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Economic Gender Equality Issues in Transition Economies

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Until a couple of decades ago, gender was almost a non-topic within development economics.[1] But in the 1990s research gradually showed that gender inequality could have substantial impact on macroeconomic outcomes. At the same time it became clear that women and men were hit differently by economic shocks.[2] These insights triggered an unprecedented focus on gender both in research and at the policy level – see Duflo (2012) for a brilliant overview with a developing country focus. The largest collective action process in history targeted at reducing world poverty, the Millennium development goals, focused on gender inequalities in several dimensions when enacted in year 2000.[3]

In the so-called transition economies, economic gender issues came on the agenda in the late 1990s as it became evident that the transition process had affected men and women differently – see e.g. Dijkstra (1997) – and that these growing gender inequalities had important humanitarian and economic costs. For instance, in many transition economies men’s mortality skyrocketed in the 1990s while the gender wage gap rapidly increased.[4] In particular, Pastore and Verashchagina (2011) show that the gender wage gap in Belarus doubled during the decade from 1996 to 2006, partly as a result of women’s increased segregation into low-wage industries.

From a gender perspective, the Soviet model had focused on full employment for both men and women, but without aspiring to dismantle traditional gender roles. Women therefore tended to work full time alongside with men, while remaining primary caretakers of children and household. The differences in gender equality were, however, significant across the Eastern and Central European countries already before the transition process started. It is thus essential to carry out country-specific analysis of gender equality so as to fully account for context-specific institutional, economic and cultural aspects.

This paper aims to provide a short overview of research on economic gender inequality that might be of particular relevance to transition economies. Given the extensive literature on gender inequality on the one hand and transition economies on the other, this report hopes to serve as an introduction and therefore provides extensive references to the literature to ease further reading.

The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the efficiency gains associated with gender equality; while the subsequent section examines education from a gender perspective. Section 4 reports on the research on gender differences in the labour market, while the following section exposes how gender stereotypes lead to less competent politicians, missing women, etc., while stereotypes at the same times can be changed quickly. The report ends with an overview of current research and policy relevant questions for transition economies.

Research based on economic gender equality

Had gender equality been a universally accepted goal, no further arguments would have been needed to promote it. In this report, the presumption is that men and women are equally worthy of human rights and civil liberties. Given conflicting policy goals, scarce resources and a lack of women decision-makers, more knowledge about the economic gains associated with gender equality is needed. Furthermore, research on the economic impact of gender inequality might not only provide arguments for promoting gender equality, but can also ease the formulation of actual policies by suggesting mechanisms through which gender equality and economic development are linked.

Economists’ argument for gender equality

From an economic point of view, the main argument to strive for gender equality is that men and women on average have the same cognitive and non-cognitive abilities. Few scientists would today question the statement that the differences within genders with respect to abilities are larger than the differences across genders. In other words, men and women are in terms of innate productive capacities more similar than men among men and women among women are. As long as we define our productive capacity only in terms of brains, most would also agree on the productive equality of men and women. But brawn is often raised as a divisive trait that makes men on average more productive than women. Galor & Weil (1996) even posits that there is no reason for women to enter the formal labour market as long as brawn is more important than brains in production as an explanation as to why women were not on the formal labour market in big numbers until the event of industrialization. Albeit seductive, this line of argument has several fundamental flaws.

First of all, no formal labour market existed before the industrial revolution. In agrarian economies everyone works – men, women and children – but are seldom paid with a monetary salary and have no formal contract regulating pay and work hours. With industrialization men came to constitute the majority of the workforce early on as a consequence of women being the main caretakers, and hence not being able to work far from home once they became mothers (until the children themselves were old enough to work). Moreover, social norms prescribing women to stay at home further impeded mothers to work during certain historical phases. Ultimately, there are few occupations – historically and especially now – that were too brawn-intensive for women.  Rather social norms assigned occupations according to one of the genders and occupation-specific technologies developed accordingly. As a first step in the overview on the mechanisms of economic gender inequality, follows in the next section an exposition on its relation to economic development.

Engendering economic development

Two flagship reports from the World Bank (2001, 2012A) were exclusively dedicated to the role of women in economic development.[5] The point of departure for both reports was the strong correlation between any measure of gender equality and economic development (measured for instance as GDP per capita). While it is clear that gender equality in education and formal labour force participation enhance economic growth – see e.g. Klasen (1999) and Klasen and Lamanna (2009) – it is also clear that sustained economic growth generates a new demand for women’s human capital and indirectly promotes gender equality. From a policy perspective the direction of causality is not unimportant in the short and medium run. In the very long run it is unlikely that a high-income economy can flourish without utilizing the female half of the country’s productive capacity.

Recent research – as Bandiera and Natraj (2013) and Cuberes and Teignier (2014) – indicate that the methodological problems are such that it is challenging to draw policy conclusions on the link between gender equality and economic development based on cross-country studies, and that country-specific analyses are needed to be able to formulate precise policy conclusions.

In the transition economies, gender equality varies greatly along with economic standard. There are clearly efficiency gains to be made by increasing gender equality, but each country needs to perform an analysis of which factors are most crucial to improve. For instance, Hsieh, Hurst, Jones och Klenow (2016) calculates that 15-20 per cent of GDP per capita growth during the period 1960 to 2008 can be attributed to the increased efficiency in the allocation of talent in the American economy. This increase in efficiency is mainly explained by the improved allocation of women’s talents according to Hsieh, Hurst, Jones och Klenow (2016). In a closely related study, Cuberes och Teignier (2016), it is estimated that the OECD’s GDP per capita is 15 per cent lower at present compared to a situation without gender segregation on the labour market and where equally many women and men become entrepreneurs.

In the following, the main gender differences that are central for gender equality and economic efficiency (and thereby growth) are discussed. Out of these, it has been viewed as a first priority to assure that girls and boys both get primary and possibly secondary and tertiary education. Secondly, from an economic standpoint, women’s activity on the formal labour market is essential for sustained economic development. Thirdly, gender norms and their relevance for a wide spectrum of economic (and political) issues are discussed.

Men and women’s education

At the beginning of the 1990s, there were few gender differences in terms of level of education and the labour force was highly educated in most transition economies, although there are considerable regional differences. Gender segregation in terms of field of study was relatively low and gender differences in math performance small. While in most transition countries there has been a feminization of higher education  – in line with the trend in most countries in the world – in other transition economies the increase in economic gender inequalities post 1991 has led to a widening of the gender gaps in both primary and secondary schooling.[6]

While it is debated – see for instance Breierova and Duflo (2004) – that girls’ education is more important than boys’ education for economic growth, it is uncontested that a gender gap in basic education harms future possibilities of a gender equal labour market and economic gender equality in a broad sense.

On a more positive note, the general math-intensity of education in transition countries is still associated with a relatively small gender gap in math performance. In some countries, girls even have a relative advantage in math relative to boys according to Unicef (2013). This becomes of special interest, since recent research has pointed to the importance of math-intensive higher secondary studies for future labour market outcomes – see Buser, Niederle and Oosterbeek (2014). This research also suggests that young women in the Netherlands (and in other European countries) are disadvantaged by their lack of math and science interests. More generally, there is an extensive literature on the existence of stereotype threat of women in mathematics, implying that especially the most talented women shy away from mathematics due to the fear of being found lacking in terms of mathematical performance – see e.g. Spencer, Steele and Quinn (1999).[7]

In most developed countries, math-intensive sciences, engineering and computer science are heavily male-dominated fields of higher education, maybe partly as a consequence of the predominant norm of math being a “male” subject. Thus, there is ample scope to promote women in IT and technology (by more research and explicit policy) in transition economies, where the preconditions for women entering these fields are generally more advantageous. At present Mexico and Greece have the largest share of women graduates in computing (around 40 per cent) according to OECD (2014). Transition countries have the potential to reach similar levels.

Women and men in the labour market

In this section, the overall findings regarding women’s labour force participation (and how it relates to economic development) and the gender wage gap are reviewed. Gender segregation on the labour market is only briefly discussed, but the following section reviews some evidence on vertical segregation. (Gender segregation varies across cultural and technological context and thus requires a more in-depth analysis.)

Development and women’s labour force participation

Women’s labour force participation has been shown to be sensitive to production technology. Research indicates that married women’s labour force participation is U-shaped of over the industrialization process – as first documented in Goldin (1994) and in Mammen and Paxson (2000) in a developing country-context. The line of arguments goes as follows. Before industrialization, most economies had a limited formal labour market. This does not imply that men and women do not work, but rather that they work in self-subsidence farming, or in the informal labour market. As economies develop, the labour force participation of married women tends to decrease for two main reasons. As production moves out of the homes, it becomes more difficult for women to combine work and the care for children. While in agricultural economies, children simply follow the mother when she works, this becomes unfeasible as production occurs in factories and under regulated conditions both because it is practically difficult to find someone to mind the children but also socially unacceptable often for a woman to leave home and children. Moreover, as economies develop there is a strong income effect, which makes it economically possible for married women not to work. Therefore, there is a decline in married women’s labour force participation as an industrialization process occurs. As the economy continues to develop the substitution effect comes into play. By this time, both men and women are more educated and eventually the family’s loss of well-educated married women’s salary becomes notable. Therefore, as the return on education increases with industrialization, the labour force participation of married women increases.

Women’s labour force participation in general has been shown to be sensitive to the introduction of new technology and new medicines. Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu (2005) indicate that the washing machine and the vacuum cleaner made home production less time-consuming, thereby freeing up time for women to dedicate more time to formal labour market work. Moreover, Goldin and Katz (2002) and Bailey (2006) show how the introduction of the Pill made it possible for women to control and plan their fertility and thereby made labour market work more feasible. Furthermore, Albanesi and Olivetti (2016) suggest that medical progress that led to improved maternal health in the US during the period 1930-1960 positively affected women’s labour force participation. Even though technological breakthroughs might come at a specific point in time, Fogli and Veldkamp (2011) has shown that it takes time for a change in social norms to occur. More precisely, their research shows how women’s labour market entry is closely related to the spread of information from working to non-working women at the local level.

Summing up, while it is clear that there is an overall tendency of women’s labour force participation increasing as a country develops into an industrialized economy with a well-developed service sector, this development is far from automatic or linear. Therefor it is important to identify country-specific conditions, technologies and norms that might enhance or hinder women to enter the labour force.

Gender wage gap

A persistent overall gender wage gap is often mistakenly interpreted as a prime indicator of women being discriminated against in the labour market. While a gender wage gap within a specific occupation in a sector might suggest the existence of discrimination, the overall wage gap is often more of an indication of gender segregation on the labour market or of low female labour force participation.

Even though a large gender wage gap is not synonymous with gender discrimination, it is associated with economic inefficiency. By simulating a theoretical growth model of the American economy, Cavalcanti and Tavares (2016) calculate that GDP per capita in the US would be 17 per cent higher if the US would have the same (relatively low) gender wage that Sweden has.

At an international level the trends in the gender wage gap appears to be related to several differences between men and women on the labour market. One correlation in international cross-country comparisons – that for long puzzled researchers – is that countries with high female employment rates tend to have higher gender wage gaps than countries with a lower female employment rate. The expectation would, if anything, be the reversed: in countries with a high share of women in formal employment, women are more emancipated and thus do not accept a considerable gender wage gap. But Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) convincingly show that more than half of this cross-country correlation is due to selection. In countries with a high gender employment gap, such as southern Europe and Ireland, there is a selection of high-skilled women into the labour market resulting in a relatively high average wage for women, and thus in a comparatively low gender wage gap. Another potential mechanism explaining why the gender wage gap is smaller in for instance Scandinavia than in the UK and the US would be that the overall wage distribution is more compressed and thereby the gender wage gap is mechanically smaller – see Blau and Kahn (2003).

Even in countries with small gender employment gaps, women on aggregate tend to work fewer hours on the formal labour market. Recent research in Olivetti and Petrongolo (2016) suggests that for industrialized countries it is the growth in the service sector that drives the number of hours women are working. It is further shown that half of the variation in female working hours across industrialized countries is explained by the share of the service sector.

But even as men and women work to the same extent and the same hours, in most countries occupational gender segregation on the labour market is widespread. Horizontal segregation signifies that men and women tend to work within different occupations and even sectors, while the vertical segregation implies that women to a less extent than men tend to be managers. In the next section we will examine some of the costs related to vertical gender segregation.

Gender stereotypes, political quotas and missing women

For a long time, women were underrepresented in politics around the world. This constituted a democratic problem since it implied that half of the constituency in a country was not represented politically. Therefore, quotas for women at different levels in politics have been introduced around the world with considerable success. Pande and Ford (2011) review the evidence on the Indian case, where quotas have been shown not only to increase the representation of women but also to dismantle the negative stereotypes towards female politicians – see Beaman et al (2009). As suggested in Besley et al (2017), the introduction of gender quotas in politics can considerable also improves the quality of politicians. With an exceptionally rich dataset, Besley et al (2017) show that the voluntary quota, implying that every second candidate to the local elections in Sweden in the mid 1990s was a female politician, increased the average competence of politicians. This was achieved by the quota allowing for competent women to be elected and by less competent male politicians not being re-elected.

Even though quotas to increase the share of women on corporate boards are more controversial – despite several European countries having implemented them (see European Commission, 2015)– there is ample evidence that the social norm envisioning the leader/executive to be a man further cements vertical gender segregation – see e.g. Babcock and Laschever (2003) and Reuben et al (2012). Changing leadership norms is indeed a most important measure for increasing economic efficiency at the firm and societal level. Sekkat, Szafarz and Tojerow (2015) investigate which governance characteristics at the firm level are most likely to yield a female CEO in a vast sample of developing countries and find that a female dominant shareholder as well as the firm being foreign-owned are most conducive to women at the corporate top.

