Location: Ukraine
Ukraine Innovation Under Fire: How a Nation Transformed Crisis Into Creativity
How does a nation innovate under fire? Ukraine’s citizens, academics, and industries have shown that creativity can flourish even in wartime. Now, a new event titled “Innovation Under Fire: How Ukraine’s Citizens, Academics, and Industry Have Accelerated Civil and Military Innovation” will explore this remarkable transformation. Hosted by the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) at the Stockholm School of Economics (SSE), the event brings together leaders from Ukraine and Sweden to discuss how innovation has become a driving force for national resilience.
Ukraine’s Innovation Ecosystem in Wartime
The defense of Ukraine has revealed the extraordinary strength of a society united by necessity. When faced with invasion, citizens, entrepreneurs, and researchers quickly mobilized their skills to create solutions that bridged the civilian and military worlds. As a result, Ukraine’s innovation has become a global example of agility and purpose.
From drones and data analytics to logistics and defense-tech startups, new technologies are reshaping how a nation responds to crisis. Moreover, these developments highlight how innovation ecosystems can thrive even under the most difficult conditions.
Event Focus: Lessons for Sweden and Europe
This event will not only showcase Ukraine’s innovation ecosystem but also explore what lessons it offers for Sweden and the rest of Europe. As geopolitical and technological challenges grow, understanding how to build resilient innovation systems is more important than ever.
Through examples of collaboration between citizens, scientists, and businesses, the discussion will reveal how creativity and courage can drive meaningful progress.
Program Highlights
- Welcome Remarks: Torbjörn Becker (SITE) and Anastasiia Nabokova (Embassy of Ukraine in Sweden)
- Keynote: Tymofiy Mylovanov, President of the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE)
- Film Screening: “The Khartiia Method” – stories of leadership, innovation, and courage in wartime Ukraine
- Panel Discussion: Building Resilience for the Future – featuring experts from Sweden and Ukraine
(Please note: The film includes violent content and may not be suitable for all audiences.)
Register to Attend
If you’re interested in how innovation can protect, empower, and rebuild nations, don’t miss this event. Register here via Trippus. For questions or more information, please contact site@hhs.se.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed during events and conferences are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Steady Against the Wind: Ukraine’s and Moldova’s Path Towards EU Membership
The Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) will host its annual Development Day Conference on December 5, 2025. This year’s theme, “Steady Against the Wind: Ukraine’s and Moldova’s Path Towards EU Membership,” focuses on resilience and reform. The event gathers policymakers, experts, and business leaders to discuss progress toward EU integration. Organized by SITE at the Stockholm School of Economics, it explores how Sweden and the EU can support both nations’ ambitions.
Background: The Long Road to EU Membership
Despite ongoing hardships, Ukraine and Moldova are steadily advancing toward EU membership. Both have carried out vital reforms, strengthened democratic institutions. However, major challenges persist. These include corruption, judicial reform, and the struggle to ensure territorial security. Institutional capacity also remains a key issue. Even so, the two countries continue to push forward, determined to secure a stable and European future.
Conference Themes and Goals
The SITE 2025 Development Day will feature a mix of presentations and panel discussions. The sessions will explore three main themes:
- Economies & Support: Examining the economic outlook and the role of foreign aid in an uncertain world.
- Democracy & Media: Fighting corruption and disinformation while promoting transparency through media and civil society.
- People & Capacity: Building human capital, boosting institutions, and turning brain drain into brain gain.
The event will take stock of the current situation, draw lessons from past experience, and discuss how Sweden and the EU can best support the next steps.
Why It Matters
Ukraine’s and Moldova’s EU journey is more than a political process; it is a story of endurance. Their progress shows how reform and cooperation can thrive even in difficult times. Moreover, SITE’s Development Day 2025 offers a unique opportunity to reflect, collaborate, and shape the future of Europe together.
Join the Conversation
Entry is free, but registration is required. Venue details will be shared with confirmed participants. To register or learn more, visit the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) website or contact site@hhs.se.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed during events and conferences are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Denmark Backs New KSE Institute Center on Sanctions and Resilience
The Danish government is partnering with the KSE Institute to establish the Center for Geoeconomics and Resilience and the Sanctions Hub of Excellence. This initiative will strengthen KSE Institute’s sanctions research, economic resilience, and Ukraine’s post-war recovery. The Center will be led by Benjamin Hilgenstock and Yuliia Pavytska, with funding from Denmark’s Research Reserve and Ukraine Transition Programme.
Building Economic Resilience Through Sanctions Research
Denmark’s support comes amid Ukraine’s ongoing fight against Russia’s full-scale invasion. Since 2022, the KSE Institute has played a vital role in shaping global sanctions policy. The new Center will expand this work, deepening research into the economic effects of sanctions and strategies for Ukraine’s recovery.
