Location: Global
Ownership Structure, Acquisitions and Managerial Incentives
Both the theoretical and empirical literature assume that takeovers are less likely to occur when firms have large concentrated shareholders, e.g. family firms. Hence the disciplinary role of takeovers becomes irrelevant in incentivizing the management. We argue that this conjecture is false. Using a contracting model, we show that the existence of takeovers can work in favour of firms with controlling shareholders, amplifying the disciplinary effects relative to firms with dispersed shareholders. We further show how takeover threats interact with alternative governance structures, specifically, with monitoring and performance pay. While carrots (performance pay) and sticks (takeover threat) play substitute roles in incentive provision, the internal monitoring available to large shareholders is a substitute mechanism irrespective of the disciplinary effect of the market for corporate control.
Introduction
The nature of optimal corporate ownership has been a longstanding question in corporate governance literature. While large controlling shareholders can address managerial agency problems by monitoring management and alleviating the free-riding problem in takeovers (see e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1980; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985 and Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi, 1997), they may also expropriate other stakeholders by influencing management or deterring efficient takeovers to maintain their private control benefits (Stulz,1988). Empirical evidence about the effect of controlling shareholders, for example a founding family, on firm performance is also inconclusive (see Bertrand and Schoar (2006) who review the empirical studies on family ownership).
Amid the ongoing debate, we provide a new perspective on the role of controlling shareholders in the market disciplinary mechanism, and how it interacts with the firm’s potential synergy characteristics and internal governance mechanisms. While the use of performance pay and internal monitoring are easily justified by the extant literature, the disciplinary effects of the market for corporate control are less obvious. In many countries, there are debates about the social cost of concentrated ownership structures, and some regulators (e.g., the European Commission) have been advocating in favour of breaking up concentrated ownership structures to facilitate the market for corporate control and its managerial disciplinary function.
In contrast to this standard view, our analysis shows that the managerial disciplinary mechanism of synergistic takeover can be strengthened by the presence of controlling shareholders. Furthermore, while the control premium required by controlling shareholders reduces the incidence of synergistic takeovers, the internal monitoring performed by these shareholders can complement the market disciplinary mechanism in high synergy potential firms. Overall, it is ambiguous whether dismantling a concentrated ownership structure would increase firm value and, in particular, in firms which provide high synergy potential to acquirers.
Our analysis suggests that more sophisticated policies for the market for corporate control may improve the social welfare more effectively.
Controlling Ownership and Managerial Agency Problem
The managerial agency problem is relevant even when considering takeovers of family firms. Founders hold 15% of the CEO positions, 30% are held by descendants while the absolute majority of approximately 55% are held by professional managers (Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Bidders that operate in the same industry, for example, will be able to observe the state of demand to assess the synergistic improvements. In contrast, family owners are likely to be less actively involved in firm operations, and less informed about the industry/market situation, which suggests their lack of operational expertise vis-a-vis managers.
In the presence of potential conflicts of interest between the management and shareholders, the market for corporate control serves a disciplining role. Then why does the private benefit of controlling shareholders, which increases the takeover premium, strengthen this market disciplinary mechanism?
We argue that, notwithstanding their negative effect on the incidence of synergistic takeovers, the controlling shareholders can strengthen the managerial disciplinary effect of a takeover in firms that offer acquirers large business synergies.
To answer the question intuitively, suppose that the manager has no anti-takeover defense. In this case, the manager can secure herself from takeover threats only by increasing the market value of the firm, and, therefore, the takeover threat can discipline the manager. In firms which offer high synergy potential to the acquirers, however, the manager may find it too costly to increase the market value enough to deter a synergistic takeover. The control premium required by controlling shareholders can complement the market disciplinary mechanism in this circumstance, and, specifically, reduce the profitability of synergistic takeovers and make the acquirers’ bidding choice more sensitive to current market value. That is, it allows the managers of firms that offer high business synergies to reduce the takeover threat significantly by increasing the market value.
Technically, our model shows that the necessary and sufficient condition for the complementarity of ownership concentration and the market disciplinary mechanism is the log-convexity of the distribution function of potential business synergy. The market value increase from truthfully reporting the favorable state may, in itself, not significantly deter the takeover attempts for these firms since acquirers still find the business synergy more than offsets a high stock price. The control premium required by controlling shareholders makes truthful managerial reporting (and the corresponding market value enhancement) more effective in reducing the likelihood of a takeover. Specifically, the control premium increases the manager’s opportunity cost of misreporting and, in turn, it reduces the information rent that shareholders forgo to the manager.
Interaction with Other Governance Mechanisms
The analysis also provides implications for the relationship between ownership structure and other governance mechanisms, such as managerial compensation and the monitoring function of controlling shareholders.
Given that the managerial agency problem cannot be fully eliminated by the takeover threat and managerial compensation, the monitoring function of controlling shareholders can complement the other two governance mechanisms in our setting.
We show that the disciplinary effect of synergistic takeovers reduces the information rent paid to the manager and, thus, it diminishes managerial incentive pay. This implies that managerial pay-performance sensitivity is negatively associated with ownership concentration in firms which offer high business synergies. Furthermore, our analysis also shows that, in high synergy potential firms in which controlling shareholders strengthen the market disciplinary mechanism, monitoring function of controlling shareholders can complement the market disciplinary mechanism, and, thus, ownership concentration increases the operating efficiency relative to firms with dispersed ownership.
Conclusion
Contrary to the common prior, the disciplinary effect of synergistic takeovers can be stronger in high synergy potential firms with controlling shareholders due to improvements in incentives for managerial self-selection. Specifically, the control premium encourages the manager to deter the takeover threat by increasing the current value of the firm. In this case, managerial entrenchment is consistent with improvements in shareholder value.
The disciplinary effect acts as a complement to the internal monitoring efforts of controlling shareholders in reducing the amount of incentive pay required to induce managerial truthfulness. In contrast, the control premium in firms with few synergies isolates the manager from the takeover threat, making incentive provision reliant on internal monitoring.
However, the disciplining effect of synergistic takeovers is not without its costs, making the overall value implications ambiguous. Incentive provision requires that shareholders accept relatively low bidding prices, by allowing takeovers with negative synergies. Furthermore, tailoring correct incentive pay requires a relatively high distortion to effort levels in times of economic downturns. While controlling ownership is able to mitigate these concerns, the existence of a control premium also reduces the incidence of socially desirable synergistic improvements in firm value.
Overall, policy makers should take care when considering implementation of constraints on the controlling states in order to facilitate the market for corporate control.
References
- Anderson, Ronald C., and David M. Reeb, 2003. “Founding-family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the S&P 500”, The Journal of Finance, 58, 1301-1327.
- Bertrand, Marianne, and Antoinette Schoar, 2006. “The role of family in family firms”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20, 73-96.
- Burkart, Mike, Denis Gromb, and Fausto Panunzi, 1997. “Large shareholders, monitoring and the value of the firm”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics,112, 693.
- Demsetz, Harold, and Kenneth Lehn, 1985. “The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences”, Journal of Political Economy, 93, 1155-1177.
- Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver D. Hart, 1980. “Takeover bids, the free-rider problem, and the theory of the corporation”, The Bell Journal of Economics,11, 42-64.
- Villalonga, Belen, and Raphael Amit, 2006. “How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?”, Journal of Financial Economics, 80, 385-417.
- Stulz, Renee, 1988. “Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporate control”, Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 25-54.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Sex, Drugs, and Bitcoin: How Much Illegal Activity Is Financed Through Cryptocurrencies?
Using novel approaches that exploit the blockchain to identify illegal activity, we estimate that around $76 billion of illegal activity per year is financed through payments in bitcoin (46% of bitcoin transactions). This staggering number is close to the scale of the US and European markets for illegal drugs and suggest that cryptocurrencies are transforming the black markets by enabling “black e-commerce.”
Cryptocurrencies have grown rapidly in price, popularity, and mainstream adoption. The total market capitalization of bitcoin alone exceeds $150 billion as of July 2018, with a further $150 billion in over 1,800 other cryptocurrencies. The numerous online cryptocurrency exchanges and markets have a daily dollar volume of around $50 billion. Over 170 ‘cryptofunds’ have emerged (hedge funds that invest solely in cryptocurrencies), attracting around $2.3 billion in assets under management. Recently, bitcoin futures contracts have commenced trading on the major US derivatives exchanges (CME and CBOE), catering to institutional demand for trading and hedging bitcoin. What was once a fringe asset is quickly maturing.
The rapid growth in cryptocurrencies and the anonymity that they provide users has created considerable regulatory challenges, including the use of cryptocurrencies in illegal trade (drugs, hacks and thefts, illegal pornography, even murder-for-hire), potential to fund terrorism, launder money, and avoid capital controls. There is little doubt that by providing a digital and anonymous payment mechanism, cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin have facilitated the growth of ‘darknet’ online marketplaces in which illegal goods and services are traded. The recent FBI seizure of over $4 million of bitcoin from one such marketplace, the ‘Silk Road’, provides some idea of the scale of the problem faced by regulators.
In a recent research paper (Foley, Karlsen, and Putnins, 2018), which is forthcoming in the Review of Financial Studies, we quantify the amount of illegal activity that involves the largest cryptocurrency, bitcoin. As a starting point, we exploit several recent seizures of bitcoin by law enforcement agencies (including the US FBI’s seizure of the Silk Road marketplace) to construct a sample of known illegal activity. We also identify the bitcoin addresses of major illegal darknet marketplaces. The public nature of the blockchain allows us to work backwards from the law enforcement agency bitcoin seizures and the darknet marketplaces through the network of transactions to identify those bitcoin users that were involved in buying and selling illegal goods and services online. We then apply two econometric methods to the sample of known illegal activity to estimate the full scale of illegal activity. The first exploits the trade networks of users to identify two distinct ‘communities’ in the data—the legal and illegal communities. The second exploits certain characteristics that distinguish between legal and illegal bitcoin users, for example, the extent to which individual bitcoin users take actions to conceal their identity and trading records, which is a predictor of involvement in illegal activity.
We find that illegal activity accounts for a substantial proportion of the users and trading activity in bitcoin. For example, approximately one-quarter of all users (26%) and close to one-half of bitcoin transactions (46%) are associated with illegal activity. The estimated 27 million bitcoin market participants that use bitcoin primarily for illegal purposes (as at April 2017) annually conduct around 37 million transactions, with a value of around $76 billion, and collectively hold around $7 billion worth of bitcoin.
To give these numbers some context, the total market for illegal drugs in the US (Kilmer et al, 2014) and Europe (EMCDDA, 2013) is estimated to be around $100 billion and €24 billion annually. Such comparisons provide a sense that the scale of the illegal activity involving bitcoin is not only meaningful as a proportion of bitcoin activity, but also in absolute dollar terms. The scale of illegal activity suggests that cryptocurrencies are transforming the way black markets operate by enabling ‘black market e-commerce’. In effect, cryptocurrencies are facilitating a transformation of the black market much like PayPal and other online payment mechanisms revolutionized the retail industry through online shopping.
