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Towards European Union Membership: Poland’s EU Pre-accession Funds and Infrastructure Development

Posted on October 6, 2025 | Policy Brief, Policy Papers

European Union flag waving during a public demonstration, symbolizing support and integration efforts related to EU Pre-Accession Funds.

In advance of formal membership, candidate countries are offered three pillars of EU assistance: trade concessions, stabilization and association agreements and financial support. These instruments aim both to prepare candidates economically, politically and administratively, and to signal accession’s benefits to their populations. In this paper we describe the channels in which the third pillar – the EU pre-accession funds – affected Poland’s economic and institutional development ahead of its 2004 membership. The funds were designed to accelerate institutional transformation, modernize agriculture, strengthen rural communities, improve transport networks, and promote environmental protection. In Poland, between the mid-1990s and 2003, they supported extensive investments that produced unprecedented improvements in technical infrastructure. Poland’s accession referendum in 2003 turned decisively in favor of EU membership, despite strong regional variation in support. While no causal evidence is available, we argue that without the EU-funded infrastructural transformation, its outcome would have been less certain. For current EU candidate countries, Poland serves as an excellent example of how targeted external financial assistance can support structural transformation ahead of integration with the EU.

Introduction

Seven countries are currently eligible to receive financial support through the European Union’s Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III): Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Türkiye. The funding allocated within the program for the 2021–2027 period amounts to 14.162 billion EUR (in 2021 prices; European Commission, 2024). IPA III is the successor to the former two IPA editions, which have provided support exceeding 24 billion EUR since 2007 to countries in the then EU enlargement region. IPA aims to support countries that have entered a pathway to EU membership, expected in the foreseeable future, to facilitate progressive alignment with EU rules, values, and various standards and policies enforced in the European Union before they become full members. It constitutes one of the pillars of assistance offered by the EU to countries with a prospect of membership, with trade concessions and stabilization and association agreements (SAAs) serving as the other two.

Next in line to obtain financial help through the pre-accession funding are Moldova and Ukraine, both of which were granted candidate status by the European Council fairly recently. While they have already started their accession negotiations and may benefit from trade concessions and SAAs, they still need to fulfill certain requirements to be eligible for IPA. Though formally also a candidate since late 2023, the accession process of Georgia is currently suspended due to concerns about democratic backsliding, implementation of controversial laws and disputed parliamentary elections.

In this paper, we examine Poland’s experience in utilizing the funding available prior to the 2004 EU enlargement to undergo important structural and systemic changes. Given the goals of the funding, we discuss the evolution of a number of economic indicators which can serve as evidence of the socio-economic advancement that occurred in Poland in the years leading to its EU accession. These examples illustrate different dimensions of development that societies in countries embarking on the EU accession process could benefit from on their way towards full integration.

EU Pre-accession Funding Options in the 1990s

Together with nine other countries, mainly from the Eastern European region and the former communist bloc (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia), Poland joined the EU in 2004. It was the largest enlargement of the European community both in terms of the number of new countries and population-wise.

On the pathway to EU membership, these candidates benefited from a coordinated set of financial instruments designed to accelerate their political, economic, and institutional development. During the 1990s and early 2000s, three programs offered financial assistance: Phare, SAPARD, and ISPA. Each addressed a different strategic challenge that candidates faced during their accession period – many of which underwent the transition from centrally planned to free market economies.

From the pool of soon-to-be EU members, Hungary and Poland were the first among the post-communist Central and Eastern European countries to formally start the accession process as early as 1994 (Cyprus and Malta applied in 1990). These two countries also inaugurated the distribution of financial assistance among the EU applicants. They became the first beneficiaries of the Phare program, which concentrated on supporting public administration reform, improving institutional capacity, and preparing regions for effective absorption of EU structural funds. It also helped modernize local infrastructure and provided targeted assistance to sectors undergoing major restructuring. Phare was soon extended to cover all other candidate countries.

The second initiative – SAPARD, concentrated on the needs of the agricultural sector and rural communities. The goal was to raise the competitiveness of local farming and modernize food production.

The third program, ISPA, funded major environmental and transportation initiatives.

These three programs helped close the gap between the candidate countries and older EU member states by improving infrastructure and enhancing the functioning of their institutions. Formally, they also helped ensure that the new members met EU strict standards and legal directives and built the foundations for their long-term cohesion. More detailed descriptions of the objectives of each program, with a special focus on Poland, are included in Box 1.

Figure 1 presents the annual expenditures between 1990 and 2003 within each of the three analyzed instruments provided by the European Union to Poland (bars, left axis). With connected lines, we show the scope of each program in cumulative amounts over time (right axis). During the 1990s, the budget spent on Poland under the Phare program was kept under 200 million EUR annually (in the last year of the decade, it increased to almost 300 million EUR). However, after the program’s restructuring since the beginning of the 2000s, annual spending through this instrument doubled. Among the three, Phare was the major funding source for Poland, as the country received a total of 3.5 billion EUR until 2003 (equivalent to 1.9% of the Polish GDP in 2003) – almost five times more than under the SAPARD program. Poland also obtained the highest total amount of funding of all candidate countries at the time, corresponding to 30% of the overall provided financial assistance (Kawecka-Wyrzykowska & Ambroziak 2006).

Figure 1. Values of  EU pre-accession funds in Poland

Source: Own compilation based on Tables 3, 4, 6 from Kawecka-Wyrzykowska & Ambroziak (2006). Note: in 2003 prices.

In 2000, ISPA and SAPARD were introduced to further support specific areas identified during the 1990s as critical and requiring targeted funding – the agricultural sector, initiatives to enhance the transportation network, and environmental protection. Through SAPARD, projects related to farming and rural infrastructure received approximately 150 million EUR per year in Poland, accumulating to 700 million EUR over the four-year period until 2003. Since one of the prerequisites in SAPARD was national co-funding of ca. 25% of the public contribution in the investments, overall 1.1 bn EUR (0.6% of the 2003 GDP) of public money was committed to different projects in Poland through this instrument (ARiMR 2025; investments consisted in 50% of private resources).

Projects supported within ISPA on average obtained 300 million EUR annually in Poland, with total spending reaching 1.4 billion EUR until 2003 (0.8% of the 2003 GDP). Poland was still the major beneficiary of these two types of financial support, though the total share of the funding received within each of them was much lower than in the Phare program, respectively 32% in SAPARD and 34% in ISPA (Kawecka-Wyrzykowska & Ambroziak 2006).

 

Box 1. Financial instruments offered in the 1990s on the pathway to EU membership: Phare, SAPARD, ISPA

Originally known as Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring of the Economy, Phare was launched in 1989 at a pivotal moment in European history. Initially designed to support the two countries in their transition from communism to democracy and a market economy, Phare quickly expanded to cover other parts of Central and Eastern Europe. Its mission was not only to help rebuild economies, but also to support political democratization. At first, it operated through national programs, but as regional cooperation gained importance, Phare introduced international initiatives to foster cross-border collaboration. The evolving challenges faced by the transforming countries led to a significant change in the program’s operation in the late 1990s. Financial support was now focused on two main pillars: investment in essential infrastructure, which consumed about 70 per cent of resources, and institutional development, which received the remaining 30 per cent. Poland benefited from several specialized initiatives within Phare. Socio-Economic Cohesion focused on modernizing regional infrastructure and preparing Polish regions to efficiently absorb EU structural funds. Cross-Border Cooperation strengthened ties between Poland and its neighbors. Institutional Building contributed to more efficient and transparent public administration.

The Special Accession Program for Agriculture and Rural Development, SAPARD, was established in 1999 to help transform the agricultural sectors and rural economies of ten countries aspiring to join the EU at the time. The goal was to prepare farmers and food processors to meet strict EU sanitary and veterinary standards. In Poland, SAPARD played a major role given the country’s vast rural landscape and the important role of agriculture in the economy – accounting for 7% of the GDP in 1995 (CSO 2014). Around 75% of the total budget was allocated from EU funds, with the remainder covered by national co-financing. However, the rules required an own contribution from each beneficiary, thus around half of the total value of all investments realized through SAPARD was private capital (Supreme Audit Office, 2002). SAPARD in Poland focused on, on the one hand, the modernization of agriculture and, on the other, on rural development. A large part of the program went into modernizing agricultural holdings, supporting farmers in buying new machinery, improving farm buildings, and upgrading agricultural production to meet EU standards. Equally important was the modernization of food processing industries, like meat, dairy, fruits and vegetables. Another significant part of the program concentrated on infrastructure in rural communities — building roads, sewage systems, and improving basic services. To encourage economic diversification, assistance was provided to develop non-farming businesses and create new job opportunities outside of agriculture (EU Council, 1999a).

Created in 1999, the main goal of ISPA was to finance large-scale projects in two critical sectors: transportation and environmental protection. Projects selected for funding were typically expensive, exceeding 5 million EUR, and had a strategic, national or at least regional impact (EU Council, 1999b). From the society’s perspective, these initiatives improved living standards, protected public health and the natural environment and promoted sustainable development. In the environmental sector, ISPA focused mainly on critical areas, including improving the quality of drinking water, building modern sewage treatment plants, managing waste more efficiently, and reducing air pollution. Given the EU’s strict environmental directives, addressing these issues was a fundamental condition for accession. ISPA concentrated also on modernizing and expanding major roadways and railway lines, especially those which were signified as part of the Trans-European Transport Network. Improved transport connections facilitated trade, mobility, and regional development, essential for increasing economic competitiveness and tightening of physical linkage with the rest of Europe.

The total amount of received funding was only one of the factors that may have played a role in the scope and pace of overall socio-economic changes in Poland. Importantly, the spatial distribution of investments provided a unique opportunity to reduce the geographical inequalities deeply rooted in Polish history and related, in particular, to the partitions of Poland lasting from the late 1700s till the end of World War I (Becker et al. 2016; Grosfeld & Zhuravskaya 2015). The eastern regions of Poland were historically much less developed, with the agricultural sector maintaining a critical position in economic activity and employment.

To illustrate the differences in regional distribution of the funding, we use a number of indicators related to investments realized with the help of the SAPARD instrument – which was specifically targeted at supporting infrastructure in rural areas and advancements in the agricultural sector. In Figure 2, we present three measures of investment allocation – the total (public+private) value of investments completed in each region (a), total value of investments per capita (b), and per hectare of agricultural land (c). Depending on the analyzed indicator, we obtain a slightly different picture of the distribution of the investments in SAPARD throughout the country. It appears that the Western regions of Poland received the least funding from SAPARD, whereas the Eastern and most rural regions were less successful in securing the funding. In all three cases, though, the Wielkopolskie Voivodship – a region in the Central-Western part of Poland – stands out as the one that collected the highest funding not only overall, but also when calculated per inhabitant or, most crucially, per area of agricultural land.

Figure 2. Spatial distribution of the SAPARD investments in Poland, total amount (public+private) for the period 2000-2003

Source: Own compilation based on Table 7.2 from Rudnicki (2008). Note: Converted from PLN to EUR using 4PLN/EUR exchange rate; c) per hectare of agricultural land. As compared to Fig. 1 the amounts for SAPARD include private resources spent

The most likely reason behind the particular allocation of the funding is related to the application process. The total amount of the funding was granted to Poland with limited distributional guidelines, and the funds were allocated on the first-come, first-served basis (ARiMR 2003). The maps in Figure 2 suggest that farmers, agricultural producers and manufacturers, and rural municipalities in Wielkopolskie region were quick and efficient when it came to funding applications. The scale and scope of the investments, though – looking at the three different measures – shows the flow of substantial benefits to all central and eastern regions.

Infrastructural Metamorphosis of Poland in the 1990s

As described above, an exceptional stream of additional funds from the EU was directed to Poland from the early days of its transition. The funding programs evolved with time during the 1990s and became more specialized closer to EU accession to address the specific needs of the candidate countries. While causal evidence of the impact of EU pre-accession funds on evolving infrastructure remains scarce and is methodologically challenging (with just a few exceptions on more recent pre-accession funding schemes, like Denti 2013), a simple overview of a number of key indicators might serve as strong suggestive evidence that the funds actually made a significant difference. In this part of the paper, we take a closer look at some examples of Polish infrastructure that underwent enormous progress in the late 1990s and early 2000s. We stipulate that the EU funding played a crucial role in the acceleration of this development.

All three analyzed EU instruments – Phare, SAPARD and ISPA – shared some common objectives, for instance, increasing access to clean water in the population, reducing pollution in lakes, rivers, and the sea, and improving road conditions, especially the low-rank ones in remote, rural areas. In Figures 3-5, we present the scale of improvement observed in these three areas on the lowest level of regional disaggregation, namely, in Polish municipalities. We compare the three selected indicators over almost a decade, between 1995, the initial year of data availability, and 2004.

