Tag: Central and Eastern Europe
The 2024 FREE Network Retreat: Economic Research and Capacity Building in Moldova
The 2024 FREE Network Retreat, held in Chisinau, Moldova on September 11-13, brought together representatives from the FREE Network institutes and other stakeholders, focusing on economic research and capacity building, especially in the context of Moldova’s EU accession efforts. The event featured general sessions on institutional development, special tracks on academic, administrative and communication topics, and a half-day conference on “Economic Research and Capacity Building“. Key discussions addressed challenges such as Moldova’s weak economic research infrastructure, policymaking gaps, and the need for capacity building. Several examples of Moldovan success stories were also highlighted. The event concluded with a call for strengthened collaboration and donor support towards economics education and fostering Moldova’s research and capacity-building landscape.
Introduction
The FREE Network Retreat is an annual event for researchers and administrators from the FREE Network institutes. The 2024 Retreat took place in Chisinau, Moldova, September 11-13 and was attended by representatives from BEROC (Belarus – currently in exile in Lithuania), BICEPS (Latvia), CenEA (Poland), ISET (Georgia), KSE (Ukraine) and SITE (Sweden). In addition, although not being a member of the FREE Network, the New Uzbekistan University in Tashkent and its Greater Eurasia Research Center (GEAR) were represented.
Like at previous retreats, there were two general sessions with a focus on the development of the individual institutes and the Network as a whole, and three tracks of special sessions on academic, administration and communication topics. The Retreat also involved a meeting of the FREE Network’s joint initiative The Forum for Research on Gender in Eastern Europe (FROGEE) – and a special side event on the integration of Ukrainian Refugees in Moldova.
An integral part of this year’s Retreat was the half-day conference, “Economic Research and Capacity Building”. Drawing on the FREE Network’s experience, the conference focused on how capacity building and research can facilitate the transformation of societies and economies, particularly within the Moldovan context, on its path towards EU-accession. In addition, it provided the FREE Network members an opportunity to share their experiences of capacity building, economic research and policymaking with Moldovan stakeholders.
The Conference was open to external participants interested in the topic, particularly policymakers, academics, and think tank representatives. It clearly illustrated the need to strengthen not only economic research and capacity building but also academic education in economics and related fields, improve the quality and access to data, and raise the level of competence in economics within the government and public sector in general.
A summary of the Conference discussions is provided below. For a full overview of the program and participants see the Appendix.
The Opening Session
The opening session started with the general observation that EU integration, in addition to being a political and security issue is primarily an economic issue with a need for economic research and analysis that can inform policy discussions and educate current and future stakeholders. Within this context, all the FREE Network institutes have considerable experience engaging in research and discussions of policy and policy reform within the region. With Moldova not (yet) represented in the FREE Network, the Conference served as a platform for the Network to learn and eventually engage in sustainable partnership(s).
The discussion then shifted to the Moldovan situation and the challenges ahead on the path to EU membership. Several challenges were identified: a lack of economic research, with most existing research being rather weak; missing connections between researchers and policymakers; a shortage of human resources; and generally weak institutions; as well as policies often being based on trial and error rather than evidence-based decision-making.
To address these challenges several actions were suggested including the need to strengthen research and independent economic thinking through capacity building; drawing on the experience of the countries that have joined the EU during the last two decades; developing international research cooperation through networks like the FREE Network; business-friendly practices and treating investors right while at the same time encouraging entrepreneurship and educating society on the importance of private and public investments.
The discussion also addressed activities supporting civil society undertaken by the EU and Sweden, respectively. Examples of activities include building partnerships and strong ecosystems for innovation and entrepreneurship, supporting reforms cutting red tape and improving the business climate in general as well as supporting the Academy of Economic Studies Moldova and the Association of Women in Business.
Research and Capacity Building – the Moldovan Perspective
The discussion started with a presentation of three Moldovan success stories. The first one is a recently launched program on media, gaming development and animation. Currently, 1,000 students are being enrolled. The program attracts Moldovans from all over the country as well as Moldovan students abroad who decided to terminate their studies abroad to go back to Moldova and enrol in the program. The success of the program is a good example of cooperation between industry, higher education institutions and the Ministry of Education opening up to new professions and programs that attract young people.
The second example is taken from the fashion industry. Traditionally Moldova has been a country where sewing takes place thanks to cheap labor. However, in recent years a “pipeline” of talent, design and brands has developed. As a result, the value added in the industry and export revenues as well as wages have increased.
The final example is the Moldovan tech industry. The tech industry has been at the forefront and could be considered the tiger of the Moldovan economy with growth rates of 30-40 percent per year. There are two main reasons behind this success: the rapidly developing Moldovan startup scene combined with a 7 percent single tax mechanism for the tech industry.
The discussion then turned to the role of research in policymaking. The first argument put forward focused on the impact (or rather the lack of impact) of research and analysis on Moldovan policymaking. As the examples above show, the Moldovan economy has the potential to develop – however, the policy discussion does not focus on the transition towards higher-value activities. On the contrary, even though Moldovan research highlights the role of transition to higher value-added, this argument has essentially been ignored in the policy debate that has been mostly characterized by rhetoric on job creation rather than transition to an economy that creates jobs within the high(er) value-added sectors. Unfortunately, this is not the only example of Moldovan policy discussions and decision-making ignoring the research perspective and outcomes. Among other examples mentioned is the recent tax reform experience and programs supporting Small and Medium Sized Enterprises. Currently, reforms are driven either by purely political reasons or by lobbying or by any other vested interests. There is essentially no impact assessment or any economic analysis underpinning the decisions. Due to the fact that policy initiatives neither are based on economic analysis nor on best practices, they are vulnerable to clientelism or corruption. The importance of rule of law was emphasized in light of Moldova’s anchoring to the EU and with reference to Latvia and the other Baltic states. It is a too important topic to be left to the lawyers and should hence be part of economic capacity building and research.
The second argument referred to access to reliable data needed for quality policy-oriented research. While the data collected by the National Bureau of Statistics in general is good, the main issue lies in accessing it. The Bureau does not have the resources to support researchers. To exacerbate the problem further, there seems to be no willingness among policymakers to address this issue. Given Moldova’s vulnerability to Russian disinformation and the increased pressure on Moldova, the issue of access to reliable data is even more pressing today than a few years ago.
To foster an informed policy debate and decision-making process taking evidence-based research into account, it would be desirable to create a platform to advocate the results of economic policy analysis where, e.g., policy papers and monitoring reports, could be presented and discussed by experts and decision-makers in the public and private sectors as well as the civil society.
The session continued with a discussion on human capital. The successful program attracting Georgians in the diaspora to return and work for the Georgian government, launched during the first decade of the 2000s, served as the point of departure for the discussion. The key to the success in Georgia was that the government was able to pay competitive salaries. This is one of the main challenges facing Moldova. Even though there have been some adjustments in government salaries during recent years, the government is still far from being anywhere close to paying the same salaries as the private sector in general and think tanks in particular. An understanding of this is important not only at the national level but also among donors. It was noted that there have been some adjustments in government salaries, but it has not been enough. Further, while the Moldovan diaspora are starting to return, they, however, have little governmental or political experience, which makes it difficult to involve them in, e.g. policymaking and development of support programs. It would be good to draw on experiences and best practices from other countries in the region – such as the Baltic states and Georgia – and use them as benchmarks, e.g., for the innovation ecosystem, incubators and accelerators.
Research and Capacity Building – the FREE Network Experience
The FREE Network institutes shared their experiences in capacity building and brain gain, developing an economics undergraduate program, research and policy impact, and network building through research.
ISET (Georgia) shared their experience on attracting talented economists in the Georgian diaspora back to Georgian academia, research, and government positions. The starting point was an initiative developed in collaboration with the donor community to establish a world-class economics school in the Caucasus – the International School of Economics (ISET). The school has developed from a small boutique school to a school with three academic programs (undergraduate and graduate) and about 700 enrolled students. ISET graduates are in high demand and are seen in the private and public sectors. The ISET Policy Institute plays a pivotal role in terms of contributing to evidence-based policymaking. Throughout the years more than 50 ISET graduates have been accepted in Ph.D. programs at top universities worldwide. Many of them have returned to Georgia and ISET after completing their Ph.D. Had not it been for opportunities offered by ISET and the Policy Institute, it is very unlikely that they would have returned. The FREE Network and the opportunities offered are a great resource for the ISET as well as for the ISET Policy Institute.
BEROC (Belarus – in exile in Lithuania since 2022) shared their experience on the process of creating and launching an undergraduate program in economics and business. BEROC started as a research center, but the idea to establish a Bachelor program in economics and business had been around for several years. As part of the re-organization and reformation of the European Humanities University (Belarusian, but in exile), the European Commission approached BEROC asking if it could develop an undergraduate program in economics and business for Belarusian students.
The challenge has been two-fold: first, in the current political situation, Belarusian people are “locked within the country” and for them it is much easier to go to Russia for studies. In addition, the cost of living and the tuition fee (although low by Baltic standards) provide additional barriers to potential students. Second, BEROC operates in exile themselves. Nevertheless, a Bachelor program in economics and business will be launched in October 2024 with the support of Belarusian business in exile. Thanks to cooperation with partners within the FREE Network the program is at the global frontier.
BICEPS (Latvia) provided an overview of how research can contribute to the policy agenda. BICEPS’s first policy reports, published more than 15 years ago, focused on the unsustainable Latvian economic growth and inflation levels at the time. These reports reached conclusions that, while correct ex-post, were contrary to those of the Latvian Central Bank. This divergence sparked substantial discussion at both the political level and in the media.
In the early 2010s, BICEPS was commissioned to produce the first-ever Latvian Competitiveness Report. This report has served as a foundation for policymaking and has left a lasting mark on the policy agenda. Furthermore, following BICEPS’s research on the shadow economy and the annual presentation of the shadow economy index, the Ministry of Finance, through public procurement, commissioned a 2021 project to develop a model addressing the impact of the shadow economy.
The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) Latvia and the EUROMOD tax-benefit microsimulation model are long-term projects run by BICEPS. Current projects include one focused on the impact of broadening the sugar tax base, a regional Global Entrepreneurship Monitor study, a project on road congestion tolls in cities and the development of sustainable agriculture in Africa.
