to mounting inefficiencies, increased inflationary pressures, and weakening long-term growth prospects (SITE, 2024; SITE, 2025). This policy brief discusses how the recent surge in presidential decrees, the sharp expansion of targeted subsidies across nearly all sectors, and the tightening of price regulations reflect the Kremlin’s strategic use of counter sanctions as a means of consolidating economic power and reinforcing centralized control.

An Expansion of Presidential Control

Since 2022, presidential decrees account for 25 percent of all anti-sanctions legislative measures, indicating a significant consolidation of executive control over economic policymaking.  The trend of expanding presidential control through issued decrees is illustrated in Figure 1. As shown in the figure, the total number of presidential decrees has nearly doubled since 2019, amounting to 1131 in 2024. The largest share of this decree increase, however, occurred post February 2022.

Figure 1. Number of Presidential Decrees in Russia

Source: ConsultantPlus, 2025.

Beyond the expansion in the number of decrees, what is particularly noteworthy is the breadth of topics they cover. They range from significant interventions on nationalization and economic control to quite detailed low-impact orders.

Among the highly impactful presidential decrees, Decree No. 79 (February 28, 2022) should be mentioned. The decree introduced a mandate that Russian residents engaged in foreign economic activities sell 80 percent of their foreign currency earnings. Further, Decree No. 302 (April 25, 2023), allowed the Russian state to seize foreign assets from “unfriendly states” if necessary for national security or in retaliation for asset confiscations abroad. Global companies from Germany (Uniper), Finland (Fortum), France (Danone), and Denmark (Carlsberg) are among those affected by these expropriations (Garant, 2025). Seized foreign assets were transferred to state-controlled entities, which drastically reduced competition and increased inefficiencies within key Russian industries.

Similarly, Decree No. 416 (June 30, 2022) on the Nationalization of Sakhalin-2, transferred oil and gas projects from foreign operators (Shell, Mitsubishi and Mitsui) to a Russian-controlled legal entity. Moreover, foreign companies from “unfriendly” countries were required to sell their Russian assets at a minimum 50 percent discount when exiting the market. Additionally, they were obliged to pay a “voluntary contribution” to the Russian federal budget at 15 percent of asset value (Garant, 2025).

At the same time, numerous presidential decrees have been adopted to address very specific low-level administrative issues. While their economic impact has been quite limited, they have largely contributed to a growing micromanagement and regulatory complexity (for instance, Decree No. 982 (December 22, 2023) on Temporary State Control Over a Car Dealership, Decree No. 1096 (June 17, 2022) on Transport Credit Holidays etc.).

Apart from the potential negative effects of direct government intervention in the economy, there are several issues with Presidential Decrees. Most importantly, presidential decrees, unlike statutes or other forms of legislation, are not subject to parliamentary approval. Thus, they are bypassing legislative debate and accountability, which makes them less transparent and balanced. Presidential decrees serve as tools to avoid legislative resistance since the Russian judiciary rarely challenges presidential authority, meaning decrees are difficult to contest or reverse through legal means. Further, they often overlap with other legislation, thus duplicating the functions of other legislative (and executive) authorities, leading to regulatory uncertainty. This, in turn, undermines implementation and expands bureaucratic oversight, further increasing inefficiencies and costs (see for instance, Remington, 2014; Pertsev, 2025).

Altogether, the surge in presidential decrees in Russia contributes to increasing institutional instability, an increasing administrative burden and a centralization of power. However, the full impact of these measures on the macro level is yet to unfold.

Targeted Subsidies and Industry Dependence

A key tool in Russia’s counter sanctions strategy is the expansion of state subsidies. Since 2022, substantial subsidies have been directed toward the energy sector; industrial and technological development – including aviation, pharmaceuticals, electronics, and shipbuilding; agriculture and food security; transportation and infrastructure; the banking sector; housing; and consumer lending. The scale of these subsidies indicates growing imbalances and escalating fiscal risks in the Russian economy (Garant, 2025).