We begin with Figure 3, which depicts the expansion of the water pipe network measured in kilometers per 1,000 inhabitants in each municipality. As specified in the legend, the darker the green category, the higher the density of the water pipe network. The rapid expansion of the network between 1995 and 2004 is evident, especially in some parts of the country. Most often, the upgrade to the top category happened in regions that lagged well behind the rest of the country in 1995. Here, the notable examples are the central regions of Poland (Kujawsko-Pomorskie and Lodzkie Voivodships, including the northern part of the Mazowieckie Voivodship) and the north-eastern frontiers (Podlaskie and Warminsko-Mazurskie Voivodships).

Figure 3. Length of the water pipe system (in km) per 1000 inhabitants in Polish municipalities in 1995 and 2004

Source: Own compilation based on the statistics from the CSO Local Data Bank (BDL); Geodata: National Register of Boundaries (PRG). Note: The legend is based on 2004 data: the two top and bottom categories in the legend cover 10% of observations each, and the rest of the categories cover 20% of observations each. Municipality borders marked in white, voivodship borders in yellow. Poland underwent an important administrative reform in 1999, when 49 voivodships were aggregated into the current 16. For the year 1995, we use the post-reform voivodship division of the country. Between 1995 and 2004, only negligible administrative changes took place at the municipal level.

In Figure 4, we show the share of the population enjoying access to sewage treatment plant services. The progress over time in this respect was related, on the one hand, to the construction of new treatment facilities and, on the other, to the concurrent expansion of the sewage pipeline network, which resulted in a higher share of users for the existing wastewater treatment plants. The increase in the usage of the treatment plants over time is striking, especially given that at the starting point, in 1995, only a limited number of municipalities had a wastewater treatment plant in operation. These municipalities were mainly concentrated in the northwestern corner of Poland and in the southwestern region of Silesia.

In comparison to the water pipe system in Figure 3, the development of sewage treatment plant access was concentrated in regions that were already ahead of the rest of Poland in 1995 – specifically, the northwestern and southwestern ones. However, a substantial increase in access to sewage treatment services is also visible in central and eastern parts of Poland, where in 1995 plants offering these services were extremely rare. This particular type of development can also be viewed from the perspective of the extent of pollution reduction in Poland’s internal waters. The number of scientific reports documented a sharp decline in biochemical factors of industrial, agricultural and household origin, hazardous to both humans and the environment, commonly polluting Polish rivers and lakes in the 1990s (Gorski et al, 2017; Marszelewski & Piasecki, 2020).

Figure 4. Number of residents connected to sewage treatment plants per 1000 inhabitants in Polish municipalities in 1995 and 2004

Source: see Figure 3. Note: The legend is based on 2004 data: due to high prevalence of zeros the bottom category in the legend covers 30% of observations, the rest of categories cover 10% of observations each. Municipality borders marked in white, voivodship borders in yellow (see Notes in Figure 3 for details).

The third pair of maps (Figure 5) illustrates the development of the country’s road network. The Figure shows the expansion and modernization of the lower rank roads administered by municipalities, which seem particularly important from the point of view of day-to-day transportation and quality of life of local populations.

Figure 5. Length of the municipality road network (in km) per 1000 inhabitants in Polish municipalities in 1995 and 2004

Source and Note: see Figure 3.

The data in Figure 5 cover both paved or hard-surfaced roads and dirt roads. One point to keep in mind here is that with an overall development of a municipality and of the neighboring region, the status of the municipality’s small-scale road may be updated to a higher rank, administered by the county or even by the voivodship. Figure 5 does not account for such an update of rank (in the Figure of roads), so the numbers presented are likely to represent a lower bound of the actual advancement. The maps in Figure 5 compare the length of municipal roads per 1000 inhabitants in 1995 and 2004. While a significant improvement in the road system is visible almost all over the country, the central regions seem to have gained the most, at least when it comes to this particular type of roads.

Investments and Development vs. Public Perception

Overall, all three figures above demonstrate that during the decade before Poland integrated with the EU, significant progress was achieved in terms of improving the quality of life, increasing accessibility of public utilities, reducing environmental degradation and capturing sustainable urban development. Substantial investments in rural areas had an important impact on reducing regional disparities.

Another important observation when examining all three figures together is that, while advancement occurred throughout the country, the bulk of improvement in each of the considered aspects was concentrated in slightly different parts of it, and almost all Polish municipalities recorded an important inflow of investments related to the pre-accession funding. While again we cannot provide any causal evidence, below we confront the spatial distribution of infrastructural modernization from Figures 3-5 with public support for joining the EU expressed in the referendum organized in 2003, a year before accession.

Figure 6. Support for the EU accession in the referendum in 2003

Source: Own compilation based on the statistics from the National Electoral Commission; Geodata: National Register of Boundaries (PRG). Note: The bottom category in the legend covers municipalities that voted against EU integration (12.3% of observations), the rest of the categories cover 25% of the remaining observations each. Municipality borders marked in white, voivodship borders in yellow.

In Figure 6, we present the results of the vote on the municipal level, with darker blue shades indicating higher support for EU membership. The map clearly highlights high geographical variation in support for European integration, with much stronger proportions of votes in favor of EU membership in western and northern Poland. In contrast, the support in central and eastern Poland was substantially lower, reflecting a higher degree of skepticism towards the benefits of the EU. Clearly, many factors influenced people’s choices at the time of the referendum. They depended on their economic conditions, the degree of exposure to relations with Western European countries, the level of awareness of the potential gains from integration, as well as fears concerning the future of local economies and those related to cultural influences.

Just by looking at the map of support, it is impossible to say much about the degree to which the EU pre-accession funds affected the outcome of the referendum. For that, we would need to know more about the dynamics of support across regions. Yet, while the share of votes in favor of integration in many eastern municipalities was below 50%, people in a substantial majority of localities expressed overwhelming support for joining the EU. The result of the referendum was 77,45% in favor. Although no causal analysis linked the results to EU pre-accession funds, the scale of investment and its visibility, as well as its tangible effects – the direct translation of EU funds into daily quality of life all across Poland, are very likely to have turned many people’s votes in the EU’s favor.

Conclusion

Since the early 1990s, on the path to EU membership in 2004, Poland, like other candidate countries, received generous European pre-accession financial assistance. The combination of three financial instruments in operation at the time – Phare, SAPARD, and ISPA – enabled Poland to make substantial investments in key economic sectors, including public administration, agriculture, environmental protection, and physical infrastructure. The early launch of the Phare program prepared Poland to follow various EU standards and prerequisites, and contributed to the implementation of the cohesion policy. Initiation of assistance within SAPARD and ISPA instruments since 2000 strengthened the rural economy and competitiveness of Polish agriculture, and allowed for modernization of the transportation and environmental infrastructure. In pre-accession assistance, Poland received a total of 5.5 billion euro (over 3% of the 2003 GDP), by far the highest support provided to the candidate countries at the time.

Substantial investments made during the 1990s and early 2000s, largely covered by pre-accession financial aid, had a remarkable impact on the quality of existing infrastructure in Poland. Kilometers of roads were built and renovated in Polish municipalities, thousands of households acquired a connection with the water pipe network, and hundreds of wastewater treatment plants were constructed. This is only a small subset of selected advancements that can be demonstrated using quantitative data collected in a comparable way over time. Numerous other types of infrastructure received substantial investments to support development, modernization or enhancement. On top of that, all these improvements have likely contributed to further spill-over effects through higher levels of regional growth, a boost in the labor market with the creation of new jobs, a reduction of unemployment, or enhanced labor productivity. All these changes, taken together, played a key role in determining the overall quality of life for the Polish population, reducing regional economic inequalities, and improving the quality of the local natural environment, etc.

The distribution of support for Poland’s accession to the EU, as reflected in the 2003 referendum results, differed significantly by region. Enthusiasm for the EU was significantly lower in the eastern parts of the country, while residents of many western municipalities voted overwhelmingly in favor of membership. Yet, even at a very fine geographical distribution, we see only a relatively small group of municipalities – 12.3% – where less than 50% of residents voted in favor of EU membership, and the overall outcome across the country was a decisive “YES”. Thus, although the substantial advancement in infrastructural development all across the country did not convince the majority of residents in each and every locality, the number and geographical scope of those voting in favor was very decisive. It is impossible to say how high/low the support would have been without the received support. Yet, given the scale of the resulting changes in various basic dimensions of quality of life, it seems safe to say that, thanks to the funds, many voters looked at the future integration with a higher degree of appreciation. Naturally, other factors played a role in determining people’s decisions in the referendum, with economic conditions and prospects for socio-economic development being just one factor, albeit a likely important one.

Pre-accession funds in the current candidate countries, how they are used, distributed, and how they change people’s daily lives, will again prove important in showcasing the benefits of integration. At the same time, to secure the kind of support that the Polish population expressed in the 2003 referendum, it will be important to also highlight the broader benefits of integration and address fears and concerns of various population groups.

The experience of Poland and other member countries from Central and Eastern Europe can serve not only as an example of the benefits of pre-accession funds, which we studied in this policy paper. The countries’ socio-economic success and the changes in the quality of life, both before and after accession, should be seen as a clear case of fundamental changes, which would have been highly unlikely had the countries decided to stay out of the European Union.

Acknowledgement

The authors acknowledge the support from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida. We are grateful to Patryk Markowski for his assistance in preparing this analysis and detailed background research.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Mapping Ukrainian CSOs in the Nordic-Baltic Region: Areas of Advocacy and Common Challenges

Posted on September 29, 2025 | Policy Brief

Modern cityscape at dusk with illuminated glass tower in central Stockholm, symbolizing innovation and cooperation, related to mapping Ukrainian CSOs.

This policy brief maps Ukrainian civil society organizations (CSOs) active in the Nordic-Baltic region (NB8), based on a 2025 survey and discussions at the Nordic Ukraine Advocacy Summit. It highlights the diverse landscape of advocacy groups, ranging from long-established diaspora organizations to initiatives formed after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The analysis highlights key challenges, such as the lack of coordination mechanisms, uneven access to political platforms, and limited technical capacity. Closer cooperation with policymakers and donors would benefit both sides, utilizing CSOs’ expertise in facilitating better integration of displaced Ukrainians and improving inclusive policymaking. It is important to recognize the role of Ukrainian civil society not only as a facilitator in the immediate support efforts but also as a strategic partner in shaping Europe’s long-term peace architecture.

Introduction

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 caused a massive migration of Ukrainians settling across the EU, including the Nordic-Baltic region. This movement gave rise to a wide range of new initiatives, including advocacy, cultural diplomacy, support for integration, and humanitarian efforts. Alongside long-standing diaspora organisations, these newly formed groups quickly became vital actors mobilizing resources, amplifying Ukraine’s voice internationally, and contributing to host societies. In light of these dynamics, it is worthwhile to understand how these organizations operate and what challenges they face.

To this end, the Nordic Ukraine Forum, with the support of the Swedish Institute, conducted a Survey of Nordic-Baltic Ukrainian Civil Society Organisations 2025: Mapping Areas of Advocacy, Structures, and Common Challenges between March and May 2025 (Zubkovych et al., 2025). This study examined Ukrainian CSOs active in both the Nordic-Baltic region (NB8) and Ukraine, based on a structured survey of 17 organizations (from an initial pool of 42). Notably, the survey focused exclusively on organizations with advocacy for Ukraine as a main activity, excluding smaller initiatives dedicated primarily to humanitarian relief, such as collecting clothes or food. Additionally, the output of the survey has been supplemented by the discussions and outcomes from the Nordic Ukraine Advocacy Summit (NUAS), held in Oslo in June 2025, with 30 participating CSOs. Together, these sources provide a unique empirical overview of the role and activities of Ukrainian advocacy CSOs in the Nordic-Baltic region.

Survey Results

Areas of Advocacy

The survey covers Ukrainian advocacy organisations based in the Nordic-Baltic region, where Sweden-based organisations or initiatives made up over half of the total respondents. The survey represents both long-established diaspora organizations and newer initiatives formed in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. About one-fourth of CSOs were established before 2014 (the earliest in 1997), while the majority were founded after 2022, reflecting the urgent mobilization of diaspora communities during the war.

Surveyed CSOs represent a broad mix of leadership roles, gender, professions, languages, membership sizes, and funding models. Most remain volunteer-driven and rely on short-term or project-based funding. More detailed demographic and organizational profiles can be found in the report by Zubkovych et al., 2025. Survey results show that Ukrainian CSOs in the NB8 focus on a wide range of areas. The most common activities include advocacy for Ukraine’s military support, cultural diplomacy and education, as well as support for displaced Ukrainians and their integration (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Focus areas of Ukrainian CSOs in the Nordic-Baltic region

Source: Zubkovych et al., 2025.