CenEA (Poland) might be small in terms of people employed, but disproportionally big in terms of impact and presence in the Polish policy discussion. From the very beginning, CenEA has aimed at combining policy with solid economic research. The focus has primarily been in the areas of fiscal policy, ageing and health – with the latter two being major issues in Poland.
For CenEA, the FREE Network has been fundamental, both for funding and for building its credibility and position. CenEA has played an active role in terms of broadening and deepening the cooperation within the FREE Network. It has been very active in developing and coordinating the FROGEE project. The project (financed by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, SIDA) has run for six years and covered a wide range of topics within the field of gender equality. It has resulted in several FREE Policy Briefs, policy and research papers, and several conferences and workshops. In addition, the project has contributed to the development of tools and skills for both senior and junior researchers within the Network. Based on the success of the FROGEE project, new projects and initiatives within the Network have been developed.
SITE (Sweden) has taken the lead on the FREECE (the Forum for Research on Eastern Europe: Climate and Environment) project. The project has been around for eighteen months with a focus on the transition from an economy based on the production and consumption of fossil fuels to an economy based on the production and consumption of zero-carbon renewables. This will be a challenge for everyone, especially for countries throughout Eastern Europe that often rely on the extraction and consumption of fossil fuels for employment as well as for energy needs.
The FREECE project provides several opportunities to engage in policy-relevant research while at the same time filling a gap in the literature.
Initiatives and the Road Ahead
At the current stage of Moldovan economic and political development there is a higher demand for analysis and applied research, rather than general and theoretical research. In other words, policy relevance needs to be in focus. At the same time, such applied analysis and research need to involve well-educated human capital with relevant skills, such as university graduates. This puts focus on the role of universities and how they can reform.
The Moldova School of Economics initiative was launched approximately half a year ago. Among the first activities were public lectures on economic behaviour and public policies. In September, in cooperation with CERGE-EI in Prague, the first short economics course was launched. Currently, there are discussions with the Ministry of Education and the State University on developing the initiative into an actual program. So far, the response has been positive. The vision is to create the Moldova School of Economics into an initiative that reaches out not only to Chisinau and Moldova but to the wider region.
The session on this topic proceeded to discuss how the FREE Network could support Moldovan research and capacity building, focusing on its experience in implementing various projects. One potential starting point would be a summer school involving both the FREE Network and Moldovan economists living abroad. There are already contacts with members of the diaspora who have expressed a willingness to participate as faculty members, without compensation. Additionally, there is a need for shorter courses or executive classes aimed at individuals in ministries. Topics to be covered may include basic macroeconomic analysis, fiscal policy, and economic growth. It is also important to incorporate microeconomic subjects, such as the factors driving innovation and the development of economic clusters.
Concluding Comments
The FREE Network Retreat and conference has shown that many of the issues currently facing Moldova, have at least partly been addressed by the FREE Network members in their respective countries. Looking forward this should provide a good basis for cooperation between the Network and Moldovan partners. Three broadly defined areas for collaboration and partnerships were identified: (i) education and training: at the university level as well as for ministries and government agencies; (ii) creation and development of a good environment for research and policy analysis; (iii) communication and outreach.
The dialogue that has been initiated during the conference should continue and include a discussion on how to attract donors to support long-term cooperation that contributes to the needed strengthening of research and capacity building in Moldova.
Appendix
Conference Programme: Economic Research and Capacity Building
9.30 Conference Opening
- Torbjörn Becker, Director, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics
- Jānis Mažeiks, Ambassador of the European Union to the Republic of Moldova
- Katarina Fried, Ambassador of Sweden to the Republic of Moldova
10:00 Research and Capacity Building – the Moldovan perspective
- Doina Nistor, Chief of Party, Moldova Future Technologies Activity
- Adrian Lupușor, Executive Director, Independent Analytical Center Expert-Grup
- Kálmán Mizsei, EU Adviser to the Government of Moldova
10:50 Research and Capacity Building: The FREE Network Experience
- Tamar Sulukhia (ISET, Georgia): Capacity building and brain gain
- Dzmitry Kruk (BEROC, Belarus – in exile): Development of a new academic programme
- Marija Krūmiņa (BICEPS, Latvia): Research and policy impact
- Michal Myck (CenEA, Poland): Network building and the FROGEE experience
- Julius Andersson (SITE, Sweden): Network building and the FREECE experience
11:30 Initiatives and the Road Ahead
- Mihnea Constantinescu, Advisor to the Governor National Bank of Moldova
- Misha Zeldin-Gipsman, the Moldova School of Economics Initiative
12:10 Concluding Comments
- Torbjörn Becker, Director, SITE
- Kata Fredheim, Associate Professor, BICEPS and Stockholm School of Economics in Riga
12:20 Lunch and Networking
Conference moderator: Kata Fredheim, BICEPS and SSE Riga.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Media Freedom in Eastern Europe
In recent years, press freedom in many Eastern European countries has increasingly come under threat. This policy brief provides an overview of the importance of a free press for democracy and the challenges to media freedom in these European transition economies.
Introduction
Freedom of expression – which encompasses media freedom – is a fundamental human right enshrined in most countries’ constitutions. Yet for many of their citizens, it is more of an aspiration than a reality. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a number of countries in Eastern Europe embarked on a process of democratisation and accession to the European Union – for which one of the prerequisites is a free press.
Figure 1 shows a measure of press freedom for the eight Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004. These countries saw a general improvement in press freedom from the early 1990s to the early 2000s. But since then, experiences have diverged and in 2017 only Estonia and the Czech Republic showed better scores on press freedom than when they first joined the EU. This pattern of backsliding is not confined to the media, but is also evident in other measures of democracy.
Figure 1. Media Freedom in Eastern Europe
Media and Democracy
A free press and a strong democracy are mutually reinforcing. Research, from mainly Western democracies, shows that the media plays an important role in informing the electorate and holding politicians accountable. For example, Snyder and Strömberg (2010) find that U.S. voters are less informed about their Congressmen when they are covered less in the local press. This is ultimately damaging for voters, as these politicians work less for their constituency and these constituencies also receive less federal funding.
Investigative journalism can play an important role in uncovering corruption and other forms of wrongdoing by politicians. For instance, using the Panama Papers and other leaked documents, journalists uncovered 11,562 offshore entities linked to Russia, 2943 linked to Latvia, and 103 linked to Sweden (see: Offshore Leaks Database). While there are legitimate uses for these offshore entities, the lack of transparency surrounding offshore finance also facilitates tax evasion and money laundering. The revelations of offshore holdings became an embarrassment to many politicians, with some forced to resign. In Russian media, the allegations that the leaks document suspected money laundering by President Putin were characterised as US propaganda (Hoskins and Shchelin, 2018).
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the length of time a country’s leader has been in office and its press freedom score in 2020. While there is no systematic relationship between leader tenure length and press freedom in Western Europe (in blue), across Eastern Europe (in red), countries whose leader has been in power for longer tend to have less media freedom. This correlation is likely to reflect three factors: 1) media coverage can affect a government’s chances of staying in power; 2) a longer-lived government might be more able to control the media and 3) a host of other factors, such as the public’s political engagement and the strength of democratic institutions, could influence both freedom of the press and the longevity of governments.
Figure 2. Media Freedom and Leader Tenure
Electoral Effects of the Media
A number of papers show the causal effects of (biased) media coverage in shaping support for political parties. For instance, watching Fox News increases voting for the Republican party in the US (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; Martin and Yurukoglu, 2017).
Enikolopov, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya (2011) investigate the influence of NTV (the only national TV channel that was at the time independent of the government) on voting in the 1999 parliamentary election in Russia. They find that areas with greater access to NTV were significantly less likely to vote for the government party and more likely to vote for opposition parties.
Biased media can also be used as a foreign policy tool. Peisakhin and Rozenas (2018) find that Ukrainian areas that received Russian TV had on average greater support for pro-Russian parties and candidates in the 2014 elections.
The media landscape in many CEE countries is highly polarised and politicised. Kostadinova (2015) cites research showing that in some former communist countries many journalists still rely on government officials as news sources. In other countries, media in opposition to the communist regimes emerged at the end of the 1980s, such as in Poland where the Gazeta Wyborcza became one of the leading daily newspapers.
Government Control of the Media
Governments have many ways of controlling the media in their country. At the extreme, governments can own and run media outlets, dictate their contents, and censor any dissenting voices. While political and media systems across CEE are diverse, they share some common experiences that might explain their current fragility.
Transitions in Media Ownership
In the Eastern Bloc, the mass media was owned and tightly controlled by the state and used as a tool for propaganda. After the fall of communism, many state-owned media were privatised – along with other state-owned enterprises. Foreign (mostly western European) media conglomerates purchased a significant fraction of media outlets in a number of countries.
While private and foreign ownership of the media can reduce the government’s ability to influence media content, the experience of CEE was not entirely positive. Stetka (2012) argues that while foreign owners brought capital and technology, they were less concerned with transplanting Western journalistic and professional standards. Dobek-Ostrowska (2015) claims that this focus on profit led to the tabloidisation of news across the CEE.
Following the global financial crisis in 2007/2008, foreign investors started to pull out of the CEE media markets and are being replaced by local owners who often have strong links with the government. This is evident in Hungary, where businessmen close to the government have been buying up independent media outlets, including its largest news website, one of two national commercial TV channels, and all regional newspapers (Bede, 2018). The Polish government also aims to “re-nationalise” its media. Plans by a state-run oil company to buy one of the country’s largest media publishers from its German owners were recently approved.
Elsewhere, domestically owned and previously independent media outlets are also being bought by new pro-government owners. In Russia, the formerly independent NTV from the above example was taken over by a state-owned company in 2001 and started to cover the ruling party in the run-up to the following elections in a similarly favourable way to state-controlled TV channels. Gehlbach (2010) argues that Putin’s media strategy is to exert tight control over the news coverage of these three main national television networks, while allowing media outlets with less reach to operate more independently.
In some countries of the region, there is limited information about the ultimate owner of media outlets. Within the EU, Latvia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Cyprus, are assessed as high risk in terms of transparency of media ownership (Brogi et al. 2020). In 2009, the Swedish company Bonnier sold Diena – one of Latvia’s largest newspapers – to an initially undisclosed investor. A year later, a Latvian businessman acquired a controlling stake in the paper.
