Location: Ukraine
Humanitarian Demining and Ukraine’s Recovery: Lessons Yet to Learn
This policy brief examines how land mine action underpins Ukraine’s reconstruction and economic renewal. It outlines the current scale of contamination and the national humanitarian demining strategy. The brief also reviews international experience from countries around the world, discussing the economic recovery driven by demining and the economic efficiency of mine action. It documents significant variation in direct mine action costs across countries and contexts, complicating the assessment of these costs in the case of Ukraine. The brief also discusses the indirect costs arising from systemic inefficiencies in Ukraine’s demining effort, including fragmented governance, shortages of qualified personnel, outdated standards, and security constraints. It concludes that Ukraine’s success in transforming demining into a catalyst for recovery depends on effective coordination, data-driven planning, gender inclusion, and the adoption of best international practices.
Understanding the Scale and Current Need for Humanitarian Demining in Ukraine
As of mid-2025, approximately 137,000 km² of Ukrainian land remains potentially contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). While this is a reduction from 174,000 km² at the end of 2022, Ukraine remains one of the most mine-contaminated countries in the world (Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, 2023; UDA, 2025).
The problem of demining is multidimensional, encompassing both humanitarian and economic consequences. More than six million people currently live in at-risk areas, and the number of mine incidents has already exceeded one thousand. Without addressing the problem, the number of victims could rise to more than 9,000 by 2030 (Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, 2023). Contamination affects some of the world’s most fertile agricultural regions, as well as energy, transport, and residential zones.
The funding needs are substantial. According to UNDP (2024), Ukraine’s total demining bill could reach USD 34–35 billion, requiring tens of thousands of trained specialists. As of early 2025, Ukraine has more than 4,500 sappers and deminers, but this number remains far below national needs. Experts emphasize that the workforce must increase significantly to ensure the timely clearance of contaminated territories. At present, approximately 87 mine-action operators are active in Ukraine, encompassing government bodies, private companies, humanitarian organizations, and international partners (UN Women Ukraine, 2025).
At the same time, the potential economic benefits of demining are immense. According to the TBI (2024) estimates, Ukraine loses about USD 11.2 billion each year (compared to 2021) due to mine contamination. Frontline regions such as Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv are particularly exposed, experiencing a reduction in exports of USD 8.9 billion and a loss of regional tax revenues of USD 1.1 billion annually.
In addressing the problem, the government has recently adopted a National Mine Action Strategy until 2033, which aims to clear about 80% of the de-occupied territories within 10 years (Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, 2024). However, this ambitious plan faces serious systemic challenges, including the dispersion of power among government agencies, insufficient and inconsistent funding, and delays in public procurement and tender processes (UDA, 2025). Thus, humanitarian demining stands at the crossroads of Ukraine’s security and economic recovery, affecting how quickly the country can restore farmland, rebuild infrastructure, and attract investment. Its success depends on efficient resource use, data-driven planning, and the adoption of proven international practices. The following sections examine global experience and economic efficiency in mine action, as well as the key challenges Ukraine must address to achieve tangible and sustainable recovery.
Evidence and Lessons from Global Experience
The problem of humanitarian demining is widespread globally, affecting dozens of post-conflict states across Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Many of these countries, such as Afghanistan, Mozambique, Eritrea, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia, have already undergone large-scale clearance operations and provide tangible evidence of how demining drives economic recovery and social stabilization.
In Afghanistan, humanitarian demining produced wide-ranging socio-economic benefits. It vastly improved mobility and access to resources and markets, served as a prerequisite for broader development initiatives, restored agricultural productivity and employment, and positively influenced mental health and community relations by reducing fear, enabling return, and rebuilding trust within affected populations (UNMAS, 2021).
In Mozambique, large-scale railway clearance reopened a key regional trade corridor, creating more than 400 jobs. The operation restored transport connectivity, enabled the renewal of coal exports, and stimulated agricultural and industrial recovery in the surrounding areas (Lundberg, 2006). In Eritrea, humanitarian demining enabled the return of more than 20,000 refugees within a year, which allowed about 29 villages to resume crop cultivation and schooling; casualty rates for both residents and livestock fell to zero, restoring local food security and rural incomes (Lundberg, 2006).
Sudan offers a contrasting case, where political and logistical barriers pushed costs to nearly USD 45 per m² (Bolton, 2008). Despite high costs, the reopened transport corridors and access to markets demonstrated substantial humanitarian and trade benefits, underscoring that elevated expenditure in complex terrains can still deliver strong socio-economic returns.
Post-war European experiences reinforce these findings. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, humanitarian demining has served as a foundation for sustainable socio-economic recovery, enabling the rebuilding of housing and infrastructure, reducing flood risks, restoring agricultural and forest productivity, improving access to water, and ensuring safe mobility essential for trade and community development (GICHD & UNDP, 2022). Similarly, mine clearance in Croatia has been pivotal to national recovery, restoring access to agricultural and forest land, enabling infrastructure and EU-funded development projects, and supporting tourism and investment in previously contaminated regions (Mine Action Review, 2021).