However, estimating the total resources going to subsidies is quite challenging. Precise subsidy figures are only explicitly stated in few legislative acts. Most legislative documents mention the form of subsidy without specifying the amount or the source of financing. Nevertheless, some estimates have been made by both Russian and Western experts.

For instance, Russia spent approximately 12 RUB trillion (126 USD billion) on fossil fuel subsidies in 2023 (Gerasimchuk et al., 2024). Subsidies to the agricultural sector were estimated at 1 trillion RUB between 2022 and 2024 (Statista, 2025). Since 2022, Russia has allocated approximately 1.09 trillion RUB (12 billion USD) in subsidies to the aviation sector to maintain operations (Stolyarov, 2023; Garant, 2025). Around 100 billion RUB were allocated to support the tourism industry during 2023–2024 (Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, 2024; Garant, 2025).

To understand the order of magnitude, it’s worth noting that, for instance, budget revenues from oil and gas amounted to 8.8 trillion RUB in 2023 and 11.1 trillion RUB in 2024 (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Budget revenues and expenditures

Source: SITE, 2025.

In addition, state subsidies for mortgages nearly doubled since 2022, with the total amount reaching 1.7 trillion RUB between 2022 and 2024 (CBR, 2024). Thus, the Russian mortgage market has become heavily dependent on state support, with subsidized mortgage programs accounting for nearly 70 percent of the growth in mortgage lending in early 2024 (CBR, 2024). Although the so-called standard preferential mortgage program was terminated on July 1, 2024, its discontinuation does not remove the substantial fiscal burden created by earlier subsidy schemes.

Moreover, the Russian government has expanded subsidized lending programs to support both businesses and individuals. For instance, preferential loans and credit holidays have been granted to small, medium and large enterprises (see for instance, Presidential Decree: No. 121, March 2022, Federal Law 08.03.2022 No. 46-FZ, and others (Garant, 2025)), further straining the government’s finances.

In many cases, subsidies allocated to state-owned enterprises double as a mechanism for off-budget military financing. For instance, defense-industrial conglomerates like Rostec not only receive targeted support but play also a pivotal role in facilitating military acquisitions and production activities outside of the formal federal budget framework (Kennedy, 2025). This not only obscures the true scale of budget expenditures but again increases the long-term fiscal burden.

As such, these measures have fostered a heavy reliance on state funding, resulting in the accelerated depletion of financial reserves and contributing to increased fiscal risks.

Price Controls, State Regulation and Planned Procurement

As mentioned earlier, the set of countermeasures recently implemented by Russia also indicates a shift toward a planned economy, with hallmark features such as price controls gradually re-emerging as policy tools. As in Belarus, where state-led economic management has long been the norm, the Russian government’s direct intervention in price-setting mechanisms, particularly for essential goods, erodes market signals.

Since 2022, a series of decrees have introduced price controls on essential goods and services to cushion households against rising costs amid inflation. These measures include caps on fare increases for public transportation, limits on tariffs for heating, water supply, and wastewater services; price limits on essential medicines, and staple agricultural products (Garant, 2025).

By limiting the price growth of necessities, these interventions aim to support households in the short term. However, prolonged price controls may entail distorted market signals, increased subsidies dependency for producers, and higher administrative costs for control enforcement.

The deviation from market mechanisms has been even more amplified in procurement, through Federal Law No. 272-FZ (July 14, 2022), which compels businesses to accept government contracts if they receive state subsidies or operate in strategic sectors. In practice, companies cannot refuse government contracts if their products or services are required for so-called counterterrorism and military operations abroad. Refusal to comply with procurement orders may result in criminal liability, as non-performance can be interpreted as economic sabotage under this law.

In addition, the Russian government provides up to 90 percent of procurement contracts in advance (Government Decree No. 505, March 29, 2022). This arrangement weakens the role of contracts, prices, and competition, while increasing the fiscal risks. In effect, it reinforces a central planning logic and undermines competitive procurement, where outcomes should be driven by performance and value rather than access to state funding.

