Location: Armenia
Trade Diversification, Export Complexity, and Structural Transformation in the South Caucasus and Central Asia
This policy paper examines trade diversification, export sophistication, and economic complexity in the South Caucasus and Central Asia during 2019–2024. Using detailed product-level trade data, it assesses how concentrated or diversified countries’ exports and imports are, as well as changes in the sophistication of the products they export. Evidence from the Atlas of Economic Complexity is also used to evaluate diversification opportunities based on countries’ productive capabilities.
The results reveal substantial heterogeneity across the region. Georgia and Kazakhstan maintain relatively diversified export structures, while Armenia and Azerbaijan exhibit increasing export concentration. Export sophistication improves modestly in several countries, particularly Armenia and Uzbekistan. Overall, the findings suggest gradual but uneven structural transformation across the region, with diversification into more complex export sectors remaining limited.
Introduction
International trade plays a central role in shaping economic growth and macroeconomic stability in the South Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA). The economies of the region are highly open, with trade flows accounting for a large share of GDP in most countries. This strong integration into global markets creates important opportunities for growth, but it also exposes these economies to fluctuations in global demand, commodity prices, and international supply chains, potentially with drastic consequences.
This exposure has become particularly concerning in the context of the global economic environment since 2019. A series of major shocks—including the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East—have disrupted global supply chains, energy markets, and transport corridors. At the same time, geopolitical tensions and shifting industrial and trade policies have increased global policy uncertainty. Frequent changes in tariff policies and strategic trade measures by major economies, including the United States, have further contributed to an increasingly uncertain global trading environment.
In this context, the resilience of national economies depends not only on the scale of trade but also on its structure. Countries with concentrated export baskets or strong dependence on a small number of trading partners are typically more vulnerable to external shocks. By contrast, economies with diversified exports and greater participation in higher-value production tend to be more resilient and better positioned for long-term growth. Three related concepts—trade diversification, product sophistication, and economic complexity—provide useful tools for evaluating these structural characteristics. Diversification captures the breadth of the export basket; product sophistication reflects the income and knowledge intensity of exported goods; and economic complexity reflects the broader productive capabilities that underpin them.
This research brief examines the trade structures of the South Caucasus and Central Asian countries through these three dimensions. Using detailed product-level international trade data, the analysis evaluates export and import diversification, the income and technological content of export baskets, and the broader productive capabilities reflected in economic complexity indicators. By comparing patterns across countries and over time, the brief provides new insights into how the region’s economies are positioned to navigate an increasingly uncertain global trading environment.
Stylized Facts: External Balances and Trade Structure
Recent data highlight two closely related characteristics of South Caucasus and Central Asian economies: substantial variation in external balances and strong exposure to international trade. Current account positions differ significantly across the region and fluctuate over time, reflecting differences in export structures, commodity dependence, and import demand (Figure 1). Resource-rich economies such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan periodically record sizable surpluses driven largely by oil and natural gas exports, while several other economies experience persistent deficits associated with narrower export bases and higher reliance on imports. Particularly large deficits were observed in the Kyrgyz Republic during 2022–2023, illustrating the sensitivity of smaller economies to shifts in trade flows and external demand. These dynamics are closely linked to the high degree of trade openness observed across the region: smaller economies such as Georgia, Armenia, and the Kyrgyz Republic exhibit particularly high trade-to-GDP ratios, while larger economies such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan show somewhat lower—but still substantial—levels of trade exposure.
Figure 1. Current Account as a percentage share of GDP (2019-2025)

Source: Authors’ calculations, IMF
Figure 2 summarizes the geographic composition of trade across the region and highlights the continued importance of a relatively small number of external partners. The European Union, Russia, China, and other CIS economies dominate both export destinations and import sources. Comparing 2019 and 2024, several broad regional shifts emerge. On the export side, the European Union increased its relative importance as a destination for many exports—particularly energy and resource-based products; exports directed to Russia and other CIS markets also grew in importance after 2022. In turn, the share going to the residual category of other countries fell substantially. On the import side, Russia and China strengthened their positions as key suppliers across much of the region, reflecting geographic proximity, established transport corridors, and China’s growing role in regional trade. Imports from the European Union remained important, especially for machinery, equipment, and higher-value manufactured goods.
Overall, despite some adjustments between 2019 and 2024, the region’s trade patterns remain concentrated among a relatively small group of partners. This concentration increases exposure to destination-specific shocks and may weaken trade resilience. It is therefore important to assess not only how diversified exports are, but also how sophisticated and capability-intensive they are, since these characteristics affect an economy’s ability to adapt and redirect trade over time.
Figure 2. Geographic Structure of Regional Exports and Imports for South Caucasus and Central Asian economies, 2019 vs. 2024

