Tag: Post-War Ukraine

Humanitarian Demining and Ukraine’s Recovery: Lessons Yet to Learn

Posted on December 1, 2025 | Policy Brief

This policy brief examines how land mine action underpins Ukraine’s reconstruction and economic renewal. It outlines the current scale of contamination and the national humanitarian demining strategy. The brief also reviews international experience from countries around the world, discussing the economic recovery driven by demining and the economic efficiency of mine action. It documents significant variation in direct mine action costs across countries and contexts, complicating the assessment of these costs in the case of Ukraine. The brief also discusses the indirect costs arising from systemic inefficiencies in Ukraine’s demining effort, including fragmented governance, shortages of qualified personnel, outdated standards, and security constraints. It concludes that Ukraine’s success in transforming demining into a catalyst for recovery depends on effective coordination, data-driven planning, gender inclusion, and the adoption of best international practices.

Understanding the Scale and Current Need for Humanitarian Demining in Ukraine

As of mid-2025, approximately 137,000 km² of Ukrainian land remains potentially contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). While this is a reduction from 174,000 km² at the end of 2022, Ukraine remains one of the most mine-contaminated countries in the world (Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, 2023; UDA, 2025).

The problem of demining is multidimensional, encompassing both humanitarian and economic consequences. More than six million people currently live in at-risk areas, and the number of mine incidents has already exceeded one thousand. Without addressing the problem, the number of victims could rise to more than 9,000 by 2030 (Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, 2023). Contamination affects some of the world’s most fertile agricultural regions, as well as energy, transport, and residential zones.

The funding needs are substantial. According to UNDP (2024), Ukraine’s total demining bill could reach USD 34–35 billion, requiring tens of thousands of trained specialists. As of early 2025, Ukraine has more than 4,500 sappers and deminers, but this number remains far below national needs. Experts emphasize that the workforce must increase significantly to ensure the timely clearance of contaminated territories. At present, approximately 87 mine-action operators are active in Ukraine, encompassing government bodies, private companies, humanitarian organizations, and international partners (UN Women Ukraine, 2025).

At the same time, the potential economic benefits of demining are immense. According to the TBI (2024) estimates, Ukraine loses about USD 11.2 billion each year (compared to 2021) due to mine contamination. Frontline regions such as Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv are particularly exposed, experiencing a reduction in exports of USD 8.9 billion and a loss of regional tax revenues of USD 1.1 billion annually.

In addressing the problem, the government has recently adopted a National Mine Action Strategy until 2033, which aims to clear about 80% of the de-occupied territories within 10 years (Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, 2024). However, this ambitious plan faces serious systemic challenges, including the dispersion of power among government agencies, insufficient and inconsistent funding, and delays in public procurement and tender processes (UDA, 2025). Thus, humanitarian demining stands at the crossroads of Ukraine’s security and economic recovery, affecting how quickly the country can restore farmland, rebuild infrastructure, and attract investment. Its success depends on efficient resource use, data-driven planning, and the adoption of proven international practices. The following sections examine global experience and economic efficiency in mine action, as well as the key challenges Ukraine must address to achieve tangible and sustainable recovery.

Evidence and Lessons from Global Experience

The problem of humanitarian demining is widespread globally, affecting dozens of post-conflict states across Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Many of these countries, such as Afghanistan, Mozambique, Eritrea, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia, have already undergone large-scale clearance operations and provide tangible evidence of how demining drives economic recovery and social stabilization.

In Afghanistan, humanitarian demining produced wide-ranging socio-economic benefits. It vastly improved mobility and access to resources and markets, served as a prerequisite for broader development initiatives, restored agricultural productivity and employment, and positively influenced mental health and community relations by reducing fear, enabling return, and rebuilding trust within affected populations (UNMAS, 2021).

In Mozambique, large-scale railway clearance reopened a key regional trade corridor, creating more than 400 jobs. The operation restored transport connectivity, enabled the renewal of coal exports, and stimulated agricultural and industrial recovery in the surrounding areas (Lundberg, 2006). In Eritrea, humanitarian demining enabled the return of more than 20,000 refugees within a year, which allowed about 29 villages to resume crop cultivation and schooling; casualty rates for both residents and livestock fell to zero, restoring local food security and rural incomes (Lundberg, 2006).

Sudan offers a contrasting case, where political and logistical barriers pushed costs to nearly USD 45 per m² (Bolton, 2008). Despite high costs, the reopened transport corridors and access to markets demonstrated substantial humanitarian and trade benefits, underscoring that elevated expenditure in complex terrains can still deliver strong socio-economic returns.

