Location: Georgia
Meeting Qualification Mismatch with Vocational Training
While in an ideal world the qualification preferences of job seekers and employers would coincide, in reality this is often not the case. Besides informational asymmetries (job seekers not knowing which qualifications are demanded by employers) the reason is that employers may be in need of qualifications that are not considered attractive by the job seekers. In the country of Georgia, we want to address this problem through a “recommendation system” which will suggest vocational training to job seekers. There are two main problems to be tackled in this project: (1) How can we decide what would be the most useful qualification for a given job seeker, and (2) how can we incentivize the job seekers to follow our recommendations? This policy brief discusses our approach to this problem.
Introduction
Qualification mismatches are common in many labor markets around the world (see for example, Ghignoni and Verashchagina (2014) for Europe, McGuinness and Sloane (2011) for the UK, and Béduwé and Giret (2011) for France). It is well known that qualification mismatch is a relevant problem also in the country of Georgia, as was shown in various studies (see ISET (2012) and The World Bank (2013)).
The ISET Policy Institute (ISET-PI) was commissioned by the World Bank to assist the Social Service Agency (SSA) of Georgia, an agency of the Ministry of Labor, Health, and Social Affairs, in developing a system which will recommend vocational training to job seekers with the aim to reduce the qualification mismatch in Georgia.
Job Seekers’ Preferences Matter
Vocational training addresses the needs of two different groups. It is demanded by job seekers, who want to improve their human capital in a way that matches their preferences and, in the optimal case, maximizes their chances to get back into employment. At the same time, vocational training also addresses the needs of employers, whose businesses may face shortages in qualified personnel.
It is not enough to only include employers in the analysis if one wants to effectively fight the qualification mismatch. If one does not consider job seeker’s preferences, it may happen that people prefer to not participate in the vocational training system at all. Even if one can effectively incentivize job seekers to attend training programs, as is the case in Germany for example, where the refusal to participate in training is sanctioned by a reduction of unemployment benefits (cf. Neubäumer (2012)), it is likely that involuntary training will be less effective. Therefore, it is problematic that most studies which analyze the demand for qualifications in the job market, for example for the European Union (Lettmayr and Nehls (2012)), New Zealand (Earle (2008)), and Australia (Shah (2010)), exclusively focus on employers and neglect the preferences of the people who are to be trained. In Georgia, we will do it differently.
Why Would Job Seekers Follow Our Recommendations?
The objective of the recommendation system we develop is to maximize the impact the training has on the employment chances of the job seeker. Arguably, this is also the primary goal for most job seekers, as they often state that they want to receive training in an “employable” profession. Therefore, if the purpose of the recommendation system is communicated properly, and if it is transparent and trustworthy, the job seekers may want to voluntarily follow its advice.
Recommendation System vs. Matching Algorithm
One can think of two different ways of advising job seekers in their training choices: recommendation systems and matching algorithms.
Recommendation systems make suggestions to job seekers separately. These kinds of systems are ubiquitous on the Internet. For example, Amazon.com proposes books to its customers based on their purchasing history. In a similar way, a recommendation system for vocational training would suggest vocational training programs to job seekers based on relevant data about their characteristics and the job market situation. Yet its major shortcoming is that a recommendation system will not take into account what other job seekers do and what recommendations were given to them.
For that reason, in a recommendation system, it can happen that the number of people recommended to choose a certain program is larger than that program’s capacity (because the advice comes as a ranking, this does not cause the system to be useless, as the job seeker may then choose the program which is highest in the ranking and which has free places).
Likewise, if many job seekers follow the advice of the recommendation system, oversupply and undersupply of certain qualifications in the job market is not ruled out. This is again due to the fact that recommendations are made separately. If there is a huge demand for, say, plumbers, and many people receive the advice to receive training in plumbing, this may subsequently cause an oversupply of plumbers.