Source: Authors’ Calculation, UN Comtrade. Note: Shares of major partner groups (European Union, Russia, China, CIS, and other countries) in total exports and imports of South Caucasus and Central Asian economies.
Methodology
To analyse the structure and evolution of trade patterns, the study employs four complementary indicators: the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), the Theil index, the export sophistication indicators PRODY and EXPY, and the Economic Complexity Index (ECI). These indicators capture different aspects of trade structures, including concentration, diversification, technological sophistication, and productive capabilities embedded in economies.
Trade concentration is first evaluated using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI). The index measures the extent to which a country’s exports or imports are concentrated across products. In this study, the index is calculated at the HS-4 product level, allowing for a detailed assessment of trade structures.
The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index is defined as:
\[
HHI_i^X = \sum_{k=1}^{N} \left(s_{ik}^X\right)^2
\]
\[
HHI_i^M = \sum_{k=1}^{N} \left(s_{ik}^M\right)^2
\]
where
\[
s_{ik}^X = \frac{X_{ik}}{X_i}
\]
\[
s_{ik}^M = \frac{M_{ik}}{M_i}
\]
Here
- $s_{ik}^X$ = the share of the product in country ’s total exports
- $s_{ik}^M$ = the share of the product in country ’s total imports
- $X_{ik}$ denotes exports of the product by country
- $M_{ik}$ denotes imports of the product by country
- $X_i$ denotes the total exports of country
- $M_i$ denotes the total imports of country
The index ranges between 0 and 1. Values close to zero indicate highly diversified trade structures, while values approaching one suggest strong concentration in a limited number of products.
The HHI provides a simple summary of whether trade is concentrated in a small number of products or partners. To complement this, the analysis also uses the Theil index, which captures how unevenly trade is distributed across all destinations or product categories. This distinction matters because similar levels of overall concentration can mask different underlying structures. In plain terms, the Theil index compares the observed trade distribution with a benchmark of equal shares across all categories: a value of zero indicates perfect equality, and the more uneven the distribution, the higher the index. As a result, comparing the two indicators allows a more nuanced assessment of whether concentration changes reflect dominance by a few categories or broader structural shifts in trade patterns.
Unlike the HHI, the Theil index can also be decomposed into within-group and between-group components, which helps identify the sources of concentration. The Theil index for exports and imports is defined as:
\[
T_i^X = \sum_{k=1}^{N} s_{ik}^X \ln\left(\frac{s_{ik}^X}{\bar{s}}\right)
\]
\[
T_i^M = \sum_{k=1}^{N} s_{ik}^M \ln\left(\frac{s_{ik}^M}{\bar{s}}\right)
\]
where
\[\quad \bar{s} = \frac{1}{N}
\]
and N represents the total number of HS-4 products, so that the terms in brackets measure how far the actual share allocation is from the equal share one. Higher values of the Theil index indicate greater concentration of trade across products, while lower values indicate higher diversification. Compared with the HHI, the Theil index has the advantage of being decomposable into within-sector and between-sector components. That is, the HHI can be broken down into group-specific contributions, but it does not provide the same standard additive decomposition with equally clear interpretation. allowing a more detailed examination of diversification patterns. The policy paper assesses export and import concentration using the HHI and Theil indices not only by product categories but also by trading partner countries (in the formulas above, products are replaced by countries).
While the HHI and Theil indices measure concentration and diversification, they do not say much about the type of goods a country exports. To capture this dimension, the analysis uses the PRODY and EXPY indicators introduced by Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007). These indicators assess the sophistication of a country’s export bundle, inferring it from the characteristics of the countries that export the respective products. In particular, a product receives a higher PRODY value when it is exported more intensively by higher-income economies. A country’s EXPY then summarizes the sophistication of its overall export basket by taking a weighted average of the PRODY values of the goods it exports.
More specifically, the PRODY index measures the income content of a product and is calculated as the weighted average of the GDP per capita of countries exporting that product:
\[
PRODY_k = \sum_{c} \theta_{ck} \, Y_c
\]
where
\[
\theta_{ck} = \frac{\frac{X_{ck}}{X_c}}{\sum_{c’} \left(\frac{X_{c’k}}{X_{c’}}\right)}
\]
Here
- $Y_c$ denotes GDP per capita of country $c$,
- $X_{ck}$ denotes exports of product $k$ by country $c$,
- $X_c$ denotes total exports of country $c$,
In plain terms, PRODY asks whether a product is typically associated with richer or poorer exporters.
The PRODY calculation gives more weight to countries for which a product is relatively important in the export basket. This prevents the measure from being driven by very small or incidental exports. As a result, a product receives a high PRODY score when it is a meaningful export to richer economies, not merely when it appears in their trade data.
The weights $\theta_{ck}$ capture the relative importance of the product k in each country’s export basket. Products exported primarily by high-income economies, therefore, receive higher PRODY values.
Using the PRODY values of individual products, the sophistication of a country’s export basket is measured using the EXPY index:
\[
EXPY_i = \sum_{k} \left(\frac{X_{ik}}{X_i}\right) PRODY_k
\]
EXPY applies the same logic at the country level: it shows whether a country’s export basket is tilted toward products that are more commonly exported by higher-income economies. Higher EXPY values, therefore, suggest a more sophisticated export structure – they indicate that the country exports goods that are typically produced by higher-income economies.
Unlike the HHI, PRODY and EXPY do not lie between 0 and 1. Their values are expressed on the scale of the underlying income measure used in the data, so they are most informative in comparative terms across countries and over time. Also, empirical applications frequently use the natural logarithm of EXPY. This transformation reduces skewness and facilitates interpretation in regression analysis.
Finally, to capture the deeper productive capabilities embedded in economies, the analysis incorporates the Economic Complexity Index (ECI) developed by the Harvard Growth Lab and published in the Atlas of Economic Complexity. The ECI measures the knowledge intensity of an economy by combining information on the diversity of products a country exports and the ubiquity of those products across countries.
The calculation begins with the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) indicator:
\[
RCA_{ck} = \frac{\dfrac{X_{ck}}{X_c}}{\dfrac{\sum_{c} X_{ck}}{\sum_{c} X_c}}
\]
where
- $X_{ck}$ denotes exports of product $k$ by country $c$,
- $X_c$ denotes total exports of country $c$.
Countries are considered competitive exporters of product k if their revealed comparative advantage in that product exceeds 1. Based on this country–product matrix relationship, economic complexity is inferred from two simple ideas: diversity and ubiquity. Diversity refers to the number of different products a country can export competitively. Ubiquity refers to how many countries can export a given product competitively. Economies tend to be ranked as more complex (have a higher value of ECI) when they export a broad range of products that relatively few other countries can produce, because this indicates a deeper and more versatile set of productive capabilities.
Taken together, these indicators provide a comprehensive framework for analysing trade structures. The HHI and Theil indices measure trade concentration and diversification at the HS-4 product level for both exports and imports (as well as concentration by countries), the PRODY and EXPY indicators capture the income sophistication of export baskets, and the Economic Complexity Index reflects the underlying productive capabilities of national economies.
Results
The HHI results reveal significant cross-country differences in export diversification. Georgia and Kazakhstan consistently exhibit the lowest export concentration by destination country across the period, with HHI values remaining below 0.15. Although both countries experience a gradual increase in concentration over time, their exports remain comparatively diversified across destination countries relative to the rest of the region.
In contrast, Armenia and Azerbaijan show a noticeable increase in export concentration by destination country after 2021. Armenia’s export HHI rises sharply and remains close to the upper benchmark threshold by 2024, suggesting that exports became increasingly reliant on a smaller set of countries. Azerbaijan also shows a temporary increase in export concentration around 2022, followed by a modest decline by 2024, indicating partial normalization after the peak of external shocks.
The Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan exhibit persistently higher average export concentration by destination country than other countries in the region. Kyrgyzstan reaches particularly high levels during the early pandemic years and remains relatively concentrated thereafter. Uzbekistan also maintains a relatively high concentration, although its export structure shows some signs of gradual diversification toward the end of the period. Tajikistan remains in the intermediate range, with export concentration by country relatively stable across years.
Import concentration patterns differ from those of exports. Several countries maintain relatively diversified import structures by source country throughout the period. Georgia and Azerbaijan show consistently low import HHI values, indicating broad import structures. However, for some other countries in the region, import concentration increases sharply during the shock period. Kazakhstan experiences a substantial increase during 2020–2022, followed by a return to lower levels in subsequent years. Armenia also records a sharp increase in import concentration in 2024, suggesting increased reliance on a narrower set of partner countries. Kyrgyzstan shows a gradual increase toward the end of the sample period.
Figure 3. HHI of Export by Country, 2019–2024