Post-war European experiences reinforce these findings. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, humanitarian demining has served as a foundation for sustainable socio-economic recovery, enabling the rebuilding of housing and infrastructure, reducing flood risks, restoring agricultural and forest productivity, improving access to water, and ensuring safe mobility essential for trade and community development (GICHD & UNDP, 2022). Similarly, mine clearance in Croatia has been pivotal to national recovery, restoring access to agricultural and forest land, enabling infrastructure and EU-funded development projects, and supporting tourism and investment in previously contaminated regions (Mine Action Review, 2021).

Collectively, these cases demonstrate that the economic dividends of demining are consistent across contexts. Clearing mines enables agricultural revival, facilitates transport and trade, lowers accident-related health costs, and strengthens confidence in governance. However, incomplete data and fragmented decision-making might delay land release and inflate costs.

For Ukraine, where contamination covers more than 137,000 km² of high-value farmland and industrial zones, these global lessons confirm that mine action must be integrated as a central pillar of the reconstruction process.

Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Humanitarian Demining: Indicators and Limitations

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, in its recent report, defines efficiency in demining as “a measure of how economically resources or inputs are converted to results” (GICHD, 2023, p. 6). In humanitarian demining, this means achieving the maximum area of land safely released or the largest number of explosive items cleared using the least possible resources, without compromising safety. Efficiency, however, differs from effectiveness which is defined in the report as “the extent to which the intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance” (GICHD, 2023, p.6).

Yet, the quantitative framework developed by GICHD primarily focuses on efficiency indicators, particularly cost-based metrics such as cost per square meter of land released, cost per square meter of land fully cleared, and cost per explosive item found. This narrow focus allows for financial comparison but risks overlooking effectiveness dimensions such as the humanitarian, developmental, and social outcomes of mine clearance.

To operationalize this concept, the GICHD study developed a framework of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) to measure economic efficiency across 17 mine-affected countries between 2015 and 2019 (GICHD, 2023, pp.14-17). Three indicators are identified as central for assessing the financial efficiency of mine action operations:

  1. Cost per square metre of land released – measuring the overall cost of returning territory to productive use, encompassing land cleared, reduced, and cancelled. A lower value indicates greater cost efficiency in land release and better-targeted survey and clearance operations.
  2. Cost per square metre of land cleared – reflecting the technical cost of full clearance, which is higher due to intensive labour, equipment, and safety requirements.
  3. Cost per explosive item found – linking financial inputs to tangible outputs, i.e., the average expenditure needed to locate and neutralize one explosive ordnance.

These metrics allow analysts and policymakers to assess how funds are transformed into measurable clearance outcomes. However, as GICHD (2023) stresses, they should be used for internal evaluation and planning, not for direct comparison between countries. Differences in contamination types, topography, labour costs, access, and national data systems make cross-country benchmarking misleading. The report explicitly cautions that “no country should be considered as having a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ performance in terms of operational efficiency purely on the basis of the KPI values” (GICHD, 2023, p.21). Even similar indicators can yield different implications depending on whether operations are clearance-driven (activity-based) or survey-driven (decision-based). To illustrate the scale and variation in demining costs globally, Table 1 presents key indicators of humanitarian demining costs as of 30 November 2022.

As shown in Table 1, costs per square meter of released territory range from USD 0.02/m² (Thailand) to USD 5.87/m² (Lebanon), i.e., a 293-fold difference. Similarly, the cost per explosive item ranged from USD 274 (Sri Lanka) to USD 13,450 (Croatia) (Rohozian, 2024). Such disparities illustrate that comparing “price per m²” without context or establishing the “benchmark” in the field is quite problematic.

Table 1. Key indicators of the cost of demining across countries, as of 30 Nov. 2022

State  Cost per square meter of territory released from the local socio-economic system, USD Cost per square meter of territory that has been cleared in the local socio-economic system, USD Cost of a single found explosive item in the local socio-economic system, USD
Angola 0,32 7,88 9042
Afghanistan 0,79 1,48 911
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0,36 19,06 6059
Vietnam 0,28 0,65 500
Western Sahara 0,41 0,51 2183
Zimbabwe 1,89 4,49 289
Iraq 0,81 1,32 4437
Cambodia 0,22 0,37 678
Laos 0,99 0,99 356
Lebanon 5,87 10,65 2204
South Sudan 0,49 4,07 5667
Serbia 1,07 1,96 9757
Sudan 2,89 5,78 457
Tajikistan 1,29 1,98 1721
Thailand 0,02 2,25 281
Croatia 1,03 1,23 13450
Sri Lanka 2,26 3,65 274

Source: Rohozian, 2024.

Moreover, the study acknowledges limitations in data standardisation and completeness. Variations in how organisations record and report costs affect comparability. Aggregated national averages can obscure contextual factors such as contamination density or security conditions. For these reasons, GICHD recommends interpreting efficiency metrics in conjunction with qualitative information, including terrain, contamination type, and labour structure, and always balancing cost-efficiency with safety and effectiveness.