In contrast, a matching algorithm aims at an overall optimum for the whole group of job seekers. Genuine matching algorithms do not make separate recommendations, but propose a globally optimal assignment. In Western countries they are used, for example, to match interns to hospitals, students to universities, and kidneys to dialysis patients. Matching theory is one of the most successfully applied subfields of game theory, acknowledged through the award of the Economics Nobel Prize of 2012 to matching theorist Alvin E. Roth. The standard survey of matching theory is Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
In a matching algorithm, the abovementioned problems of a recommendation system would not occur (up to statistical uncertainty), because the matching algorithm would take into account how the suggestions made by the system affect the demand for a program. It would aim to keep the number of people, likely to choose a program, to remain below its capacity.
While a matching algorithm is more ambitious, it also has disadvantages compared to a simple recommendation system. First of all, the data requirements are higher, as the capacities of programs have to be taken into account. More importantly, in a matching algorithm the recommendations will be generated in a way that is not transparent to the job seeker (though it is possible to give some general explanations). This may reduce acceptance and willingness to participate. The recommendation system, on the other hand, can work in a relatively transparent way. Finally, a recommendation system can be adjusted and changed on an ongoing basis by Social Service Agency personnel without the help of external experts. Given its complexity, this is hardly possible with a matching algorithm.
Therefore, it was decided that the simpler option of a recommendation system is to be pursued. Later, the system may be upgraded to a full-blown matching algorithm.
The Technical Aspects of How Recommendations are made
Consider the situation of a job seeker looking for vocational training. Through the envisioned system, they will receive a recommendation of which qualification to pick in the vocational training system of the SSA.
The pieces of information used for making this recommendation are personal characteristics of the job seeker (like age, gender, preferences, skills, and other information obtained through the website worknet.ge which is operated by the SSA) and the current and future economic situation in different sectors. To this end, we will use value added tax data that can be decomposed into 45 sectors and updated on a monthly basis. For forecasts, we will draw on the Business Confidence Index of ISET, which allows decomposition into 5 sectors.
Given the information about the job seeker and the economic environment in different sectors, we will answer the question: “How many months do we expect the job seeker to be unemployed in the year after the training if the training was in qualification X?” Here, X can be whatever is offered in the vocational training system at the location of the job seeker, for example welder, mechanic, accountant, or IT expert. Alternatively, we could answer the question: “What is the salary we expect the job seeker to have in the year after the training if the training was in qualification X?”
The recommendation made to the job seeker will be: “Choose the training in field X if somebody with your personal characteristics, given the economic situation and outlook, has the lowest expected number of unemployed months (or the highest salary) in X in the year after training in X was received.” This recommendation is likely to be accepted by the job seeker if also the job seeker wants to maximize their employment chances (or maximize salary).
The forecast can be made using econometric regression analysis. Let i be a job seeker and xi be the number of months unemployed in the year after training was received. Then we have for each qualification one estimation equation
where alpha is the intercept and the betas are the coefficients for different personal and economic characteristics. When the alpha and beta coefficients are known, then one can enter the specific data for a job seeker and forecast how long it would take him to find a job if training would be received in a particular field.
For estimating the coefficients, no recommendations will be made for some time (like 3 months) after the system is launched and only information will be collected. The SSA or a specialized survey agency will call the job seekers every month after they received training and ask whether they found employment. Job seekers who received training through the SSA will be obliged to answer this question truthfully. Information about the characteristics of the job seeker is known through their participation in the worknet.ge system, which is a requirement for anybody who wants to receive vocational training through the SSA.
When the recommendation phase starts, further data will be collected. Errors in the estimation of the coefficients will be corrected “automatically” through the feedback (in terms of job market performance of the trainees) that the system gets on an ongoing basis. To increase this effect, the database used for the estimation of the coefficients will be “rolling”, i.e. people who recently received training will be added while those who received training a longer time ago (e.g. one year or more) will be removed from the database.
Conclusion
In Georgia, ISET will design and implement a recommendation system for vocational training, addressing the qualification mismatch in the labor market. As in many other areas, Georgia is willing to go for innovative policy solutions making use of advanced economic methods, very much in line with the country’s reputation as one of the top reformers in the world.
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References
- Béduwé, Catherine and Giret, Jean-Francois (2011): “Mismatch of vocational graduates: What penalty on French labour market?”, Journal of Vocational Behavior 78, pp. 68-79
- Earle, David (2008): “Advanced trade, technical and professional qualifications: Matching supply to demand”, New Zealand Government Ministry of Education, Auckland.