Collectively, these cases demonstrate that the economic dividends of demining are consistent across contexts. Clearing mines enables agricultural revival, facilitates transport and trade, lowers accident-related health costs, and strengthens confidence in governance. However, incomplete data and fragmented decision-making might delay land release and inflate costs.
For Ukraine, where contamination covers more than 137,000 km² of high-value farmland and industrial zones, these global lessons confirm that mine action must be integrated as a central pillar of the reconstruction process.
Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Humanitarian Demining: Indicators and Limitations
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, in its recent report, defines efficiency in demining as “a measure of how economically resources or inputs are converted to results” (GICHD, 2023, p. 6). In humanitarian demining, this means achieving the maximum area of land safely released or the largest number of explosive items cleared using the least possible resources, without compromising safety. Efficiency, however, differs from effectiveness which is defined in the report as “the extent to which the intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance” (GICHD, 2023, p.6).
Yet, the quantitative framework developed by GICHD primarily focuses on efficiency indicators, particularly cost-based metrics such as cost per square meter of land released, cost per square meter of land fully cleared, and cost per explosive item found. This narrow focus allows for financial comparison but risks overlooking effectiveness dimensions such as the humanitarian, developmental, and social outcomes of mine clearance.
To operationalize this concept, the GICHD study developed a framework of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) to measure economic efficiency across 17 mine-affected countries between 2015 and 2019 (GICHD, 2023, pp.14-17). Three indicators are identified as central for assessing the financial efficiency of mine action operations:
- Cost per square metre of land released – measuring the overall cost of returning territory to productive use, encompassing land cleared, reduced, and cancelled. A lower value indicates greater cost efficiency in land release and better-targeted survey and clearance operations.
- Cost per square metre of land cleared – reflecting the technical cost of full clearance, which is higher due to intensive labour, equipment, and safety requirements.
- Cost per explosive item found – linking financial inputs to tangible outputs, i.e., the average expenditure needed to locate and neutralize one explosive ordnance.
These metrics allow analysts and policymakers to assess how funds are transformed into measurable clearance outcomes. However, as GICHD (2023) stresses, they should be used for internal evaluation and planning, not for direct comparison between countries. Differences in contamination types, topography, labour costs, access, and national data systems make cross-country benchmarking misleading. The report explicitly cautions that “no country should be considered as having a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ performance in terms of operational efficiency purely on the basis of the KPI values” (GICHD, 2023, p.21). Even similar indicators can yield different implications depending on whether operations are clearance-driven (activity-based) or survey-driven (decision-based). To illustrate the scale and variation in demining costs globally, Table 1 presents key indicators of humanitarian demining costs as of 30 November 2022.
As shown in Table 1, costs per square meter of released territory range from USD 0.02/m² (Thailand) to USD 5.87/m² (Lebanon), i.e., a 293-fold difference. Similarly, the cost per explosive item ranged from USD 274 (Sri Lanka) to USD 13,450 (Croatia) (Rohozian, 2024). Such disparities illustrate that comparing “price per m²” without context or establishing the “benchmark” in the field is quite problematic.
Table 1. Key indicators of the cost of demining across countries, as of 30 Nov. 2022
| State | Cost per square meter of territory released from the local socio-economic system, USD | Cost per square meter of territory that has been cleared in the local socio-economic system, USD | Cost of a single found explosive item in the local socio-economic system, USD |
| Angola | 0,32 | 7,88 | 9042 |
| Afghanistan | 0,79 | 1,48 | 911 |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 0,36 | 19,06 | 6059 |
| Vietnam | 0,28 | 0,65 | 500 |
| Western Sahara | 0,41 | 0,51 | 2183 |
| Zimbabwe | 1,89 | 4,49 | 289 |
| Iraq | 0,81 | 1,32 | 4437 |
| Cambodia | 0,22 | 0,37 | 678 |
| Laos | 0,99 | 0,99 | 356 |
| Lebanon | 5,87 | 10,65 | 2204 |
| South Sudan | 0,49 | 4,07 | 5667 |
| Serbia | 1,07 | 1,96 | 9757 |
| Sudan | 2,89 | 5,78 | 457 |
| Tajikistan | 1,29 | 1,98 | 1721 |
| Thailand | 0,02 | 2,25 | 281 |
| Croatia | 1,03 | 1,23 | 13450 |
| Sri Lanka | 2,26 | 3,65 | 274 |
Source: Rohozian, 2024.
Moreover, the study acknowledges limitations in data standardisation and completeness. Variations in how organisations record and report costs affect comparability. Aggregated national averages can obscure contextual factors such as contamination density or security conditions. For these reasons, GICHD recommends interpreting efficiency metrics in conjunction with qualitative information, including terrain, contamination type, and labour structure, and always balancing cost-efficiency with safety and effectiveness.
However, drawing on global patterns and Ukraine’s official USD 34–35 billion cost estimate, we can expect Ukraine to fall within the middle range of international demining costs. It will likely be more expensive than low-cost cases in Asian contexts but substantially below the extreme-cost cases, such as Lebanon, due to its terrain, institutional capacity, and ability to scale mechanized clearance.