Government Advertising
Around the world, traditional news media is facing increased competition from digital platforms and becoming highly dependent on advertising revenue, including advertising from the government and pro-government businesses According to the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom, there are no clear and fair criteria for the distribution of state advertising to the media in the majority of EU countries – especially those in Eastern Europe (with the exception of Estonia).
Szeidl and Szucs (2021) document how the Hungarian government targeted advertising to friendly media outlets and how these media in turn covered the government more positively. They also present suggestive evidence that a similar favour exchange between government and the media occurs in nine other Eastern European countries, including Poland.
Two weeks ago, many private Polish media outlets coordinated a media blackout to protest government plans to tax advertising revenues. The media companies complained that the tax would cost them $270m a year, while public media received twice as much from taxpayers.
Public Service Media
The establishment of public service media forms an integral part of the EU’s agenda for promoting press freedom. While public service media are an important and trusted source of unbiased information in many western European countries, they generally play a smaller role in the Eastern European media markets. Furthermore, no laws are guaranteeing the independence of public service media from the government in eastern EU countries, with the exception of the Baltic states and Slovenia (see Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom).
Intimidation of Journalists
Governments can also ensure positive coverage by intimidating editors and journalists. Since 1992, 91 journalists were killed, imprisoned, or went missing in Russia, 18 in Ukraine, 15 in Belarus, and 8 in Georgia (data by the Committee to Protect Journalists). While not all of these cases reflect government action, several recent examples illustrate how the judicial system may be used against journalists. For instance, according to the CPJ, ten journalists were imprisoned in November 2020 for covering protests against President Lukashenko in Belarus and one journalist was charged with high treason and espionage in Russia in July 2020.
There are also fears that governments can use defamation laws to deter and punish unwelcome media reports. For instance, the head of Poland’s ruling party filed a libel charge against two journalists from the Gazeta Wyborcza for reporting about his alleged involvement in a real estate project (see, e.g. Council of Europe media freedom alert).
Conclusion
The media plays a vital role in shaping the public debate and holding those in power accountable to the wider population. This power of the media also increases the risk that governments attempt to influence media content.
In recent years, many countries in CEE have seen press freedom come increasingly under threat, undermining some of the progress made since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Part of the present fragility of media freedom in Eastern Europe may be due to their historical experience. During the transition from communism, many formerly state-owned media companies were sold to private and often foreign owners. In the past decade, local business interests with strong ties to the government started to buy up large shares of the media market in a number of Eastern European countries. Meanwhile, public service media have been less successful at establishing themselves as important and unbiased sources of information across Eastern Europe compared to Western Europe. To ensure positive media coverage, many governments adopt a carrot and stick approach: state advertising revenues and intimidation of individual journalists.
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”. To ensure these fundamental rights, there need to be transparent and fair rules governing the ownership, management, and financing of media outlets and safeguards for individual journalists.
References
- Bede, Márton, 2018. “As elections loom, stakes are raised for Hungarian media.” International Press Institute.
- Brogi, Elda, Roberta Carlini, Iva Nenadic, Pier Luigi Parcu and Mario Viola de Azevedo Cunha, 2020. ”Monitoring Media Pluralism in the Digital Era.”, Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom Report.
- DellaVigna, Stefano, and Ethan Kaplan. “The Fox News effect: Media bias and voting.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 122, no. 3 (2007): 1187-1234.
- Dobek-Ostrowska, Bogusława, 2015. “25 years after communism: four models of media and politics in Central and Eastern Europe”. In Democracy and media in Central and Eastern Europe 25 years on, 11-46. Publisher: Peter Lang Edition Editors: Bogusłąwa Dobek-Ostrowska & Michał Głowacki
- Enikolopov, Ruben, Maria Petrova and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2011. “Media and political persuasion: Evidence from Russia.” American Economic Review, 101(7), pp. 3253-85.
- Gehlbach, Scott, 2010. “Reflections on Putin and the Media“, Post-Soviet Affairs, 26:1, 77-87.
- Hoskins, Andrew and Pavel Shchelin, 2018. “Information war in the Russian media ecology: the case of the Panama Papers.” Continuum, 32:2, 250-266.
- Kostadinova, Petia, 2015. “Media in the New Democracies of Post-Communist Eastern Europe.” East European Politics and Societies, 29 (2), 453–66.
- Martin, Gregory J., and Ali Yurukoglu, 2017. “Bias in cable news: Persuasion and polarization.” American Economic Review 107, no. 9: 2565-99.
- Peisakhin, Leonid and Arturas Rozenas. 2018. “Electoral Effects of Biased Media: Russian Television in Ukraine.” American Journal of Political Science, 62: 535-550.
- Snyder, James M., and David Strömberg, 2010. “Press Coverage and Political Accountability.” Journal of Political Economy, 118 (2), 355-408.
- Stetka, Vaclav. “From multinationals to business tycoons: Media ownership and journalistic autonomy in Central and Eastern Europe.” The International Journal of Press/Politics, 17: 4, 433-456.
- Szeidl, Adam, and Ferenc Szucs, 2010. “Media capture through favor exchange.” Econometrica, 89 (1): 281-310.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Eastern Europe | Key Points From the 2020 SITE Development Day Conference
After having been relatively mildly affected in the first wave, Eastern Europe is currently in the midst of the second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic with much higher levels of infected and dead compared to the spring. This health crisis not only has economic consequences but also has contributed to political instability in parts of the region. This policy brief shortly summarizes the presentations and discussions held at the SITE Development Day 2020 Conference, focusing on the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic in Eastern Europe.
A Swedish Government Perspective
The conference started with the Swedish Minister of International Development Cooperation, Peter Eriksson, discussing the current situation in Eastern Europe with a particular focus on the partnership with Sweden.
According to Minister Eriksson, Swedish foreign policy in general, and foreign aid policy in particular, has historically paid too little attention to Eastern Europe. He has therefore emphasized that Swedish aid should be used to promote democracy and human rights in the region. As the pandemic has exacerbated global anti-democratic trends and intensified existing inequalities, international support and cooperation have become more essential than ever.
Minister Eriksson mentioned several priority areas of Swedish aid policy in the region, such as the fight against corruption, economic reforms for poverty alleviation, gender equality, and media freedom. Emphasizing the importance of the latter, Minister Eriksson mentioned education for journalists and financial support for small independent media as important Swedish efforts in the region. He stressed that the protection of pluralistic media is also a military security matter, as countries like Georgia and Ukraine have been targets of foreign disinformation campaigns. The importance to support democracy and civil society was also illustrated by the case of Belarus, where all ongoing projects in partnership with the state or state-affiliated organizations have been suspended. The Swedish government has successfully implemented regional projects in energy efficiency and water purification, although Minister Eriksson underlined that the need for measures to slow down climate change is intensifying.
The important role of European Union membership was also mentioned. Minister Eriksson argued that the incentives created by potential EU membership have been the main drivers of democratization, modernization, and poverty reduction as well as progress towards greener economies in the region.
In response to the pandemic, Sweden, as well as the European Union, have increased aid transfers to Eastern Europe. Minister Eriksson underlined, though, the need to not only support immediately affected sectors and outcomes, as the pandemic has many serious spillover effects in other areas already in need of help prior to the crisis.
The Economic Outlook for the Region
The second section of the conference provided a current account of the economic situation in the region by two speakers from different sectors.
Alexander Plekhanov, director for Transition Impact and Global Economics at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), shared results from an EBRD survey on the impact of the pandemic. The survey was conducted in August and covered 8 emerging economies in Eastern Europe and 6 more advanced countries for comparison.
Analysis of the survey responses shows that the impact of the crisis is very broad. The share of respondents that had lost their job was 15% in emerging economies, and almost twice as high in advanced economies. Many factors contributed to this gap. One affected area was tourism, with international tourism being particularly important in many emerging economies, and hard to replace with increased domestic tourism. The outbound relative to inbound tourism for countries like Sweden and the UK equals a factor of 3 and 2 respectively, while the corresponding in emerging economies is often below 1.
Compared to the 2008 financial crisis, the economic impact over the first five months of the pandemic was at similar aggregate levels, but more unequal across socio-economic groups. For instance, job losses were higher among the young and those with lower income and with less education. Yet, the overall impact in emerging economies was 10% less unequal than in advanced economies due to differences in the structures of economies and the feasibility of working from home.
Fredrik Rågmark, the CEO of Medicover, a healthcare and diagnostics services provider operating in the region in the last 25 years, provided insights from a business perspective.
Similar to Minister Eriksson, Rågmark argued that, for Medicover, the biggest change in the region over recent years has been related to EU integration, and in particular to Poland becoming an EU Member. Rågmark noted that the change was not limited to Poland: all the countries in the region are on a trajectory of change but at different stages. In his mind, the biggest difference between the emerging Eastern Europe and the West is that people have higher expectations about the future in the East.
Rågmark recognized that corruption has been a major challenge for the region in attracting business and investors, but also that it has gotten significantly better in recent years. The EU integration process has been essential there, as membership and continued support relies on institutional reforms to improve governance and ensure political accountability. Recognizing the risk that governments lose incentives to continue reforms once membership is secured (currently exemplified by the policies in Hungary and Poland), Rågmark yet emphasized that the European Union has been extremely successful in improving the business climate in the region and should receive more recognition than it often does.
As for the COVID-19 crisis, Rågmark argued that Plekanovs description was very representative of what he has seen in Eastern Europe. Medicover experienced a drastic falloff in late March when people were not allowed to visit the hospital unless they had acute symptoms. When countries re-opened in the summer, the company had a strong rebound of replaced demand from the lockdown. Also, Medicover has contributed significantly to the testing effort across the region. Due to the challenges associated with the skyrocketing demand for PCR testing, many countries in Eastern Europe that previously only allowed the public sector to treat inpatient COVID-19 cases, have opened up ambulatory services to the private sector. In terms of scaling up testing capacity, the private sector has been very important. Medicover is now a major provider of PCR-testing in Ukraine and Poland, and the single largest provider in Romania.
Economic Policy Responses to the Crisis: Regional Experiences
In this section, experts from the FREE network provided brief overviews of the current situation in their respective countries, as well as the major developments during the year.
