Tag: EU Integration Ukraine

Strengthening Human Capital: How Ukraine and Moldova Can Retain and Reconnect Their Students

Posted on December 22, 2025 | Policy Brief

As more young people from Ukraine and Moldova choose to study abroad, the question of whether internationally educated youth return home has significant implications for demographic sustainability and economic growth. This policy brief presents findings from a survey of young people from Ukraine and Moldova. It outlines their motivations and considerations when deciding whether to study in their home countries or abroad, as well as what it would take for states to transform potential “brain drain” into “brain gain”. The survey data reveal a generation of young people facing constraints and uncertainty, yet still willing to invest in their societies. The analysis highlights a dual task facing both states: They need to offer high-quality education for students who choose to study domestically, while also maintaining meaningful ties with students and graduates educated abroad. Meeting these challenges means contributing to national resilience and human capital development.

Introduction

Across Ukraine and Moldova, an increasing number of young people are choosing to pursue their studies abroad in search of high-quality education, international experiences, and stronger career prospects. The challenge for the two states is to encourage the return of the internationally educated youth to halt the loss of much-needed human capital. Two countries already face labour shortages and ageing populations. One-way student emigration risks weakening their innovation potential and slowing economic development, just as EU integration efforts intensify. Yet, with the right policies, this mobility can be turned from a “brain drain” into a “brain gain”.

This policy brief addresses two questions. First, how do individual, structural, political, and security-related factors shape the decisions of young people from Ukraine and Moldova to study at home or abroad? And second, under what conditions are students studying abroad willing to return, and what would it take for states to transform potential “brain drain” into “brain gain”?

To answer these questions, the analysis draws on a survey of young people from Ukraine and Moldova who studied domestically and/or abroad. The survey, which included multiple-choice and open-ended questions, collected responses from 118 individuals originally from either country (N = 236). These findings, complemented by several in-depth interviews with students and academics (conducted separately from the survey), provide insight into how young people from Ukraine and Moldova chose their study destination countries and how their states can better support and engage them at home and abroad.

Ukraine: Educational Choices and Emigration Under Wartime Conditions

Background: By October 2025, Russian attacks had damaged or destroyed 38% of Ukraine’s university facilities (Mykhailova, 2025). Despite the war, universities continue to expand student opportunities, strengthen institutions, and align with EU standards. To mitigate brain drain and performance risks, they draw on government, private-sector, and international support. Participation in Erasmus+, European Universities Alliances, and Horizon Europe helps build institutional capacity and sustain research funding (ERUA, 2025; European Commission, 2024).

In almost four years of full-scale war, the young generation in Ukraine had to adapt to new realities, where war became a backdrop to their formative years. For many, student life now means managing a “war-life balance”: attending classes in shelters, studying through power outages, fundraising for their friends and lecturers in the armed forces, and helping clean campuses after nighttime attacks.

Following the Russian invasion in 2022, the number of Ukrainian students enrolled in Western universities (EU, UK, USA, Canada) increased by 47% in the 2022/2023 academic year compared to the previous one, with Poland being the country with the largest share of Ukrainian students, accounting for 40% of the 115,000 Ukrainian students enrolled in Western higher education institutions in 2023/2024 (Stadnyi, 2025). This number is likely to rise further, given that 350,990 Ukrainian refugees aged 14–17 were living in Europe in September 2025 (Eurostat, 2025).

Survey responses: Students who chose to study in Ukraine highlighted the balance of education quality and affordability, as well as the convenience of staying close to family. Many also felt a strong patriotic commitment to contributing to Ukraine’s future and believed their chosen fields offered good opportunities at home.

Interviewees who had studied both in Ukraine and, at another stage of their education, abroad, noted that international experience broadened their expertise. They valued mobility programmes, double degrees, multicultural cohorts, and Erasmus exchanges. When reflecting on what could be improved in Ukrainian higher education, students prioritised more student-centred and practice-oriented teaching, such as interactive methods, discussion-based seminars, and case-based learning. They stressed the need for better access to international research databases, electronic libraries, and up-to-date literature, which remains limited in many universities. Interviewees also called for stronger career centres, internship programmes, company-based thesis projects, and mentorship.

