Tag: Hungary

U.S. Sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil: Pressure on Moscow, Strains on Europe

The U.S. sanctions on two Russian oil giants, Rosneft and Lukoil, came into effect on Nov 21, 2025. These sanctions affect not only companies per se but also their counterparties worldwide under the secondary sanctions clause. For the EU, these sanctions highlight a central trade-off: how to exert real pressure on Russia without fracturing political alignment among EU Member States. This brief discusses the consequences of the sanctions, including their immediate impact on the firms and Russia’s budget, the new tensions exposed in Europe’s energy policy, and the broader lessons for the next generation of EU sanctions tools.

The Threat of Secondary Sanctions

On 22 October 2025, the United States imposed sanctions on Russia’s two largest oil companies, Rosneft and Lukoil. At the time, the measures appeared symbolically significant: they were the first sanctions package introduced by the new Trump administration and were coordinated with the EU’s 19th sanctions package, giving the impression of renewed transatlantic alignment after a long period of fragmentation and uncertainty. The announcement reportedly caught Mr Putin off guard. This reaction highlights how unexpected the measures were, given President Trump’s rhetoric and the geopolitical positioning many observers had anticipated he would adopt.

Although, in retrospect, that initial sense of alignment appears more fragile, given other political developments during November, the sanctions that formally came into effect once the wind-down period ended on 21 November are likely to be consequential, both for the target companies and for the Russian federal budget. To understand this impact, it is essential to look at how U.S. sanctions operate in practice, especially the leverage created by secondary sanctions.

When the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designates an entity for sanctions, it warns that any financial institution dealing with that entity may itself become exposed to penalties. In particular, OFAC notes that foreign banks engaging in significant transactions for a sanctioned person risk the imposition of so-called secondary sanctions. In practical terms, OFAC can bar such a bank from accessing the U.S. financial system if it knowingly carries out, or helps carry out, a transaction for someone under U.S. sanctions. Losing this access means losing the ability to use U.S. dollar accounts and payment channels.

This is precisely why OFAC’s sanctions are so widely feared: almost every dollar transaction in the world ultimately passes through a U.S. correspondent bank. Even two foreign banks trading dollars in Asia or Africa must clear their payments through the United States. If OFAC cuts a bank off from that system, it is effectively locked out of the dollar economy, and in the global economy, losing access to dollars is like losing access to oxygen.

The power of secondary sanctions becomes visible in how different actors react to the risk. Swiss trader Gunvor abruptly withdrew, and later publicly denied, its bid to acquire Lukoil’s international business once the sanctions exposure became apparent. In Bulgaria, the government moved to take control of Lukoil’s Burgas refinery because, once sanctions took effect, counterparties were likely to refuse payments to a sanctioned entity, forcing the refinery to shut down. This temporary state takeover has been tacitly tolerated so far, as it was deemed necessary to maintain Bulgaria’s fuel security. The same logic drove Viktor Orbán to rush to Washington to secure guarantees for Hungary’s fuel supplies, resulting in a one-year exemption from U.S. measures. In short, the threat of secondary sanctions is real and shapes major commercial and political decisions alike.

Economic Implications for the Targets

Given the far-reaching implications of OFAC sanctions, the economic impacts are potentially significant. Following the announcement in October, financial markets reacted immediately. Lukoil’s share price fell by around 9.4 percent, while Rosneft’s declined by approximately 7 percent. This asymmetry reflects the companies’ different exposure profiles. Lukoil, as a more private and internationally exposed firm, is significantly more vulnerable than Rosneft, whose operations are more domestically anchored and politically protected.

The sanctions raise the prospect of forced divestments of Lukoil’s foreign assets, likely at significantly reduced valuations due to the limited pool of potential buyers willing to engage with sanctioned entities. Even when divestment is not formally mandated, the measures can make it effectively impossible for the companies to repatriate dividends from their overseas holdings, as financial intermediaries are unlikely to process payments involving sanctioned actors. This constitutes an immediate loss of income, besides the longer-term loss of strategic presence in Europe.

Figure 1. Map of Lukoil’s foreign assets

Source: Bloomberg. The map includes the headquarters of the international marketing and trading arm, LITASCO SA, based in Geneva.

