Author: Admin
Sweden Supports Ukraine with a Record Aid Pledge
Sweden supports Ukraine with €10.7 billion in aid, marking the largest pledge to another country in modern Swedish history. Four years after Russia’s full-scale invasion, Swedish political, military, and economic leaders met at Kulturhuset in Stockholm on February 16, 2026. Their message was clear: backing Ukraine strengthens Sweden’s own security and Europe’s stability.
Torbjörn Becker, Director of the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), joined senior officials to discuss how military innovation and economic endurance shape the war and might impact its outcome. As Sweden’s support for Ukraine continues, attention is shifting to both battlefield technology and financial resilience.
Technology Transforming Ukraine’s Front Lines
The war has evolved at a remarkable speed. Sweden’s Minister for Defence, Pål Jonson, described a battlefield defined by drones, satellites, and electronic warfare. As a result, troops can no longer hide easily. Innovation cycles that once took years now unfold within months.
Vice Admiral Eva Skoog Haslum warned that the front lines remain extremely dangerous. She described parts of the battlefield as “kill zones,” where constant surveillance and precision strikes limit movement. Meanwhile, Ukraine has weakened Russia’s naval presence in the Black Sea by using smaller, flexible systems instead of traditional large warships.
Swedish military equipment has played a significant role. The CV90 combat vehicle and Archer artillery system have performed effectively in combat. Designed for harsh northern conditions and to counter Russian systems, they have proven highly relevant in Ukraine.
Economic Pressure and Long-Term Advantage
Although military developments matter, economic endurance may decide the war. Becker emphasized that while Russia’s economy is much larger than Ukraine’s, the combined economic power of the EU and the United States far outweighs Russia.
“Russia’s economy is roughly ten times the size of Ukraine’s. But compared to the EU and the United States together, it is closer to 1 to 20. If political support holds, the resources are there to sustain Ukraine over time,” Becker explained.
Russia depends heavily on oil revenues. Therefore, when oil prices fall or sanctions tighten, state income drops. At the same time, Russia relies increasingly on China for advanced technology components. According to Becker, this dependence creates long-term vulnerability.
Interest rates in Russia have climbed to around 20–25 percent. Such high rates strain banks and businesses. Over time, financial instability could weaken Russia’s ability to finance the war.
Planning for Ukraine’s Economic Recovery
Ukraine also faces serious fiscal challenges. The country spends more than half of its state budget on defense. Public debt now exceeds 100 percent of GDP. As a result, debt restructuring will likely be necessary.
Becker pointed to roughly USD 300 billion in frozen Russian central bank reserves held abroad. Using these funds could provide a stronger financial foundation for rebuilding Ukraine. “The main obstacle is not technical or legal,” Becker said. “It is about political coordination and will.”
As Sweden’s support for Ukraine continues, European leaders are rethinking both defense strategy and economic resilience. The lessons learned from this war will likely shape European security policy for years to come.
Key Conclusions on Sweden’s Support for Ukraine
- Russia’s war economy faces mounting pressure from high interest rates and shrinking reserves.
- Western economic strength gives Ukraine a structural long-term advantage.
- Oil revenues remain central to Russia’s fiscal stability.
- Frozen Russian central bank assets could help fund Ukraine’s reconstruction.
Further Reading on Sanctions Against Russia and Economic Pressure
Energy exports remain the backbone of Russia’s economy and a tool of geopolitical leverage. Sanctions targeting this sector aim to reduce state revenue and limit Moscow’s influence abroad.
Visit the Sanctions Portal Evidence Base to explore research on energy sanctions against Russia. You can also review the Timeline of Western Sanctions and Russian Countermeasures to see how both sides have adapted since the full-scale invasion.
Explore SITE’s research articles, policy briefs, datasets, reports, and additional publications on the SITE website, and subscribe to the newsletter to stay informed about important updates.
What Europe Can Learn From Ukraine’s Battle Against Information Aggression
On 12 February 2026, the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), the Center for Statecraft and Strategic Communication (CSSC) at SSE, and the Swedish Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce in Scandinavia (SUCC) hosted a high-level seminar on how democracies should respond to information aggression and hybrid threats. The event brought together Ukrainian officials, researchers, and business experts to share lessons from more than a decade of confronting Russia’s information warfare. As a result, the discussion offered guidance for European policymakers, regulators, and civil society leaders.