More broadly, respondents argued that improving Ukrainian higher education requires increased investment in research, modernised infrastructure, deeper links with the private sector, and a stronger emphasis on critical thinking, analytical skills, and interdisciplinarity.

Safety has become one of the key determinants in the educational choices of Ukrainian adolescents, as parents encourage their children to seek safety abroad. However, a decisive factor for student migration is development and opportunities, rather than safety, according to the conducted survey (Figure 1). This finding is also consistent with the Index of the Future: Professional Expectations and Development of Adolescents in Ukraine (Shymanskyi et al., 2025, p.16).

Figure 1. Importance of different factors for Ukrainian students who chose to study abroad

Source: Primary survey data collected for this policy brief.

Speaking about the conditions under which they would be willing to return, respondents mentioned broader structural factors, including security and better career prospects in Ukraine after graduation (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Long-term return intentions of Ukrainian students studying abroad

Source: Primary survey data collected for this policy brief.

For many, Ukraine’s accession to the EU would signal long-term stability and opportunity (Figure 3). One interviewee described their participation in the Create Ukraine initiative, which brings internationally trained Ukrainians to work in government advisory teams on twelve-month placements. This example illustrates how targeted return schemes can channel international expertise into the public sector.

Figure 3. Perceptions of how Ukraine’s potential EU accession would affect opportunities for young people

Source: Primary survey data collected for this policy brief.

Student Mobility in Moldova

Background. Moldova faces an acute challenge of emigration, which results in a shrinking labour force, demographic imbalance, and growing pressure on the country’s social and economic systems. Emigration also affects the education sector, as universities operate with shrinking student cohorts and a shortage of qualified staff. While over 60,000 students are enrolled in 16 higher education institutions in the Republic of Moldova, approximately 14,000 Moldovan students pursue their education in the EU, and four out of five of them are in Romania (Munteanu, 2024; Moldpres, 2025). Economic challenges drive the emigration of young people, who leave in search of more stable career prospects and higher wages (Całus, 2025).

Moldova undertakes a variety of education reforms aimed at reducing incentives for students to leave in search of better-quality studies. Recent measures include simplifying the recognition of foreign degrees, increasing scholarships, expanding dual-education programmes, and launching a national online admissions platform (Eurydice, 2025). EU support reinforces these efforts by modernising university governance, improving labour-market relevance, expanding international cooperation, and strengthening research and innovation (Council of Europe, 2025).

Over the past decade, Moldova has also expanded its engagement with the diaspora, particularly in higher education, to promote knowledge exchange and professional networks (Baltag, Bostan & Plamadeala, 2023). Initiatives include short-term skills-transfer schemes that bring diaspora professionals into Moldovan universities for teaching, mentoring, or consultancy (Bureau for Relations with Diaspora, 2022). These efforts acknowledge that full return migration is unlikely in the near future, but circular mobility and diaspora engagement offer alternatives.

Survey responses. Moldovan students said they chose to study at home because of affordability, accessibility, and the relevance of local programmes. They valued learning in a familiar language and culture, and many hoped to build their futures in Moldova because of family ties and a desire to contribute to the country’s development. However, their educational decisions are shaped by political stability and economic prospects. Those who stay or return form a highly engaged group, actively involved in volunteer work, community projects, and local NGOs. By contrast, students open to leaving cited a weak job market, low wages, and limited opportunities, seeing study or work abroad as offering better prospects.

Students with experience in both systems emphasised the need for more practical learning, internships, company partnerships, real-world projects, and a wider range of electives, as well as stronger career guidance and mobility opportunities. Moldovan students studying abroad said they would be more attracted to domestic universities if curricula were modernised, programmes diversified, and links to the labour market strengthened. Many students abroad remain unsure about returning or plan to stay abroad due to low salaries, limited career prospects, weak institutions, and broader political and economic uncertainty in Moldova (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Long-term return intentions of Moldovan students studying abroad

Source: Primary survey data collected for this policy brief.