- Ghignoni, Emanuela and Verashchagina, Alina (2014): “Educational qualifications mismatch in Europe. Is it demand or supply driven?”, Journal of Comparative Economics, in press
- ISET (2012): “National Competitiveness Report for Georgia”, Tbilisi.
- Lettmayr, Christian F. and Nehls, Hermann (2012): “Skills supply and demand in Europe: Methodological framework”, CEDEFOP Working Paper No. 25
- McGuinnes, Seamus and Sloane, Peter J. (2011): “Labour market mismatch among UK graduates: An analysis using REFLEX data”, Economics of Education Review 30, pp. 139-145
- Neubäumer, Renate (2012): “Bringing the unemployed back to work in Germany: training programs or wage subsidies?”, International Journal of Manpower 33, pp. 159 – 177
- Roth, Alvin E. and Sotomayor, Marilda (1990): “Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis”, Econometric Society
- Shah, Chandra (2010): “Demand for qualifications and the future labour market in Australia 2010 to 2025”, Center for the Economics of Education and Training Working Paper, Monash University
- The World Bank (2013): “Georgia: Skills Mismatch and Unemployment Labor Market Challenges”, World Bank Report No. 72824-GE
The crisis in Ukraine and the Georgian economy
We analyze how the crisis in Ukraine will likely impact the Georgian economy and distinguish between short-run and long-run effects. We argue that the short-run effects are transmitted through trade and capital flows and that they are rather negative for Georgia and can hardly be bolstered. In the long-run, however, the crisis could improve the competitiveness of the Caucasus Transit Corridor, an important trading route between Europe and Central Asia Georgia participates in. We give recommendations how political decision makers could support such a development in the wake of an impairment of the northern Ukrainian transit routes.
Introduction
When Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovich decided not to sign the association agreement with the European Union and instead opted for a Russian package of long-term economic support, many Ukrainians perceived this not to be a purely economic decision. Rather, they feared this to be a renunciation of Western cultural and political values, and – to put it mildly – were not happy about this development.
The Russian political system, characterized by a prepotent president, constrained civil rights, and a government controlling important parts of the economy through its secret service, is not exactly the dream of young Ukrainians. Russia can offer economic carrots, but these do not count much against the soft power of Europe that comes in the form of political freedom, good governance, and economic development to the benefit of not just a small group of oligarchs.
Hence, it was all but surprising when many young Ukrainians took their anger about Yanukovich to the streets. After protests that lasted for nearly three months, President Yanukovich fled the country, a temporary government took over, and chaos broke out on the Crimean peninsula.
The dispute about the Crimea has the potential to impede the relations between Russia and the West for a long time to come, in particular if Russia enforces an annexation of the territory. Moreover, the tensions could quickly turn into a military conflict. The aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush was moved into an operational distance to the Crimea, accompanied by 20 smaller U.S. warships, and 12 additional fighter planes will be stationed in Poland. Yet even if there will be no direct confrontation between official Russian and U.S. forces, Ukraine could become the battleground of a proxy war, a kind of conflict that was common in the Cold War era. In this respect, one can already read the writing on the wall: the new Ukrainian government begs the U.S. for supplying arms and ammunition, and while the Obama administration is still reluctant to give in to such requests, the call is supported by hawkish U.S. congressmen who might finally prevail.
Ukraine is a country that is geographically close to Georgia and, like Georgia, has vital economic stakes in the Black Sea area. Georgia will not be unaffected by whatever happens in Kiev and Simferopol. In this policy brief, we will inform policy makers about the likely short-run and long-run economic consequences of the turmoil in Ukraine, discuss the challenges and opportunities that may arise, and derive some policy recommendations.
Short-run economic consequences
The crisis in Ukraine will almost instantaneously affect trade and capital flows between Georgia, Ukraine, and Russia. The effects will likely be negative and hit Georgia in a situation of economic recovery.
The Georgian real GDP growth rates were 6.3% in 2010, 7.2% in 2011, and 6.2% in 2012, and the real GDP per capita evolved from about 2,600 USD to about 3,500 USD in this time, but the upsurge discontinued in 2013 (if no other source is mentioned, figures presented in this policy brief (including those in the graphs) come from the Georgian statistical office GeoStat). ISET-PI, in its February 2014 report on the leading GDP indicators for Georgia, estimates the GDP in 2013 to be 2.6%, while GeoStat, the statistical office of Georgia, believes it to be 3.1%.