By 2026, the Center aims to develop a broader macroeconomic research program, creating a hub for collaboration between Ukrainian and European experts. A new satellite office in Copenhagen, hosted by the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), will further connect Ukrainian and Nordic analytical institutions.
Strengthening Strategic Research and Action
The project’s goal is to enhance analytical capacity on sanctions policy, economic stability, and post-war recovery. The team will study how sanctions impact Russia’s economy, develop proposals for new restrictive measures, and expose the operations of the “shadow fleet” used to evade sanctions.
Benjamin Hilgenstock will take on the role of Director of the Center, while Yuliia Pavytska will lead the Sanctions Hub. Key experts, including Nataliia Shapoval (President of KSE Institute), Elina Ribakova (Director of the International Affairs Program and Vice President for Foreign Policy at KSE), Anna Vlasyuk (Head of International Law and Policy Research), and Borys Dodonov (Head of the Center for Energy and Climate Studies) will play a central role in advancing the Center’s research and strategic initiatives. In addition, Olena Bilousova, Anatoliy Kravtsev, Kateryna Olkhovyk, Dmytro Pokryshka, Pavlo Shkurenko, Lucas Risinger, and Matvii Talalaievskyi will join the Sanctions Hub, continuing their exceptional work on sanctions policy and analysis.
Expanding the Partnership Between Denmark and Ukraine
Denmark’s investment underscores its leadership within the global sanctions coalition. The project is co-financed by Denmark’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, and Ministry of Higher Education and Science.
Further Reading
Read the full announcement on the Kyiv School of Economics website to explore the complete details of this new collaboration.
Visit the KSE Institute Sanctions Hub to explore in-depth monitoring of international sanctions against Russia. The Hub maintains a consolidated sanctions database and provides detailed reports on the impact of sanctions on Russia’s economy. It also features analyses of sanctions effectiveness, revealing patterns of enforcement and circumvention, as well as position papers and sectoral reports offering expert insights into key industries and policy recommendations from KSE researchers.
Visit the SITE Sanctions Portal to gain insights into sanctions on Russia and its economic retaliation measures. This resource provides a detailed timeline and comprehensive evidence base that brings together data, analysis, and expert commentary. It helps researchers, journalists, and policymakers navigate the evolving sanctions landscape. SITE Sanctions Portal explores the economic consequences of Western sanctions and Russia’s strategic responses.
Maria Perrotta Berlin, Anna Anisimova, and Kata Fredheim on Displaced Ukrainians’ Integration in Sweden
A recent article from the Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs highlights several studies on migrants’ social norms and integration. Among them is a FREE Network policy brief by Maria Perrotta Berlin, Anna Anisimova, and Kata Fredheim, offering insights into Sweden’s approach to receiving and integrating displaced Ukrainians.
In their brief, the authors examine how Sweden’s implementation of the EU Temporary Protection Directive has created uncertainty for displaced Ukrainians. This uncertainty has hindered both their integration and participation in the labor market.
While Sweden shows strong political and public support for Ukraine, limited rights and unclear long-term status pose challenges. Refugees face fewer benefits and opportunities than in neighboring Nordic countries or Poland, making Sweden a less attractive destination.
Many Ukrainians arriving in Sweden are highly educated and employable. Yet, barriers such as limited access to language training, housing, and stable residence permits slow their economic inclusion. Civil society and private sector initiatives, including mentorship and job-matching programs, have helped fill some gaps. However, these efforts remain insufficient without stronger institutional support.
To read the full policy brief on migrant integration in Sweden, visit the FREE Network website. For more expert analysis from SITE, explore the SITE website.
Trump’s Sanctions Hit Russia’s Oil Giants: Maria Perrotta Berlin Discusses the Impact
In a new Associated Press (AP) report, the United States and European Union have jointly announced fresh sanctions on Russia’s leading oil producers, Rosneft and Lukoil. The measures aim to cut revenue funding for Moscow’s war in Ukraine and signal the Trump administration’s first major sanctions package on Russian oil since returning to office.
This move underscores Washington’s tougher stance toward the Kremlin’s war economy and its global oil trade network.
Sanctions Are Powerful, But Often Come Too Late
“The sanctions are large and powerful, but they have always come a little too late,” said Maria Perrotta Berlin, Assistant Professor at the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE).
Perrotta Berlin explained that Russia’s shadow fleet and complex web of traders have helped it adapt to earlier restrictions. However, she noted that the new measures, which threaten secondary sanctions on Indian and Chinese refiners, could have a more immediate chilling effect on Russian oil exports.