Similarly to Ukraine, the young population views the prospect of Moldova’s EU accession as a sign of economic growth, political stability, and improved business and career opportunities, which may motivate them to return and confidently build their future in Moldova. The majority of respondents agree that Moldova’s EU membership will improve opportunities for young people in the country (Figure 5). One of the interviewees shared, “Over time, if we reach that standard of living, I wouldn’t need to look for it elsewhere, because I would have it at home.” EU membership could help reverse the “brain drain,” depending on the pace of domestic economic transformation and the government’s ability to leverage integration to grow high-value industries that retain talent and boost economic growth (Gherasim, 2024).

Figure 5. Perceptions of how Moldova’s potential EU accession would affect opportunities for young people

Source: Primary survey data collected for this policy brief.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

In Ukraine, young people make their educational choices amid war and uncertainty. In Moldova, their decisions whether to study domestically or abroad are shaped by structural conditions. But in both countries, youth demonstrate a strong sense of identity, civic commitment, and desire to contribute to their countries’ future. Therefore, supporting these students requires a dual strategy: strengthening domestic higher education systems while maintaining close ties with those who pursue opportunities abroad.

For students who choose to remain in Ukraine or Moldova, the priority is ensuring that higher education institutions provide quality and relevance. At the same time, students abroad should be viewed as a community whose expertise, networks, and global experiences can play an important role in national development. Diaspora-engagement programmes implemented in Moldova are increasingly relevant to Ukraine to help maintain meaningful connections with human capital abroad.

The survey and interview data presented above suggest the following policy recommendations, relevant for both countries and reflecting the needs and expectations of young people.

Key recommendations:

  1. Keep strengthening the quality and relevance of higher education at home:
    1. Modernise curricula and enhance teaching quality by shifting toward methods that prioritise critical thinking and applied skills.
    2. Strengthen institutional capacity through international partnerships and expand the variety of courses and programmes to better match labour-market needs, including the development of joint courses that enhance relevance and quality.
    3. Promote career services through university-employer partnerships, internship programmes, company-based thesis projects and mentorship schemes that help students transition into the labour market.
  2. Maintain meaningful connections with students and young professionals abroad:
    1. Develop diaspora networks connecting students abroad with universities and employers at home.
    2. Promote public sector and private sector programmes that integrate internationally trained young professionals.
    3. Expand short-term exchanges: visiting fellowships, research collaborations, consultancy roles.

Mobilising the potential of young people in Ukraine and Moldova is essential for long-term resilience, EU integration, and economic growth. In turn, investing in education quality, labour market development, and diaspora engagement is a strategic investment in national development and human capital. Ultimately, retaining and reconnecting talent depends on broader security, political, and economic developments, especially progress on EU integration and successful reforms.

Acknowledgement

The author thanks Tatiana Cantarji and Cristina Varzari, students at the State University of Moldova, for their valuable assistance in distributing the online questionnaire among Moldovan students and conducting interviews. The author is also grateful to all survey participants and interviewees for sharing their time and insights.

 

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Liberal Values in Ukraine Days Before the 2022 Invasion

Posted on September 22, 2025 | Policy Brief

Monument in Kyiv at sunrise symbolizing Ukraine liberal values of freedom, democracy, and resilience.

Just weeks before Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, the European Social Survey completed the 10th round of data collection on public attitudes and beliefs in Ukraine. This policy brief examines regional variation in liberal values such as attitudes toward democracy and the EU, based on that data. While respondents in Eastern Ukraine were more skeptical of democracy and EU integration, they did not consistently reject liberal social values to a greater extent than respondents in other parts of the country. The most striking divide however, lies in institutional trust, which was significantly lower in Eastern Ukraine. This suggests that trust in institutions, which may have been further negatively impacted by prolonged exposure to violence since 2014, underlie the observed regional differences in attitudes towards democracy and the EU. Understanding these differences is vital for policymakers navigating Ukraine’s reform and EU accession process.