Generally, gender norms are known to be persistent and difficult to change. But there are examples where stereotypes change quickly, such as when the introduction of cable television to remote rural villages in South India almost instantly wiped out the traditional son preference with the introduction of more modern gender norms – see Jensen and Oster (2009). Unfortunately, son preferences can also be intensified due to worsening economic conditions, as for instance happened in South Caucuses after the breakup of the USSR. Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia all experienced a significant decline in fertility after 1990 and a sharp increase in the de facto son preference, measured as of the average share of boys to girls at birth. Research – see Das Gupta (2015), Dudwick (2015), and Ebenstein (2014) – suggest that this is the outcome of a combination of factors that all concurred to emphasize sons’ larger economic capability in helping their parents economically. In times of economic crises, increased availability of ultrasound technology and abortion together with having fewer children per family, the traditional preference for sons, at least temporarily, peaked to Chinese levels (after the One-Child policy).

Economic gender analysis in transition economics

In the following, the need for sex-disaggregated data and country-specific research are discussed, as well as recent policy work on gender equality.

Data

The prerequisite for well-informed research and policy is data availability. At the international level an impressive effort has been made during the last decades to create sex-disaggregated data, and there are now many gender databases as, for instance, the World Bank’s Gender data portal (http://datatopics.worldbank.org/gender/). While there are surveys such as the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS, http://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/economic-research-and-data/data/lits.html), Demographic and Health Services (DHS, http://dhsprogram.com) and others being made, there is still a lack of gender-disaggregated data in most transition economies.

The national Statistics Bureau should have the mission of collecting and reporting sex-disaggregated data. Moreover, it is excellent if all interesting gender statistics regularly are published in an overview report to increase accessibility both for the general public but also for policy-makers. In Sweden, Statistics Sweden biannually since 1984 publishes “Women and Men in Sweden – Facts and Figures” (http://www.scb.se/en_/Finding-statistics/Publishing-calendar/Show-detailed-information/?publobjid=27675), a much appreciated publication. Since 1989, the Swedish government publishes, in an Appendix to its annual Autumn Budget, an overview of the “Economic Allocation of Resources between Men and Women”, where both past policy and current statistics are presented. Initially, the intention was to in this way guarantee the production of sex-disaggregated statistics that was necessary for the formulation of gender-sensitive economic policies.

An even more ambitious step would be to create longitudinal micro-datasets where individuals are followed in terms of family, education, work, health and other characteristics so as to be able to fully evaluate the effect of economic policy.

Country-specific research

Gender-specific analysis of labour market conditions and economic outcomes exist for several countries, see e.g. Khitarishvili (2016). However, there is a vast array of dimensions and mechanisms within the field of research about economic gender equality in need of further investigation, particularly incorporating deep knowledge about country-specific economic circumstances.

As discussed in Section 2, the correlation between gender equality and economic development is generally strong but the direction of causality is unclear. There is therefore scope to analyse the precise nature of the gender inequality within each transition economy with respect to the driving forces of economic growth. Are there, for example, any differences in accumulation of human capital at young age between men and women? Are women able to capitalize on their human capital in the labour market? Are there regulations in place impeding women to work in certain sectors and how is the availability of childcare? Is male mortality higher than female mortality – as has been the case in some transition countries in recent years?

In Section 3 about gender inequality in human capital, there are several dimensions that need country-specific contextualization. Higher education has generally undergone a feminization during recent decades in many transition economies, but not in all. To map such trends, it is essential both to analyse whether the economy capitalizes on women’s newly gained human capital and to study why men are becoming less present in higher education. Moreover, by field of study, transition economies have been exceptionally gender equal in math from an international perspective. One could try to exploit such an advantage by channelling women into programming and IT. This could provide transition economies with a considerable comparative advantage by them using their talent pool better than most countries.

Regarding gender inequality in the labour market, there are a number of interesting research projects that must be pursued at the country level as exemplified in Section 5. For instance, in Moldova there is only a tiny gender gap in labour force participation. While this can pass as an indication of a gender equal labour market, in reality it masks a highly (horizontally and vertically) gender segregated labour market, which might also be one explanation of Moldova’s elevated rates of human trafficking – see further World Bank (2014).

Policy

Gender inequality has been perceived as one of the most important dimension to both investigate and address by part of the international organizations working with development assistance. Three major policy areas can be identified, beyond the policy initiatives addressing basic health, violence against women and trafficking: a) the labour market; b) norms; and c) political representation. Regarding gender inequalities in the labour market, the trend is now for a deeper analysis attempting to identify the mechanisms at work in the labour market – see for instance Morton et al (2014).

The policy work on social norms is innovative and often uses surveys and interviews to map gender-specific stereotypes and expectations in order to provide a background and explanation for the wide gender differences in economic outcomes. World Bank (2012B) constitutes such an example, where gender norms are contextualized and at the same time put into a cross-country perspective. Here the attempts of involving men by at least mapping their attitudes are well on their way.

Lastly, there is a considerable amount of policy work – hand in hand with the extensive research on the topic – on women’s low degree of political representation. Introducing quotas for women in parliament is not enough to assure women’s political representation as overly evident in the report by the European Commission on the topic (European Commission, 2015). Further policy work is of the essence to support and ease the implementation of quotas and other measures to assure women’s political representation actually improves.

Concluding remarks

This report touches upon main gender issues in transition economies with a focus on economic dimensions, but essential human rights issues as equal access to health care and legislation, and policies against trafficking are, of course, presupposed. Ultimately gender equality is not a women’s issue. But women are the most engaged so far and efforts must continue to involve men and make them active stakeholders.

Even with the best intentions, it remains crucial to formulate actions on the basis of research. Given that economic resources for policy interventions are limited and that we strive for having policy-impact, continuous effort has to be made to let research inform policy on how to best use available resources.

References

Albanesi, S., and C. Olivetti (2016). “Gender Roles and Medical Progress”. Journal of Political Economy 124(3): 650-695.

Alesina, Alberto, Giuliano Paola and Nathan Nunn (2013). “On the Origins of Gender Roles: Women and the Plough”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 128(2): 469-530.

Babcock, Linda and Sara Laschever (2003). Women Don’t Ask: Negotiation and the Gender Divide. Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Baden, Sally (1993). “The Impact of Recession and Structural Adjustment on Women’s Work in Selected Developing Countries”. Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, BRIDGE Report 15.

Bailey, Martha J. (2006). “More Power to the Pill: The Impact of Contraceptive Freedom on Women’s Lifecycle Labor Supply”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(1): 289-320. Uppdatering “Erratum and Addendum,”, September 2009.

Beaman, Lori, Chattopadhyay, Raghabendra, Duflo, Esther, Pande, Rohini and Petia Topalova (2009). “Powerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Prejudice?”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 124: 1497-1540.

Bandiera, Oriana and Ashwini Natraj (2013). “Does Gender Inequality Hinder Development and Economic Growth? Evidence and Policy Implications”. World Bank Research Observer 28(2): 2-21.

Becker, Gary S., Hubbard, William H. J. and Kevin M. Murphy (2010). “The Market for College Graduates and the Worldwide Boom in Higher Education of Women”. American Economic Review 100(2): 229-33.

Besley, Tim, Folke, Olle, Persson, Torsten and Johanna Rickne (2017). “Gender Quotas and the Crisis of the Mediocre Man: Theory and Evidence from Sweden”. American Economic Review 107(8): 2204-42.

Bhattacharya, Jay, Gathmann, Christina and Grant Miller (2013). “The Gorbachev Anti-Alcohol Campaign and Russia’s Mortality Crisis”. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5(2): 232-60.

Blau, Francine and Lawrence M. Kahn, 2003. “Understanding International Differences in the Gender Pay Gap”. Journal of Labor Economics 21: 106-144.

Boserup, Ester (1970). Woman’s Role in Economic Development. London: George Allen & Unwin.

Breierova, Lucia and Esther Duflo (2004). “The Impact of Education on Fertility and Child Mortality: Do Fathers Really Matter Less Than Mothers?”. NBER Working paper 10513.

Buser, Thomas, Niederle, Muriel and Hessel Oosterbeek (2014). “Gender, Competitiveness, and Career Choices”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 129(3): 1409-1447.

Cavalcanti, T. och J. Tavares, 2016. “The Output Cost of Gender Discrimination: A Model-Based Macroeconomic Estimate”. Economic Journal 126: 109–134.

Cuberes, David and Marc Teignier (2014). “Gender Inequality and Economic Growth: a critical review”. Journal of International Development 26: 260–276.

Cuberes, D. och M. Teignier, 2016. “Aggregate Effects of Gender Gaps in the Labor Market: A Quantitative Estimate”. Journal of Human Capital 10(1): 1-32.

Das Gupta, Monica (2015). “’Missing Girls’ in the South Caucasus Countries: Trends, Possible Causes, and Policy Options”. Policy Research Working Paper 7236. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group.

Djikstra, Geske, A. (1997). “Women in Central and Eastern Europe: A Labour Market Transition” in Djikstra, Geske and Janneke Plantega (eds.). Gender and Economics. London: Routledge.

Dudwick, Nora (2015). “Missing Women in the South Caucasus: Local Perceptions and Proposed Solutions”. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.

Duflo, Ester (2012). “Women Empowerment and Economic Development”. Journal of Economic Perspectives 50(4): 1051-1079.

Ebenstein, Avraham (2014). “Patrilocality and Missing Women”. Mimeo, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Elborgh-Woytek, Katrin et al. (2013). “Women, Work, and the Economy: Macroeconomic Gains from Gender Equity”. IMF Staff Discussion Notes No. 13/10.

European Commission (2015). “Gender Balance on Corporate Boards Europe is Cracking the Glass Ceiling”. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/womenonboards/factsheet_women_on_boards_web_2015-10_en.pdf

European Commission (2015). “Women in Power and Decision-Making in the Eastern Partnership Countries”. http://eige.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/gender_equality_and_decision_making_in_eap_countries_2015_-_report_and_annex_one_file.pdf

Fogli, Alessandra and Laura Veldkamp (2011). “Nature or Nurture? Learning and the Geography of Female Labor Force Participation”. Econometrica 79: 1103–1138.

Galor, Oded and David N. Weil (1996). “The Gender Gap, Fertility, and Growth“. American Economic Review 86(3): 374-38.

Goldin, C., 1994. “The U-shaped Female Labor Force Function in Economic Devlopment and Economic History”. NBER Working Paper 4707.

Goldin, Claudia and Larry F. Katz (2002). ”The Power of the Pill: Oral Contraceptives and Women’s Career and Marriage Decisions”. Journal of Political Economy 110(4): 730-770.

Greenwood, J. Seshadri, A. and M. Yorukoglu (2005). ”Engines of Liberation”. Review od Economic Studies 72(1): 109-133.

Hsieh, C.-T., Jones, C. I., Hurst, E. och P. J. Klenow (2016). ”The Allocation of Talent and U.S. Economic Growth”. Mimeo. Older version in NBER Working paper 18693.

Jensen, Robert and Emily Oster (2009). “The Power of TV: Cable Television and Women’s Status in India”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 124: 1057-94.

Kabeer, Naila (2003). Gender Mainstreaming in Poverty Eradication and the Millennium Development Goals – A handbook for policy-makers and other stakeholders. International Development Research Centre, Ottawa.

Kazandjian, Romina, Kolovich, Lisa, Kochhar, Kalpana and Monique Newiak (2016). “Gender Equality and Economic Diversification”. IMF Working Paper 16/140.

Khitarishvili, Tamar (2016). “Gender Dimensions of Inequality in the Countries of Central Asia, South Caucasus and Western CIS”. Levy Economics Institute Working Paper 858.

Klasen, Stephan (1999). “Does Gender Inequality Reduce Growth and Development? Evidence from Cross-Country Regressions”. Background paper for Engendering Development, World Bank, Washington DC.

Klasen, Stephan and Francesca Lamanna (2009). “The Impact of Gender Inequality in Education and Employment on Growth: New Evidence for a Panel of Countries”. Feminist Economics 15(3): 91-132.

Mammen, K. and C. Paxson (2000). “Women’s Work and Economic Development”. Journal of Economic Perspectives 14: 141-164.

Morton, Matthew, Klugman, Jeni, Hanmer, Lucia and Dorothe Singer (2014). Gender at Work : A Companion to the World Development Report on Jobs. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.

OECD (2015). Education at a Glance 2015: OECD Indicators. OECD Publishing, Paris.

Olivetti, Claudia and Barbara Petrongolo (2008). “Unequal Pay or Unequal Employment? A Cross-Country Analysis of Gender Gaps”. Journal of Labor Economics 26: 621-654.

Olivetti, C. and B. Petrongolo (2016). “The Evolution of Gender Gaps in Industrialized Countries”. forthcoming Annual Review of Economics.

Pande, Rohini and Deanna Ford (2011). “Gender Quotas and Female Leadership: A Review”. Background Paper for the World Development Report on Gender

Pastore, Francesco and Alina Verashchagina (2011). “When Does Transition Increase the Gender Wage Gap?”. Economics of Transition 19(2): 333-369.

Reuben, Ernesto, Rey-Biel, Pedro, Sapienza, Paola and Luigi Zingales (2012). “The Emergence of Male Leadership in Competitive Environments”. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 83(1): 111–117.

Sekkat, Khalid, Szafarz, Ariane and Ilan Tojerow (2015). “Women at the Top in Developing Countries: Evidence from Firm-Level Data”. IZA Discussion paper 9537.