Operationally, both firms face higher costs and greater frictions. Sanctions increase the risk for suppliers, banks, insurers, and logistics partners, who now must factor in secondary sanctions exposure when doing business with Lukoil or Rosneft. This narrows the pool of potential counterparties and scares away buyers.

These dynamics are already visible in the adjustment patterns of major international buyers of Russian oil, notably India and China. There, the adjustment is expected to be sharper for India than for China. This is because India is more dependent on the dollar, given the rupee’s status, while trade with Russia is not as diversified to allow for barter-like arrangements (as Russia reportedly resorted to with China). Several major Indian refiners reportedly began planning to halt or scale back purchases of Russian crude. However, the grace period allowed India to stock up: according to tracking firm Kpler, India’s Russian oil imports reached 1.855 million barrels per day (bpd) in November, a five-month high, reflecting a rush to secure barrels ahead of the sanctions deadline. But for December, the same sources project a drop to 600,000–650,000 bpd, a three-year low in Russian oil shipments to India.

About 40-45 percent of China’s oil imports from Russia are also affected by these sanctions, and Chinese buyers, especially the smaller independent refiners but even some state-owned ones, are being more careful.

By and large, though, export volumes are unlikely to decline significantly in the near term, given the extensive circumvention networks and practices already in place. Nevertheless, financial effects are increasingly visible, not least due to another effect of the sanctions – buyers being able to extract deeper discounts, further compressing Russia’s earnings. There are already multiple reports of Urals trading at its steepest discount in a year, sometimes several dollars per barrel below Brent. The discount widened from USD11–12/bbl (before Oct 22 sanctions) to USD19–20/bbl by early November, and reportedly as wide as USD20–23.5/bbl by mid-November.

Figure 2. Urals–Brent discount, widening after sanctions.

Source: TradingEconomics.com.

 

According to CREA’s fossil fuel tracker for October 2025, “Russia’s monthly fossil fuel export revenues saw a 4 percent month-on-month decline to EUR 524 million (mn) per day — the lowest they have been since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.” This corresponds to a 15 percent year-on-year drop in fossil fuel export revenues and resulted in a 26 percent year-on-year drop in tax revenues from oil and gas exports.

Over the medium to long term, these commercial pressures may accumulate and become consequential. Higher operating costs and lower revenues mean that both companies will have less capital available for investment. Because Russia’s upstream sector is both capital-intensive and dominated by Rosneft and Lukoil, with limited scope for independent or foreign producers to expand under current political and sanctions constraints, any sustained under-investment by these two companies is unlikely to be compensated by market reorganization. This raises the risk of faster production declines and a longer-term weakening of the entire industry.

Implications for the Russian State Budget

Lukoil and Rosneft are the two largest taxpayers in Russia, contributing through a broad range of fiscal streams and payments associated with state-owned infrastructure. In Rosneft’s case, where the state holds a majority stake, dividends are also a source of federal revenue. Any reduction in company profitability, therefore, translates directly into lower tax payments and smaller dividends.

Sanctions-driven increases in shipping, insurance, and compliance costs will further compress margins and reduce the tax base. The loss of foreign assets, or their sale at distressed prices, diminishes both current profit tax liabilities and future dividend streams.

Some taxes, such as the mineral extraction tax (MET), are based on production volumes rather than profitability, which reduces the immediate fiscal impact. But as profitability declines, and especially if the sector’s investment levels fall, the medium-term fiscal losses become more substantial as reduced investment ultimately erodes production volumes.

All in all, Rosneft and Lukoil together produce between 40 and 50 percent of the national oil output. Although the share of oil and gas revenues in the federal budget has decreased from the historical 35–40 percent to 25-30 percent, the potential fiscal impact remains substantial. According to Reuters, projected oil revenues for the current month are roughly 35 percent lower than in the same month of 2024, marking the weakest level in two and a half years.