The unsatisfactory performance of the Georgian economy in 2013 was arguably caused by political uncertainties resulting from the government change that took place in late 2012, and as these uncertainties are largely overcome, most economists believe that Georgia will get back to its remarkable growth trajectory in 2014. The IMF, in its Economic Outlook, predicts a real GDP Growth of 6% in 2014, and the government of Georgia expects this number to be 5%. With an escalating crisis in Ukraine, it is questionable whether these rosy forecasts are still realistic.
Effects on imports
In 2013, Ukraine and Russia were the 3rd and the 4th largest importers to Georgia, respectively. Graph 1 shows the top five importers to Georgia, which together make up about 50% of total imports. The imports from Ukraine and Russia are mainly comprised of consumption goods: of all goods that were imported between 2009 and 2013 from Ukraine and Russia, about 30% were foodstuff. The ten main import goods in this time (in order of monetary volume) were cigarettes, sunflower oil, chocolate, bread, cakes, meat other than poultry, poultry, and sugar.
If the supply of these goods would be reduced through a breakdown of production and logistics, roadblocks, damaged infrastructure etc., the consequences for Georgia would not be utterly severe. From Ukraine and Russia, Georgia receives few goods that are (1) needed for investment projects and (2) cannot be produced domestically (an example of sophisticated investment goods that need to be imported would be ski lifts for tourism projects). Moreover, as Ukraine and Russia supply primarily standard goods that are produced almost everywhere, it is unlikely that a cutback in their imports would lead to sharp price rises in Georgia. Very quickly, increased imports from other countries would close any supply gaps. In addition, many imported consumption goods, like Ukrainian orange juice, are but luxury for ordinary Georgians, who buy their food in cheap domestic markets that sell almost exclusively local products.
Effects on exports
A small anecdote may illustrate the status of Georgian products in the Russian market. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Stalin used to invite his comrades to his Kuntsevo dacha almost every night. At these occasions, he drank only semi-sweet Georgian red wine. His clique, usually preferring Russian vodka, adopted this habit out of fear to displease the dictator. Yet the real highlight of these nightly gatherings took place after midnight, when an opulent feast began, featuring all the delicacies of the Georgian cuisine. Through Stalin (and the fact that Georgia was a preferred destination of Soviet tourism), Georgian food obtained an excellent reputation in most countries of the former Soviet Union, and, to the dismay of Georgians, some younger Russians even do not know that Khinkali is not an originally Russian dish.
As can be seen in Graph 2, Russia and Ukraine are among the top 5 destinations for Georgian produce, together absorbing about 14% of total Georgian exports in 2013. In 2006, two Georgian products that are traditionally highly popular in Russia, namely wine and mineral water (the famous “Borjomi” brand), were banned from the Russian market. Yet in the wake of the diplomatic thaw that set in after the new government assumed power last year, this ban was lifted, and in 2013, the export of these goods regained momentum. In 2013, 68% of all wine exported from Georgia was sold in Russia and Ukraine (44 and 24 percentage points, respectively). In both countries, Georgian wines are sold at the higher end of the price range and are typically consumed by people with middle and high income. It is likely that these exports, in particular those to Ukraine, will be affected considerably by the crisis. This may happen through decreased demand for luxury foods and through a possible depreciation of the Ukrainian hryvna and the ruble vis-à-vis the Georgian lari.
Another sector that may be affected by the situation in Ukraine is the car re-export business. Georgia imports huge numbers of used cars from the U.S., Europe, and Japan, and passes them on to countries in the region. While this business hardly yields potential for real economic progress, it accounts for roughly 25% of Georgian exports! Of these 25%, about 7 percentage points go to Russia and Ukraine. Moreover, many cars are imported to Georgia on the land route from Europe through Ukraine and Russia (often driven by private, small-scale importers). If it will become more difficult to cross the border between Russia and Ukraine, this business, providing income to many low-skilled Georgians, may be at risk.