Belarus
The Academic Director of BEROC, Kataryna Bornukova, provided an alarming description of recent developments in Belarus. Even before 2020, the prospects of the Belarussian economy did not look great. As relations with Russia started to worsen, the year began with shortages in the oil supply which contributed to GDP contraction already in the first quarter. When the pandemic hit Belarus in the spring the government neglected its severity. Initially, no measures of economic relief were introduced and there are valid suspicions that the official COVID-19 statistics were inaccurate. Eventually, the government created incentives for state-owned companies to keep up output, slowing down the GDP contraction in the second quarter. However, these measures are now a source of financial risk for the whole country as the state has accumulated huge inventories and substantially increased public debt. Unfortunately, during the second wave, policy responses are still lacking and the ongoing political crisis worsens the situation as it hampers economic development through increased uncertainty and lowered public trust.
Poland
As for Poland, Michal Myck, director of CenEA, argued that development during the crises has been mixed both in terms of the pandemic itself and government response.
While infections were at low levels during the first wave in April, they increased sharply during the second wave at the end of October. Similar to Belarus, there have been significant political developments over the year such as the presidential election campaign and the “Women’s Strike”. Myck suggested that these events have complicated a clear strategic response to the virus. During the summer, the government shifted its attention away from preparations for the second wave, towards the July elections. The first wave was met by fiscal and monetary stimulus packages. Although employment and growth have not fallen that much relative to neighboring countries, Myck argued that Poland will be left with a significantly higher level of public debt and other challenges when the pandemic is over.
Georgia
Giorgi Papava, Center Head at ISET-PI, explained that the Georgian government declared a state of emergency and lockdown in March, despite the low number of infections at the time. From April to June, the economy then experienced a 13% drop in GDP. After the economy re-opened at the end of June, it has shown a slight recovery over the summer. Unfortunately, it was followed by a sharp increase in infections in the autumn. This second wave was not met by similar restrictions until after the elections at the end of November, again suggesting the role of politics in the pandemic response in the region. In terms of economic impact, the most severe blow for Georgia was the sharp decline in tourism affecting many sectors including hospitality and food services, construction, arts, entertainment, and recreation.
Ukraine
Olena Sholomytska, Senior Researcher at KSE, explained how Ukraine, like most other countries in the region, experienced low reported infection rates in the spring, though high detection rates and low levels of testing may suggest that real infection rates were higher. The summer was followed by a sharp increase in infections and the situation has worsened since then. The economy saw a 7.5% drop in GDP in the second quarter, partly due to a strict lockdown policy, followed by a slight recovery in the third. The Ukrainian government has introduced various monetary and fiscal measures for both households and firms including cash allowances for self-employed, small firms, and people with temporary pay cuts, as well as long-term financing for banks up to 5 years. Currently, the government is reluctant to enforce stricter measures to prevent the second wave of infections mainly for political reasons. Ukrainians are becoming less afraid of the virus and more discontent with the restrictions, so the government is concerned about taking an unpopular decision.
Russia
Natalya Volchkova, Director at CEFIR at NES, explained how Russia, after a relatively calm summer, was hit by the second wave in October as the number of infections and COVID-19 deaths reached their highest levels since the onset of the pandemic. As far as economic performance is concerned, monthly indicators of economic activity show a sharp decline at the beginning of March and a slight recovery since then. However, when looking at month-on-month comparisons, economic performance is significantly lower in every month throughout 2020 compared to 2019.
The support measures introduced during the spring and summer constituted 3.7% of GDP. While most stimulus was allocated to the corporate sector (2.1%) households also received a significant amount of support (1.6%). The measures targeted to help household income included: cash transfers to families with children; increased unemployment benefits; 2019 tax-return for self-employed; extra payments to medical specialists; and credit restructuring and penalty-free payment deferrals for COVID-19 infected. The support dedicated to the business sector included: tax and credit payment deferrals; bankruptcy moratorium for 6 months; reduction in property tax: and subsidies to backbone enterprises. The support measures are expected to increase GDP growth by 1.8 percentage points by boosting household consumption, corporate inventory, and investments.
Latvia
Sergej Gubin, Research Fellow at BICEPS, described the epidemiological impact of the pandemic in the spring as hardly noticeable in Latvia. Although, the country currently has the 3rd lowest COVID-19 mortality rate in the EU, infections and mortality have increased quite dramatically during the fall.
While the restrictions introduced in the spring did not include a strict lockdown or a mandatory mask policy, the government closed borders, schools, and kindergartens. Following the second wave, the restrictions adjusted to including a mask policy, open borders, and 5-12 graders on distance learning.
The economic policy response has included downtime benefits for employees of firms with a reduction in turnover of 30% or more, temporary tax reliefs, and sick leave benefits for parents with young children on distance learning. The drop in GDP for 2020 is projected to be 7% and unemployment is expected to increase by 7.7%.
The Implications of the Pandemic for Gender Inequality
It is widely known that the pandemic has had catastrophic consequences for health and economic activity. Many experts, though, have also expressed concerns about its impact on gender equality and the welfare of women. On the health side, men and women have been shown to be equally susceptible to infection, however among those that get infected women have significantly lower mortality rates than men. Monika Oczkowska, Senior Researcher at CenEA, showed that about 40 % of deaths in Poland were women, which is very similar to Western European countries, whereas excess mortality has been particularly high among men in older age groups.
The pandemic has also impacted gender inequality through the labor market. In countries like Ukraine and Georgia, the pandemic has significantly worsened pre-existing inequalities. In the latter, the number of registered unemployed increased by 16 000 in the second quarter, and among them, 90% were women, according to Yaroslava Babych, Policy Center Head at ISET-PI. Also, among the 44 000 workers that lost their employment during lockdown in the spring a vast majority were women. Partly, the reason for this is that the restrictions affected sectors that were predominantly female such as restaurants, cafés, and retail, as well as arts and entertainment.
In Belarus, a country with relatively high female labor force participation, the impact on gender inequality changed over time. In the Belarussian labor market, women are highly concentrated in the hospitality and public sector, and men in the industrial sector. After the first wave in the spring, women were worst affected, both in terms of unemployment and loss of income, which was largely driven by the impact on the hospitality industry. Over time men became more affected as the industrial sector took a hit, whereas women benefitted from steady employment within the public sector. The gender distribution in the Ukrainian labor market is similar to the Belarusian. Women are concentrated in sectors that are economically vulnerable to the crisis but also in those that are critical for everyday life such as the health and education sectors. In other words, in these countries some women are at high risk of losing their job while others, that are less at risk of an economic shock, often are particularly likely to be exposed to health shocks.
From a more positive perspective, the crisis has also brought about structural changes to the labor market that could potentially improve gender equality. In Russia, workplaces have started to provide more flexible working conditions which have enabled more women to work remotely from home.
One serious consequence of the crises is an increase in domestic violence as the pandemic has exacerbated things that are known to increase conflict and violence within households. Maria Perrotta Berlin, Assistant professor at SITE, argued that mobility restrictions have increased the time spent with family members, increased isolation from social networks and support organizations, and increased stress caused by economic insecurity. According to the international ombudsman of Russia, the number of distress calls relating to intimate partner violence has increased by 150% during the pandemic, compared to an estimated average increase of 60% in Europe during the same time.
Political Implications in the Region with a Special Focus on Belarus and Russia
The final section of the day focused on political developments in Russia and Belarus in the times of the COVID-19 pandemic, two countries with close historical, political and economic ties. SITE invited two experts on the politics in respective countries: Elena Panfilova, Founder of the Center for Anti-corruption Research and former Chair of Initiative Transparency International – Russia, and Artyom Shraibman, founder of Sense Analytics, a political consultancy in Minsk and nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center.
Panfilova gave a comprehensive narrative of the recent political developments in Russia related to the onset of the pandemic. Panfilova argued that the political response to the pandemic in Russia changed over time. In the spring, the government and political elites had a relatively active response and clear communication with the public. However, when the second wave started in September the government largely stayed silent. According to Panfilova, the reason for this is that Russian politicians started to anticipate the important 2021 regional elections and that they found it hard to communicate with the public without challenging their future political interests as the crisis response had been met with much discontent. This discontent, Panfilova argued, had to do with Russia’s vertical system of accountability being very ineffective in dealing with a horizontal problem such as COVID-19. The response system would have needed help across the political spectrum and would have benefited from more transparency to fight the pandemic; instead, the government continued to restrict political freedom and civil rights.
Reacting to the introduction by Panfilova, Shraibman argued that there is no historic example of a situation where the response to similar situations have differed so much between the Belarusian and Russian governments. The Belarusian regime’s response, in contrast to the Russian, was close to non-existent in the first wave and this continued up until the autumn when the government started to introduce restrictions in response to the second wave of infections.
The pressure of the pandemic has revealed the weaknesses and flaws of governments around the world and not least in Belarus. Although there are several reasons for the political crisis such as the stagnation of the Belarus economy, Shraibman argued that the mismanagement of the pandemic became the tipping point.
Shraibman explained how the Belarus regime has always tried to sell a paternalistic identity and has presented itself as a stable and fair welfare system that cares for the poor and the vulnerable. The mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic shattered this identity in the eyes of the public. The rhetoric and state-level deception during the first wave irritated a lot of people as the state-owned media outlets often accused the sick of being weak and ridiculed people for wearing masks. As many Belarusians saw relatives die and doctors started to contradict the narrative of the state, people were reminded of the Soviet government’s concealment of the Chernobyl disaster.
These developments created stress on the Belarusian society right before the presidential elections in August since the frustration that had been accumulated was channeled into political activity. During the pandemic, people learned how to organize and coordinate crowdfunding initiatives to support doctors and similar initiatives. This self-organization infrastructure transferred to the opposition campaign and is now used to support victims of political repression.
During the second wave, the government started exploiting the crisis to restrict political freedom. For instance, independent observers were not allowed to observe electoral polls, and political prisoners were not allowed to meet with lawyers. These and similar actions have further aggravated the political discontent with the regime in the country. Shraibman concluded that groups in society that previously have been apolitical now have become politicized, as they have personally experienced the repressive measures previously targeted primarily to the Belarusian opposition.
Concluding Remarks
As in previous years, the Development Day conference offered us an opportunity to invite a diverse group of experts, politicians, and practitioners to discuss a current and important topic in the area of development and transition. The different perspectives highlighted the multifaceted impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on Eastern Europe, as well as the continued engagement of Swedish society in the region. Unfortunately, the pandemic also prevented us from meeting in person this time, but we hope that next year we will be able to meet again at the Stockholm School of Economics.