Challenges in Ukraine’s Humanitarian Demining
In addition to the substantial direct costs of humanitarian demining, it is essential to understand the indirect costs generated by systemic inefficiencies, i.e., costs that arise not from clearance itself, but from delays, duplication, weak coordination, and different shortages.
A review of Ukraine’s current mine-action landscape allows us to identify the main structural challenges that contribute to elevated indirect costs. These include fragmented governance, incomplete and inconsistent data, security-related access constraints, and a shortage of trained personnel.
One of the most pressing challenges is the fragmentation of coordination and governance. Responsibilities remain dispersed across numerous actors, including the Ministry of Defence, the State Emergency Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Economy, the National Mine Action Authority, and over 20 accredited NGOs and private contractors.
According to the UDA (2025), this overlap of mandates and inconsistent prioritisation frameworks frequently results in duplicated surveys and delayed task approvals, reducing efficiency and transparency. At the same time, the idea of consolidating all authority within a single centralised body would risk excessive concentration of power and reduced accountability. A more effective path forward would be to strengthen the existing Mine Action Center’s coordinating role while maintaining clear institutional separation between policymaking and operational implementation, ensuring transparency, competition, and sustained donor confidence.
A persistent shortage of qualified personnel represents one of the most critical challenges to scaling up humanitarian demining in Ukraine. According to UNDP (2025), the country currently employs around 4,500 trained deminers, while full national recovery will require at least 10,000 professionals over the next decade (TBI, 2024). The workforce is under pressure from wartime mobilization, which diverts potential recruits to defense roles, and from a shortage of experienced supervisors and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) specialists, limiting the number of teams that can safely operate simultaneously. The National Mine Action Strategy for the Period up to 2033 (Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, 2024) further acknowledges that Ukraine’s training system is inadequate for the sector’s needs.
Current state-level training for the profession of “Sapper (demining)” follows military-oriented standards that demand extensive time and resources but offer limited relevance to humanitarian operations. Only ten educational institutions are licensed to train deminers, and only a few conduct active courses. To close this capacity gap, the Strategy calls for expanding domestic training infrastructure, establishing accredited qualification centers, recognizing informal and partial training, and developing new professional standards tailored to humanitarian demining.
Another set of pressing challenges in Ukraine’s humanitarian demining effort concerns data deficits and security limitations. Incomplete and inconsistent mapping of hazardous areas continues to undermine planning and coordination. According to the Ministry of Economy (2023), Ukraine inherited multiple legacy databases using different coordinate systems and lacking harmonized metadata, resulting in duplication and delays in verifying “released” land. The absence of a unified digital mine-action information management system constrains both operational oversight and donor transparency. As Rohozian (2024) observes, such imperfect information leads to “erroneous management decisions” that increase total costs and prolong recovery.
In addition, large areas in the east and south remain off-limits due to ongoing hostilities, unexploded ordnance, and damaged infrastructure. Fluctuating front lines, dense contamination, and logistical barriers raise insurance and hazard-pay costs, shorten fieldwork periods, and cause rapid equipment deterioration.
Thus, addressing these interconnected challenges is essential to accelerate Ukraine’s reconstruction and ensure that mine action effectively supports the safe return of communities, the revival of agricultural production, and the broader recovery of the national economy.
The Role of Women in Humanitarian Demining
The role of women in Ukraine’s humanitarian demining sector deserves special attention, as they have become an integral part of the national workforce serving as deminers, team leaders, and technical-survey dog handlers. Their growing participation reflects both professional competence and the importance of gender-inclusive recovery efforts (UN Women Ukraine, 2025).
However, until 2017, Ukrainian legislation classified demining as a “dangerous profession,” barring women from formal employment in this field (Ministry of Health of Ukraine, 2017). Following sustained advocacy by international organizations, this restriction was lifted, granting women official access to mine-action professions. Since then, the number of women in operational and leadership roles has grown steadily.
Nevertheless, persistent stereotypes suggesting that demining is unsuitable for women have been disproved by practice, as reported by UN Women Ukraine, 2025. In practice, modern safety protocols and technologies such as drones and remotely operated vehicles allow women and men to perform tasks under equal safety conditions.
Following the lifting of the employment ban in 2017, which opened demining professions to women, mine-action organizations began reconsidering how to better meet women’s practical needs in the field. Recognizing that protective gear and uniforms had long been designed for men, many operators are now adapting equipment to fit women’s bodies, enhancing both comfort and operational efficiency.
These findings further demonstrate that gender-inclusive employment contributes to a reconstruction process that benefits all citizens and fosters social recovery based on principles of equity and shared responsibility.
Conclusions
In conclusion, humanitarian demining represents a strategic prerequisite for Ukraine’s reconstruction, food security, and long-term economic recovery. International experience demonstrates that mine clearance delivers substantial socio-economic dividends by restoring access to land, enabling trade, and rebuilding local livelihoods. However, the economic efficiency of mine action cannot be measured through simple cross-country comparisons. Costs per square meter or per explosive item differ widely depending on terrain, contamination density, labor costs, and institutional frameworks. Therefore, efficiency should be evaluated in context, i.e., by how well resources are transformed into measurable recovery outcomes without compromising safety or inclusiveness.