In recent years (since 2015), the proportion of bitcoin activity associated with illegal trade has declined. There are two reasons for this trend. The first is an increase in mainstream and speculative interest in bitcoin (rapid growth in the number of legal users), causing the proportion of illegal bitcoin activity to decline, despite the fact that the absolute amount of such activity has continued to increase. The second factor is the emergence of alternative cryptocurrencies that are more opaque and better at concealing a user’s activity (e.g., Dash, Monero, and ZCash). Despite these two factors affecting the use of bitcoin in illegal activity, as well as numerous darknet marketplace seizures by law enforcement agencies, the amount of illegal activity involving bitcoin at the end of our sample in April 2017 remains close to its all-time high.
In shedding light on the dark side of cryptocurrencies, we hope this research will reduce some of the regulatory uncertainty about the negative consequences and risks of this innovation, facilitating more informed policy decisions that assess both the costs and benefits. In turn, we hope this contributes to these technologies reaching their potential. Our work also contributes to understanding the intrinsic value of bitcoin, highlighting that a significant component of its value as a payment system derives from its use in facilitating illegal trade. This has ethical implications for bitcoin as an investment. Third, the techniques developed in the paper this brief is based on can be used in cryptocurrency surveillance in a number of ways, including monitoring trends in illegal activity, its response to regulatory interventions, and how its characteristics change through time. The methods can also be used to identify key bitcoin users (e.g., ‘hubs’ in the illegal trade network) which, when combined with other sources of information, can be linked to specific individuals.
References
- EMCDDA, 2013. “EU drug markets report: a strategic analysis.” Lisbon, January 2013.
- Foley, Sean; Jonathan R. Karlsen; and Talis J. Putnins, 2018. “Sex, Drugs, and Bitcoin: How Much Illegal Activity Is Financed Through Cryptocurrencies?” (October 21, 2018), forthcoming in the Review of Financial Studies.
- Kilmer, Beau; Susan S. Sohler Everingham; Jonathan P. Caulkins; Greg Midgette; Rosalie Liccardo Pacula; Peter H. Reuter; Rachel M. Burns; Bing Han; and Russell Lundberg, 2014. “What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs: 2000–2010.” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014.
Acknowledgment: This Policy Brief is based on a recent research paper (Foley, Karlsen, and Putnins, 2018), which is forthcoming in the Review of Financial Studies, published by Oxford University Press and the Society for Financial Studies.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
How Are Gender-role Attitudes and Attitudes Toward Work Formed? Lesson from the Rise and Fall of the Iron Curtain
Gender differences in attitudes toward work and gender-role attitudes are important determinants of gender inequality in the labor market. In this brief we show that these attitudes vary considerably across countries and can also change within the same country over a relatively short time period. We then present evidence that politico-economic regimes that make substantial effort to bring women into the labor market can shape these attitudes: gender differences in attitudes toward work decrease, and gender-role attitudes become less traditional. Cultural norms with long historical roots are not necessarily invariant to large shocks, and policies aimed at raising women’s presence in the labor market can activate virtuous cycles of increasing female employment.
Gender inequality and cultural attitudes
Levels of gender inequality in the labor market differ considerably worldwide, even among countries at similar levels of economic development. Policies, technology, and economic conditions have long been shown to play an important role in explaining cross-country and regional differences in gender inequality. More recently, researchers have emphasized the role of cultural attitudes, such as women’s attitudes toward work and gender role attitudes (i.e. the beliefs that individuals hold regarding the appropriate roles of men and women in societies). Fortin (2008), for instance, finds that gender differences in attitudes towards work account for part of the existing gender wage gap in the US. Further, Fernández et al. (2004) show that differences in gender-role attitudes partly explain existing variation in female labor force participation. Given that gender differences in attitudes toward work and gender-role attitudes contribute to explain gender inequality in the labor market, economists have recently started studying the origins of these attitudes and their sources of variation over time.
In this policy brief we first document variation across space and over time in gender differences in attitudes toward work and gender-role attitudes; then, we present evidence that politico-economic regimes that put emphasis on women’s inclusion in the labor market can shape these attitudes.
Gender-role attitudes and attitudes toward work across space and over time
The World Values Survey (Inglehart et al., 2014) asks questions, among others, about the importance of work in one’s life, and about one’s beliefs on the appropriate roles for women and men in society.
Based on these questions, we measure gender differences in the importance given to work, and levels of agreement with statements regarding gender roles. Below we show that such measures vary considerably among a sample of countries in Europe and Central-Asia, as well as within countries over time.
Figure 1 shows gender differences in the percentage of survey respondents who reported that work was very important or rather important to them in the survey wave of 1995-1998. There is substantial cross-country variation in whether men or women give more importance to work, and in the magnitude of the gender difference. Moreover, the underlying variation across women is larger than across men (data not shown): the minimum and maximum values among men are 84% (in Georgia) and 97.5% (in Bosnia), whereas the respective values for women are 77% (in Georgia) and 96.6% (in Macedonia).
Figure 1. Gender differences in attitudes toward work
Source: Data are from the 1995-1998 wave of the World Values Survey. Individuals are asked the following question: Please say, for each of the following, how important is work in your life, and the options given are Very important, Rather important, Not very important, Not at all important. Countries selected are those in Europe and Central Asia where the question was asked in the 1995-1998 wave.
Figures 2 and 3 show variation across countries in gender role attitudes. The share of respondents who agree with the statement “A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work “varies from a minimum of 47% in Poland to a maximum of 93% in Finland. The share of respondents who agree with the statement “Both the husband and wife should contribute to household income” varies from a minimum of 78% in Armenia and Finland to a maximum of 98% in Albania.
Figure 2. Working mother: warm relationship with her children.
Source: Data are from the 1995-1998 wave of the World Values Survey. Individuals are asked the following question: People talk about the changing roles of men and women today. For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each?. Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly? A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work. Countries selected are those in Europe and Central Asia where the question was asked in the 1995-1998 wave.
Figure 3. Husband and wife should both contribute to income.
Source: Data are from the 1995-1998 wave of the World Values Survey. Individuals are asked the following question: People talk about the changing roles of men and women today. For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me how much you agree with each. Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly? Both the husband and wife should contribute to household income. Countries selected are those in Europe and Central Asia where the question was asked in the 1995-1998 wave.
A recent strand of the economics literature analyzes the long-term determinants of attitudes and finds that they have very deep historical roots (see Giuliano, 2018). However, attitudes also evolve over time. Figures 4 and 5 show that while in some countries attitudes remain rather stable after 1998, in other countries they change substantially. In Russia, for instance, the gender difference in attitudes toward work has doubled over a period of ten years, with men becoming from 5 to 10 percentage points more likely than women to report that work is important to them. Turning to gender-role attitudes, the percent of respondents who think that a working mother can have a warm relationship with her children has increased the most in countries as different as Macedonia and Spain. The percent of individuals who think that both husband and wife should contribute to income has increased relatively sharply in Moldova, while declining rather substantially in Montenegro and especially in Serbia.
Figure 4. Gender differences in attitudes toward work over time.
Source: See Note to Figure 1.
Figure 5. Gender role attitudes over time.
Source: See Notes to Figures 2 and 3.
The graphs thus suggest that the attitudes considered here vary not only cross-sectionally but can also change over a relatively short time period. A natural question to ask is then: what type of shocks cause a change in gender differences in attitudes toward work and in gender role attitudes?
The role of politico-economic regimes in shaping attitudes
In recent work (Campa and Serafinelli, 2018), we show that politico-economic regimes that focus on women’s inclusion in the labor market can reduce gender differences in attitudes toward work and make gender-role attitudes less traditional. Studying the question of whether politico-economic regimes can change attitudes is difficult, because countries or regions exposed to different regimes are likely very different along many other dimensions, including their history, which is known to shape attitudes. To circumvent this problem, we exploit the imposition of state-socialist regimes across Central and Eastern Europe and their efforts to promote women’s economic inclusion (see Campa and Serafinelli, 2018). First we focus on the socialist regime that emerged in East-Germany in 1949. This regime favored women’s access to tertiary education and to qualified employment through massive childcare provision and other policies that were popular throughout the entire Central and Eastern European region. Conversely, in West-Germany, women were encouraged to either stay home after they had children or take part-time jobs after extended breaks (Trappe, 1996; Shaffer, 1961). Since East and West-Germany before 1949 were part of the same country and as such had a common history and shared institutions, we can compare attitudes in East- and West-Germany after the separation to isolate the impact of different politico-economic regimes on attitudes. In other words, the underlying hypothesis is that attitudes toward work and gender role attitudes in East- and West-Germany were the same before the separation. Such a hypothesis is arguably valid especially because we compare only individuals who, during the separated years, lived relatively close to the East-West border (e.g. within 50 km from the border), and are, thus, expected to have close enough (geography, culture and social norm-driven) preferences and attitudes before the separation.
The results of the comparison can be summarized as follows: (a) due to exposure to a different politico-economic regime, East-German women participated more in the labor market and became more educated than their West-German counterparts; (b) the importance given to work by East-German women increased, which led to a lower gender gap in attitudes toward work with respect to West-Germany; (c) both women and men in East-Germany developed less traditional attitudes than West Germans regarding the relationship of working mothers with their children and the gender division of roles in the household.
In the second part of the paper, we also extend the analysis to a number of transition countries in the Central and Eastern European region. We show that in Central and Eastern Europe between 1945 and 1990 gender-role attitudes became less traditional than in Western Europe.
Conclusion
In this brief we have documented that gender differences in attitudes toward work and gender role attitudes vary substantially across space and can change over a relatively short time period. Since these attitudes affect the level of gender inequality in the labor market, understanding their determinants is important and policy-relevant. In recent work (Campa and Serafinelli, 2018), we exploit the imposition of state-socialist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and show that individuals exposed to different regimes develop different attitudes toward work and different gender-role attitudes.
Such a finding suggests that policies aimed at increasing women’s participation in the labor market can activate virtuous cycles; namely, such policies might improve the cultural acceptance of female work, thus potentially further raising women’s labor force participation. The evidence from the Central and Eastern European region also suggests that history is not necessarily an excuse for inaction regarding women’s participation in the labor market. While deeply rooted cultural norms can be an obstacle to women’s economic empowerment, these norms are not necessarily absolutely time-invariant, and can respond to important economic and policy shocks.
A caveat to such conclusions is that the evidence presented here is specific to women’s attitudes toward work and attitudes regarding the acceptability of female work. Other attitudes and norms are also important in defining the level of gender equality in a society, such as those involving the division of roles in a couple when both couple members work outside of the home, the acceptability of violence against women, the suitability of women and men to different fields of education. Little is known about these attitudes and more research is needed to understand which policies, if any, can change them.
References
- Campa, P. and M. Serafinelli (2018), Politico-economic regimes and attitudes: Female workers under state-socialism, Review of Economics and Statistics, Forthcoming
- Fernández, R., A. Fogli and C. Olivetti (2004), Mothers and sons: Preference formation and female labor force dynamics, Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(4): 1249–1299.
- Giuliano (2018). Gender: A Historical Perspective, in Oxford Handbook on the Economics of Women, ed. Susan L. Averett, Laura M. Argys, and Saul D. Hoffman, New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
- Inglehart, R., C. Haerpfer, A. Moreno, C. Welzel, K. Kizilova, J. Diez-Medrano, M. Lagos, P. Norris, E. Ponarin & B. Puranen et al. (eds.). 2014. World Values Survey: Round Three – Country Pooled Datafile Version: www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV3.jsp.