Ukraine’s Experience with Information Aggression
For Ukraine, information aggression is a daily reality rather than a theoretical risk. Since 2014, hostile disinformation, manipulation, and psychological pressure have preceded and accompanied every major escalation of Russia’s war. Consequently, Ukraine has learned that shifts in the information space often signal impending military, economic, or cyber shocks.
Experts from SITE, CSSC, and SUCC emphasized that information aggression is not merely a media issue, but also a matter of security, economic stability, and governance. They further stressed that universities and policy institutes play a critical role in transforming frontline experience into practical guidance.
In their opening remarks, SITE Director Torbjörn Becker and CSSC Director Rikard Westerberg argued that information operations must be treated as a core component of modern conflict. Ukrainian diplomats noted that information warfare often shapes alliances and delays international responses long before tanks move. Ignoring information aggression, therefore, leaves democracies divided, unprepared, and economically vulnerable.
Analysis and Key Insights
Narratives, Trust, and the Cognitive Battlefield
Keynote speaker Liubov Tsybulska, Director of the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security in Ukraine, described the information space as a central battlefield. She showed how narrative flooding, dehumanisation, and strategic ambiguity can erode trust and break alliances over time. In this context, perception becomes as important as territory.
Therefore, trust in institutions, media, and expert communities is both the main target and the main defence. Long-term investment in institutional credibility and transparent decision-making is crucial. In addition, Ukraine’s experience shows that early detection of hostile narratives, rapid factual responses, and careful avoidance of amplifying false content are vital tools.
Institutions and Digital Resilience
Advisor Natalia Mishyna from Ukraine’s State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection focused on institutional adaptation. Ukraine has strengthened digital infrastructure protection, electoral security, and crisis communication across government and civil society. As a result, the country has built faster incident response and clearer lines of responsibility.
For Europe, the key lesson is that cybersecurity, strategic communication, and public outreach must be integrated rather than separated into silos. Many EU states have hybrid threat or cyber units. However, coordination often remains fragmented and reactive. Therefore, more unified structures that link technical security with clear public messaging are needed.
Markets, Media, and Incentives
Associate Professor Carlos Diaz Ruiz from Hanken School of Economics added a market-based view. He underlined that information aggression exploits weaknesses in media and platform business models. Sensational and polarising content can be rewarded by advertising systems even when it harms democratic resilience.
Consequently, regulatory frameworks, competition policy, and platform governance all influence how hostile narratives spread. Responses cannot treat media and technology firms as passive channels. Instead, they must align private-sector incentives with the broader goal of information resilience.
Key Lessons from Ukraine for Europe
Across the seminar, several concise lessons for Europe emerged:
- Information aggression is a systemic risk that affects security, markets, and social cohesion.
- Trust and credibility are core defence assets, not soft add-ons.
- Civil society and state coordination are essential for response and recovery.
- International cooperation is necessary, as information threats ignore borders.
Taken together, these insights show that information aggression is a persistent strategic challenge embedded in wider hybrid warfare, not a temporary disturbance.
Why It Matters
Implications for European Democracies
Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, hybrid operations against European societies have become more frequent and complex. These include cyber attacks, targeted narrative campaigns, and energy-related disinformation. Ukraine’s experience illustrates the cost of underestimating such activities.
When information aggression goes unchecked, it can reduce support for sanctions and military assistance. It can also deepen social polarisation and weaken trust in elections, public health measures, and climate policy. Therefore, national security strategies, risk assessments, and crisis exercises must include the information dimension as a central pillar.
Policy and Governance Priorities
The EU has already launched frameworks to counter hybrid threats, yet implementation often lags behind the pace of attacks. Ukraine’s experience suggests three priorities for Europe.
- First, countries should embed information resilience into total defence and security planning, not just media policy.
- Second, rules for online platforms, political advertising, and data use should explicitly consider how they can be misused by information aggression.
- Third, cross-border strategic communication must improve, as hostile narratives are rarely limited to one country.
At the same time, responses must stay grounded in democratic values. Heavy-handed censorship can damage the trust that democracies seek to protect. Consequently, transparency, accountability, and open engagement with citizens are essential elements of any credible strategy.