It should also be noted that Ukrainians and Russians make up an ever-increasing share of the tourists coming to Georgia (though the biggest group of tourists are Israelis). Also through this channel, an economic downturn in Ukraine and Russia will have unpleasant consequences for Georgia.
Effects on capital flows
According to the National Bank of Georgia, in 2013 a total of 801 mln USD was flowing in from Russia (see Graph 3). Ukraine contributed 45 mln USD to the money inflows, still significant for an economy as small as Georgia’s. An economic downturn in Russia and Ukraine would hit many Georgian citizens, often pensioners and elderly people, who depend on remittances of their children and other family members sent from these countries. This may aggravate a trend that already exists: in January 2014, money inflows decreased by 4% from Russia and by 5% from Ukraine (compared to January 2013).
Long-run economic consequences
Most of the economic dynamics Georgia experienced since 2003 was “catch up growth”. A country permeated by corruption, with a dysfunctional police and judicial system, without protection of property rights and contract enforcement, will grow almost automatically when the government restarts to fulfill its basic functions. Yet once this phase of returning to normal economic circumstances is over (Georgia probably is already in this situation), high growth rates can hardly be achieved without a strong export orientation of the economy, in particular when an economy is as small as Georgia’s. Most economists concerned with Georgia are therefore struggling to identify economic sectors where Georgia is in a good position to develop export potential. The National Competitiveness Report for Georgia, written in 2013 by the ISET Policy Institute on behalf of USAID, therefore extensively discusses the question what Georgia can deliver to the world. Though not related to export in a classical sense, the report points out that one of the advantages Georgia has is its geographical location, providing for possibilities to transform Georgia into a logistics hub.
There are three main routes to transport goods from Europe to the Central Asian countries (e.g. from Hamburg to Taraz in Kazakhstan). One route goes via the Baltic ports of Klaipeda or Riga, and then through Ukraine and Russia, and another route goes overland through Ukraine. A third one, the so called Caucasian Transit Corridor, has the Georgian port city of Poti and Turkey as its Western connection points, then goes through Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the Caspian Sea, and further east it splits up into a Kazakhstan and a Turkmenistan branch.
According to the Almaty based company Comprehensive Logistics Solutions, the fastest and cheapest route is the one through the Baltic ports. The transport from Hamburg to Taraz takes around 33 days and costs 6,220 USD per standard container. The overland transport via Ukraine takes around 34 days and costs 7,474 USD. Finally, transport through the CTC currently takes the longest time, namely around 40 days, and costs 6,896 USD.
Unlike many other economic activities, competition for transportation is more or less a zero-sum game played by nations. If transport through Ukraine and Russia will be restrained due to closed borders and political and economic instability, the total transport volume will not change substantially. Rather, instead of going through the northern routes, the goods will flow through the CTC. A similar development could be observed when the embargo against Iran was tightened and shipping goods through Iranian ports became increasingly difficult for Armenia and Azerbaijan. As a result, Azerbaijan, traditionally importing through Iran and exporting through Poti, now facilitates both its imports and exports through Poti.
This is a great chance for Georgia if it wants to become serious about transforming into a logistics hub. In our policy recommendations, we will speak about how to utilize on this opportunity.
Policy recommendations
Georgia can do little to bolster the short-run effects that are transmitted through the trade and capital flow channels. Political decision makers should be aware of problems that might arise for particularly vulnerable groups in the population, like pensioners who lose income in case remittances from Russia and Ukraine run dry, and help out with social support if necessary.
Regarding the long-run impact, Georgia should use this opportunity for gaining ground in the competition with northern transit routes. The Caucasus Transit Corridor can become much faster and cheaper if (a) a deepwater port and modern port facilities with warehouses will be built in Poti, (b) the road and train infrastructure will be improved, and (c) it will be easier to bring cargo over the Caspian Sea. Regarding the latter point, it would be important to assist Azerbaijan in improving the port management at Baku (in particular reducing corruption), and in reforming the monopolistic Azerbaijani State Caspian Sea Shipping Company.
Azerbaijan invests 775 mln USD into the Georgian part of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, proving their serious interest to upgrade CTC. Given this impressive commitment of Azerbaijan, Georgia should not stand back.