- Shaffer, H (1981), “Women in the two Germanies: A comparison of a socialist and a non-socialist society.”
- Trappe, H (1996), “Work and family in women’s lives in the German Democratic Republic”, Work and Occupations 23(4): 354–377.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Managing Relational Contracts
A wide range of important economic activities depend on self-enforcing informal “relational” contracts. For instance, a firm may buy a good knowing that it cannot sue the other firm if the quality is low – instead high quality is maintained through threat of the firm not making any future purchases. Relational contracts are typically modeled as being between a principal and an agent, such as a firm owner and a supplier. Yet in a variety of organizations, relationships are overseen by an intermediary such as a manager. Such arrangements open the door for collusion between the manager and the agent. We develop a theory of such managed relational contracts. We show that managed relational contracts can be both more and less efficient than the principal agent ones. In particular, kickbacks from the agent can help solve the manager’s commitment problem. When commitment is difficult, this can result in higher quality than the principal could incentivize directly. However, making relationships more valuable enables more collusion and hence can reduce quality.
Introduction
In 2006, the American retailer Aéropostale accused its chief merchandising manager Christopher Finazzo of receiving more than $25 million in kickbacks from a supplier, South Bay. Aéropostale argued that Finazzo had paid inflated prices to South Bay in exchange. Finazzo responded that he had favoured South Bay since they provided higher quality and a willingness to adapt to Aéropostale’s procurement needs. He argued that Aéropostale often remained “loyal” and “committed” to long-time “vendors even when those vendors charged higher prices” (Droney, 2017). In 2013, a jury found Finazzo and South Bay guilty of fraud. They appealed the restitution amount and in 2017 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit demanded a recalculation. Judge Droney argued that it was possible that Aéropostale did not lose money as a result of the kickback scheme. He argued that instead Finazzo’s “conduct may have reduced transactions costs for South Bay” and the relationship may have made it profitable for South Bay to pay kickbacks even at non-inflated prices (Droney, 2017).
Relational contracts between organizations are ubiquitous and are crucial for enforcing promises. Indeed, “lack of trust and commitment” is behind most supplier collaboration failures (Webb, 2017). The task of maintaining these relationships is often delegated to a manager like Finazzo. As illustrated by Aéropostale’s case, the firm can never guarantee that the manager will exclusively act in the firm’s best interest. Managers can exploit the (otherwise very valuable) trust relationship with their suppliers to collude with them. Does collusion between the manager and agent crowd out quality? Is collusion always detrimental for the principal?
In a new paper (Troya-Martinez and Wren-Lewis, 2018), we develop a theory of managed self-enforcing relational contracts.
Our model features a manager and an agent who have a bilateral relational contract over time (Levin, 2003). To model that the relationship is managed on behalf of a third party, we assume that profits are shared between the manager and a principal. Every period, the agent privately exerts costly effort to produce a quality which cannot be formally contracted on. To motivate effort, the manager promises to reward high quality with a price premium. This price is paid in part by the principal and in part by the manager. The manager and agent can also make side payments (which represent kickbacks, bribes or other favours) after the quality has been realized. The payment of both the price and side payments needs to be self-enforced.
Kickbacks as an enforcing mechanism
We find that collusion resulting from a managed relational contract can disincentivize quality if the manager pays a discretionary price premium regardless of quality. In particular, she may do so when she trusts that the agent will respond by making a side payment. More surprisingly, side payments can enhance a manager’s ability to commit, and hence allow higher quality. This is because the supplier will renege on paying side payments if the manager reneges on the promised price. This is consistent with evidence that side payments can help contract enforcement. Cole and Tran (2011) analyse informal payments in an Asian country and find that when contract payments are dependent on non-contractible quality, “the kickback is paid only after all contract payments have been made”. In a similar case, Paine (2004) describes how “a purchasing official called about an overdue payment for items already received, [explaining] ‘we can get you a check by next week if you can give us a discount — in cash so we can distribute it to employees’”.
Side payments are thus not necessarily detrimental for the firm when commitment is scarce. This theory thus provides an instance of the “reduced transaction costs” mentioned by Judge Droney.
More trust is not always better
Another interesting implication of a managed relational contract is the non-monotonicity of the relation between trust and efficiency. In the standard principal-agent model of relational contracts, more trustworthy relationships produce higher quality. In managed relational contacts, we show that the opposite may happen.
Figure 1 depicts the effort (and hence quality) exerted by the agent when the manager is in charge (purple) and when the principal is in charge (green). It depicts the effort as a function of the time discount factor delta, which is a measure of how valuable the relationship is (i.e. a larger delta implies a more valuable future). More valuable relationships produce higher effort, and hence higher quality, only up to a point. Once the relationship is sufficiently valuable, extra value facilitates collusion, which reduces effort. In particular, it allows the manager to pay the agent a high price in exchange for a side payment even when quality is low. This non-monotonicity result is consistent with evidence on firms’ use of guanxi, a system of trust-based “informal social relationship” in China which is often used to ensure “that a contract is honored” (Chow, 1997). Vanhonacker (2004) observes that “it would be naive to think—as many Western executives do—that the more guanxi you have on the front lines in China, the better”. Instead, he argues too much guanxi can “divide the loyalties of the sales and procurement people”.
Figure 1. Effort (or quality) with and without delegation to a manage
Source: Troya-Martinez and Wren-Lewis (2018). This figure plots the effort incentivized by the manager (in purple) and by the principal (in green) as a function of the discount factor (delta), which is a measure of how valuable the future is.
This result has important implications for policies designed to reduce fraud or corruption in contexts where relational contracts are valuable. Many such policies involve disrupting relational contracts in order to reduce manager-agent collusion, for instance by encouraging competition or increasing personnel rotation. The results of the analysis suggest that, in some circumstances, weakening manager-agent relations may simultaneously cut corruption and improve output. In other circumstances, however, there will be a trade-off, and reducing corruption may come at the cost of holding back potentially productive relationships.
Conclusion
The paper summarized by this brief is the first paper that studies the impact of collusion on relational contracts. The main take away messages are the following: First, when trust is a scarce resource, managed relational contracts are more credible and can incentivize more quality than direct relational contracts.
Second, collusion can crowd out productive effort when the relationship between manager and agent is too strong. In this case, trust is used to overpay the agent when quality is low.
Before the most recent Aéropostale judgment, it was common to use “the value of the kickbacks” as “a reasonable measure of the pecuniary loss suffered” by the third party (Droney, 2017). Judge Droney, however, argued that this “negative correlation” between kickbacks and loss should not be taken for granted. Indeed, our model has shown when this negative correlation may not exist. Hence, our conclusions may help explain why politicians and firm owners frequently turn a blind eye to employees accepting side payments (Banfield, 1975). On the other hand, our model also identifies when side payments undermine effort. In other words, it emphasizes the complex relationship between kickbacks and productive relational contracts. This complexity needs to be accounted for in policymaking.
References
- Banfield, Edward C. 1975. “Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization.” The Journal of Law & Economics, 18(3): 587-605.
- Chow, Gregory C. 1997. “Challenges of China’s economic system for economic theory.” The American Economic Review, 87(2): 321-327.
- Cole, Shawn; and Anh Tran. 2011. “Evidence from the Firm: A New Approach to Understanding Corruption.” In International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption Vol. II. , ed. Susan Rose-Ackerman and Tina Soriede, 408-427. Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Droney, J. 2017. “United States v. Finazzo.” 14-3213-cr, 14-3330-cr.
- Levin, Jonathan. 2003. “Relational Incentive Contracts.” American Economic Review, 93(3): 835-857.
- Paine, Lynn S. 2004. “Becton Dickinson: Ethics and Business Practices (A).” Harvard Business School Case 399-055.
- Troya-Martinez, Marta; and Liam Wren-Lewis, 2018. “Managing Relational Contracts”, CEPR Discussion Paper Series DP12645 (v. 2).
- Vanhonacker, Wilfried R. 2004. “When Good Guanxi Turns Bad.” Harvard Business Review, 82(4): 18.
- Webb, Jonathan, 2017. “Why Do Supplier Collaborations Go Wrong? What Can Be Done About It?”, Forbes, 28 September 2017.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Revisiting Growth Patterns in Emerging Markets
Recent studies document that emerging markets are rather similar in their growth patterns despite profound differences in starting conditions and productivity fundamentals. This challenges the common view on productivity as the main growth engine. The crucial role of the external environment for emerging markets emphasized by numerous studies adds to this doubt. I argue that productivity fundamentals still matter and remain the core driver of sustainable growth. However, external factors are crucial for understanding deviations from the trajectory of sustainable growth, i.e. episodes of growth accelerations/decelerations.
Challenges for Understanding Growth in Emerging Markets
As we enter the 4th decade of economic transition in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the causes and directions of causality of long-term growth in emerging markets might need to be reconsidered. Some recent studies emphasize that growth trajectories in emerging markets are pretty similar, i.e. average growth rates do not differ too much, while jumps and drops in growth rates are synchronous for the bulk of emerging economies (e.g. Fayad and Perelli, 2014). For instance, a decade ago the level of GDP per capita (in 2011 international $) in Macedonia was roughly 45% of that in the Slovak Republic, which likely reflected the productivity (measured through the Global Competitiveness Index) gap between them. During the last decade, Macedonia has roughly closed this productivity gap. Growth theory would postulate that this should have transformed into faster output growth in Macedonia vs. Slovak Republic closing well-being gap. However, the two countries’ had throughout the decade roughly equal average output growth and the well-being gap today is still the same as it was ten years ago.
Such observations seem to conflict with existing theoretical views. First, this is a challenge to the well-being convergence concept that results from growth theory. Moreover, if we measure growth in terms of the speed of closing the well-being gap with respect to the frontier (the US economy), one may argue even for divergence. For instance, Figure 1 presents a scatter-plot for a sample of emerging markets relating the initial conditions – well-being level in 1995 (GDP per capita relative to one of the US economy) – and the average speed of well-being gap (vs. the US economy) closing throughout 1996-2017 (measured in p.p. of corresponding gap ).
Second, the evidence that productivity gains do not automatically trigger output growth challenges a common view that productivity is the major driver for sustainable growth.
Figure 1.Starting Conditions and Well-Being Gains
Source: Own computations based on data from World Development Indicators database (World Bank).
What are possible explanations for the observed similarity in growth rates of emerging markets?
A study by the IMF (2017) suggests a response: growth in emerging markets is similar and synchronous due to the external environment. This study emphasizes the crucial dependence of medium-term growth in developing countries on the following factors: growth of external demand in trade partners, financial conditions, and trade conditions. Moreover, it states that these factors are dominant in explaining the episodes of growth strengthening/weakening.
Does this explanation change the growth nexus for emerging markets? Can one state, that while external factors are crucial for growth and growth in developing countries is rather homogenous, the productivity gains are not so important anymore?
I would say no. First, for better understanding of growth patterns we must clearly compare the relative importance of productivity gains vs. external factors in affecting the growth schedule. Second, we must separate relatively short-term fluctuations in GDP growth from sustainable growth.
Detecting Relative Importance of Growth Drivers
To answer the question about the relative importance of productivity fundamentals and growth factors, I study a panel of 34 emerging market economies (EBRD sample netted from 3 countries for which the data is not available) for 11 years (2007-2017).