However, drawing on global patterns and Ukraine’s official USD 34–35 billion cost estimate, we can expect Ukraine to fall within the middle range of international demining costs. It will likely be more expensive than low-cost cases in Asian contexts but substantially below the extreme-cost cases, such as Lebanon, due to its terrain, institutional capacity, and ability to scale mechanized clearance.

Challenges in Ukraine’s Humanitarian Demining

In addition to the substantial direct costs of humanitarian demining, it is essential to understand the indirect costs generated by systemic inefficiencies, i.e., costs that arise not from clearance itself, but from delays, duplication, weak coordination, and different shortages.

A review of Ukraine’s current mine-action landscape allows us to identify the main structural challenges that contribute to elevated indirect costs. These include fragmented governance, incomplete and inconsistent data, security-related access constraints, and a shortage of trained personnel.

One of the most pressing challenges is the fragmentation of coordination and governance. Responsibilities remain dispersed across numerous actors, including the Ministry of Defence, the State Emergency Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Economy, the National Mine Action Authority, and over 20 accredited NGOs and private contractors.

According to the UDA (2025), this overlap of mandates and inconsistent prioritisation frameworks frequently results in duplicated surveys and delayed task approvals, reducing efficiency and transparency. At the same time, the idea of consolidating all authority within a single centralised body would risk excessive concentration of power and reduced accountability. A more effective path forward would be to strengthen the existing Mine Action Center’s coordinating role while maintaining clear institutional separation between policymaking and operational implementation, ensuring transparency, competition, and sustained donor confidence.

A persistent shortage of qualified personnel represents one of the most critical challenges to scaling up humanitarian demining in Ukraine. According to UNDP (2025), the country currently employs around 4,500 trained deminers, while full national recovery will require at least 10,000 professionals over the next decade (TBI, 2024). The workforce is under pressure from wartime mobilization, which diverts potential recruits to defense roles, and from a shortage of experienced supervisors and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) specialists, limiting the number of teams that can safely operate simultaneously. The National Mine Action Strategy for the Period up to 2033 (Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, 2024) further acknowledges that Ukraine’s training system is inadequate for the sector’s needs.

Current state-level training for the profession of “Sapper (demining)” follows military-oriented standards that demand extensive time and resources but offer limited relevance to humanitarian operations. Only ten educational institutions are licensed to train deminers, and only a few conduct active courses. To close this capacity gap, the Strategy calls for expanding domestic training infrastructure, establishing accredited qualification centers, recognizing informal and partial training, and developing new professional standards tailored to humanitarian demining.

Another set of pressing challenges in Ukraine’s humanitarian demining effort concerns data deficits and security limitations. Incomplete and inconsistent mapping of hazardous areas continues to undermine planning and coordination. According to the Ministry of Economy (2023), Ukraine inherited multiple legacy databases using different coordinate systems and lacking harmonized metadata, resulting in duplication and delays in verifying “released” land. The absence of a unified digital mine-action information management system constrains both operational oversight and donor transparency. As Rohozian (2024) observes, such imperfect information leads to “erroneous management decisions” that increase total costs and prolong recovery.

In addition, large areas in the east and south remain off-limits due to ongoing hostilities, unexploded ordnance, and damaged infrastructure. Fluctuating front lines, dense contamination, and logistical barriers raise insurance and hazard-pay costs, shorten fieldwork periods, and cause rapid equipment deterioration.

Thus, addressing these interconnected challenges is essential to accelerate Ukraine’s reconstruction and ensure that mine action effectively supports the safe return of communities, the revival of agricultural production, and the broader recovery of the national economy.

The Role of Women in Humanitarian Demining

The role of women in Ukraine’s humanitarian demining sector deserves special attention, as they have become an integral part of the national workforce serving as deminers, team leaders, and technical-survey dog handlers. Their growing participation reflects both professional competence and the importance of gender-inclusive recovery efforts (UN Women Ukraine, 2025).

However, until 2017, Ukrainian legislation classified demining as a “dangerous profession,” barring women from formal employment in this field (Ministry of Health of Ukraine, 2017). Following sustained advocacy by international organizations, this restriction was lifted, granting women official access to mine-action professions. Since then, the number of women in operational and leadership roles has grown steadily.

Nevertheless, persistent stereotypes suggesting that demining is unsuitable for women have been disproved by practice, as reported by UN Women Ukraine, 2025. In practice, modern safety protocols and technologies such as drones and remotely operated vehicles allow women and men to perform tasks under equal safety conditions.

Following the lifting of the employment ban in 2017, which opened demining professions to women, mine-action organizations began reconsidering how to better meet women’s practical needs in the field. Recognizing that protective gear and uniforms had long been designed for men, many operators are now adapting equipment to fit women’s bodies, enhancing both comfort and operational efficiency.

These findings further demonstrate that gender-inclusive employment contributes to a reconstruction process that benefits all citizens and fosters social recovery based on principles of equity and shared responsibility.