Introduction

It has been well documented that values in post-communist countries in Eastern Europe on average, tend to be more authoritarian, more nationalistic, more in favor of state intervention in the economy, and more skeptical towards sexual and ethnic minorities and foreigners than in Western Europe (e.g., Roland 2012). Behind the averages, however, there is substantial variation in values across subgroups of populations. Even before the onset of the full-scale Russian invasion, a discussion on regional Ukrainian differences in relation to democratic values, the wish for EU integration, and similar liberal attitudes existed, both in and outside of the country.

The path towards a closer relationship with Europe and the EU started already in 2014, but since February 2022, Ukraine has politically positioned itself even closer to the EU, and an EU accession process is now underway. However, for a successful reform process in Ukraine, how public opinion is shaped and whether attitudes and values converge towards those of the EU will be important (Olofsgård et al. 2024).

With this in mind, this policy brief provides a descriptive account of public liberal values in Ukraine by analyzing data from the 10th round of the European Social Survey (ESS) conducted just weeks before the full-scale invasion on the 22nd of February 2022. Some of the differences we observe are likely long-standing and related to differences in language preferences and cultural and informational exposure from Russia and the EU, respectively. Yet, given the exposure to instability and conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine since 2014, we also discuss the role that exposure to conflict may have played in explaining several attitudinal dimensions, including satisfaction with democracy, support for liberal social values, attitudes toward Europe and EU integration, as well as levels of trust.

Data

The ESS round 10 data was collected through face-to-face interviews in Ukraine between January 18th, 2022, and February 8th, 2022. The nationally representative survey focuses on public attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors and includes questions on opinions on democracy, the EU, and similar topics commonly considered to capture liberal views.

ESS Sample Characteristics

The sample consisted of more women than men (about 59 percent and 41 percent, respectively). While the Ukrainian population is well-educated, most still find it difficult (41 percent) or very difficult (32 percent) to live comfortably on their income. 11.5 percent of the sample was unemployed, while 31 percent were retired. Broken down by location, most average outcomes are similar, albeit with the East displaying somewhat lower levels of education and greater income difficulties (see Figure 1 for an illustration of what oblasts (regions) are included in each geographical unit). Unemployment was, however, substantially higher in the West (about 15 percent), while the share of retirees was lower (26 percent).

Some heterogeneity exists when it comes to belonging to a religious denomination. In the Central and South, around 63 percent state they belong to a church/mosque/synagogue, etc. The East is roughly at par with the national average (70 and 69.5 percent, respectively), while this figure is 82 percent in the Western part of the country. Similarly, there are major differences in the language one most often speaks at home. In the country as a whole, 13.4 percent stated they speak both Ukrainian and Russian at home. In the East, this figure was as high as 27.1 percent, displaying the duality in mother tongue in this part of Ukraine. The corresponding figure for the West was 3.3 percent. On the contrary, 92.4 percent marked that they most often speak only Ukrainian at home in the West, whereas this figure was only 5.2 percent in the East.

Figure 1. Geographical Classification of Ukraine’s Oblasts

Note: The map depicts the ESS coverage at the time of data collection, excluding Crimea and Sevastopol – illegally annexed by Russia since 2014.

Key Variables of Interest

To understand the views on liberal values, ESS responses to questions in the following areas have been considered:

  • I. Merits of democracy: satisfaction with the way democracy works; importance of living in a democratic country.
  • II. Liberal democratic values: agreement with statements such as “gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own lives as they wish”; attitudes towards the merits of obedience, respect for authority, and loyalty towards leaders; attitudes towards immigrants.
  • III. Opinions about Europe and the EU: support for further EU integration; emotional attachment to Europe; vote intention in a hypothetical EU referendum.