Spencer, Steven J., Steele, Claude M. and Diane M. Quinn (1999). “Stereotype Threat and Women’s Math Performance“. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 35: 4–28.

UNICEF (2013). Equity in Learning? A Comparative Analysis of the PISA 2009 Results in Central and Eastern Europe and The Commonwealth of Independent States. Geneva: United Nations Children’s Fund.

World Bank (2001). Engendering Development – Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources and Voice. Washington, DC.

World Bank (2012A). World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development. Washington, DC.

World Bank (2012B). On Norms and Agency Conversations about Gender Equality with Women and Men in 20 Countries. Washington, DC.

World Bank (2014). “Moldova: Gender Disparities in Endowments and Access to Economic Opportunities”. Report 76077-MD, Washington, DC.

[1] The exception was the seminal Boserup (1970).

[2] See for instance Baden (1993).

[3] See Kabeer (2003) for an overview of research in development economics and policy experience relevant to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals from the perspective of gender equality.

[4] Research – see Bhattacharya, Gathmann and Miller (2013) – however suggests that it might have been changing alcohol policy rather than transition per se that caused the sudden increase in mortality.

[5] The IMF has published a number of reports recently, such as Elborgh-Woytek et al (2013) and Kazandjian, Kolovich, Kochhar and Newiak (2016).

[6] See for instance, Becker et al (2010) and OECD (2015).

[7] Stereotype threat is defined as when an individual perceives to be ”at risk of confirming, as a self-characteristic, a negative stereotype about one’s social group” in the seminal paper by Steele and Aronson (1995).

Individual Retirement Timing in Russia: Implications for Pension Age

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This policy brief summarizes the findings in a paper where individual exit trajectories of Russians from the labor market to economic inactivity are examined using survival analysis methods based on the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey for 1995-2015. Among other results, the analysis shows that the statutory retirement age has a significant impact on the time of exit from the labor market for both men and women, but the effect is very high for women. This is an interesting and unexpected result, given no penalty for working beyond the pension age of those already retired, the five-year difference in statutory retirement age between males and females, and the low pension age in Russia on an international scale. This questions the painlessness of rising the retirement age for women, should the decision finally be taken.

An ageing population, combined with a slowdown in economic growth, challenges the Russian public finances with an increased deficit of the Pension fund. In addition, the persistently negative natural population growth against the backdrop of ageing has predetermined a decline in the working-age population in the foreseeable future. Older cohorts are therefore becoming a potentially attractive source to increase the size of the labor force. All this has actualized the discussion about the need to increase the Russian retirement age (see, for instance, Maleva and Sinyavskaya, 2010). However, little is known about the labor market situation of older age groups and, in particular, about the process of their exit from the labor market

The Russian pension system, unlike the pension systems of many developed countries, hardly penalizes continuation of work after reaching retirement age and documenting a pension (working pensioners lose only pension indexation). The changes in pension law that have entered into effect since 2015 encourage continued work without recourse to retirement, but there have been few responses to the innovation so far. Coupled with the low pension replacement rate (i.e., the proportion of wages substituted by pension), this makes the process of leaving the labor market nontrivial, since a large number of people of retirement age remain on the labor market after reaching retirement age.

Denisova (2017) examines individual exit trajectories of Russians from the labor market to pension-age economic inactivity applying survival analysis to the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS-HSE). The major research questions are the following: What determines the length of stay of older age groups in the Russian labor market? What is the role of the statutory retirement age in this process?

Data and research methodology

The RLMS-HSE for the period of over 20 years, from 1995 to 2015, is the empirical basis of the research (http://www.cpc.unc.edu/rlms). I limit the sample to age 45-72 as there is practically no retirement by age before age 45, and 72 years is the upper boundary of the working age definition internationally accepted by statisticians. I exclude from the sample those who are on retirement and did not work or seek work for the entire period of observation, since their decision to end working activity remained outside the observation period.

An episode in the survival analysis of exit from the labor market into pension-age inactivity is an episode of working life. The analytical time in this case is the age of the respondent. The failure event (the moment of exit from the labor market to pension-age economic inactivity) is defined by the simultaneous fulfillment of three conditions: the respondent does not work, does not look for a job, and receives retirement pension. Only the final exits from the labor market into inactivity are considered, while temporary exits are disregarded.

I evaluate proportional hazard models, which suggest that exogenous economic factors shift the baseline hazard function (which reflects the average entire sample hazard rate at each age) proportionally. A semi-parametric Cox model specification with robust errors clustered at individual level is used.

The vector of explanatory characteristics includes education; marital status; experience in the labor market (work at an enterprise with a state share; entrepreneurship versus work for wages); health characteristics (subjective and objective); settlement type; and attainment of statutory retirement age. In all cases, I control for the year of the survey.

Given the differences in the behavior of men and women in the labor market, the regression analysis is run separately for the subsamples of men and women. The statistical significance of the differences in returns to factors between men and women is tested based on the results of the full sample regression with interaction terms.

Averaged process of exit from the labor market

The averaged process of leaving the labor market pending on age is conveniently described through so-called Kaplan-Mayer’s survival function (an estimate of the survival process). As seen from Figure 1, the process of exit prior to age 55 for women and 60 for men is very slow, while the rate of exit becomes almost permanent and slows down after 70 years. Men stay in the labor market longer: 25% of women leave the labor market at the age of 58 years, whereas for men this age is 60. The threshold of 75% of the sample that left the labor market is reached in the sample of women by the age of 70, and 71 for men.

Determinants of exit

The analysis of older cohorts’ exit from the labor market via survival methods confirms important determinants of the process, previously identified in literature. The impacts of health and of financial incentives are in this group of results.

Figure 1. Survival functions, men and women

Source: Author’s calculations based on RLMS-HSE 1995-2015 data

Health status is the key factor for men’s exit into inactivity: the exit to inactivity is accelerated by 71 percentage points for males with bad health, whereas for women this factor is statistically irrelevant.

A higher per capita household income is correlated with later exit from the labor market. A higher income from the main place of employment has no statistically significant effect when we control for household income and is at an extended boundary (15%) of statistical significance if we do not. Both variables indirectly reflect the pension replacement rate, and I interpret the results as an indirect confirmation that workers at the top part of the income distribution, being inadequately insured by the pension system, remain on the labor market longer.

The identified peculiarities of the exit to pension-age inactivity of the Russian elderly are of major interest. Unlike many developed countries, only highly skilled persons remain in the labor market longer than others, while the behavior of middle-skilled groups, and skilled and unskilled workers does not statistically differ between them.

Employment at state-owned enterprises slows down women’s exit to inactivity but is not significant for men. Self-employment and entrepreneurship prolong the presence in the labor force, by 41 percentage points for women.

The regression analysis demonstrates that the statutory retirement age has a significant impact on the time of exit from the labor market for both men and women, and the effect is significantly higher for women: the hazard rate of inactivity rises by 63 percentage points when a woman reaches 55 years, and by 25% when a man reaches 60. For men, an effect comparable in size is the self-assessment of health as poor.

Discussion

The results, on the one hand, confirm those for developed countries: health status is the key factor for men’s exit into inactivity, and financial motives have a significant impact. At the same time, the peculiarities of the Russian labor market are reflected in a differing labor market exit process of various professional groups, in the sense that self-employment and entrepreneurship and work at state enterprises postpone exit into inactivity. The high sensitivity of women to the statutory retirement age, which by 2.5 times exceeds the sensitivity of men, is one of the new and unexpected results, taking into account that the statutory retirement age for women in Russia is very low by international standards. This questions the painlessness of rising the retirement age for women, should the decision finally be taken. Indeed, given the very low pension age for females, an (gradual) increase in the retirement age for women would seem not to raise strong objections. However, our result testifies that the normative border of the retirement age has a decisive influence on women’s choice of time of exit from the labor market, even under control (as far as data permits) on differences in education, situation in the labor market and family circumstances. In this situation, the process of rising the retirement age, if such a decision is taken, can be rather painfully accepted by those who so strongly focus on its current meaning in their life plans.

References

  • Denisova, Irina, 2017, “Exit of senior age cohorts from the labor market: survival analysis approach” – forthcoming in Population and Economics.
  • Maleva T.M., Sinyavskaya O.V., 2010 “Raising the retirement age: pro et contra, Journal of the New Economic Association, No. 8, pp. 117-139.

Russian Financial Markets, Pension Funds and ETFs

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In this brief, I consider problems arising from the virtual non-existence of index funds and/or Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) in the Russian financial markets. While the Russian economy requires cheaper money for firms’ investments and better options for pensioners, there are almost no instruments that allow stocks for long-term value acquisition by the pension funds. I argue that more passive options and better representation of Russian stock indices may be beneficial for both the real economy and future pensioners.

Russian financial markets

In Russia, banks play a more important role in the economy than financial markets (see Danilov et al., 2017). Comparing the two, we observe bank assets to GDP ratio of about 100%, and financial markets to GDP of less than 45%. The current proportion of sources of corporate and household financing (2/3 of banks and 1/3 of financial markets), and the value of financial markets to GDP, is similar to Germany. However, the banking system in Russia is smaller and less stable. For example, it attracts passives that are very short-term, with average duration of less than 3 years.

One of the causes of the underdeveloped financial markets is the low amount of money in non-government pension funds, and the restrictive regulation that requires them to protect initial capital of future pensioners. This reduces the investment opportunity set of these pension funds, as volatile stocks are unattractive to them, and instead the funds mostly choose to invest in bonds. This is specific to the Russian market: for example, there are no such restrictions in the European approach (European Commission, 2017). However, both in developed countries and in emerging markets, stocks provide higher long-term returns than bonds. Thus, future pensioners in Russia lose on the upside, and the economy sticks to banks as the main source of investment.

The macro economy is also less effective due to the small financial markets. In the data (see Cournède et al., 2015), we see a positive correlation between the growth of outstanding stocks/bonds and the economic growth for low enough levels of total value of financial markets. While causality goes in both directions (higher GDP means need for more financial instruments), this is a compelling reason to develop financial markets.

Finally, people in Russia do not “believe” in stocks and bonds. If one compares the deposit rate in a bank with the yields of the same bank, the former is almost uniformly lower than the latter. Yet, even in the case of Sberbank, the largest bank in Russia, individuals prefer to keep their money in deposits or in foreign currency. This is a signal of low financial literacy, as well as of low income, or lack of trust; this is evident in many surveys (S&P, 2015).

Therefore, our research question is: what could be done to make the Russian market more attractive to domestic investors, and make them invest and save for pensions?

Indexing

There are many papers regarding diversification and investment opportunities of individual investors. As recent research shows (see Bessembinder, 2017), individual stocks are not good for investment even on US market. Namely, most stocks return less than Treasury bills at monthly horizons. Due to this property of financial markets, it is important that domestic investors have access to wide indices.

Moreover, Berk and Binsbergen (2015) demonstrate that active mutual funds generate as much of profits as they retain as fees. This means that individual investors are better off if they choose passive options, like index funds or Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs), as their main investment vehicle. Index funds and ETFs mostly invest in one index, say S&P500 of the 500 largest US stocks, and their explicit mandate is to stick to this index. Index funds can only be bought through a broker, while ETFs are traded on an exchange, like stocks. This makes them different in terms of possibility of active portfolio rebalancing. However, both are very passive by nature.

These arguments lead to the first conclusion: to improve investment opportunities of pension funds and individual investors, as well as the macroeconomic stability, the regulator might motivate institutional market participants to provide more passive, diversified, and stock-based portfolios.

ETFs and robo-advising in Russia

One way to increase the number of passive options is to allow more ETFs in Russian stock exchanges. As ETFs and their availability to investors have to be confirmed by the regulator (the Central Bank), one cannot immediately add new ETFs to the market. Index funds are another option. However, they have a long and sad history in the Russian market: most (about 95%) of the so-called “index funds” deviate from their benchmarks and do not follow indices. This has to do with the openness of the funds: while mutual funds and index funds have to report their stock/bond/cash holdings once a quarter, ETFs publish it daily. So one can check that ETFs follow their mandates with ease. Moreover, ETFs are usually cheaper and thus save returns for investors.

While existing ETFs on the Moscow Stock Exchange already cover a wide range of markets and even some sectors (including the Russian stock market, US S&P500, Europe and China), they are still too small in terms of assets under management (about $150 millions) and are issued by one company (FinEx). Currently, FinEx ETFs are almost the only option to invest passively, and to diversify, in the Russian market. At the same time, in most markets, index funds are marginally better saving/retirement/investment vehicle as they require less trading fees and thus save returns for low-income investors.

Regulators can facilitate the process of indexation in at least two following ways: (i) allow introduction of more index funds or ETFs in the market (requires regulator’s supervision and confirmation); and (ii) provide incentives to brokers and financial advisors to make them their first recommendation to individual investors and pension funds (as is done in the US, see BNY Mellon, 2016).

Another way to cater to low-income investors is robo-advising – an ongoing revolution in the financial markets. This tool allows investors to get wealth management advice for a small fee (about 0.15% in the best case), and it mostly invests in low-cost, passive ETFs that allow diversification of investments. While this is still new for Russia (and done by FinEx with partners from banks), it has become more widespread in developed markets. Assets under management with robo-advisors increase rapidly and now exceed $220 billions. This tool is useful for investors who are not financially literate, do not have economic or financial education, but still need good investment opportunities. In Russia, robo-advising may become a norm for so-called “non-qualified” investors – people with low enough savings and no educational certificates on financial markets. The regulator has not yet confirmed this, but we see many signs that it will go in this direction. One problem for this market is that it is still not official, and human financial advice is considered as a norm for non-qualified investors if they would like to expand their investment universe to say derivatives.