For Ukraine, transforming demining into a genuine driver of recovery requires addressing several domestic challenges. Fragmented governance and overlapping mandates continue to reduce coordination and transparency, while limited training capacity and workforce shortages constrain operational progress. Inconsistent data systems and incomplete mapping impede strategic planning, and security conditions still restrict access to large contaminated areas in the east and south of Ukraine. Overcoming these barriers will require strengthening the coordinating role of the National Mine Action Center and expanding professional education and certification programs.
Equally important, the growing participation of women in mine action deserves special recognition. Since the 2017 reform that lifted employment restrictions, women have become active as deminers, team leaders, and survey specialists, demonstrating both competence and leadership in this traditionally male-dominated field. Promoting gender-balanced participation will strengthen Ukraine’s mine action capacity and align reconstruction with broader principles of equality and social inclusion.
Thus, ensuring that clearance efforts are efficient, transparent, data-driven, and inclusive will determine how effectively Ukraine can restore productive land, rebuild infrastructure, and regain investor confidence.
References
- Bolton, M. (2008). Sudan’s Expensive Minefields: An Evaluation of Political and Economic Problems in Sudanese Mine Clearance. Global CWD Repository. James Madison University.
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) & United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2022). The Sustainable Development Outcomes of Mine Action in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- GICHD (2023). Operational Efficiency in Mine Action – Annexes. Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining.
- Lundberg, J. (2006). Humanitarian Demining as a Precursor to Economic Development. Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, 9(2).
- Mine Action Review. (2021). Croatia: Clearing the Mines 2021.
- Ministry of Economy of Ukraine. (2023). Ukraine Is Determined to Minimize the Impact of Mine Contamination in 10 Years.
- Ministry of Economy of Ukraine. (2024). National mine action strategy for the period up to 2033 [English translation]. Mine Action Support Team, Ministry of Economy of Ukraine.
- Ministry of Health of Ukraine. (2017). Order no. 1254, dated 13.10.2017. On the recognition of the Order of the Ministry of Health of Ukraine No. 256 of December 29, 1993 as invalid.
- Rohozian, Y. (2024). The Impact of the Cost of Demining on the Trajectory of Socio-Economic Systems Recovery in the Post-Conflict Period. Economics of Systems Development, 6(1), 54–59.
- Tony Blair Institute for Global Change (TBI). (2024). From economic recovery to global food security: The urgent need to demine Ukraine.
- Ukrainian Deminers Association (UDA). (2025). What Hinders Demining in Ukraine: Systemic Challenges.
- UN Women Ukraine (2025). In the Words of Iryna Krykunenko: “Women in Demining is Not Just a Profession”
- UNDP (2024). In Ukraine, Tackling Mine Action from All Sides to Make Land Safe Again.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Saving Lives During War: How to Make Evacuation Messages More Effective
When war threatens civilian populations, effective evacuation messages can mean the difference between life and death. Drawing on a controlled survey experiment conducted with 2,006 Ukrainians during the 2022 Russian invasion, we find that providing clear evacuation plans dramatically improves a message’s perceived effectiveness, while sophisticated message framing makes little difference. Our results indicate that people facing war are not naive about dangers—they need practical information on how to escape, not persuasion about why they should leave. This is especially true for those who do not have the means to evacuate autonomously. These findings offer guidance for authorities and humanitarian organizations: focus on providing concrete evacuation logistics rather than crafting perfect messaging.
The Life-or-Death Challenge of Wartime Evacuations
Each year, tens of thousands of civilians die in armed conflicts worldwide. Many of these deaths could be prevented through timely evacuations from danger zones. Yet despite imminent threats, many civilians hesitate to leave their homes. Understanding how to increase the effectiveness of evacuation messages has become a critical challenge for saving lives.
In July 2022, five months into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we conducted the first experimental study testing the effectiveness of evacuation messages during an active war. Working with 2,006 Ukrainians from regions directly affected by combat, focusing on areas that experienced occupation, shelling, and ground fighting, we tested two fundamental approaches to improving evacuation messaging.
Figure 1. Surveyed regions with the relative share of respondents.

Source: Martinez et al. (2025)
Testing What Works: Plans vs. Persuasion
Our experiment compared two strategies:
Strategy 1: Persuasive Nudges
We tested different message framings inspired by behavioral economics, emphasizing either the gains from evacuating (saving lives) or losses from staying (risking death), and highlighting either deteriorating living conditions or benefits to military effectiveness. These techniques have proven effective in other contexts, from increasing vaccination rates to promoting energy conservation.
Strategy 2: Practical Evacuation Plans
We tested whether adding concrete evacuation instructions improved message effectiveness. Half of our messages included specific details: free buses available at designated locations, phone numbers for reserving seats, and clear departure times.
Participants evaluated how effective each message would be in convincing residents of their city to evacuate, using a scale from 0 (completely ineffective) to 10 (very effective).
Key Finding: People Need Logistics, Not Persuasion
Our results deliver a clear message for policymakers and humanitarian organizations:
Providing evacuation plans works
Messages that included concrete evacuation plans were rated approximately 5% more effective than those without. This improvement is both statistically significant and practically meaningful—in Donetsk oblast alone, where 350,000 civilians remained in Ukrainian-controlled areas during our study, a 5% increase in evacuation rates could mean 17,500 additional lives moved to safety.