With Russian companies cut off from foreign investment and other external financing due to sanctions, large-scale government support has become even more critical – intensifying dependence on state subsidies and, by extension, state control. The legal changes outlined above have turned procurement into a key instrument of political control over businesses. The scale of these subsidies is contributing to a damaging shift toward a centrally planned system, restricting competition and undermining long-term growth potential.

Fiscal Sustainability at Risk

The extensive use of subsidies, preferential loans, and government-backed financial interventions has placed an increasing burden on Russia’s fiscal system. While these measures were introduced to mitigate the effects of international sanctions, stabilize key industries and support households, they have led to significant structural imbalances, growing budget deficits, and rising financial risks.

State-subsidized loans have surged across multiple sectors, including construction, IT, housing, energy, infrastructure, and agriculture. The result has been a sharp increase in corporate and consumer debt, with unsecured consumer loans growing at an annual rate of 17 percent as of April 2024. Overdue debt on loans to individuals reached 1.34 trillion RUB by February 2025, signaling mounting financial distress for households despite the support measures (CBR, 2025).

The high concentration of corporate debt has further destabilized the financial system. By early 2024, the debt of the five largest companies accounted for 56 percent of the banking sector’s capital, indicating systemic vulnerabilities (CBR, 2025). In addition, the government has implemented new policies that exacerbate the risks connected to state interventions in banking operations. For instance, in March 2022, it introduced a moratorium on bankruptcy proceedings, effectively delaying the official declaration of businesses as insolvent or financially distressed. At the same time, the Central Bank required commercial banks to restructure loans rather than classify them as defaults – masking financial distress and exacerbating long-term risks to the banking sector (Garant, 2025).

Moreover, a growing share of Russia’s war-related spending now flows through off-budget channels – such as state-owned enterprises and regional programs – rather than the federal budget. According to a recent analysis, as much as one-third of military and strategic expenditures bypass formal budget reporting altogether (Kennedy, 2025).

These hidden expenditures distort the actual fiscal position, reduce transparency, and increase the long-term burden on the public sector by masking the true scale of liabilities – raising further questions about the sustainability and accountability of Russia’s fiscal policy.

Conclusions

Since February 2022, Russia’s counter-sanctions measures have markedly shifted its economic governance toward greater state control and elements reminiscent of Soviet-era central planning. Large-scale subsidies, administrative pricing, and deep state involvement in production and procurement have suppressed market competition and efficiency. These interventions have distorted incentives and curtailed the role of market signals, contributing to growing inefficiency across key sectors.

Looking ahead, the long-term economic outlook for Russia is increasingly negative. While the counter-sanctions measures may have softened the initial blow of international sanctions, they have entrenched structural vulnerabilities, reduced fiscal flexibility, and amplified systemic risks, particularly in the financial and real estate sectors. Moreover, by undermining innovation and productivity, Russia’s counter sanctions are accelerating its trajectory toward deeper economic isolation and a centrally managed model, with severe implications for sustainable growth.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

The Southern Urals as a Touchstone for Soviet Wartime Performance

Posted on January 18, 2021 | Policy Brief

Image of a Soviet tank representing soviet war performance

As time passes and archives open, ever more topics in Russian military-economic history can be studied with primary sources. One such theme is the colossal evacuation of industrial enterprises and equipment from July 1941 onwards. Thousands of railway cars and lorries carried equipment, raw materials, as well as personnel from Ukraine, the Baltics, and western regions of the Russian Federation to the Urals and beyond. A recent documentary collection Put’ k Pobede (The Road to Victory) opens new areas for research on the southern Urals. These regional sources illustrate and add details to documents from the federal archives on the history of the Soviet military-industrial complex. Successful evacuation of industrial capacity eastwards was a decisive factor for the Soviet endurance and finally its victory in 1945. However, many empirical questions remain to be answered and analytical calculations to be done, on how in fact the Soviet system managed simultaneously to successfully evacuate factories eastwards and thousands of troop transports westwards to the fronts.