Conclusion
The crisis in Ukraine yields short-run risks and long-run opportunities for the Georgian economy. While there is little that can be done about the risks, the opportunities call for courageous steps to improve the Caucasus Transit Corridor. If the countries that hold stakes in the CTC are now further reducing the cost of transportation and make the route faster and more customer-friendly, the CTC may establish itself as the main trading route connecting Europe and Central Asia. Once critical investments have taken place, CTC’s advantage could be sustained beyond the current crisis. It is a competitive route that simply needs upgrading, which can happen now as a fallout of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia.
References
- Leading GDP Indicators for Georgia, The ISET Policy Institute, February 2014, http://www.iset-pi.ge/index.php?article_id=711
- The National Competitiveness Report for Georgia, The ISET Policy Institute, 2013, http://www.iset-pi.ge/index.php?article_id=713
- World Economic Outlook, The International Monetary Fund, October 2013, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/
Fact or Fiction? The Reversal of the Gender Education Gap Across the World and the Former Soviet Union
In this policy brief, I discuss the reversal of the gender education gap in many countries around the world – a fact that is still not widely known, although is increasingly gaining attention. I describe recent studies that have documented this fact for both developed and developing countries and have provided evidence on the trend. As there has not been much analysis of the education gap in the former Soviet Union countries, I present some measures of the education gap in the USSR and FSU countries, and compare them to other countries around the world. Finally, I discuss the potential causes of the reversal identified in the literature and how the reversal of the gap is related to other gender disparities.
Who Needs a Safety Net?
One definition of safety net found on the internet is the following: “a net placed to catch an acrobat or similar performer in case of a fall”. This brings to my mind the thrilling performances I saw at the circus when I was a child and I have to admit in most cases there was a safety net. Only in some rare occasions it was removed and the increased tension became palpable. We knew that only the best acrobats could dare performing in those conditions since the slightest mistake or distraction could lead to disastrous consequences. Born in this context, the term safety net has soon been extended beyond circuses. The same internet source, right below the standard definition adds: “fig. a safeguard against possible hardship or adversity: a safety net for workers who lose their jobs”.
Imagine you are a European worker in a time of crisis. You are the only breadwinner in your family and you become unemployed. The situation of your family is going to worsen significantly, but you know that – at least for some time – you and your family will be able to survive thanks to your unemployment benefits and to other forms of social support. In the meantime, hopefully, you will be able to get a new job – maybe thanks to the help from a public employment agency – or will at least be admitted into some publicly sponsored training program increasing your probability to get a new job.
Imagine that, instead of being fired, you get sick. Luckily most of the costs for your care will be covered by the public healthcare system. You will continue receiving your salary (with a reduction as the length of the period of sickness goes beyond a certain number of days) for at least a few months, typically until you can go back to work. If your illness is really serious, at some point you will not receive compensation but you will keep your job unless you stay away from your workplace continuously for a very long period. Should you lose your job, you will still be able to rely for a while on unemployment benefits and on additional forms of social support. Your family will be suffering of course, but at least you will be able to “gain some time” to find a solution.
Now imagine a different scenario. You lose your job. You get one month severance pay but no unemployment benefits. The labor market is hardly creating new jobs, so you have a high probability of not finding a good job and will have either to accept to be unemployed for a long period of time or to work in badly paid temporary jobs, maybe in very dangerous working places (because nobody is in charge of checking working conditions). In case you choose not to risk and to try looking for safer jobs, most likely during your unemployment period you will not receive any training and certainly no support from (non-existing) public employment agencies.
Or, what if you are sick and all healthcare costs fall on you. If you have a private health insurance you get some assistance. If not, you have to dissave in order to get some treatment. You receive one month of salary, after which your employer is free to fire you without having to give you any compensation. So you suddenly find yourself sick and not only unable to help your family but being a burden for it, with no public support and no income. To be fair, you might receive some sort of assistance, after you have applied to the government for support as a needy household if your situation has deteriorated so much that you cannot ensure even your subsistence (maybe by selling assets). However, this support is typically not that high.
This second case is not that of a fictional country. It is a representation of the conditions of most workers in Georgia.