To evaluate the relative importance of productivity and external factors, I use a standard approach of running panel growth regressions with fixed effects. At the same time, I make a number of novelties in the research design.
First, for measures of productivity, I engage a unique database – Global Competitiveness Indicators by World Economic Forum (WEF). Although this database provides an insightful perspective on productivity fundamentals at the country level, it is rather seldom a ‘guest’ in economic research. From this database, I extract a number of individual indicators in order to detect which ones among them that have the strongest growth-enhancing effect. For an alternative specification, I use principal components of 9 individual indicators from this database as proxies for productivity gains.
Second, for external factors, I use an approach similar to the IMF (2017) and calculate variables representing external demand growth, trade conditions, and financial conditions (such as a measure of capital inflows) for each country. Moreover, in respect to external demand growth, I use different competing measures (based on either imports of GDP growth of trade partners) and choose the best one in each individual equation. By doing so, I allow this dimension of the external environment to be represented in each model to the largest possible extent.
Third, I depart from using output growth as the only measure of economic growth and response variable in growth regressions. I argue that for international comparison purposes it is worthwhile to consider also the speed of closing the gap towards the frontier (the US economy). On the one hand, this measure is strongly correlated with the traditional output growth rate. On the other hand, this measure, in a sense, nets out the growth rate of a country from global growth, thus capturing something more unique and peculiar just to individual countries’ gains in well-being. Furthermore, I argue that in the discussion about the factors behind growth, one should distinguish between relatively short and long term growth. Annual growth rates, especially at relatively short time horizon, are too dependent on fluctuations, which may be interpreted in terms of growth rate strengthening/weakening. However, to emphasize the property of growth sustainability, we should get rid of ‘unnecessary noise’. For this purpose, I also introduce a trend growth rate measured in a most simple way as the 5 year moving average (following the discussion in Coibion et al. (2017), show that the bulk of measures of ‘potential’ growth are not good enough to get rid of demand shocks and these measures are pretty close to simple moving average measures).
I apply this definition of trend growth both to ‘standard’ GDP growth rate and to the speed of closing the gap towards frontier. So, finally I have 4 response variables: ‘standard’ growth rate, the speed of closing the gap to frontier, and two corresponding measures of trend growth.
Sustainable Growth Mainly Depends on Productivity
Having short-term (annual) growth rate as response variable (either ‘standard’ or the one in terms of closing the gap) provides results close to those in IMF (2017). It may be interpreted in a way that the external environment is more important than productivity factors. If dividing all regressors into two broad groups of factors – external and productivity – the former is responsible for up to 70% of the growth effect, while the latter for about 30%. Among external environment factors, the most important one is financial conditions. Its relative importance is roughly 50% of the group of external factors’ total.
Among productivity fundamentals, an important contributor to short-term growth is the quality of the macroeconomic environment. According to the methodology of WEF (2017), this indicator encompasses the fiscal stance, savings-investment balance, the external position, inflation path, debt issues, etc.
When refocusing from short-term growth to the growth trend as a response variable, the relative importance of the factors behind growth changes. Productivity fundamentals in this case drive up to 80% of growth effect, while external factors are responsible for the remaining 20%. It is worth noting here that the proportion in favor of productivity factors is higher for the concept of closing the gap to frontier rather than for ‘standard’ trend growth rate. This evidence may be interpreted as additional justification for treating this measure of growth as ‘good’ at reflecting individual properties of a country in a global landscape.
Furthermore, the role of individual variables also changes. Among external factors, the most important role in driving sustainable growth belongs to trade conditions and external demand growth, while the role of financial conditions is either miserable or insignificant at most. Among productivity factors as drivers of trend growth, the quality of the macroeconomic environment seems to play a special role, as well as the efficiency of the goods market and the financial system.
Conclusions
The evidence showing rather similar and synchronous growth in emerging markets and recent evidence on the crucial importance of external factors for emerging markets should not lead us to incorrectly believe that productivity fundamentals do not matter anymore. Productivity fundamentals are still the core driver of sustainable growth. At the same time, we should keep in mind the important role of the external environment for emerging markets. However, changes in the external environment are more likely to generate relatively short-term growth rate fluctuations, while having a modest impact on the sustainable growth trajectory. Hence, a country aiming to secure sustainable growth should still first of all think about productivity fundamentals.
References
- Coibion, O., Gorodnichenko, Y, Ulate, M. (2017). The Cyclical Sensitivity in Estimates of Potential Output, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 23580.
- EBRD (2017). Transition Report 2017-2018, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London, UK.
- Fayad, G., and Perelli, R. (2014). Growth Surprises and Synchronized Slowdown in Emerging Markets—An Empirical Investigation, IMF Working Paper, WP/14/173.
- IMF (2017). Roads Less Traveled: Growth in Emerging Markets and Developing Economies in a Complicated External Environment, in IMF World Economic Outlook, April, 2017, pp. 65-120.
- World Economic Forum (2017). The Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018, Geneva: World Economic Forum.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Gender Equality and Economic Development: From Research to Action
It’s increasingly being acknowledged that gender inequality is not just a human rights issue, but of first order importance for economic development. It is also an issue of high priority for the Swedish government, with the feminist foreign policy gaining a lot of attention worldwide. This policy brief shortly summarizes presentations held during a full day conference at the Stockholm School of Economics on June 1, 2018. The event focused on how gender discrimination negatively impacts the productivity of low and middle income economies, but also how reforms and specific initiatives can better the situation. The perspective was both long term, how norms and laws governing women’s rights have evolved over time, and short term, illustrating the current challenges women and societies face, with a particular emphasis on the situation in Eastern Europe. This was the 7th installment of SITE Development Day – a yearly development policy conference organized with support from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
From Research: Causes, Costs and Remedies
Cross-country differences in gender equality are often explained by variation in formal institutions such as laws and policies, and informal institutions such as social norms, religion and culture. A recent literature has focused on understanding the underlying drivers behind the variation in gender norms, arguing that these norms themselves may be functions of predetermined fundamentals such as geography, language and external shocks such as wars, revolutions or the slave trade. An influential line of research has emphasized that certain agricultural conditions have given prominence to technologies that require more muscular strength (the plow), whereas in shifting agriculture, hand-held tools like the hoe and the digging stick, require less upper body strength, are more labor intensive and easier to combine with child care. The former conditions are therefore associated with a stricter gender division of labor that generated a norm that the natural place for women is in the home. That these differences still linger have been empirically shown looking at cross-country variation in outcomes such as female labor force participation, political representation, inheritance rules, polygamy, parental authority and women’s freedom of movement. The variation is also found among second generation immigrants, where the attitudes from the parents’ ancestry are reflected also among those born and raised in western societies with more equal gender norms.
There has been an increasing emphasis on trying to estimate how gender inequality inhibits economic development, and to put numbers on the foregone economic development and growth from continuing inequality. A key indicator of inequality in this respect is the gender gap in labor force participation. There has been progress globally in this respect, but we are still far from equality and outcomes vary dramatically across regions and countries. Traditional approaches to estimate the benefits of increased female labor force participation (flfp) has assumed perfect substitutability between men and women. New evidence suggests that this may not be true, that men and women are complementary, which implies that increased flfp increases production beyond just the fact that more people are put to work. This also means that more women in work increases the productivity of men, in other words a win-win situation. This complementarity effect can take place at the workplace (think of diversified company boards), but recent research suggests that this is particularly true at the macro level. This is likely because men and women tend to work in different sectors and occupations that are themselves complementary, yielding the additional benefit at the macro level. Estimates of welfare gains of eliminating barriers to female labor force participation to levels seen in the US, suggest improvements of on average 22 % in South Asia and 18 % in the Middle East and North Africa region.
One important policy tool to influence gender outcomes, and sometimes also gender norms, is tax and benefits policy. These sets of policies are almost never explicitly gender biased, but the impact of details of policies in areas such as inheritance law, parental leave, pensions and taxes all affect the incentives that men, women and couples face. It is also important to understand that these policies often operate in an environment that is far from being without a gender bias, suggesting that there may be motivation for government intervention to correct outcomes and also lead the way to slowly change norms. As models of household decision-making suggest that partners may not operate as a unitary actor maximizing joint welfare, and women typically have lower bargaining power within the household, policies that leave discretionary power to the couple may lead to highly unequal outcomes. Instead policies may need to be individualized, such as tax policy and parental leave policy.
The conference also contained a panel specifically focusing on Eastern Europe. The communist legacy meant that these countries, in some dimensions such as flfp, started from much more equal levels than other countries at comparable levels of income in the 1990s. The most immediate gender crisis in some ways was on behalf of men, whose life expectancy dropped dramatically. This crisis for men also created externalities in the form of domestic violence and orphaned children. Since 1990, there has therefore been some reversals in gender outcomes, and in some areas, such as political representation, the region on average performs quite poorly. Individual countries also face very different challenges. In Georgia the sex ratio at birth increased dramatically in the 1990’s as economic hardship and conflict coincided with the introduction of new technology to determine the sex of a child in utero. In Belarus inequality strikes both ways, with men having more than 10 years lower life expectancy, have higher retirement age and are drafted to military service. On the other hand women are under-represented in politics and largely responsible for unpaid homework, partly due to a very generous 3 year-long paid maternity leave policy. The tradition of bride kidnapping in parts of Central Asia (as high as 10-25 % of women in parts of rural Kyrgyzstan) was brought up, and research showing birthweight losses of children to kidnapped mothers equivalent to those measured elsewhere in conflict zones (100-200 g) suggest that this is indeed a real violation of these women.
To Action: Policies for gender equality
The SDG 2030 agenda and the concurrent finance for development process both emphasize the importance of having all sectors of society onboard in the quest of achieving the new development goals. The event therefore included representatives of both the private, public and civil societies, and featured a range of different initiatives across these sectors. A sector in which many women work for foreign companies in developing countries is textile. Here foreign companies can lead the way through initiatives beyond direct wage and employment policies that improve women’s welfare, such as information campaigns devoted to personal hygiene or policies that transfer salaries directly to the personal account of the employees (an approach that matters when there is unequal bargaining power within the household, as shown through research). Also initiatives to reduce harassment and support female careers can make a difference. A sector on the other side of the spectrum is the telecommunications sector, which is very male dominated. This bias typically start from an early age, and is reinforced by gender stereotypes. Active work in the community to early on reaching out with tech programs explicitly targeting girls can make a difference, and so can making people aware of unconscious biases.
Aid agencies and NGOs also play an important role in promoting gender equality in partner countries. Research shows that women in relative terms tend to spend resources in ways that benefit the family more, and discrimination can be counteracted through policies specifically targeting women and trying to strengthening their situation both outside and inside the household. Initiatives that give women access to credits, and foster collective action and political engagement have been tested on large scale in for instance India. Aid financed investment funds target female entrepreneurs, and engage in programs to integrate women into the investment process. Investors also have the leverage to stress the importance of partner companies investing in their female employees, for instance though education, safe transportation and separate changing rooms. A major player like Sida can engage in a dialogue also with partner governments to incentivize them to live up to commitments made in conventions and treaties, but also empower change agents that can put pressure on patriarchic structures. In the health sector, priority is given to sexual and reproductive rights, but beyond targeted interventions it is also important to mainstream a gender perspective into all types of projects and programs. It’s acknowledged that measuring impact is a challenge, and some partners are perceived as more receptive than others, but the perception is that attitudes are changing.