Many organizations also prioritize working with media, countering disinformation, humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and advocacy for Ukraine’s EU integration, followed by legal aid, human rights, and gender issues.

Figure 2 presents the main types of activity through which Ukrainian CSOs pursue their objectives. As shown, Ukrainian CSOs perform their tasks by raising social media awareness (82%) and organizing events in support of Ukraine (82%). Other key activities include demonstrations, media outreach, and direct engagement with policymakers. These findings suggest the need to examine more closely which social media platforms are being used, especially given the increasing risks of disinformation and propaganda.

Figure 2. Types of activities of Ukrainian CSOs in the Nordic-Baltic region

Source: Zubkovych et al., 2025.

Main Challenges

At the same time, the survey reveals the main challenges that Ukrainian CSOs in the Nordic-Baltic region have been facing (Figure 3). In particular, the respondents mentioned the absence of structured coordination mechanisms, which leads to duplication of efforts and uneven visibility.

For instance, while several groups in Sweden and Norway focus on humanitarian aid, their activities often run parallel rather than in partnership. The lack of common platforms or umbrella networks reduces their collective influence and makes it more challenging to articulate shared priorities to governments and donors. Without stronger horizontal coordination, CSOs risk competing rather than complementing one another in their advocacy and support work.

Figure 3. Main challenges for Ukrainian CSOs

Source: Zubkovych et al., 2025.

Funding emerged as one of the most pressing issues in the survey. Most organizations reported reliance on short-term, project-based grants or donations. Many CSOs lack multi-year funding, which makes strategic planning and staff retention almost impossible. This precarious situation often leads to volunteer burnout and creates uncertainty about the future of their programs. Donor practices have unintentionally exacerbated this vulnerability by neglecting the long-term capacity-building needs of diaspora CSOs.

The survey further highlights significant disparities in institutional access. Larger CSOs, particularly those based in capital cities such as Stockholm, Oslo, and Helsinki, enjoy greater visibility and are more likely to receive invitations to political consultations. By contrast, smaller groups in regions often remain excluded from policy-making processes, despite being closer to affected communities. This imbalance risks creating unequal representation, where only a handful of well-resourced organizations shape public debate, while others remain invisible. Respondents from Baltic states also pointed out that while they are engaged in cultural diplomacy and integration activities, they struggle to gain recognition from national ministries or international donors. The result is a fragmented advocacy landscape, where not all voices are equally heard.

Many organizations reported gaps in technical capacity, particularly a lack of specific skills in fundraising, project management, digital communication, lobbying, and public outreach. Additionally, the survey highlighted the dual role that Ukrainian CSOs currently play outside Ukraine. On one hand, they act as advocates for Ukraine internationally, lobbying for sanctions, military aid, and continued political support. On the other hand, they provide practical integration services for displaced Ukrainians, including legal counselling, language courses, housing support, and employment assistance. While both roles are crucial, this dual identity can create tensions. For instance, CSOs in Sweden and Finland reported that resources devoted to advocacy sometimes limited their ability to address integration needs, while groups in Estonia and Latvia noted that local integration demands risk overshadowing their transnational advocacy. Without clearer strategies or additional resources, CSOs may struggle to balance these functions effectively.

Conclusion

The survey of Ukrainian CSOs in the Nordic-Baltic region, combined with insights from NUAS 2025, highlights both their urgent needs and strategic opportunities.

For CSOs, strengthening coordination mechanisms is critical to reduce duplication and amplify their collective influence. Creating cross-border advocacy platforms and thematic working groups would help CSOs to better coordinate their activities, learn from others’ experience, and articulate common priorities. In particular, smaller CSOs would benefit from learning how to adopt effective communication strategies, diversify outreach through multiple platforms, and enhance engagement with local communities and institutional stakeholders.

At the same time, CSOs should invest in internal capacity: skills training in project management, advocacy, and digital communication can improve efficiency and increase funding opportunities. Finally, CSOs should balance their dual roles, such as supporting displaced Ukrainians locally while advocating for Ukraine internationally, by dividing responsibilities and tailoring strategies to avoid role conflict.

In turn, policymakers and donors may benefit from closer cooperation with Ukrainian CSOs. As documented by Anisimova et al.  (2025), Ukrainian CSOs and civil society actors have already stepped in to fill gaps left by the public sector in the Nordic-Baltic countries. They have been facilitating labor market integration by offering mentorship, language support, and professional networks; improving access to information and bridging communication barriers between displaced people, employers, and municipalities. By recognizing and making use of Ukrainian CSOs’ experience, NB8 governments can develop more efficient mechanisms for integrating displaced populations. Furthermore, wider interaction with CSOs – including small local ones, currently underrepresented in the policy dialogue – may help coordinate with local communities and ensure inclusive policy-making processes.

Ultimately, it is important to recognize the role of Ukrainian civil society not only as a facilitator in the immediate support efforts but also as a strategic partner in shaping Europe’s long-term peace architecture.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Liberal Values in Ukraine Days Before the 2022 Invasion

Posted on September 22, 2025 | Policy Brief

Monument in Kyiv at sunrise symbolizing Ukraine liberal values of freedom, democracy, and resilience.

Just weeks before Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, the European Social Survey completed the 10th round of data collection on public attitudes and beliefs in Ukraine. This policy brief examines regional variation in liberal values such as attitudes toward democracy and the EU, based on that data. While respondents in Eastern Ukraine were more skeptical of democracy and EU integration, they did not consistently reject liberal social values to a greater extent than respondents in other parts of the country. The most striking divide however, lies in institutional trust, which was significantly lower in Eastern Ukraine. This suggests that trust in institutions, which may have been further negatively impacted by prolonged exposure to violence since 2014, underlie the observed regional differences in attitudes towards democracy and the EU. Understanding these differences is vital for policymakers navigating Ukraine’s reform and EU accession process.

Introduction

It has been well documented that values in post-communist countries in Eastern Europe on average, tend to be more authoritarian, more nationalistic, more in favor of state intervention in the economy, and more skeptical towards sexual and ethnic minorities and foreigners than in Western Europe (e.g., Roland 2012). Behind the averages, however, there is substantial variation in values across subgroups of populations. Even before the onset of the full-scale Russian invasion, a discussion on regional Ukrainian differences in relation to democratic values, the wish for EU integration, and similar liberal attitudes existed, both in and outside of the country.

The path towards a closer relationship with Europe and the EU started already in 2014, but since February 2022, Ukraine has politically positioned itself even closer to the EU, and an EU accession process is now underway. However, for a successful reform process in Ukraine, how public opinion is shaped and whether attitudes and values converge towards those of the EU will be important (Olofsgård et al. 2024).

With this in mind, this policy brief provides a descriptive account of public liberal values in Ukraine by analyzing data from the 10th round of the European Social Survey (ESS) conducted just weeks before the full-scale invasion on the 22nd of February 2022. Some of the differences we observe are likely long-standing and related to differences in language preferences and cultural and informational exposure from Russia and the EU, respectively. Yet, given the exposure to instability and conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine since 2014, we also discuss the role that exposure to conflict may have played in explaining several attitudinal dimensions, including satisfaction with democracy, support for liberal social values, attitudes toward Europe and EU integration, as well as levels of trust.

Data

The ESS round 10 data was collected through face-to-face interviews in Ukraine between January 18th, 2022, and February 8th, 2022. The nationally representative survey focuses on public attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors and includes questions on opinions on democracy, the EU, and similar topics commonly considered to capture liberal views.

ESS Sample Characteristics

The sample consisted of more women than men (about 59 percent and 41 percent, respectively). While the Ukrainian population is well-educated, most still find it difficult (41 percent) or very difficult (32 percent) to live comfortably on their income. 11.5 percent of the sample was unemployed, while 31 percent were retired. Broken down by location, most average outcomes are similar, albeit with the East displaying somewhat lower levels of education and greater income difficulties (see Figure 1 for an illustration of what oblasts (regions) are included in each geographical unit). Unemployment was, however, substantially higher in the West (about 15 percent), while the share of retirees was lower (26 percent).

Some heterogeneity exists when it comes to belonging to a religious denomination. In the Central and South, around 63 percent state they belong to a church/mosque/synagogue, etc. The East is roughly at par with the national average (70 and 69.5 percent, respectively), while this figure is 82 percent in the Western part of the country. Similarly, there are major differences in the language one most often speaks at home. In the country as a whole, 13.4 percent stated they speak both Ukrainian and Russian at home. In the East, this figure was as high as 27.1 percent, displaying the duality in mother tongue in this part of Ukraine. The corresponding figure for the West was 3.3 percent. On the contrary, 92.4 percent marked that they most often speak only Ukrainian at home in the West, whereas this figure was only 5.2 percent in the East.

Figure 1. Geographical Classification of Ukraine’s Oblasts

Note: The map depicts the ESS coverage at the time of data collection, excluding Crimea and Sevastopol – illegally annexed by Russia since 2014.

Key Variables of Interest

To understand the views on liberal values, ESS responses to questions in the following areas have been considered:

  • I. Merits of democracy: satisfaction with the way democracy works; importance of living in a democratic country.
  • II. Liberal democratic values: agreement with statements such as “gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own lives as they wish”; attitudes towards the merits of obedience, respect for authority, and loyalty towards leaders; attitudes towards immigrants.
  • III. Opinions about Europe and the EU: support for further EU integration; emotional attachment to Europe; vote intention in a hypothetical EU referendum.

Regional Differences

There are some clear regional divides in attitudes toward democracy, liberal values, and EU integration across Ukraine in the weeks leading up to the full-scale Russian invasion. These differences are particularly pronounced between Eastern Ukraine and the Center, South, and West – though not uniformly in the same direction.

Figure 2. Attitudes toward democracy, liberal values, and EU integration across Ukraine

Source: Authors’ creation from ESS.

On democratic commitment, only 37 percent of respondents in the East considered it “extremely important” to live in a democratically governed country. This was about 16 percentage points lower than the national average. When categories were grouped into low, medium, and high importance, the East still trailed the national average by about 10 percentage points (about 67.5 and 75 percent, respectively). Similarly, satisfaction with democracy is the lowest among respondents from the East (about 6 percent compared to a national average, including the East, of 11 percent). Geographical differences are also evident in the responses to the question on whether it is acceptable for a country to have a strong leader above the law. A smaller share rejected this in the East (about 30 percent compared to the national average of 37 percent).

However, the East stood out in the other direction on some core liberal values, as depicted in Figure 2. It had the lowest share disagreeing with LGBT rights (31 percent vs. 40 percent nationally), the weakest support for teaching children obedience (17 percent), and the highest rejection of it (41 percent). Further, only 12 percent in the East agreed that “the country needs most loyalty towards its leaders,” compared to 26 percent nationally. This question could reflect one’s view on the current leadership, warranting some caution in the interpretation. On immigration, however, the East was less liberal: only 19 percent saw immigrants as having a positive impact, versus about 30 percent nationally.

The sharpest regional divide between the East and other regions concerns attitudes toward Europe and EU membership. In a hypothetical referendum, 73 percent of respondents in the East said they would vote to remain outside of the EU, compared to 47 percent in the South, 23 percent in the Central, and just 11 percent in the West. Support for further European unification was also substantially lower in the East, with only about 17 percent in favor of further unification, as compared to the almost 50 percent national average. Similarly, emotional attachment to Europe is substantially lower among respondents from the East, with nearly all respondents stating low or medium attachment only – figures that nearly invert those of respondents from the West of Ukraine.

The Role of Trust

Turning to the measures of trust, the East clearly stands out. Trust in the parliament, the police, political parties, politicians, and the legal system was substantially lower among respondents from the East (in the ranges of 5 to 15 percentage points more respondents answered they had a low level of trust in said institutions than the national average). When asked about trust in the United Nations, the East also stood out with more than 50 percent stating low trust compared to the national average of about 37. The same pattern holds also when asked about the European Parliament – 73 percent compared to the national average of about 44 percent – stated low trust. Respondents from the South also displayed lower levels of trust across all measures, but the deviations from the average are about half as big as the East.

When asked whether people can generally be trusted, or one can’t be too careful, the East did not stand out in this way, underpinning how distrust is strongly directed toward institutions, both national and international.

Conflict Exposure

Figure 3 details the conflict intensity in the last two years leading up to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As can be seen, incidents of violence are concentrated in the Donbass area, including the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. While not marked by similar levels of active conflict, Kharkiv oblast – also part of the East classification – borders areas with high levels of conflict intensity in the Donbass, as well as Russia in the east.

Figure 3. Conflict intensity in Ukraine, by raion

2020

 

2021

Source: Authors’ creation from Armed Conflict and Location Data.