If you keep this in mind, you will not be surprised looking at the following pictures taken from the latest EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) Transition Report, titled: “Crisis and Transition: the People’s Perspective”. The tables and pictures included in the report are based on a series of household surveys conducted by the EBRD in a number of transition countries plus a few selected countries of Western Europe. The aim of this study was to study how the crisis had affected household’s welfare in order to draw some conclusion about the potential vulnerability of countries and households to future crises.
Figure 1.
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2011
In this first picture Georgia (in red) stands out as very much above the regression line. It is what is defined as an “outlier”. In this case, being an outlier means exactly that Georgian households, despite having been themselves hit by a relative smaller number of negative events, appear to have suffered much more than households in similar situations in other countries. In other words, they were forced to cut their consumption much more than households in other countries.
The second picture (below) allows us to see where Georgian households had to cut their consumption. Of course, cutting the consumption of luxury goods is not the same as cutting the consumption of food or healthcare. Looking at the second picture, the situation in Georgia appears even worse. Most households have had to cut exactly where one would hope they had not to: staple food consumption and visits to doctors.
Neither of these cuts bode well for the future of Georgian households, as they are likely to have long lasting (negative) effects. Especially as a new world crisis seems approaching.
Figure 2.
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2011
Why this discussion about Georgia and safety nets? The reason is because for some time now Georgia has been presented consistently as a showcase country with an impressive reform track (including an extremely liberal labor market reform that has drastically reduced all forms of workers’ protection) and equally impressive growth rates.
Much less has been said about how Georgian people have been affected by these reforms. For sure the picture that emerges from the EBRD study is of a country where households are extremely vulnerable to any slowing down of the economy or worsening of the macroeconomic conditions, much more than in most other countries.
Again, looking at the EBRD study, we can see that this is related to at least two factors: on the one hand the extremely weak safety net provided by the state; on the other hand, the limited success (so far) in translating high growth rates into a substantial amount of new, “good quality” jobs. This is what led the EBRD, after presenting these results to suggest the following two key priorities for the Georgian government: “…to create a basis for export led growth… […] but also to establish an effective social safety net”.
I would like to conclude with my personal answer to the question: “who needs a safety net?” The answer is a lot of people, I would say, especially in times of crisis like the current. After all, not even the best acrobats would dare to perform all the time without it, especially when they are trying their most dangerous performances for the first time and when preconditions are less than perfect. Why? Because the cost of failure would be too high. Like in the case of acrobats – even more, as they are not risking their own lives – policy makers have the responsibility of taking into account in their evaluations what could go wrong and think of ways to minimize negative impacts on the population.
Most economists would agree that only a sustainable increase in the welfare of citizens (including the most vulnerable ones) is the true sign of development of a country in the long run. Assuring this, as someone sometimes seems to forget, requires also creating and maintaining – especially when markets are less than perfect, a solid social safety net.
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Five Million Tourists in Georgia by 2015 – a Myth or a Nightmarish Reality?
Anybody traveling on the Georgian countryside will be astonished by the pace of development. Mestia, the capital of Svaneti, resembles one big construction site. The new concrete road from Zugdidi promises to shorten the travel time to 2 hours. A whole network of ski lifts is currently being planned, carrying a promise of turning Svaneti, a long-isolated region of Georgia, into the Switzerland of the Caucasus.
Mestia and Svaneti are representative of a broader effort by the Georgian government, assisted by international financial institutions, to develop the Georgian tourism sector. This has mainly involved infrastructure projects and tax breaks to encourage private investment in the tourism industry. A very partial list of touristic destinations that have received or are receiving a major facelift includes Old Tbilisi, Mtskheta, Signagi, Kutaisi, Gudauri, Mestia, Batumi, Kobuleti and Anaklia.
Tourism is one of Georgia’s main exporting sectors and earns hard currency and helps to reduce the current account deficit. As a labor intensive industry, it helps to create a lot of formal and informal jobs (particularly in the periphery where they are most needed). The growth in tourism also spurs business development in many related sectors of the economy – agriculture, transportation services, arts and crafts to name just a few.
Georgia is not the only country in the world riding on the wave of tourism expansion. Tourism is currently the fastest growing sector in the global economy, particularly important for developing countries. According to UNWTO tourism barometer, the flow of foreign tourists into developing countries increased by 4.5% in 2011 compared to the previous year. The rate of increase stands at 9% for Central and Eastern European countries.