Sanctions Pressure on Putin and Russia’s Oil Strategy
According to the AP article, the sanctions aim to pressure President Vladimir Putin to consider President Donald Trump’s proposal for an “immediate ceasefire.” Analysts caution that while the sanctions won’t cripple Russia’s economy overnight, they could increase long-term costs, reduce oil revenues, and expose vulnerabilities in Moscow’s energy strategy. In parallel, the European Union’s ban on Russian LNG imports and the sanctioning of 117 additional tankers amplify the economic pressure on Russia’s fossil fuel sector.
To read Maria Perrotta Berlin’s full commentary and detailed analysis on how Trump’s sanctions are reshaping Russia’s oil policy, see the full AP article on the Associated Press website.
Further Reading: Sanctions, Energy, and Russia’s War Economy
Energy exports remain the backbone of Russia’s economy and a tool of geopolitical leverage. Sanctions targeting this sector aim to reduce state revenue and limit Moscow’s influence abroad.
- Explore the Sanctions Portal Evidence Base to access the latest research on energy sanctions against Russia.
- Review the Timeline of Western Sanctions and Russian Countermeasures to understand how both sides have adapted since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
For more expert insights and economic analysis, visit the SITE website.
U.S. Sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil: Benjamin Hilgenstock Explains the Impact on Russia’s Oil Revenues
The United States has imposed its toughest sanctions yet on Russia’s energy industry, focusing on Rosneft and Lukoil. These are the country’s two largest oil producers. The measures aim to restrict Moscow’s access to global markets and increase pressure on the Kremlin’s war financing.
In a detailed Financial Times analysis, experts examined how these sanctions could reshape global oil trade. They may also deepen Russia’s fiscal strain as the government faces a tightening budget environment.
Benjamin Hilgenstock on Russia’s Budget Vulnerability
“The sanctions come at a time of heightened vulnerability for the Russian budget,” said Benjamin Hilgenstock, head of macroeconomic research and strategy at the Kyiv School of Economics Institute (KSE Institute).
He explained that energy revenues make up about one-quarter of Russia’s federal income. Moreover, these revenues have fallen by 20 percent year-on-year in 2025. Therefore, Washington’s new sanctions could further intensify financial pressure on the Kremlin and limit its ability to sustain long-term spending.
Market Reaction: Rising Oil Prices and Global Adjustments
The Financial Times report also looked at market reactions following the sanctions announcement. Brent crude prices rose by 9 percent, as traders assessed possible disruptions to Russian exports. However, analysts warned that while China and India may initially resist pressure from Washington, secondary sanctions could change their stance. Over time, refiners might diversify their oil supplies, testing Russia’s ability to maintain production and revenue.
Read the Full Analysis
To read Benjamin Hilgenstock’s complete commentary and the full Financial Times article, visit FT.com. In addition, explore the KSE Institute’s homepage for more insights and expert research.
Further Reading: Sanctions and Russia’s Energy Economy
Energy exports remain a cornerstone of Russia’s economy and a major source of geopolitical power. By targeting the oil and gas sector, sanctions aim to reduce state revenues and limit Moscow’s ability to wage war against Ukraine. For deeper insights, visit the Sanctions Portal Evidence Base to explore current research on energy sanctions and their impact on Russia’s economy.
Torbjörn Becker: Drone Strikes Undermine Russia’s War-Funding Revenues
A surge of Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil refineries has triggered widespread gasoline shortages across the country. These attacks directly threaten one of Russia’s main sources of income, its energy sector.
Drone Strikes Expose Russia’s Dependence on Energy Revenues
In a report by Finland’s public broadcaster YLE, experts analyzed the coordinated assaults and their mounting economic consequences. At least 14 of Russia’s 38 refineries have been hit, disrupting roughly 20 percent of the nation’s refining capacity. The campaign represents a new stage in Ukraine’s efforts to erode Russia’s revenue base and weaken its wartime economy.
“They remind the Russian people that a war is ongoing in Ukraine, but they also strike at Russian revenues. Oil and gas income is absolutely essential for financing Russia’s offensive war against Ukraine,” said Torbjörn Becker, Director of the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE).
Torbjörn Becker further emphasized that economic pressure has become a central pillar of Ukraine’s broader defense strategy.
Economic Fallout Deepens as Russia Faces Fuel Shortages and Export Bans
The YLE article also explored the economic and political fallout within Russia. Gasoline shortages have been reported in at least 21 regions, prompting authorities to extend export bans and enforce rationing. Analysts cautioned that prolonged attacks could force refinery closures, limit exports, and damage Russia’s image as a reliable energy supplier. Becker added that the strikes could send shockwaves through global energy markets, increasing volatility and uncertainty.
To read the full YLE report and Torbjörn Becker’s full commentary, visit the complete article. For additional expert insights from SITE, explore the institute’s official webpage.