Conclusion: Building Information Resilience
The SSE seminar delivered a clear message: Europe cannot afford to ignore information aggression. Ukraine’s experience shows that early recognition, coordinated action, and sustained investment in trust-building can limit long-term damage from hybrid campaigns.
Going forward, European governments, businesses, and civil society organisations will need to treat information resilience as a continuous task. Moreover, deeper cooperation with Ukrainian institutions and experts can help Europe avoid repeating costly mistakes. By convening diplomacy, security, research, and business communities, SSE and its partners contribute to a growing community of practice on countering information aggression. In this way, they highlight that defending the information space is now central to protecting open and resilient European societies.
Suggested Additional Resources
- EUvsDisinfo: East Stratcom Task Force, a team of experts with a background mainly in communications, journalism, social sciences, and Russian studies. Part of the EU’s diplomatic service, which is led by the EU’s High Representative.
- NATO StratCom COE: Contributes to improved strategic communications capabilities within NATO and Allied nations. Strategic communication is an integral part of the efforts to achieve the Alliance’s political and military objectives, thus it is increasingly important that the Alliance communicates in an appropriate, timely, accurate and responsive manner on its evolving roles, objectives, and missions.
- Hybrid CoE: The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats is an autonomous, network-based international expert organization dedicated to addressing hybrid threats.
Suggested Policy Briefs
- Ukraine and NATO – Evidence from Public Opinion Surveys. This policy brief analyzes how public opinion in Ukraine has shifted over time toward unprecedented support for NATO membership—especially in response to repeated Russian aggression—and examines regional differences and the broader societal implications of this change.
- Russia’s Data Warfare. This policy brief discusses how, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Kremlin has systematically withheld and obscured key economic statistics to hinder transparency and analysis of its economy and the effects of sanctions as part of a broader disinformation strategy, and explores alternative ways to assess Russia’s economic performance despite the lack of reliable official data.
- Trending? Social Media Attention on Russia’s War in Ukraine. This policy brief examines how social media attention to Russia’s war in Ukraine, especially trending hashtags on platforms like X/Twitter across 62 countries, has fluctuated over time, revealing patterns of global public engagement and interest in the conflict beyond traditional news coverage.
Benjamin Hilgenstock Highlights Risks of Russia’s Expanding Shadow Fleet
Russia remains one of the world’s largest oil exporters, and a recent media report shows how Moscow now relies on a growing “shadow fleet” to bypass Western sanctions. The article, published by BBC Turkish, explains that hundreds of aging tankers move Russian crude through the Baltic and Black Seas. As a result, Europe faces rising maritime and environmental risks.
“Russia has built a shadow fleet of oil tankers that allows it to evade sanctions. These old, poorly maintained ships are unlikely to have adequate insurance against oil spills. About three-quarters of Russia’s oil exports by sea leave ports in the Baltic and Black Seas. This means that these ships pass through European waters several times every day,” explains Benjamin Hilgenstock, a senior economist at the KSE Institute.
Tactics Behind Russia’s Shadow Fleet
The article also reviews the tactics used by these ships. Many disable tracking systems, switch flags, or operate under false identities. Moreover, maritime analysts estimate that more than 1,300 tankers now belong to this shadow network. This means that about 80% of Russia’s seaborne exports move without insurance from major International Group-affiliated clubs. In response, NATO countries have increased monitoring efforts in the Baltic Sea, especially after several recent drone and cable disruption incidents.
To read the full article, visit the original publication by BBC Turkish. Explore more policy briefs on the Russo-Ukrainian War in the policy brief section.
Further Reading: Sanctions, Energy, and Russia’s War Economy
Energy exports remain the backbone of Russia’s economy and a tool of geopolitical leverage. Sanctions targeting this sector aim to reduce state revenue and limit Moscow’s influence abroad.
- Explore the Sanctions Portal Evidence Base to access the latest research on energy sanctions against Russia.
- Review the Timeline of Western Sanctions and Russian Countermeasures to understand how both sides have adapted since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
For more expert insights and economic analysis, visit the SITE website.