A big positive side of robo-advising is the reduction of human errors. As Richard Thaler, Nobel Prize winner of 2017, has persuasively shown in his research that humans make many judgement errors. These mistakes lead to lower returns on investment, too much trading that eats returns due to fees, and higher wealth inequality. Robo-advisers avoid all that and allow individual investors to save and invest more long-term.

The second conclusion is: regulators should help the financial industry to develop better robo-advising software that uses ETFs; use these robo-advisers as replacement for human advisers; and advertise this as the option for long-term investment, including pension funds.

Conclusion

Russian financial markets should provide more financial instruments to Russian firms and higher flexibility for investors. The Central Bank as the supervisor of financial markets, and the Ministry of Economic Development as the main government branch responsible for economic growth, may take additional steps to increase availability of passive investment options for Russian citizens. Reforms of incentives of brokerage firms might be needed, yet the ultimate goal is to improve well-being and pensions, and probably make good use of the money of long-term domestic investors. One possible option is to widen already existing ETFs market and allow individual investors to use robo-advising to invest in many instruments, even if these investors are not highly qualified or wealthy.

References

Highlights for Commemoration of the 1917 Russian Revolution – Hints for Further Study

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Professional historians in general have an ambivalent attitude towards anniversaries and commemorations of historical events, be they epochal or not. On the one hand, centennials and similar memorials may alleviate the funding of one’s research projects as the authorities likewise wish to highlight certain events. On the other hand, jubilee years can tend to divert historians from their ordinary research directions. Not for nothing would even frank scholars from Oxford, England complain in 2014 of the “tyranny of celebrations” and wish that nothing comparative to the centennial of the Great War 1914-1918 would appear soon.

In Russia, similar attitudes seem not to have appeared with respect to the centennial of the 1917 revolutions, the February and October revolution as traditionally called. In my April 2017 policy brief, I noted how universities all over Russia organized conferences devoted to various aspects of 1917. Many more publications have appeared as well as translations or new editions of classical works. Here I only hint at some accomplishments that may deserve to be studied for anyone who is genuinely interested in the historical debates in Russia.

This autumn, the leading institutes of the Academy of Sciences, the Institute for General History (IVI RAN) and the Institute for Russian History (IRI RAN) held their grand events with participation of leading scholars from the West, inter alia Hélène Carrère-d’Encausse and Alexander Rabinovich, to mention only a few. The IRI RAN presented its two-volume “The Russian revolution in 1917: The Power, Society, Culture” with the same emphasis as the main theme of the conference, i.e. how the historiography of the February and October revolution changed over time (see http://iriran.ru/?q=node/1699).

Western mass media and Russia observers in particular have during 2017, in my view, one-sidedly focused on how Kremlin would, or not, ‘celebrate’, ‘commemorate’, or even ‘want to forget’ the epochal events in Russia one hundred years ago. In contrast to other anniversaries, the 200th of Napoleon’s war on Russia or the 100th of the First World War, the highest political spheres have, as it seems for good reasons, left the information sphere quite free for the professional historians, film and TV producers, and others to commemorate at their own behest the 1917 revolution.

One important source of information about the commemoration of the 1917 Russian Revolution is the book published by AIRO-XXI, Association for the Study of Russian History in the 21th Century, led by the renowned historiographer Gennadyi Bordiugov. Just as for the anniversaries of the Victory in World War Two (in 2005 and 2015), Bordiugov and his colleagues in AIRO-XXI started a huge monitoring project in late 2016 in order to follow how various groups and centres all over Russia, as well as in major Western countries, were to commemorate the 1917 Russian revolution. The monitoring is by now complete and the result is the mighty book “Revolution-100. A Reconstruction of the Jubilee” (http://www.airo-xxi.ru/-2017-/2395–100-). This will for a long time serve as the best introduction to how Russia – in the broadest terms – comes to grips with the jubilee. The first articles give the background – how the October revolution was celebrated in the Soviet era and the major changes in the post-1991 Russia. Several contributions give the present-day context – how parallels are drawn between contemporary events in Russia and abroad, on the one hand, and the Russian revolution, on the other hand. The virtual sphere today, the Internet and blogosphere take up a much more important space for the younger generation than books and encyclopaedias; therefore the monitoring project also includes surveys of which aspects of the revolution are treated therein.

In contrast to what originally was set as leitmotiv for the commemoration – a reconciliation among groups and personalities with divided approaches to the Bolshevik takeover in particular and the Soviet experiment in general, most publications, exhibitions and meetings that the AIRO-XXI have monitored show that the epochal historical cataclysms one hundred years ago still are as divisive as before. The great contrast is that disputes are formalized and fact-based, that arguments from any side are given due consideration, and that most accept the device that “there is no final truth in history, merely arguments without end”.

The AIRO-XXI monitoring also treats the cinema, television and Internet series that were shown in connection with the jubilee. Much media interest was connected with the protests from the Orthodox Church against the film “Matilda” as it allegedly defamed the last tsar Nikolai II for showing his love affair in the 1890s with a prima ballerina. The artistic freedom finally triumphed and the debates only slightly influenced the mass of cinemagoers. We can also note that Russian television channels have sent pedagogical and dramatic series on some of the major figures of the revolution. One on the mythical Aleksandr Parvus (Helphand) with his views on revolutionizing Russia during the war, even with the help of the German General Staff; the other on Leo Trotskii as people’s commissar of war from 1918. These series and many others are vividly described in the AIRO-XXI volume by the philologist Boris Sokolov, who clearly presents where historical facts might have been twisted for the sake of art.

Mention should finally be made, for those who wish to follow how Russia’s leading professional historians analyse the revolution, that many lectures given at universities during 2017 are available at YouTube. Suffice it here to mention Vladimir Buldakov (for his books, see my previous policy brief), who since the 1980s researched the Russian revolutions and presented his main theses in “Krasnaya Smuta” (Red Troubled times). In 2017, he has lectured on this theme for various audiences (compare https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SG9T3H55Hrk;https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JnRXgCqGBrg; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9UPYYBnYow8)

To appreciate how an academic discussion on the ‘Great Russian Revolution ‘ – as many scholars today prefer to treat the events in 1917 – at its best can deepen our understanding, it is well worth pondering the arguments by renowned historians Aleksandr Shubin, Aleksandr Vatlin, Tatiana Nekrasova, Gennadii Bordiugov and Vladimir Pantin in the Kultura Channel program series “Chto delat?” (What is to be done) (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KQF0o8adIDw). Although each of the specialists had their own interpretations and various approaches, the mentor Vitalii Tretiakov, well-known journalist and formerly chief-editor of “Nezavisimaya Gazeta, managed to step-by-step highlight the issues that have divided historians in the past, as well as such matters that will call for renewed research.

In early 2017, some hoped that commemorative arrangements on the 1917 revolution would lead towards reconciliation between those opposing groups who still reason and argue as one or the other political parties of that era, between those who sympathized with the socialists in general and/or the Bolsheviks in particular, on the one hand, and those who ideologically has more affinity with the Liberal, Conservative or Monarchist groups, on the other hand. While such reconciliation is not yet in sight, the many articles in mass media, museum exhibitions and TV series have definitely heightened the older generations’ understanding of the very complex, intricate nature of the political, social and military forces that first led to the dissolution of tsarism, their fact-based knowledge of the tentative to establish a full democratic country even in the framework of the world war, and finally to a better grasp – than the standard Soviet orthodox narratives – of why and how the seemingly minuscular Bolshevik party could successfully grasp power in November 1917 and in the end also triumph in the devastating civil war.

It goes without saying that for school teachers all over Russia, the commemorative arrangements have provided a golden opportunity to engage their pupils and students in various forms of so-called living history, i.e. combining the state’s grand story with the localities’ and the families’ own histories.

Paid Work after Retirement – Does Quality of Your Main Job in the Past Matter?

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In this brief, we summarize the results of a recent analysis focused on identifying the key determinants of engagement in paid work after retirement based on life histories data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). We find a strong link between the probability of work after retirement and indicators of quality of work prior to labor market exit, such as high physical and psychosocial demands, lack of control or receiving adequate social support. These results suggest a potentially important role of job-quality regulations. We find no significant association with past experience of adequate rewards with respect to efforts in the main job, which suggests that involvement in paid work after retirement may to a lesser extent be driven by financial concerns. This might mean that policy initiatives targeted at higher level of labor market activity among retirees should stress non-material aspects of employment in later life.

The collection of data in the 7th wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) proceeded in 2017, and the Centre for Economic Analysis (CenEA) has recently published a report based on information collected in previous waves of the survey. The report entitled “The Polish 50+ generation in the European context: activity, health and wellbeing” examined among other issues the determinants of labor market activity of people aged 50+ with a special focus on Poland (Myck and Oczkowska, 2017).

SHARE is a panel survey conducted every two years and focuses on health conditions, material situation and social relations of the population aged 50 years and older. In 2017, in the 7th Wave, interviews were conducted with over 80,000 participants in 26 European countries and Israel. While the survey usually focuses on contemporary conditions of respondents, the interviews in Wave 3 (the SHARE-Life conducted in 2008-2009) is concerned with respondents’ life histories and topics such as family history, mobility and work histories.

In this brief, we draw on one of the chapters from the report and present results of a analysis that combines information on the quality of the main job of the respondents’ working careers, with information on engagement in paid work among retired individuals to examine key determinants of undertaking paid work after labor market exit.

Work histories in SHARE

The life-history interview includes a series of 12 questions evaluating effort-reward imbalance in the main job of individuals’ working careers (Siegrist and Wahrendorf, 2011; Siegrist et al., 2004; 2014). Based on these questions, five dimensions of the quality of the workplace were identified: physical and psychosocial demands, control, social support and reward (see Table 1). Figure 1 presents an example of the distribution of answers to one of the questions used to define these dimensions, which asked about the extent to which the respondents’ main jobs was physically demanding. Generally, men’s past main job is more often described as physically demanding than women’s. While less than half of respondents in France and Sweden claimed physically strenuous main job, the respective measure in Poland and Greece was as high as 75%.

Table 1. Dimensions of job quality

Dimension SHARE Questionnaire Items
Physical demands

– „My job was physically demanding.”

– „My immediate work environment was uncomfortable (for example, because of noise, heat, crowding).”

Psychosocial demands – „My work was emotionally demanding.”

– „I was exposed to recurrent conflicts and disturbances.”

Control – „I was under constant time pressure due to a heavy workload.”

– „I had very little freedom to decide how to do my work.”

Social support at work – „I received adequate support in difficult situations.”

– „There was a good atmosphere between me and my colleagues.”

– „In general, employees were treated fairly.”

Reward

– „I had an opportunity to develop new skills.”

– „I received the recognition I deserved for my work.”

– „Considering all my efforts and achievements, my salary was adequate.”

Notes: answer categories: “strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree”. Source: adapted from Siegrist and Wahrendorf (2011).

Figure 1. “My job was physically demanding”

Notes: includes wave 3 respondents with at least 10 years of seniority who retired by the time of wave 6; weighted. Source: own calculation based on SHARE data waves 3 (2008-2009) and 6 (2015).

Following Wahrendorf and Siegrist (2011), for the purpose of further analysis, we construct five measures of workplace quality based on the questions listed in Table 1. For each dimension of job quality, we calculate a sum-score of answers (from 1 “strongly agree” through 2 “agree”, 3 “disagree” to 4 “strongly disagree”) to selected questions, and identify the upper (lower) tertile of observations. We create five binary indicators (with 1 meaning “yes”) describing the quality of work in the sense of high physical or psychosocial demands, lack of control, and adequate social support or adequate reward. The results are presented in Figure 2 in association with the frequency of paid work after retirement.

Figure 2. Associations between quality of work in the past and frequency of paid work after retirement

Notes: includes wave 3 respondents with at least 10 years of seniority who retired by the time of wave 6 from selected countries (CZ, FR, DE, GR, PL, ES, SE); weighted. Source: own calculation based on SHARE data waves 3 (2008-2009) and 6 (2015).

In most cases the percentage of retirees engaged in paid work was significantly higher among those positively evaluating the quality of their past workplace. The only dimension where no significant difference was found in the level of involvement in paid work was between the retirees who estimated rewards at work as adequate to their efforts and those who assessed them otherwise.

What determines paid work after retirement?

The role of the five measures of job quality was further examined using models of probability of paid work after retirement. Apart from quality indicators regarding the main job, controls included total labor market experience, unemployment incidence, as well as detailed demographics and information concerning current health status and material conditions. Odds ratios were estimated separately for men and women from a group of selected countries: Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Poland, Spain and Sweden.

Higher education is positively associated with the odds of employment after retirement, but have the opposite effect for age, poor health and living in rural areas. Each additional year of labor market experience increases the odds of working after retirement, but we find no significant effect of unemployment episodes.

Both men and women without experience of high physical demands and lack of control in their main job have higher odds of working after retirement than those who declared such experiences. For example, men who did not experience highly, physically demanding main jobs have 1.4 times higher odds of work after retirement compared to those who did. The respective odds for those who did not experience lack of control are 1.9. On the other hand, high psychosocial demands and adequate social support have significant influence only among retired women. Women who did not report high psychosocial demands had 1.25 times higher odds of work after retirement, while those who received adequate support in their past job had 1.5 times higher odds. We find no significant effect of the experience of adequate rewards with respect to efforts in the main job, and similarly no significant association between material conditions and employment of retirees. Both of these may imply that involvement in paid work after retirement is to a lesser extent driven by financial concerns.