Uneven Burden-sharing in the EU

These sanctions also carry costs for the EU itself. Their impact is felt unevenly across Member States, largely reflecting differences in pre-war dependence on Russian oil and gas. This is why EU sanctions on Russian energy have consistently included exceptions for highly dependent Member States in Central Europe, notably Hungary and Slovakia (and, before, Czechia). The Council explicitly acknowledged these exemptions were justified on the grounds of security of supply and fairness, recognizing that certain countries faced structural reliance on Russian oil and lacked immediate alternatives (Council Decision (EU) 2022/879 and the EU’s 6th package). At the same time, the financial significance of these exemptions for the EU’s pressure on Russia is very limited. According to CREA’s data for October 2025, Hungary purchased EUR 258 million of Russian fossil fuels that month and Slovakia EUR 210 million. This constitutes less than 4% of Russia’s global fossil-fuel export revenues for that month.

However, these exemptions produced asymmetric outcomes within the EU, complicating EU unity. Countries that retained access to Russian crude, typically priced below global benchmarks and substantially cheaper than LNG-based alternatives, effectively enjoyed a cost advantage over Member States that had already diversified or lost access to Russian supplies. They have avoided abrupt supply disruptions but also benefited from lower-cost inputs, while others absorbed higher market prices and the capital expenditure needed to secure alternative supply chains (including LNG terminals, new interconnectors, or upgrades to refineries).

The sanctions on Rosneft, Lukoil, and their EU subsidiaries offer a good example of how uneven the impact of energy measures can be across Member States. Rosneft holds significant shares in three German refineries, together accounting for around 12 percent of Germany’s refining capacity, but these assets have been under German state trusteeship since 2022 — meaning that Rosneft is still the legal owner, yet it no longer controls day-to-day operations. Lukoil, by contrast, directly owns major refineries in Bulgaria (Neftochim Burgas) and Romania (Petrotel Ploiești), and has a large stake in a Dutch refinery. For years, the countries hosting these assets benefited from cheaper Russian crude and gasoline, slower pressure to diversify, and more lenient implementation of EU sanctions.

As sanctions tighten and divestment of Russian-owned assets in Europe becomes unavoidable, these states now face higher prices and costly adjustments. In this sense, the current phase can be seen as a rebalancing act: the advantages these countries once enjoyed are gradually diminishing as their energy prices converge with those of other member states. At the same time, their exposure to supply disruptions may even be increasing, given the lack of earlier investment in diversifying their energy import sources.

But the politics remain contentious. Hungary’s push for renewed derogations and Slovakia’s threat in March 2025 to block EU support for Ukraine unless gas transit via Ukraine is reopened to Slovakia and Western Europe show how differing energy profiles still shape national positions on sanctions.

In the long term, however, solidarity cannot mean accepting the structurally uneven burden-sharing of sanctions costs. EU solidarity principles (reflected in the Treaties, the Clean Energy Package, and crisis-response mechanisms such as the 2022 gas solidarity regulation) imply that Member States should support one another to withstand shocks, not that some should bear permanent disadvantages. As highlighted in the energy-security literature, especially in the work of Le Coq and Paltseva (2009, 2012, 2022, or 2025), solidarity can be viewed as a mutual insurance mechanism that is most effective when tied to interconnection and diversification, enabling states with asymmetric exposure to external energy suppliers to cope with disruptions without undermining collective action.

Following this logic, solidarity should be understood as doing as much as possible to ensure that the Member States most exposed to Russian oil and gas are sufficiently integrated into the EU system—through stronger interconnections, diversified supply routes, and access to alternative sources—so that they can sustain tougher sanctions without requiring permanent derogations. The EU’s challenge, therefore, is to ensure a more even sharing of the sanctions’ burden, preventing any Member State from systematically free-riding by shifting the costs of sanctioning Russia (or other common policies) onto others, while preserving political cohesion.

Conclusion

The analysis of this episode carries important implications for EU policy.

First, it underscores both the strategic potential and the political limits of secondary sanctions as a policy tool. Legally, the EU’s treaties constrain extraterritorial action and anchor the Union in a territorial understanding of jurisdiction; furthermore, this take is consistent with the EU’s long-standing identity as a regulatory—rather than coercive—power. Practically, the Union lacks the federal-level enforcement structures needed to police foreign actors across jurisdictions. Politically, the use of secondary sanctions remains divisive: they raise concerns about infringing third countries’ sovereignty, provoking retaliation against EU trade, constraining diplomatic flexibility, and straining relations with key partners in the Global South. Member States’ exposure to international trade and to specific partners such as China, India, Türkiye, and the Gulf varies widely, making consensus difficult. At the same time, EU firms are deeply embedded in global supply chains, and the euro lacks the dollar’s reach, increasing the risk that aggressive measures, such as secondary sanctions, could accelerate de-euroization.