Conclusions

In conclusion, humanitarian demining represents a strategic prerequisite for Ukraine’s reconstruction, food security, and long-term economic recovery. International experience demonstrates that mine clearance delivers substantial socio-economic dividends by restoring access to land, enabling trade, and rebuilding local livelihoods. However, the economic efficiency of mine action cannot be measured through simple cross-country comparisons. Costs per square meter or per explosive item differ widely depending on terrain, contamination density, labor costs, and institutional frameworks. Therefore, efficiency should be evaluated in context, i.e., by how well resources are transformed into measurable recovery outcomes without compromising safety or inclusiveness.

For Ukraine, transforming demining into a genuine driver of recovery requires addressing several domestic challenges. Fragmented governance and overlapping mandates continue to reduce coordination and transparency, while limited training capacity and workforce shortages constrain operational progress. Inconsistent data systems and incomplete mapping impede strategic planning, and security conditions still restrict access to large contaminated areas in the east and south of Ukraine. Overcoming these barriers will require strengthening the coordinating role of the National Mine Action Center and expanding professional education and certification programs.

Equally important, the growing participation of women in mine action deserves special recognition. Since the 2017 reform that lifted employment restrictions, women have become active as deminers, team leaders, and survey specialists, demonstrating both competence and leadership in this traditionally male-dominated field. Promoting gender-balanced participation will strengthen Ukraine’s mine action capacity and align reconstruction with broader principles of equality and social inclusion.

Thus, ensuring that clearance efforts are efficient, transparent, data-driven, and inclusive will determine how effectively Ukraine can restore productive land, rebuild infrastructure, and regain investor confidence.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

The Case for Seizing Russian State Assets

Posted on June 18, 2025 | Policy Brief

Facade of the Central Bank of Russia with Russian flag, symbolizing the debate around seizing Russian state assets to support Ukraine.

This brief examines the legal and economic arguments in the ongoing debate over whether to confiscate Russian state assets frozen in Western democracies and redirect them toward supporting Ukraine’s resilience and reconstruction. It also outlines concrete proposals for how such a measure could be undertaken in compliance with international law and with manageable economic consequences.

At the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, substantial Russian state assets held in Western countries were frozen. While not all countries have disclosed precise figures, estimates place the total between $290–330 billion, most of it held within European jurisdictions. These numbers can be put in perspective to the total global support to Ukraine so far, €267 billion according to the Kiel Institute’s Ukraine Support Tracker. A lively discussion has emerged around the legal, economic, and political feasibility of seizing these assets to support Ukraine. As evident, this would constitute a very substantial addition to the support for the country. Thus far, agreement has only been reached on utilizing the returns on the assets to service a $50 billion loan to Ukraine under the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) mechanism. It has been argued that $50 billion should be enough, but Western contributions to the defence of Ukraine have been around €80 billion per year. The ERA is thus only a partial and very short-term financial solution for Ukraine, while a €300 billion fund based on the seizure of the assets would last perhaps 3-5 years. In short, the size of the fund matter and the principal amount is significantly larger than the fund that has been set up based solely on taxing the returns of the frozen assets.

This brief survey’s the main areas of contention and proposes viable pathways forward. It focuses on the legal and economic dimensions, setting aside moral arguments—which are broadly accepted given Russia’s unprovoked aggression and the destruction it has caused. Ultimately, the question is a political one: whether the legal justification and economic trade-offs favour asset seizure over other financing methods.

The Legal Arguments

Opposition to seizure often cites the principle of sovereign immunity. Yet, international law permits exceptions through countermeasures—acts that would otherwise be unlawful but are allowed in response to grave violations by another state. Additionally, asset confiscation may be lawful when enforcing international judgments (other possible legal avenues are for instance explored in Webb (2024), though in the end deemed as less likely to gain traction and legal approval). In both cases, the goal is to induce compliance with international obligations and secure reparations. A further legal basis lies in the doctrine of collective self-defense, which permits states not directly attacked to aid those that are, in response to unlawful aggression (Vlasyuk, 2024).

Critics often note that countermeasures should be temporary and reversible. However, as Vlasyuk (2024) points out, international law qualifies reversibility as being required only “as far as possible.” This implies that in cases of severe violations—where reversible countermeasures have failed—non-reversible actions may be justified. One proposed mechanism ties the frozen assets to future war reparations, allowing permanent transfers only if Russia refuses to comply with a future reparations ruling. Since reparation should go to the victim of Russia’s aggression, it also means that it is Ukraine that has the ultimate claim on the frozen Russian assets. This implies that any decision of confiscation and governance structure for transferring funds to Ukraine should be made with the consent of Ukraine. Put differently; even if the money is in Western financial institutions, there are good reasons to make sure the resources are used according to Ukrainian preferences.