It should be noted that the map also depicts strategic deployments and political unrest, such as demonstrations, explaining the prevalence of “conflict” also in a few other places in Ukraine prior to February 2022. The occurrences of such incidents are, however, far less than those in Luhansk oblast and Donetsk oblast at the time. An important piece of information is that the intensity pattern holds for the time Armed Conflict and Location Data for Ukraine has been available (2018), i.e. individuals situated in the East have been exposed to incidences of violence over a prolonged period of time.

This raises the question whether this exposure to violence may have contributed to increased differences in trust in institutions and support for democracy and the EU beyond what was already there before 2014. The most immediate effect probably comes from selective migration, i.e., that individuals who remain in the eastern regions in early 2022 despite the violence since 2014 may be those who, on average, are more skeptical of the Ukrainian government and its tilt away from the authoritarian Russia and towards the EU. But previous literature and recent studies on Ukraine suggest that there may also be a direct effect coming from exposure to violence on an individual’s attitudes. This relationship has recently been mapped by Obrizan (2025). A key finding is that military solutions are preferred in the segment of the population that has experienced hardship and personal losses since the full-scale invasion in 2022.

More generally, any kind of trust – including the interpersonal one – can be affected by exposure to conflict. The relationship is complicated, and in some instances, violence can cause more pro-social attitudes and behavior. An important distinction, however, is that exposure to violence amplifies the distinctions in attitudes and behavior towards members of in- and out-groups (Olofsgård, 2025). This suggests that conflict may have further increased the differences between the East of Ukraine and the rest of the country, if many residents in the former perceive national and western institutions as being dominated by groups they do not feel strong attachments to.

Further, terror management theory (e.g., Landau et al. 2004) suggests that fear induces support for charismatic and strong leadership. In a context where liberal democracy is not everywhere well enough entrenched, this may tilt over into support for more authoritarian leadership in response to attacks triggering stronger emotions of fear. Furthermore, work by Feldman and Stenner (1997) shows that the impact of perceived societal threat on triggering stronger authoritarian preferences can depend on authoritarian predispositions. The latter is measured by, e.g., looking at attitudes towards child rearing and emphasis on obedience. In the context of the finding above, this would imply that the impact of violence on authoritarian preferences would be weaker in the eastern parts of Ukraine, compared to the rest of the country, a potentially interesting avenue for future research.

Conclusions

The findings in this policy brief nuance simple narratives about regional divides in Ukraine. While dissatisfaction with democracy and skepticism toward the EU are more common in the East, this does not necessarily correspond to a general rejection of liberal social values. In some cases — such as attitudes toward child-rearing, authority, and LGBT rights — respondents from the East even express more liberal views than elsewhere.

Not explicitly discussed in the brief is the topic of mother tongue. The data shows that Russian speakers are less emotionally attached to Europe and less supportive of EU integration. Yet, there is no consistent evidence that Russian speakers are less committed to liberal democratic values overall. The effect of language is difficult to disentangle from geography, particularly given the concentration of Russian speakers in Eastern Ukraine.

What does stand out more clearly is that trust and the general view on institutions are substantially lower and more negative in the East. Respondents from the East consistently report lower trust in national and international political institutions. Interestingly, this pattern does not extend to generalized social trust — the East does not differ markedly from the rest of the country. This contrast suggests a more focused skepticism directed at formal institutions, rather than widespread social distrust. One possible explanation, as discussed in Olofsgård (2025), is that when exposed to conflict and violence, interpersonal trust may reflect confidence in one’s in-group, while institutional trust hinges on feeling represented within the broader political system. If respondents from the East perceive themselves as excluded from the national or European in-group, this could explain their lower levels of trust in both domestic and international institutions, and exposure to violence may have further amplified this. While signs of such alienation appear in the data, one should refrain from drawing too strong conclusions from this alone. Another possible explanation is that prolonged exposure to violence has eroded confidence in the government’s ability to protect citizens, and in the effectiveness of EU support, which would turn support away from the EU option preferred by the current government.  Future research on the effects of war exposure should more carefully disentangle the various aspects and forms of trust and how they relate to liberal values in Ukraine. Rebuilding institutional trust remains a key challenge. In this context, instilling peace and decentralizing political power may be essential for increasing trust in the Eastern part of the country, if that helps residents in the East to identify with public institutions. As Ukraine advances on its path toward EU membership, fostering a shared sense of national belonging will be critical in overcoming the narrative of an East–West divide when rebuilding the country.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Georgian Experience of Gender Biased Sex Selection

Posted on October 8, 2018 | Policy Brief

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This policy brief presents the evidence on gender biased sex selection (GBSS) in Georgia, giving an overview of the so-called “sex ratio transition” process, and discussing the determinants of GBSS using a demand and supply-side approach. After its independence from the Soviet Union, Georgia started experiencing a significant rise of the sex ratio at birth (SRB) and in 2004 the country had reached one of the highest SRB rates in the world. A traditionally pronounced son preference was further strengthened by deteriorated economic conditions, decrease in fertility and relatively easy and cheap access to technologies for early sex determination and abortion. However, Georgia has managed to reverse and stabilize a skewed SRB rate. Among the factors that might have contributed are the strengthening of the social security system, improved economic conditions, a rise in fertility rates, economic empowerment of women, and the increased cultural influence of Western values. This trend reversal places Georgia in a unique position and may provide valuable insights for other countries who struggle with the same problem.

It is widely recognized that the Caucasus has traditionally been a “male-dominated region,” with a particularly strong son preference. However, before the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, sex ratios at birth in the Caucasus countries were very close to normal levels.

After independence from the Soviet Union, the SRB started rising immediately in Georgia, reaching 114.1 male births per 100 female births by 1999 (while the biologically normal SRB level is 105 male births per 100 female births). In the early 2000s, SRB peaked and stabilized between 112 and 115 male births per 100 female births for several years.  As Figure 1 shows, after reaching historically high levels in 2004, SRB started to decline and finally returned to a normal level by 2016.

Figure 1. Estimated sex ratio at birth in 1990-2016

Source: UNFPA, 2017.

The sex selection here is not discussed as “an archaic practice” in Georgia, but rather a modern reproductive behavior, a rational strategy responding to the surrounding environment – demand and supply factors. Demand-side factors include socio-economic and cultural factors that make having a boy more beneficial for a family and lower the value of girls – leading to son preference. The fertility rate is also accounted as a demand-side factor since low or decreasing fertility can increase incentives to perform selective abortions. As for the supply-side factors, they cover the ease of access to  technologies for early sex determination and selective abortion and its cost, as well as the content of the legislation regulating abortion.

Demand side factors

Factors increasing demand

Son preference and a patrilineal system. The traditional Georgian family is patrilineal. Patrilineality, also known as the male line, is a common kinship system in which an individual’s family membership derives from and is recorded through his or her father’s lineage. It generally involves the inheritance of property, rights, names, or titles by persons related through male kin. In such systems, women join their husbands’ families after marriage and are expected to care for their in-laws rather than their parents. Sons are expected to stay with their parents and take care of them. Thus, patrilineal systems make daughters less beneficial and desirable to their parents compared to sons. UNFPA (2017) concludes that the practice of post-marital co-residence with parents is still quite widespread in Georgian society, and this pattern is biased towards the male kin line, downplaying the role of women and their kin. The patrilocal residence (the situation in which a married couple resides with or near the husband’s parents) is more common in villages (more than 90%) than in urban areas (75%). The incidence of patrilocal residence is the lowest in Tbilisi (69%). In general, patrilocal residence decreases with improving economic conditions.

Demographic change – changes in fertility rates. Low or decreased fertility rates (when other factors favorable for GBSS are in place) mean that families are no longer able to ensure the birth of a son through repeated pregnancies. In societies characterized by strong son preference, and with increasing availability of sex detection technologies, couples start to opt for sex selection because they want to avoid additional births of girls, something that contraception cannot alone ensure. Therefore, low fertility acts as a “squeeze factor,” forcing parents to make choices ensuring the desired gender composition of their family.

An inverse relationship between fertility and SRB is observed in Georgia. The first decade of transition to market economy was severe for the country. Reducing household size was one strategy chosen by Georgian families to cope with increased rates of unemployment, deterioration of the social security system and deprivation of basic needs such as water and electricity. The decline of fertility during the years 1990-2003 coincided with increased SRB levels. When fertility started to rebound in 2003, the “squeeze factor” began to vanish, removing pressure on the SRB. At the same time, the SRB started to decline.

The low value of women. In Georgia, women are stereotypically perceived as natural caretakers, whose core responsibilities involve child care and household duties. They are also expected be obedient to their husbands and let them have leading positions in various activities (UNDP 2013). The majority of the population in the country thinks that men should be the ones who are the family’s decision-makers and that they should also be the main breadwinners. According to a 2010 study, 83% of respondents think that men should be the main breadwinners in the family, and 63% believe that they should also be the family’s decision-makers (CRRC, 2010). It is evident that such attitudes and values contribute to decrease the perceived value of girls in society, compared to boys, and add additional stimulus to GBSS.

Factors decreasing demand

The strengthening of state institutions and the social security system. Georgia has experienced a deep transformation of its social, economic and political systems in the last fifteen years. Reforms were carried out in all sectors. Most importantly, the country totally restructured its social security system, which was practically non-existent in Georgia at the beginning of the 1990’s. Currently, Georgian citizens are offered: a) universal pension system, above the subsistence minimum, which provides a flat rate benefit to all elderly; b) social assistance, which represents a monthly subsidy to poor families, is well targeted, and has contributed to reducing poverty (Kits et al. 2015), and (c) a universal health insurance system which covers all people who are uninsured by private companies and softens the burden of health care expenditures for households.

These changes, together with the improved general economic situation in the country, have decreased the role of the family as a buffer institution offering protection and stability (notably through sons), and provided more formal alternatives for social security, bank loans, contractual employment, etc. Due to this, the (large) intergenerational family is no longer perceived as the only strategy for coping with social and financial uncertainty.

New cultural influence of Western values. From the early 2000s, Georgia has been increasingly exposed to Western norms and culture through media, migration, increased tourism, and the process of economic integration with the European Union. According to experts, this process was accompanied by “media support and an enthusiastic, quasi-propagandistic hail. The general spirit was to promote an image of Georgia as a country open to the world with West-European views and lifestyles” (UNFPA 2017).

Supply side factors

While the availability of technologies for the early determination of sex and for abortion is not the root cause of GBSS, it constitutes a facilitating supply factor. Without prenatal diagnostics and accessibility of abortion, parents would not be able to resort to selective abortions even if they had a pronounced preference for boys.

Currently, Georgia is among the countries offering high-tech reproductive services. Private clinics, hospitals, and special reproductive medicine centers compete to supply reproductive services, and one can easily see the most recent ultrasound technologies in the great majority of the urban facilities. In addition, the cost of an ultrasound test is extremely low, depending on the service provider. This represents only 1.9%-4.8% of the average monthly incomes per Georgian household. In this context, the GBSS-related demand for prenatal diagnostics can easily be accommodated, when it arises.

Conclusion

Georgia has had a unique experience of “sex ratio transition” in the region, which was an integral part of its overall transformation process. The deteriorated social and economic conditions of households following the beginning of the transition process, coupled with easier and cheaper access to prenatal diagnostics were reflected in a skewed SRB and manifested son preference. Only when socio-economic conditions improved, and the country accelerated its institutional strengthening and modernization process, did the SRB returned to its normal level.

It is too early to conclusively state that Georgia is back to normal SRB levels for good. Birth masculinity still remains at a high level i) for third-order births, as the most of the couples are reluctant to have more than three children, and giving birth to a third child is the last chance for families to have a boy; ii) there is a significant urban-rural divide in the context of birth order. For three or higher order births, SRB is significantly distant from normal levels for almost all regions, reaching beyond 145, while in Tbilisi the bias remains moderate; iii) gender-biased sex selection remains high among poor people and ethnic minorities.

If Georgia is to minimize the incidence of GBSS in the future, it needs to act on several fronts: enhance gender equality through qualitative research and civic activism; increase the perceived value of girls and women in the society through policies and initiatives addressing cultural stereotypes, as well as by publicizing illuminated stories of success of girls and women that provide positive role models; monitor SRB trends; support advocacy actions and awareness-raising campaigns on GBSS and encourage the ethical use of sex detection technologies.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Is Cutting Russian Gas Imports Too Costly For The EU?

Posted on June 9, 2014 | Policy Brief

20140608 FREE Network Policy Brief

This brief addresses the economic costs of a potential Russian gas sanction considered by the EU. We discuss different replacement alternatives for Russian gas, and argue that complete banning is currently unrealistic. In turn, a partial reduction of Russian gas imports may lead to a loss of the EU bargaining power vis-à-vis Russia. We conclude that instead of cutting Russian gas imports, the EU should put an increasing effort towards building a unified EU-wide energy policy.