Within these constraints, the EU has opted for more limited, quasi-extraterritorial tools—most notably the “no-Russia clause”, which requires that EU exporters include a contractual ban on re-exporting their goods to Russia —to approximate the effects of secondary sanctions without formally adopting them. This calibrated approach has so far allowed the Union to signal resolve while limiting geopolitical and economic risks. But as U.S. secondary sanctions increasingly shape global trade patterns in ways that affect the EU, the question of whether this strategy remains sufficient is becoming harder to avoid.

Second, the episode highlights the need to make burden-sharing within common EU policies, including sanctions, more transparent and more equitable. Derogations for highly exposed Member States were justified in the short run on security-of-supply grounds, but their continuation produced persistent asymmetries in costs and benefits across the Union. These disparities have shaped national positions on sanctions, complicated collective decision-making, and, in some cases, been leveraged as political bargaining tools. As sanctions become a more permanent feature of the EU’s external action, clearer mechanisms will be needed to ensure that no Member State can systematically shift the economic or political costs of common measures onto others. This may involve revisiting the design of derogations, considering compensatory financial instruments, or more closely integrating sanctions policy with energy, industrial, and fiscal planning.

Ultimately, the credibility of the EU’s sanctions strategy will depend on its ability to align legal constraints, geopolitical ambition, and fair burden-sharing into a single, coherent framework.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Do Economic Sanctions Work?

North Korean rocket displayed under a glass dome, illustrating the resilience of sanctioned regimes—an image exploring the question: Do Economic Sanctions Work?

Analysts have interpreted the recent openings in Myanmar and North Korea as the finally successful result of years of international pressure and economic sanctions. At the same time, debate is hot on the scope for similar measures in Iran, Syria, and, closer to us, Belarus and Hungary. Does economics have anything to say on this? What can we learn from the analysis of past experiences?

On February 29th, after decades of frustrating attempts by the outside world with sticks and carrots, but mostly economic and diplomatic isolation, North Korea announced that it would suspend its enrichment of uranium and its tests of weapons and long-range missiles. It would even allow an inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the first one since the country walked out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003. The recently inaugurated leader, young Kim Jong Un, asked, in exchange, some tons of food aid and the promise of talks. Some believe this was inspired by another recent unexpected “opening”: the turn-of-the-year developments in Myanmar, where a cease-fire and the release of many of the political prisoners prompted a slow but sure thawing in the country’s diplomatic relations with the rest of the world. Some months on, the government’s intentions to move from a military dictatorship to greater pluralism still seem sincere enough. Many have interpreted these events as the finally successful result of years of international pressure and economic sanctions on the two countries. Is the tide turning for sanctions enthusiasts?

At the same time, though, concerns are rising that EU member Hungary is moving in quite the opposite direction, after a change in the constitution that endangers the independence of the media, the judiciary and the central bank. Hungarians protesting in the streets are openly talking about authoritarian evolution drawing parallels with the behavior of the government in Belarus, which only months ago attracted harsh criticism – and stringent sanctions. Hungary might follow suit in this respect as well: its credit line with the IMF is still hanging from a thread, and the EU threatened law suit over the constitutional changes, while a potential limitation of the country’s voting rights in Brussels is whispered as the “nuclear option”.

Although the situation looks increasingly, explosive both in Syria and Iran, even in these cases the hopes of the international community rest exclusively on economic coercion. Syria’s economy is now under severe pressure, after even the Arab League imposed sanctions. This is first time such a decision is taken against a fellow member. Near all trade and financial relations have been cut off, with the exception of some banks in Lebanon and perhaps a few business friends in China and Russia that might still offer assistance to Bashar Assad’s regime. But the country’s foreign reserves, already low one year ago at the offset of the crisis, should be running out by now, and inflation is rising as many consumption goods become scarce. At the same time, although Saudi Arabia is arming the rebel groups, a military intervention sanctioned by the international community seems unlikely, given the recent Libyan precedent.