Message framing makes little difference
Surprisingly, none of our carefully crafted persuasive messages performed better than a simple, standard evacuation notice. Whether we emphasized gains or losses, living conditions or military benefits, the framing made no significant difference to perceived effectiveness.
Different groups respond differently
The evacuation plan’s effect was strongest among those who had not previously evacuated, which is exactly the population authorities most need to reach. This particular segment of the population is characterized by lower financial means and, therefore, a lower likelihood of owning a car, which turned out to be a crucial factor when it comes to timely evacuations. Finally, women responded more strongly to evacuation plans than men.
Figure 2. Experimental Treatment Effects.

Source: Martinez et al. (2025)
Understanding the Psychology of War Zone Evacuations
Why do practical plans matter more than persuasive messaging? Our findings suggest that people experiencing war are far from naive about the dangers they face. Among our respondents:
- 82% perceived real risk of death or injury from missile strikes
- 40% had already evacuated at least once
- 50% of those who stayed had considered evacuating
Which seems to suggest that the barrier is not understanding risk—it is knowing how to act on it. Our correlational analysis supports this interpretation: those offered transportation during the early invasion were 12-18 percentage points more likely to evacuate, while simply receiving evacuation information showed weaker effects.
Policy Recommendations
Based on our findings, we recommend that authorities and humanitarian organizations prioritize the following:
- Focus resources on logistics, not messaging
Instead of investing in sophisticated communication strategies, dedicate resources to organizing concrete evacuation support: transportation, clear meeting points, advance booking systems, and designated evacuation routes.
- Provide specific, actionable information
Every evacuation message should include: exact locations for transportation pickup, specific departure times, contact information for coordination, clear instructions for what evacuees can bring, and confirmation of free transportation.
- Target messages strategically
Prioritize delivering evacuation plans to those who have not previously evacuated, women who show higher responsiveness to organized evacuations, and areas where residents lack personal evacuation plans, that is most likely in the lower socio-economic status neighborhoods.
- Act on timing
Our research captured a relatively stable period in the conflict. During acute escalations, rapid deployment of evacuation logistics likely matters even more than message optimization.
Implications Beyond Ukraine
While our study focused on Ukraine, approximately 50 active conflicts worldwide threaten civilian populations. Our findings suggest a fundamental shift in how international organizations approach emergency evacuations: from persuasion to facilitation.
The lesson is sobering, but actionable. People facing mortal danger do not need convincing that threats are real. They need practical help escaping them. This insight should reshape how humanitarian organizations allocate resources, how militaries plan for civilian protection, and how governments prepare for crisis scenarios.
Conclusion
Effective evacuation during war is not about finding the perfect words; it is about providing clear paths to safety. Our research suggests that even simple additions of logistical information can meaningfully improve an evacuation message’s perceived effectiveness. In contexts where every percentage point of improved evacuation rates translates to lives saved, focusing on practical evacuation support over persuasive messaging represents both an evidence-based and morally imperative policy choice. For the millions of civilians who may face evacuation decisions in current and future conflicts, the message from our research is clear: authorities must move beyond telling people to leave and start showing them exactly how.
References
- Martinez, Seung-Keun; Pompeo, Monika; Sheremeta, Roman; Vakhitov, Volodymyr; Weber, Matthias; and Zaika, Nataliia, 2025. “Civilian Evacuation During War: Evidence from Ukraine“, The Economic Journal (2025): ueaf075.
- Benartzi, Shlomo et al., 2017. “Should governments invest more in nudging?” Psychological Science, 28(8), 1041-1055.
- Thompson, Rebecca R.; Garfin, Dana R.; and Silver, Roxane C., 2017. “Evacuation from natural disasters: A systematic review of the literature“, Risk Analysis, 37(4), 812-839.
- Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2024. UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (v24.1). Uppsala University.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Strengthening Ukraine: Sharing Knowledge for a Sustainable Future
The HROMADA Conference 2025 brings together leading experts to discuss Ukraine’s reconstruction and reform. Hosted by the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) at the Stockholm School of Economics, the event highlights how collaboration, research, and policy innovation can accelerate Ukraine’s sustainable recovery.
Exploring Key Challenges and Opportunities
Ukraine stands at a crucial crossroads in its path toward stability and prosperity. Therefore, the conference focuses on governance, demographics, and energy as pillars for building a more resilient society. Moreover, discussions will emphasize how effective policy and regional collaboration can support Ukraine’s long-term integration with Europe.
Panels Focused on Ukraine Reconstruction
Torbjörn Becker, Director of SITE, and Ulrik Tideström, Sweden’s Special Envoy for Ukraine, will deliver the opening remarks.
The HROMADA Conference 2025 program features three dynamic panels designed to tackle Ukraine’s most urgent priorities:
- Ukraine–Nordic–Baltic Dialogue on Energy Transition and Security – This panel explores how regional partnerships can strengthen Ukraine’s energy independence and security.