Soon after Russia stepped in Crimea, the question of whether and how the European Union could react to this event has been in the focus of political discussions. So far, the EU has mostly implemented sanctions on selected Russian and Ukrainian politicians, freezing their European assets and prohibiting their entry into the EU, but broader economic sanctions are intensively debated.

One such sanction high on the political agenda is an EU-wide ban on imports of Russian gas. Such a ban is often seen as one of the potentially most effective economic sanctions. Indeed the EU buys more than half of total Russian gas exports (BP 2013), and gas export revenues constitute around one fifth of the Russian federal budget (RossBusinessConsulting,2012 and our calculations). Thus, by banning Russian gas the EU may indeed be able to exert strong economics pressure on Russia.

However, the feasibility of such sanction is questionable. Indeed, in 2012 Russia supplied around 110 bcm of natural gas to EU-28 (Eurostat), which constitutes 22.5% of total EU gas consumption. There are a number of alternatives to replace Russian gas, such as an increase in domestic production by investing in shale gas, or switching to other energy sources, such as nuclear, coal or renewables. However, many of the above alternatives, e.g. shale gas or nuclear power, involve large and time-consuming investments, and thus cannot be used in the short run (say, within a year). Others, such as wind energy, are subject to intermittency problem, which again requires investments into a backup technology. The list of alternatives implementable within a short horizon is effectively down to replacing Russian gas by gas from other sources and/or switching to coal for electricity generation. Below, we argue that even if such a replacement is feasible, it is likely to be very costly for the EU, both economically and environmentally.

Notice that any replacement option will be automatically associated with a significant increase in economic costs. This is due to the fact that a substantial part of Russian gas exports to Europe (e.g., according to Financial Times, 2014 – up to 75%) are done under long-term “take-or-pay” contracts. These contracts assume that the customer shall pay for the gas even if it does not consume it. In other words, by switching away from Russian gas, the EU would not only incur the costs of replacing it, but also incur high financial or legal (or both) costs of terminating the existing contracts with Russia, with the latter estimated to be around USD 50 billion (Chazan and Crooks, Financial Times, 2014).

Due to this contract clause, own costs of replacement alternatives become of crucial importance. The coal alternative is currently relatively cheap. However, a massive use of coal for power generation is associated with a strong environmental damage and is definitely not in line with the EU green policy.

What about the cost of reverting to alternative sources of gas? First, in utilizing this option, the EU is bound to rely on external and potentially new gas suppliers. Indeed, the estimates of potential contribution within the EU – by its largest gas producer, the Netherlands – are in the range of additional 20 bcm (here and below see Zachmann 2014 and Economist 2014). Another 15-25 bcm can be supplied by current external gas suppliers: some 10-20 bcm from Norway, and 5 bcm from Algeria and Libya. This volume is not sufficient for replacement, and is not likely to be cheaper than Russian gas.

This implies that the majority of the missing gas would need to be replaced through purchases of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) on the world market, in particular, from the US. This option may first look very appealing. Indeed, the current gas price at Henry Hub, the main US natural gas distribution hub, is 4.68 USD/mmBTU (IMF Commodity Statistics, 2014). Even with the costs of liquefaction, transport and gasification – which are estimated to be around 4.7 USD/mmBTU (Henderson 2012) – this is way lower than the current price of Russian gas at the German border (10.79 USD/mmBTU, IMF).

However, this option is not going to be cheap. A substantial increase in the demand for LNG is likely to lead to an LNG price hike. Notice that, at the abovementioned prices, US LNG starts losing its competitive edge in Europe already at a 15% price increase. Just for a very rough comparison, the 2011 Fukushima disaster lead to 18% LNG price increase in Japan in one month after disaster. Some experts are expecting the price of LNG in Europe to rise as much as two times in these circumstances (Shiryaevskaya and Strzelecki, Bloomberg, 2014).

Moreover, it is not very likely that there will be sufficient supply of LNG, even at increased prices. For example, in the US, which is the main ”hope” provider of LNG replacement for Russian gas, only one out of more than 20 liquefaction projects currently has full regulatory approval for imports to the EU. This project, Cheniere Energy’s Sabine Pass LNG terminal, is planned to start export operations no earlier than in the 4th quarter of 2015 with a capacity of just above 12bcma (World LNG Report, 2013). Of course, there are other US and Canada gas liquefaction projects currently undergoing regulatory approval process, but none of them is going to be exporting in the next year or two. Another potential complication is that two thirds of the world LNG trade is covered by long-term oil-linked contracts (World LNG Report, 2014), which significantly restricts the flexibility of short-term supply reaction, contributing to a price increase. All in all, LNG is unlikely to be a magical solution for Russian gas replacement.

All of the above discussion suggests that it may be prohibitively expensive for the EU to do completely without Russian gas. Maybe the adequate solution is partial? That is, shall the EU cut down on its imports of natural gas from Russia, by, say, a half, instead of completely eliminating it?

On one hand, this may indeed lower the costs outlined above, such as part of take-or-pay contract fines, or costs associated with an LNG price increase. On the other hand, cutting down on Russian gas imports may lead to an important additional problem, loss of buyer power by the EU.

Indeed, the dependence on the gas deal is currently mutual – as outlined above, not only Russian gas is important for the EU energy portfolio; the EU also represents the largest (external) consumer of Russian gas, with its 55% share of the total Russian gas exports. In other words, the EU as a whole possesses a substantial market power in gas trade between Russia and the EU, and this buyer power could be and should be exercised to achieve certain concessions, such as advantageous terms of trade from the seller etc.

However, the ability to have buyer power and to exercise it depends crucially on whether the EU acts as a whole to exercise a credible pressure on Russia. That is, the EU Member States may be much better off by coordinating their energy policies rather than diluting the EU buyer power by diversifying gas supply away from Russia. This coordination may be a challenge given the Member States’ different energy profiles and environmental concerns. Also, such coordination requires a stronger internal energy market that will allow for better flow of the gas between the Member States. While demanding any of these measures would be double beneficial: they will improve the internal gas market’s efficiency, and at the same time reinforce the EU’s buyer power vis-à-vis Russia.

To sum up, the EU completely banning Russian gas imports does not seem a feasible option in the short run. In turn, half-measures are not necessarily better due to the loss of the EU’s buyer power. Thereby, the best short-term reaction by the EU may be to put the effort into working up a strong unified energy policy, and to place “gas at the very back end of the sanctions list” for Russia as suggested by the EU energy chief Gunther Oettinger (quoted by Shiryaevskaya and Almeida, Bloomberg, 2014).

 

References

The Arab Spring Logic of the Ukrainian Revolution

Posted on March 31, 2014 | Policy Brief

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Motivated by the unusual patterns and dynamics of the Arab Spring, we construct a model explaining the vulnerability of the newly established incumbent to popular unrest. Using this model for the case of similar protests in Ukraine, we find that the current combination of availability of information, military capacity of the incumbent and his radicalization, together with the opportunity costs of participation in a protest, are likely to result in the formation of new government that is also vulnerable to popular protests. The persistence of the protests after the formation of a temporal government in Ukraine supports this hypothesis. Additionally, as the policy position of Viktor Yanukovych was relatively mild, his potential successor might be more radical. Exponential growth of social media users, reduction of military capacity, relatively high unemployment and the possible radicalization of the Ukrainian President might put the country into an “instability zone” with recurrent protests.

On the night of 21 November 2013 spontaneous protests erupted in Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, after the Ukrainian government suspended preparations for signing an Association Agreement and a Free Trade Agreement with the European Union in favor of agreements with Russia. The movement concentrated on Independence Square (Maidan Naseljenosti) soon took on the name “Euromaidan”. Soon the protest spread to other cities in the country. The initial agenda of closer relations with the EU was soon encompassed in the wider protest against Viktor Yanukovych, elected President in 2010. He fled the country on February 21 under the pressure of popular protests, exacerbating the leadership crisis. Temporary leadership was taken up by the Speaker of the Supreme Rada – Oleksander Turchinov, while new elections were scheduled to take place on May 25.

Despite the successful removal of Victor Yanukovich from power and a promise of new elections in May, the protests on Maidan did not cease. The major factor of uncertainty comes from the very nature of the protests. For many months, it ran without organizers or formal leadership so that the future course of action remains unclear. It is hard to comply with the demands of Maidan, as no clear set of demands are formulated. Though five figures of Maidan: Tymoshenko, Klitschko, Tyagnybok, Yatsenuk and Yarosh remain the most visible, none of them has sufficient support of Maidan. Whichever course prevails – resumed Eurointegration or an alliance with Russia (which became a less likely option)– the number of people who oppose the new course is likely to be enough to fill a new Maidan.

The swift happenings in Maidan are highly reminiscent of the events of the Arab Spring at its crux: it also was a leaderless protest, coordinated mainly with social media, and encompasses people of vastly different socio-economic, political and demographic characteristics.

Using social media technologies, Euromaidan has created an interactive map of logistics (http://maydanneeds.com/) that provides detailed information on and locations of where to eat, makeshift hospitals, information booths, and the barricades. Clicking on the icons of the map, one discovers not only the locations of the facilities but also their needs, which enables coordination of protesters’ efforts to contribute to the common cause. However, just as in case of Tahrir Square or the Tunisian unrest, the common cause is poorly defined: aside from dissatisfaction with Viktor Yanukovych, the protesters exhibited very different preferences for the future course of action, and the three most prominent figures of the protest – Klitschko, Tyagnybok and Yatsenuk – were shunned as they spoke about the common agenda.

The aftermath of the Arab Spring remains unclear for both protesters and the world. The Syrian social unrest has resulted in ongoing violent conflict, while Libyan society still experiences serious problems with the formation of a new government after the murder of Kaddafi and the end of civil war. Tunisia and Egypt were able to choose new Presidents and form new governments. The latter were themselves dismissed soon after they came to power: the first elected post-Mubarak government collapsed in mid-2013 after a year of almost uninterrupted protests. These two cases are especially interesting as constitutional exits of leaders who were in autocratic office for less than one year were generally caused by coups and not protests between 1945 and 2002 (Svolik, 2009).

Nevertheless, we can apply the knowledge acquired there to the new Ukrainian protest we observed on Maidan and try to predict its development by the means of stylized models suggested in Dagaev, Lamberova, Sobolev and Sonin (2013).

Our approach relies on four simple parameters that drive the dynamics of the protests. First, we consider the costs of collective action – the opportunity costs of spending time on Maidan. The second parameter is the military capacity of the incumbent that can be devoted to the suspension of the protest. The higher it is, the more numerous should the protest be to succeed. The third parameter we use is the degree of the radicalization of the incumbent (the difference between his position and the preferred policy of the majority of the population). Finally, we use an information availability parameter (how many people are aware of the place and time of the occurrence of the protest).

With the electric telegraph, a communication tool of the 19th century, information availability was low and many of those who would have been glad to pay the costs of collective actions to replace the incumbent stay at home as they are not aware of the protest taking place. With Facebook and Twitter, the availability of information is much higher. According to our findings, the crucial role in dynamics of contemporary mass actions is played by the ratio of military capacity to the information availability rather than their values per se.

Our framework assumes that each citizen’s decision of whether to participate in the protest or not is based on the difference between her position and the preferred policy of the incumbent. According to this decision, all citizens can be classified into two groups – those who participate in a protest against the incumbent, and those who do not. We define a person, who has the median position among the protesters, as the expected new incumbent. So if the elections were held among the protesters, he would receive the widest support. If the number of citizens participating in the protest is sufficient to overcome the military capacity of the current incumbent, the protest becomes successful, and the expected new incumbent of the protest becomes the new incumbent. The combination of military capacity, opportunity costs and costs of coordination determine the size of the stability zone – a segment of policy space where the incumbent is not vulnerable to mass protest.

The model allows us to predict the dynamics of the protests that is generated by different combinations of the parameters. For illustrative purposes, the availability of information about the protest is proxied by data on Facebook penetration and military capacity is described by the number of military personnel per capita in 2009 collected by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (Hackett, 2010). The incumbent policy position is proxied by the Legitimacy Index from Polity IV, where a higher index corresponds to lower legitimacy of the incumbent and his regime. Finally, the costs of participation in a protest are proxied by the employment rate. A recent study by Campante and Chor stresses unemployment as important determinants of opportunity costs of taking to the streets during Arab Spring (Campante & Chor, 2012). As unemployed individuals have fewer options of how to spend their time, one should expect that a substantial number of unemployed people corresponds to a relative ease of sparking unrest.