New Frontiers for Research on the Soviet War effort, 1939–1945

The role of the new industrial centers in the Urals and Siberia for the Soviet defense potential has been recognized long ago (1). From the mid-1920s, Soviet military leaders included projections for full mobilization of industrial and human resources in contingency plans for the case of war. Evacuation projects outlined which important factories were to be re-located from close-to-border areas (within the range of enemy air bombings) to well-prepared interior locations (2). Industrial plans in the late 1930s put significant emphasis on the enhancing of defense-related production, as well as on modernization of the armed forces (3).

Checking the blueprints for IS heavy tank at the Kirov Tank Factory in Cheliabinsk.

In the early 2000s, a grand research project started on the history of the Russian and Soviet military-industrial complex by exploring the main federal archives (GARF, RGAE, RGVA, and others). The project has so far resulted in five volumes that cover the period from 1914 till 1942. The first volumes show the evolution of the Russian defense industries until the mid-1930s, with special emphasis on how military considerations influenced the five-year plans for 1928–32 and 1933–37. The fourth volume starts (p. 5–85) with a historical preface by Professor Andrei Sokolov (1941–2015), who was also the author of a most informative study of the military-industrial complex. It contains documents for the crucial period up to June 1941 (4). The fifth volume reproduces relevant documents from several archives concerning the first war-years 1941 and 1942. (5)

How did Soviet security concerns change in the first stage of World War Two? In August 1939, the Red Army won a momentous victory over the Japanese forces at Khalkhin-Gol in Mongolia. Japan thereafter gave up their invasion plans against the Soviet Far East, and shifted its aggression southwards to the Philippines and Indochina. Thus, the risk diminished considerably of the USSR facing a two-front war, with tough enemy coalitions in Europe as well as in the East. (6). This strategic significance of the Red Army’s victory was apparently missed in Berlin. In 1940, the German military leaders paid attention mostly to the poor performance of the Soviet army in the Winter War against Finland (7). Encouraged by an easy victory over France by June 1940, Hitler ordered Wehrmacht to plan for war against Russia.

When the Soviet leaders in 1939 concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany, they obviously calculated that France and Great Britain were to wage a long-drawn-out war against Germany for many years, yet with uncertainty as to who would be the winning one. The drastically changed outlook after the sudden defeat of France in 1940 challenged the Soviet leaders to speed up already expansive plans for military-industrial production.

The American engineer John Scott who had worked as a welder in Magnitogorsk in the 1930s, and thereafter as a correspondent in Moscow for a British newspaper, compiled a massive dossier for the Research and Analysis department of the American intelligence O.S.S. (Office of Strategic Studies). His 1943 exhaustive “Heavy industry in the Soviet Union east of the Volga; a report prepared for the Board of Economic Warfare” covered a unique amount of data on new industrial enterprises obtained from open sources. While stationed in Stockholm as O.S.S. agent later in World War II, under the cover of a Time-Life correspondent, John Scott lectured in many cities in Sweden over his best-selling book “Behind the Urals”, which in Swedish had the more pertinent subtitle “The secret of the endurance of the Russian defense” (8). Scott emphasized that Stalinist forced drive in the 1930s had created completely new industrial zones far beyond the borders, out of reach for even long-range German air raids. This had been a revelation for many Westerners. British and American military attachés in Moscow were profoundly mistaken in 1941 when they predicted a rapid German victory. As Hitler’s Operation Barbarossa came to a standstill in the winter of 1941-42, Western assessments of the real Soviet military-industrial capabilities had to be reconsidered (9).

Relocation of a Minor Industrial Nation – the 1941-42 Evacuations

A crucial factor – likewise often neglected in Western historiography – for the Soviet military-industrial endurance was the evacuation of industry. In an unprecedented way, another Soviet defense-industrial basis would rapidly emerge east of Volga, in the Urals and in Siberia.

A fundamental Russian 12-volume work on the Great Patriotic war describes main traits of the industrial evacuation (10). Already a few days after the German invasion, the situation on the fronts forced the Soviet leadership to consider completely unexpected scenarios. It was soon obvious that the German invasion could not be stopped, as the principal Red Army doctrine had expected, at the borders. All pre-war considerations of how to mobilize the Soviet military-industrial potential were up for revision. The unforeseen disasters on Soviet territory, not covered in pre-war plans for industrial mobilization, led to the formation of a council for evacuation of factories. Tens of thousands industrial workers and millions in the civilian population must be evacuated.