List of Participants
- Peter Eriksson, Minister for International Development Cooperation, Sweden.
- Alexander Plekhanov, director for Transition Impact and Global Economics, EBRD.
- Fredrik Rågmark, CEO Medicover, Sweden.
- Kataryna Bornukova, Academic Director BEROC, Minsk, Belarus.
- Michal Myck, Director CenEA, Szczecin Poland.
- Giorgi Papava, Center Head at ISET-PI, Tbilisi, Georgia.
- Olena Sholomytska, Senior Researcher KSE, Kyiv, Ukraine.
- Natalya Volchkova, Director CEFOR at NES, Moscow, Russia.
- Sergej Gubin, Research Fellow BICEPS, Riga, Latvia.
- Lev Lvovskiy, Research Fellow BEROC, Minsk, Belarus.
- Monika Oczkowska, Senior Research Economist CenEA, Szczecin, Poland.
- Yaroslava Babych, Head of Macroeconomic Policy Research Center ISET-PI, Tbilisi, Georgia.
- Aleksandr Grigoryan, Associate Professor American University of Armenia, Yerevan, Armenia.
- Olga Kupets, Policy Professor KSE, Kyiv, Ukraine.
- Maria Perrotta Berlin, Assistant Professor SITE, Stockholm, Sweden.
- Artyom Shraibman, founder of Sense Analytics and nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Moscow Center.
- Elena Panfilova, Founder of the Center for Anti-corruption Research and former Chair of Initiative Transparency International – Russia.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Belarus Economic Outlook
The Belarus economy was already struggling to generate growth before both the corona pandemic and the political protests following the August presidential election. The lack of growth was the result of an incomplete transition process to modernize the economy combined with a strong reliance on the Russian economy and its dependence on international commodity prices that have not paid off in recent years. With the added political turmoil and, so far, lack of a new political and economic strategy, the economic outlook for Belarus looks grim. Even if a full-blown crisis may be avoided by restrictive economic policies, stagnation will nevertheless be the most likely outcome without fundamental reforms.
Introduction
The Belarus economy was for many years doing very well under president Lukashenko, but since the global financial crisis in 2008/09, this course has been reversed. The downward growth trend has been exacerbated by both slumps in international oil prices (particularly important because of linkages with Russia, see Becker 2016a, 2016b, 2018, 2020), and the COVID-19 pandemic. This is clearly illustrated in Figure 1, which shows how the average growth rate has fallen all the way to a negative one percent in the years since 2015, while the period before the global financial crisis generated an average growth of 8 percent.
The lack of growth in Belarus and its causes has been analyzed in several papers long before the current developments. Akulava (2015) discusses how the government already five years ago understood that it needs to stimulate the private sector to generate growth; Kruk and Bornukova (2016) in turn describe how growth in the boom years was driven by capital accumulation but not improvements in productivity (TFP) that could have sustained growth in more recent years. As for policies to generate growth, Kruk (2014) argues that Belarus should focus on institutional changes that create the right incentives for firms and lead to a more efficient resource allocation rather than simply spend money on new equipment for existing firms. The need for productivity-enhancing reforms is further stressed in Kruk (2019) who points out that there is limited space to stimulate growth by expansionary macroeconomic policies.
Although the political situation after the election is strongly linked to the lack of democracy and freedom, the citizens’ willingness to protest is most likely enforced by the very poor economic performance of recent years. And while the importance of economic developments is sometimes glossed over in the current reporting and narrative of Belarus it will be an important factor in the popularity of any future government in Belarus as well as the current one.
Figure 1. Real GDP growth
Note: The chart is based on the April 2020 version of the IMF’s World Economic Outlook and in the just-released October edition, the 2020 forecast is less negative due to global economic developments. However, this does not change the general downward growth trend Belarus has experienced.
Background
On the structural side, the economy of Belarus is heavily connected to Russian economic developments, which in turn depends on international oil prices (Becker 2016a, 2016b). In the group of FSU countries, Belarus stands out as the country that has the largest share of its exports going to Russia and the largest share of its FDI coming from Russia. On top of that, Belarus enjoys subsidized prices on oil and gas from Russia that benefits not only its exporting refineries but also other energy-intensive industries that are important for generating export revenues.
Figure 2. Exports and FDI shares with Russia and Rest of the World
As a final background note, the importance of SOEs in terms of employment has gone down in recent years but SOEs are still an important provider of jobs in Belarus and another sign of an unfinished transition agenda.
Figure 3. Importance of SOEs
To improve growth prospects, this is clearly a sector in need of reforms, including some privatizations, to make it more competitive and less of a drain on government finances. However, this process will need to deal with sensitive employment issue regardless of who is in charge politically.
Furthermore, Marozau, Aginskaya, and Akulava (2020) discuss how the corona pandemic may threaten the jobs of the over 1 million people that are employed by SMEs. The financial constraints of the government make it hard to offer widespread support to SMEs, and the authors argue that the government should target future winners among SMEs rather than the big losers in the crisis.
The challenge of increased unemployment is further exacerbated by the lack of an unemployment benefit system with extensive coverage (Bornukova, 2017). The lack of a well-targeted social security system could lead to a new increase in poverty rates. Mazol (2019) shows how past crises had a negative impact on poverty with absolute poverty increasing almost twofold in 2015/2016.
Recent Developments
The economy in Belarus was facing challenges (like much of the world) this year due to the COVID-19 pandemic well before the political crisis following the August election triggered additional problems. The IMF growth forecast for the year was well into negative numbers and given the (not always stable) links to Russia and thus to oil prices, the longer-term outlook was cloudy as well. Although the IMF’s October forecast shows less negative growth for 2020 (from minus 6 to minus 3 percent as the world is expected to see less of a contraction due to the COVID-19 pandemic), the longer-term outlook is one of stagnation with annual growth of around 1 percent.
For 2020, the economic and political difficulties can be seen in exchange rate developments as well as in the evolution of foreign exchange reserves (Figures 4 and 5). In some ways, the 25-30 percent depreciation of the currency viz the dollar and euro is not the full story on the currency, since the exchange rate viz the Russian ruble has been much more stable. Given the close links to the Russian economy, this is quite important to note. Indeed, foreign currency reserves (the more liquid part of international reserves) have gone down by some 40% this year but are still at around 3 billion USD.
Additional pressure on the financial system in the past months came from significant withdrawals and people moving their savings to hard currencies after the August election. Krug and Lvovskiy (2020) discuss how this development is driven by political turmoil and also how the lack of trust that is currently generated in the system will lead to further stagnation of the economy. This line of reasoning is supported by Mazol (2018), who shows how financial stress in the past has contributed to costly economic contractions.
Figure 4. Exchange rate indices
(Jan 2020=100)
Figure 5. Foreign exchange reserves
Outlook and Policy Conclusions
The current economic policy will not generate growth in the short or long term by itself and the current political situation is clearly affecting growth negatively. The current political leadership could of course once again turn to Russia to ask for economic assistance in various forms, including loans, subsidies, or investments. Given the situation in Belarus, this will clearly come at a high political cost that will not necessarily be immediately transparent to people in Belarus or the outside world. Further, a sufficient level of assistance is not bulletproof either – Russia is itself facing difficult economic times ahead, both because of the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on oil prices but also because of its own inability to generate sustainable growth that is not based on oil, gas and minerals (Becker, 2018, 2020).
How long the political and economic repression can go on without triggering a full-blown meltdown of the financial system in Belarus is anyone’s guess. Unfortunately, a policy mix of more restrictions on financial and exchange transactions in combination with accepting stagnation has been shown to be a model that has “worked” from Cuba, to Iran, Venezuela and North Korea for very long periods of time, so there are no given deadlines for such regimes.
Regardless of short-term policy changes, Russia will remain an important economic player in Belarus for a long time unless something dramatic changes. If there is a transition of political power in Belarus, any new political leadership will have to make careful choices with regard to its relationship with Russia. Quickly cutting ties to its big eastern neighbor could turn out to be very costly for Belarus from an economic perspective given the structure of trade, subsidies, and investments between the two countries.
If the EU (or the West more generally) wants to provide Belarus with a realistic economic alternative to Russia in the short run, it will need to provide substantial funding and strongly support a wide-ranging economic reform program that will need to address transition issues that most of its neighbors did many years ago. This will involve not only selling state assets to foreign investors but also changing the economic system from the ground up, including institutions and management practices. Another important part of the needed change is modern Western education. The importance of higher education institutions (HEI) to generate growth in Belarus is stressed by Marozau (2019), who discusses the role of HEIs in improving productivity and how the universities in Belarus fail to stimulate innovation and entrepreneurship.
The support package may not be cheap for the EU financially but helping the people in Belarus to finally make the transition to a modern, democratic market economy on the doorstep of the EU would certainly be worth it. The question is if the EU will manage to unite around such a policy in a time of COVID-19 lockdowns and economic hardship within its current boundaries. Patience may be required among those that fight for their freedom and a new economic model in Belarus.
References
- Akulava, Maryia, 2015. ”The Role of Belarusian Private Sector”, FREE policy brief, January.
- Becker, Torbjörn, 2016a. “Russia’s Oil Dependence and the EU”, SITE Working paper 38.
- Becker, Torbjörn, 2016b. “Russia and Oil — Out of Control”, FREE policy brief.
- Becker, Torbjörn, 2020, “Russia’s Macroeconomy — A Closer Look at Growth, Investment and Uncertainty”, Ch 2 in Putin’s Russia: Economy, Defence and Foreign Policy, Steven Rosefielde (ed.), World Scientific Publishers, Singapore.
- Becker, Torbjörn and Susanne Oxenstierna, (eds.) 2018, The Russian Economy under Putin, Routledge, London.
- Belstat, 2020, National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus data on SOE employment at https://belstat.gov.by/en/ .
- Bornukova, Kateryna, 2017. “Fiscal Redistribution in Belarus: What Works and What Doesn’t?”, FREE policy brief, September.
- Bornukova, Kateryna, Cojocaru, Alexandru, Matytsin, Mikhail, Shymanovich, Gleb, 2019. “Poverty, Vulnerability, and Household Coping Strategies During the 2015/16 Recession in Belarus”, Policy Research Working Papers 49, The World Bank.