Regional Differences

There are some clear regional divides in attitudes toward democracy, liberal values, and EU integration across Ukraine in the weeks leading up to the full-scale Russian invasion. These differences are particularly pronounced between Eastern Ukraine and the Center, South, and West – though not uniformly in the same direction.

Figure 2. Attitudes toward democracy, liberal values, and EU integration across Ukraine

Source: Authors’ creation from ESS.

On democratic commitment, only 37 percent of respondents in the East considered it “extremely important” to live in a democratically governed country. This was about 16 percentage points lower than the national average. When categories were grouped into low, medium, and high importance, the East still trailed the national average by about 10 percentage points (about 67.5 and 75 percent, respectively). Similarly, satisfaction with democracy is the lowest among respondents from the East (about 6 percent compared to a national average, including the East, of 11 percent). Geographical differences are also evident in the responses to the question on whether it is acceptable for a country to have a strong leader above the law. A smaller share rejected this in the East (about 30 percent compared to the national average of 37 percent).

However, the East stood out in the other direction on some core liberal values, as depicted in Figure 2. It had the lowest share disagreeing with LGBT rights (31 percent vs. 40 percent nationally), the weakest support for teaching children obedience (17 percent), and the highest rejection of it (41 percent). Further, only 12 percent in the East agreed that “the country needs most loyalty towards its leaders,” compared to 26 percent nationally. This question could reflect one’s view on the current leadership, warranting some caution in the interpretation. On immigration, however, the East was less liberal: only 19 percent saw immigrants as having a positive impact, versus about 30 percent nationally.

The sharpest regional divide between the East and other regions concerns attitudes toward Europe and EU membership. In a hypothetical referendum, 73 percent of respondents in the East said they would vote to remain outside of the EU, compared to 47 percent in the South, 23 percent in the Central, and just 11 percent in the West. Support for further European unification was also substantially lower in the East, with only about 17 percent in favor of further unification, as compared to the almost 50 percent national average. Similarly, emotional attachment to Europe is substantially lower among respondents from the East, with nearly all respondents stating low or medium attachment only – figures that nearly invert those of respondents from the West of Ukraine.

The Role of Trust

Turning to the measures of trust, the East clearly stands out. Trust in the parliament, the police, political parties, politicians, and the legal system was substantially lower among respondents from the East (in the ranges of 5 to 15 percentage points more respondents answered they had a low level of trust in said institutions than the national average). When asked about trust in the United Nations, the East also stood out with more than 50 percent stating low trust compared to the national average of about 37. The same pattern holds also when asked about the European Parliament – 73 percent compared to the national average of about 44 percent – stated low trust. Respondents from the South also displayed lower levels of trust across all measures, but the deviations from the average are about half as big as the East.

When asked whether people can generally be trusted, or one can’t be too careful, the East did not stand out in this way, underpinning how distrust is strongly directed toward institutions, both national and international.

Conflict Exposure

Figure 3 details the conflict intensity in the last two years leading up to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As can be seen, incidents of violence are concentrated in the Donbass area, including the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. While not marked by similar levels of active conflict, Kharkiv oblast – also part of the East classification – borders areas with high levels of conflict intensity in the Donbass, as well as Russia in the east.

Figure 3. Conflict intensity in Ukraine, by raion

2020

 

2021

Source: Authors’ creation from Armed Conflict and Location Data.

It should be noted that the map also depicts strategic deployments and political unrest, such as demonstrations, explaining the prevalence of “conflict” also in a few other places in Ukraine prior to February 2022. The occurrences of such incidents are, however, far less than those in Luhansk oblast and Donetsk oblast at the time. An important piece of information is that the intensity pattern holds for the time Armed Conflict and Location Data for Ukraine has been available (2018), i.e. individuals situated in the East have been exposed to incidences of violence over a prolonged period of time.