The massive evacuations of entire factories, or at least the most crucial equipment, started already in July 1941 from the Baltic republics, Ukraine, and Russia’s Western regions. The council on the evacuation sent directives concerning which factories to relocate eastwards and to which cities.

Evacuated equipment installed, under open skies, even before the factory walls were built!

Evacuation organs were responsible for rail, road, and river transports, as well as for the integration of evacuated resources to existing factories or to new building sites.

Facilities and stock that could not be evacuated were destroyed so as not to fall into the hands of the enemy (“scorched earth policy”). Most complicated from a logistic point of view was the evacuation of the industrial, transport, and energy production facilities. These had to be constantly re-adapted as the military situation changed with the German armies’ further advance towards Moscow, Leningrad, and in Ukraine in particular. Troop transports towards the fronts had priority; thus, evacuation trains sometimes had to wait on sidetracks for many days.

Assembly of engines at the Urals Automotive Factory (UAZ) in the Miass city.

Hundreds of thousands of civilians were evacuated from Ukraine, southern and western parts of the Russian Federation, and sent to Uzbekistan and other interior regions. Western literature has described few aspects of the evacuation, with emphasis on problems by influx of thousands of refugees, e.g. in the cities of Kirov (now Viatka) and Tashkent (11).

Mentioned should be the successful evacuation of the country’s cultural treasures. One telling example is how the staff of the Hermitage museum and hundreds of volunteers in Leningrad managed to pack down much of the museum’s exhibits. Over a million works of art were sent in special trains to Sverdlovsk (now Ekaterinburg), where they were safely stored until 1945. Remaining paintings and sculptures were stored in the underground of the Hermitage. When evacuation could not be accomplished, German occupation forces plundered art collections, and thousands of war trophies sent home by Nazi generals.

An Innovative Source Collection Volume from Cheliabinsk

In regional studies more complex, detailed analyses of the evacuation, its successes and failures have been presented. A documentary collection Put’ k Pobede (The Road to Victory) from the Cheliabinsk State Archives (OGAChO), shows how formerly restricted topics can be studies as archive holdings are declassified. The Road to Victory contains over sixty photocopied documents. It gives short biographies of industrial managers and contains many pertinent photographs from enterprises. The interested reader of the photocopies will find a great amount of new information that calls for analysis (12). One of the primary findings in the archives is that the number of enterprises, whole or parts thereof, set up and restarted in Cheliabinsk and other cities in the southern Urals were 329 enterprises from 27 different ministries (commissariats). That is substantially larger a figure than the previously assumed number of enterprises. The leading historian on this topic, Marina Potiomkina, professor at the G.I. Nosov Magnitogorsk State Technical University, gives a thorough presentation of how evacuated enterprises in fact managed to integrate into the existing factories (13). The dimensions of this emergency relocation of entire industrial plants are enormous. Often German troops were approaching closely and the factories were under bombardment. One striking example is the report on evacuation from Zaporozhie to Magnitogorsk in 1941 as the front skirmishes already threatened several factories.

Historians like to unscramble interesting information from seemingly peripheral, marginal notes in such documents. There are lots of “food for thought” in the commentaries by the wartime managers. The reader furthermore gets a clear perspective on the massive change of the urban landscape in the region. The new administrative structure is reflected in biographies of leading managers and designers, in detailed information on every known evacuation site, as well as in the characterization of affiliate people’s commissariats (ministries) that were moved from Moscow to Cheliabinsk. Important wartime reports with photos, diagrams, and drawings are reproduced in a rich illustrative section of this book. The documentary clarifies how the relocation of equipment from the Kirov Works in Leningrad to the Tractor Factory in Cheliabinsk laid the foundations for the consolidated tank industry in the Urals. Contemporary correspondence reflects both complaints and achievements, in particular under the most severe conditions in winter 1941–42.