- Central Bank of Russia, 2020, data on FDI at http://cbr.ru/eng/ .
- IMF, 2020, World Economic outlook data April and October at https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/SPROLLS/world-economic-outlook-databases#sort=%40imfdate%20descending .
- Kruk, Dzmitry, 2014. ”Stimulating Growth in Belarus: Selecting the Right Priorities”, FREE policy brief, November.
- Kruk, Dzmitry , 2019. ”Can Loose Macroeconomic Policies Secure a ‘Growth Injection’ for Belarus?”, FREE policy brief, December.
- Kruk, Dzmitry and Kateryna Bornukova, 2016. ”The Anatomy of Recession in Belarus”, FREE policy brief, December.
- Kruk, Dzmitry and Lev Lvovskiy, 2020. “Does Political Illegitimacy in Belarus Imply New Economic Risks?”, FREE policy brief, October.
- Marozau, Radzivon, 2019. “Development of Belarusian Higher Education Institutions Based on the Entrepreneurial University Framework”, FREE policy brief, January.
- Marozau, Radzivon, Hanna Aginskaya and Maryia Akulava, 2020, ”Supporting Measures for Belarusian SMEs: the Context of the Covid-19 Pandemic”, FREE policy brief, May.
- Mazol, Aleh, 2018. ”Financial Stress and Economic Contraction in Belarus”, FREE policy brief, February.
- Mazol, Aleh, 2019. ” Poverty Dynamics in Belarus from 2009 to 2016”, FREE policy brief, March.
- National Bank of Belarus data on exchange rates and reserves.
- World Bank, 2020, World Development Indicators data on FDI at https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Does Political Illegitimacy in Belarus Imply New Economic Risks?
Today’s political crisis in Belarus has given rise to the phenomenon classified in political science as political illegitimacy. However, this is not a pure political phenomenon. It causes adverse and severe economic adjustments. In a short-term perspective, it gives rise to numerous risks of financial destabilization. Moreover, it is likely to deepen the current recession and make it protracted. In the long-term, political illegitimacy causes adverse institutional adjustments and erosion of human capital, which is likely to lead a country into a long-lasting depression. We argue that resolving the political crisis in a way that revives trust and legitimacy is the only ‘good’ solution.
Short-term Economic Effects of Political Illegitimacy
Since August 9, 2020, Belarus has been widely discussed worldwide in mass media because of the country’s political crisis. Political scientists classify the current situation in Belarus as a case of political illegitimacy, i.e. there is no consensus in the Belarusian society concerning the recognition and acceptance of a new term for the governing regime.
In turn, the governing regime prefers to ignore the illegitimacy issue. There is an implicit assumption behind this: illegitimacy is an intangible issue that can hardly result in any tangible threat to the sustainability of the governing regime.
We oppose this view and argue that, at least in an economic dimension, there are numerous channels through which illegitimacy transforms into tangible problems. Inasmuch as the stance of the economy affects political sustainability, it will undermine the latter.
From a short-term perspective, the issue of political illegitimacy has become part of the information accounted for in the decision-making of economic agents in Belarus. Hence, in their economic decisions they either try to struggle against it, or at least to hedge against corresponding adverse effects.
Most evident, the adjustments in decision-making has already visualized in households’ savings behavior. Directly, illegitimacy considerations gave rise to deposit withdrawals from the banking system and enlarged demand for hard currency. Consequently, this led to a rise in depreciation-/inflation-expectations and lowered public trust in the banking system, which in turn has amplified these patterns of the households’ behavior. In August, Belarus experienced historical peaks in deposit outflows and international reserves were depleted as a result. This has substantially amplified the risks of financial turmoil.
So far, the authorities have curbed the financial stress by implementing a restrictive monetary policy. However, this does not suppress adverse patterns in households’ behavior. It only somewhat allows for a shift of adverse adjustments from financial markets towards the real economy. Moreover, it weakens but does not completely remove the threat of full-fledged financial turmoil, taking into account the systemic financial fragility in Belarus.
In addition to the illegitimacy issue itself, other adverse expectations are likely to give rise to unfavourable trends in households’ consumption behaviour as well. First, household consumption is likely to be dampened as a result of poor consumer confidence and sentiment. Second, additional losses in consumption are likely to occur due to tightening access to credit and progressing financial fragility.
Similar mechanisms are likely to be in place with respect to investment demand. First, poor confidence and sentiment undermine the investment activity of businesses. In Belarus, this channel is likely to be more powerful for private businesses, as investment plans of SOEs (due to their directive nature) are less sensitive to confidence and expectations. Second, investment activity is likely to decline due to deteriorating financial conditions and consequent contraction of credit. This linkage is especially important for the SOEs and housing investments.
The power of adverse consumption and demand trends is still questionable. However, preliminary estimates (introducing negative shocks in addition to scenarios in Kruk, 2020) show that they will reduce the output growth rate by at least 1.5-2.0 percentage points in 2020 Q3-Q4. In other words, they are expected to deepen the current recession and are likely to make it more long-lasting.
Deteriorating payment discipline is one more expected outcome from political illegitimacy. Being amplified by deteriorating financial conditions and economic activity, it can turn into a full-fledged payment crisis and fiscal instability.
Adverse Institutional Adjustments and Effects on Labor Market
Human-to-human interactions based on mutual benefit and trust are the core of a modern market-based economy. Key institutions created to support this interpersonal trust are laws and law-enforcement agencies. If a person does not trust her counterpart in a deal and does not think that she can take him to court to defend her rights, no deal will be signed. When an individual observes unrightful and politically-motivated court decisions in criminal cases, the distrust is also passed on to her beliefs that she would be able to defend her economic rights in the same court. As we observe police violence, tortures, and criminal charges of protesters with no attempt to prosecute those responsible, public trust in the law-enforcement system fades away, and thus all kinds of deals previously supported by a contract-enforcement system cease to exist.
The quality of a judicial system is widely recognized as a powerful determinant to overall institutional quality and the business environment. Hence, poor trust in it would likely undermine business activity directly. Existing businesses are to re-orient towards shorter-term strategies, being reluctant to initiating long-term and risky projects. Moreover, their inclination to geographical diversification of their business activity or even full migration is likely to rise. New entrants – that are extremely important to achieve productivity gains (Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syversen, 2008) – are less likely to start business in the country.
An increase in emigration is a usual consequence of political crisis, especially if it is accompanied by violence and politically-motivated incarcerations. What is unique about the current Belarus crises is that the list of potential emigrees include not only individuals but also firms, especially those working in the IT sector. After 11 August 2020, many IT companies found their employees detained, beaten and tortured. The offices of Yandex, Google and PandaDoc were searched and four top managers working at the latter were detained on tax evasion charges which are likely to be politically-inspired. As of the 18th of September, around 200 IT companies are considering relocation from Belarus and many more are considering partial relocation of their employees to already established foreign offices (Dev.by(2020a)). Results from a recent survey show that 33% of IT specialists have already decided to leave Belarus and the rest indicated that they will leave if the situation worsens (Dev.by(2020b)).
There are several major reasons for why the IT-sector is affected more by the current crises compared to traditional sectors of the Belarusian economy. Firstly, IT companies rarely own physical capital and thus can change their location in a matter of days by simply relocating their employees and laptops. Secondly, the IT labor market is global and mobile, and companies compete for the workers. Therefore, if many workers hold similar strong views on a particular situation, employers are bound to support them to a certain extent. As a result of the latter, many IT companies have openly voiced their disagreement with the election results and the politically motivated violence following the election. High-level employees and owners of major companies have participated in various opposition initiatives and as a result, now face retribution from Lukashenko’s government.
In addition to politically-motivated emigration, we can expect an increase in economically-driven emigration rates as the economy is expected to shrink (Bornukova and Lvovskiy, 2020).
What Is the Way Forward?
The political crisis in Belarus has triggered multidimensional adverse economic adjustments. Nevertheless, the authorities prefer to ignore the links between politics and economics. Hence, they try to overcome the problems with economic policy tools only. However, the room to maneuver with these tools is considerably restricted, and in some cases completely ineffective in suppressing adverse trends.
With respect to the short-term agenda, the authorities cannot offset the adverse trends. They can just mitigate challenges in one dimension and try to re-direct it to another one. For instance, currently the authorities focus on mitigating the probability of a full-fledged financial crisis. This consideration requires restricting monetary conditions. Otherwise, the exchange rate is likely to depreciate, which would be problematic from a corporate debt sustainability perspective. Although being somewhat effective in this regard, this policy mix dampens economic activity. From a financial dimension, the challenge is being re-directed to the real economy.
A similar picture might soon emerge in a fiscal sphere as well. An economic downturn and political crisis can result in a widening income gap. At the same time, the room for maneuver on the expenditure side is constrained. The funds accumulated from the previous periods have to a large extent already been spent to support SOEs. Hence, a further expansion of expenditures is hardly possible, as it would undermine fiscal and public debt sustainability. Therefore, fiscal stimulus is likely to fade away and can gradually even become negative.
Based on estimations in Kruk (2020), before the issue of illegitimacy appeared, the economy was developing according to a scenario of about a 3% drop in GDP in 2020 and a meagre recovery (if any) in 2021. Adding the assumptions associated with adverse adjustments due to the illegitimacy issue into the Kruk (2020) estimates, we show that the recession is likely to deepen by at least 1 percentage point in 2020. In 2021, output losses are likely to expand considerably. In regard to the long-term agenda, the situation is even worse. Conceptual decisions on economic activity by firms and households are closely linked with the issues of trust and legitimacy (Bornukova et al., 2020). Having lost them, the authorities are unlikely to have any effective tools for standing against adverse institutional adjustments and the erosion of human capital. Hence, we may expect that today’s poor growth potential of the Belarusian economy – up to 2.5% of per annum growth (Kruk, 2020) – is likely to weaken further and could even become negative. This means that the stagnation over the recent decade is likely to turn into a long-term depression.
Conclusions
The political crisis and the arising issue of political illegitimacy in Belarus impose severe economic challenges for the country. In a short-term perspective, there are numerous channels that are likely to deepen the recession and make it long-lasting. Moreover, risks to financial stability are progressing rapidly. Hence, there is little room for securing macro stabilization in the near future.
In a long-term perspective, the country is likely to suffer from the disruption of productivity enhancers. It will stem from lower business initiatives and the erosion of human capital. This is a way to a long-term depression.