The sanctions faced by Iran over its nuclear program are also growing to unprecedented severity, and also in this case military action does not seem to be considered an option – except by (understandably) jumpy Israel. Given the stage that the nuclear program has reached, and the level of protection built around it, bombing is not likely to stop it. Experts say that a successful US-lead operation could at most delay it some ten years. Arguably, this would only result in an even angrier Iran equipped with nuclear weapons, in ten years from now. Hence it would appear much more fruitful to try to change the population’s attitude, so that Iranians themselves can in turn affect their political leaders’ attitude, even if this needs replacing the regime altogether. This way the prospect of a nuclear Iran would not look as scary.

As the international community considers over and over its stance in all these thorny situations, a legitimate question in everybody’s mind is: What is the likelihood that the sanctions will work? Does the economic literature have anything to say on this matter?

Achieving the Goal

According to Richard Baldwin, Professor of International Economics at the Graduate Institute of Geneva, “[i]t would be difficult to find any proposition in the international relations literature more widely accepted than those belittling the utility of economic techniques of statecraft.” In other words, a prominent scholar’s synthesis of the literature is that economic sanctions do not work. The anecdote most widely cited by advocates of sanctions is of course South Africa. The economic pressure imposed on the country in the mid-1980s certainly contributed to the strain that the inefficient and costly apartheid regime was increasingly suffering, finally leading to its dismissal. At the opposite end of the spectrum stands Iraq, where neither the comprehensive sanctions nor the oil-for-food program, in principle a quite clever combination of sanctions and aid, could achieve anything. The success of the following military intervention is also a subject of debate, though not one I will address here. Some have drawn the conclusion that the discriminating factor lies in how important for the target regime is the recognition of and identification with the sanctioning part. Others argue the probability that the sanctions succeed is linked to the cost born by the target, or by the sanctioning part (also called the sender), or other observable factors. If truth be told, these are both quite special cases, hard to generalize. But then again, one could argue that every episode involving international disputes is a special case. It follows that the systematic study of economic sanctions with the evaluation of their effects is not a straightforward task at all.

The first step to evaluate the success of imposed economic sanctions is to establish what the goal is. In the most basic terms, there are two types of explicit goals. In some cases, the imposition of an economic sanction is purely punitive towards a policy or act of a regime, or towards the regime itself, and aims at expressing disapproval from the initiating part, when inaction can signal complicity. Hoffman [8] was one of the first to suggest that “sanctions are mostly adopted to alleviate cross pressure situations, resulting when a (foreign) government faces demands for action but war is undesirable”. In this case, it makes little sense to talk about success or failure, as the imposition of sanctions is a goal in itself.

In the extreme case, this type of sanctions aims at destabilizing the target regime, inducing political change. This seems to be part of the aim of actions taken against Syria, although an end to the Iranian theocracy, and Lukashenko’s regime in Belarus, for that matter, would certainly be welcome as well. An analysis of the historical records from 1914 to 1989 [4] reveals that the probability of success with this goal has been 38% when the regime was very stable to start with and up to 80% in “distressed” countries. The single most important factor of success is hence, not surprisingly, the pre-sanctions stability of the political system in the target country. In some cases, paradoxically the imposition of sanctions stimulated political cohesion in the target country – the so called rally-round-the-flag effect. This is what seems to be happening, at least at this stage, in Hungary. The evidence suggests that there is a threshold of political cohesion above which external intervention strengthens the target government.  According to Lindsay [13], three factors make it more likely that sanctions produce political integration rather than regime collapse:

  1. If they are seen as an attack on the whole country rather than on a specific faction
  2. If identification with the sanctioning part is weak or even negative
  3. If no alternative to the sanctioned course of action is available or perceived as better

In this light, measures that can be manipulated to punish only or prevalently the regime’s domestic supporters and political base are to be considered as superior. Travel bans and freezes of assets, foreign bank accounts and property of functionaries are examples of this type of measures. Financial restrictions, in addition to be perceived as comparatively fairer, have also been more effective in the past. Moreover, also to the point that the sanctions should not, if possible, hurt everyone indiscriminately, they are preferable to measures that hurt the productive sector, like trade restrictions.