Further Reading
Reducing Russia’s financial capacity to sustain its unjust war against Ukraine requires a comprehensive, multi-layered approach. Explore the latest research on sanctions against Russia in the Sanctions Portal Evidence Base. Learn about the major sanction packages introduced by Western allies following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as well as the corresponding countermeasures, by visiting the Timeline of Western Sanctions and Russian Counteractions.
To read more policy briefs on sanctions and the Russian economy, visit the FREE Network website.
Torbjörn Becker on Sanctions Evasion Through Third Countries
Aftonbladet reports that Russian drones shot down in Ukraine contained ball bearings marked “SKF”, despite strict sanctions banning such exports. The Gothenburg-based manufacturer SKF is prohibited from selling to Russia under EU sanctions. Yet, Aftonbladet discovered SKF-branded ball bearings from the company’s Chinese factory inside Russian military drones.
SKF denies producing these parts, stating they are counterfeits. However, according to Russian customs data and Corisk’s analysis, up to half a billion SEK worth of SKF-labeled products may have entered Russia via indirect or shadow trade routes.
“It is a violation of sanctions if you knowingly sell a product to, for example, Turkey, and you know that the Turkish company will send it on to Russia,” said Torbjörn Becker, Director of the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), in an interview with Aftonbladet.
Becker also emphasized the complexity of tracing global supply chains. While counterfeit goods are common in sanctioned economies, he questioned whether Russia can replicate high-precision components like advanced ball bearings. Instead, Becker suggested that such copying might occur outside Russia before the products reach it through parallel trade networks.
To read the full investigation and Becker’s analysis, visit Aftonbladet and Göteborgs-Posten.
Further Reading
Sanctions on trade aim to disrupt Russia’s economic activity and military capabilities by restricting access to critical goods, technologies, and supply chains. These measures are designed to raise the cost of aggression and limit resources that sustain the war effort. Explore current research on trade sanctions in the Sanctions Portal Evidence Base.
Explore the main sanction packages imposed by Western allies after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Review Russian countermeasures, including retaliatory actions and domestic policies to reduce the sanctions’ impact. Visit the Timeline of Western Sanctions and Russian Countermeasures to learn more.
Mapping Ukrainian CSOs in the Nordic-Baltic Region: Areas of Advocacy and Common Challenges
This policy brief maps Ukrainian civil society organizations (CSOs) active in the Nordic-Baltic region (NB8), based on a 2025 survey and discussions at the Nordic Ukraine Advocacy Summit. It highlights the diverse landscape of advocacy groups, ranging from long-established diaspora organizations to initiatives formed after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The analysis highlights key challenges, such as the lack of coordination mechanisms, uneven access to political platforms, and limited technical capacity. Closer cooperation with policymakers and donors would benefit both sides, utilizing CSOs’ expertise in facilitating better integration of displaced Ukrainians and improving inclusive policymaking. It is important to recognize the role of Ukrainian civil society not only as a facilitator in the immediate support efforts but also as a strategic partner in shaping Europe’s long-term peace architecture.
Introduction
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 caused a massive migration of Ukrainians settling across the EU, including the Nordic-Baltic region. This movement gave rise to a wide range of new initiatives, including advocacy, cultural diplomacy, support for integration, and humanitarian efforts. Alongside long-standing diaspora organisations, these newly formed groups quickly became vital actors mobilizing resources, amplifying Ukraine’s voice internationally, and contributing to host societies. In light of these dynamics, it is worthwhile to understand how these organizations operate and what challenges they face.
To this end, the Nordic Ukraine Forum, with the support of the Swedish Institute, conducted a Survey of Nordic-Baltic Ukrainian Civil Society Organisations 2025: Mapping Areas of Advocacy, Structures, and Common Challenges between March and May 2025 (Zubkovych et al., 2025). This study examined Ukrainian CSOs active in both the Nordic-Baltic region (NB8) and Ukraine, based on a structured survey of 17 organizations (from an initial pool of 42). Notably, the survey focused exclusively on organizations with advocacy for Ukraine as a main activity, excluding smaller initiatives dedicated primarily to humanitarian relief, such as collecting clothes or food. Additionally, the output of the survey has been supplemented by the discussions and outcomes from the Nordic Ukraine Advocacy Summit (NUAS), held in Oslo in June 2025, with 30 participating CSOs. Together, these sources provide a unique empirical overview of the role and activities of Ukrainian advocacy CSOs in the Nordic-Baltic region.
Survey Results
Areas of Advocacy
The survey covers Ukrainian advocacy organisations based in the Nordic-Baltic region, where Sweden-based organisations or initiatives made up over half of the total respondents. The survey represents both long-established diaspora organizations and newer initiatives formed in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. About one-fourth of CSOs were established before 2014 (the earliest in 1997), while the majority were founded after 2022, reflecting the urgent mobilization of diaspora communities during the war.