Further discussion and policy implications

Differences in the degree of engagement in paid work after retirement with respect to the assessment of past job quality suggest a potentially important role of job quality regulations. At the same time, lack of significant association between the material situation and paid work after retirement implies that policy initiatives targeted at higher levels of labor market activity among retirees may benefit from stressing the non-material aspects of employment in later life.

Results point to a strong link between quality of work in the past and probability of work after retirement, which is in line with what other studies have showed: e.g. that low quality of work in the past strongly correlates with the desire to retire as soon as possible (e.g. Dal Bianco et al., 2014). Given the demographic pressure on public finances observed or expected in many developed countries, and foreseen reductions in the generosity of pension benefits, increasing the level of engagement in paid work after labor market exit may become an important policy challenge. The results summarized in this brief suggest that governments should, on the one hand, pay attention to the labor market conditions faced by those currently employed, and on the other hand focus on a broad set of incentives to encourage employment among older generations, going beyond financial remuneration.

References

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Avoiding Corruption and Tax Evasion in Belarus’ Construction Sector

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This brief summarizes our research on the problem of corruption and tax evasion in the construction sector in Belarus. We conducted a survey of construction companies, asking them to estimate the extent of different dimensions of tax evasion and corruption within the sector. The results show the most problematic directions in the sphere. Based on international experiences, we develop recommendations of how to reduce corruption and tax evasion in construction of Belarus.

Shadow economy and the construction sector

The problem of a shadow economy is real for many countries in the world. Many countries try to minimize the level of this illegal activity. But it is very difficult to liquidate tax evasion or envelope wages fully.

In Belarus there is a lot of discussion about corruption and tax evasion limitation. The country ranked 79th in the Corruption Perception Index 2016. The situation in Belarus is much better then in Russia or Kazakhstan, but worse than in Sweden, Finland and Switzerland.

There is lack of systematically updated knowledge about the situation with corruption and tax evasion in the different economic spheres of Belarus. At the same time, there are sectors, which are more prone to develop a shadow economy. One of them is the construction sector. Multilevel chains of relations between contractors and subcontractors, numerous suppliers, and complicated procedures for facility acceptance create possibilities for illegal schemes.

Construction plays an important role in national production. In 2016, the construction sector corresponded to more than 6% of Belarusian GDP. In 2014, this indicator was above 10%. The decline can be explained by a reduction of preferential lending in housing construction and a recession in the economy. Despite the reduction in the share of GDP, around 8% of the total labor force works in construction. More than 90% of the legal entities in the sphere are presented by privately owned enterprises [8].

Taking into account the importance of construction it is necessary to emphasize that reducing the size of the shadow economy could create a better business environment, reduce companies’ expenditures for resolving issues in informal ways, and increase budgetary revenues.

In this brief we present a short summary of our research “Problems of corruption and tax evasion in construction sector in Belarus”, which is forthcoming in the International Journal Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Issues. The project was made in the framework of the project “Corporate engagement in fighting corruption and tax evasion”, financed by the Nordic Council of Ministries.

Method

In order to understand the main issues and challenges in construction sector, we surveyed 50 Belarusian construction companies. We took 20 companies from Minsk and its surrounding region, and 6 organizations from each Belarusian region (Brest, Grodno, Vitebsk, Gomel, and Mogilev). The survey was based on the method used in Putnins and Sauka (2016). This method includes a questionnaire, which helps understanding the actual situation with the shadow economy in the sector. The questions of the survey were divided into three parts.

The first part included neutral questions about economic characteristics of the company, such as number of employees, profit level, the year of establishment, wage levels, and form of ownership.

The second part include more sensitive questions, but which can help us understanding the most problematic issues concerning to corruption and tax evasion. These questions concern such indicators as the level of underreported business income, the degree of underreported number of employees, the percentage of revenue that firms pay in unofficial payments to ‘get things done’, and main barriers to business development. In order to make the answers easier for participants, all the questions deal with the situation in the sector as a whole, and not the company in particular.

The third part of questions concerns the situation in public procurement, and includes the perception of main problems in the sphere.

Survey results

The first part of the survey shows that there has been a decline in many of the economic indicators during the last two years. This may be one factor stimulating the sector’s development of informal activities. Indeed the results of the second part of survey demonstrate that level of shadow economy has significant dimensions. More then 60% of the respondents agree that some firms in the sector received hidden income. More than 50% of the interviewed companies believe that some organizations in the construction sector hire part of their employees unofficially. Wages in “envelopes” is also a problem for the construction companies.

Unregistered firms are a big threat to having a well-developed construction sector. More than 60% of the interviewed companies agree with the existence of unregistered companies. Such non-official organizations create unfair competition in the sector and decrease the level of budget revenues. Many of the unregistered companies work in the sphere of home improvements and renovations.

Figure 1. Estimation of the approximate level of hidden salaries (“wages in the envelopes”) in construction industry

Notes: X-axis is the percentage of respondents that agree with the statement. Source: Results of the survey

The survey results allow us to conclude that the state budget loses part of its corporate income taxes, taxes on wages and social contributions due to the existence of hidden incomes, wages in envelopes, and unregistered companies and employees.

The last, but not the least, question in the second part of the survey was about main obstacles and barriers for operating in the construction sphere. Most of the respondents underlined three groups of barriers. One of them is the administrative challenge, including high level of taxation, inconsequent business legislation, and attitude of the government towards business in general. The second barrier includes economic problems such as lack of funds for business investments, payment behavior of clients, low product or service demand from customers, low access to credits, and inflation. The third group of problems in the construction sector is related to the shadow economy. A large part of the enterprises experiences a problem of high competition from illegal business and corruption. At the same time, a positive thing is that the majority of respondents does not consider crime and racketeering as a threat for the sector.

Figure 2. Estimation of approximate share of unregistered firms production in the total output in construction industry

Notes: The X-axis is the percentage of respondents that agree with the statement. Source: Results of the survey

In the third part of the survey, companies were asked about their participation in public procurement tenders. About 42% of all respondents did not have this experience over the past two years. One of the questions was about competition among construction companies. About 40% of all respondents underlined that they have lost at least one public tender because of unfair competition. Given that only 58% of the companies participated in tenders, we can conclude that unfair competition is a widespread problem for the majority of public procurement auction participants. Imperfect legislation is another problem for the companies. 46% of all respondents believe that the quality of legislation in the sphere is unsatisfactory. Only 12% of the companies did not see any problems in the national legislation.

At the end of the interview, companies were asked to list three main problems in the sphere of public procurement. The answers are shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Main problems that companies face when participating in public procurement tenders

Notes: The X-axis is the percentage of respondents that agree with the statement. Source: Results of the survey

The most common answer was corruption. Unfair competition and nepotism were also quite common problems in the public procurement sphere. Among administrative barriers, companies emphasized the complexity of documentation preparation and imperfect legislation. Important economic problems were inflation and unequal conditions for public and private enterprises.

International experiences and recommendations in fighting corruption and tax evasion in the construction sector

Corruption and tax evasion can be stimulated by different factors. One of the main preconditions of the shadow economy in the Belarusian construction sector is inconsistent and frequently changing legislation. For example, public procurements are regulated by the Presidential Decree (Ukaz) on procurement of goods (works, services) in construction. However, this regulation document expires at the end of 2018. Before 2017, such operations were regulated by several legislative acts. Developing understandable and sustainable legislation, which creates clear rules for participants of the market, is very important to increase transparency and openness of the market [11; 12; 13; 15; 18].

Another problem concerns the relations of contractors and sub-contractors. In many cases negotiations between parties are closed and non-transparent. So, it is very difficult to estimate the effectiveness of costs and proper use of funds.

Modern E-Government system adoption can support increased transparency between contractors and sub-contractors, as well as improve the quality of state services. One of the directions in this sphere is the transition towards full electronic document management. [3; 4; 6].

Another risk is related to public procurement procedure. Direct communications between public tender participants and organizers create possibilities for unfair competition. There is substantial international evidence showing that full digitalization of the process would improve the transparency of the public procurement procedure [3; 4; 21]. For example, good reference points for implementation of such digitalization can be the Georgian or Ukrainian experiences of electronic tenders. These two countries have relatively similar institutional environment and heritage as Belarus.

The problem of tax evasion is often related with payments in cash. Such transactions are less transparent and visible for authorities. According to national legislation operations between legal entities should be in cashless form. But there are exceptions to the rule [20]. In this regards the level of tax evasion would be decreased if payments in cash will be minimized.

Another concern is the efficiency of the public procurement procedures. During public procurement auctions in construction, price plays the most important role. The share of “Bid Price” criterion in total volume of all criteria can be up to 50%. The project with the lowest price has the best chance to win the tender. This is not always reasonable. Moreover, some companies hire disabled people that allow them to obtain preferential treatment in the public procurement procedure – for example, apply special correction indicators to the final price. In many cases it is better to install more expensive but high efficiency (more qualitative or ecological) equipment instead of buying cheap but low quality ones. Of course, even in EU legislation, the cost or price of projects is a very important criterion. But then it is often defined as a price-quality ratio. In this regards, the quality of the project can be estimated from the environmental, qualitative or social side [12; 19].

One more issue according to survey results is the problem of unregistered labor force in construction. It can be partly resolved by ID card implementation for all workers and employers in construction sector. In Finland, for example, all workers in construction must have such cards during workdays. Tax authorities can check the availability of the cards at any time [17].

Conclusion

Our survey of Belarusian construction companies confirmed wide exposure of the sector to tax evasion and corruption. The majority of the respondents agreed that some companies hire unregistered workers, pay wages in envelopes, or have hidden income. The most common answer to the main problems in the public procurement sphere was corruption. Based on international experience and national peculiarities, it is advisable to propose the following measures to reduce corruption and tax evasion in construction sector:

  1. Adoption of sustainable legislation.
  2. E-Government system development.
  3. Modernization of the electronic tender system to require no direct contacts between organizers and tender participants.
  4. Reduction of the possibilities of making payments in cash.
  5. Implementation of a price-quality ratio as one of the main criteria for choosing the winner of tenders.
  6. Introduction of ID cards for all employees and employers in the construction sector.

These and other measures are likely to significantly improve the business environment in the construction sector.

References

[1] Anderson, E. 2013. Municipal “Best Practices”: Preventing Fraud, Bribery and Corruption, International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy. Available on the Internet:http://icclr.law.ubc.ca/sites/icclr.law.ubc.ca/files/publications/pdfs/Municipal%20Best%20Practices%20-%20Preventing%20Fraud%2C%20Bribery%20and%20Corruption%20FINAL.pdf.

[2] Fazekas, M., Toth, I.J., King, L.P. 2013. Corruption manual for beginners: “Corruption techniques” in public procurement with examples from Hungary, Working Paper series: CRCB-WP/2013:01 Version 2.0, Budapest, Hungary. Available on the Internet: http://www.crcb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Fazekas-Toth-King_Corruption-manual-for-beginners_v2_2013.pdf.

[3] Krasny, A. 2014. Georgia E-Government. Available on the Internet: https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ua/Documents/public-sector/e-government/Electronic%20government%20of%20Georgia.pdf.

[4] Luzgina, A. International experience of the e-Government System development/ A. Luzgina //Journal of the Belarusian State University. Economics. – Minsk, 2017. – P.76-83.

[5] Luzgina, A., Laukkanen E., Larjavaara I., Viavode I., Volberts J. ,Corporate engagement in fighting corruption and tax evasion in construction sector”, forthcoming in “Entrepreneurship and sustainability issues”

[6] Naumov, A. 2014. Georgia E-experience for Belarus. Available on the Internet: http://e-gov.by/best-practices/elektronnyj-opyt-gruzii-dlya-belarusi.

[7] Official website of Transparency International. Available on the Internet: https://www.transparency.org/.

[8] Official website of Belarusian National Statistical Committee. Available on the Internet: http://www.belstat.gov.by.

[9] Official website of the European Commission. Available on the Internet: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/index_en.

[10] On procurements of goods (works, services) [Electronic source] // Decree of the President of the Republic of Belarus/ 20.10.2016 # 380. Rus.: О закупках товаров (работ, услуг) при строительстве, Указ Президента Республики Беларусь от 20.10.2016, №380. – Mode of access: http://www.pravo.by/document/?guid=3871&p0=P31600380.

[11] On public procurements of goods [Electronic source] // Law of the Republic of Belarus/ 13.07.2012, # 419-З. Rus.: О государственных закупках товаров, работ услуг Закон Республики Беларусь от 13 июля 2012 г. № 419-З. – Mode of access: http://www.pravo.by/document/?guid=3871&p0=h11200419&p1=2.

[12] On organization and conduct of the procurement of goods (works, services) procedures and settlements between customer and contractor in facilities construction [Electronic source] // Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus / 31.12.2014, # 88.: Rus: Об организации и проведении процедур закупок товаров (работ, услуг) и расчетах между заказчиком и подрядчиком при строительстве объектов, Постановление Совета Министров Республики Беларусь №88 от 31.12.2014. – Mode of access: http://www.pravo.by/document/?guid=3871&p0=C21400088.

[13] Putnis, J.T., Sauka, A. 2016. Shadow economy index for the Baltic countries 2009 – 2016. The Center for Sustainable Business at SSE Riga. – 47 p.

[14] Pelipas, I., Tochitskaya, I. 2016. Problems of corruption in the assessments of small and medium enterprises. Available on the Internet:

[15] Procurement in construction, what has been changed since January 1, 2017. Available on the Internet: http://www.mas.by/ru/news_ru/view/zakupki-v-stroitelstve-chto-izmenilos-s-1-janvarja-2017-goda-852/

[16] Preventing corruption in public procurements. 2016. OECD Publishing. Available on the Internet: http://www.oecd.org/gov/ethics/Corruption-in-Public-Procurement-Brochure.pdf.