- Demographics, Mobility, and Return – Experts will analyze population trends, labor mobility, and opportunities for return migration.
- Public Administration for Reconstruction and European Integration – The discussion will focus on modern governance reforms essential for rebuilding trust and efficiency.
Keynote Insight: Sanctions and the Russian Economy
Maria Perrotta Berlin, Assistant Professor at SITE, will deliver the keynote address. She will explain how international sanctions have reshaped Russia’s economy and what that means for Ukraine’s recovery strategy. Her insights aim to connect economic policy with the realities of post-war reconstruction.
Join the Conversation
The HROMADA Conference strengthens academic and policy collaboration between Ukraine and its Nordic–Baltic partners. To participate, please register through the HROMADA webpage for full program details and venue information. Once registered, attendees will receive all necessary access details directly.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed during events and conferences are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Ukraine Innovation Under Fire: How a Nation Transformed Crisis Into Creativity
How does a nation innovate under fire? Ukraine’s citizens, academics, and industries have shown that creativity can flourish even in wartime. Now, a new event titled “Innovation Under Fire: How Ukraine’s Citizens, Academics, and Industry Have Accelerated Civil and Military Innovation” will explore this remarkable transformation. Hosted by the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) at the Stockholm School of Economics (SSE), the event brings together leaders from Ukraine and Sweden to discuss how innovation has become a driving force for national resilience.
Ukraine’s Innovation Ecosystem in Wartime
The defense of Ukraine has revealed the extraordinary strength of a society united by necessity. When faced with invasion, citizens, entrepreneurs, and researchers quickly mobilized their skills to create solutions that bridged the civilian and military worlds. As a result, Ukraine’s innovation has become a global example of agility and purpose.
From drones and data analytics to logistics and defense-tech startups, new technologies are reshaping how a nation responds to crisis. Moreover, these developments highlight how innovation ecosystems can thrive even under the most difficult conditions.
Event Focus: Lessons for Sweden and Europe
This event will not only showcase Ukraine’s innovation ecosystem but also explore what lessons it offers for Sweden and the rest of Europe. As geopolitical and technological challenges grow, understanding how to build resilient innovation systems is more important than ever.
Through examples of collaboration between citizens, scientists, and businesses, the discussion will reveal how creativity and courage can drive meaningful progress.
Program Highlights
- Welcome Remarks: Torbjörn Becker (SITE) and Anastasiia Nabokova (Embassy of Ukraine in Sweden)
- Keynote: Tymofiy Mylovanov, President of the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE)
- Film Screening: “The Khartiia Method” – stories of leadership, innovation, and courage in wartime Ukraine
- Panel Discussion: Building Resilience for the Future – featuring experts from Sweden and Ukraine
(Please note: The film includes violent content and may not be suitable for all audiences.)
Register to Attend
If you’re interested in how innovation can protect, empower, and rebuild nations, don’t miss this event. Register here via Trippus. For questions or more information, please contact site@hhs.se.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed during events and conferences are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Steady Against the Wind: Ukraine’s and Moldova’s Path Towards EU Membership
The Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) will host its annual Development Day Conference on December 5, 2025. This year’s theme, “Steady Against the Wind: Ukraine’s and Moldova’s Path Towards EU Membership,” focuses on resilience and reform. The event gathers policymakers, experts, and business leaders to discuss progress toward EU integration. Organized by SITE at the Stockholm School of Economics, it explores how Sweden and the EU can support both nations’ ambitions.
Background: The Long Road to EU Membership
Despite ongoing hardships, Ukraine and Moldova are steadily advancing toward EU membership. Both have carried out vital reforms, strengthened democratic institutions. However, major challenges persist. These include corruption, judicial reform, and the struggle to ensure territorial security. Institutional capacity also remains a key issue. Even so, the two countries continue to push forward, determined to secure a stable and European future.
Conference Themes and Goals
The SITE 2025 Development Day will feature a mix of presentations and panel discussions. The sessions will explore three main themes:
- Economies & Support: Examining the economic outlook and the role of foreign aid in an uncertain world.
- Democracy & Media: Fighting corruption and disinformation while promoting transparency through media and civil society.
- People & Capacity: Building human capital, boosting institutions, and turning brain drain into brain gain.
The event will take stock of the current situation, draw lessons from past experience, and discuss how Sweden and the EU can best support the next steps.
Why It Matters
Ukraine’s and Moldova’s EU journey is more than a political process; it is a story of endurance. Their progress shows how reform and cooperation can thrive even in difficult times. Moreover, SITE’s Development Day 2025 offers a unique opportunity to reflect, collaborate, and shape the future of Europe together.
Join the Conversation
Entry is free, but registration is required. Venue details will be shared with confirmed participants. To register or learn more, visit the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) website or contact site@hhs.se.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed during events and conferences are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Denmark Backs New KSE Institute Center on Sanctions and Resilience
The Danish government is partnering with the KSE Institute to establish the Center for Geoeconomics and Resilience and the Sanctions Hub of Excellence. This initiative will strengthen KSE Institute’s sanctions research, economic resilience, and Ukraine’s post-war recovery. The Center will be led by Benjamin Hilgenstock and Yuliia Pavytska, with funding from Denmark’s Research Reserve and Ukraine Transition Programme.