KSE Institute: Russian Oil Revenues Drop, but Shadow Fleet Cushions the Blow
Russia’s oil export revenues declined by $0.9 billion in August 2025, reaching $13.5 billion, according to the latest Russian Oil Tracker by the KSE Institute. Lower global prices for crude oil and most oil products drove the drop, even though export volumes remained mostly stable. Crude oil revenues fell to $8.8 billion, while oil product revenues slid to $4.8 billion.
The report, authored by researchers from the KSE Institute, highlights how Russia continues to rely on a vast “shadow fleet” to move oil and avoid Western sanctions.
How Sanctions and Shadow Fleets Shape the Oil Market
Since the start of Western sanctions, Russia has developed a massive network of old tankers to transport crude and oil products outside official oversight. Many of those tankers are over 15 years old, which increases the risk of oil spills. In August 2025, 155 of these tankers departed Russian ports, often engaging in ship-to-ship (STS) transfers to obscure cargo origins.
Only 21% of crude and 82% of oil products were shipped using tankers covered by International Group (IG) insurance, showing how much the shadow fleet now dominates Russia’s seaborne oil trade.
India and Turkey Remain Russia’s Top Buyers
India remains the largest importer of Russian seaborne crude oil. Although imports fell 11% month-on-month to 1.5 million barrels per day, India still accounted for 45% of Russia’s total seaborne crude exports. Turkey held its top spot for oil product imports, taking in 425,000 barrels per day.
Key Research Findings
- Russia’s oil export revenues dropped by $0.9 billion in August 2025.
- 155 shadow fleet tankers carried oil and products, with 86% over 15 years old.
- Sanctions enforcement remains weak, allowing more tankers to operate illegally each month.
- Urals crude traded below the G7/EU price cap, while ESPO crude exceeded it.
What’s Next for Russian Oil Revenues?
The KSE Institute projects that Russia’s oil revenues will reach $155 billion in 2025 and $125 billion in 2026 under current sanctions. If Western enforcement weakens further, revenues could climb to $161 billion in 2025 and $146 billion in 2026. However, with stronger price caps and wider discounts on Russian crude, revenues could fall sharply, to as low as $46 billion in 2026. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, Russia has lost an estimated $159 billion in oil export revenues.
Read the Full Report
Read the full Russian Oil Tracker – September 2025 on the KSE Institute’s website.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Benjamin Hilgenstock: Sanctions, Russia’s Economy, and Energy Strategy
At the 7th Annual International Sanctions Conference “Guarding the Gate: Sanctions, Export Controls & Business Responsibilities”, Benjamin Hilgenstock joined leading economists and policymakers to explore the global impact of sanctions and export controls. The conference, organized by the Financial Intelligence Unit of Latvia (FIU Latvia) on November 6, 2025, highlighted how sanctions enforcement shapes both global security and economic resilience.
Sanctions, Export Controls & Business Responsibilities
The program opened with keynote remarks from Baiba Braže, Latvia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Toms Platacis, Head of FIU Latvia. Their speeches set the stage for discussions on aligning sanctions with strategic goals, improving judicial cooperation, and enhancing compliance.
Moreover, expert panels examined topics such as “Sanctions on Trial: How the Courts Are Shaping Sanctions Policy,” “Following the Money: Risks in the Financial Sector,” and “Sanctions in Practice: Business Responsibility and Compliance.” Each session emphasized practical enforcement and cross-border cooperation.
In the panel “Counting the Global Cost: Sanctions and Economic Consequences,” moderated by Kārlis Bukovskis, the discussion featured Benjamin Hilgenstock of the Kyiv School of Economics and Matīss Mirošņikovs of Latvijas Banka. Together, they analyzed Russia’s wartime fiscal expansion, persistent inflation, and dependence on energy exports, agreeing that stronger sanctions and lower export volumes are essential to restrict Moscow’s war financing.
The conference concluded with the session “Guarding the Gate: Latvia’s Experience.” In it, Paulis Iļjenkovs of FIU Latvia and Uldis Cērps from the Finance Latvia Association reflected on Latvia’s achievements in sanctions coordination and national enforcement. Their discussion underscored how cooperation between institutions strengthens compliance and accountability.
Shift From Price to Volume
Benjamin Hilgenstock, Director of the Center for Geoeconomics and Resilience at the KSE Institute, called for tougher energy sanctions. He stressed that reducing export volumes, rather than only limiting prices, should be the main priority. Price caps, he argued, have limited effectiveness. In contrast, curbing export volumes would cut Russia’s revenues more quickly.