A meeting at the Cheliabinsk Kirov Factory: Tank industry minister Isaak Zaltsman (2d from left), Region party secretary Nikolai Patolichev (4thfrom left), chief tank designer Zjozef Kotin (9th from left).

At the end of the war in 1945 many cadres, engineers, and workers could return to their home cities in western parts of Russia. The Cheliabinsk region had undergone dramatic changes. It was then a mix of the original factories, established in the 1930s or even earlier. To this was added trainloads of evacuated equipment from Leningrad, Kharkov, and other cities. New branches, in particular of defense-related industries thus formed the basis for the postwar planning. Any of the documents in Put’ k Pobede can serve as a starting point for discussions concerning the undoubtedly strong aspects of the Soviet command economy, on the one hand, and also on which reforms might have been called for even at that time period, on the other hand.

In conclusion and forward-looking, it should be mentioned that Professor Potiomkina has recently surveyed the entire historiography of Soviet wartime industrial evacuation. Her article includes not only her own and others’ works on the Urals, but also an impressive number of contributions from other regions. Her evaluation of the character of the evacuation calls for a stricter methodology, for a common conceptualization, and for a better grasp of the primary sources, in order to estimate the relative weight of planning versus improvisation, of success stories as compared to failures in the evacuation process. (14)

Note: Illustrations reproduced with permission by Cheliabinsk Regional Archive (OGAChO).