A Government Perspective
From the Swedish government’s side it was emphasized that gender equality is a goal in itself, as well as a prerequisite for economic development. The by now well-known feminist foreign policy is based on three R’s: that all women and girls should have access to rights, representation and resources. The policy is backed up by an action plan with clearly expressed goals in areas of peace and violence, political representation, economic empowerment and sexual and reproductive health rights. These goals will be evaluated for results (a fourth “R”) and, due to international demand, the foreign ministry is currently preparing a handbook for feminist foreign policy to document the process and the lessons learned. In the collaboration with Eastern Partnership countries, gender equality became part of the summit declaration in 2015. There’s an increasing willingness to talk about gender in the partnership countries, but many challenges remain, as also exemplified by recent experience from working in the government of Ukraine. Swedish initiatives are often a catalyst for change, though, with EU politicians and administrators slowly following pace. It was emphasized that to argue for the case of women and girls, data and research is crucial, so the FREE initiative to create a center of excellence in gender economics (FROGEE) was received with much appreciation.
To get more information about the presentations during the day and references to the data and literature discussed above, please visit this page.
Participants at the conference
- Ann Bernes, Ambassador for Gender Equality and Coordinator of Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy, Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- Raphael Espinoza, Senior Economist, IMF.
- Paola Giuliano, Associate Professor of Economics, UCLA, Anderson School of Management.
- Michal Myck, Director at CenEa, Poland.
- Anna-Karin Dahlberg, Corporate Sustainability Manager at Lindex.
- Richard Nordström, General Director at Hand in Hand.
- Karin Kronhöffer, Director Strategy and Communication at Swedfund.
- Anne Larilahti, VP Head of Sustainability Strategy at Telia.
- Jesper Roine, Deputy Director, SITE.
- Charles Becker, Research Professor of Economics, Duke University.
- Tamta Maridashvili, Researcher, ISET-PI, Georgia.
- Lev Lvovskiy, Research Fellow, BEROC.
- Elsa Håstad, Director at the Department for Europe and Latin America at Sida.
- Inna Sovsun, Vice President at Kyiv School of Economics (KSE), Ukraine.
- Anna Westerholm, Sweden’s Ambassador for the EU Eastern Partnership.
- Carin Jämtin, Director General at Sida.
- Torbjörn Becker, Director at SITE.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Career Women and the Family – A New Perspective on the Role of Minimum Wage
This brief finds that whereas in the 1980s richer women had fewer children than women near the middle of income distribution in the US, it is no longer true today. It argues that the rise in inequality is the main driver for this change. Greater income inequality enables high-income families to outsource household production to lower-income people. Changes to minimum wage laws are thus likely to affect the fertility and career decisions of the rich.
“I have frequently been questioned, especially by women, of how I could reconcile family life with a scientific career. Well, it has not been easy.”
– Marie Curie, 1867-1934
Much has been made of women “leaning in” at work at a cost to their families. Indeed, this discussion has become more prevalent as women have surpassed men in higher education in most developed countries, and have entered prestigious careers en masse, a fact reinforced by public policy. For example, in 2012 the European Commission published a special report on women in decision-making positions, suggesting legislation to achieve balanced representation of women and men on company boards. One natural question to ask is, how high is the cost of a woman’s career to her family? This is a difficult, multifaceted, and even sexist question to ask.
High-income women have historically had fewer kids (Figure 1 for the year 1980). Social scientists’ leading explanations rely on the difficulty of combining children and a career. Under this view of the world, as more women focus on their careers, they have fewer children. On the other hand, the evidence shows that more educated (or wealthier) women produce more educated children. Given these two regularities, the majority of children are born to poorer mothers, and thus receive an inferior education. Moreover, this creates a feedback loop that depresses the average education through time making us question our ability to sustain a satisfactory average level of education.
Figure 1. Fertility rates by income deciles, 1980 and 2010
Notes: Calculated using Census and American Community Survey Data. The sample is restricted to white, non-Hispanic married women. Fertility rates are hybrid fertility rates, constructed by age-specific deciles. Deciles are constructed using total household income.
However, the negative relationship between family income and fertility ceases to hold after the 2000s. Figure 1 shows that for the year 2010, the cross-sectional relationship between income and fertility has flattened or even become a U-shape. Today, high-income women have higher fertility rates than those of women near the middle of income distribution. This is a result of a substantial increase in fertility among women in the 9th and 10th decile of family income: they increased their fertility by 0.66 & 0.84 children, respectively. The rise in fertility of high-skilled females was first documented in Hazan and Zoabi (2015), discussed in a previous FREE Policy Brief. The implications are profound; children are more likely to be born to wealthier or more educated mothers than in the past. This has a far-reaching impact on the future composition of the population.
How can we understand the change in fertility patterns over time? We argue that rising wage inequality played an important role. Data for the years 1980 and 2010 show that average real hourly wages, quoted in 2010 $ grew from $28 ($51) to $50 ($64) for women (men) in the 10th decile of the income distribution. This increase was accompanied by stagnant wages for women (men) in the 1st decile, precisely the people who are most likely to provide services that substitute for household chores (Figure 2). Thus, growing wage inequality over the past three decades created both a group of women who can afford to buy services that help them raise their children, and a group who is willing to supply these services cheaply. In a recent paper, we found that the increase in wage inequality from 1980 and 2010 can actually explain the rise in high income fertility (Bar et al. 2017). Moreover, this rise in inequality has resulted in a large increase in college attendance through the changing patterns of fertility. This is because more children are now born to highly educated mothers.
Figure 2. Wives’ Wage by Income Decile 1980 & 2010
Notes: Calculated using Census and American Community Survey Data. The sample is restricted to white, non-Hispanic married men. Deciles are constructed age-by-age, using total household income. Representative wages for each decile is the average of these decile-specific wages from ages 25 to 50.
Our new understanding of the interrelation between income inequality, the relative cost of home production substitutes, fertility pattern and educational choice induces us to rethink some typical economic debates. For instance, consider the minimum wage. The typical debate about the minimum wage is focused on how it affects lower wage individuals in terms of income and their ability to find work. However, if people who earn the minimum wage are disproportionately also those who help raise wealthier families’ children, or simply make running a household easier, then a higher minimum wage can make home production substitutes more expensive for high wage women, making it harder for them to afford both a family and a career. While indirect, this effect can be significant. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the real wage, relative to the minimum wage, both for the industries of the economy associated with home production substitutes and other sectors of the economy. The figure clearly shows that workers in industries associated with home production substitutes are concentrated around the minimum wage and thus are much more likely to earn wages that are close to the minimum wage.
Figure 3. The distribution of real wages, relative to the effective real minimum wage in each state and year, by sector of the economy
Notes: Data from Current Population Survey, 1980–2010, using all workers.
Interestingly, we calculate a change in the cost of home production substitutes following an increase of the Federal minimum wage from $7.25 to $15/hour, as suggested by Bernie Sanders during the 2016 presidential election. It turns out that this increase in the minimum wage would increase the cost of market services that substitute for household chores by about 21.1%. Indeed, the minimum wage has a strong impact on the average wages of workers producing home production substitutes. However, how does this increase affect the economy?
According to our theory, higher costs of home production substitutes would affect women’s choice of how to allocate their time between labor force participation and home production, including raising children. The higher cost of these substitutes induces women to buy less of them and spend more of their time producing home production goods. Indeed, we find that the increase in the minimum wage decreases fertility and increases mothers’ time at home, and more so for higher income households. The magnitudes are large. A 10th (5th) decile household decreases fertility by 12.8% (9.4%), while the mother spends 9.7% (2.5%) more time at home. Notice that these numbers are calculated under the assumption that women can adjust fertility. What about those who are “locked in” their fertility choice? We recalculate changes in mother’s time at home for these mothers using the model’s fertility in 2010 with the increased cost of market services that substitute for household chores. A 10th decile mother increases time at home by 25.9%, while a 5th decile mother increases it by 13.1%. These numbers are larger as the family has not had a chance to scale back fertility. The short run effect on labor supply is also very large. The average reduction in labor supply by women in the 9th and 10th deciles is 3.5%.
Whether an increase in the minimum wage is good or bad for the society is a big question. Not only does it lie beyond the scope of our theory, but also beyond the scope of social sciences. However, the one modest contribution we try to make is in observing that an increase in the minimum wage heightens the rivalry between a woman’s career and family. As such, it forces women to forgo one in order to opt for the other.
The sexist nature of our question lay in the implicit assumption that it is the mother’s responsibility to look after the children or home production in general, rather than the father’s. While once this was a nearly universal attitude, it is now increasingly common for fathers to take a more central role in childcare rather than leave everything to the mother. How does this change in gender roles affect our analysis? In modern times, both spouses’ careers are potentially affected by children, as both parents take a role in child care. Fathers are now facing the same tradeoffs as mothers did in the traditional gender role story: children vs. careers. As a result, marketization is more important than ever for career oriented parents.
Talk to a high wage family and no doubt that they’ll readily tell you how important their ability to purchase daycare, prepared food, or other help at home is to their success as parents. Perhaps parents don’t realize that the price of these goods are so intricately linked to inequality or the minimum wage, but the policy maker should bear in mind that these are key factors for career women and the family.
References
- Hazan and Zoabi (2015), “Do Highly Educated Women Have Smaller Families” The Economic Journal
- Bar, Hazan, Leukhina, Weiss, and Zoabi (In progress) “Is the Market Pronatalist? Inequality, Differential Fertility, and Growth Revisited”
Political Responsibility for Economic Crises
This brief summarizes the results of research on the political costs of large-scale economic crises. In a large historic sample of countries, we study the impact of different types of crises, such as sovereign and domestic defaults, banking crises and economic recessions, on political turnover of top politicians: heads of the state and central bank governors. According to the findings, only default on domestic debt increases the probability of politicians’ turnover but not the default on external debt. As argued, this is due to the fact that the latter is not directly felt by the voters. In addition, we find that although currency crises increase chances of head of central bank turnover, it does not affect tenures of heads of state. Presumably, this is the case since currency crises are in the eyes of the public the responsibility of CB governors. These findings are relevant for both developed and transition economies, but are especially important for the latter as political turmoil and economic recessions are more prevalent in developing nations.
Overview and Key Findings
Large-scale economic crises are associated not only with the economic downturns, but also with political turnover. When the national economy is in a critical state, a default declaration often turns the economy back to growth as it is typically viewed as an act of acknowledging a problem and showing readiness for changes. However, politicians responsible for the economy and leaders of the states are often reluctant to declare default and try to postpone it, which worsens the situation. One of the reasons behind such unwillingness to act is a fear of a political turnover following the open acknowledgement of a problem.
This brief summarizes the findings Lvovskiy and Shakhnov (2018). We investigate the statistical evidence of political costs related to different types of economic crises.
We find that the effects of a crisis depend on the crisis type and on whether it was in the area of responsibility of a given politician. For example, external sovereign defaults have no effect on political turnover, which we interpret as external sovereign default having a small impact on the general public. On the contrary, domestic sovereign defaults have a large impact on the country population and often lead to the replacement of the top executive. In turn, banking crises are followed by the downfall of the government at the level of chief executive as well as the governor of the central bank.