In addition, Hilgenstock urged the use of secondary sanctions to prevent banks and ports from helping Russia evade restrictions. These measures, he noted, would discourage third countries from undermining the global sanctions framework.
The panel also discussed Russia’s growing dependence on China for trade and consumer goods. Hilgenstock described this as a “temporary marriage of convenience,” warning that the relationship offers little long-term stability. He also observed that Western firms still operating in Russia face extended uncertainty. While a sudden collapse of Russia’s economy is unlikely, he added, persistent enforcement will gradually weaken its fiscal stability.
Further Reading
To explore in-depth monitoring of international sanctions against Russia, visit the KSE Institute’s Sanctions Hub. The Hub maintains a consolidated sanctions database and provides detailed reports on the impact of sanctions on Russia’s economy. It also features analyses of sanctions effectiveness, revealing patterns of enforcement and circumvention, as well as position papers and sectoral reports offering expert insights and policy recommendations from KSE researchers.
To gain further insights into sanctions on Russia and its economic retaliation measures, visit the SITE Sanctions Portal. This resource provides a detailed timeline and comprehensive evidence base that combines data, analysis, and expert commentary. It helps researchers, journalists, and policymakers navigate the evolving sanctions landscape. The SITE Sanctions Portal also explores the economic consequences of Western sanctions and Russia’s strategic responses.
Belarus Economy Monitor: Belarus Inflation Eases in Q3
Belarus inflation slowed in Q3 2025, as reported in BEROC’s Quarterly Inflation Review. The Annual Consumer Price Index (CPI) reached 7.1% in September, while quarterly price growth more than halved. The baseline forecast now expects Belarus inflation to remain between 7–8% by year-end and throughout 2026.
What’s Driving the Cool-Down
In September 2025, the annual inflation rate was 0.9 percentage points below the July forecast, near the lower bound of its confidence interval. Fruit and vegetable prices dropped by 3.9% quarter-on-quarter (QoQ) in Q3 2025, correcting after a sharp 53% QoQ surge in Q2 2025. As expected, the earlier price gap between Russian and Belarusian markets stopped influencing inflation by the end of Q2 2025.
A strong harvest helped stabilize food prices and reduced the risk of renewed acceleration in this segment. However, continued price controls on fruits and vegetables still limit price growth. Consequently, these measures may build up inflationary pressure and narrow supply if Russian prices rise sharply.
Inflation in the Non-Food Segment
Prices for non-food goods rose by 1.6% QoQ in Q3 2025, compared with 3.5% in the previous quarter. Median inflation in this category stood around 2.4% QoQ. The fastest price increases occurred in goods where authorities relaxed price controls earlier in the year. In contrast, most other categories experienced very weak growth because strict regulations remained in place.
Moreover, the overvaluation of the Belarusian ruble against the US dollar, euro, and yuan lowered prices for imported goods, especially electronic devices, adding another disinflationary factor.
Key Findings
- Annual CPI reached 7.1% in September; the Q4 baseline remains at 7–8%.
- The ruble was about 1% overvalued, providing a mild disinflationary effect.
- Money supply grew much faster than GDP, highlighting the monetary roots of inflation.
- Unregulated services remained strong, showing persistent demand-side pressure.
What It Means for 2026
The forecast projects Belarus’ inflation to stay around 7–8% next year. External factors are likely to ease inflation slightly, provided global supply chains remain stable. Nevertheless, strong wage growth and consumer demand will continue to create upward pressure, even as both slow down. Furthermore, if price controls ease, pent-up “inflationary overhang” could push prices higher.
Two major risks remain. First, a sharper decline in domestic demand could bring inflation closer to 5–6%. Second, unpredictable policy choices still pose uncertainty. Renewed fiscal stimulus could reignite inflation, whereas tighter controls might return if prices climb again.