Surveyed CSOs represent a broad mix of leadership roles, gender, professions, languages, membership sizes, and funding models. Most remain volunteer-driven and rely on short-term or project-based funding. More detailed demographic and organizational profiles can be found in the report by Zubkovych et al., 2025. Survey results show that Ukrainian CSOs in the NB8 focus on a wide range of areas. The most common activities include advocacy for Ukraine’s military support, cultural diplomacy and education, as well as support for displaced Ukrainians and their integration (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Focus areas of Ukrainian CSOs in the Nordic-Baltic region

Source: Zubkovych et al., 2025.
Many organizations also prioritize working with media, countering disinformation, humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and advocacy for Ukraine’s EU integration, followed by legal aid, human rights, and gender issues.
Figure 2 presents the main types of activity through which Ukrainian CSOs pursue their objectives. As shown, Ukrainian CSOs perform their tasks by raising social media awareness (82%) and organizing events in support of Ukraine (82%). Other key activities include demonstrations, media outreach, and direct engagement with policymakers. These findings suggest the need to examine more closely which social media platforms are being used, especially given the increasing risks of disinformation and propaganda.
Figure 2. Types of activities of Ukrainian CSOs in the Nordic-Baltic region

Source: Zubkovych et al., 2025.
Main Challenges
At the same time, the survey reveals the main challenges that Ukrainian CSOs in the Nordic-Baltic region have been facing (Figure 3). In particular, the respondents mentioned the absence of structured coordination mechanisms, which leads to duplication of efforts and uneven visibility.
For instance, while several groups in Sweden and Norway focus on humanitarian aid, their activities often run parallel rather than in partnership. The lack of common platforms or umbrella networks reduces their collective influence and makes it more challenging to articulate shared priorities to governments and donors. Without stronger horizontal coordination, CSOs risk competing rather than complementing one another in their advocacy and support work.
Figure 3. Main challenges for Ukrainian CSOs

Source: Zubkovych et al., 2025.
Funding emerged as one of the most pressing issues in the survey. Most organizations reported reliance on short-term, project-based grants or donations. Many CSOs lack multi-year funding, which makes strategic planning and staff retention almost impossible. This precarious situation often leads to volunteer burnout and creates uncertainty about the future of their programs. Donor practices have unintentionally exacerbated this vulnerability by neglecting the long-term capacity-building needs of diaspora CSOs.
The survey further highlights significant disparities in institutional access. Larger CSOs, particularly those based in capital cities such as Stockholm, Oslo, and Helsinki, enjoy greater visibility and are more likely to receive invitations to political consultations. By contrast, smaller groups in regions often remain excluded from policy-making processes, despite being closer to affected communities. This imbalance risks creating unequal representation, where only a handful of well-resourced organizations shape public debate, while others remain invisible. Respondents from Baltic states also pointed out that while they are engaged in cultural diplomacy and integration activities, they struggle to gain recognition from national ministries or international donors. The result is a fragmented advocacy landscape, where not all voices are equally heard.
Many organizations reported gaps in technical capacity, particularly a lack of specific skills in fundraising, project management, digital communication, lobbying, and public outreach. Additionally, the survey highlighted the dual role that Ukrainian CSOs currently play outside Ukraine. On one hand, they act as advocates for Ukraine internationally, lobbying for sanctions, military aid, and continued political support. On the other hand, they provide practical integration services for displaced Ukrainians, including legal counselling, language courses, housing support, and employment assistance. While both roles are crucial, this dual identity can create tensions. For instance, CSOs in Sweden and Finland reported that resources devoted to advocacy sometimes limited their ability to address integration needs, while groups in Estonia and Latvia noted that local integration demands risk overshadowing their transnational advocacy. Without clearer strategies or additional resources, CSOs may struggle to balance these functions effectively.
Conclusion
The survey of Ukrainian CSOs in the Nordic-Baltic region, combined with insights from NUAS 2025, highlights both their urgent needs and strategic opportunities.
For CSOs, strengthening coordination mechanisms is critical to reduce duplication and amplify their collective influence. Creating cross-border advocacy platforms and thematic working groups would help CSOs to better coordinate their activities, learn from others’ experience, and articulate common priorities. In particular, smaller CSOs would benefit from learning how to adopt effective communication strategies, diversify outreach through multiple platforms, and enhance engagement with local communities and institutional stakeholders.
At the same time, CSOs should invest in internal capacity: skills training in project management, advocacy, and digital communication can improve efficiency and increase funding opportunities. Finally, CSOs should balance their dual roles, such as supporting displaced Ukrainians locally while advocating for Ukraine internationally, by dividing responsibilities and tailoring strategies to avoid role conflict.