The Economic Arguments

The principal economic concerns surrounding asset seizure are its potential impact on confidence in European capital markets, including risks of capital flight, increased interest rates, and diminished credibility of the euro. There are also fears of reciprocal actions by Russia against remaining Western investments.

These concerns, however, are increasingly overstated. The major shock to financial markets occurred when the assets were first frozen; any anticipated impact should now be fully priced in. Moreover, a viable reserve currency must be supported by convertibility, sound economic governance, and rule of law—features absent in countries like China, Gulf states, or most other emerging economies. The yen and Swiss franc lack either scale or stability. Despite previous sanctions and the 2022 asset freeze, the dollar and euro still account for around 80 percent of global foreign exchange reserves (The International Working Group on Russian Sanctions, 2023). Given the current crisis of confidence in U.S. fiscal governance, the euro remains especially robust.

The extraordinary nature of the situation also diminishes fears of setting a destabilizing precedent. Investors alarmed by this measure may not be long-term assets to Western markets but rather criminal states or individuals that should not be protected by the West’s financial and legal systems. More broadly, it signals to authoritarian regimes that aggressive actions will carry financial consequences. Western firms still operating in Russia have had ample time to disinvest, and those that remain should not constrain public policy.

Importantly, the costs of inaction must be considered. Financing Ukraine through increased public borrowing could raise interest rates across the eurozone and widen yield spreads between fiscally stronger and weaker member states. Seizing Russian assets, by contrast, may be economically safer, more equitable, and legally sound (International Working Group on Russian Sanctions, 2023).

Suggested Approaches

Several proposals aim to facilitate asset transfer in ways consistent with international law and economic stability.

Zelikow (2025) proposes the establishment of a trust fund to lawfully assume custody of frozen assets. This fund—grounded in the legal doctrine of countermeasures—would not represent outright confiscation but a conditional hold. Assets would remain Russia’s property until disbursed to victims of its aggression. A board of trustees would oversee disbursements—for example, servicing ERA loans or financing reconstruction. In this proposal, the fund would broadly define “victims” to include Ukraine and neighbouring states that have borne costs, such as accommodating refugees. This can perhaps help build political support among Western countries for the trust fund, but it has the obvious drawback that it may imply less support to Ukraine. Zelikow (2025) argues that institutions like the Bank of England or World Bank could manage the fund, given past experience with similar arrangements, potentially issuing bonds backed by the assets to accelerate support.

Vlasyuk (2024) proposes a multilateral treaty among coalition states recognizing Russia’s grave breaches of international law. This would provide a unified legal basis for transferring central bank assets to Ukraine via a compensation fund. National legislation would follow—similar to the U.S. REPO Act—tailored narrowly to address such violations. These laws should include safeguards, such as provisions to suspend asset seizure if hostilities end and reparations are paid.

Dixon et al. (2024) propose a “reparation loan” backed by Ukraine’s reparations claims. The EU or G7 would lend to Ukraine, using these claims as collateral. If Russia fails to pay after a ruling by a UN-backed claims commission, the frozen assets could be seized. This approach aligns well with the requirement for reversibility in countermeasures and may also reassure financial markets.

Conclusions

In summary, compelling legal arguments support the transfer or confiscation of Russian state assets under international law. Meanwhile, fears of damaging economic consequences appear increasingly unfounded. Any meaningful support for Ukraine—whether through asset seizure or public borrowing—will carry financial implications. However, using Russian rather than Western taxpayer resources is both morally and politically compelling.

What is now needed is coordinated political will and a practical, legally sound mechanism to operationalize asset transfers. With sound governance, such a step would not only finance Ukraine’s recovery but reinforce the international legal order and deter future aggression. An arrangement that makes sure all resources go to Ukraine—and not toward covering losses incurred by supporting Western countries—should be prioritized.

References

  • Dixon, H., Buchheit, L. C., & Singh, D. (2024). Ukrainian reparation loan: How it would work. The International Working Group on Russian Sanctions.
  • The International Working Group on Russian Sanctions. (2023). Working Group paper #15. Stanford University.
  • Vlasyuk, A. (2024). Legal report on confiscation of Russian state assets for the reconstruction of Ukraine. KSE Institute.
  • Webb, P. (2024). Legal options for confiscation of Russian state assets to support the reconstruction of Ukraine. European Parliament.
  • Zelikow, P. (2025). A fresh look at the Russian assets: A proposal for international resolution of sanctioned accounts (Hoover Institution Essay). Hoover Institution Press.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Ukraine’s Fight Is Our Fight: The Need for Sustained International Commitment

Posted on February 24, 2025 | Policy Brief

A large Ukrainian flag being carried by a crowd of demonstrators in Lithuania, symbolizing Ukraine International Commitment and global solidarity against aggression.