[17] Briganti, F., Machalska, M., Steinmeyer, Heinz-Dietrich, Buelen, W. 2015. Social Identity cards in the European construction industry, edited by Buelen W. Available on the Internet: http://www.efbww.org/pdfs/EFBWW-FIEC%20report%20on%20social%20ID%20cards%20in%20the%20construction%20industry.pdf.

[18] Zaiats, D. 2015. The authorities will strengthen the fight against the shadow economy [Electronic resource]. – Mode of access: https://news.tut.by/economics/465337.html.

[19] On public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC [Electronic resource]// Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council / 26 Februay 2014.  – Mode of access: https://news.tut.by/economics/465337.html.

[20] On making amendments and alterations to Instruction on the procedure of conducting cash transactions and the procedure of the cash settlement in Belarusian rubles on the territory of the Republic of Belarus // Resolution of the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus / 31.03.2014. #199. Rus: – О внесении дополнений и изменений в Инструкцию о порядке ведения кассовых операций и порядке расчетов наличными денежными средствами в белорусских рублях на территории Республики Беларусь. Mode of access: http://pravo.by/document/?guid=12551&p0=B21428983&p1=1&p5=0.

[21] Prozorro [Electronic source]. – Mode of access: https: //prozorro.gov.ua/en.

The Determinants of Renewables Investment

20171112 Determinants of Renewables Investment 01

On the 24th of October, SITE held the first of its series of Energy Talks, replacing what for one decade had been known as SITE Energy Day. For this first edition, SITE invited Thomas Sterner, Professor of Environmental Economics at the University of Gothenburg to give a presentation under the headline of “Technological Development, Geopolitical and Environmental Issues in our Energy Future”. To comment on the presentation, Leonid Neganov, Minister of Energy of Moscow Region, and Karl Hallding, Senior Research Fellow at the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI), had been invited. This policy brief reports on the important subjects presented by our guests as well as the discussion that took place during the event.

From climate change concerns to climate change targets

Thomas Sterner began his presentation by addressing the well-known issue of climate change, a constantly current topic.

Different versions of Figure 1 (below) have been used extensively by those discussing climate change over the last decades, most notably by the previous US President Al Gore in his 2006 documentary “An Inconvenient Truth”. It shows the concentration of CO2 (carbon-dioxide) in the atmosphere over the past 400,000 years. There is wide agreement within the scientific community that the emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG), such as CO2, methane and nitrous oxides, have led to the shifting weather patterns and increased temperature over the past century (NASA, 2017).

Figure 1. Level of CO2 in the Atmosphere

Notes: The vertical red line is the Keeling curve, showing how the concentration has changed since 1958. Source: Allmendinger, 2007.

Predicting the impact of these emissions is far from an exact science: the temperature increases are likely to be unevenly spread across the world as shown in Figure 2. Some areas are likely to be particularly afflicted, especially coastal lowlands susceptible to flooding and semi-arid areas where droughts can become more likely. Unless current emission levels start to decrease, we are likely to observe severe results of climate change within 20 years, such as displacement and increased migration in the wake of extreme weather (NIC, 2016). For instance, adverse health effects in China, or decreasing productivity in South-East Asia, have already become apparent due to current increased temperatures (Kan, 2011; Kjellstrom, 2016).

Figure 2. Predicted Temperature Increase

Source: IPCC, 2013.

To tackle this issue and its negative economic impacts, many policy makers have agreed to replace fossil fuels with renewables. Renewables is the collective term of energy sources that have a neutral or negative net-effect of GHG emissions and are extracted through resources that are continuously replenished, e.g. solar, wind and hydro power, and biomass energy.

As the issue of climate change is a global one, the transition to renewables needs to be global too. International climate agreements have hence long been the accepted norm to approach climate change issues. The Paris Agreement is currently the guiding principle, in spite of the announcement of the Trump administration to withdraw the United States. Though instrumental in creating a momentum in the transition to lower levels of GHG emissions, it comes with many flaws. Its goal of a maximum average temperature increase of 2°C might be considered radical given current levels. However, the policy instruments that the target depends on – the Intended Nationally Determined Commitments (INDCs) – shift the responsibility to individual nations and remove the global responsibility. As Thomas Sterner pointed out, the first three words of this acronym remove indeed any binding force, and elementary game theory tells us that it will be hard, not to say unlikely, for all signatories to remain cooperative in achieving the target of 2°C.

Investing in renewables: from political choice to competitive choice

As stated above, investing in renewables is a necessary condition to achieve climate change targets. Indeed, there are some countries that have pushed the development of renewables with the aim to reduce the fossil fuel dependency to a minimum level in a very near future (see Figure 3). However, most of these investments are currently driven by political will. A natural question is whether renewables technologies can be competitive.

It is a fact that costs of renewables have been severely decreased in the last decade (Timmons et al., 2014). However, as Thomas Sterner mentioned, the cost of renewables and of fossil fuels are still very place and time specific and depends on the scale. Investments in renewables are growing and solar and wind power have both seen production capacities increasing markedly yearly over the last years (GWEC, 2016; IEA, 2017a). However, coming from an initial low level, it will take some time before we will be able to rely on them.

Even with massive investments and decreasing generation costs, the intermittent nature of most renewable energies will still impede the competitiveness of renewables. Solar and wind power are the technologies where most of the development has been centred (Frankfurt School-UNEP Centre/BNEF, 2017). They are highly weather dependent and electricity production from these sources cannot be secured all of the time. This makes countries dependent on backup technologies. In some countries, the obvious answers to these challenges have been hydro and nuclear power. Both technologies have their respective drawbacks though.

Figure 3. World’s Top 10 Investors in Renewable Energy in 2016

Notes: New Investments $BN, Growth on 2015. Source: Frankfurt School-UNEP Centre/BNEF, 2017.

Hydro power requires a geography that allows for dams, which in turn change the nature markedly around them and may not be available during drought periods. Nuclear energy has surrounding safety aspects that most recently came to light with the 2011 Fukushima Daaiichi nuclear disaster, leading Germany to decide to shut down all of its 17 reactors by 2022 (25 % of the country’s electricity production). Moreover, it may also be technically difficult to have nuclear as a backup technology given the associated ramping and start-up constraints.

Two further remarks on the intermittency problem can be made. First, this problem is likely to become more severe when policymakers push for large-scale electrification (c.f. EU Energy Roadmap established in 2011). For example, the full electrification of transport or heating sector will drive up the demand for and consumption of electricity. As this happens, the need for something to secure constant energy access will increase.

Second, only the development of technologies that allow electricity storage could solve this issue permanently. However, the current technological progress regarding batteries’ capacity cannot yet offer the solution (J. Dizard, 2017).

Oil price, a reference price

Another important aspect stressed by Thomas Sterner was to take into account the significant role of fossil fuel prices. Although identifying an optimal oil price for a fossil-free future is not a straightforward procedure, as discussed during the event.

The high price of oil during the late 00s and early 10s stimulated the development of alternative technologies. As awareness of climate change and its effects increased among policy makers and the general public, there was a momentum to push for the development of renewables.

As investments in renewables went up, so did investments in another less green technology: hydraulic fracturing, or fracking. In the 10 years between 2005 and 2015, the United States alone saw the extraction of shale gas and oil to increase six-fold. (EIA, 2016) In part to maintain a market share, OPEC countries exceeded their own set production limits and oil prices tumbled from around $100 per barrel to around $50 (Economist, 2014).

With roughly three years behind us of somewhat stable and low oil prices, the question is what the implications of this are. It makes it more difficult to phase out fossil fuels as demand for them goes up, depressing efforts put into the research and deployment of renewables. Energy efficiency also becomes less important, driving up waste and stopping investments in energy conservation.

On the other hand, with low oil prices, investments in the fossil-fuels industry are also less likely to take place. Keeping resources in the ground becomes more palatable as profit margins are pushed down. This, in turn, is likely to have a positive effect on environment by decreasing the level of GHG emissions.

The invited guests, Leonid Neganov and Karl Hallding spoke more in depth about two central countries that contribute in shaping global environmental policy.

The local conditions, Russia and China examples

As the world’s fourth largest supplier of primary energy and the largest supplier of natural gas to the EU (IEA, 2017b), Russia presents an interesting case to observe as a country supplying fossil fuels. Leonid Neganov, Minister of Energy of Moscow Region, commented on the current policy direction of the country. He explained that non-renewable, GHG emitting energy sources make up a majority, roughly 60% of the Russian energy balance. The rest is provided by more or less equal shares of nuclear and hydro power. New renewable technologies make up a miniscule share of an estimate 0.2% of the current total.

According to Neganov, in the coming 20 years, we should not expect to see too much of a change. Though total output is expected to increase, the share of GHG-neutral energy will remain more or less constant, though the share of renewables are set to increase to 3% according to the current drafts of Russian energy policy. A more pronounced transition to other energy sources are more likely in a longer perspective towards 2050, even though circumstances may naturally change over the coming decades.

Other available information also points to that Russia has decided to tackle the shift in consumption of its major market in Europe by widening its geographic reach. Massive infrastructure investments, such as the Altai and TurkStream gas pipelines, will enable Russia to more easily reach markets that are currently beyond any practical reach.

With the Altai pipeline, Russia will be able to provide China with natural gas at a much greater level than before. China being by far the largest producer of coal sees an opportunity to shift away from the consumption of a resource that during winters causes its major cities to periodically become enveloped in clouds of smog and at the same time also decrease its GHG emissions. The environmental benefits of natural gas as opposed to coal should not be exaggerated though. Thomas Sterner pointed out that methane, the main compound of natural gas, is a considerably more potent GHG than CO2. A total leakage of an estimated 1% negates the environmental benefits, he said.

Karl Hallding, Senior Research Fellow at SEI, particularly stressed the need to look at China. It is the supplier of half of the world’s coal, extraction levels remain high. (BP, 2017) Domestic consumption is decreasing but consumption of Chinese coal is, however, more likely to shift geographic location rather than to be left in the ground, said Hallding. Through massive infrastructure investments, such as the New Silk Road, and in energy production in Sub-Saharan Africa, China spreads its influence (IEA, 2016). By exporting emissions, the impact at the global level will not change.

References

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Ethnic Networks in Ex-USSR

20171106 Ethnic Networks in Ex-USSR Image 01

Do ethnic networks facilitate international trade when formal institutions are weak? Using data collected by ethnologists on the share of ethnic groups across countries, this study assesses the effect of ethnic networks on bilateral trade across the sphere of the former Soviet Union. This region provides a perfect setting to test for this effect as both forced re-settlement of entire ethnic groups during the Stalin era and artificially drawn borders in Central Asia led to an exogenous ethnic composition within countries. While ethnic networks do not seem to have played a role in inter-republic trade during the Soviet Union, they did facilitate trade in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a transitional period when formal institutions were weak. This effect, however, eroded steadily from the early 2000s.

Economists and historians alike study the role of ethnic networks in international trade. Some prominent examples are the Greek commercial diaspora of the Black Sea in the 19th century (Loannides and Minoglou, 2005), the Maghribi traders in 11th-century North Africa (Greif, 1993), or the overseas Chinese all around the world in the last decades (Rauch and Trindade, 2002). Such networks facilitate trade by building trust relationships, enforcing contractual agreements in weak legal environments, matching buyers with faraway sellers that speak different languages, and by exchanging information on arbitrage opportunities.

In “Ethnic Minorities and Trade: The Soviet Union as a Natural Experiment”, forthcoming in The World Economy, we study the Soviet Union (USSR) to assess the role of ethnic networks in international trade. We argue that ex-USSR countries are particularly well suited for such a study. Indeed, the ethnic diversity of ex-USSR countries is exogenous, partly due to the creation of artificial borders cutting through ethnic homelands, and partly due to forced relocations (deportations) during the Stalin era, which brought ethnic groups to various remote regions of the USSR. This exogeneity adds power to our empirical strategy.

Ethnic Networks in the USSR

We first build a measure of ethnic networks based on the size of common ethnic groups using ethnologists’ data from the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset on the resulting ethnic groups across ex-USSR countries (Vogt et al., 2015; Bormann et al., Forthcoming). It covers all ethnic groups in every country of the world from 1946 to 2013. While there is some yearly variation in the data, we focus on the cross-section average for the pre-1991 period as per our identification strategy based on exogenous distributions.

Figure 1 gives an overview of the spatial distribution of ethnic groups, such as Russian, Kazakh, or Uzbek.

Figure 1. Ethnic Groups in the USSR

Source: Authors’ own ArcGIS mapping based on the EPR-ED dataset.

Russians are ubiquitous across the Soviet sphere. Countries with the largest ethnic Russian populations are Kazakhstan, Estonia, Latvia and Moldova. At the same time, Russia is very diverse. Almost all of the 60 ex-USSR ethnic groups are present in Russia, and ethnic Russians account for only 62% of the population. Most countries are ethnically diverse. Kazakhstan for example is home to Russians as well as Germans, Tatars, Ukrainians, Uzbeks and Uighurs.

From the information on ethnic populations within each country, we create an ethnic network index as the sum of products of common ethnic groups as a share of the country’s population. Figure 2 presents a matrix overview of the ethnic network index among country pairs with darker shades corresponding to higher scores. Some high scoring country pairs are Russia—Kazakhstan, Ukraine—Russia, Uzbekistan—Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan—Uzbekistan, Latvia—Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—Kazakhstan.