While there is large literature on career concerns of politicians and political turnover, the majority of papers either focus on the regular changes through elections in democratic regimes (Treisman, 2015) or study a particular non-democratic country, like China (Li and Zhou, 2005). However, throughout history, crises have often happened in transition, non-democratic or not fully democratic countries. Furthermore, even in democratic countries many changes of government have been irregular. Since a delay in default declaration usually harms economies it is important to understand the mechanisms behind it in different institutional settings. Our paper contributes to this understanding by analyzing the impact of economic crises on political survival in a wide set of countries and regimes. Better understanding of the political costs that the top executives face while making such decisions is crucial for the prediction of these decisions as well as for international default negotiations and consultations.
Below we describe our finding in some more detail.
Statistical Analysis and Results
Our analysis consists of two main parts. We start with the political turnover for heads of state, who are in charge of the performance of the whole economy, which we measure by the GDP growth. Then, we look at central bank (CB) governors, who are in charge of the monetary policy, price stability, stability of the financial sector and banking supervision.
Table 1. Head of state changes
Table 1 presents the estimated linear probability regression models for the head of state turnover. As expected, elections have a strong impact on the probability of the turnover of the head of state. Further, as Column 1 in Table 1 shows default on external debt has no significant impact on the head of state tenure while default on domestic debt increases the yearly chances of being displaced by 34 %. This supports the idea that voters care more about their own savings than about the general situation with the state’s budget. When we look at the effect of past crises (the predictor variable in this case is whether a crisis took place last year), Column 2 coefficients for both external and domestic defaults appear to no longer be statistically significant. Instead, banking crises become significant. This situation could be due to the fact that one of the common consequences of domestic defaults is an ongoing distortion of savings which often leads to deposit runoffs, so the effect of the previous year’s domestic default now acts through a banking crisis.
Table 2. Central bank governor changes
Table 2 presents similar results but this time the left hand side variable is CB governor turnover. Similarly to the case with the head of state turnover, only default on domestic debt has a significant effect on the CB’s governor tenure and not the one on external debt. The main differences with Table 1 are that elections do not statistically predict turnover of CB heads while currency crises do. The former result is expected since in most countries there are no direct elections of central bank governors and central banks often have some degree of independence from the government. The latter result, that currency crises have a significant impact on CB governors’ tenures, implies that since currency control is one of the roles of a CB, its head is held accountable for currency crises and not the head of a state.
Conclusion
We examine the political cost of different types of economic crises, and find non-uniform effects of different types of crises on the political survival of various key officials. Domestic defaults, and recent banking crises are shown to be costly both for heads of states and central bank governors, while currency crises only have an impact on the political survival of the latter.
Interestingly and importantly, we find no evidence of the impact of (external) sovereign default on political turnover of the head of state or central bank governors. In other words, contrary to Yeyati and Panizza’s (2011) suggestion, it seems that there is no immediate political cost at the top associated with (external) sovereign default. One possible explanation is that the public does not punish a politician for defaults because by defaulting, the politician makes the optimal decision. In a modern world, many developing nations experience rapid growth of their sovereign debt. The presented evidence brings partial optimism that even if economic mistakes have already been made, top politicians would understand that acknowledging a problem and making steps toward its solution may not always be as costly for them as has previously been thought.
References
- Li, Hongbin; Li-An Zhou, 2005. “Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China,” Journal of Public Economics, 89 (9), 1743 – 1762.
- Lvovskiy, Lev; Shakhnov, Kirill, “Political Responsibility for Different Crises”, BEROC working paper #50, 2018
- Treisman, Daniel “Income, Democracy, and Leader Turnover”, American Journal of Political Science, 2015, 59 (4), 927–942.
- Yeyati, Eduardo Levy and Ugo Panizza, “The elusive costs of sovereign defaults,” Journal of Development Economics, January 2011, 94 (1), 95–105.
When Fair Isn’t Fair: Framing Taxes and Benefits
Taxes and benefits create incentives for people to adopt or avoid certain behaviours. They create premiums for (socially) preferred states. A premium can be determined by either taxing unwanted behaviour or by subsidizing desired behaviour. The resulting economic incentive for changing one’s behaviour is nominally equivalent under both mechanisms. However, the choice of frame for an incentive to be either described in terms of a tax or as a benefit can strongly influence perceptions of what is fair treatment of different, e.g. income, groups. Using a survey-experiment with Flemish local politicians, we show policy-makers to be highly susceptible to such tax and benefit framing effects. As such effects may (even unintendedly) lead to sharply different treatment of the same group under the two mechanisms, important questions arise, particularly for the design of new tax and benefit schemes.
The design and implementation of redistributive policies usually evoke much discussion. Opinions, both in public and often also in political debate, tend to be driven by ethical and fairness considerations. However, such concerns can lead to unintended consequences and – at least in terms of ex-ante intended fairness – to ex-post imbalanced incentive structures for different (income) groups.
An important function of taxes and benefits is the creation of premiums for certain behaviours or actions. Either unwanted behaviour may be taxed and thereby sanctioned, or desired behaviour may be encouraged through benefits. Irrespective of the method chosen, an economic incentive is created for individuals to opt for the desired behaviour.
The way such premiums are defined can usually be thought of as a two-step process. First, a baseline for a given behaviour, action, or state is chosen as a reference-point. For instance, baseline behaviours could be to not have retirement savings, to not use safety-certified equipment or follow accepted standards at work, or to not have children. Arguably, these are cases warranting the creation of incentives to encourage people to adopt the socially desirable behaviours of saving money for their old age, working in a safe environment, and having children. The second step, then, requires a choice of mechanism to create an incentive. The mechanism can be to either punish the unwanted behaviour – such as not adhering to safety standards at work – or to grant (cost-reducing) subsidies and benefits for taking the desired action, such as saving for old age or having children.
Importantly, the combination of the chosen reference point and the mechanism to create the incentive can influence the way people think about the fairness of an incentive when the targets belong to different (income) groups. Schelling (1981) demonstrated this point in an in-class experiment, which, somewhat simplified, runs as follows:
Families typically receive some child benefit: they get a certain sum per child. Imagine there are two families, one poor and one rich, both with their first child. What amounts of child benefit should each family get? Should the poor get more than the rich, should both families get the same, or should the rich family get more for having a child than the poor family? Schelling’s students would tend to voice support for either the poor getting more or both families getting the same. After all the rich family is surely already affluent enough to support their child. At the extreme, the rich family would get nothing for having a child, and the poor family quite a lot.
Now think of a world where the standard is to have a child, and couples who do not have a child have this ‘socially undesirable’ behaviour ‘penalised’ through a fee, for instance in the form of a tax. Should the poor couple pay a higher fee, should both couples pay the same, or should the rich couple pay a higher fee? The students now overwhelmingly supported requiring the rich couple to pay more. After all, they have more disposable income. However, in this case, the rich couple receives a lot for having a child (they no longer need to pay the steep fee), whereas the poor family may get no (additional) economic incentive for having a child. The treatment of the same family thus obviously drastically differs between the two frames. At the extreme, the poor family gets quite a lot for changing from having no children to having one child in the first frame, but nothing in the second frame. For the rich family, the situation is the reverse: there is no premium for having a child in the first frame, but potentially quite a high premium for having a child in the second frame.
Does this thought-experiment matter outside the classroom (see also Traub 1999, McCaffery & Baron 2004), beyond the context of child benefit, and among those actually exposed to the design considerations of tax and benefit systems? In a recent paper (Kuehnhanss & Heyndels 2018), we test the occurrence of such framing effects with elected local politicians in Flanders, Belgium, who are involved in the budgetary decision-making in their municipalities.
Framing experiment
We invited 5,928 local politicians to take part in an online survey on economic and social preferences in spring 2016. Participation was voluntary, not incentivised, and questions were not compulsory, allowing respondents to skip them if they so chose. In total, 869 responses to the survey were registered and (N1=) 608 participants provided usable answers to the questions relevant to the framing effect described above.
Participants were randomly allocated to one of two groups, each receiving a slightly different wording of the following question:
“In Belgium couples receive financial benefits from the state. Suppose that it is not relevant how the transfer is funded, and ignore any other benefits, which might come into play. How much [more / less] should a couple [with their first child / without children] receive per month than a couple [without children / with their first child]?”
One group saw the question in the benefit frame with only the italicised phrases in the brackets displayed; the other group saw the question in the tax frame with only the phrases in boldface displayed. In both groups, participants were then asked to fill in amounts they would consider appropriate for each of three couples with different monthly net incomes: €2,000, €4,000, or €6,000, respectively.
With framing effects – and distinct from classic rational choice models – the expectation is that the three couples would be treated differently depending on the phrasing of the question. In the italicised benefit version the amount granted should be decreasing with the income of the family. In the boldface tax version the stated amount should be increasing with the families’ income.
Figure 1. Results child scenario
Source: Kuehnhanss & Heyndels (2018, p.32)
As Figure 1 shows, the results strongly conform to this pattern. The low-income (€2,000) couple is granted an average of €330 in the benefit frame, but only €178 in the tax frame (recall that the premium in the latter arises from no longer receiving less – or ‘paying a fee’ – once there is a child). For the high-income (€6,000) couple, the amounts granted average €132 in the benefit frame, but a much higher €368 in the tax frame.
Environmental taxes and benefits
Child benefit systems are usually a well-established part of countries’ tax and benefit systems. The design of new instruments is more common in policy areas undergoing, for instance, technological change or being newly regulated. A relevant example is policy on the promotion of environmentally friendly behaviour and technologies, e.g. through ‘green’ taxes and subsidies. To test the validity of the hypothesised framing effect, we also included a second scenario in our survey related to the municipal interests of our respondents, namely car taxes. Flemish municipalities receive income from a surcharge levied on the car taxes paid by motorists. Consequently, we asked our participants (N2 = 525, see the paper for details) to imagine the introduction of a new environmental certificate for cars in Belgium, and to provide amounts they would consider appropriate for the difference in annual tax paid on cars with or without the certificate. Specifically, roughly one half of participants was asked how much less the owner of a certified car should have to pay in annual car tax than the owner of a non-certified car (the subsidy frame). The other half was asked how much more the owner of a non-certified car should pay in annual car tax than the owner of a certified car (the tax frame). The question was again asked for three different levels, proxying wealth via the cost of the cars: €15,000, €30,000, and €45,000, respectively.
Figure 2. Results car scenario
Source: Kuehnhanss & Heyndels (2018, p.32)
Figure 2 shows the results. The effect is less pronounced in this scenario, as the slope for the granted amounts in the subsidy frame remains largely flat or slightly increases. Nonetheless, a substantial framing effect remains. In the tax frame, the amount of the premium (i.e. the amount of taxes no longer owed once a certificate is obtained) strongly increases with the cost of the car. Taking the most expensive car (€45,000) as an example, we thus observe differential treatment across frames also in this scenario. In the subsidy frame, the premium for having a certificate is €778, in the tax frame it is a much higher €1,333.
Conclusion
These results suggest a strong and economically meaningful effect of framing among policy-makers with a stake in tax and benefit systems. While the exact mechanism driving the results invites further research, the strongly divergent premiums, and hence distribution of incentives, across baseline frames raise concerns of unintended effects in the design of taxes and benefits. Especially new schemes – e.g. ‘green’ policy, reform, or regulatory expansion – may benefit from increased scrutiny in the design process. Awareness of susceptibilities to framing and its potential influence on the formulation of individual tax and benefit instruments may help to align intended fairness, incentive structures, and redistributive outcomes.