We are at a critical juncture in the defense of Ukraine and the liberal world order. The war against Ukraine is not only a test of Europe’s resilience but also a critical moment for democratic nations to reaffirm their values through concrete action. This brief examines Western support to Ukraine in the broader context of international efforts, putting the order of magnitudes in perspective, and emphasizing the west’s superior capacity if the political will is there. Supporting Ukraine to victory is not just the morally right thing to do, but economically rational from a European perspective.

As the U.S. support to the long-term survival of Ukraine is becoming increasingly uncertain, European countries need to step up. This is a moral obligation, to help save lives in a democratic neighbor under attack from an autocratic regime. But it is also in the self-interest of European countries as the Russian regime is threatening the whole European security order. A Russian victory will embolden the Russian regime to push further, forcing European countries to dramatically increase defense spending, cause disruptions to global trade flows, and generate another wave of mass-migration. This brief builds on a recent report (Becker et al., 2025) in which we analyze current spending to support Ukraine, put that support in perspective to other recent political initiatives, and discuss alternative scenarios for the war outcome and their fiscal consequences. We argue that making sure that Ukraine wins the war is not only the morally right thing to do, but also the economically rational alternative.

The International Support to Ukraine

The total support provided to Ukraine by its coalition of Western democratic allies since the start of the full-scale invasion exceeded by October 2024 €200 billion. This assistance, which includes both financial, humanitarian, and military support, can be categorized in various ways, and its development over time can be analyzed using data compiled by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. A summary table of their estimates of aggregate support is provided below.

A particularly relevant aspect in light of recent news is that approximately one-third of total disbursed aid has come from the United States. The U.S. has primarily contributed military assistance, accounting for roughly half of all military aid provided to Ukraine. In contrast, the European Union—comprising both EU institutions and bilateral contributions from member states—stands as the largest provider of financial support. This financial assistance is crucial for sustaining Ukraine’s societal functions and maintaining the state budget.

Table 1. International support to Ukraine, Feb 2022 – Oct 2024

Source: Trebesch et al. (2024).

Moreover, the EU has signaled a long-term commitment to provide, in the coming years, an amount comparable to what has already been given. This EU strategy ensures greater long-term stability and predictability, guaranteeing that Ukraine has reliable financial resources to sustain state operations in the years ahead. Consequently, while a potential shift in U.S. policy regarding future support could pose challenges, it would not necessarily be insurmountable.

What is crucial is that Ukraine’s allies remain adaptable, and that the broader coalition demonstrates the ability to adjust its commitments, as this will be essential for sustaining the necessary level of assistance moving forward.

Putting the Support in Perspective

To assess whether the support provided to Ukraine is truly substantial, it is essential to place it in context through meaningful comparisons. One approach is to examine it in historical terms, particularly in relation to past instances of large-scale military and financial assistance. A key historical benchmark is the Second World War, when military aid among the Allied powers played a decisive role in shaping the outcome of the conflict. Extensive resources were allocated to major military operations spanning multiple continents, with the United States and the United Kingdom, in particular, dedicating a significant share of their GDP to support their allies, including the Soviet Union, France, and other nations.  As seen in Figure 1, by comparison, the current level of aid to Ukraine, while substantial and essential to its defense, remains considerably smaller in relation to GDP.

Figure 1. Historical comparisons

Source: Trebesch et al. (2024).

Another way to assess the scale of support to Ukraine is by comparing it to other major financial commitments made by governments in response to crises. While the aid allocated to Ukraine is significant in absolute terms, it remains relatively modest when measured against the scale of other programs, see Figure 2.

A recent example is the extensive subsidies provided to households and businesses to mitigate the impact of surging energy prices since 2022.  Sgaravatti et al. (2021) concludes that most European countries implemented energy support measures amounting to between 3 and 6 percent of GDP. Specifically, Germany allocated €157 billion, France and Italy each committed €92 billion, the UK spent approximately €103 billion. These figures represent 5 to 10 times the amount of aid given to Ukraine so far, with some countries, such as Italy, allocating even greater relative sums. On average, EU countries have spent about five times more on energy subsidies than on Ukraine aid. Only the Nordic countries and Estonia have directed more resources toward Ukraine than toward energy-related support. Although not all allocated funds have been fully disbursed, the scale of these commitments underscores a clear political and financial willingness to address crises perceived as directly impacting domestic economies.

Figure 2. EU response to other shocks (billions of €)

Source: Trebesch et al. (2024).

Another relevant comparison is the Pandemic Recovery Fund, also known as Next Generation EU. With a commitment of over €800 billion, this fund represents the EU’s comprehensive response to the economic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. Again, the support to Ukraine appears comparatively small, about one seventh of the Pandemic Recovery Fund.

The support to Ukraine is also much smaller in comparison to the so-called “Eurozone bailout”, the financial assistance programs provided to several Eurozone member states (Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal) during the sovereign debt crisis between 2010 and 2012. The programs were designed to stabilize the economies hit hard by the crisis and to prevent the potential spread of instability throughout the Eurozone.