Building Economic Resilience Through Sanctions Research
Denmark’s support comes amid Ukraine’s ongoing fight against Russia’s full-scale invasion. Since 2022, the KSE Institute has played a vital role in shaping global sanctions policy. The new Center will expand this work, deepening research into the economic effects of sanctions and strategies for Ukraine’s recovery.
By 2026, the Center aims to develop a broader macroeconomic research program, creating a hub for collaboration between Ukrainian and European experts. A new satellite office in Copenhagen, hosted by the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), will further connect Ukrainian and Nordic analytical institutions.
Strengthening Strategic Research and Action
The project’s goal is to enhance analytical capacity on sanctions policy, economic stability, and post-war recovery. The team will study how sanctions impact Russia’s economy, develop proposals for new restrictive measures, and expose the operations of the “shadow fleet” used to evade sanctions.
Benjamin Hilgenstock will take on the role of Director of the Center, while Yuliia Pavytska will lead the Sanctions Hub. Key experts, including Nataliia Shapoval (President of KSE Institute), Elina Ribakova (Director of the International Affairs Program and Vice President for Foreign Policy at KSE), Anna Vlasyuk (Head of International Law and Policy Research), and Borys Dodonov (Head of the Center for Energy and Climate Studies) will play a central role in advancing the Center’s research and strategic initiatives. In addition, Olena Bilousova, Anatoliy Kravtsev, Kateryna Olkhovyk, Dmytro Pokryshka, Pavlo Shkurenko, Lucas Risinger, and Matvii Talalaievskyi will join the Sanctions Hub, continuing their exceptional work on sanctions policy and analysis.
Expanding the Partnership Between Denmark and Ukraine
Denmark’s investment underscores its leadership within the global sanctions coalition. The project is co-financed by Denmark’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, and Ministry of Higher Education and Science.
Further Reading
Read the full announcement on the Kyiv School of Economics website to explore the complete details of this new collaboration.
Visit the KSE Institute Sanctions Hub to explore in-depth monitoring of international sanctions against Russia. The Hub maintains a consolidated sanctions database and provides detailed reports on the impact of sanctions on Russia’s economy. It also features analyses of sanctions effectiveness, revealing patterns of enforcement and circumvention, as well as position papers and sectoral reports offering expert insights into key industries and policy recommendations from KSE researchers.
Visit the SITE Sanctions Portal to gain insights into sanctions on Russia and its economic retaliation measures. This resource provides a detailed timeline and comprehensive evidence base that brings together data, analysis, and expert commentary. It helps researchers, journalists, and policymakers navigate the evolving sanctions landscape. SITE Sanctions Portal explores the economic consequences of Western sanctions and Russia’s strategic responses.
Maria Perrotta Berlin, Anna Anisimova, and Kata Fredheim on Displaced Ukrainians’ Integration in Sweden
A recent article from the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs highlights several studies on migrants’ social norms and integration. Among them is a FREE Network policy brief by Maria Perrotta Berlin, Anna Anisimova, and Kata Fredheim, offering insights into Sweden’s approach to receiving and integrating displaced Ukrainians.
In their brief, the authors examine how Sweden’s implementation of the EU Temporary Protection Directive has created uncertainty for displaced Ukrainians. This uncertainty has hindered both their integration and participation in the labor market.
While Sweden shows strong political and public support for Ukraine, limited rights and unclear long-term status pose challenges. Refugees face fewer benefits and opportunities than in neighboring Nordic countries or Poland, making Sweden a less attractive destination.
Many Ukrainians arriving in Sweden are highly educated and employable. Yet, barriers such as limited access to language training, housing, and stable residence permits slow their economic inclusion. Civil society and private sector initiatives, including mentorship and job-matching programs, have helped fill some gaps. However, these efforts remain insufficient without stronger institutional support.
To read the full policy brief on migrant integration in Sweden, visit the FREE Network website. For more expert analysis from SITE, explore the SITE website.
Trump’s Sanctions Hit Russia’s Oil Giants: Maria Perrotta Berlin Discusses the Impact
In a new Associated Press (AP) report, the United States and European Union have jointly announced fresh sanctions on Russia’s leading oil producers, Rosneft and Lukoil. The measures aim to cut revenue funding for Moscow’s war in Ukraine and signal the Trump administration’s first major sanctions package on Russian oil since returning to office.
This move underscores Washington’s tougher stance toward the Kremlin’s war economy and its global oil trade network.
Sanctions Are Powerful, But Often Come Too Late
“The sanctions are large and powerful, but they have always come a little too late,” said Maria Perrotta Berlin, Assistant Professor at the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE).
Perrotta Berlin explained that Russia’s shadow fleet and complex web of traders have helped it adapt to earlier restrictions. However, she noted that the new measures, which threaten secondary sanctions on Indian and Chinese refiners, could have a more immediate chilling effect on Russian oil exports.