In turn, policymakers and donors may benefit from closer cooperation with Ukrainian CSOs. As documented by Anisimova et al. (2025), Ukrainian CSOs and civil society actors have already stepped in to fill gaps left by the public sector in the Nordic-Baltic countries. They have been facilitating labor market integration by offering mentorship, language support, and professional networks; improving access to information and bridging communication barriers between displaced people, employers, and municipalities. By recognizing and making use of Ukrainian CSOs’ experience, NB8 governments can develop more efficient mechanisms for integrating displaced populations. Furthermore, wider interaction with CSOs – including small local ones, currently underrepresented in the policy dialogue – may help coordinate with local communities and ensure inclusive policy-making processes.
Ultimately, it is important to recognize the role of Ukrainian civil society not only as a facilitator in the immediate support efforts but also as a strategic partner in shaping Europe’s long-term peace architecture.
References
- Zubkovych, A., Anisimova, A., & Adamson, E. (2025). Survey of Nordic-Baltic Ukrainian civil society organisations. Mapping Areas of Advocacy, Structures and Common Challenges.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Liberal Values in Ukraine Days Before the 2022 Invasion
Just weeks before Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, the European Social Survey completed the 10th round of data collection on public attitudes and beliefs in Ukraine. This policy brief examines regional variation in liberal values such as attitudes toward democracy and the EU, based on that data. While respondents in Eastern Ukraine were more skeptical of democracy and EU integration, they did not consistently reject liberal social values to a greater extent than respondents in other parts of the country. The most striking divide however, lies in institutional trust, which was significantly lower in Eastern Ukraine. This suggests that trust in institutions, which may have been further negatively impacted by prolonged exposure to violence since 2014, underlie the observed regional differences in attitudes towards democracy and the EU. Understanding these differences is vital for policymakers navigating Ukraine’s reform and EU accession process.
Introduction
It has been well documented that values in post-communist countries in Eastern Europe on average, tend to be more authoritarian, more nationalistic, more in favor of state intervention in the economy, and more skeptical towards sexual and ethnic minorities and foreigners than in Western Europe (e.g., Roland 2012). Behind the averages, however, there is substantial variation in values across subgroups of populations. Even before the onset of the full-scale Russian invasion, a discussion on regional Ukrainian differences in relation to democratic values, the wish for EU integration, and similar liberal attitudes existed, both in and outside of the country.
The path towards a closer relationship with Europe and the EU started already in 2014, but since February 2022, Ukraine has politically positioned itself even closer to the EU, and an EU accession process is now underway. However, for a successful reform process in Ukraine, how public opinion is shaped and whether attitudes and values converge towards those of the EU will be important (Olofsgård et al. 2024).
With this in mind, this policy brief provides a descriptive account of public liberal values in Ukraine by analyzing data from the 10th round of the European Social Survey (ESS) conducted just weeks before the full-scale invasion on the 22nd of February 2022. Some of the differences we observe are likely long-standing and related to differences in language preferences and cultural and informational exposure from Russia and the EU, respectively. Yet, given the exposure to instability and conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine since 2014, we also discuss the role that exposure to conflict may have played in explaining several attitudinal dimensions, including satisfaction with democracy, support for liberal social values, attitudes toward Europe and EU integration, as well as levels of trust.
Data
The ESS round 10 data was collected through face-to-face interviews in Ukraine between January 18th, 2022, and February 8th, 2022. The nationally representative survey focuses on public attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors and includes questions on opinions on democracy, the EU, and similar topics commonly considered to capture liberal views.
ESS Sample Characteristics
The sample consisted of more women than men (about 59 percent and 41 percent, respectively). While the Ukrainian population is well-educated, most still find it difficult (41 percent) or very difficult (32 percent) to live comfortably on their income. 11.5 percent of the sample was unemployed, while 31 percent were retired. Broken down by location, most average outcomes are similar, albeit with the East displaying somewhat lower levels of education and greater income difficulties (see Figure 1 for an illustration of what oblasts (regions) are included in each geographical unit). Unemployment was, however, substantially higher in the West (about 15 percent), while the share of retirees was lower (26 percent).
Some heterogeneity exists when it comes to belonging to a religious denomination. In the Central and South, around 63 percent state they belong to a church/mosque/synagogue, etc. The East is roughly at par with the national average (70 and 69.5 percent, respectively), while this figure is 82 percent in the Western part of the country. Similarly, there are major differences in the language one most often speaks at home. In the country as a whole, 13.4 percent stated they speak both Ukrainian and Russian at home. In the East, this figure was as high as 27.1 percent, displaying the duality in mother tongue in this part of Ukraine. The corresponding figure for the West was 3.3 percent. On the contrary, 92.4 percent marked that they most often speak only Ukrainian at home in the West, whereas this figure was only 5.2 percent in the East.