Figure 2. Ethnic Networks Index

Source: Authors’ estimates. The index is the sum of products of common ethnicities as a share of the country’s population.

Effect of Ethnic Networks on Bilateral Trade in the USSR

Next, we evaluate the impact of ethnic networks on aggregate trade between the countries of the former Soviet sphere. We use trade data from two sources. First, the data on internal trade between Soviet republics from 1987 to 1991 are from the input-output tables of each Soviet Union republic as compiled by the World Bank mission to the Commonwealth of Independent States (Belkindas and Ivanova, 1995). Second, the Post-1991 to 2009 trade data are from the Correlates of War Project (Barbieri et al., 2009, 2016), which offers the best coverage of the trade in the region.

We follow the migrant network and trade literature and estimate a standard log-linear gravity equation controlling for importer-year and exporter-year fixed effects (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003).

Figure 3 presents the results on the effect of ethnic networks on trade over time. We observe that there is no effect in the period before the end of the USSR, a positive effect after the breakup of the Soviet Union, and an erosion of this effect from 2000s on (omitting Russia from the sample does not alter the results).

These results can be explained with the fact that in the Soviet Union ethnic ties did not matter as official production and trade were centrally planned by the State Planning Committee, Gosplan, and by State Supplies of the USSR, or Gossnab, which was in charge of allocating producer goods to enterprises. Free trade was forbidden. However, once the Soviet system collapsed and before countries could establish more formal trade ties, the first reaction and fallback option for many people was to reach out to their co-ethnics (in the 1990s) to substitute for the broken chains of the centrally planned trade (Gokmen, 2017). The other reason is that the institutional framework was at its weakest in this transitional period, and hence, reliance on informal institutions such as ethnic networks may have been especially strong (Greif, 1993). Once systematic and formal trade ties could be established, more and more traders no longer had to rely on their ethnic networks and this could explain the decline in the effect in the 2000s.

Figure 3. The Effect of Ethnic Networks on Trade over Time

Source: Authors’ estimates. Estimate of the effect of ethnic networks on bilateral trade in a gravity model controlling for distance, contiguity, and importer and exporter fixed effects.

Conclusion

This study shows that ethnic minorities played a role in shaping trade patterns across ex-USSR countries, but only in the early years following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, we argue that reliance on informal institutions, such as ethnic networks, in forming trade relations is especially strong when the institutional framework is at its weakest in the transition period. This message may hold, not only for transition countries, but also for other developing countries with poor institutions.

References

  • Anderson, J. E. and E. van Wincoop, 2003. “Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the Border Puzzle,” American Economic Review, 93, 170-192.
  • Barbieri, K., M. G. Omar, and O. Keshk, 2016. “Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 4.0.”
  • Barbieri, K., M. G. Omar, O. Keshk, and B. Pollins, 2009. “TRADING DATA: Evaluating our Assumptions and Coding Rules,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, 26, 471-491.
  • Belkindas, M. and O. Ivanova, 1995. “Foreign Trade Statistics in the USSR and Successor States,” Tech. rep., The World Bank, Washington, DC.
  • Bormann, N. C., L. E. Cederman, and M. Vogt, Forthcoming. “Language, Religion, and Ethnic Civil War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution.
  • Gokmen, G., 2017. “Clash of civilizations and the impact of cultural differences on trade,” Journal of Development Economics, 127, 449-458.
  • Gokmen, Gunes; Elena Nickishina; and Pierre-Louis Vezina, forthcoming. “Ethnic Minorities and Trade: The Soviet Union as a Natural Experiment”, The World Economy.
  • Greif, A., 1993. “Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade: The Maghribi traders’ coalition”, The American Economic Review, 525-548.
  • Loannides, S.; and I. P. Minoglou, 2005. “Diaspora Entrepreneurship between History and Theory”, London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 163-189.
  • Rauch, J. E. and V. Trindade, 2002. “Ethnic Chinese networks in international trade”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 84, 116-130.
  • Vogt, M., N. C. Bormann, S. Regger, L. E. Cederman, P. Hunziker, and L. Girardin, 2015. “Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Dataset Family,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1327-1342.

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Rewarding Whistleblowers to Fight Corruption?

20171022 Rewarding Whistleblowers to Fight Corruption Image 01

Whistleblower reward programs, or “bounty regimes”, provide financial incentives to witnesses that report information on infringements, helping law enforcement agencies to detect/convict culprits. These programs have been successfully used in the US against procurement fraud and tax evasion for quite some time, and were extended to fight financial fraud after the recent crisis. In Europe there is currently a debate on their possible introduction, but authorities appear much less enthusiastic than their US counterparts. In this brief, we discuss recent research on two commonly voiced concerns on whistleblower rewards – the risk of increasing false accusations, and that of crowding out other motivations to blow the whistle – and the adaptations these programs may need to fight more general forms of corruption. Research suggests that the mentioned concerns can be handled by an appropriate design and management of the programs, as apparently done in the US, and that these programs can indeed be a cost effective instrument to fight corruption, but only in countries with a sufficient quality of the judicial system and administrative capacity. They may instead be problematic for weak institutions environments.

Corruption and fraud seem to remain highly widespread in almost all countries. For example, a recent survey of over 6,000 organizations across 115 countries shows that one in three organizations, both worldwide and in the US, experienced fraud in the past 24 months, prevalently in the form of asset misappropriation, cybercrime, corruption, and procurement and accounting fraud (Global Crime Survey, 2016).

Whistleblower (protection and) reward programs are a possibly effective tool to combat fraud and corruption, at least in the light of the US successful experience, where for a long time whistleblowers reporting large federal fraud have been entitled to up to 30% of recovered funds and sanctions under the False Claims Act. The US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) also allows whistleblower rewards in the tax area, and the Dodd-Frank Act introduced them for financial and securities fraud, apparently also with success (c.f. Call et al., 2017, and Wilde, 2017).

In Europe and the rest of the world, instead, rewards are absent and whistleblowers are still poorly protected from retaliation from employers. Some countries have taken encouraging legal steps to at least improve protection, and a discussion is ongoing at the G20 level on how to further improve the situation (G20 report, 2011).

Although many praise whistleblowers, there has been a large range of objections raised against introducing rewards (and even against improving whistleblower protection); mostly by corporate lawyers and lobbyists, but also by regulatory and law enforcement agencies (see Nyreröd and Spagnolo, 2017, for an overview).

In the rest of this brief, we focus on two often voiced concerns, the risks of eliciting false/fraudulent reporting and of crowding out of non-financial motivation, on which recent research has shed light that should be taken into account in the current policy debate. We then discuss some problems linked to the use of whistleblower rewards programs in a more general corruption context.

Fraudulent reports

One concern commonly raised in the discussion of whistleblower rewards is that they may create incentives to fraudulently report false or fabricated information in the hope of receiving a reward. Although clearly an important concern to take into account, we only know of very few anecdotal cases of malicious or false reporting, and fraudulent reporting does not appear to have been a major problem in the US (see again Nyreröd and Spagnolo, 2017 for an overview of the empirical evidence).

A recent paper by Buccirossi, Immordino and Spagnolo (2017) analyzes this concern within a formal economic model and shows that it is not a ground (or an excuse) for not introducing appropriately designed and managed protection and reward programs in countries with sufficiently effective court systems. In these countries, stronger sanctions against lying to the court can (and should) be introduced to balance the incentives for manipulation that may be generated by large bounties. Most legal systems already have defamation and perjury laws, which means that a whistleblower is already committing a crime by fraudulently reporting false information, that can easily be strengthened where necessary without giving up whistleblower rewards. According to this study, the balancing of incentives is what allows the US to effectively use large financial incentives for whistleblowers, besides a very strong protection from retaliation, with little problems in terms of fraudulent reports.

However, the study also shows that this is only possible if the precision (effectiveness, independence) of the court system is sufficiently high. Where court systems are imprecise, the interaction between courts’ mistakes in the legal case based on the information reported by the whistleblower and in the following case for perjury/defamation against the whistleblower if the first case is dismissed, incentives for fraudulent reports, and courts’ adaptation of the standard of proof to account for these incentives, make it impossible to appropriately balance the two incentives. Therefore, whistleblower reward programs should not be introduced in environments where the law enforcement system is ineffective, independently from why it is so (bureaucratic slack, incompetence, political interference, corruption, etc.).

Crowding-out non-financial motivation

Another concern is that whistleblower rewards may have a “crowding out” effect on intrinsic motivation. The problem is that “the commodification of whistleblowing via the provision of bounties may render would-be whistleblowers less likely to come forward by reducing the moral valance of the wrongdoing” (Engstrom, 2016:11). Recent experimental evidence suggests that this concern is overstated. In particular, Schmolke and Utikal (2016) investigate the effects of whistleblower rewards in an environment where one subject may increase his payoff at the cost of harming the group, and find rewards to be highly effective in increasing the number of crimes reported. Data from that experiment suggests a little role for crowding out of non-monetary motivation, if any. Another recent study by Butler, Serra and Spagnolo (2017) investigates if and how monetary incentives, expectations of social approval or disapproval, and the salience of the harm caused by the reported illegal activity interact and affect the decision to blow the whistle. Experimental results show that financial rewards significantly increase the likelihood of whistleblowing and do not substantially crowd out non-monetary motivations activated by expectations of social judgment. The study also finds that public scrutiny and social judgment decrease (increase) whistleblowing when the public is less (more) aware (aware) of the negative externalities generated by the reported crime. All in all, most the recent studies we are aware of suggest that crowding-out of non- financial concerns is not a first-order problem for whistleblower reward schemes as long as there is a clear perception of the public harm linked to the illegal behavior reported by the whistleblower.

Whistleblower rewards and corruption

Although whistleblowing can occur in any sector, firm, or government, an area of particular interest is corruption. Corruption in public procurement is estimated to cost the EU 5.3 billion Euros annually. Hence, corruption deterrence through increased whistleblowing could save the EU significant resources annually (EC Report, 2017).

Contrary to fraud, corruption always takes at least two parties, a bribe taker, typically a government official or politician, and a bribe giver, which may be a firm or an individual. The fact that at least one additional party is involved than in the standard case of fraud, should make whistleblower rewards programs even more powerful since they may deter corruption by increasing the fear that a (potential or real) partner in crime may blow the whistle, even when no third party witness observes the illegal act (Spagnolo, 2004).

When the reported wrongdoer is an individual, as is often the case with corruption, there may be an issue in the use of rewards for whistleblowers linked to the funding of the rewards (c.f Nyreröd & Spagnolo, 2017b for an overview).

In the current US schemes, rewards for whistleblowers are ‘self-financing’, as they constitute a fraction of the funds recovered thanks to the whistleblower or/and of the fines paid by the culprits. An individual and a government official involved in a corrupt deal may, however, not be wealthy enough for the fines and the recovered funds to amount to a sufficiently strong incentive to blow the whistle, given the loss of future gains from the corrupt relationships and the various forms of retaliation whistleblowing may lead to. This problem is of course also relevant for fraud when an individual with few or well-hidden assets is the culprit, rather than a corporation, but it seems particularly relevant for corruption.

Whistleblower reward programs are also malleable to the concerns at hand. If the priority is to combat higher-level corruption, then setting a monetary threshold for when a claim is to be considered is appropriate to limit administrative costs for the program. Indeed, a concern with utilizing whistleblower rewards programs for combating lower-level corruption is that the administrative burden required looking through the whistleblower claims and the costs of limiting abuses may outweigh the benefits gained in detection and deterrence. This concern is also valid for small fraud and tax evasion, which is why all the US programs have a minimum size for cases eligible to whistleblower rewards, but the problem is likely to be more relevant to the case of ‘petty’ corruption. These programs are more suited for ‘large cases’ in which the amount of funds recovered is large enough to pay for rewards and administrative costs, making these programs self-financing even without calculating the benefits for the deterrence/prevention of future infringements. However, when focusing on large corruption cases, other issues become relevant.

An issue particularly important for the case of ‘grand’ corruption is how independent the judicial system is from political pressure, and how able it is to protect whistleblowers against politically mandated retaliation. If corrupt politicians can importantly influence courts, the police or other relevant administrative agencies, then protection can hardly be guaranteed and inducing witnesses to blow the whistle through financial incentives may put their life at risk, although sufficiently large rewards can partly compensate for this risk and help escaping part of the retaliation.

Conclusion

On the whole, whistleblower rewards, in general and in the corruption context specifically, remain a promising tool to detect and deter crime. Careful design and implementation are necessary, because as for any powerful tool, these programs can be well used to do great thing, but also misused to do great damage. As the US experience has shown, along with sufficiently independent and precise courts and an effective administration of law enforcement, well designed and administered whistleblower reward programs hold the promise of greatly improving fraud and corruption detection and of being self-financing through recovered funds and fines.

Of course, even in a very good institutional environment, a poor design and/or implementation can lead to poor performance and do more harm than good (c.f. the case of leniency policies in China discussed in Perrotta et al., 2017). Moreover, in poor institutional environments, where the court system is not sufficiently precise and independent and other law enforcement institutions are not effective, even well-designed and implemented whistleblower reward schemes may bring more problems than benefits. Whistleblower rewards, as any other high-powered incentives, need good governance to ensure that the potentially very high benefits they can generate will be realized. Third parties like international courts and organizations could potentially provide for some low institution environments, the independent safe harbor necessary to protect whistleblowers and a check on court effectiveness for the award of financial incentives.