Sanctions Pressure on Putin and Russia’s Oil Strategy
According to the AP article, the sanctions aim to pressure President Vladimir Putin to consider President Donald Trump’s proposal for an “immediate ceasefire.” Analysts caution that while the sanctions won’t cripple Russia’s economy overnight, they could increase long-term costs, reduce oil revenues, and expose vulnerabilities in Moscow’s energy strategy. In parallel, the European Union’s ban on Russian LNG imports and the sanctioning of 117 additional tankers amplify the economic pressure on Russia’s fossil fuel sector.
To read Maria Perrotta Berlin’s full commentary and detailed analysis on how Trump’s sanctions are reshaping Russia’s oil policy, see the full AP article on the Associated Press website.
Further Reading: Sanctions, Energy, and Russia’s War Economy
Energy exports remain the backbone of Russia’s economy and a tool of geopolitical leverage. Sanctions targeting this sector aim to reduce state revenue and limit Moscow’s influence abroad.
- Explore the Sanctions Portal Evidence Base to access the latest research on energy sanctions against Russia.
- Review the Timeline of Western Sanctions and Russian Countermeasures to understand how both sides have adapted since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
For more expert insights and economic analysis, visit the SITE website.
U.S. Sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil: Benjamin Hilgenstock Explains the Impact on Russia’s Oil Revenues
The United States has imposed its toughest sanctions yet on Russia’s energy industry, focusing on Rosneft and Lukoil. These are the country’s two largest oil producers. The measures aim to restrict Moscow’s access to global markets and increase pressure on the Kremlin’s war financing.
In a detailed Financial Times analysis, experts examined how these sanctions could reshape global oil trade. They may also deepen Russia’s fiscal strain as the government faces a tightening budget environment.
Benjamin Hilgenstock on Russia’s Budget Vulnerability
“The sanctions come at a time of heightened vulnerability for the Russian budget,” said Benjamin Hilgenstock, head of macroeconomic research and strategy at the Kyiv School of Economics Institute (KSE Institute).
He explained that energy revenues make up about one-quarter of Russia’s federal income. Moreover, these revenues have fallen by 20 percent year-on-year in 2025. Therefore, Washington’s new sanctions could further intensify financial pressure on the Kremlin and limit its ability to sustain long-term spending.
Market Reaction: Rising Oil Prices and Global Adjustments
The Financial Times report also looked at market reactions following the sanctions announcement. Brent crude prices rose by 9 percent, as traders assessed possible disruptions to Russian exports. However, analysts warned that while China and India may initially resist pressure from Washington, secondary sanctions could change their stance. Over time, refiners might diversify their oil supplies, testing Russia’s ability to maintain production and revenue.
Read the Full Analysis
To read Benjamin Hilgenstock’s complete commentary and the full Financial Times article, visit FT.com. In addition, explore the KSE Institute’s homepage for more insights and expert research.
Further Reading: Sanctions and Russia’s Energy Economy
Energy exports remain a cornerstone of Russia’s economy and a major source of geopolitical power. By targeting the oil and gas sector, sanctions aim to reduce state revenues and limit Moscow’s ability to wage war against Ukraine. For deeper insights, visit the Sanctions Portal Evidence Base to explore current research on energy sanctions and their impact on Russia’s economy.
Torbjörn Becker: Drone Strikes Undermine Russia’s War-Funding Revenues
A surge of Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil refineries has triggered widespread gasoline shortages across the country. These attacks directly threaten one of Russia’s main sources of income, its energy sector.
Drone Strikes Expose Russia’s Dependence on Energy Revenues
In a report by Finland’s public broadcaster YLE, experts analyzed the coordinated assaults and their mounting economic consequences. At least 14 of Russia’s 38 refineries have been hit, disrupting roughly 20 percent of the nation’s refining capacity. The campaign represents a new stage in Ukraine’s efforts to erode Russia’s revenue base and weaken its wartime economy.
“They remind the Russian people that a war is ongoing in Ukraine, but they also strike at Russian revenues. Oil and gas income is absolutely essential for financing Russia’s offensive war against Ukraine,” said Torbjörn Becker, Director of the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE).
Torbjörn Becker further emphasized that economic pressure has become a central pillar of Ukraine’s broader defense strategy.
Economic Fallout Deepens as Russia Faces Fuel Shortages and Export Bans
The YLE article also explored the economic and political fallout within Russia. Gasoline shortages have been reported in at least 21 regions, prompting authorities to extend export bans and enforce rationing. Analysts cautioned that prolonged attacks could force refinery closures, limit exports, and damage Russia’s image as a reliable energy supplier. Becker added that the strikes could send shockwaves through global energy markets, increasing volatility and uncertainty.
To read the full YLE report and Torbjörn Becker’s full commentary, visit the complete article. For additional expert insights from SITE, explore the institute’s official webpage.
Further Reading
Reducing Russia’s financial capacity to sustain its unjust war against Ukraine requires a comprehensive, multi-layered approach. Explore the latest research on sanctions against Russia in the Sanctions Portal Evidence Base. Learn about the major sanction packages introduced by Western allies following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as well as the corresponding countermeasures, by visiting the Timeline of Western Sanctions and Russian Counteractions.
To read more policy briefs on sanctions and the Russian economy, visit the FREE Network website.