Read the Full Report
Read the full report on the BEROC website to explore all charts and methods. Learn more about the Belarusian economy and find additional policy briefs on Belarus and its economic policy in the FREE Network publications section.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Denmark Backs New KSE Institute Center on Sanctions and Resilience
The Danish government is partnering with the KSE Institute to establish the Center for Geoeconomics and Resilience and the Sanctions Hub of Excellence. This initiative will strengthen KSE Institute’s sanctions research, economic resilience, and Ukraine’s post-war recovery. The Center will be led by Benjamin Hilgenstock and Yuliia Pavytska, with funding from Denmark’s Research Reserve and Ukraine Transition Programme.
Building Economic Resilience Through Sanctions Research
Denmark’s support comes amid Ukraine’s ongoing fight against Russia’s full-scale invasion. Since 2022, the KSE Institute has played a vital role in shaping global sanctions policy. The new Center will expand this work, deepening research into the economic effects of sanctions and strategies for Ukraine’s recovery.
By 2026, the Center aims to develop a broader macroeconomic research program, creating a hub for collaboration between Ukrainian and European experts. A new satellite office in Copenhagen, hosted by the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), will further connect Ukrainian and Nordic analytical institutions.
Strengthening Strategic Research and Action
The project’s goal is to enhance analytical capacity on sanctions policy, economic stability, and post-war recovery. The team will study how sanctions impact Russia’s economy, develop proposals for new restrictive measures, and expose the operations of the “shadow fleet” used to evade sanctions.
Benjamin Hilgenstock will take on the role of Director of the Center, while Yuliia Pavytska will lead the Sanctions Hub. Key experts, including Nataliia Shapoval (President of KSE Institute), Elina Ribakova (Director of the International Affairs Program and Vice President for Foreign Policy at KSE), Anna Vlasyuk (Head of International Law and Policy Research), and Borys Dodonov (Head of the Center for Energy and Climate Studies) will play a central role in advancing the Center’s research and strategic initiatives. In addition, Olena Bilousova, Anatoliy Kravtsev, Kateryna Olkhovyk, Dmytro Pokryshka, Pavlo Shkurenko, Lucas Risinger, and Matvii Talalaievskyi will join the Sanctions Hub, continuing their exceptional work on sanctions policy and analysis.
Expanding the Partnership Between Denmark and Ukraine
Denmark’s investment underscores its leadership within the global sanctions coalition. The project is co-financed by Denmark’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, and Ministry of Higher Education and Science.
Further Reading
Read the full announcement on the Kyiv School of Economics website to explore the complete details of this new collaboration.
Visit the KSE Institute Sanctions Hub to explore in-depth monitoring of international sanctions against Russia. The Hub maintains a consolidated sanctions database and provides detailed reports on the impact of sanctions on Russia’s economy. It also features analyses of sanctions effectiveness, revealing patterns of enforcement and circumvention, as well as position papers and sectoral reports offering expert insights into key industries and policy recommendations from KSE researchers.
Visit the SITE Sanctions Portal to gain insights into sanctions on Russia and its economic retaliation measures. This resource provides a detailed timeline and comprehensive evidence base that brings together data, analysis, and expert commentary. It helps researchers, journalists, and policymakers navigate the evolving sanctions landscape. SITE Sanctions Portal explores the economic consequences of Western sanctions and Russia’s strategic responses.
Maria Perrotta Berlin, Anna Anisimova, and Kata Fredheim on Displaced Ukrainians’ Integration in Sweden
A recent article from the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs highlights several studies on migrants’ social norms and integration. Among them is a FREE Network policy brief by Maria Perrotta Berlin, Anna Anisimova, and Kata Fredheim, offering insights into Sweden’s approach to receiving and integrating displaced Ukrainians.
In their brief, the authors examine how Sweden’s implementation of the EU Temporary Protection Directive has created uncertainty for displaced Ukrainians. This uncertainty has hindered both their integration and participation in the labor market.
While Sweden shows strong political and public support for Ukraine, limited rights and unclear long-term status pose challenges. Refugees face fewer benefits and opportunities than in neighboring Nordic countries or Poland, making Sweden a less attractive destination.
Many Ukrainians arriving in Sweden are highly educated and employable. Yet, barriers such as limited access to language training, housing, and stable residence permits slow their economic inclusion. Civil society and private sector initiatives, including mentorship and job-matching programs, have helped fill some gaps. However, these efforts remain insufficient without stronger institutional support.
To read the full policy brief on migrant integration in Sweden, visit the FREE Network website. For more expert analysis from SITE, explore the SITE website.
Trump’s Sanctions Hit Russia’s Oil Giants: Maria Perrotta Berlin Discusses the Impact
In a new Associated Press (AP) report, the United States and European Union have jointly announced fresh sanctions on Russia’s leading oil producers, Rosneft and Lukoil. The measures aim to cut revenue funding for Moscow’s war in Ukraine and signal the Trump administration’s first major sanctions package on Russian oil since returning to office.
This move underscores Washington’s tougher stance toward the Kremlin’s war economy and its global oil trade network.
Sanctions Are Powerful, But Often Come Too Late
“The sanctions are large and powerful, but they have always come a little too late,” said Maria Perrotta Berlin, Assistant Professor at the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE).
Perrotta Berlin explained that Russia’s shadow fleet and complex web of traders have helped it adapt to earlier restrictions. However, she noted that the new measures, which threaten secondary sanctions on Indian and Chinese refiners, could have a more immediate chilling effect on Russian oil exports.
Sanctions Pressure on Putin and Russia’s Oil Strategy
According to the AP article, the sanctions aim to pressure President Vladimir Putin to consider President Donald Trump’s proposal for an “immediate ceasefire.” Analysts caution that while the sanctions won’t cripple Russia’s economy overnight, they could increase long-term costs, reduce oil revenues, and expose vulnerabilities in Moscow’s energy strategy. In parallel, the European Union’s ban on Russian LNG imports and the sanctioning of 117 additional tankers amplify the economic pressure on Russia’s fossil fuel sector.
To read Maria Perrotta Berlin’s full commentary and detailed analysis on how Trump’s sanctions are reshaping Russia’s oil policy, see the full AP article on the Associated Press website.
Further Reading: Sanctions, Energy, and Russia’s War Economy
Energy exports remain the backbone of Russia’s economy and a tool of geopolitical leverage. Sanctions targeting this sector aim to reduce state revenue and limit Moscow’s influence abroad.
- Explore the Sanctions Portal Evidence Base to access the latest research on energy sanctions against Russia.
- Review the Timeline of Western Sanctions and Russian Countermeasures to understand how both sides have adapted since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
For more expert insights and economic analysis, visit the SITE website.
U.S. Sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil: Benjamin Hilgenstock Explains the Impact on Russia’s Oil Revenues
The United States has imposed its toughest sanctions yet on Russia’s energy industry, focusing on Rosneft and Lukoil. These are the country’s two largest oil producers. The measures aim to restrict Moscow’s access to global markets and increase pressure on the Kremlin’s war financing.
In a detailed Financial Times analysis, experts examined how these sanctions could reshape global oil trade. They may also deepen Russia’s fiscal strain as the government faces a tightening budget environment.
Benjamin Hilgenstock on Russia’s Budget Vulnerability
“The sanctions come at a time of heightened vulnerability for the Russian budget,” said Benjamin Hilgenstock, head of macroeconomic research and strategy at the Kyiv School of Economics Institute (KSE Institute).
He explained that energy revenues make up about one-quarter of Russia’s federal income. Moreover, these revenues have fallen by 20 percent year-on-year in 2025. Therefore, Washington’s new sanctions could further intensify financial pressure on the Kremlin and limit its ability to sustain long-term spending.
Market Reaction: Rising Oil Prices and Global Adjustments
The Financial Times report also looked at market reactions following the sanctions announcement. Brent crude prices rose by 9 percent, as traders assessed possible disruptions to Russian exports. However, analysts warned that while China and India may initially resist pressure from Washington, secondary sanctions could change their stance. Over time, refiners might diversify their oil supplies, testing Russia’s ability to maintain production and revenue.
Read the Full Analysis
To read Benjamin Hilgenstock’s complete commentary and the full Financial Times article, visit FT.com. In addition, explore the KSE Institute’s homepage for more insights and expert research.
Further Reading: Sanctions and Russia’s Energy Economy
Energy exports remain a cornerstone of Russia’s economy and a major source of geopolitical power. By targeting the oil and gas sector, sanctions aim to reduce state revenues and limit Moscow’s ability to wage war against Ukraine. For deeper insights, visit the Sanctions Portal Evidence Base to explore current research on energy sanctions and their impact on Russia’s economy.