For Georgia, however, the growth of tourism has been truly spectacular. According to the Georgian Border Security statistics, the number of foreigners visiting Georgia during the first 10 months in 2011 increased by 42% compared to the same period last year. While not reflecting the actual number of tourists (as opposed to foreigners working in Georgia and buyers of re-exported cars), these data illustrate a steep upward trend. Even under most conservative assumptions, the total number of border crossings by foreigners will reach about 2.6 million by the end of 2011, which is 28% above the 2010 level.
Since 2004, incoming tourism has expanded at an impressive average rate of 32% per year, nearly doubling every three years. A simple (simplistic) extrapolation suggests that in four more years, by 2015, Georgia may be receiving more than 5million tourists a year. Is this a realistic estimate? Would it be a blessing or a curse?
What the border crossings statistics conceal is that Georgia remains a very expensive destination, especially during the short high season. According to Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Index for 2011, Georgia is ranked 73rd among 139 countries, the same ranking as in 2009. In particular, Georgia ranked 82nd on information and communication technologies, 105th on air transportation infrastructure and 94th on general infrastructure. Overall, Georgia does better than its South Caucasus neighbors Armenia (100th) and Azerbaijan (87th) but worse than Russia (53rd) and Turkey (50th).
At present, tourists are willing to pay a significant premium to satisfy their curiosity for this Eastern outpost of Western civilization. Despite high prices and mediocre quality of services, Georgia has so far been able to maintain its attraction as an island of democracy; exotic, underexplored and yet secure location with good food and wine. However, as the country enters a period of two closely watched elections in 2012 and 2013, what will be at stake, among other things, is Georgia’s status as a destination of choice for investors, donors, and tourists. As far as mass tourism is concerned, a setback in the global public relations battle could bring into play the “value for money“ factor, making further expansion in the sector more tightly related to infrastructure and service improvements.
Slower growth in tourism may be a blessing in disguise. From the purely economic point of view one has to consider the impact of tourism on long-term economic growth. Unfortunately, tourism – like many other labor intensive service industries – has little potential for substantial productivity growth: it takes about the same amount of labor to cook one khachapuri today as it did in the 19th century. As wages are typically tied to productivity this means that tourism has little potential for long-term income growth. Wages in tourism may eventually increase – a phenomenon known to economists as “Baumol’s cost disease” – when other sectors improve their productivity and start competing for workers with the tourism industry.
Thus, the Georgian government should be advised to worry, not about the sheer number of tourists, but rather the amount of money the tourists spend in the country. According to this view, Georgia should strive to increase the share of relatively wealthy tourists from Western Europe and North America. These tourists account for a meager 3.6% of total border crossings by foreigners in the first 10 months of 2011. A closely related goal should be to smooth the sharp seasonal fluctuations currently plaguing the industry. High season tourism (mainly from the CIS) at “peak load” prices has been growing so far, but there is ultimately a limit to how many tourists Batumi, Kobuleti and Anaklia can absorb in July and August. After all, there are cheaper and better mass-tourism alternatives on the Turkish side of the border. Conversely, increasing offseason tourism would help attract additional investment in human and physical capital and raise the quality of services to a level appropriate for high-end tourism.
Along with the economic pitfalls outlined above, the danger associated with becoming just another “Disneyland” of mass tourism is in losing the very reason why people would want to come to Georgia, as well as losing a part of the national identity. The magnificence of Georgian landscapes is in the wild, untamed nature of their beauty. It is also one of the very few places in Europe where one can still witness and appreciate the tenacity and courage of people who do not merely survive, but “live with” the land, with the nature that is both generous and unforgiving.
Of course, we almost always accept as inevitable the sacrifice of “tradition” for “progress”. Most of the time, it is difficult to tell whether the changes we are going through are for the better or for the worse. In particular, it may depend on what people perceive to be the “core” of their identity. Our feeling is that Georgians as a people have been formed to a great extent by the freedom, the wilderness, and the power of their mountains. Any successful and smart approach to developing the tourism industry would take into consideration these important cultural aspects as well.
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