Source: Author’s Calculation, UN Comtrade
Figure 4. HHI of Import by Country, 2019–2024

Source: Author’s Calculation, UN Comtrade
Examining concentration at the HS4 product level provides additional insight into the structure of trade baskets. Changes in overall HHI may arise either because the product distribution becomes more uneven or because a small number of product categories become temporarily dominant.
The HS4-product level export results (Figure 5) reveal substantial cross-country variation in product concentration. Azerbaijan remains the most concentrated exporter throughout the period. Although the figure shows some decline in concentration in the earlier years, this change is not sustained, and the country’s export basket remains heavily concentrated in a narrow set of products. Kazakhstan also shows a relatively high concentration, although the decline after 2022 suggests some gradual diversification. In contrast, Georgia and Tajikistan maintain consistently low HHI values, indicating relatively diversified export baskets across HS4 product categories. Armenia and Uzbekistan remain in the intermediate range, although Armenia shows an increase in concentration in 2024.
Import concentration at the HS4 product level (Figure 6) remains generally lower than export concentration but exhibits greater volatility across countries. Most economies maintain relatively diversified import baskets, with HHI values typically below 0.05–0.06. However, several temporary spikes are visible. Armenia records a sharp increase in import concentration in 2024, suggesting growing reliance on a narrower set of imported goods. Kyrgyzstan experiences a pronounced spike in 2023, while Georgia shows a moderate increase during 2022–2023, then stabilizes. These fluctuations likely reflect temporary supply disruptions, shifts in trade routes, or changes in import demand during periods of economic and geopolitical shocks.
Figure 5. HHI of Export by HS4 Product Categories, 2019–2024

Source: Author’s Calculation, UN Comtrade
Figure 6. HHI of Import by HS4 Product Categories, 2019–2024

Source: Author’s Calculation, UN Comtrade
The country-level Theil index largely reinforces the message from the HHI analysis: across the region, recent changes in export concentration have been driven mainly by shifts in the distribution of exports across destination markets rather than by a restructuring of export baskets.
Armenia shows the clearest increase in geographic concentration, while Azerbaijan also remains relatively concentrated despite some normalization after the 2022 spike. Georgia remains the most geographically diversified case, and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan show only moderate changes over time. Overall, the Theil results add nuance rather than overturning the HHI findings: they suggest that the main source of recent concentration has been unevenness across partner countries, not a uniform narrowing of export structures across all economies.
At the product level, the Theil index points to a more nuanced picture. In several countries, product-level inequality declines or remains moderate even when destination-country concentration rises, suggesting that geographic concentration and product concentration do not always move together. This is especially important for interpretation: an economy may become more dependent on a smaller set of trading partners while still maintaining or even broadening the composition of its export basket. Azerbaijan remains the clearest case of persistently high product concentration, whereas Georgia continues to display a relatively diversified product structure.
In cases where the Theil and HHI measures differ somewhat, the gap likely reflects that the HHI is more sensitive to dominant categories, whereas the Theil index captures unevenness across the full distribution of trade shares.
The product-level Theil index (Figure 7) also provides additional insights into the composition of export baskets. Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan show noticeable declines in product-level inequality between 2019 and 2024, suggesting some diversification across product categories despite rising geographic concentration. This pattern indicates that while exports may increasingly rely on fewer destination countries, the underlying product composition has broadened.
In contrast, Azerbaijan maintains a relatively high product concentration, which is fully consistent with the HS4-product level HHI results showing the highest export concentration across product categories in the region. Georgia shows a slight increase in product-level inequality, although overall concentration remains relatively low compared to most other countries, confirming the diversified structure observed in the HHI product-level analysis.
Overall, the Theil index results reinforce the conclusions drawn from the HHI analysis while providing additional insight into the drivers of concentration. The evidence suggests that recent changes in trade structures across the South Caucasus and Central Asia are driven primarily by shifts in geographic export patterns rather than by widespread narrowing of product specialization. In several countries, product diversification appears to be improving even as exports become more concentrated across trading partners.
Figure 7. Theil Index by Country and Product Categories, 2019 and 2024

Source: Author’s Calculation, UN Comtrade. Note: Higher values indicate greater concentration in the distribution of products.
Export sophistication is measured by the EXPY index, with higher values indicating that a country exports products typically produced by higher-income economies.
Between 2019 and 2024, export sophistication increases for most countries in the region, although the magnitude of change varies (Figure 8). Armenia shows the largest improvement in EXPY, suggesting a shift toward higher-value exports. Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic also show moderate increases in export sophistication. In contrast, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan experience only modest changes, indicating relatively stable export structures over the period.
Importantly, increases in export sophistication should be interpreted alongside changes in concentration indicators. When EXPY increases while export concentration remains low or declines, the improvement reflects broader structural upgrading. However, when increases in EXPY coincide with rising concentration, the shift may reflect specialization in a smaller number of higher-value products rather than broad-based diversification.
Figure 8. Export Sophistication (EXPY), 2019 and 2024

Source: Author’s Calculation, UN Comtrade. Note: Higher values indicate a more sophisticated export basket.
The previous indicators evaluate diversification and sophistication based on observed trade patterns. An additional perspective on structural transformation can be obtained by examining future diversification opportunities, using the feasibility analysis derived from the Atlas of Economic Complexity Index (ECI) developed by the Growth Lab at Harvard University (see Figure 9). This framework maps potential export opportunities based on the relationship between product sophistication and proximity to existing productive capabilities.
Figure 9. Economic Complexity Index (ECI), 2012- 2024