References

  • Global Economic Crime Survey, 2016. Available at: https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/economic-crime-survey/pdf/GlobalEconomicCrimeSurvey2016.pdf
  • Buccirossi, P., Immordino, G., and Spagnolo, G., 2017. “Whistleblower Rewards, False Reports, and Corporate Fraud”. SITE Working Paper No. 42, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2993776
  • European Commission Report, 2017. Estimating the Economic Benefits of Whistleblower Protection in Public Procurement, Milieu Ltd.
  • Engstrom, D., 2016. “Bounty Regimes”, in Research Handbook on Corporate Criminal Enforcement and Financial Misleading (Jennifer Arlen ed., Edward Elgar Press, forthcoming 2016)
  • Butler, J., Serra, D., and Spagnolo G., 2017. “Motivating Whistleblowers.” Unpublished manuscript.   Available at: https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2017/preliminary/1658
  • Schmolke, K.U., Utikal, V., 2016. “Whistleblowing: Incentives and Situational Determinants.” FAU – Discussion Papers in Economics, No. 09/2016. 2016. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2820475
  • Call, A.C., Martin, G.S, Sharp, N.Y., Wilde, J.H., 2017. “Whistleblowers and Outcomes of Financial Misrepresentation Enforcement Actions.” Journal of Accounting Research, forthcoming.
  • Wilde, J.H., (2017). “The Deterrent Effect of Employee Whistleblowing on Firms’ Financial Misreporting and Tax Aggressiveness”, The Accounting Review, forthcoming.
  • Nyreröd, T. Spagnolo, G., 2017a “Myths and evidence on whistleblower rewards”, SITE Working Paper No.
  • Spagnolo, G., 2004. “Divide et Impera: Optimal Leniency Programs.” CEPR Discussion Papers 4840, 2004.
  • Nyreröd, T. Spagnolo, G. 2017b. “Whistleblower Rewards in the Fight against Corruption?” (in Portuguese), forthcoming in the book  Corrupção e seus múltiplos enfoques jurídi
  • Berlin-Perrotta, M., Qin, B. and Spagnolo, G., 2017. “Leniency, Asymmetric Punishment and Corruption: Evidence from China,” SITE Working Paper. Available at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2718181 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2718181
  • G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan, Protection OF Whistleblowers Study on Whistleblower Protection Frameworks, Compendium of Best Practices and Guiding Principles for Legislation, 2011. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/anti-corruption/48972967.pdf
  • Wolfe S., Worth M., Dreyfus S., Brown A.J., 2015. Breaking the Silence, Strengths and Weaknesses in G20 Whistleblower Protection Laws, 2015. Available at: https://blueprintforfreespeech.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Breaking-the-Silence-Strengths-and-Weaknesses-in-G20-Whistleblower-Protection-Laws1.pdf

Latvia Stumbling Towards Progressive Income Taxation: Episode II

20171015 Latvia Stumbling Towards Progressive Income Taxation Image 01

In August 2017, the Latvian parliament adopted a major tax reform package that will come into force in January 2018. This reform was a long-awaited step from the Latvian authorities to make the personal income tax more progressive. Some of the elements of the adopted reform, e.g. the changes in the basic tax allowance are estimated to help reducing the tax wedge on low wages and help addressing the problem of high income inequality. At the same time, the way the newly introduced progressive tax rate is designed will effectively lead to a reduction in the tax burden on labor and will hardly introduce any progressivity to the system.

In recent years, reducing income inequality has become one of the top priorities of the Latvian government. Income inequality in Latvia is higher than in most other EU and OECD countries, and the need to address this issue has been repeatedly emphasized by the Latvian officials, the European Commission, the World Bank and OECD.

The main reason for high income-inequality is a low degree of income redistribution ensured by the tax-benefit system. The personal income tax (PIT) has been flat since the mid-nineties. While the non-taxable income allowance introduces some progressivity to the system, the Latvian tax system is characterized by a very high tax burden on low wages, compared to other EU and OECD countries.

Since the beginning of 2017, the government has worked on an extensive tax reform package that was passed in the parliament in August and will become effective as of January 2018.

Two years ago, we wrote about the tax reform of 2016. In this brief, we estimate the effect of the 2018 reform on the tax burden on labour and income inequality. We will only consider changes in direct taxes on personal income – the changes in enterprise income tax and excise tax are outside the scope of our analysis. Parts of our estimations are done using the tax-benefit microsimulation model EUROMOD (for more details about the EUROMOD modelling approach, see Sutherland and Figari, 2013) and EU-SILC 2015 data.

Tax reform 2018

We focus our analysis on four elements of the reform that are expected to affect income inequality and that are described below. In our simulations, however, we take into account all changes in the PIT rules.

First, the flat PIT rate of 23% will be replaced by a progressive rate with three brackets: 20% (applied to annual income not exceeding 20,000 EUR), 23% (for annual income above 20,000 EUR and below 55,000 EUR) and 31.4% (applied to income exceeding 55,000 EUR per year).

Second, the maximum possible PIT allowance will be increased and the structure of the PIT allowance will be made more progressive. Latvia has a differentiated allowance since 2016, which means that individuals with lower incomes are eligible for a higher tax allowance. Figure 1 shows the changes in the non-taxable allowance that will be introduced by the reform. Another important change is that the differentiated allowance will be applied to the taxable income in the course of the year. The current system foresees that, during a calendar year, all wages are taxed applying the lowest possible allowance (60 EUR per month in 2017), but workers eligible for a higher allowance have to claim the overpaid tax in the beginning of the next year.

Figure 1. Basic PIT allowance before (2017) and after (2018-2020) the reform, EUR

Source: compiled by the authors.

Third, the rate of social insurance contributions will be increased by 1 percentage point. Social insurance contributions are capped and the cap will be increased from 48,600 EUR per year to 55,000 EUR per year, i.e. to the same income threshold that divides the top PIT bracket.

Finally, the reform will modify the solidarity tax – a tax, which was introduced in Latvia in 2016 and which is paid by top income earners. When this tax was initially introduced, one of its objectives was to eliminate the regressivity from the tax system caused by the cap on social insurance contributions. Hence, the rate of the solidarity tax was set at the same level as the rate of social insurance contributions and was effectively replacing social insurance contributions above the cap. The reform foresees that part of the revenues from the solidarity tax (10.5 percentage points) will be used to finance the top PIT rate. This element of the reform implies that after January 2018 those falling into the top PIT bracket will, in fact, not face a higher PIT rate than those falling into the second income bracket – the introduction of the top rate will be offset by the restructuring of the solidarity tax.

Results

There are four main findings. First, the reform will reduce the tax wedge on labor income, whereas the tax wedge on low wages will remain high by international standards. Second, most of the PIT taxable income earners (93.5%) will fall into the bottom income bracket. Hence the reform will effectively reduce the tax burden, while the effect on progressivity is very limited. Third, the (small) increase in tax progressivity is ensured mainly by changes in the tax allowance, while the effect of changes in the tax rate on progressivity is negligible: Even those few PIT payers that fall into the top tax bracket will not experience any increase in the tax burden due to a compensating change in the solidarity tax. Finally, it is mainly the households in the middle of the income distribution that will gain from the reform.

Effect on tax wedge

We start with a simple comparison of the average labor tax wedge in Latvia and other OECD countries for different wage levels before and after the reform. The tax wedge measures the share of total labor costs that is taxed away in the form of taxes or social contributions payable on employees’ income.

Table 1. Average tax wedge for single wage earners without dependents in Latvia and other OECD countries, before and after the reform

 

67% of average worker’s wage

 

100% of average worker’s wage

 

167% of average worker’s wage

OECD average in 2016, % (a) 32.3 36.0 40.4
Latvia 2016, % (a) 41.8 42.6 43.3
Latvia’s rank in 2016* (a) 6 11 16
Latvia 2018, % (b) 39.4 42.3 42.6
Latvia 2019, % (b) 39.1 42.1 42.6
Latvia 2020, %(b) 39.0 41.9 42.8

Source: (a) OECD and (b) authors’ calculations. Note: * Ranking across 35 OECD countries. Higher ranking implies higher tax wedge relative to other countries.

Table 1 shows that the tax wedge on low wages (67% of an average worker’s wage) in Latvia is pretty high. In 2016, it was the 6th highest across OECD countries, while the tax wedge on high incomes (167% of the wage) is much closer to the OECD average.

While the reform will slightly reduce the tax wedge for low wage earners (from 41.8% to 39.0% in 2020), it will still remain high by OECD standards. Despite an increase in PIT rate for high-income earners, the reform will also lower the tax wedge for those who earn 167% of the average wage. Why? The explanation comes from the income thresholds for the tax brackets. The income of those earning 167% of the average wage is estimated to fully fall into the first tax bracket in 2018–2019 and only slightly exceed the income bracket for the second PIT rate by 2020. This means that most of the incomes of people earning 167% of the average wage will be taxed at the rate of 20%, which is lower than the current flat rate of 23%. Moreover, in 2020, only a small share of their income will be taxed at 23% – the same rate that these individuals would have had faced in the absence of the reform. Hence, we observe a reduction in the tax wedge for high-income earners.

Generally, only a very small share of taxpayers will fall into the middle and the top income brackets. According to our estimations, as many as 93.5% of all PIT taxable income earners will fall into the lowest income bracket, and only about 6.5% will fall into the second income bracket and about 0.5% will face the top PIT rate.

Apart from the progressive PIT schedule, the reform envisages important changes in the solidarity tax. As explained above, part of the revenues from the solidarity tax will be used to finance the top PIT rate. Therefore, even those (very few) taxpayers whose income will exceed the threshold for the top PIT rate, will not experience any increase in the tax burden because of the compensating change in the solidarity tax. Therefore, the reform will effectively reduce the tax burden on labour with very little effect on progressivity.

While lowering the tax burden is generally welcome, the motivation for applying the top rate to such a small group of taxpayers is not clear. For example, in their recent in-depth analysis of the Latvian tax system, the World Bank (World Bank, 2016) came up with a tax reform proposal that envisaged a considerably lower threshold for the top PIT rate, which, according to our estimations, would cover about 12% of the taxpayers. Given the limited budget resources and an especially high tax wedge on low wages, a more targeted reduction in the tax burden would be preferable. Similar concerns about insufficient reduction in the tax burden on low-income earners are expressed in the latest OECD economic survey of Latvia (OECD, 2017).

Effect on income distribution

Below we present the results from the tax-benefit microsimulation model EUROMOD. Figure 2 shows the simulated change in equivalized disposable income by income deciles compared to the baseline “no-reform” scenario in 2018-2020.

Figure 2. Change in equivalized disposable income by income deciles caused by the reform compared to “no-reform” scenario, %

Source: authors’ calculations using EUROMOD-LV model

The first thing to note is that these are mainly households in the middle of the income distribution who will gain from the reform – their income will increase due to both the increase in non-taxable allowance and the introduction of the progressive rate.

The gain in the bottom of the income distribution is smaller for several reasons. First, the proportion of non-employed individuals (unemployed and non-active) is larger in the bottom deciles. Second, individuals with low wages are less likely to gain from the reduction in the tax rate and the increase in the basic allowance, since they might already have most of their income untaxed due to the currently effective basic allowance. The same applies to pensioners who have a higher basic allowance than the employed individuals and who are mainly concentrated in the bottom of income distribution.

Our results suggest that the wealthiest households will also see their incomes grow as a result of the reform (by about 1% in 10th decile). The growth is ensured by the fact that annual income below 20,000 EUR will be taxed at a reduced rate of 20%, and, taking into account that even in the top decile only about half of the individuals get income from employment that exceeds 20,000 EUR per year, the gain from the tax reduction is considerable even in the top decile. A reduction in the tax allowance for high-income earners will have a negative effect on wealthy individuals’ income, but this will be more than compensated by the above positive effect of the change in the tax rate. Hence, the net effect on the incomes in the top deciles is estimated to be positive.

Finally, Table 2 summarizes the effect of the reform on the income distribution, measured by the Gini coefficient on equivalized disposable income. On the whole, the reform is estimated to slightly reduce income inequality – in 2020, the Gini coefficient is expected to be 0.6 points lower than it would have been in the absence of the reform. This reduction is mainly driven by the changes in the non-taxable allowance, while the three PIT rates are estimated to have an increasing impact on income inequality.

Table 2. Gini coefficient on equivalized disposable income in the reform and “no-reform” scenario

2018 2019 2020
“No-reform” scenario 35.2 35.4 35.7
Reform scenario 35.0 35.0 35.1

Source: authors’ calculations using EUROMOD-LV model

Conclusion

The 2018 tax reform was a long-awaited step from the Latvian authorities on the way to a more progressive tax system. The planned changes in the basic tax allowance are estimated to help reducing the tax wedge on low wages and help addressing the problem of high income-inequality.

At the same time, the second major aspect of the reform, the introduction of a progressive PIT rate, raises more questions than answers. The progressive rate, the way it is designed, will effectively lead to an across-the-board reduction of the tax burden on labor and will hardly help to reach the proclaimed objective of taxing incomes progressively. Given the limited budgetary resources and given that taxes on low wages will remain high compared to other countries even after the reform, a more targeted reduction of the taxes on low-income earners would have been a more preferred option.

References

  • OECD, 2017. “OECD Economic Surveys: Latvia 2017”, OECD Publishing, Paris. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-lva-2017-en
  • Sutherland, H. and Figari, F., 2013. “EUROMOD: the European Union tax-benefit microsimulation model”, International Journal of Microsimulation, 1(6), 4-26.
  • World Bank, 2016. “Latvia Tax Review”, available at http://fm.gov.lv/files/nodoklupolitika/Latvia%20Tax%20Review%20Draft%20231216%20D.pdf

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