Standard economic tools are mainly ineffective against both the short-term and long-term challenges. Resolving the political crisis in a way that revives trust and legitimacy is the only ‘good’ solution.
References
- Bornukova, K. and Lvovskiy, L. (2020). Demography as a Challenge for Economic Growth, Bankauski Vesnik, 680 (3), PP. 31-35.
- Bornukova, K. Godes, N., and Shcherba, E. (2020). Confidence in the Economy: What is It, How it Works and Why We Need it?, Bankauski Vesnik, 680 (3), PP. 95-99.
- Foster, L., Haltiwanger, J., and Syversen, Ch. (2008). Reallocation, Firm Turnover, and Efficiency: Selection on Productivity of Profitability? American Economic Review, 98(1), PP. 394-425.
- Kruk, D. (2020). Short-term Perspective for the Belarusian Economy, BEROC Policy Paper No. 92.
- Dev.by. (2020a). https://dev.by/news/pochti200-relocate
- Dev.by. (2020b). https://dev.by/news/opros-relocate-september2020.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Revisiting Growth Patterns in Emerging Markets
Recent studies document that emerging markets are rather similar in their growth patterns despite profound differences in starting conditions and productivity fundamentals. This challenges the common view on productivity as the main growth engine. The crucial role of the external environment for emerging markets emphasized by numerous studies adds to this doubt. I argue that productivity fundamentals still matter and remain the core driver of sustainable growth. However, external factors are crucial for understanding deviations from the trajectory of sustainable growth, i.e. episodes of growth accelerations/decelerations.
Challenges for Understanding Growth in Emerging Markets
As we enter the 4th decade of economic transition in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the causes and directions of causality of long-term growth in emerging markets might need to be reconsidered. Some recent studies emphasize that growth trajectories in emerging markets are pretty similar, i.e. average growth rates do not differ too much, while jumps and drops in growth rates are synchronous for the bulk of emerging economies (e.g. Fayad and Perelli, 2014). For instance, a decade ago the level of GDP per capita (in 2011 international $) in Macedonia was roughly 45% of that in the Slovak Republic, which likely reflected the productivity (measured through the Global Competitiveness Index) gap between them. During the last decade, Macedonia has roughly closed this productivity gap. Growth theory would postulate that this should have transformed into faster output growth in Macedonia vs. Slovak Republic closing well-being gap. However, the two countries’ had throughout the decade roughly equal average output growth and the well-being gap today is still the same as it was ten years ago.
Such observations seem to conflict with existing theoretical views. First, this is a challenge to the well-being convergence concept that results from growth theory. Moreover, if we measure growth in terms of the speed of closing the well-being gap with respect to the frontier (the US economy), one may argue even for divergence. For instance, Figure 1 presents a scatter-plot for a sample of emerging markets relating the initial conditions – well-being level in 1995 (GDP per capita relative to one of the US economy) – and the average speed of well-being gap (vs. the US economy) closing throughout 1996-2017 (measured in p.p. of corresponding gap ).
Second, the evidence that productivity gains do not automatically trigger output growth challenges a common view that productivity is the major driver for sustainable growth.
Figure 1.Starting Conditions and Well-Being Gains
Source: Own computations based on data from World Development Indicators database (World Bank).
What are possible explanations for the observed similarity in growth rates of emerging markets?
A study by the IMF (2017) suggests a response: growth in emerging markets is similar and synchronous due to the external environment. This study emphasizes the crucial dependence of medium-term growth in developing countries on the following factors: growth of external demand in trade partners, financial conditions, and trade conditions. Moreover, it states that these factors are dominant in explaining the episodes of growth strengthening/weakening.
Does this explanation change the growth nexus for emerging markets? Can one state, that while external factors are crucial for growth and growth in developing countries is rather homogenous, the productivity gains are not so important anymore?
I would say no. First, for better understanding of growth patterns we must clearly compare the relative importance of productivity gains vs. external factors in affecting the growth schedule. Second, we must separate relatively short-term fluctuations in GDP growth from sustainable growth.
Detecting Relative Importance of Growth Drivers
To answer the question about the relative importance of productivity fundamentals and growth factors, I study a panel of 34 emerging market economies (EBRD sample netted from 3 countries for which the data is not available) for 11 years (2007-2017).
To evaluate the relative importance of productivity and external factors, I use a standard approach of running panel growth regressions with fixed effects. At the same time, I make a number of novelties in the research design.
First, for measures of productivity, I engage a unique database – Global Competitiveness Indicators by World Economic Forum (WEF). Although this database provides an insightful perspective on productivity fundamentals at the country level, it is rather seldom a ‘guest’ in economic research. From this database, I extract a number of individual indicators in order to detect which ones among them that have the strongest growth-enhancing effect. For an alternative specification, I use principal components of 9 individual indicators from this database as proxies for productivity gains.
Second, for external factors, I use an approach similar to the IMF (2017) and calculate variables representing external demand growth, trade conditions, and financial conditions (such as a measure of capital inflows) for each country. Moreover, in respect to external demand growth, I use different competing measures (based on either imports of GDP growth of trade partners) and choose the best one in each individual equation. By doing so, I allow this dimension of the external environment to be represented in each model to the largest possible extent.
Third, I depart from using output growth as the only measure of economic growth and response variable in growth regressions. I argue that for international comparison purposes it is worthwhile to consider also the speed of closing the gap towards the frontier (the US economy). On the one hand, this measure is strongly correlated with the traditional output growth rate. On the other hand, this measure, in a sense, nets out the growth rate of a country from global growth, thus capturing something more unique and peculiar just to individual countries’ gains in well-being. Furthermore, I argue that in the discussion about the factors behind growth, one should distinguish between relatively short and long term growth. Annual growth rates, especially at relatively short time horizon, are too dependent on fluctuations, which may be interpreted in terms of growth rate strengthening/weakening. However, to emphasize the property of growth sustainability, we should get rid of ‘unnecessary noise’. For this purpose, I also introduce a trend growth rate measured in a most simple way as the 5 year moving average (following the discussion in Coibion et al. (2017), show that the bulk of measures of ‘potential’ growth are not good enough to get rid of demand shocks and these measures are pretty close to simple moving average measures).
I apply this definition of trend growth both to ‘standard’ GDP growth rate and to the speed of closing the gap towards frontier. So, finally I have 4 response variables: ‘standard’ growth rate, the speed of closing the gap to frontier, and two corresponding measures of trend growth.
Sustainable Growth Mainly Depends on Productivity
Having short-term (annual) growth rate as response variable (either ‘standard’ or the one in terms of closing the gap) provides results close to those in IMF (2017). It may be interpreted in a way that the external environment is more important than productivity factors. If dividing all regressors into two broad groups of factors – external and productivity – the former is responsible for up to 70% of the growth effect, while the latter for about 30%. Among external environment factors, the most important one is financial conditions. Its relative importance is roughly 50% of the group of external factors’ total.
Among productivity fundamentals, an important contributor to short-term growth is the quality of the macroeconomic environment. According to the methodology of WEF (2017), this indicator encompasses the fiscal stance, savings-investment balance, the external position, inflation path, debt issues, etc.
When refocusing from short-term growth to the growth trend as a response variable, the relative importance of the factors behind growth changes. Productivity fundamentals in this case drive up to 80% of growth effect, while external factors are responsible for the remaining 20%. It is worth noting here that the proportion in favor of productivity factors is higher for the concept of closing the gap to frontier rather than for ‘standard’ trend growth rate. This evidence may be interpreted as additional justification for treating this measure of growth as ‘good’ at reflecting individual properties of a country in a global landscape.
Furthermore, the role of individual variables also changes. Among external factors, the most important role in driving sustainable growth belongs to trade conditions and external demand growth, while the role of financial conditions is either miserable or insignificant at most. Among productivity factors as drivers of trend growth, the quality of the macroeconomic environment seems to play a special role, as well as the efficiency of the goods market and the financial system.
Conclusions
The evidence showing rather similar and synchronous growth in emerging markets and recent evidence on the crucial importance of external factors for emerging markets should not lead us to incorrectly believe that productivity fundamentals do not matter anymore. Productivity fundamentals are still the core driver of sustainable growth. At the same time, we should keep in mind the important role of the external environment for emerging markets. However, changes in the external environment are more likely to generate relatively short-term growth rate fluctuations, while having a modest impact on the sustainable growth trajectory. Hence, a country aiming to secure sustainable growth should still first of all think about productivity fundamentals.
References
- Coibion, O., Gorodnichenko, Y, Ulate, M. (2017). The Cyclical Sensitivity in Estimates of Potential Output, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 23580.
- EBRD (2017). Transition Report 2017-2018, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London, UK.
- Fayad, G., and Perelli, R. (2014). Growth Surprises and Synchronized Slowdown in Emerging Markets—An Empirical Investigation, IMF Working Paper, WP/14/173.
- IMF (2017). Roads Less Traveled: Growth in Emerging Markets and Developing Economies in a Complicated External Environment, in IMF World Economic Outlook, April, 2017, pp. 65-120.
- World Economic Forum (2017). The Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018, Geneva: World Economic Forum.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Remaining Challenges for Faster Growth in CESEE
Between 1995 and 2016, per capita GDP levels in Europe have converged, as countries that had lower income levels in 1995 on average have seen faster growth rates between 1995 and 2016 (Figure 1).
Figure 1
Income differentials between CESEE and Germany have narrowed significantly during this time. If we look at CESEE as a whole, in 1995 GDP per capita of CESEE was only a third of Germany. By 2016 it has increased to almost half. If we look at individual countries, all countries in CESEE have seen faster GDP growth than in Germany, but there have been important cross-country differences. For example, growth has been relatively rapid in the EU New Member States and very slow in Ukraine.
Nevertheless, CESEE is still much poorer than Germany. The richest country in CESEE – Slovenia – has the income level per capita Germany had in 1990 (Figure 2). Poland is as rich as Germany was in the late 1970s. And Ukraine, which in early transition had similar level of income to Poland, is now as rich as Germany was in the early 1950s.
Figure 2
CESEE is poorer both because labor productivity is lower and a smaller share of the population works. GDP per capita is the product of GDP per worker and the employment to population rate:
In 2015, labor productivity in CESEE was still well below that in Germany and the Netherlands (Figure 3, x-axis). Employment rates were also lower, but those differences were less pronounced (Figure 3, y-axis).