Figure 1. Geographical Classification of Ukraine’s Oblasts

Note: The map depicts the ESS coverage at the time of data collection, excluding Crimea and Sevastopol – illegally annexed by Russia since 2014.
Key Variables of Interest
To understand the views on liberal values, ESS responses to questions in the following areas have been considered:
- I. Merits of democracy: satisfaction with the way democracy works; importance of living in a democratic country.
- II. Liberal democratic values: agreement with statements such as “gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own lives as they wish”; attitudes towards the merits of obedience, respect for authority, and loyalty towards leaders; attitudes towards immigrants.
- III. Opinions about Europe and the EU: support for further EU integration; emotional attachment to Europe; vote intention in a hypothetical EU referendum.
Regional Differences
There are some clear regional divides in attitudes toward democracy, liberal values, and EU integration across Ukraine in the weeks leading up to the full-scale Russian invasion. These differences are particularly pronounced between Eastern Ukraine and the Center, South, and West – though not uniformly in the same direction.
Figure 2. Attitudes toward democracy, liberal values, and EU integration across Ukraine




Source: Authors’ creation from ESS.
On democratic commitment, only 37 percent of respondents in the East considered it “extremely important” to live in a democratically governed country. This was about 16 percentage points lower than the national average. When categories were grouped into low, medium, and high importance, the East still trailed the national average by about 10 percentage points (about 67.5 and 75 percent, respectively). Similarly, satisfaction with democracy is the lowest among respondents from the East (about 6 percent compared to a national average, including the East, of 11 percent). Geographical differences are also evident in the responses to the question on whether it is acceptable for a country to have a strong leader above the law. A smaller share rejected this in the East (about 30 percent compared to the national average of 37 percent).
However, the East stood out in the other direction on some core liberal values, as depicted in Figure 2. It had the lowest share disagreeing with LGBT rights (31 percent vs. 40 percent nationally), the weakest support for teaching children obedience (17 percent), and the highest rejection of it (41 percent). Further, only 12 percent in the East agreed that “the country needs most loyalty towards its leaders,” compared to 26 percent nationally. This question could reflect one’s view on the current leadership, warranting some caution in the interpretation. On immigration, however, the East was less liberal: only 19 percent saw immigrants as having a positive impact, versus about 30 percent nationally.
The sharpest regional divide between the East and other regions concerns attitudes toward Europe and EU membership. In a hypothetical referendum, 73 percent of respondents in the East said they would vote to remain outside of the EU, compared to 47 percent in the South, 23 percent in the Central, and just 11 percent in the West. Support for further European unification was also substantially lower in the East, with only about 17 percent in favor of further unification, as compared to the almost 50 percent national average. Similarly, emotional attachment to Europe is substantially lower among respondents from the East, with nearly all respondents stating low or medium attachment only – figures that nearly invert those of respondents from the West of Ukraine.
The Role of Trust
Turning to the measures of trust, the East clearly stands out. Trust in the parliament, the police, political parties, politicians, and the legal system was substantially lower among respondents from the East (in the ranges of 5 to 15 percentage points more respondents answered they had a low level of trust in said institutions than the national average). When asked about trust in the United Nations, the East also stood out with more than 50 percent stating low trust compared to the national average of about 37. The same pattern holds also when asked about the European Parliament – 73 percent compared to the national average of about 44 percent – stated low trust. Respondents from the South also displayed lower levels of trust across all measures, but the deviations from the average are about half as big as the East.
When asked whether people can generally be trusted, or one can’t be too careful, the East did not stand out in this way, underpinning how distrust is strongly directed toward institutions, both national and international.
Conflict Exposure
Figure 3 details the conflict intensity in the last two years leading up to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As can be seen, incidents of violence are concentrated in the Donbass area, including the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. While not marked by similar levels of active conflict, Kharkiv oblast – also part of the East classification – borders areas with high levels of conflict intensity in the Donbass, as well as Russia in the east.
Figure 3. Conflict intensity in Ukraine, by raion
2020

2021

Source: Authors’ creation from Armed Conflict and Location Data.
It should be noted that the map also depicts strategic deployments and political unrest, such as demonstrations, explaining the prevalence of “conflict” also in a few other places in Ukraine prior to February 2022. The occurrences of such incidents are, however, far less than those in Luhansk oblast and Donetsk oblast at the time. An important piece of information is that the intensity pattern holds for the time Armed Conflict and Location Data for Ukraine has been available (2018), i.e. individuals situated in the East have been exposed to incidences of violence over a prolonged period of time.