Alternatively, sanctions are designed to compel a specific policy change in the target country. This is the case of Hungary and its new constitution, and formally of Iran, which is only required to drop its quest for nuclear weapons. The emerging consensus in the sanctions literature is that concessions are most likely at the threat stage [11]. Nevertheless, there are cases where the threat of sanctions fails and sanctions are then actually imposed. And, although the success rate becomes lower at this stage, there are examples where the target yields only after the sanctions are imposed. It might seem tempting then to investigate whether observable variables can predict the likelihood of success in these cases, because this would teach us something about the current crises around the world. However, trying to understand when and why sanctions have success based on the analysis of empirical data is complicated by a number of challenges.

First of all, there are at least two sources of censoring in the sample of imposed sanctions: because it is only a specific type of disputes that reach this stage, the evaluation based on them will be biased. The first reason why these are special cases is due to the fact that imposed sanctions have already failed at the threat stage. Hovi et al. [9] look at this situation from a game-theoretic perspective and argue that, if sender and target are rational, a threat of sanctions could fail because of one of three reasons: 1) it is not credible, so no actual sanctions will follow the threat; 2) it is not sufficiently potent, meaning that the target considers sanctions to be a lesser evil than yielding; 3) it is noncontingent, i.e. the target expects sanctions to be imposed regardless of whether it yields or not. If any one of these is true, then the target that did not yield at the threat stage will not yield after sanctions are imposed either (or no sanctions will be imposed if alternative 1 is true). Imposed sanctions will work only if at least one of these factors is initially not known with certainty, or wrongly perceived by the target: if the target believes the threat non credible, but then sanctions are actually imposed; if the target was wrong in judging the cost of the sanctions and realizes it only after sanctions are actually imposed; or if the target thought that sanctions would be imposed regardless of its behavior, but is subsequently persuaded that, in fact, the sanctions will cease if it yields. Otherwise, with perfect knowledge and rational decision-making, sanctions that are actually imposed are bound to fail precisely because they were imposed, i.e. because they failed at the threat stage.

Further selection occurs even earlier than the threat stage. The literature has examined thoroughly how strategic interaction during the sanction episode affects sanctions outcomes and duration (for example, [15], [7], [14], [5], [6], [12]). Much fewer studies have undertaken the possibility that states also act strategically before episodes, when choosing whether to challenge the status quo and how much to demand of the target. Theories around this stage of the “game” are referred to as endogenous demand theories. Krustev [11] proposes the idea that perhaps “strategic demands can account for the widely cited discrepancy between the frequent use of sanctions and the modest success rate of these instruments”. His game-theoretic model has the implication that oftentimes sender governments strategically choose hard cases, because “the uncertain prospects that the target agrees to a large demand might outweigh the certain prospects of receiving minor concessions”. This also results in a low observed success rate.

Beyond the difficulties related to selection, another challenge that the analyst faces is to isolate the effect of sanctions. Usually, sanctions are not adopted in a vacuum, but rather complement other types of actions (e.g. diplomatic pressure, military action), which interact with the success of the measures. Similarly, there is the issue of unintended consequences, that also affect the costs on both parts, and hence the likelihood of success. Most importantly, some of these unintended effects might change the situation so drastically that talking about success or failure does not make sense anymore.

Unintended Consequences

Besides the success or failure with the specific goals they are intended to obtain, economic sanctions bring about a host of more or less foreseeable unintended consequences as well. One especially undesirable outcome of trade sanctions has recently been brought to attention from the analysis of former Yugoslavia [2]. Under a regime of import restrictions, private and public actors might be pushed towards the use of unlawful methods in order to avoid the sanctions and reach the international market through unofficial ways. An unhealthy cooperation between politicians, organized crime and smuggling networks might then establish itself and persist even beyond the duration of the sanctions.

This consideration speaks against isolating the target country from trade flows. A case in itself concerns, though, trades which already lie on the boundary of lawfulness and little contribute to the productive sector, such as arms traffic. These can and should be decisively stopped. Aside from the security benefits to such a move, this also has the potential to dry up a significant source of revenue for the contested leadership.