Overall, the scale of these commitments underscores a clear political and financial willingness and ability to address crises perceived as directly impacting domestic citizens. This raises the question of whether the relatively modest support for Ukraine reflects a lack of concern among European voters. However, this does not appear to be the case. In survey data from six countries – Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland – fielded in June 2024, most respondents express satisfaction with current aid levels, and a narrow majority in most countries even supports increasing aid (Eck and Michel, 2024).

A further illustration comes from the Eurobarometer survey conducted in the spring of 2024 which asked: “Which of the following [crises] has had the greatest influence on how you see the future?”. Respondents could choose between different crises, including those mentioned above, and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Figure 3 illustrates the total commitments made by EU countries for Ukraine up until October 31, 2024, compared to other previously discussed support measures, represented by the blue bars. The yellow bars, on the other hand, show a counterfactual allocation of these funds, based on public priorities as indicated in the Eurobarometer survey. Longer yellow bars indicate that a higher proportion of respondents perceived this crisis as having a greater negative impact on their outlook for the future. By comparing the actual commitments (blue bars) with this hypothetical allocation (yellow bars)—which reflects how resources might have been distributed if they aligned with the population’s stated priorities—it becomes evident that there is substantial public backing for maintaining a high level of support for Ukraine. The results show that the population prioritizes the situation in Ukraine above several other economic issues, including those that directly affect their own personal finances.

Figure 3. Support to Ukraine compared to other EU initiatives – what do voters think?

Source: Trebesch et al. (2024); Niinistö (2024); authors’ calculations.

The Costs of Not Supporting Ukraine

When discussing the costs of support to Ukraine it is important to understand what the correct counterfactual is. The Russian aggression causes costs for Europe irrespective of what actions we take. Those costs are most immediately felt in Ukraine, with devastating human suffering, the loss of lives, and a dramatic deterioration in all areas of human wellbeing. Also in the rest of Europe, though, the aggression has immediate costs, in the economic sphere primarily in the form of dramatically increased needs for defense spending, migration flows, and disruptions to global trade relationships. These costs are difficult to determine exactly, but they are likely to be substantially higher in the case of a Russian victory. Binder and Schularik (2024) estimate increased costs for defense, increased refugee reception and lost investment opportunities for the German industry at between 1-2 percent of GDP in the coming years. As they put it, the costs of ending aid to Ukraine are 10-20 times greater than continuing aid at Germany’s current level.

Any scenario involving continued Russian aggression would demand substantial and sustained economic investments in defense and deterrence across Europe. Clear historical parallels can be drawn looking at the difference in countries’ military spending during different periods of threat intensity. Average military spending in a number of Western countries during the Cold War (1949-1990) was about 4.1 percent of GDP, much higher in the U.S. but also in Germany, France and the UK. In the period after 1989-1991 (the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Soviet Union), the amounts fell significantly. The average for the same group of countries in this period is about 2 percent of GDP and only 1.75 percent if the U.S. is excluded.

Also after 1991 there is evidence of how perceived threats affect military spending. Figure 4 plots the change in military spending over GDP between 2014-2024 against the distance between capital cities and Moscow. The change varies between 0 (Cyprus) and around 2.25 (Poland) and shows a very clear positive correlation between increases in spending and proximity to Moscow.  There has also in general been a substantial increase in military spending after 2022 in several European countries, but in a scenario where Russia wins the war, these will certainly have to be increased further and maintained at a high level for longer.  An increase in annual military expenditure in relation to GDP in the order of one to two percentage points would mean EUR 200-400 billion per year for the EU, while the total EU support to Ukraine from 2022 to today is just over €100 billion.

Figure 4. Increase in military expenditures in relation to distance to Moscow

Source: SIPRI data, authors’ calculations.

A Russian victory would also have profound consequences for migration flows, with the most severe effects likely in the event of Ukraine’s surrender. The Kiel Institute estimates the cost of hosting Ukrainian refugees at €26.5 billion (4.2 percent of GDP) for Poland, one of the countries that received the largest flows. Beyond migration, a Russian victory would also reshape the global geopolitical order. Putin has framed the war as a broader conflict with the U.S. and its democratic allies, while an emerging alliance of Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China is positioning itself as an alternative to the Western-led system. A Ukrainian defeat would weaken the authority of the U.S., NATO, and the rules-based international order, potentially driving more nations in the Global South toward authoritarian powers for military and economic support. This shift could disrupt global trade, affect access to food, metals, and energy. Estimating the full economic impact of such a shift is difficult, but comparisons can be drawn with other global shocks. The European Union’s GDP experienced a significant contraction due to the Covid-19 pandemic, 5.9 percent contraction in real GDP according to Eurostat, 6.6 percent according to the European Central Bank. While the economy rebounded relatively quickly from the pandemic, a permanent geopolitical realignment caused by a Russian victory would likely have far more severe and lasting economic consequences.