Source: Growth Lab at Harvard University
Across the South Caucasus and Central Asia, the feasibility analysis reveals substantial heterogeneity in the pace and depth of structural transformation. Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan show the most pronounced improvements in economic complexity over time, suggesting that a growing number of technologically more sophisticated products are becoming feasible given existing productive capabilities. This pattern indicates a widening diversification frontier and reflects the accumulation of capabilities that can support expansion into more complex sectors.
These findings are broadly consistent with the earlier results on export sophistication (EXPY), which also show noticeable improvements in Armenia and moderate gains in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. At the same time, the concentration indicators provide an important qualification. While Armenia shows rising export sophistication, the HHI and Theil indices indicate increasing export concentration in recent years. This suggests that structural upgrading may be occurring alongside a narrowing export base, implying that diversification into complex products has not yet become broad-based. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan present a more balanced picture, with modest improvements in sophistication accompanied by relatively stable or moderate concentration levels, which is more consistent with gradual structural diversification.
Georgia and Kyrgyzstan display more incremental dynamics in the ECI analysis. Their export structures have become somewhat more sophisticated, but diversification largely occurs within sectors that remain relatively close to their existing productive structures and only moderately more complex than current exports. This pattern aligns with the earlier results showing relatively stable concentration indicators and only modest increases in export sophistication, pointing to gradual capability accumulation rather than rapid structural upgrading.
In contrast, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan remain more constrained by relatively low levels of economic complexity. In these economies, the distribution of feasible products remains concentrated in lower-complexity segments of the product space, and many technologically more sophisticated activities remain distant from their current capability base. This result is partly consistent with the earlier findings from concentration indicators: Tajikistan’s export structure remains relatively stable but limited in diversification, while Azerbaijan’s export structure continues to be influenced by resource-based specialization. As a result, the set of feasible diversification opportunities remains narrower and concentrated in sectors with relatively limited technological sophistication.
Overall, the ECI analysis complements the empirical results obtained from HHI, Theil, and EXPY indicators. While some countries in the region demonstrate signs of capability accumulation and gradual upgrading, the results suggest that structural transformation remains uneven across the region. In several cases, improvements in export sophistication occur alongside persistent concentration in a limited number of products, indicating that diversification into more complex sectors has not yet translated into broad-based structural change.
Conclusion
This brief examined the evolution of trade diversification, export sophistication, and structural transformation in the South Caucasus and Central Asia between 2019 and 2024. The results show substantial cross-country differences. While some economies maintain relatively diversified export structures, others remain more dependent on a narrow set of products. Export sophistication has improved modestly in several countries, but in some cases, this has coincided with rising export concentration. This does not necessarily indicate a negative development: such a pattern may reflect successful specialization based on comparative advantage or upgrading into higher-value activities. However, when sophistication gains are concentrated in a small number of products or markets, the resulting export structure may remain vulnerable to external shocks and less supportive of broad-based structural transformation.
The analysis also points to uneven progress in productive capabilities across the region. Some countries are gradually expanding the range of products they can competitively produce, while others remain constrained by narrower capability bases.
These results highlight the nuanced relationship between diversification, sophistication, and economic complexity. Diversifying into more complex sectors can strengthen economic resilience by broadening the range of activities an economy can rely on, reducing dependence on a limited set of simple or commodity-based exports, and enhancing the capacity to adapt to changes in demand, prices, or trade routes. In this context, the key policy challenge is not diversification for its own sake, but fostering the development of productive capabilities that enable more sophisticated, adaptable, and resilient export structures over time.
References
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- Brummitt, C. D., Gómez-Lievano, A., Hausmann, R., & Bonds, M. H. (2018). Machine-learned patterns suggest that diversification drives economic development.
- Hausmann, R., Hwang, J., & Rodrik, D. (2007). What you export matters. Journal of Economic Growth, 12(1), 1–25.
- Hausmann, R., Hidalgo, C., Bustos, S., Coscia, M., Chung, S., Jimenez, J., Simoes, A., & Yıldırım, M. (2014). The Atlas of Economic Complexity: Mapping Paths to Prosperity. MIT Press.
- Hidalgo, C. A., & Hausmann, R. (2009). The building blocks of economic complexity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106(26), 10570–10575.
- International Monetary Fund. (various years). Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia.
- Neffke, F., Hartog, M., Boschma, R., & Henning, M. (2018). Agents of structural change: The role of firms and entrepreneurs in regional diversification.
- Rodrik, D. (2006). What’s so special about China’s exports? China & World Economy, 14(5), 1–19.
- World Bank. (2020). Central Asia Trade: Structural Transformation and Diversification.
- Harvard Growth Lab. (2024). Atlas of Economic Complexity – Feasibility Analysis.
- United Nations Comtrade Database. (2024). International Trade Statistics.
- World Bank. (2023). World Development Indicators.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Risks of Russian Business Ownership in Georgia
This policy brief addresses risks tied to Russian business ownership in Georgia. The concentration of this ownership in critical sectors such as electricity and communications makes Georgia vulnerable to risks of political influence, corruption, economic manipulation, espionage, sabotage, and sanctions evasion. To minimize these risks, it is recommended to establish a Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) screening mechanism for Russia-originating investments, acknowledge the risks in national security documents, and implement a critical infrastructure reform.
Russia exerts substantial influence over Georgia. First and foremost, Russia has annexed 20 percent of Georgia’s internationally recognized territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Further, it employs a variety of hybrid methods to disrupt the Georgian society including disinformation, support for pro-Russian parties and media, trade restrictions, transportation blockades, sabotage incidents, and countless more. These tactics aim to hinder Georgia’s development, weaken the country’s statehood, and negatively affect pro-Western public sentiments (Seskuria, 2021 and Kavtaradze, 2023).
Factors that may also increase Georgia’s economic dependency on Russia concern trade relationships, remittances, increased economic activity driven by the most recent influx of Russian migrants, and private business ownership by Russian entities or citizens (Babych, 2023 and Transparency International Georgia, 2023). This policy brief assesses and systematizes the risks associated with Russian private business ownership in Georgia.
Sectoral Overview of Russian Business Ovnership
Russian business ownership is significant in Georgia. Recent research from the Institute for Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI) has addressed Russian capital accumulation across eight sectors of the Georgian economy: electricity, oil and gas, communications, banking, mining and mineral waters, construction, tourism, and transportation. Of the eight sectors considered by IDFI, Russian business ownership is most visible in Georgia’s electricity sector, followed by oil and natural gas, communications, and mining and mineral waters industries. In the remaining four sectors considered by IDFI, a low to non-existent level of influence was observed (IDFI, 2023).
Figure 1. Overview of Russian Ownership in the Georgian Economy as of June 2023.

Source: IDFI, 2023.
There are several reasons for concern regarding the concentration and distribution of Russian business ownership in the Georgian economy.
First, it is crucial to keep Russia’s history as a hostile state actor in mind. Foreign business ownership is not a threat in itself; However, it may pose a threat if businesses are under control or influence of a state that is hostile to the country in question (see Larson and Marchik, 2006). Business ownership has been a powerful tool for the Kremlin, allowing Russia to influence various countries and raising concerns that such type of foreign ownership might negatively affect national security of the host country (Conley et al., 2016). Similar concerns have become imperative amidst Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine (as, for instance, reflected in Guidance of the European Commission to member states concerning Russian foreign acquisitions).
Further, Russian business ownership in Georgia is particularly threatening due to the ownership concentration within sectors of critical significance for the overall security and economic resilience of the country. While there is no definition of critical infrastructure or related sectors in Georgia, at least two sectors (energy and communications) correspond to critical sectors, according to international standards (see for instance the list of critical infrastructure sectors for the European Union, Germany, Canada and Australia). Such sectors are inherently susceptible to a range of internal and external threats (a description of threats related to critical infrastructure can be found here). Intentional disruptions to critical infrastructure operations might initiate a chain reaction and paralyze the supply of essential services. This can, in turn, trigger major threats to the social, economic, and ecological security and the defense capacity of a state.
Georgia’s Exposure to Risks
Identifying and assessing the specific dimensions of Georgia’s exposure to risks related to Russian business ownership provides a useful foundation for designing policy responses. This brief identifies six distinct threats in this regard.
Political Influence
Russia’s business and political interests are closely intertwined, making it challenging to differentiate their respective motives. This interconnectedness can act as a channel for exerting political influence in Georgia. Russians that have ownership stakes in Georgian industries (e.g. within electricity, communications, oil and gas, mining and mineral waters) have political ties with the Russian ruling elite facing Western sanctions, or are facing sanctions themselves. For instance, Mikhail Fridman, who owns up to 50 percent of the mineral water company IDS Borjomi, is sanctioned for supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine. Such interlacing raises concerns about indirect Russian influence in Georgia, potentially undermining Georgia’s Western aspirations.
Export of Corrupt Practices
The presence of notable Russian businesses in Georgia poses a significant threat in terms of it nurturing corrupt practices. Concerns include “revolving door” incidents (movement of upper-level public officials into high-level private-sector jobs, or vice versa), tax evasion, and exploitation of the public procurement system. For instance, Transparency International Georgia (2023) identified a “revolving door” incident concerning the Russian company Inter RAO Georgia LLC, involved in electricity trading, and its regulator, the Georgian state-owned Electricity Market Operator JSC (ESCO). One day after Inter RAO Georgia LLC was registered, the director of ESCO took a managerial position within Inter RAO Georgia LLC. Furthermore, tax evasion inquiries involving Russian-owned companies have been documented in the region, particularly in Armenia, further highlighting corruption risks. We argue that such corrupt practices might harm the business environment and deter future international investments.
Economic Manipulation
A heavy concentration of foreign ownership in critical sectors like energy and telecommunications, also poses a risk of manipulation of economic instruments such as prices. The significant Russian ownership in Armenia’s gas distribution network exemplifies this threat. In fact, Russia utilized a price manipulation strategy for gas prices when Armenia declared its EU aspirations. Prices were then reduced after Armenia joined the Eurasian Economic Union (Terzyan, 2018).
Espionage
Russian-owned businesses within Georgia’s critical sectors also pose espionage risks, including economic and cyber espionage. Owners of such businesses may transfer sensitive information to Russian intelligence agencies, potentially undermining critical infrastructure operations. As an example, in 2022, a Swedish business owner in electronic trading and former Russian resident, was indicted with transferring secret economic information to Russia. Russian cyber-espionage is also known to be used for worldwide disinformation campaigns impacting public opinion and election results, compromising democratic processes.
Sabotage
The presence of Russian-owned businesses in Georgia raises the risk of sabotage and incapacitation of critical assets. Russia has a history of using sabotage to harm other countries, such as when they disrupted Georgia’s energy supply in 2006 and the recent Kakhovka Dam destruction in Ukraine (which had far-reaching consequences, incurring environmental damages, and posing a threat to nuclear plants). These incidents demonstrate the risk of cascading effects, potentially affecting power supply, businesses, and locations strategically important to Georgia’s security.
Sanctions and Sanction Evasion
Russian-owned businesses in Georgia face risks due to Western sanctions as they could be targeted by sanctions or used to evade them. Recent cases, like with IDS Borjomi (as previously outlined) and VTB Bank Georgia – companies affected by Western sanctions given their Russian connections – highlight Georgia’s economic vulnerability in this regard. Industries where these businesses operate play a significant role in Georgia’s economy and job market, and instabilities within such sectors could entail social and political concerns. There’s also a risk that these businesses could help Russia bypass sanctions and gain access to sensitive goods and technologies, going against Georgia’s support for international sanctions against Russia. It is crucial to prevent such sanctions-associated risks for the Georgian economy.
Assessing the Risks
To operationalize the above detailed risks, we conducted interviews with Georgian field experts within security, economics, and energy. The risk assessment highlights political influence through Russian ownership in Georgian businesses as the foremost concern, followed by risks of corruption, risks related to sanctions, espionage, economic manipulation, and sabotage. We asked the experts to assess the severity level for each identified risk and notably, all identified risks carry a high severity level.
Recommendations
Considering the concerns detailed in the previous sections, we argue that Russia poses a threat in the Georgian context. Given the scale and concentration of Russian ownership within critical sectors and infrastructure, a dedicated policy regime might be required to improve regulation and minimize the associated risks. Three recommendations could be efficient in this regard, as outlined below.
Study the Impact of Adopting a Foreign Direct Investment Screening Mechanism
To effectively address ownership-related threats, it’s essential to modify existing investment policies. One approach is to introduce a FDI screening mechanism with specific functionalities. Several jurisdictions implement mechanisms with similar features (see a recent report by UNCTAD for further details). Usually, such mechanisms target FDI’s that have security implications. A dedicated screening authority overviews investment that might be of concern for national security and after assessment, an investment might be approved or suspended. In Georgia, a key consideration for designing such tool includes whether it should selectively target investments from countries like Russia or apply to all incoming FDI. Additionally, there’s a choice between screening all investments or focusing on those concerning critical sectors and infrastructure. Evaluating the investment volume, possibly screening only FDI’s exceeding a predefined monetary value, is also a vital aspect to consider. However, it’s important to acknowledge that FDI screening mechanisms are costly. Therefore, this brief suggests a thorough cost and benefit analysis prior to implementing a FDI screening regime in Georgia.
Consider Russian Ownership-related Threats in the National Security Documents
Several national-level documents address security policy in Georgia, with the National Security Concept – outlining security directions – being a foundational one. Currently, these concepts do not specifically address Russian business ownership-related threats. When designing an FDI screening mechanism, however, acknowledging various risks related to Russian business ownership must be aligned with fundamental national security documents.
Foster the Adoption of a Critical Infrastructural Reform
To successfully implement a FDI screening mechanism unified, nationwide agreement on the legal foundations for identifying and safeguarding critical infrastructure is needed. The current concept for critical infrastructure reform in Georgia envisages a definition of critical infrastructure and an implementation of an FDI screening mechanism. We therefore recommend implementing this reform in the country.
Conclusion
This policy brief has identified six distinct risks related to Russian business ownership in several sectors of the Georgian economy, such as energy, communications, oil and natural gas, and mining and mineral waters. Even though Georgia does not have a unified definition of critical infrastructure, assets concentrated in these sectors are regarded as critical according to international standards. Considering Russia’s track record of hostility and bearing in mind threats related to foreign business ownership by malign states, this brief suggests regulating Russian business ownership in Georgia by introducing a FDI screening instrument. To operationalize this recommendation, it is further recommended to consider Russian business ownership-related threats in Georgia’s fundamental security documents and to foster critical infrastructural reform in the country.
References
- Babych, Y. (2023). The Georgian Economy after One Year of Russia’s War in Ukraine: Trends and Risks. ISET Policy Institute. https://iset-pi.ge/storage/media/other/2023-03-13/6982ed30-c1ad-11ed-896a-efa0ef78cee7.pdff
- Conley, H. A., Mina, J., Stefanov, R., & Vladimirov, M. (2016). The Kremlin Playbook: Understanding Russian Influence in Central and Eastern Europe. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/1601017_Conley_KremlinPlaybook_Web.pdf
- Institute for Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI). (2023, June). Russian Capital and Russian Connections in Georgian Business. https://idfi.ge/public/upload/Analysis/Russian%20capital%20and%20Russian%
20connections%20in%20Georgian%20business.pdf - Kavtaradze, N. (2023). Hybrid Warfare and Russia’s Modern Warfare. Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS). https://gfsis.org.ge/files/library/opinion-papers/201-expert-opinion-eng.pdf
- Larson, A. P., & Marchik, D. M. (2006). Foreign Investment and National Security. ETH Zurich. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/20513/2006-07_ForeignInvestmentCSR.pdf
- Seskuria, N. (2021). Russia’s “Hybrid Agression” against Georgia: The Use of Local and External Tools. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/210921_Seskuria_Russia_Georgia.pdf?VersionId=__d9rw2TtaDba9xaHASf6lCEmJ.oqhA7
- Terzyan, A. (2018). The anatomy of Russia’s grip on Armenia: Bound to Persist? https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/198543/1/ceswp-v10-i2-p234-250.pdf
- Transparency International Georgia. (2023). Georgia’s Economic Dependence on Russia: Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War. Transparency International Georgia. https://transparency.ge/en/post/georgias-economic-dependence-russia-impact-russia-ukraine-war-1
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Understanding the Economic and Social Context of Gender-based and Domestic Violence in Central and Eastern Europe – Preliminary Survey Evidence
This brief presents preliminary findings from a cross-country survey on perceptions and prevalence of domestic and gender-based violence conducted in September 2021 in eight countries: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Sweden and Ukraine. We discuss the design and content of the study and present initial information on selected topics that were covered in the survey. The collected data has been used in three studies presented at the FROGEE Conference on “Economic and Social Context of Domestic Violence” and offers a unique resource to study gender-based violence in the region.
While the COVID-19 pandemic has amplified the academic and policy interest in the causes and consequences of domestic violence, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has tragically reminded us about the gender dimension of war. There is no doubt that a gender lens is a necessary perspective to understand and appreciate the full consequences of these two ongoing crises.
The tragic reason behind the increased attention given to domestic violence during the COVID-19 lockdowns is the substantial evidence that gender-based violence has intensified to such an extent that the United Nations raised the alarm about a “shadow pandemic” of violence against women and girls (UN Women on-line link). Already before the pandemic, one in three women worldwide had experienced physical or sexual violence, usually at the hands of an intimate partner, and this number has only been increasing. The tragic reports from the military invasion of Ukraine concerning violence against women and children, as well as information on the heightened risks faced by war refugees from Ukraine, most of whom are women, should only intensify our efforts to better understand the background behind these processes and study the potential policy solutions to limit them to a minimum in the current and future crises.
The most direct consequences of gender-based and domestic violence – to the physical and mental health of the victims – are clearly of the highest concern and are the leading arguments in favour of interventions aimed at limiting the scale of violence. One should remember though, that the consequences and the related social costs of gender-based and domestic violence are far broader, and need not be caused by direct acts of physical violence. Gender-based and domestic violence can take the form of psychological pressure, limits on individual freedoms, or access to financial resources within households. As research in recent decades demonstrates, such forms of abuse also have significant consequences for the psychological well-being, social status, and professional development of its victims. All these outcomes are associated with not only high individual costs, but also with substantial social and economic costs to our societies.
This policy brief presents an outline of a survey conducted in eight countries aimed at better understanding the socio-economic context of gender-based violence. The survey, developed by the FREE Network of independent research institutes, has a regional focus on Central and Eastern Europe, with Sweden being an interesting benchmark country. The data was collected in September 2021 in Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Sweden and Ukraine. The socio-economic situation of all these countries irrevocably changed with the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the ongoing war, and its dramatic consequences. The world’s attention focused on the unspeakable violence committed by the Russian forces in Ukraine, the persecution in Belarus and Russia of their own citizens who were protesting against the invasion, and the challenges other neighbouring countries have faced as a result of an unprecedented wave of Ukrainian refugees. This change, on the one hand, calls for a certain distance with which we should judge the survey data and the derived results. On the other hand, the data may serve as a unique resource to support the analysis of the pre-war conditions in these countries with the aim to understand the background driving forces behind this dramatic crisis. In as much as the gender lens is necessary to comprehend the full scale of the consequences of both the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, it will be equally indispensable in the process of post-war development and reconciliation once peace is again restored.
Survey Design, Countries, and Samples
The survey was conducted in eight countries in September 2021 through as a telephone (CATI) survey using the list assisted random digit dialling (LA-RDD) method covering both cell phones and land-lines, and the sampling was carried out in such a way as to make the final sample representative of the respective populations by gender and three age group (18-39; 40-54; 55+). The collected samples varied from 925 to 1000 individuals. The same questionnaire initially prepared as a generic English version was fielded in all eight countries (in the respective national languages). The only deviations from the generic version were related to the education categories and to a set of final questions implemented in Latvia, Russia and Ukraine with a focus on the evaluation of national IPV legislation.
Table 1 presents some basic sample statistics, while Figure 1 shows the unweighted age and gender compositions in each country. The proportion of women in the sample varies between 49.4% in Sweden and 55.0% in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. The average sample age is between 43 (Armenia) and 51 (Sweden), while the proportion of individuals with higher education is between 29.3% in Belarus and 55.4% in Georgia. The highest proportion of respondents living in rural areas could be found in Armenia at 62.9%, while the lowest was in Georgia at 24.1%. Figure 1 illustrates good coverage across age groups for both men and women.
Table 1. FROGEE Survey: samples and basic demographics

Source: FROGEE Survey on Domestic and Gender-Based Violence.
Figure 1. FROGEE Survey: gender and age distributions

Source: FROGEE Survey on Domestic and Gender-Based Violence.
Socio-economic Conditions and Other Background Characteristics
To be able to examine the relationship between different aspects of domestic and gender-based violence to the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents, an extensive set of questions concerning the demographic composition of their household and their material conditions were asked at the beginning of the interview. These questions included information about partnership history and family structure, the size of the household and living conditions, education and labour market status (of the respondent and his/her partner) and general questions concerning material wellbeing. In Figure 2 we show a summary of two of the latter set of questions – the proportion of men and women who find it difficult or very difficult to make ends meet (Figure 2A) and the proportion who declared that the financial situation of their household deteriorated in the last two years, i.e. since September 2019, which can be used as an indicator of the material consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. We can see that the difficulties in making ends meet are by far lowest in Sweden, and slightly lower in the other EU countries (Latvia and Poland). The differences are less pronounced with regard to the implication of the pandemic, but also in this case respondents in Sweden seem to have been least affected.
Figure 2. Making ends meet and the consequences of COVID-19
a. Difficulties in making ends meet

b. Material conditions deteriorated since 2019

Source: FROGEE Survey on Domestic and Gender-Based Violence.
Perceptions and Incidence of Domestic and Gender-Based Violence and Abuse
Frequency of differential treatment and abuse
The set of questions concerning domestic and gender-based violence started with an initial module related to the different treatment of men and women, with respondents asked to identify how often they witnessed certain behaviours aimed toward women. The questions covered aspects such as women being treated “with less courtesy than men”, being “called names or insulted for being a woman” and women being “the target of jokes of sexual nature” or receiving “unwanted sexual advances from a man she doesn’t know”, and the respondents were to evaluate if in the last year they have witnessed such behaviours on a scale from never, through rarely, sometimes, often, to very often. We present the proportion of respondents answering “often” or “very often” to two of these questions in Figure 3A (“People have acted as if they think women are not smart”) and 3B (“A woman has been the target of jokes of a sexual nature”). We find significant variation across these two dimensions of differential treatment, and we generally find that women are more sensitive to perceiving such treatment. It is interesting to note that the proportion of women who declared witnessing differential treatment in Sweden is very high in comparison to for example Latvia or Belarus, which, as we shall see below, does not correspond to the proportion of women (and men) witnessing more violent types of behaviour against women.
Figure 3. Frequency of differential treatment (often or very often)
a. People have acted as if they think women are not smart

b. A woman has been the target of jokes of a sexual nature

Source: FROGEE Survey on Domestic and Gender-Based Violence.
Questions on the frequency of witnessing physical abuse were also asked in relation to the scale of witnessed behaviour. Here respondents were once again asked to say how often “in their day-to-day life” they have witnessed specific behaviours. These included such types of abuse as: a woman being “threatened by a man”, “slapped, hit or punched by a man”, or “sexually abused or assaulted by a man”. The proportion of respondents who say that they have witnessed such behaviour with respect to two of the questions from this section are presented in Figure 4. In Figure 4A we show the proportion of men and women who have witnessed a woman being “slapped, hit or punched” (sometimes, often or very often), while in Figure 4B being “touched inappropriately without her consent”. Relative to the perceptions of differential treatment the incidence of a woman being hit or punched (4A) declared by the respondents seems more intuitive when considered against the overall international statistics of gender equality. The proportions are lowest in Sweden and Poland, and highest in Armenia and Ukraine. However, the perception of inappropriate touching by men with respect to women (Figure 4B) shows a similar extent of such actions across all analysed countries.
Figure 4. Frequency of abuse (sometimes, often or very often)
a. A woman has been slapped, hit or punched by a man

b. A woman has been touched inappropriately, without her consent, by a man

Source: FROGEE Survey on Domestic and Gender-Based Violence.
Perceptions of abuse
The questions concerning the scale of witnessed behaviours were complemented by a module related to the evaluation of certain behaviours from the perspective of their classification as abuse and the degree to which certain types of gender-specific behaviours are acceptable. Thus, for example respondents were asked if they consider “beating (one’s partner) causing severe physical harm” to be an example of abuse within a couple (Figure 5A) or if “prohibition to dress as one likes” represents abuse (Figure 5B). This module included an extensive list of behaviours, such as “forced abortion”, “constant humiliation, criticism”, “restriction of access to financial resources”, etc. As we can see in Figure 6, with respect to the clearest types of abuse – such as physical violence – respondents in all countries were pretty much unanimous in declaring such behaviour to represent abuse. With respect to other behaviours the variation in their evaluation across countries is much greater – for example, while nearly all men and women in Sweden consider prohibiting a partner to dress as he/she likes to be abusive (Figure 5B), only about 57% of women and 36% of men in Armenia share this view.
The questionnaire also included questions specifically focused on the perception of intimate partner violence. These asked respondents if they knew about women who in the last three months were “beaten, slapped or threatened physically by their intimate partner”, and the evaluation of how often intimate partners act physically violent towards their wives.
Figure 5. Perceptions of abuse: are these examples of abuse within a couple?
a. Beating causing severe physical harm

b. Prohibition to dress as one likes

Source: FROGEE Survey on Domestic and Gender-Based Violence.
A further evaluation of attitudes towards violent behaviour was done with respect to the relationship between a husband and wife and his right to hit or beat the wife in reaction to certain behaviours. In Figure 6 we show the distribution of responses regarding the justification for beating one’s wife in reaction to her neglect of the children (6A) or burning food (6B). The questions also covered such behaviour as arguing with her husband, going out without telling him, or refusing to have sex. As we can see in Figure 6, once again we find substantial country variation in the proportion of the samples – both men and women – who justify such violent behaviour within couples. This was particularly the case when respondents were asked about justification of violent behaviour in the case of a woman neglecting the children. In Armenia as many as 30% of men and 22% of women agree that physical beating is justified in those cases. These proportions are manyfold greater than what can be observed in countries such as Latvia, where 3% of men and women agreed that abuse was justifiable under these circumstances, or Sweden, where only 1% of men and women agreed.
Figure 6. Perceptions of abuse: is a husband justified in hitting or beating his wife
a. If she neglects the children

b. If she burns the food

Source: FROGEE Survey on Domestic and Gender-Based Violence.
Seeking help and the legal framework
The final part of the questionnaire focused on the evaluation of different reactions to incidents of domestic and gender-based violence. Respondents were first asked if a woman should seek help from various people and institutions if she is beaten by her partner – respondents were asked if she should seek help from the police, relatives or friends, a psychologist, a legal service or if, in such situations, she does not need help. In Figure 7 we show the proportion of people who agreed with the last statement, i.e. claimed that it is only the couple’s business. The proportions of respondents who declare such an attitude is higher among men than women within each country, and is highest among men in Armenia (48%) and Georgia (25%). Again, these proportions are in stark contrast to men in Sweden, or even Poland, where only 4% and 8% of men agreed, respectively. Nevertheless, looking at the total survey sample, a vast majority believe that a woman who is a victim of domestic violence should seek help outside of her home, indicating that at least some forms of institutionalised support for women are popular measures with most people.
Figure 7. Proportions agreeing that domestic violence is only the couple’s business

Source: FROGEE Survey on Domestic and Gender-Based Violence.
The interview also included questions on the need for specific legislation aimed at punishing intimate partner violence and on the existence of such legislation in the respondents’ countries. The latter questions were extended in three countries – Latvia, Russia and Ukraine – to evaluate the specific sets of regulations implemented recently in these countries and to facilitate an analysis of the role IPV legislation can play in reducing violence within households. Legislation on domestic violence is relatively recent. During the last four decades, though, changes accelerated in this respect around the world. Legislative measures have been introduced in many countries, covering different aspects of preventing, protecting against and prosecuting various forms of violence and abuse that might happen within the marriage or the family. Research strives to offer evaluations on what legal provisions are most effective, in a setting in which statistics and information are still far from perfect, and as a consequence of the dearth of strong evidence the public debate on the matter is often lively. For legislation to have an effect on behaviour through shaping the cost of committing a crime, on the one hand, and the benefit of reporting it or seeking help, on the other, or more indirectly through changing norms in society, information and awareness are key. For how can deterrence be achieved if people do not know what the sanctions are? And how can reporting be encouraged if victims do not know their rights? The evidence on legislation awareness is unfortunately quite scarce. A survey of the criminology field (Nagin, 2013) concludes that this is a major knowledge gap.
Figure 8 shows the proportions of answers to questions concerning the need for and existence of legislation specifically targeted towards intimate partner violence. We can see that while support for such legislation is quite high (Figure 8A), it is generally lower among men (in particular in Armenia, Russia and Belarus). Awareness of existence of such laws, on the other hand, is much lower, and it is particularly low among women. It should be pointed out that all countries have in fact implemented provisions against domestic violence in their criminal code, but only around half of the population, sometimes much fewer, are aware of that.
Figure 8. Need for and awareness of IPV legislation
a. State should have specific legislation aimed at punishing IPV

b. Country has specific legislation aimed at punishing intimate partner violence

Source: FROGEE Survey on Domestic and Gender-Based Violence.
Recent reforms of DV legislation that were implemented in Russia in 2017, in Ukraine in 2019 and in Latvia just a few months ago (at the time of the survey, the changes were at the stage of a proposal) were the subject of the final survey questions in these countries. We find that awareness of these recent reforms is very low in all three countries, and knowledge about the reform content (gauged with the help of a multiple-choice question with three alternative statements) is even lower. Our analysis suggests that gender and family situation are the two factors that most robustly predict support for legislation, while education and age are associated with awareness and knowledge of the reforms. Minority Russian speakers are less aware of the reforms in both Ukraine and Latvia, in Ukraine are also less likely to answer correctly about the content of the reform, and in Latvia are less supportive of DV legislation in general.
Analyses of this type are useful for policy design, to better understand which groups lack relevant knowledge and should be targeted by, for example, information campaigns to combat DV, such as those many governments around the world implemented during the covid-19 pandemic.
Future Work Based on the Survey
The above is just a small sample of the rich source of information that has resulted from conducting the survey. Already from this simple overview we can see some interesting results. There are, for example, clear differences between men and women in perceptions of how common certain types of abusive behaviour are. However, for many questions differences between countries are larger than those between men and women within a country. Interestingly such differences are also different depending on the severity of the abuse or violence. In Sweden the perception of women being victims of less violent abuse is higher than in some other countries where instead some more violent types of abuse are reported as being more common. This could, of course, be due to actual differences in actual events but it is also possible that there are differences in what types of behaviour are considered to represent harassment and abuse in different societies. More careful data work is needed to try to answer questions like this and many others. Currently there are a number of ongoing research projects based on the survey results, three of which will be presented at the FREE-network conference on “Economic and Social Context of Domestic Violence” in Stockholm on May 11, 2022. Our hope is that this work will help in taking actions to prevent gender-based abuse and domestic violence based on a better understanding of underlying cross-country differences in social norms and attitudes and their relation to socio-economic factors.
About FROGEE Policy Briefs
FROGEE Policy Briefs is a special series aimed at providing overviews and the popularization of economic research related to gender equality issues. Debates around policies related to gender equality are often highly politicized. We believe that using arguments derived from the most up to date research-based knowledge would help us build a more fruitful discussion of policy proposals and in the end achieve better outcomes.
The aim of the briefs is to improve the understanding of research-based arguments and their implications, by covering the key theories and the most important findings in areas of special interest to the current debate. The briefs start with short general overviews of a given theme, which are followed by a presentation of country-specific contexts, specific policy challenges, implemented reforms and a discussion of other policy options.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.