This raises the question whether this exposure to violence may have contributed to increased differences in trust in institutions and support for democracy and the EU beyond what was already there before 2014. The most immediate effect probably comes from selective migration, i.e., that individuals who remain in the eastern regions in early 2022 despite the violence since 2014 may be those who, on average, are more skeptical of the Ukrainian government and its tilt away from the authoritarian Russia and towards the EU. But previous literature and recent studies on Ukraine suggest that there may also be a direct effect coming from exposure to violence on an individual’s attitudes. This relationship has recently been mapped by Obrizan (2025). A key finding is that military solutions are preferred in the segment of the population that has experienced hardship and personal losses since the full-scale invasion in 2022.
More generally, any kind of trust – including the interpersonal one – can be affected by exposure to conflict. The relationship is complicated, and in some instances, violence can cause more pro-social attitudes and behavior. An important distinction, however, is that exposure to violence amplifies the distinctions in attitudes and behavior towards members of in- and out-groups (Olofsgård, 2025). This suggests that conflict may have further increased the differences between the East of Ukraine and the rest of the country, if many residents in the former perceive national and western institutions as being dominated by groups they do not feel strong attachments to.
Further, terror management theory (e.g., Landau et al. 2004) suggests that fear induces support for charismatic and strong leadership. In a context where liberal democracy is not everywhere well enough entrenched, this may tilt over into support for more authoritarian leadership in response to attacks triggering stronger emotions of fear. Furthermore, work by Feldman and Stenner (1997) shows that the impact of perceived societal threat on triggering stronger authoritarian preferences can depend on authoritarian predispositions. The latter is measured by, e.g., looking at attitudes towards child rearing and emphasis on obedience. In the context of the finding above, this would imply that the impact of violence on authoritarian preferences would be weaker in the eastern parts of Ukraine, compared to the rest of the country, a potentially interesting avenue for future research.
Conclusions
The findings in this policy brief nuance simple narratives about regional divides in Ukraine. While dissatisfaction with democracy and skepticism toward the EU are more common in the East, this does not necessarily correspond to a general rejection of liberal social values. In some cases — such as attitudes toward child-rearing, authority, and LGBT rights — respondents from the East even express more liberal views than elsewhere.
Not explicitly discussed in the brief is the topic of mother tongue. The data shows that Russian speakers are less emotionally attached to Europe and less supportive of EU integration. Yet, there is no consistent evidence that Russian speakers are less committed to liberal democratic values overall. The effect of language is difficult to disentangle from geography, particularly given the concentration of Russian speakers in Eastern Ukraine.
What does stand out more clearly is that trust and the general view on institutions are substantially lower and more negative in the East. Respondents from the East consistently report lower trust in national and international political institutions. Interestingly, this pattern does not extend to generalized social trust — the East does not differ markedly from the rest of the country. This contrast suggests a more focused skepticism directed at formal institutions, rather than widespread social distrust. One possible explanation, as discussed in Olofsgård (2025), is that when exposed to conflict and violence, interpersonal trust may reflect confidence in one’s in-group, while institutional trust hinges on feeling represented within the broader political system. If respondents from the East perceive themselves as excluded from the national or European in-group, this could explain their lower levels of trust in both domestic and international institutions, and exposure to violence may have further amplified this. While signs of such alienation appear in the data, one should refrain from drawing too strong conclusions from this alone. Another possible explanation is that prolonged exposure to violence has eroded confidence in the government’s ability to protect citizens, and in the effectiveness of EU support, which would turn support away from the EU option preferred by the current government. Future research on the effects of war exposure should more carefully disentangle the various aspects and forms of trust and how they relate to liberal values in Ukraine. Rebuilding institutional trust remains a key challenge. In this context, instilling peace and decentralizing political power may be essential for increasing trust in the Eastern part of the country, if that helps residents in the East to identify with public institutions. As Ukraine advances on its path toward EU membership, fostering a shared sense of national belonging will be critical in overcoming the narrative of an East–West divide when rebuilding the country.
References
- Feldman, S. & Stenner, K. (1997). Perceived threat and authoritarianism. Political Psychology, 18(4), 741–770.
- Landau, M. J., Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., Cohen, F., Pyszczynski, T., Arndt, J., Miller, C. H., Ogilvie, D. M. & Cook, A. (2004). Deliver us from Evil: The Effects of Mortality Salience and Reminders of 9/11 on Support for President George W. Bush. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(9), 1136–1150.
- Obrizan, M. (2025). The impact of wartime trauma on political attitudes in Ukraine. ZOiS Spotlight.
- Olofsgård, A. (2025). Exposure to Violence and Prosocial Attitudes. FREE Policy Brief Series.
- Olofsgård, A., Smitt Meyer, C. & Brik, T. (2024). Conflict Intensity and Democratic Consolidation in a Country at War. Open Science Framework.
- Roland, G. (2012). The long-run weight of communism or the weight of long-run history? In G. Roland (ed.) Economies in Transition. The Long-Run View. Palgrave McMillan London.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.