References
- Kuehnhanss Colin R.; and Bruno Heyndels, 2018. ‘All’s fair in taxation: A framing experiment with local politicians’ Journal of Economic Psychology, 65, 26-40.
- McCaffery, Edward. J.; and Jonathan Baron, 2004. ‘Framing and taxation: Evaluation of tax policies involving household composition’ Journal of Economic Psychology, 25(6), 679–705.
- Schelling, Thomas C., 1981. ‘Economic reasoning and the ethics of policy’ Public Interest, 63, 37–61.
- Traub, Stefan, 1999. Framing Effects in Taxation. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag
Economic Gender Equality Issues in Transition Economies
Until a couple of decades ago, gender was almost a non-topic within development economics.[1] But in the 1990s research gradually showed that gender inequality could have substantial impact on macroeconomic outcomes. At the same time it became clear that women and men were hit differently by economic shocks.[2] These insights triggered an unprecedented focus on gender both in research and at the policy level – see Duflo (2012) for a brilliant overview with a developing country focus. The largest collective action process in history targeted at reducing world poverty, the Millennium development goals, focused on gender inequalities in several dimensions when enacted in year 2000.[3]
In the so-called transition economies, economic gender issues came on the agenda in the late 1990s as it became evident that the transition process had affected men and women differently – see e.g. Dijkstra (1997) – and that these growing gender inequalities had important humanitarian and economic costs. For instance, in many transition economies men’s mortality skyrocketed in the 1990s while the gender wage gap rapidly increased.[4] In particular, Pastore and Verashchagina (2011) show that the gender wage gap in Belarus doubled during the decade from 1996 to 2006, partly as a result of women’s increased segregation into low-wage industries.
From a gender perspective, the Soviet model had focused on full employment for both men and women, but without aspiring to dismantle traditional gender roles. Women therefore tended to work full time alongside with men, while remaining primary caretakers of children and household. The differences in gender equality were, however, significant across the Eastern and Central European countries already before the transition process started. It is thus essential to carry out country-specific analysis of gender equality so as to fully account for context-specific institutional, economic and cultural aspects.
This paper aims to provide a short overview of research on economic gender inequality that might be of particular relevance to transition economies. Given the extensive literature on gender inequality on the one hand and transition economies on the other, this report hopes to serve as an introduction and therefore provides extensive references to the literature to ease further reading.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the efficiency gains associated with gender equality; while the subsequent section examines education from a gender perspective. Section 4 reports on the research on gender differences in the labour market, while the following section exposes how gender stereotypes lead to less competent politicians, missing women, etc., while stereotypes at the same times can be changed quickly. The report ends with an overview of current research and policy relevant questions for transition economies.
Research based on economic gender equality
Had gender equality been a universally accepted goal, no further arguments would have been needed to promote it. In this report, the presumption is that men and women are equally worthy of human rights and civil liberties. Given conflicting policy goals, scarce resources and a lack of women decision-makers, more knowledge about the economic gains associated with gender equality is needed. Furthermore, research on the economic impact of gender inequality might not only provide arguments for promoting gender equality, but can also ease the formulation of actual policies by suggesting mechanisms through which gender equality and economic development are linked.
Economists’ argument for gender equality
From an economic point of view, the main argument to strive for gender equality is that men and women on average have the same cognitive and non-cognitive abilities. Few scientists would today question the statement that the differences within genders with respect to abilities are larger than the differences across genders. In other words, men and women are in terms of innate productive capacities more similar than men among men and women among women are. As long as we define our productive capacity only in terms of brains, most would also agree on the productive equality of men and women. But brawn is often raised as a divisive trait that makes men on average more productive than women. Galor & Weil (1996) even posits that there is no reason for women to enter the formal labour market as long as brawn is more important than brains in production as an explanation as to why women were not on the formal labour market in big numbers until the event of industrialization. Albeit seductive, this line of argument has several fundamental flaws.
First of all, no formal labour market existed before the industrial revolution. In agrarian economies everyone works – men, women and children – but are seldom paid with a monetary salary and have no formal contract regulating pay and work hours. With industrialization men came to constitute the majority of the workforce early on as a consequence of women being the main caretakers, and hence not being able to work far from home once they became mothers (until the children themselves were old enough to work). Moreover, social norms prescribing women to stay at home further impeded mothers to work during certain historical phases. Ultimately, there are few occupations – historically and especially now – that were too brawn-intensive for women. Rather social norms assigned occupations according to one of the genders and occupation-specific technologies developed accordingly. As a first step in the overview on the mechanisms of economic gender inequality, follows in the next section an exposition on its relation to economic development.
Engendering economic development
Two flagship reports from the World Bank (2001, 2012A) were exclusively dedicated to the role of women in economic development.[5] The point of departure for both reports was the strong correlation between any measure of gender equality and economic development (measured for instance as GDP per capita). While it is clear that gender equality in education and formal labour force participation enhance economic growth – see e.g. Klasen (1999) and Klasen and Lamanna (2009) – it is also clear that sustained economic growth generates a new demand for women’s human capital and indirectly promotes gender equality. From a policy perspective the direction of causality is not unimportant in the short and medium run. In the very long run it is unlikely that a high-income economy can flourish without utilizing the female half of the country’s productive capacity.
Recent research – as Bandiera and Natraj (2013) and Cuberes and Teignier (2014) – indicate that the methodological problems are such that it is challenging to draw policy conclusions on the link between gender equality and economic development based on cross-country studies, and that country-specific analyses are needed to be able to formulate precise policy conclusions.
In the transition economies, gender equality varies greatly along with economic standard. There are clearly efficiency gains to be made by increasing gender equality, but each country needs to perform an analysis of which factors are most crucial to improve. For instance, Hsieh, Hurst, Jones och Klenow (2016) calculates that 15-20 per cent of GDP per capita growth during the period 1960 to 2008 can be attributed to the increased efficiency in the allocation of talent in the American economy. This increase in efficiency is mainly explained by the improved allocation of women’s talents according to Hsieh, Hurst, Jones och Klenow (2016). In a closely related study, Cuberes och Teignier (2016), it is estimated that the OECD’s GDP per capita is 15 per cent lower at present compared to a situation without gender segregation on the labour market and where equally many women and men become entrepreneurs.
In the following, the main gender differences that are central for gender equality and economic efficiency (and thereby growth) are discussed. Out of these, it has been viewed as a first priority to assure that girls and boys both get primary and possibly secondary and tertiary education. Secondly, from an economic standpoint, women’s activity on the formal labour market is essential for sustained economic development. Thirdly, gender norms and their relevance for a wide spectrum of economic (and political) issues are discussed.
Men and women’s education
At the beginning of the 1990s, there were few gender differences in terms of level of education and the labour force was highly educated in most transition economies, although there are considerable regional differences. Gender segregation in terms of field of study was relatively low and gender differences in math performance small. While in most transition countries there has been a feminization of higher education – in line with the trend in most countries in the world – in other transition economies the increase in economic gender inequalities post 1991 has led to a widening of the gender gaps in both primary and secondary schooling.[6]
While it is debated – see for instance Breierova and Duflo (2004) – that girls’ education is more important than boys’ education for economic growth, it is uncontested that a gender gap in basic education harms future possibilities of a gender equal labour market and economic gender equality in a broad sense.
On a more positive note, the general math-intensity of education in transition countries is still associated with a relatively small gender gap in math performance. In some countries, girls even have a relative advantage in math relative to boys according to Unicef (2013). This becomes of special interest, since recent research has pointed to the importance of math-intensive higher secondary studies for future labour market outcomes – see Buser, Niederle and Oosterbeek (2014). This research also suggests that young women in the Netherlands (and in other European countries) are disadvantaged by their lack of math and science interests. More generally, there is an extensive literature on the existence of stereotype threat of women in mathematics, implying that especially the most talented women shy away from mathematics due to the fear of being found lacking in terms of mathematical performance – see e.g. Spencer, Steele and Quinn (1999).[7]
In most developed countries, math-intensive sciences, engineering and computer science are heavily male-dominated fields of higher education, maybe partly as a consequence of the predominant norm of math being a “male” subject. Thus, there is ample scope to promote women in IT and technology (by more research and explicit policy) in transition economies, where the preconditions for women entering these fields are generally more advantageous. At present Mexico and Greece have the largest share of women graduates in computing (around 40 per cent) according to OECD (2014). Transition countries have the potential to reach similar levels.
Women and men in the labour market
In this section, the overall findings regarding women’s labour force participation (and how it relates to economic development) and the gender wage gap are reviewed. Gender segregation on the labour market is only briefly discussed, but the following section reviews some evidence on vertical segregation. (Gender segregation varies across cultural and technological context and thus requires a more in-depth analysis.)
Development and women’s labour force participation
Women’s labour force participation has been shown to be sensitive to production technology. Research indicates that married women’s labour force participation is U-shaped of over the industrialization process – as first documented in Goldin (1994) and in Mammen and Paxson (2000) in a developing country-context. The line of arguments goes as follows. Before industrialization, most economies had a limited formal labour market. This does not imply that men and women do not work, but rather that they work in self-subsidence farming, or in the informal labour market. As economies develop, the labour force participation of married women tends to decrease for two main reasons. As production moves out of the homes, it becomes more difficult for women to combine work and the care for children. While in agricultural economies, children simply follow the mother when she works, this becomes unfeasible as production occurs in factories and under regulated conditions both because it is practically difficult to find someone to mind the children but also socially unacceptable often for a woman to leave home and children. Moreover, as economies develop there is a strong income effect, which makes it economically possible for married women not to work. Therefore, there is a decline in married women’s labour force participation as an industrialization process occurs. As the economy continues to develop the substitution effect comes into play. By this time, both men and women are more educated and eventually the family’s loss of well-educated married women’s salary becomes notable. Therefore, as the return on education increases with industrialization, the labour force participation of married women increases.
Women’s labour force participation in general has been shown to be sensitive to the introduction of new technology and new medicines. Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu (2005) indicate that the washing machine and the vacuum cleaner made home production less time-consuming, thereby freeing up time for women to dedicate more time to formal labour market work. Moreover, Goldin and Katz (2002) and Bailey (2006) show how the introduction of the Pill made it possible for women to control and plan their fertility and thereby made labour market work more feasible. Furthermore, Albanesi and Olivetti (2016) suggest that medical progress that led to improved maternal health in the US during the period 1930-1960 positively affected women’s labour force participation. Even though technological breakthroughs might come at a specific point in time, Fogli and Veldkamp (2011) has shown that it takes time for a change in social norms to occur. More precisely, their research shows how women’s labour market entry is closely related to the spread of information from working to non-working women at the local level.
Summing up, while it is clear that there is an overall tendency of women’s labour force participation increasing as a country develops into an industrialized economy with a well-developed service sector, this development is far from automatic or linear. Therefor it is important to identify country-specific conditions, technologies and norms that might enhance or hinder women to enter the labour force.