This raises the question whether this exposure to violence may have contributed to increased differences in trust in institutions and support for democracy and the EU beyond what was already there before 2014. The most immediate effect probably comes from selective migration, i.e., that individuals who remain in the eastern regions in early 2022 despite the violence since 2014 may be those who, on average, are more skeptical of the Ukrainian government and its tilt away from the authoritarian Russia and towards the EU. But previous literature and recent studies on Ukraine suggest that there may also be a direct effect coming from exposure to violence on an individual’s attitudes. This relationship has recently been mapped by Obrizan (2025). A key finding is that military solutions are preferred in the segment of the population that has experienced hardship and personal losses since the full-scale invasion in 2022.

More generally, any kind of trust – including the interpersonal one – can be affected by exposure to conflict. The relationship is complicated, and in some instances, violence can cause more pro-social attitudes and behavior. An important distinction, however, is that exposure to violence amplifies the distinctions in attitudes and behavior towards members of in- and out-groups (Olofsgård, 2025). This suggests that conflict may have further increased the differences between the East of Ukraine and the rest of the country, if many residents in the former perceive national and western institutions as being dominated by groups they do not feel strong attachments to.

Further, terror management theory (e.g., Landau et al. 2004) suggests that fear induces support for charismatic and strong leadership. In a context where liberal democracy is not everywhere well enough entrenched, this may tilt over into support for more authoritarian leadership in response to attacks triggering stronger emotions of fear. Furthermore, work by Feldman and Stenner (1997) shows that the impact of perceived societal threat on triggering stronger authoritarian preferences can depend on authoritarian predispositions. The latter is measured by, e.g., looking at attitudes towards child rearing and emphasis on obedience. In the context of the finding above, this would imply that the impact of violence on authoritarian preferences would be weaker in the eastern parts of Ukraine, compared to the rest of the country, a potentially interesting avenue for future research.

Conclusions

The findings in this policy brief nuance simple narratives about regional divides in Ukraine. While dissatisfaction with democracy and skepticism toward the EU are more common in the East, this does not necessarily correspond to a general rejection of liberal social values. In some cases — such as attitudes toward child-rearing, authority, and LGBT rights — respondents from the East even express more liberal views than elsewhere.

Not explicitly discussed in the brief is the topic of mother tongue. The data shows that Russian speakers are less emotionally attached to Europe and less supportive of EU integration. Yet, there is no consistent evidence that Russian speakers are less committed to liberal democratic values overall. The effect of language is difficult to disentangle from geography, particularly given the concentration of Russian speakers in Eastern Ukraine.

What does stand out more clearly is that trust and the general view on institutions are substantially lower and more negative in the East. Respondents from the East consistently report lower trust in national and international political institutions. Interestingly, this pattern does not extend to generalized social trust — the East does not differ markedly from the rest of the country. This contrast suggests a more focused skepticism directed at formal institutions, rather than widespread social distrust. One possible explanation, as discussed in Olofsgård (2025), is that when exposed to conflict and violence, interpersonal trust may reflect confidence in one’s in-group, while institutional trust hinges on feeling represented within the broader political system. If respondents from the East perceive themselves as excluded from the national or European in-group, this could explain their lower levels of trust in both domestic and international institutions, and exposure to violence may have further amplified this. While signs of such alienation appear in the data, one should refrain from drawing too strong conclusions from this alone. Another possible explanation is that prolonged exposure to violence has eroded confidence in the government’s ability to protect citizens, and in the effectiveness of EU support, which would turn support away from the EU option preferred by the current government.  Future research on the effects of war exposure should more carefully disentangle the various aspects and forms of trust and how they relate to liberal values in Ukraine. Rebuilding institutional trust remains a key challenge. In this context, instilling peace and decentralizing political power may be essential for increasing trust in the Eastern part of the country, if that helps residents in the East to identify with public institutions. As Ukraine advances on its path toward EU membership, fostering a shared sense of national belonging will be critical in overcoming the narrative of an East–West divide when rebuilding the country.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.