Using these parameters, we can explain success or failure of the protest, and predict some proprieties of its aftermath.

For example, high military capacity, opportunity costs and costs of coordination generate a broad stability zone, so that even a radical incumbent would not face a threat of revolution. The decline of any of three parameters can narrow the zone of stability and make the autocrat vulnerable to mass protest. As the incumbent is highly radical, a significant part of the population takes to the streets. As a result, the new incumbent’s position is sufficiently close to the one of the median voter and is, thus, inside the stability zone. An example of such a scenario is the overturn of Slobodan Milosevic after the fall of communism, when there were eight failed and one successful attempts to form a wide coalition of opposition parties (Spoerri, 2008). The process of finding a common ground started in 1990 with the emergence of the coalition of six parties, the Associated Opposition of Serbia, which broke shortly after a series of power struggles, policy disagreements, and personality clashes. It was only ten years later that the protest which facilitated Milosevic’s downfall took place, as the leader of the united opposition, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, was able to ensure the non-involvement of the crucial military unit on behalf of Milosevic (Bujosevic & Radanovic, 2003).

In contrast, the events of the Arab Spring had different political dynamics. Low military capacity and high unemployment of Egypt and Tunisia determined a narrow stability zone ex ante. The absence of protests of these long-lived regimes can be explained by the relatively moderate position of the incumbent. In 2010, the Egyptian and Tunisian regimes had scores of 5 and 4 (out of 12) of Political Legitimacy from Polity IV, respectively. However the emergence of social media that enabled the users to coordinate their actions easily narrowed the relatively small stability zone. As the incumbent was less radical, fewer citizens benefit from its replacement and take to the streets. Thus, the new incumbent is defined by protesters, her policy position is more radical and now is out of the stability zone. The new incumbent immediately faces the new social unrest.

Table 1 presents the stylized results of our study. Locating the combination of parameters of the country in the table allows us to make the prediction about the dynamics of the protest. There are several possible courses of events: the protest can be weak and die out soon, with the incumbent staying in place; it can be significant, but yet not large enough to overthrow the incumbent; it can lead to the replacement of the incumbent, followed by the period of stability; and, finally, it can result in the replacement of the incumbent, but not cessation of the protest.

Table 1. Protest Outcome as a Function of Parameters
Table1

What do our findings tell us about Ukraine? The previously used proxy for the information index there is not a good choice, as the majority of users prefer the Russian version of Facebook – Vkontakte – as the major social network of the country. Thus, we rely on the Vkontakte penetration data (as of 2013, 18.5 million of people in Ukraine were using the network, constituting 40.6% of the population, see report of Ukranian IT-news agency AIN.UA: http://ain.ua/2013/11/28/503853).

The military parameter, that reduces the likelihood of successful protest, is low, compared to the countries of Arab Spring and constitutes 2.8 active military per 1000 people (see the Ukrainian law “Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2013”, http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc34?id=&pf3511=49126&pf35401=283834), which is half of the one in Egypt at the beginning of the protests. The unemployment parameter fell to 8.6 during the incumbency of Victor Yanukovych, which corresponds to the pre-protest unemployment in Egypt in 2010.

The legitimacy measure presents a difficulty for comparison with the Arab Spring cases, as the Legitimacy Index has not yet been updated. However, the harsh actions of Victor Yanukovych during the 2013-2014 protests (including the suppression of the protest and the passage of laws denying freedom of assembly and freedom of expression, as well as the refusal to repeal his earlier changes of the constitution towards more presidential form of government) suggest that his legitimacy level fell by approximately 50% (and was about 20% right before he was ousted from power), which is corroborated by polls (“Ukraine’s future in peril under President Yanukovych”, The Washington Post, 2 December, 2013). Thus, the conservative estimate is that his legitimacy index shifted from 3 to 4 or 5, as shown on Figure 1.

For the purpose of comparison, we plot the Arab Spring countries and Ukraine in the space of our variables in Figure 1. The X-axis shows the incumbent’s departure from the median population-preferred policy (proxied by the Legitimacy Index from Polity IV). We use the value of the index in the year prior to the start of unrest, and the index value in 2010 for countries with no protests (Morocco, Oman, Djibouti). The Y-axis corresponds to the employment level. The size of the bubble corresponds to the ratio of military capacity and Facebook (or Vkontakte) penetration (data from the Arab Spring Social Media Report).

The shading of the bubble reflects the type that country belongs to: striped (no significant protest), light gray (continuing protest), and dark grey (multiple protests). Syria is excluded from the classification and is marked white, because of the civil war and international intervention.

Figure 1. Legitimacy index (X-axis), Employment (Y-axis), Military capacity / Social media penetration (size of the bubble) in Arab Spring countries and UkraineFigure 1

Figure 1 illustrates that countries appear in tight clusters in line with our theoretical predictions. The countries with continuing protests that did not lead to the downfall of the incumbent are divided into two groups. The first group (Kuwait, Jordan, Lebanon, and Bahrain) has relatively a moderate incumbent policy position and extremely high level of development of new media. The reasons why these countries are not «striped» is high military capacity of the government that could be employed against protesters, combined with high opportunity costs of protesting (low unemployment rates).

The second group of countries (Syria, Algeria, Iraq, Yemen, and Mauritania) has more radical incumbents and higher unemployment rates (so the incentives to protests are higher there), but is poor in terms of IT development. The ratio of military capacity and Facebook (Vkontakte) penetration is high, which is reflected by the size of bubbles that are much larger than in the first groups. That is why in a country with a small military capacity (such as Yemen), the protests did not lead to the incumbent’s replacement.

Two Arab Spring countries belong to the “multiple protests” group. Both Egypt and Tunisia had relatively mild incumbents in the pre-protest era, with Tunisia’s Bashar al-Assad being the milder of the two. Both countries had relatively high unemployment rates and wide Facebook coverage, both factors alleviating the problem of organizing a collective action. Despite the fact that before the start of the protests Facebook coverage in Egypt had close to average values among the countries of Arab Spring, they grew at exponential rates and Egypt attained leading positions in the region in usage of new media several months later. Moreover, low rates of military capacity made protest activity less risky in both Tunisia and Egypt. The remaining differences in Facebook coverage and employment rates in Egypt and Tunisia account for the different structure of recurrent protests, predicted by our model.

Comparison of the Arab Spring countries data with the Ukrainian case shows that high military capacity, new media penetration and unemployment generate even more narrow stability zones than one observes in the cases of Egypt and Tunisia. The reason why the incumbent was not vulnerable to mass protests can be explained by the political legitimacy of Yanukovych as the winner of relatively free elections in 2010.

But if the Arab Spring protests were triggered by rapid growth of new (cheap) communication technologies, the successful protest against Yanukovych can be explained by his radicalization. The radicalization took the form of parliamentary acts that put significant constraints on political rights and civil liberties and violent suppression of dissident actions.

Employing the proposed approach and contrasting the Ukrainian case with the countries of the Arab Spring allows us to draw several conclusions.

Firstly, the current combination of availability of information, military capacity of the incumbent and his radicalization, together with the opportunity costs of staying on Maidan, are likely to result in successful and recurrent protest. The persistence of the protests after the formation of a temporal government supports this hypothesis.
Secondly, it is worthwhile to note that as the policy position of Viktor Yanukovych was relatively mild, his potential successor might be more radical.

Thirdly, the exponential growth of social media, the reduction of military capacity and relatively high unemployment puts Ukraine into an “instability zone”. This implies that the 2004 scenario of the Orange Revolution is unlikely to repeat. The protest of 2004 resulted in a general election, and the elected president Viktor Yushchenko served his term without interruption. The protests of 2013 are more likely to result in a rapid change of incumbents and a period of instability.

One factor can strengthen the possible incumbent’s vulnerability. The external pressure of the Russian government reduces costs of collective resistance to the new Ukrainian authorities among pro-Russian citizens, while the promise of Western countries to support fast EU integration can incentivize politicians to accelerate reforms opposed by significant parts of the population.

References

  • Bujosevic, D., & Radanovic, I. (2003). The fall of Milosevic: the October 5th revolution. Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Campante, F. R., & Chor, D. (2012). Why was the Arab world poised for revolution? Schooling, economic opportunities, and the Arab Spring. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 167–187.
  • Dagaev, D., Lamberova, N., Sobolev, A., & Sonin, K. (2013). Technological Foundations of Political Instability. Centre for Economic Policy Research Working Paper Series
  • Hackett, J. (2010). The Military Balance 2010: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense E conomics. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies.
  • Spoerri, M. (2008). Uniting the opposition in the run – up to electoral revolution – Lessons from Serbia 1990 – 2000. Totalitarismus Und Demokratie, 5(2005), 67–85.
  • Svolik, M. (2009). Power sharing and leadership dynamics in authoritarian regimes. American Journal of Political Science, 53(2), 477–494

Liquidity and Monetary Policy in Belarus

Posted on March 24, 2014 | Policy Brief

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High inflation and devaluation expectations after the 2011 currency crisis force Belarusian monetary authorities to seek non-conventional policy measures. Instead of using the refinancing rate as an instrument on the money and credit markets, the National Bank of Belarus resorts to liquidity squeezes, which drive up the rouble interbank rates. The banks have to raise deposit and loan rates in response. As a result, households continue to keep savings in the national currency deposits, while firms struggle to keep up with the payments. This situation, however, will have to end soon.

Belarusian economy is characterized by state ownership domination and various (including political) constraints. This often makes it tempting for the Belarusian authorities to resort to untraditional policy measures, or use the conventional policies in unexpected ways. A good example is Belarusian monetary policy in 2012-2013. In 2011 Belarus experienced a severe currency crisis: the exchange rate of the Belarusian rouble (BYR) crumbled from 3011 BYR per USD in January 2011 to 8470 BYR in December 2011. Prices followed the currency and doubled: in 2011 the inflation rate was 108%. Due to high government influence on the labor market and competition from the Russian labor market, real incomes quickly recuperated (Bornukova, 2012). But the owners of the deposits in Belarusian roubles took a hit – their savings lost almost a half of real value. More and more people converted their deposits into USD or other foreign currency. Inflation and devaluation expectations were soaring (Kruk, 2012).

The National Bank of Belarus clearly realized that the proper response would be to increase the interest rates: this policy measure would partially compensate the losses of rouble deposit holders, make rouble deposits attractive again and curb the growth in lending, one of the major causes of the currency crisis.

However, there is a catch. Formally, the main monetary instrument of the National bank is the refinancing rate. Yet, despite the name, this is not the rate at which the National bank is refinancing the commercial banks. Officially, it is only a “basis for setting interest rates on the operations involving liquidity provision to banks”. The problem is that most of the floating rates, especially those on concessional loans, have the refinancing rate as its basis rate. Very high refinancing rate would hurt debt-financed organizations, in particular in agriculture and construction. And the National bank found a compromise: the refinancing rate would remain relatively low; but the National bank would regulate the money market through liquidity squeezes: it would offer liquidity to the commercial banks only at a much higher collateral loan and overnight rates. The lack of liquidity due to a squeeze would drive up the interest rates on the interbank market.

Figure 1: Main interest rates in Belarus in 2012-2014
Figure1
Source: The National Bank of the Republic of Belarus.
 

Figure 1 shows the main interest rates in Belarus in 2012-2014. The refinancing rate was steadily decreasing throughout the whole period. The overnight rate (which moves together with the collateral loan rate), also set by the National bank, for some period was almost two times higher than the refinancing rate, reaching 70 percent  at  its peak. The overnight rates mostly exceeded the rate set in the interbank market. The interbank rate reflects the market price of liquidity. The National bank influences this rate by offering (or not) liquidity to the state-owned commercial banks.

The National bank has successfully used liquidity squeezes as an instrument of stabilization on the currency market. As Figure 2 shows, the two major spikes in the interbank rate coincided with the higher rates of currency devaluation. The first major devaluation episode began in the autumn of 2012. At that time the market reacted to the increased lending and the news about the ban on the exports of “solvents”, which meant Belarus would have to pay back to Russia the customs duties on oil. On the other hand, the periods of high liquidity and low interbank rates were usually followed by devaluation episodes.

Figure 2: Changes in the exchange rate and the interbank rate, 2012-2014
Figure2
Source: The National Bank of the Republic of Belarus.
 

In the summer 2013 devaluation speeded up once again, fueled by the potassium scandal. The National bank responded with lower liquidity and higher rates, which reached peak values of 50% and higher in September 2013.

Of course, this policy had other effects besides calming the currency market. As Figure 3 demonstrates, deposit and credit rates mainly reacted to the changes in the interbank rate, with peaks in the autumn of 2012 and summer-autumn of 2013. Enormously high deposit rates (often higher than 40 percent) delivered a hefty real rate of return given inflation of 22 percent in 2012 and 16 percent in 2013. Rouble deposits were growing throughout the period. But someone had to pay those rates.

Figure 3. Short-run deposit and loan rates for firms and individuals
Figure3
Source: The National Bank of the Republic of Belarus.
 

High real rates became a burden for firms and households. The commercial banks had to stop many of their long-term individual lending programs (mainly those financing housing purchases). Instead, the banks put their efforts into the development and promotion of short-term consumer credit, which was virtually non-existent just a couple of years before.  Many firms switched to cheaper loans in U.S. dollar, but the National bank quickly shut down these practices by introducing restrictions on foreign currency loans. Credit growth slowed down, and did not decline only due to the government-sponsored lending programs and a boom in consumer credit.

High loan rates together with the growing wages and low sales suffocated the firms. Average profitability across the country is declining since summer 2012, reaching the record low profit margin and negative aggregate net profits in December 2013 (see Figure 4). The lack of liquidity lead to the crisis of payments: accounts receivable and accounts payable on the 1st of February 2014 were 24.7 and 31.6 percent higher than a year before.

Figure 4. Average profit margin in Belarus, 2012-2014
Figure4
Source: The National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus
 

Today Belarus experiences high pressure for devaluation. The international currency reserves are depleted; the current account balance is in the red for a long time. The exporting enterprises quickly lose competitiveness due to low productivity. For the first time since 2009 GDP growth is virtually non-existent (and even negative in the first months of 2014). Some of the main trading partners – Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan – have already devaluated their currencies and face uncertain prospects for growth. It looks like the successful practice of fighting devaluation with liquidity squeezes at the cost of the real economy will have to end soon.

References

The crisis in Ukraine and the Georgian economy

Posted on March 17, 2014 | Policy Brief

High office buildings facing sky representing Institutions and Services Trade

We analyze how the crisis in Ukraine will likely impact the Georgian economy and distinguish between short-run and long-run effects. We argue that the short-run effects are transmitted through trade and capital flows and that they are rather negative for Georgia and can hardly be bolstered. In the long-run, however, the crisis could improve the competitiveness of the Caucasus Transit Corridor, an important trading route between Europe and Central Asia Georgia participates in. We give recommendations how political decision makers could support such a development in the wake of an impairment of the northern Ukrainian transit routes.

Introduction

When Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovich decided not to sign the association agreement with the European Union and instead opted for a Russian package of long-term economic support, many Ukrainians perceived this not to be a purely economic decision.  Rather, they feared this to be a renunciation of Western cultural and political values, and – to put it mildly – were not happy about this development.

The Russian political system, characterized by a prepotent president, constrained civil rights, and a government controlling important parts of the economy through its secret service, is not exactly the dream of young Ukrainians. Russia can offer economic carrots, but these do not count much against the soft power of Europe that comes in the form of political freedom, good governance, and economic development to the benefit of not just a small group of oligarchs.

Hence, it was all but surprising when many young Ukrainians took their anger about Yanukovich to the streets. After protests that lasted for nearly three months, President Yanukovich fled the country, a temporary government took over, and chaos broke out on the Crimean peninsula.

The dispute about the Crimea has the potential to impede the relations between Russia and the West for a long time to come, in particular if Russia enforces an annexation of the territory. Moreover, the tensions could quickly turn into a military conflict. The aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush was moved into an operational distance to the Crimea, accompanied by 20 smaller U.S. warships, and 12 additional fighter planes will be stationed in Poland. Yet even if there will be no direct confrontation between official Russian and U.S. forces, Ukraine could become the battleground of a proxy war, a kind of conflict that was common in the Cold War era. In this respect, one can already read the writing on the wall: the new Ukrainian government begs the U.S. for supplying arms and ammunition, and while the Obama administration is still reluctant to give in to such requests, the call is supported by hawkish U.S. congressmen who might finally prevail.

Ukraine is a country that is geographically close to Georgia and, like Georgia, has vital economic stakes in the Black Sea area. Georgia will not be unaffected by whatever happens in Kiev and Simferopol. In this policy brief, we will inform policy makers about the likely short-run and long-run economic consequences of the turmoil in Ukraine, discuss the challenges and opportunities that may arise, and derive some policy recommendations.

Short-run economic consequences

The crisis in Ukraine will almost instantaneously affect trade and capital flows between Georgia, Ukraine, and Russia. The effects will likely be negative and hit Georgia in a situation of economic recovery.

The Georgian real GDP growth rates were 6.3% in 2010, 7.2% in 2011, and 6.2% in 2012, and the real GDP per capita evolved from about 2,600 USD to about 3,500 USD in this time, but the upsurge discontinued in 2013 (if no other source is mentioned, figures presented in this policy brief (including those in the graphs) come from the Georgian statistical office GeoStat). ISET-PI, in its February 2014 report on the leading GDP indicators for Georgia, estimates the GDP in 2013 to be 2.6%, while GeoStat, the statistical office of Georgia, believes it to be 3.1%.

The unsatisfactory performance of the Georgian economy in 2013 was arguably caused by political uncertainties resulting from the government change that took place in late 2012, and as these uncertainties are largely overcome, most economists believe that Georgia will get back to its remarkable growth trajectory in 2014. The IMF, in its Economic Outlook, predicts a real GDP Growth of 6% in 2014, and the government of Georgia expects this number to be 5%. With an escalating crisis in Ukraine, it is questionable whether these rosy forecasts are still realistic.

Effects on imports

In 2013, Ukraine and Russia were the 3rd and the 4th largest importers to Georgia, respectively. Graph 1 shows the top five importers to Georgia, which together make up about 50% of total imports. The imports from Ukraine and Russia are mainly comprised of consumption goods: of all goods that were imported between 2009 and 2013 from Ukraine and Russia, about 30% were foodstuff. The ten main import goods in this time (in order of monetary volume) were cigarettes, sunflower oil, chocolate, bread, cakes, meat other than poultry, poultry, and sugar.

If the supply of these goods would be reduced through a breakdown of production and logistics, roadblocks, damaged infrastructure etc., the consequences for Georgia would not be utterly severe. From Ukraine and Russia, Georgia receives few goods that are (1) needed for investment projects and (2) cannot be produced domestically (an example of sophisticated investment goods that need to be imported would be ski lifts for tourism projects). Moreover, as Ukraine and Russia supply primarily standard goods that are produced almost everywhere, it is unlikely that a cutback in their imports would lead to sharp price rises in Georgia. Very quickly, increased imports from other countries would close any supply gaps. In addition, many imported consumption goods, like Ukrainian orange juice, are but luxury for ordinary Georgians, who buy their food in cheap domestic markets that sell almost exclusively local products.

Graph01

Effects on exports

A small anecdote may illustrate the status of Georgian products in the Russian market. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Stalin used to invite his comrades to his Kuntsevo dacha almost every night. At these occasions, he drank only semi-sweet Georgian red wine. His clique, usually preferring Russian vodka, adopted this habit out of fear to displease the dictator. Yet the real highlight of these nightly gatherings took place after midnight, when an opulent feast began, featuring all the delicacies of the Georgian cuisine. Through Stalin (and the fact that Georgia was a preferred destination of Soviet tourism), Georgian food obtained an excellent reputation in most countries of the former Soviet Union, and, to the dismay of Georgians, some younger Russians even do not know that Khinkali is not an originally Russian dish.

As can be seen in Graph 2, Russia and Ukraine are among the top 5 destinations for Georgian produce, together absorbing about 14% of total Georgian exports in 2013. In 2006, two Georgian products that are traditionally highly popular in Russia, namely wine and mineral water (the famous “Borjomi” brand), were banned from the Russian market. Yet in the wake of the diplomatic thaw that set in after the new government assumed power last year, this ban was lifted, and in 2013, the export of these goods regained momentum. In 2013, 68% of all wine exported from Georgia was sold in Russia and Ukraine (44 and 24 percentage points, respectively). In both countries, Georgian wines are sold at the higher end of the price range and are typically consumed by people with middle and high income. It is likely that these exports, in particular those to Ukraine, will be affected considerably by the crisis. This may happen through decreased demand for luxury foods and through a possible depreciation of the Ukrainian hryvna and the ruble vis-à-vis the Georgian lari.

Another sector that may be affected by the situation in Ukraine is the car re-export business. Georgia imports huge numbers of used cars from the U.S., Europe, and Japan, and passes them on to countries in the region. While this business hardly yields potential for real economic progress, it accounts for roughly 25% of Georgian exports! Of these 25%, about 7 percentage points go to Russia and Ukraine. Moreover, many cars are imported to Georgia on the land route from Europe through Ukraine and Russia (often driven by private, small-scale importers). If it will become more difficult to cross the border between Russia and Ukraine, this business, providing income to many low-skilled Georgians, may be at risk.

It should also be noted that Ukrainians and Russians make up an ever-increasing share of the tourists coming to Georgia (though the biggest group of tourists are Israelis). Also through this channel, an economic downturn in Ukraine and Russia will have unpleasant consequences for Georgia.

Graph02

Effects on capital flows

According to the National Bank of Georgia, in 2013 a total of 801 mln USD was flowing in from Russia (see Graph 3). Ukraine contributed 45 mln USD to the money inflows, still significant for an economy as small as Georgia’s. An economic downturn in Russia and Ukraine would hit many Georgian citizens, often pensioners and elderly people, who depend on remittances of their children and other family members sent from these countries. This may aggravate a trend that already exists: in January 2014, money inflows decreased by 4% from Russia and by 5% from Ukraine (compared to January 2013).

Graph03

Long-run economic consequences

Most of the economic dynamics Georgia experienced since 2003 was “catch up growth”. A country permeated by corruption, with a dysfunctional police and judicial system, without protection of property rights and contract enforcement, will grow almost automatically when the government restarts to fulfill its basic functions. Yet once this phase of returning to normal economic circumstances is over (Georgia probably is already in this situation), high growth rates can hardly be achieved without a strong export orientation of the economy, in particular when an economy is as small as Georgia’s. Most economists concerned with Georgia are therefore struggling to identify economic sectors where Georgia is in a good position to develop export potential. The National Competitiveness Report for Georgia, written in 2013 by the ISET Policy Institute on behalf of USAID, therefore extensively discusses the question what Georgia can deliver to the world. Though not related to export in a classical sense, the report points out that one of the advantages Georgia has is its geographical location, providing for possibilities to transform Georgia into a logistics hub.

There are three main routes to transport goods from Europe to the Central Asian countries (e.g. from Hamburg to Taraz in Kazakhstan). One route goes via the Baltic ports of Klaipeda or Riga, and then through Ukraine and Russia, and another route goes overland through Ukraine. A third one, the so called Caucasian Transit Corridor, has the Georgian port city of Poti and Turkey as its Western connection points, then goes through Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the Caspian Sea, and further east it splits up into a Kazakhstan and a Turkmenistan branch.

According to the Almaty based company Comprehensive Logistics Solutions, the fastest and cheapest route is the one through the Baltic ports. The transport from Hamburg to Taraz takes around 33 days and costs 6,220 USD per standard container. The overland transport via Ukraine takes around 34 days and costs 7,474 USD. Finally, transport through the CTC currently takes the longest time, namely around 40 days, and costs 6,896 USD.

Unlike many other economic activities, competition for transportation is more or less a zero-sum game played by nations. If transport through Ukraine and Russia will be restrained due to closed borders and political and economic instability, the total transport volume will not change substantially. Rather, instead of going through the northern routes, the goods will flow through the CTC. A similar development could be observed when the embargo against Iran was tightened and shipping goods through Iranian ports became increasingly difficult for Armenia and Azerbaijan. As a result, Azerbaijan, traditionally importing through Iran and exporting through Poti, now facilitates both its imports and exports through Poti.

This is a great chance for Georgia if it wants to become serious about transforming into a logistics hub. In our policy recommendations, we will speak about how to utilize on this opportunity.

Policy recommendations

Georgia can do little to bolster the short-run effects that are transmitted through the trade and capital flow channels. Political decision makers should be aware of problems that might arise for particularly vulnerable groups in the population, like pensioners who lose income in case remittances from Russia and Ukraine run dry, and help out with social support if necessary.

Regarding the long-run impact, Georgia should use this opportunity for gaining ground in the competition with northern transit routes. The Caucasus Transit Corridor can become much faster and cheaper if (a) a deepwater port and modern port facilities with warehouses will be built in Poti, (b) the road and train infrastructure will be improved, and (c) it will be easier to bring cargo over the Caspian Sea. Regarding the latter point, it would be important to assist Azerbaijan in improving the port management at Baku (in particular reducing corruption), and in reforming the monopolistic Azerbaijani State Caspian Sea Shipping Company.

Azerbaijan invests 775 mln USD into the Georgian part of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, proving their serious interest to upgrade CTC. Given this impressive commitment of Azerbaijan, Georgia should not stand back.

Conclusion

The crisis in Ukraine yields short-run risks and long-run opportunities for the Georgian economy. While there is little that can be done about the risks, the opportunities call for courageous steps to improve the Caucasus Transit Corridor. If the countries that hold stakes in the CTC are now further reducing the cost of transportation and make the route faster and more customer-friendly, the CTC may establish itself as the main trading route connecting Europe and Central Asia. Once critical investments have taken place, CTC’s advantage could be sustained beyond the current crisis. It is a competitive route that simply needs upgrading, which can happen now as a fallout of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

References

The relationship between education and labor market opportunities: the case of Ukraine

Posted on March 10, 2014 | Policy Brief

Education and labour market policy brief image

Author: Hanna Vakhitova, KSE and Tom Coupe, KSE

This brief is based on a research project that analyses the extent to which the educational system in Ukraine contributes to better local employment opportunities, hence diminishing the outflows. According to the results, additional year of education increases the chance of finding a job by 2-3%. However, the effect of education on wages is small, especially when compared to other transition countries (1-5% wage premium for a year of education). In addition, while in 8 out of 10 countries education has zero or positive impact on the probability of starting a business, this impact is negative and significant in Ukraine. *)

Reputation for Quality and Entry in Procurement: Is there a Trade-Off?

Posted on February 24, 2014 | Policy Brief

20140224 Reputation for Quality and Entry Image 01

How much weight should be given to past performance indicators when selecting contractors? Does a large weight assigned to suppliers’ previous performance deter entry by new, innovative suppliers that have no track records for the very reason that they are new? If yes, how should we take this into account when designing procurements for firms or governments? This note describes recent research that sheds light on these questions crucial for every government and organization.

Introduction

How should past performance be accounted for when selecting (public or private) contractors? On one hand, giving large weight to suppliers’ previous performance in assigning contracts may improve incentives in procurement; on the other hand, it may deter entry by new, innovative suppliers for the very reason that they are new. Are there ways to structure procurement rules and procedures to minimize or eliminate these costs? How can well performing suppliers be rewarded, but not at the expense of losing the most innovative start-ups, that could pose important positive externalities on the buyer and on society overall? These questions are important ones and every procurement manager, in the private and public sector, should know how to answer, or at least how to think about, them. Unfortunately, if one looks at the leading management and operations textbooks, or at public procurement textbooks, it is hard to find a line that could help in making these crucial decisions. The only procurement book that at least mentions these crucial questions, to our knowledge, is the Handbook of Procurement (2006; see Ch. 18, by Dellarocas et al.). However, even that handbook falls short in providing evidence-based or – more generally – research-based guidance for these questions. This is the case because there is practically no research dealing with these everyday problems. One recent exception is an experimental study recently undertaken by Butler, Carbone, Conzo and Spagnolo (2013) that will be discussed in depth in the reminder of this brief.

Public Policy Relevance  

Before getting into the results of this recent study, let me provide some background information that will give an idea of the relevance of these questions for public policy.

Public procurement currently accounts for between 15% and 20% of the GDP in developed countries (see http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/pcp/key_en.html).  In 2011, the total public procurement market in the EU – i.e. the purchases of goods, services and public works by governments and public utilities – reached a size of approximately €2,500 billion, corresponding to 19 percent of GDP (see e.g. http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/modernising_rules/public-procurement-indicators-2011_en.pdf). As Table 1 below shows, despite year-to-year fluctuations, there has been an overall increase in procurement expenditures relative to 2007 levels, both absolutely and proportionately. The increasing shift in focus in EU innovation policies, from “push-based” mechanisms like R&D subsidies/tax breaks towards demand-led “pull” mechanisms, like Pre-Commercial Procurement, is likely to further increase the volume of this market.

Table 1: Total EU procurement expenditure on works, goods and services
 
In EUR billion

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2,178.55

2,263.62

2,346.00

2,416.52

2,405.89
 
As a % of GDP

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

17.6

18.1

20.0

19.7

19.0
Source: DG MARKT. 2011. Public Procurement Indicators.

The enormous size of this market notwithstanding, we know relatively little about whether, when, and how buyers should use reputational indicators based on past performance in selecting among sellers, and whether the use of such indicators necessarily reduces the ability of new sellers—i.e., sellers with no history of past performance—to enter the market.

It is well known that reputational mechanisms that reward past performance are important governance tools that complement (and sometimes substitute for) contracts in private transactions (Calzolari and Spagnolo 2009). Private buyers, however, are typically only concerned about the price and quality of the good they buy. Regulators in charge of public procurement, instead, are usually also concerned that the public procurement process is transparent and open for obvious accountability reasons. The need to prevent favoritism and corruption has led lawmakers around the world to ensure that open and transparent auctions where bidders are treated equally—even when in some crucial dimensions they have very different track records—are used whenever possible.

The trend in the US

The costs of limiting discretion to ensure public buyers’ accountability – such as the possibly large cost of not allowing reputational forces to complement incomplete procurement contracts – were stressed by Kelman (1990), who pushed for a deep reform of the US procurement system when he was the head of public procurement during the Clinton administration. The reform was targeted at reducing the rigidity of procurement rules in the Federal Acquisition Regulations and allowing public buyers to adopt more flexible purchasing practices common in the private sector, including giving more weight to suppliers’ past performance. Since the Federal Acquisitions Streamlining Act of 1994, US federal departments and agencies are expected to record past contractors’ performance evaluations and share them through common platforms for use in future contractor selection.

However, the US Senate recently expressed the apparently widespread concern that past performance-based selection criteria could hinder new and small businesses’ ability to enter and compete effectively, leading to an intriguing, but inconclusive report by the General Accountability Office.

This is not to say that US regulators were not concerned with the ability of small and medium enterprises (SME) – sometimes the most innovative part of the economy – to enter public procurement markets. In the US, this long-held concern led to large programs like the Small Business Act, with its rules limiting the bundling of public demand in very large procurements and establishing the Small Business Agency, and the ‘set aside’ (procurement only open to SMEs) common in many types of procurement auctions. However, the worry that past-performance based selection may contribute to the exclusion of novel and smaller firms only arose in the last couple of years.

The (opposite) trend in the EU

The European Union has instead been moving precisely in the opposite direction. An important concern driving procurement regulation in Europe since the Treaty of Rome has been helping the process of common market integration by increasing cross-border procurement, i.e., the amount of goods and services each EU Member State buys from contractors based in other states. The EU Procurement Directives that coordinate public procurement regulation in the various European states have been limiting the use of past-performance information in the process of selecting among offers—a feature that came under broad attack during the 2011 consultation for the revision of the EU Directives (see Replies to the Consultation on the 2011 EU Green Book on Public Procurement regulation). The EU regulators appear to have been always convinced that using reputational indicators as a criteria for selecting contractors leads to manipulations in favour of local incumbents, at the expense of cross-border procurement and market integration.  (see e.g., http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/modernising_rules/consultations/index_en.htm).

Only very recently – now that the US is moving towards reconsidering the effects, and possibly limiting the use of past-performance indicators – has the EU started to move (again in the opposite direction to the US) towards leaving more space to these indicators, perhaps as a reaction to the comments they received in recent consultations.

Finally, to have an idea of the lack of research-based knowledge guiding policy in this field, note that in some cases EU regulation already acknowledges the crucial importance of past-performance based reputation for some types of procurement. For example, the European Research Council (ERC) provides funding to top researchers in Europe, who are selected through peer review, and the track record of the researchers is usually the main awarding criterion. ERC funding is distributed almost exclusively based on reputation criteria in order to support the best and the brightest. Other European instruments for the procurement of research, such as the FET-OPEN program, are based on a strictly enforced, completely anonymous evaluation instead, without obvious reasons justifying this opposite approach. On the dedicated homepage of these programs it states: “The anonymity policy applied to short proposals has changed and is strictly applied. The part B of a short STREP proposal may not include the name of any organization involved in the consortium nor any other information that could identify an applicant. Furthermore, strictly no bibliographic references are permitted.”

Reputation and Entry in Procurement

In a recent research paper (Butler, Carbone, Conzo and Spagnolo, 2013) we have been trying to fill at least part of this knowledge gap and offer some initial evidence-based guidelines for future policy.

The study

We build a simple model of repeated procurement with limited enforcement and potential entry and implement it in the laboratory. We focus on reputation as an incentive system to limit moral hazard in the quality dimension as well as on the effect of reputation on selection through entry. We assume that some costly-to-produce quality dimension of supply, although observable to the parties, is too costly to verify for a court to be governed through explicit contracting and is therefore left to reputational governance. We make the additional assumption that there is a potential entrant firm that is more efficient than all incumbent firms. In this context, we study how quality, price, entry and welfare change with the introduction of a simple and transparent reputational mechanism. This mechanism rewards an incumbent firm that chooses to provide (costly) high-quality production with a bid subsidy in the subsequent procurement auction, and may also award a bid subsidy (of varying size) to an entrant with no history of production.

Note that in the case of public procurement and of firms’ vendor rating systems, we are talking about reputational mechanisms based on public rules, known and accepted by suppliers. Formal mechanisms and rules give commitment power to the buyer and can be designed in many different ways. A common mistake is to assume that reputational mechanisms must be designed along the line of the eBay feedback system, in which new sellers start with “zero reputation”. However, a buyer with some commitment power concerning the rules for information aggregation and diffusion and for selecting suppliers may well award a positive rating to new entrants—e.g. the maximum possible rating, or the average rating in the market, putting entrants at less of a disadvantage—and ensure that this is taken into account by the scoring rule that selects the contractor, even if the contractor has never before interacted with the buyer. Indeed, private corporations often have vendor rating systems in which all suppliers start off with the same maximal reputational capital—a given number of points—and then lose points when performing poorly and are suspended for some time if their reputational capital falls below a certain low threshold. This type of vendor rating system creates an advantage for new suppliers, most likely stimulating rather than hindering entry, suggesting that it is possible to design a reputational mechanism in public procurement that simultaneously sustains quality and entry.

The results

First of all, the study shows that concerns about reputation-based selection hindering entry are justified: naively introducing a “standard” reputational mechanism in which only good past performance is rewarded with a bid subsidy in the following procurement auction increases quality provision, but it also significantly reduces entry.

In contrast to this first result, the study goes on to show that properly designed reputational mechanisms in which new entrants, with no history of past performance, are awarded a moderate or high reputation score—as is often done in the private sector—actually foster rather than hinder entry while, at the same time, delivering a substantial increase in high quality goods provision.

The third important result of this study is that the total cost to buyers (buyer’s transfer) does not increase when a reputational mechanism is introduced, even though (costly) quality provision increases. The introduction of bid subsidies for good past performance appears to benefit the buyer/taxpayer by increasing competition for incumbency, driving winning bids down sufficiently to offset the potential increase in procurement costs due to bid subsidies.

Conclusions

Considered together, the findings in Butler et al. (2013) suggest that there need not be a trade-off between reputation and entry in procurement, and that the debates both in the EU and the US are rather misplaced. The results suggest that the dual goals of providing incentives for quality provision and increasing entry and cross-border procurement – in the EU or elsewhere – are achievable through an appropriately designed reputational mechanism. Policy makers should therefore probably stop quarrelling about whether a generic past-performance based reputational mechanism should be introduced, and instead focus on how such a mechanism should be designed.

References

  • Butler Jeff, Carbone Enrica, Conzo Pierluigi and Giancarlo Spagnolo. 2013. “Reputation and Enty in Procurement.” CEPR Discussion Paper No. 9651.
  • Calzolari, Giacomo and Giancarlo Spagnolo. 2009. “Relational Contracts and Competitive Screening.”  CEPR Discussion paper No. 7434.
  • European Commission. 2011. Green Paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement policy Towards a more efficient European Procurement Market. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/index_en.htm
  • European Commission. 2011. Green Paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement policy Towards a more efficient European Procurement Market. Synthesis of Replies.  Available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2011/public_procurement/synthesis_document_en.pdf
  • Government Accountability Office. 2011. (GAO-12-102R, Oct. 18, 2011). Prior Experience and Past Performance as Evaluation Criteria in the Award of Federal Construction Contracts. Available at  http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-102R
  • Kelman, Steven. 1990.  Procurement and Public Management: The Fear of Discretion and the Quality of Government Performance: American Enterprise Institute Press.
  • Yukins, Christoher. 2008. “Are IDIQS Inefficient? Sharing Lessons with European Framework Contracting.” Public Contract Law Journal,  37(3): 545-568.