References

  • (1) Compare my previous SITE Policy Briefs in 2015, https://www.hhs.se/sv/om-oss/news/site-publications/2015/research-of-formerly-secret-archives-sheds-new-light-on-the-soviet-wartime-economy/  and https://freepolicybriefs.org/2015/05/04/new-light-on-the-eastern-front-contributions-from-russia-to-the-70th-anniversary-of-the-victory-in-europe-in-world-war-two/; see also Samuelson, Tankograd (Swedish, English or Russian version, chapters 7, 8 and 9.
  • (2) Meliia, Aleksei, Mobilizatsionnaia podgotovka narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR, [Mobilization preparedness of the Soviet economy], Moscow: Alpina Biznes Buks, 2004.
  • (3) For a most recent work, see Robert W. Davies et altere, The Industrialisation of Soviet Russia 7: The Soviet economy and the Approach of war, 1937–1939, by, London 2018, referred to in previous Policy Brief: https://freepolicybriefs.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/freepolicybriefs20200702-1.pdf
  • (4) Sokolov, Andrei K. Ot Voenproma k VPK: Sovetskaia voennaia promyshlennost 1917–iiun 1941, [From Voenprom to VPK: Soviet military industry 1917–June 1941], Moscow: Novyi Khronograf, 2012, chapter IV. Compare Sokolov (ed.), Oboronno-promyshlennyi kompleks SSSR nakanune Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (1938 – iium 1941), [The Defence-industry complex of the USSR prior to the Great Patriotic war (1938 – June 1941], vol. IV, Moscow 2014.
  • (5) Artizov, Andrei (ed.) et altere, Oboronno-promyshlennui kompleks SSSR v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny, iiun 1941–1942, [The Defence-industry complex of the USSR during the Great Patriotic war, June 1941–1942], Moscow:  Compare lecture by RGAE Director Elena A. Tiurina on this documentary volume, Оборонно-промышленный комплекс СССР в годы Великой Отечественной войны – Российское историческоеобщество (historyrussia.org) .
  • (6) Goldman, Stuart D., Nomonhan, 1939; The Red Army’s Victory That Shaped World War II, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis 2012, for analysis of this decisive battle that was previously neglected in Western historiography.
  • (7) Compare Carl Van Dyke, The Soviet Invasion of Finland, 1939–1940, London: Routledge, 1997, for a pioneer study based on declassified Soviet archival sources, that shows lessons Stalin and his generals drew from the Winter War 1939–40.
  • (8) See John Scott, Behind the Urals: An American Worker in Russia’s City of Steel, London, 1989, new edition in with foreword by Stephen Kotkin). Idem, Vad gör Ryssland bortom Ural?: Hemligheten med det ryska försvarets kraft, Stockholm: Natur och Kultur 1943. Scott’s O.S.S. study of prewar industry in the Urals and Siberia is in the Library of Congress, Washington, DC (Manuscript Division).
  • (9) For the – mostly mistaken! – Western estimates of Soviet military capabilities before the fascist invasion as well as  many months later in 1941 – 42, compare Martin Kahn, The Western Allies and Soviet Potential in World War II: Economy, Society and Military Power, London: Routledge 2019.
  • (10) Velikaia Otechestvennaia voin 1941–1945 godov. Tom 7. Ekonomika i oruzhie voiny, [The Great Patriotic war, 1941–1945. Volume 7: The Economy and Armaments of the War], Moscow 2013, “Mobilizatsiia ekonomiki SSSR i perekhod k ekonomike voennogo vremeni”, p. 60 – 117; “Evakuatsiia kak sostavnaia chast perestroika ekonomiki v voennoe vremia”, p. 118 – 144; “Sozdanie ekonomicheskikh predposylok dlia korennogo pereloma v voine”, p. 145 – 196.
  • (11) Larry E. Holmes, Stalin’s World War II Evacuations: Triumph and Troubles in Kirov, University Press of Kansas 2017; Rebecca Manley, To the Tashkent Station: Evacuation and Survival in the Soviet Union at War, Cormell University Press 2009.
  • (12) Nikolai A. Antipin et altere (ed.), Put’ k Pobede: Evakuatsiia promysjlennosti predpriiatii v Cheliabinskuiu oblast v godu Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine 194 –1945 gg., [The Road to Victory: The Evacuation of industrial factories to the Cheliabinsk region during the Great Patriotic war 1941–1945], Cheliabinsk 2020.
  • (13) See Marina N. Potiomkina, in Put’ k Pobede, p. 7–21; idem, Evakuatsiia v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny na Urale: liudi i sudby, [Evacuation in the Urals during the Great Patriotic war: People and destinies], Magnitogorsk 2002; idem, Evakuatsiia naseleniia v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny na Ural: Gendernoe izmerenie, [The Evacuation of the populations to the Urals during the Great Patriotic war: The Gender dimension], Magnitogorsk 2019; idem, Demograficheskii aspect evakuatsii naseleniia v sovetskii tyl v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi vony, [The Demographic aspect of the evacuation of the population to the Soviet interiors during the Great Patriotic war], Magnitogorsk 2019.
  • (14) Potiomkina, Marina N. & Aleksei Yu. Klimanov, ”Sovremennaia otechestvennaia istriografiia i perspektivy izuchenija promyshlennoi evakuatsii perioda Belikoi Otechestvennoi voiny”, [Contemporary Russian historiography and perspectives on the study of industrial evacuation in the Great Patriotic War], Noveishaia istoria Rossii, Tom 10, No 3, 2020.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Crisis and Trust

Posted on January 26, 2015 | Policy Brief

Authors: Maxim Ananyev and Sergei Guriev, CEFIR

Our research uses the 2008-2009-crisis experience in Russia to identify the relationship between income and trust. In 2009, Russian GDP fell an 8-percent drop in 2009. The impact of the crisis was very uneven among Russian regions because of their differences in industrial structure inherited from the Soviet times. We find that the regions that specialize in producing capital goods, as well as those depending on oil and gas, had a more substantial income decline during the crisis. The variation in the industrial structure allows creating an instrument for the change in income. After instrumenting average regional income, we find that the effect of income on generalized social trust (the share of respondents saying that most people can be trusted) is statistically and economically significant. Controlling for conventional determinants of trust, we show that a 10 percent decrease in income is associated with 5-percentage point decrease in trust. Given that the average level of trust in Russia is 25%, this magnitude is substantial. We also find that the post-crisis economic recovery did not restore the pre-crisis trust level. Trust recovered only in those regions where the 2009 decline in trust was small. In the regions with the large decline in trust during the crisis, trust in 2014 was still 10 percentage points below its pre-crisis level. This has straightforward policy implications: governments should pursue generous countercyclical policies especially in the areas that are the most vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks.