Tag: Trade diversification

Trade Diversification, Export Complexity, and Structural Transformation in the South Caucasus and Central Asia

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This policy paper examines trade diversification, export sophistication, and economic complexity in the South Caucasus and Central Asia during 2019–2024. Using detailed product-level trade data, it assesses how concentrated or diversified countries’ exports and imports are, as well as changes in the sophistication of the products they export. Evidence from the Atlas of Economic Complexity is also used to evaluate diversification opportunities based on countries’ productive capabilities. 

The results reveal substantial heterogeneity across the region. Georgia and Kazakhstan maintain relatively diversified export structures, while Armenia and Azerbaijan exhibit increasing export concentration. Export sophistication improves modestly in several countries, particularly Armenia and Uzbekistan. Overall, the findings suggest gradual but uneven structural transformation across the region, with diversification into more complex export sectors remaining limited.

Introduction

International trade plays a central role in shaping economic growth and macroeconomic stability in the South Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA). The economies of the region are highly open, with trade flows accounting for a large share of GDP in most countries. This strong integration into global markets creates important opportunities for growth, but it also exposes these economies to fluctuations in global demand, commodity prices, and international supply chains, potentially with drastic consequences.

This exposure has become particularly concerning in the context of the global economic environment since 2019. A series of major shocks—including the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East—have disrupted global supply chains, energy markets, and transport corridors. At the same time, geopolitical tensions and shifting industrial and trade policies have increased global policy uncertainty. Frequent changes in tariff policies and strategic trade measures by major economies, including the United States, have further contributed to an increasingly uncertain global trading environment.

In this context, the resilience of national economies depends not only on the scale of trade but also on its structure. Countries with concentrated export baskets or strong dependence on a small number of trading partners are typically more vulnerable to external shocks. By contrast, economies with diversified exports and greater participation in higher-value production tend to be more resilient and better positioned for long-term growth. Three related concepts—trade diversification, product sophistication, and economic complexity—provide useful tools for evaluating these structural characteristics. Diversification captures the breadth of the export basket; product sophistication reflects the income and knowledge intensity of exported goods; and economic complexity reflects the broader productive capabilities that underpin them.

This research brief examines the trade structures of the South Caucasus and Central Asian countries through these three dimensions. Using detailed product-level international trade data, the analysis evaluates export and import diversification, the income and technological content of export baskets, and the broader productive capabilities reflected in economic complexity indicators. By comparing patterns across countries and over time, the brief provides new insights into how the region’s economies are positioned to navigate an increasingly uncertain global trading environment.

Stylized Facts: External Balances and Trade Structure

Recent data highlight two closely related characteristics of South Caucasus and Central Asian economies: substantial variation in external balances and strong exposure to international trade. Current account positions differ significantly across the region and fluctuate over time, reflecting differences in export structures, commodity dependence, and import demand (Figure 1). Resource-rich economies such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan periodically record sizable surpluses driven largely by oil and natural gas exports, while several other economies experience persistent deficits associated with narrower export bases and higher reliance on imports. Particularly large deficits were observed in the Kyrgyz Republic during 2022–2023, illustrating the sensitivity of smaller economies to shifts in trade flows and external demand. These dynamics are closely linked to the high degree of trade openness observed across the region: smaller economies such as Georgia, Armenia, and the Kyrgyz Republic exhibit particularly high trade-to-GDP ratios, while larger economies such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan show somewhat lower—but still substantial—levels of trade exposure.

Figure 1. Current Account as a percentage share of GDP (2019-2025)

Source: Authors’ calculations, IMF

Figure 2 summarizes the geographic composition of trade across the region and highlights the continued importance of a relatively small number of external partners. The European Union, Russia, China, and other CIS economies dominate both export destinations and import sources. Comparing 2019 and 2024, several broad regional shifts emerge. On the export side, the European Union increased its relative importance as a destination for many exports—particularly energy and resource-based products; exports directed to Russia and other CIS markets also grew in importance after 2022. In turn, the share going to the residual category of other countries fell substantially. On the import side, Russia and China strengthened their positions as key suppliers across much of the region, reflecting geographic proximity, established transport corridors, and China’s growing role in regional trade. Imports from the European Union remained important, especially for machinery, equipment, and higher-value manufactured goods.

Overall, despite some adjustments between 2019 and 2024, the region’s trade patterns remain concentrated among a relatively small group of partners. This concentration increases exposure to destination-specific shocks and may weaken trade resilience. It is therefore important to assess not only how diversified exports are, but also how sophisticated and capability-intensive they are, since these characteristics affect an economy’s ability to adapt and redirect trade over time.

Figure 2. Geographic Structure of Regional Exports and Imports for South Caucasus and Central Asian economies, 2019 vs. 2024

Source: Authors’ Calculation, UN Comtrade. Note: Shares of major partner groups (European Union, Russia, China, CIS, and other countries) in total exports and imports of South Caucasus and Central Asian economies.

Methodology

To analyse the structure and evolution of trade patterns, the study employs four complementary indicators: the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), the Theil index, the export sophistication indicators PRODY and EXPY, and the Economic Complexity Index (ECI). These indicators capture different aspects of trade structures, including concentration, diversification, technological sophistication, and productive capabilities embedded in economies.

Trade concentration is first evaluated using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI). The index measures the extent to which a country’s exports or imports are concentrated across products. In this study, the index is calculated at the HS-4 product level, allowing for a detailed assessment of trade structures.

The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index is defined as:
\[
HHI_i^X = \sum_{k=1}^{N} \left(s_{ik}^X\right)^2
\]
\[
HHI_i^M = \sum_{k=1}^{N} \left(s_{ik}^M\right)^2
\]

where
\[
s_{ik}^X = \frac{X_{ik}}{X_i}
\]
\[
s_{ik}^M = \frac{M_{ik}}{M_i}
\]

Here

  • $s_{ik}^X$ = the share of the product in country ’s total exports
  • $s_{ik}^M$ = the share of the product in country ’s total imports
  • $X_{ik}$ denotes exports of the product  by country
  • $M_{ik}$ denotes imports of the product  by country
  • $X_i$ denotes the total exports of country
  • $M_i$ denotes the total imports of country

The index ranges between 0 and 1. Values close to zero indicate highly diversified trade structures, while values approaching one suggest strong concentration in a limited number of products.

The HHI provides a simple summary of whether trade is concentrated in a small number of products or partners. To complement this, the analysis also uses the Theil index, which captures how unevenly trade is distributed across all destinations or product categories. This distinction matters because similar levels of overall concentration can mask different underlying structures. In plain terms, the Theil index compares the observed trade distribution with a benchmark of equal shares across all categories: a value of zero indicates perfect equality, and the more uneven the distribution, the higher the index. As a result, comparing the two indicators allows a more nuanced assessment of whether concentration changes reflect dominance by a few categories or broader structural shifts in trade patterns.

Unlike the HHI, the Theil index can also be decomposed into within-group and between-group components, which helps identify the sources of concentration. The Theil index for exports and imports is defined as:
\[
T_i^X = \sum_{k=1}^{N} s_{ik}^X \ln\left(\frac{s_{ik}^X}{\bar{s}}\right)
\]
\[
T_i^M = \sum_{k=1}^{N} s_{ik}^M \ln\left(\frac{s_{ik}^M}{\bar{s}}\right)
\]
where
\[\quad \bar{s} = \frac{1}{N}
\]
and N represents the total number of HS-4 products, so that the terms in brackets measure how far the actual share allocation is from the equal share one. Higher values of the Theil index indicate greater concentration of trade across products, while lower values indicate higher diversification. Compared with the HHI, the Theil index has the advantage of being decomposable into within-sector and between-sector components. That is, the HHI can be broken down into group-specific contributions, but it does not provide the same standard additive decomposition with equally clear interpretation. allowing a more detailed examination of diversification patterns. The policy paper assesses export and import concentration using the HHI and Theil indices not only by product categories but also by trading partner countries (in the formulas above, products are replaced by countries).

While the HHI and Theil indices measure concentration and diversification, they do not say much about the type of goods a country exports. To capture this dimension, the analysis uses the PRODY and EXPY indicators introduced by Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007). These indicators assess the sophistication of a country’s export bundle, inferring it from the characteristics of the countries that export the respective products. In particular, a product receives a higher PRODY value when it is exported more intensively by higher-income economies. A country’s EXPY then summarizes the sophistication of its overall export basket by taking a weighted average of the PRODY values of the goods it exports.

More specifically, the PRODY index measures the income content of a product and is calculated as the weighted average of the GDP per capita of countries exporting that product:

\[
PRODY_k = \sum_{c} \theta_{ck} \, Y_c
\]

where

\[
\theta_{ck} = \frac{\frac{X_{ck}}{X_c}}{\sum_{c’} \left(\frac{X_{c’k}}{X_{c’}}\right)}
\]

Here

  • $Y_c$ denotes GDP per capita of country $c$,
  • $X_{ck}$ denotes exports of product $k$ by country $c$,
  • $X_c$ denotes total exports of country $c$,

In plain terms, PRODY asks whether a product is typically associated with richer or poorer exporters.

The PRODY calculation gives more weight to countries for which a product is relatively important in the export basket. This prevents the measure from being driven by very small or incidental exports. As a result, a product receives a high PRODY score when it is a meaningful export to richer economies, not merely when it appears in their trade data.

The weights $\theta_{ck}$ capture the relative importance of the product k  in each country’s export basket. Products exported primarily by high-income economies, therefore, receive higher PRODY values.

Using the PRODY values of individual products, the sophistication of a country’s export basket is measured using the EXPY index:

\[
EXPY_i = \sum_{k} \left(\frac{X_{ik}}{X_i}\right) PRODY_k
\]

EXPY applies the same logic at the country level: it shows whether a country’s export basket is tilted toward products that are more commonly exported by higher-income economies. Higher EXPY values, therefore, suggest a more sophisticated export structure – they indicate that the country exports goods that are typically produced by higher-income economies.

Unlike the HHI, PRODY and EXPY do not lie between 0 and 1. Their values are expressed on the scale of the underlying income measure used in the data, so they are most informative in comparative terms across countries and over time. Also, empirical applications frequently use the natural logarithm of EXPY. This transformation reduces skewness and facilitates interpretation in regression analysis.

Finally, to capture the deeper productive capabilities embedded in economies, the analysis incorporates the Economic Complexity Index (ECI) developed by the Harvard Growth Lab and published in the Atlas of Economic Complexity. The ECI measures the knowledge intensity of an economy by combining information on the diversity of products a country exports and the ubiquity of those products across countries.

The calculation begins with the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) indicator:
\[
RCA_{ck} = \frac{\dfrac{X_{ck}}{X_c}}{\dfrac{\sum_{c} X_{ck}}{\sum_{c} X_c}}
\]
where

  • $X_{ck}$ denotes exports of product $k$ by country $c$,
  • $X_c$ denotes total exports of country $c$.

Countries are considered competitive exporters of product k if their revealed comparative advantage in that product exceeds 1. Based on this country–product matrix relationship, economic complexity is inferred from two simple ideas: diversity and ubiquity. Diversity refers to the number of different products a country can export competitively. Ubiquity refers to how many countries can export a given product competitively. Economies tend to be ranked as more complex (have a higher value of ECI) when they export a broad range of products that relatively few other countries can produce, because this indicates a deeper and more versatile set of productive capabilities.

Taken together, these indicators provide a comprehensive framework for analysing trade structures. The HHI and Theil indices measure trade concentration and diversification at the HS-4 product level for both exports and imports (as well as concentration by countries), the PRODY and EXPY indicators capture the income sophistication of export baskets, and the Economic Complexity Index reflects the underlying productive capabilities of national economies.

Results

The HHI results reveal significant cross-country differences in export diversification. Georgia and Kazakhstan consistently exhibit the lowest export concentration by destination country across the period, with HHI values remaining below 0.15. Although both countries experience a gradual increase in concentration over time, their exports remain comparatively diversified across destination countries relative to the rest of the region.

In contrast, Armenia and Azerbaijan show a noticeable increase in export concentration by destination country after 2021. Armenia’s export HHI rises sharply and remains close to the upper benchmark threshold by 2024, suggesting that exports became increasingly reliant on a smaller set of countries. Azerbaijan also shows a temporary increase in export concentration around 2022, followed by a modest decline by 2024, indicating partial normalization after the peak of external shocks.

The Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan exhibit persistently higher average export concentration by destination country than other countries in the region. Kyrgyzstan reaches particularly high levels during the early pandemic years and remains relatively concentrated thereafter. Uzbekistan also maintains a relatively high concentration, although its export structure shows some signs of gradual diversification toward the end of the period. Tajikistan remains in the intermediate range, with export concentration by country relatively stable across years.

Import concentration patterns differ from those of exports. Several countries maintain relatively diversified import structures by source country throughout the period. Georgia and Azerbaijan show consistently low import HHI values, indicating broad import structures. However, for some other countries in the region, import concentration increases sharply during the shock period. Kazakhstan experiences a substantial increase during 2020–2022, followed by a return to lower levels in subsequent years. Armenia also records a sharp increase in import concentration in 2024, suggesting increased reliance on a narrower set of partner countries. Kyrgyzstan shows a gradual increase toward the end of the sample period.

Figure 3. HHI of Export by Country, 2019–2024

Source: Author’s Calculation, UN Comtrade

Figure 4. HHI of Import by Country, 2019–2024

Source: Author’s Calculation, UN Comtrade

Examining concentration at the HS4 product level provides additional insight into the structure of trade baskets. Changes in overall HHI may arise either because the product distribution becomes more uneven or because a small number of product categories become temporarily dominant.

The HS4-product level export results (Figure 5) reveal substantial cross-country variation in product concentration. Azerbaijan remains the most concentrated exporter throughout the period. Although the figure shows some decline in concentration in the earlier years, this change is not sustained, and the country’s export basket remains heavily concentrated in a narrow set of products. Kazakhstan also shows a relatively high concentration, although the decline after 2022 suggests some gradual diversification. In contrast, Georgia and Tajikistan maintain consistently low HHI values, indicating relatively diversified export baskets across HS4 product categories. Armenia and Uzbekistan remain in the intermediate range, although Armenia shows an increase in concentration in 2024.

Import concentration at the HS4 product level (Figure 6) remains generally lower than export concentration but exhibits greater volatility across countries. Most economies maintain relatively diversified import baskets, with HHI values typically below 0.05–0.06. However, several temporary spikes are visible. Armenia records a sharp increase in import concentration in 2024, suggesting growing reliance on a narrower set of imported goods. Kyrgyzstan experiences a pronounced spike in 2023, while Georgia shows a moderate increase during 2022–2023, then stabilizes. These fluctuations likely reflect temporary supply disruptions, shifts in trade routes, or changes in import demand during periods of economic and geopolitical shocks.

Figure 5. HHI of Export by HS4 Product Categories, 2019–2024

Source: Author’s Calculation, UN Comtrade

Figure 6. HHI of Import by HS4 Product Categories, 2019–2024

Source: Author’s Calculation, UN Comtrade

The country-level Theil index largely reinforces the message from the HHI analysis: across the region, recent changes in export concentration have been driven mainly by shifts in the distribution of exports across destination markets rather than by a restructuring of export baskets.

Armenia shows the clearest increase in geographic concentration, while Azerbaijan also remains relatively concentrated despite some normalization after the 2022 spike. Georgia remains the most geographically diversified case, and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan show only moderate changes over time. Overall, the Theil results add nuance rather than overturning the HHI findings: they suggest that the main source of recent concentration has been unevenness across partner countries, not a uniform narrowing of export structures across all economies.

At the product level, the Theil index points to a more nuanced picture. In several countries, product-level inequality declines or remains moderate even when destination-country concentration rises, suggesting that geographic concentration and product concentration do not always move together. This is especially important for interpretation: an economy may become more dependent on a smaller set of trading partners while still maintaining or even broadening the composition of its export basket. Azerbaijan remains the clearest case of persistently high product concentration, whereas Georgia continues to display a relatively diversified product structure.

In cases where the Theil and HHI measures differ somewhat, the gap likely reflects that the HHI is more sensitive to dominant categories, whereas the Theil index captures unevenness across the full distribution of trade shares.

The product-level Theil index (Figure 7) also provides additional insights into the composition of export baskets. Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan show noticeable declines in product-level inequality between 2019 and 2024, suggesting some diversification across product categories despite rising geographic concentration. This pattern indicates that while exports may increasingly rely on fewer destination countries, the underlying product composition has broadened.

In contrast, Azerbaijan maintains a relatively high product concentration, which is fully consistent with the HS4-product level HHI results showing the highest export concentration across product categories in the region. Georgia shows a slight increase in product-level inequality, although overall concentration remains relatively low compared to most other countries, confirming the diversified structure observed in the HHI product-level analysis.

Overall, the Theil index results reinforce the conclusions drawn from the HHI analysis while providing additional insight into the drivers of concentration. The evidence suggests that recent changes in trade structures across the South Caucasus and Central Asia are driven primarily by shifts in geographic export patterns rather than by widespread narrowing of product specialization. In several countries, product diversification appears to be improving even as exports become more concentrated across trading partners.

Figure 7. Theil Index by Country and Product Categories, 2019 and 2024

Source: Author’s Calculation, UN Comtrade. Note: Higher values indicate greater concentration in the distribution of products.

Export sophistication is measured by the EXPY index, with higher values indicating that a country exports products typically produced by higher-income economies.

Between 2019 and 2024, export sophistication increases for most countries in the region, although the magnitude of change varies (Figure 8). Armenia shows the largest improvement in EXPY, suggesting a shift toward higher-value exports. Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic also show moderate increases in export sophistication. In contrast, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Kazakhstan experience only modest changes, indicating relatively stable export structures over the period.

Importantly, increases in export sophistication should be interpreted alongside changes in concentration indicators. When EXPY increases while export concentration remains low or declines, the improvement reflects broader structural upgrading. However, when increases in EXPY coincide with rising concentration, the shift may reflect specialization in a smaller number of higher-value products rather than broad-based diversification.

Figure 8. Export Sophistication (EXPY), 2019 and 2024

Source: Author’s Calculation, UN Comtrade. Note: Higher values indicate a more sophisticated export basket.

The previous indicators evaluate diversification and sophistication based on observed trade patterns. An additional perspective on structural transformation can be obtained by examining future diversification opportunities, using the feasibility analysis derived from the Atlas of Economic Complexity Index (ECI) developed by the Growth Lab at Harvard University (see Figure 9). This framework maps potential export opportunities based on the relationship between product sophistication and proximity to existing productive capabilities.

Figure 9. Economic Complexity Index (ECI), 2012- 2024

Source: Growth Lab at Harvard University

Across the South Caucasus and Central Asia, the feasibility analysis reveals substantial heterogeneity in the pace and depth of structural transformation. Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan show the most pronounced improvements in economic complexity over time, suggesting that a growing number of technologically more sophisticated products are becoming feasible given existing productive capabilities. This pattern indicates a widening diversification frontier and reflects the accumulation of capabilities that can support expansion into more complex sectors.

These findings are broadly consistent with the earlier results on export sophistication (EXPY), which also show noticeable improvements in Armenia and moderate gains in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. At the same time, the concentration indicators provide an important qualification. While Armenia shows rising export sophistication, the HHI and Theil indices indicate increasing export concentration in recent years. This suggests that structural upgrading may be occurring alongside a narrowing export base, implying that diversification into complex products has not yet become broad-based. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan present a more balanced picture, with modest improvements in sophistication accompanied by relatively stable or moderate concentration levels, which is more consistent with gradual structural diversification.

Georgia and Kyrgyzstan display more incremental dynamics in the ECI analysis. Their export structures have become somewhat more sophisticated, but diversification largely occurs within sectors that remain relatively close to their existing productive structures and only moderately more complex than current exports. This pattern aligns with the earlier results showing relatively stable concentration indicators and only modest increases in export sophistication, pointing to gradual capability accumulation rather than rapid structural upgrading.

In contrast, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan remain more constrained by relatively low levels of economic complexity. In these economies, the distribution of feasible products remains concentrated in lower-complexity segments of the product space, and many technologically more sophisticated activities remain distant from their current capability base. This result is partly consistent with the earlier findings from concentration indicators: Tajikistan’s export structure remains relatively stable but limited in diversification, while Azerbaijan’s export structure continues to be influenced by resource-based specialization. As a result, the set of feasible diversification opportunities remains narrower and concentrated in sectors with relatively limited technological sophistication.

Overall, the ECI analysis complements the empirical results obtained from HHI, Theil, and EXPY indicators. While some countries in the region demonstrate signs of capability accumulation and gradual upgrading, the results suggest that structural transformation remains uneven across the region. In several cases, improvements in export sophistication occur alongside persistent concentration in a limited number of products, indicating that diversification into more complex sectors has not yet translated into broad-based structural change.

Conclusion

This brief examined the evolution of trade diversification, export sophistication, and structural transformation in the South Caucasus and Central Asia between 2019 and 2024. The results show substantial cross-country differences. While some economies maintain relatively diversified export structures, others remain more dependent on a narrow set of products. Export sophistication has improved modestly in several countries, but in some cases, this has coincided with rising export concentration. This does not necessarily indicate a negative development: such a pattern may reflect successful specialization based on comparative advantage or upgrading into higher-value activities. However, when sophistication gains are concentrated in a small number of products or markets, the resulting export structure may remain vulnerable to external shocks and less supportive of broad-based structural transformation.

The analysis also points to uneven progress in productive capabilities across the region. Some countries are gradually expanding the range of products they can competitively produce, while others remain constrained by narrower capability bases.

These results highlight the nuanced relationship between diversification, sophistication, and economic complexity. Diversifying into more complex sectors can strengthen economic resilience by broadening the range of activities an economy can rely on, reducing dependence on a limited set of simple or commodity-based exports, and enhancing the capacity to adapt to changes in demand, prices, or trade routes. In this context, the key policy challenge is not diversification for its own sake, but fostering the development of productive capabilities that enable more sophisticated, adaptable, and resilient export structures over time.

References

  • Balland, P.-A., Boschma, R., Crespo, J., & Rigby, D. (2019). Smart specialization policy in the European Union: relatedness, knowledge complexity and regional diversification. Regional Studies, 53(9), 1252–1268.
  • Brummitt, C. D., Gómez-Lievano, A., Hausmann, R., & Bonds, M. H. (2018). Machine-learned patterns suggest that diversification drives economic development.
  • Hausmann, R., Hwang, J., & Rodrik, D. (2007). What you export matters. Journal of Economic Growth, 12(1), 1–25.
  • Hausmann, R., Hidalgo, C., Bustos, S., Coscia, M., Chung, S., Jimenez, J., Simoes, A., & Yıldırım, M. (2014). The Atlas of Economic Complexity: Mapping Paths to Prosperity. MIT Press.
  • Hidalgo, C. A., & Hausmann, R. (2009). The building blocks of economic complexityProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106(26), 10570–10575.
  • International Monetary Fund. (various years). Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia.
  • Neffke, F., Hartog, M., Boschma, R., & Henning, M. (2018). Agents of structural change: The role of firms and entrepreneurs in regional diversification.
  • Rodrik, D. (2006). What’s so special about China’s exports? China & World Economy, 14(5), 1–19.
  • World Bank. (2020). Central Asia Trade: Structural Transformation and Diversification.
  • Harvard Growth Lab. (2024). Atlas of Economic Complexity – Feasibility Analysis.
  • United Nations Comtrade Database. (2024). International Trade Statistics.
  • World Bank. (2023). World Development Indicators.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Russian Wheat Policies and Georgia’s Strategic Trade Policies

20240310 Wheat Policies Trade Policies Image 01

Russia is known for periodically halting its grain exports to impact global wheat prices. This has become a significant policy concern in recent years, most notably during the Covid-19 pandemic and in the wake of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Georgia heavily depends on wheat imports, and over 95 percent of its wheat has historically been sourced from Russia. Despite Russia’s periodic bans and restrictions on wheat exports occurring every 2-3 years, Georgia is yet to effectively diversify its sources of wheat imports. This policy brief analyses the impact of Russia’s most recent wheat policies on Georgia’s wheat market, examines Georgia’s response, and provides policy recommendations in this regard.

Georgia’s Temporary Import Duty on Russian Wheat Flour: Protecting Local Production and Food Security

In June 2023, the Georgian government introduced a temporary import duty on wheat flour imported from Russia in response to requests from the Georgian Flour Producers Association. The association began advocating for an import duty after Russia, in 2021, imposed a so-called “floating tariff” on wheat which made it relatively more expensive to import wheat in comparison to wheat flour. As a result of the “floating tariff” on wheat, wheat flour imports skyrocketed and almost fully substituted wheat imports. Eventually, many Georgian mills shut down and local wheat producers struggled to sell domestically produced wheat. Such an increase in flour imports raises the risk of completely replacing domestically produced flour with flour imported from Russia.

To address the above, the government has implemented a temporary import duty of 200 GEL (75 USD) per ton on wheat flour imported from Russia (the average import price ranges between 225 USD/ton and 435 USD/ton). In turn, millers have agreed to purchase 1 kilogram of wheat from Georgian farmers for 0.7 GEL (0.3 USD). This policy measure is in effect until March 1, 2024.

The Georgian Flour Producers Association advocates for an extension of the temporary import duty beyond March 1, 2024, to uphold fair competition in the wheat and flour market. According to the Georgian Flour Producers Association, an extension is desirable due to the following (Resonance daily, 2024):

  • Under the import duty, fair competition between wheat flour and wheat has been restored, and Georgian mills have resumed their operations.
  • Following the government intervention, farmers have successfully sold over 50,000 tons (on average half of the annual production) of domestically produced wheat. The Ministry of Environmental Protection and Agriculture has reported a 60 percent increase in local wheat production over the past two years, with expectations of sustained growth.
  • Wheat imports have resumed, with Georgia importing 20,000 to 25,000 tons of wheat monthly, while prior to the government intervention, the average monthly wheat imports amounted to 15,337 tons (in 2022). Additionally, 8,000 to 12,000 tons of wheat flour, on average, are also imported monthly, while in the absence of government intervention, wheat flour imports surged to over 15,000 tons (in 2022).
  • Post-intervention, the price of 100 kilograms of first-quality flour has remained stable, ranging from 45 to 49 GEL. Consequently, the price of bread has not increased but remains steady.
  • The import duty has generated an additional 20 million GEL in government revenue.
  • Through the efforts of the mills, the country now enjoys a steady and strategically managed supply of wheat, in accordance with UN recommendations. Coupled with the seasonal harvest of Georgian wheat, this ensures complete food security in any unforeseen critical scenario.

While many arguments support the decision to preserve the import duty on wheat flour, in order to make an informed decision on that matter, it is essential to thoroughly assess production, trade and price dynamics in the wheat market in Georgia. Additionally, to design adequate trade policy measures, one has also to consider the issue in a broader perspective and assess the risks associated with a high dependency on Russian wheat, especially given Russia’s history of imposing wheat export restrictions.

Russian Policy on the Wheat Market

Russia has long been one of the dominant players on the global wheat market, and its periodic decisions to halt grain exports have heavily affected international wheat prices (see Table 1). This concern became especially stringent in recent years, during the Covid-19 pandemic and Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Table 1. Russia’s policy interventions in the wheat market and their estimated impact on wheat prices, 2007-2023.

Source: United States Department of Agriculture, 2022.
The Government of the Russian Federation.
The Kansas City Wheat Futures, The U.S. Wheat Associates.

One of Russia’s most recent interventions in the wheat market is its withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative – an agreement between Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, and the United Nations (UN) during the Russian invasion of Ukraine on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian ports. While Georgia doesn’t directly import wheat from Ukraine and isn’t immediately threatened by famine, Russia’s export policies regarding wheat have raised significant food security concerns in the country. Georgia heavily depends on wheat imports from Russia, with over 95 percent of its wheat historically being sourced from there. Despite Russia’s recurrent bans and restrictions on wheat exports every 2-3 years, Georgia is yet to successfully diversify its import sources.

The Georgian Wheat Market in Figures

Domestic Production

Historically, Georgia’s agricultural sector has struggled to achieve a large-scale and sufficient wheat production due to the prevalence of small-sized farms. However, over the past decade, Georgian domestic wheat production has shown significant growth (see Figure 1). This growth has been particularly sizeable in recent years, with production increasing by 32 and 53 percent in 2021 and 2022, respectively, as compared to 2020.

Figure 1. Wheat production in Georgia, 2014-2022.

Source: Geostat, 2024.

Such increase in local production positively contributes to the self-sufficiency ratio, which increased from 7 percent in 2014 to 22 percent in 2022, in turn implying higher food security levels.

Wheat Imports

Before the introduction of Russia’s floating tariff on wheat, wheat flour imports to Georgia were almost non-existent. However, after the floating tariff was imposed on wheat, imports of wheat flour increased more than 20 times – from 743 tons in January 2021 to 15,086 tons in May 2023 – peaking at 23,651 tons in August 2022 (see Figure 2). At the same time wheat imports declined by almost 60 percent, from 29,397 tons in January 2021 to 12,133 tons in May 2023, with the smallest import quantity being 2,743 tons in May 2022 (as depicted in Figure 2).

Figure 2. Georgian wheat and wheat flour imports, 2021-2023.

Source: Geostat, 2024. Note: Imports include meslin (a mixture of wheat and rye grains).

After the introduction of the temporary import duty on wheat flour in June 2023, wheat imports have picked up, although not reaching the levels seen in 2021. Similarly, wheat flour imports have declined while remaining at higher levels than in 2021. This indicates a change in Georgia’s wheat market dynamics. Historically, Georgia predominantly imported wheat; now it imports both wheat and wheat flour. This shift must be considered in future policy design, as it has implications for domestic wheat farmers and mills.

The continued wheat flour imports, despite the temporary import duty imposed by the Georgian Government can likely be attributed to a smaller price gap between wheat and wheat flour import prices (see Table 2).

Table 2. Average import prices of wheat and wheat flour in Georgia, 2021-2023.

Source: Geostat, 2024.

In 2021, prior to Russia’s introduction of a floating tariff on wheat, the import price of wheat flour in Georgia was 24 percent higher than the import price of wheat. After the introduction of the floating tariff, importing wheat became more expensive, and the import price gap between wheat flour and wheat decreased to 22 percent by the end of 2021. Subsequently, in 2022, this gap further narrowed, and by the first half of 2023, the import price of wheat flour was 5 percent lower than the import price of wheat. This significant decrease in the price gap resulted in nearly full substitution of wheat imports with wheat flour imports. After the introduction of the import duty on wheat flour and as international wheat prices declined, a marginal positive price gap has reappeared, amounting to just 1 percent. As it stands, importing wheat flour remains more advantageous than importing wheat.

Price Effects

Russia’s floating tariff on wheat led to increased bread and wheat flour prices in 2021-2022. In June 2022, bread prices experienced the most significant surge, increasing by 36 percent, while wheat flour prices reached their peak in September 2022 with a year-on-year increase of 41 percent (see Figure 3). The primary reason for this was the record increase in wheat prices, leading to a corresponding surge in wheat flour prices in 2022. This spike occurred as the world price of wheat reached its highest point in five years.

Figure 3. Annual change in bread and wheat flour prices, 2021-2023.

Source: Geostat, 2024.

Nevertheless, in 2023 bread and wheat flour prices decreased, indicating that the import duty on wheat flour did not lead to increased prices. This could partially be explained by the fact that mills pay farmers 0.5 GEL/kg, which is lower than agreed price of 0.7 GEL/kg. Another and more crucial factor is the decline in global wheat prices. They began their descent in June 2022 and have since maintained a downward trajectory. This decrease, combined with increased local production, has so far acted as a barrier to any new bread and wheat flour price increases.

The Way Forward

The question that must be addressed is whether the import duty on wheat flour imported from Russia should be extended.

The import duty may have contributed to increased local production as higher import duties can incentivize local businesses to invest in expanding their production capacity or improving their technology to meet an increased demand. It is however essential to note that the impact of import duties on local production varies depending on the level of domestic competition, the availability of inputs (high quality seed, fertilizer etc.), technological capabilities, and government policies beyond import duties (such as investment incentives, infrastructure development, and regulatory environment). Additionally, import duties can also lead to retaliatory measures from trading partners, affecting overall trade dynamics – potentially incurring unintended consequences. Therefore, while import duties can contribute to an increased local production under certain conditions, it is just one of many factors influencing production dynamics.

Secondly, as previously detailed, the import duty has so far not resulted in increased bread prices. However, the effect of an import tariff on retail prices depends on various factors, including elasticity of demand and supply, market, competitiveness, and the extent to which the tariff is passed on to consumers by importers and retailers. Since demand for bread is inelastic, one has to keep in mind that the importers and retailers can fully pass on the increased cost from an import tariff to consumers.

Given that the floating tariff and the import duty make wheat and wheat flour imports to Georgia more expensive, one should expect future bread price increases. This unless international wheat prices continue to decline and/or producers agree to reduce their profit margins or make supply chain changes. Therefore, an extension of the import duty might be a suitable solution in the short and medium-term, but it should not be seen as a permanent solution.

To limit the risks of food scarcity in Georgia in the long run, it is essential to design strategies helping the country to reduce its dependency on Russian wheat and wheat flour. Some measures to achieve this objective may include:

Further supporting local production. Encourage investment in domestic agriculture to increase the productivity and quality of wheat production in Georgia. This can be achieved through subsidies, incentives for modern farming techniques, and access to credit for farmers.

Improving the quality of local production. Currently, most of the domestically produced wheat is unsuitable for milling into wheat flour. A significant portion of domestically produced wheat is of poor quality and instead used for feeding livestock. It is essential to invest in research and development to improve the quality of domestically produced wheat. This includes developing wheat varieties that are resistant to diseases and better suited for local growing conditions.

Seeking alternative markets for import diversification. One alternative for Georgia may be to focus on the Kazakh and Ukrainian markets (once the war is over) and negotiate possible ways to decrease the cost of transporting wheat to Georgia with state and private sector representatives.

Reducing the Georgian dependence on Russian wheat imports requires a multifaceted approach that addresses various aspects of agricultural policy, trade diversification, and domestic production capacity.

References

Resonance daily. (2024). The Association of Wheat and Flour Producers of Georgia requests an extension of the import tax on imported flour. https://www.resonancedaily.com/index.php?id_rub=4&id_artc=197847

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

How to Intensify and Diversify Ukrainian Exports? The Case of Bilateral Trade with Germany

20191021 How to Intensify and Diversify Ukrainian Exports FREE Network Policy Brief Image 00

This policy brief focuses on trade relations between Ukraine and Germany. In particular, it analyses bilateral trade in goods and examines the possibilities for increasing Ukrainian exports to Germany, in both the extensive and the intensive margins. The brief identifies prospective product groups for such increases and discusses potential obstacles to trade intensification. Finally, it provides recommendations for the further trade development.

German-Ukrainian Trade

Germany has recently become one of the most important trading partners for Ukraine. In 2018, Germany was fifth in terms of Ukrainian export destinations and third in terms of its import source countries.  While Ukraine, not surprisingly, is less important for German international trade (in 2018, Ukraine ranked 42nd in terms of Germany’s export and 45th in terms of its import), bilateral trade between Ukraine and Germany showed positive dynamics over the last five years.

Since Germany is a member of the European Union, its trade relations with Ukraine are regulated by legislation common for all EU member states. The EU’s political and economic cooperation with Ukraine is stipulated by the Association Agreement (AA). The AA is a comprehensive agreement provisioning the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) between Ukraine and the EU. While the provisional application of the AA began in the fall of 2014, the document fully entered into force on September 1, 2017. The abovementioned intensification of trade relations between Ukraine and Germany was to a significant extent driven by the signing of the DCFTA and a loss of a significant share of the Russian market.

The main Ukrainian exports to Germany include ignition wiring sets used in vehicles, aircraft and ships; low erucic acid, rape or colza seeds, iron ores agglomerated, maize, electrical switches etc. (see Table 1). Together, the top-15 product groups at a 6-digit level of the Harmonised System (HS) give 57% of the total exports from Ukraine to Germany.

Table 1. Top-15 Ukrainian product groups by export to Germany as of 2018

Source: UN Comtrade

This brief argues that both countries are likely to gain additional benefits from further intensifying bilateral trade relations. It summarizes the results of the research (Iavorskyi P. at al., 2019) on how to further expand and diversify Ukrainian exports to Germany, it identifies the prospective product groups and obstacles to their exports, and provides policy recommendations for trade development.

Promising Products

In order to find the most promising ways for increasing Ukrainian exports to Germany, this study employs a two-step approach. First, using a normalized revealed comparative advantage (NRCA) index (Run Yu et al, 2009) we distinguish goods, which Ukraine has world-wide comparative advantage in and Germany does not. A positive (negative) NRCA indicates that country’s actual share of a product in national exports is higher (lower) than the world average, – so that the country has a comparative advantage (disadvantage) in this commodity. According to this criterion, product groups with a negative NRCA for Germany and a positive NRCA for Ukraine were selected.

At the second stage, for the goods identified during the first step, a gravity model was estimated. A gravity model predicts bilateral trade flows based on the size of the economy and trade costs between them (such as distance, cultural differences, free trade agreements, tariffs, etc.). Being a general equilibrium model, it captures not only immediate impact of economic and political changes on trade between two countries, but also how it influences trade with other countries. A gap between current and potential export volumes predicted by the model is a potential for exports increase (which we refer to as undertrade).

The gravity model estimates the total undertrade between Ukraine and Germany at $ 500 million in 2016, or 35% of the total exports from Ukraine to Germany in the same year. Moreover, Ukraine has the potential to increase trade in both goods already exported to Germany as well as goods not yet supplied by Ukrainian companies to this market.

As for the structure of our findings, agricultural and mining commodities, as well as products of traditional Ukrainian export industries, such as metallurgy, are widely represented on the top of the undertraded commodity list. For example, more than a half of the estimated undertrade falls on primary food and primary industrial supplies, such as soybeans, barley, tomatoes, grain sorghum, iron ore, zirconium ores, etc. These categories already account for a large share of the current exports composition, and production in these sectors provides for a significant share of employment. Foreign currency inflow stipulated by exporting these products is also important for the Ukrainian economy.

At the same time, the undertrade in categories of final consumption, capital goods and transport is much lower. However, these product groups are important for exports diversification. These, for example, include liquid dielectric transformers, refrigerator cabinets, telescopes, tugs and pusher craft in capital goods, rail locomotives, railway cars, gas turbine engines in transport; automatic washing machines, electric space heaters, fans, coffeemakers, synthetic curtains, and leather apparel in consumer goods. Despite the complex regulation and relatively small amount of estimated undertrade, export diversification from primary to manufactured goods is important for overcoming export instability and long-term economic growth (Cadot at al. 2013), which is why promotion of trade in such areas is important.

Figure 1. Estimated undertrade according to broad economic categories

Source: Own calculations based on UN Comtrade data

Obstacles to Trade

Following the abolition or reduction of EU import duties between Ukraine and the EU under the DCFTA, tariffs do not significantly restrict exports of Ukrainian goods to the EU. Instead, technical regulations, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, geographical indications, licensing, etc. create significant barriers to bilateral trade. Thus, “non-tradability” can be explained, for instance, by the negative effects of various non-tariff barriers (both at European and national levels) or other factors, such as low competitiveness (in terms of price or quality) of Ukrainian goods compared to similar goods supplied by other countries, taste preferences of German consumers, peculiarities of importers’ associations, specific requirements of retailers, etc. Thus, harmonization of Ukrainian regulations with those of the European Union in accordance with the AA will help reduce customs barriers and existing divergences in regulations, and thus simplify the export of Ukrainian goods to the EU and Germany in particular.

Policy Recommendations

Based on the findings of the qualitative and quantitative research carried out, Ukrainian policy makers are advised to:

  • Timely and effectively align Ukrainian legislation, standards and practices with those of the EU, in line with the Action Plan and Commitments undertaken by Ukraine under the DCFTA within the framework of the AA with the EU, in particular in such areas as technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, customs, and protection of intellectual property rights.
  • Accelerate preparations for the signing of the ACAA (the Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance for Industrial Products) for the top three priority sectors of Ukrainian industry, which Ukrainian authorities agreed with European side, namely in the areas of low-voltage equipment, electromagnetic compatibility and machine safety, which will boost industrial technological exports to the EU and other countries.
  • Conduct government level negotiations with the EU and Germany regarding the removal of those barriers to the single market faced by the promising Ukrainian goods that will not be lifted as a result of harmonization of regulations with the European ones.
  • Take advantage of the Regional Pan-Euro-Mediterranean Preferential Rules of Origin Convention (the Pan-Euro-Med Convention), which establishes identical rules of origin for goods between its member-states under free trade agreements, and will facilitate the opening of new production facilities and involvement in regional and international value chains.
  • Provide information and consulting support to local manufacturers and exporters regarding the most promising destination markets, help them find partners on such markets, advise on the best ways to penetrate such markets by organizing trade missions, etc.

Another push to the German-Ukrainian trade promotion may arise from facilitating German FDIs to Ukraine. German entrepreneurs and investors are interested in localizing German production facilities in Ukraine and establishing joint German-Ukrainian enterprises, STIs, in particular in such areas as agriculture, light industry (including textiles), civil engineering, renewable energy, and circular economy (GTAI 2018a, 2018b, 2018c). This form of cooperation also boosts Ukrainian exports, since such enterprises often produce intermediate inputs for German production. In order to promote joint enterprises setup Ukraine should:

  • Establish effective mechanisms for protecting foreign investments, including export-oriented ones.
  • Ensure the rule of law and effective protection of property rights.
  • Create favorable macroeconomic conditions to ensure access to financing for both Ukrainian and foreign businesses.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.