Given that Ukraine is at the forefront of Russia’s aggression, its resilience serves as a critical test of Europe’s ability to withstand potential future threats. Thus, strengthening our own security and economic stability in the long term is inseparable from strengthening Ukraine’s resilience now. The fundamental difference lies in the long-term trajectory of these investments. In a scenario where Ukraine is victorious, military and financial aid during the war would eventually transition into reconstruction efforts and preparations for the country’s integration into the EU. This outcome is undeniably more favorable—both economically and in humanitarian terms—not only for Ukraine but for Europe as a whole. Therefore, an even more relevant question is whether the level of support is enough for Ukraine to win the war.

Is Sufficient Support Feasible?

Is it even reasonable to think that we in the West could be able to support Ukraine in such a way that they can militarily defeat Russia? Russia is spending more on its war industry than it has since the Cold War. In 2023, it spent about $110 billion (about 6 percent of GDP). By 2024, this figure is expected to have increased to about $140 billion (about 7 percent of GDP). These amounts are huge and represent a significant part of Russia’s state budget, but they are not sustainable as long as sanctions against Russia remain in place (SITE, 2024). For the EU, on the other hand, the sacrifices needed to match this expenditure would not be as great. The EU’s GDP is about ten times larger than Russia’s, which means that in absolute terms the equivalent amount is only 0.6-0.7 percent of the EU’s GDP. If the U.S. continues to contribute, the share falls to below 0.3 percent of GDP.

Despite the economic advantage of Ukraine’s allies over Russia, several factors could still shift the balance of power in Russia’s favor. One key issue is military production capacity—Russia has consistently outproduced Ukraine’s allies in ammunition and equipment. While Western economies have the resources to manufacture superior weaponry, actual production remains insufficient, requiring both increased capacity and political will. Another challenge is cost efficiency. Military purchasing power parity estimates suggest that Russia can produce approximately 2.5 times more military equipment per dollar than the EU, giving it a cost advantage in volume production. However, this does not fully compensate for its overall economic disadvantage, particularly when factoring in quality differences.

Manpower is also a critical factor. Russia’s larger population allows for sustained mobilization, but at a steep financial cost. Soldiers are recruited at a minimum monthly salary of $2,500, with additional bonuses bringing the first-year cost per recruit to three times the average Russian annual salary. Compensation for injured and fallen soldiers further strains state finances, with estimated payouts reaching 1.5 percent of Russia’s GDP between mid-2023 and mid-2024. Over time, these costs limit Russia’s ability to fund its war effort, making mass mobilization financially unsustainable.

Overall, advanced Western weaponry and superior economic capacity can match Russia’s advantage in manpower if the political will is there. Additionally, Russia’s already fragile demographic situation is deteriorating due to battlefield losses and wartime emigration. Any measure that weakens Russia’s economic capacity—particularly through sanctions and embargoes—diminishes the strategic advantage of its larger population and serves as a crucial complement to military and financial support for Ukraine.

Conclusion

Ukraine’s western allies have provided the country with substantial military and financial support since the onset of the full-scale invasion. Yet, relative to the gravity of the risks involved, previous responses to economic shocks, and citizens’ concerns about the situation, the support is insufficient. The costs of a Russian victory will be higher for Europe, even disregarding the human suffering involved. With U.S. support potentially waning, EU needs to pick up leadership.

References

  • Becker, Torbjörn; and Anders Olofsgård; and Maria Perrotta Berlin; and Jesper Roine. (2025). “Svenskt Ukrainastöd i en internationell kontext: Offentligfinansiella effekter och framtidsscenarier”, Commissioned by the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council.
  • Binder, J. & Schularick, M. (2024). “Was kostet es, die Ukraine nicht zu unterstützen?” Kiel Policy Brief No. 179.
  • Eck, B & Michel, E. (2024). “Breaking the Stalemate: Europeans’ Preferences to Expand, Cut, or Sustain Support to Ukraine”, OSF Preprints, Center for Open Science.
  • Niinistö, S. (2024) .“Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness” European Commission Report.
  • Sgaravatti, G., S. Tagliapietra, C. Trasi and Zachmann, G. (2021). “National policies to shield consumers from rising energy prices”, Bruegel Datasets, first published 4 November 2021.
  • SITE. (2024). “The Russian Economy in the Fog of War”. Commissioned by the Swedish Government.
  • Trebesch, C., Antezza, A., Bushnell, K., Bomprezzi, P., Dyussimbinov, Y., Chambino, C., Ferrari, C., Frank, A., Frank, P., Franz, L., Gerland, C., Irto, G., Kharitonov, I., Kumar, B., Nishikawa, T., Rebinskaya, E., Schade, C., Schramm, S., & Weiser, L. (2024). “The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how?” Kiel Working Paper No. 2218. Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.