Gender wage gap
A persistent overall gender wage gap is often mistakenly interpreted as a prime indicator of women being discriminated against in the labour market. While a gender wage gap within a specific occupation in a sector might suggest the existence of discrimination, the overall wage gap is often more of an indication of gender segregation on the labour market or of low female labour force participation.
Even though a large gender wage gap is not synonymous with gender discrimination, it is associated with economic inefficiency. By simulating a theoretical growth model of the American economy, Cavalcanti and Tavares (2016) calculate that GDP per capita in the US would be 17 per cent higher if the US would have the same (relatively low) gender wage that Sweden has.
At an international level the trends in the gender wage gap appears to be related to several differences between men and women on the labour market. One correlation in international cross-country comparisons – that for long puzzled researchers – is that countries with high female employment rates tend to have higher gender wage gaps than countries with a lower female employment rate. The expectation would, if anything, be the reversed: in countries with a high share of women in formal employment, women are more emancipated and thus do not accept a considerable gender wage gap. But Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) convincingly show that more than half of this cross-country correlation is due to selection. In countries with a high gender employment gap, such as southern Europe and Ireland, there is a selection of high-skilled women into the labour market resulting in a relatively high average wage for women, and thus in a comparatively low gender wage gap. Another potential mechanism explaining why the gender wage gap is smaller in for instance Scandinavia than in the UK and the US would be that the overall wage distribution is more compressed and thereby the gender wage gap is mechanically smaller – see Blau and Kahn (2003).
Even in countries with small gender employment gaps, women on aggregate tend to work fewer hours on the formal labour market. Recent research in Olivetti and Petrongolo (2016) suggests that for industrialized countries it is the growth in the service sector that drives the number of hours women are working. It is further shown that half of the variation in female working hours across industrialized countries is explained by the share of the service sector.
But even as men and women work to the same extent and the same hours, in most countries occupational gender segregation on the labour market is widespread. Horizontal segregation signifies that men and women tend to work within different occupations and even sectors, while the vertical segregation implies that women to a less extent than men tend to be managers. In the next section we will examine some of the costs related to vertical gender segregation.
Gender stereotypes, political quotas and missing women
For a long time, women were underrepresented in politics around the world. This constituted a democratic problem since it implied that half of the constituency in a country was not represented politically. Therefore, quotas for women at different levels in politics have been introduced around the world with considerable success. Pande and Ford (2011) review the evidence on the Indian case, where quotas have been shown not only to increase the representation of women but also to dismantle the negative stereotypes towards female politicians – see Beaman et al (2009). As suggested in Besley et al (2017), the introduction of gender quotas in politics can considerable also improves the quality of politicians. With an exceptionally rich dataset, Besley et al (2017) show that the voluntary quota, implying that every second candidate to the local elections in Sweden in the mid 1990s was a female politician, increased the average competence of politicians. This was achieved by the quota allowing for competent women to be elected and by less competent male politicians not being re-elected.
Even though quotas to increase the share of women on corporate boards are more controversial – despite several European countries having implemented them (see European Commission, 2015)– there is ample evidence that the social norm envisioning the leader/executive to be a man further cements vertical gender segregation – see e.g. Babcock and Laschever (2003) and Reuben et al (2012). Changing leadership norms is indeed a most important measure for increasing economic efficiency at the firm and societal level. Sekkat, Szafarz and Tojerow (2015) investigate which governance characteristics at the firm level are most likely to yield a female CEO in a vast sample of developing countries and find that a female dominant shareholder as well as the firm being foreign-owned are most conducive to women at the corporate top.
Generally, gender norms are known to be persistent and difficult to change. But there are examples where stereotypes change quickly, such as when the introduction of cable television to remote rural villages in South India almost instantly wiped out the traditional son preference with the introduction of more modern gender norms – see Jensen and Oster (2009). Unfortunately, son preferences can also be intensified due to worsening economic conditions, as for instance happened in South Caucuses after the breakup of the USSR. Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia all experienced a significant decline in fertility after 1990 and a sharp increase in the de facto son preference, measured as of the average share of boys to girls at birth. Research – see Das Gupta (2015), Dudwick (2015), and Ebenstein (2014) – suggest that this is the outcome of a combination of factors that all concurred to emphasize sons’ larger economic capability in helping their parents economically. In times of economic crises, increased availability of ultrasound technology and abortion together with having fewer children per family, the traditional preference for sons, at least temporarily, peaked to Chinese levels (after the One-Child policy).
Economic gender analysis in transition economics
In the following, the need for sex-disaggregated data and country-specific research are discussed, as well as recent policy work on gender equality.
Data
The prerequisite for well-informed research and policy is data availability. At the international level an impressive effort has been made during the last decades to create sex-disaggregated data, and there are now many gender databases as, for instance, the World Bank’s Gender data portal (http://datatopics.worldbank.org/gender/). While there are surveys such as the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS, http://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/economic-research-and-data/data/lits.html), Demographic and Health Services (DHS, http://dhsprogram.com) and others being made, there is still a lack of gender-disaggregated data in most transition economies.
The national Statistics Bureau should have the mission of collecting and reporting sex-disaggregated data. Moreover, it is excellent if all interesting gender statistics regularly are published in an overview report to increase accessibility both for the general public but also for policy-makers. In Sweden, Statistics Sweden biannually since 1984 publishes “Women and Men in Sweden – Facts and Figures” (http://www.scb.se/en_/Finding-statistics/Publishing-calendar/Show-detailed-information/?publobjid=27675), a much appreciated publication. Since 1989, the Swedish government publishes, in an Appendix to its annual Autumn Budget, an overview of the “Economic Allocation of Resources between Men and Women”, where both past policy and current statistics are presented. Initially, the intention was to in this way guarantee the production of sex-disaggregated statistics that was necessary for the formulation of gender-sensitive economic policies.
An even more ambitious step would be to create longitudinal micro-datasets where individuals are followed in terms of family, education, work, health and other characteristics so as to be able to fully evaluate the effect of economic policy.
Country-specific research
Gender-specific analysis of labour market conditions and economic outcomes exist for several countries, see e.g. Khitarishvili (2016). However, there is a vast array of dimensions and mechanisms within the field of research about economic gender equality in need of further investigation, particularly incorporating deep knowledge about country-specific economic circumstances.
As discussed in Section 2, the correlation between gender equality and economic development is generally strong but the direction of causality is unclear. There is therefore scope to analyse the precise nature of the gender inequality within each transition economy with respect to the driving forces of economic growth. Are there, for example, any differences in accumulation of human capital at young age between men and women? Are women able to capitalize on their human capital in the labour market? Are there regulations in place impeding women to work in certain sectors and how is the availability of childcare? Is male mortality higher than female mortality – as has been the case in some transition countries in recent years?
In Section 3 about gender inequality in human capital, there are several dimensions that need country-specific contextualization. Higher education has generally undergone a feminization during recent decades in many transition economies, but not in all. To map such trends, it is essential both to analyse whether the economy capitalizes on women’s newly gained human capital and to study why men are becoming less present in higher education. Moreover, by field of study, transition economies have been exceptionally gender equal in math from an international perspective. One could try to exploit such an advantage by channelling women into programming and IT. This could provide transition economies with a considerable comparative advantage by them using their talent pool better than most countries.
Regarding gender inequality in the labour market, there are a number of interesting research projects that must be pursued at the country level as exemplified in Section 5. For instance, in Moldova there is only a tiny gender gap in labour force participation. While this can pass as an indication of a gender equal labour market, in reality it masks a highly (horizontally and vertically) gender segregated labour market, which might also be one explanation of Moldova’s elevated rates of human trafficking – see further World Bank (2014).
Policy
Gender inequality has been perceived as one of the most important dimension to both investigate and address by part of the international organizations working with development assistance. Three major policy areas can be identified, beyond the policy initiatives addressing basic health, violence against women and trafficking: a) the labour market; b) norms; and c) political representation. Regarding gender inequalities in the labour market, the trend is now for a deeper analysis attempting to identify the mechanisms at work in the labour market – see for instance Morton et al (2014).
The policy work on social norms is innovative and often uses surveys and interviews to map gender-specific stereotypes and expectations in order to provide a background and explanation for the wide gender differences in economic outcomes. World Bank (2012B) constitutes such an example, where gender norms are contextualized and at the same time put into a cross-country perspective. Here the attempts of involving men by at least mapping their attitudes are well on their way.
Lastly, there is a considerable amount of policy work – hand in hand with the extensive research on the topic – on women’s low degree of political representation. Introducing quotas for women in parliament is not enough to assure women’s political representation as overly evident in the report by the European Commission on the topic (European Commission, 2015). Further policy work is of the essence to support and ease the implementation of quotas and other measures to assure women’s political representation actually improves.
Concluding remarks
This report touches upon main gender issues in transition economies with a focus on economic dimensions, but essential human rights issues as equal access to health care and legislation, and policies against trafficking are, of course, presupposed. Ultimately gender equality is not a women’s issue. But women are the most engaged so far and efforts must continue to involve men and make them active stakeholders.
Even with the best intentions, it remains crucial to formulate actions on the basis of research. Given that economic resources for policy interventions are limited and that we strive for having policy-impact, continuous effort has to be made to let research inform policy on how to best use available resources.
References
Albanesi, S., and C. Olivetti (2016). “Gender Roles and Medical Progress”. Journal of Political Economy 124(3): 650-695.
Alesina, Alberto, Giuliano Paola and Nathan Nunn (2013). “On the Origins of Gender Roles: Women and the Plough”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 128(2): 469-530.
Babcock, Linda and Sara Laschever (2003). Women Don’t Ask: Negotiation and the Gender Divide. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Baden, Sally (1993). “The Impact of Recession and Structural Adjustment on Women’s Work in Selected Developing Countries”. Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, BRIDGE Report 15.
Bailey, Martha J. (2006). “More Power to the Pill: The Impact of Contraceptive Freedom on Women’s Lifecycle Labor Supply”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(1): 289-320. Uppdatering “Erratum and Addendum,”, September 2009.
Beaman, Lori, Chattopadhyay, Raghabendra, Duflo, Esther, Pande, Rohini and Petia Topalova (2009). “Powerful Women: Does Exposure Reduce Prejudice?”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 124: 1497-1540.
Bandiera, Oriana and Ashwini Natraj (2013). “Does Gender Inequality Hinder Development and Economic Growth? Evidence and Policy Implications”. World Bank Research Observer 28(2): 2-21.
Becker, Gary S., Hubbard, William H. J. and Kevin M. Murphy (2010). “The Market for College Graduates and the Worldwide Boom in Higher Education of Women”. American Economic Review 100(2): 229-33.
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[1] The exception was the seminal Boserup (1970).
[2] See for instance Baden (1993).
[3] See Kabeer (2003) for an overview of research in development economics and policy experience relevant to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals from the perspective of gender equality.
[4] Research – see Bhattacharya, Gathmann and Miller (2013) – however suggests that it might have been changing alcohol policy rather than transition per se that caused the sudden increase in mortality.
[5] The IMF has published a number of reports recently, such as Elborgh-Woytek et al (2013) and Kazandjian, Kolovich, Kochhar and Newiak (2016).
[6] See for instance, Becker et al (2010) and OECD (2015).
[7] Stereotype threat is defined as when an individual perceives to be ”at risk of confirming, as a self-characteristic, a negative stereotype about one’s social group” in the seminal paper by Steele and Aronson (1995).