Be it on credit or on trade, it goes without saying that any restriction will hurt the economy. The political consequences of an economic downturn caused by the sanctions are not easy to foresee. Recent research on fragile states [3] studies the relationship between national incomes and two types of political violence: repression, i.e. unilateral violence by the incumbent government, and civil conflict, two-sided use of violence on the part of the state as well as insurgent groups. The link with the national income prospects is given by the consideration that both parts, deciding whether to resort to violence, evaluate the cost and benefits of violent action. The incumbent government has a cost-advantage, being able to dispose of the state resources. The costs for potential insurgent factions go down with deteriorating economic conditions, for example in presence of high unemployment, because then those involved have less to lose. Insurgence then becomes more likely. This theory is consistent with the last century’s worth of evidence, including the recent wave of revolutions in the Arab world, suggesting that countries seeing a decline in incomes move towards democracy considerably faster. The evidence is anecdotal, though, and more rigorous empirical analysis [1] revealed no significant pattern.

Moreover, the step between opposition insurgence and the establishment of a new, possibly democratic, regime might not be rapid at all, as the Syrian tragedy is reminding us of every day. The question is then whether the leverage of economic measures from outside is likely to make any difference during this phase. As analysts push for the political and logistical backing of the international community to the revolt in Syria, and as Saudi Arabia is arming the rebels, we must consider that also measures aimed at supporting eventual opposition factions, or the democratic system in general, might have undesirable consequences. Comparative statics in the context of the same theoretical framework referred to above show that, for example, the promise of financial assistance conditional on free multi-party elections may raise the incumbent’s perception of instability and hence raise the risk of repression and increased looting, unless combined with reforms to strengthen executive constraints. Even pressure for the release of political prisoners might set out a ransom system, with perverse incentives to taking more and more prisoners to be exchanged with economic assistance – this might still be a risk in Myanmar, given the abundance of political prisoners still held by the government.

Another important difference between trade and financial restrictions is that the former are likely to result in accumulation of debt. The burden of this debt, that the sanctioned regime is responsible for, will weigh on the future growth of the country, hence on future generations of taxpayers and potentially on a future government, which ideally should not be held accountable for the course of action chosen today by a contested leadership.  Alternatively, in the case of a collapse of the economy, the debt could be defaulted. This risk is on the countries or financial institutions that today lend money to the sanctioned regime. In other words, interrupting trade without at the same time closing the lines of credit would put the sanctioning part or third part lenders in the least desirable situation.

In some cases, the target has the possibility to resort to alternative lenders in third countries. Although this is preferable to a situation where the sanctioning part itself bears the risk on the debt, it is not ideal because it frustrates the sanctioning effort. An innovative proposal has been put forward by Jayachandran and Kremer [10], related to the legal doctrine of odious debt. They propose that any debt incurred by a particular regime, that could be argued to be contracted without the consent of the people and not for their benefit, is declared by some supranational institution illegitimate and nontransferable to successor regimes. This would create disincentive for lenders in third countries, and potentially eliminate equilibria with illegitimate lending. Even this type of loan sanctions hurt the economy and hence ultimately the population; however they create a long-run benefit for the population by preventing the accumulation of an unjust debt that today finances mismanagement, looting or repression and tomorrow has to be repaid by someone who never agreed to incur it. It would be very interesting to see this solution implemented in practice!

Conclusion

In short, sanctions are difficult to implement so as to reach the intended goal and minimize the unintended effects, but are maybe even more difficult to study systematically. International disputes are often complicated matters, situations that evolve over long time horizons. The traditional research question of when sanctions work might not be the most relevant one. Including in the analysis the strategic behavior occurring at the threat stage, and even before that, is a first step, although basing policy on the prediction that threats work better than sanctions does not strike me as a very useful conclusion.

The fact that evaluation is problematic and generalization almost impossible does not mean, however, that the study of sanctions is useless altogether. Economic analysis may still be informative for decision-making, and produce innovative ideas on the design of supranational institutions for conflict management, like the proposal on odious debt illustrates.

Bibliography

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Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.