Figure 3
Differences in employment rates are, however, more pronounced if we take into account that in CESEE a higher share of the population is of working age. The employment to population rate is the product of the employment to working age population [1] rate:
The share of the working age population in CESEE is relatively high (Figure 4), although it is now declining. The employment to working age ratios in CESEE are well below those in Germany (Figure 5); only the Baltics come close.
Figure 4
Figure 5
It will be challenging to further increase the employment to total population rate, given the impact of aging and the already relatively low level of unemployment. The decline of the working age population will accelerate in the next decade (Figure 6) as the baby-boom generation is retiring; in a number of countries the working age population is set to decline by more than 1 percent annually. [2] If the share of the working age population that works remains constant, the share of the employment to total population rate will fall sharply. At the same time, the unemployment rate in many countries is already close to pre-crisis lows (Figure 7). It will therefore be key to increase labor force participation rates, which in most countries are still below those of Germany, particularly those of women (Figure 8).
Figure 6
Figure 7
Figure 8
A higher capital stock may be even more important than raising the employment rate. There is a strong correlation between the level of capital stock per capita and GDP per capita (Figure 9, left panel). The relationship between the employment rate and GDP per capita is much weaker (Figure 9, right panel). Further convergence of CESEE will thus require capital deepening. As of 2015, the capital stock per capita in CESEE region is on average only a quarter of that in Germany.
Figure 9
Figure 10
Figure 11
Figure 12
Unfortunately, the growth of the capital stock per capita has slowed (Figure 10), which reflects the decline in investment rates. Investment rates are low compared with other emerging market countries (Figure 11). Saving rates are low too (Figure 12), which suggests that a rebound of investment could lead to a re-emergence of high current account deficits, unless savings increases as well. Yet it may be challenging to boost saving. With labor markets tightening, wages shares are likely to increase, which is likely to reduce corporate profits. Indeed, in a number of countries this is already happening (Figure 13). Household savings are difficult to influence. Boosting public savings would help, yet even though unemployment rates are falling, few countries plan a meaningful fiscal tightening (Figure 14).
Figure 13
Figure 14
TFP growth has slowed as well. TFP growth has recovered somewhat in recent years, but it is still much slower than in the pre-crisis years (Figure 15). The TFP slowdown might be a result of both the decrease of productivity in main trading partners and unfinished post-crisis adjustment.
The IMF’s CESEE Regional Economic Issues have identified several factors that might restrain productivity and investment. The May 2016 and November 2016 IMF CESEE Regional Economic Issues [3] analyzed several areas where reforms are needed in CESEE, and recommended to improve institutions to boost productivity. The May 2016 REI suggested the largest efficiency gains might come from increasing protection of property rights, upgrading legal systems and other government services. In this context, the November 2016 REI discussed the need to improve public investment management and tax administration. Given the large gaps in infrastructure and capital stock to Western Europe, improving the efficiency of public investment by improving its allocation and the implementation of frameworks and procedures could boost potential growth significantly. Regarding tax administration, reducing compliance gaps, would help improve tax collection, which could generate more fiscal revenues and allow for higher public investment.
Figure 15
In short, further catch-up is possible but challenging. Labor force participation could be further increased, which would also help to offset declining share of working age population. A slowdown or even reversal of net emigration would also contribute. The capital stock is relatively low, and higher investment is needed especially in infrastructure, but raising the saving rate will be a challenge. Since the crisis the TFP has slowed considerably, and re-igniting TFP growth will be crucial for boosting growth. For all this, improving the quality of institutions and legal frameworks will help.
Bas Bakker is the IMF’s Senior Resident Representative for Central and Eastern Europe; Marta Korczak and Krzysztof Krogulski are economists in the IMF’s regional office for Central and Eastern Europe in Warsaw. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Comments by [Jorg Decressin] on an earlier version are gratefully acknowledged.
[1] The working age population is the population ages between 15 and 64.
[2] In many countries, demographics pressures have been exacerbated by the net emigration. A reduction in emigration, or even reversal, would also help. See IMF Staff Discussion Note “Emigration and Its Economic Impact on Eastern Europe” available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1607.pdf
[3] In many countries, demographics pressures have been exacerbated by the net emigration. A reduction in emigration, or even reversal, would also help. See IMF Staff Discussion Note “Emigration and Its Economic Impact on Eastern Europe” available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1607.pdf
Cross-Country Differences in Convergence in CESEE
Since 1989, there have been large differences in the convergence of the income levels of the former communist countries in CESEE with those in the US. Most Central European countries have seen a sharp rise in relative incomes, but many countries in former Yugoslavia and the CIS have not—indeed, some countries, including Moldova and Serbia, are now poorer than they were in 1989 (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Transition outcomes
Figure 2. GDP level in Poland and Ukraine
The difference between Ukraine and Poland is particularly stark. In 1989, both had similar income levels, but Poland is now more than three times as rich (Figure 2). As a result, cross-country income differences in CESEE remain large. In 1989, the Czech Republic, Russia, Slovenia and Croatia had the highest income per capita in 1989, about 4 times as high as in Albania and Moldova, the poorest in the group. Twenty-six years later, the differences are even larger. GDP per capita in Slovenia is 6 times as high as in Moldova (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Cross-country income differences
What Explains Convergence Differences?
These differences in convergence do not seem to reflect data problems. True, GDP statistics in 1989 were not very good. It is hard to measure value added when prices are not quite right. Moreover, GDP at that time was probably not a good indicator or of consumer welfare. Much of what was produced was not wanted by consumers (e.g. military expenditures) and/or of low quality. Nevertheless, these issues apply to all post-communist countries in the regions—it is not clear that some countries suffered from data problems more than others.
Indeed, more direct measures of economic activity also suggest large initial output falls and large cross-country differences. Between 1990 and 1995 electricity consumption per capita fell by almost 40 percent in Ukraine and Moldova. By then electricity consumption in Poland had nearly recovered to the 1990 level (Figure 4).
Figure 4. An alternative measure of decline in economic activity
Instead, several factors seem to have a played a role:
- The speed of transition to a market economy
- War and conflicts
- Boom-busts
- EU Membership
- Whether transition has been completed
Countries that reformed early had a shorter and shallower post-transition recession. The lower the EBRD transition index in 1995 (i.e., the less the economy was reformed), the sharper the output decline between the beginning of the transition and 1995 (Figure 5).
Figure 5. Market reforms and post-transition recession
Why was this? In late 1989, a fierce debate broke out over what came to be called gradualism versus shock therapy. Many gradualists argued that the structural flaws of the economy would frustrate attempts at liberalization, and therefore that reforms should be implemented in a gradual, sequenced way. But for others—including key figures such as Leszek Balcerowicz in Poland—understanding the nature of the problem meant the opposite: reform was a seamless web that could only succeed if all the changes happened together, because liberal prices, improved governance, and a stable economic and financial environment were needed to reinforce one another; little could be achieved with a partial reform. The evidence from the past 25 years has vindicated the seamless web theory of transition. There is no doubt that some reforms took much longer than anticipated, including privatization, both of banks and companies. But it seems clear that the countries that made sweeping changes, and that kept at reform and stabilization have done well.[2] Countries that followed a more gradual path suffered from the decline of the old industries and did not get the boost from the growth of new firms. And in some countries bouts of macroeconomic instability repeatedly undermined reforms and sapped political momentum.
Weaker growth in the early transition years was not compensated by faster growth later. Countries, where output declines were deeper in early 1990s, did not see more rapid growth in subsequent years (Figure 6).
Figure 6. Permanent output losses in the early transition
Wars and conflicts also played an important role. It is striking that the five countries with the lowest growth all had a war or serious conflict between 1990 and 2015 (Figure 7).
Figure 7. Wars and conflicts impact on long-term growth
Avoiding boom-busts helped boost longer-term growth. Steady growth rates seem to be more conducive to higher long term growth than booms followed by busts. Between 2002 and 2008, Romania had capital inflows fueled boom and grew much faster than Poland, but thereafter it suffered a deep bust, and between 2002 and 2015, Poland has grown faster (Figure 8).
Figure 8. The hare and the tortoise
EU accession was a powerful catalyst for reforms and upgrading of institutional frameworks. CESEE countries that joined the EU were required to bring their regulations and institutions up to Western European standards. There is a striking difference in the level of EBRD transition indicators between EU countries and non-EU countries (Figure 9).
Figure 9. EU accession as a reform catalyst
Thus, prospects of EU Membership have led to more reforms and, as a consequence, to stronger growth (Figure 10).
Figure 10. Market reforms and changes in income levels
Countries that upgraded their institutions to EU standards saw a decline in cross-country income differences. Countries that joined the EU in 2000s show clear pattern of convergence. The difference between Bulgaria and Slovenia has narrowed by 15 percent of Slovenia’s GDP since the former begun EU accession negotiations in 2000 (Figure 11, right panel). Similarly, a group of candidate and potential candidate countries, including Croatia (which joined the EU only in 2013) have converged as well (Figure 11, left panel).
Figure 11. Convergence within CESEE regions
By contrast, there was no convergence among the European CIS-countries. Russia, the richest of CIS countries grew by only 0.6 percent annually since 1989, while output per capita declined in Moldova and Ukraine. Only Belarus achieved growth rates comparable to non-CIS countries, but its largely unreformed economy may have approached the limits of the current extensive growth model (Figure 12).
Figure 12. Convergence in the European CIS region
Countries that have a more completed transition are richer. There is a strong correlation between progress in market reforms and a country’s income level (Figure 13).
Figure 13. Market reforms and income level
Similarly, richer countries have a more vibrant private sector (Figure 14).
Figure 14. Market reforms and private sector share in the economy
Correlation does of course not mean causality but is it telling that there is no highly reformed poor country.
Convergence Post-2009 Crisis
Post-2009, catch-up has slowed down. Pre-crisis, convergence was rapid and widespread. In some countries, the GDP per capita gap to the US narrowed by more than 12 percentage points in 2003-08. Since 2010 only two-thirds of countries in the region have continued to catch-up with the US, while Ukraine and Slovenia saw a widening of income differences (Figure 15). And if we include the 2009 crisis, which was deeper in CESEE than in Western Europe, convergence has been even less.
Figure 15. Convergence pace pre- and post-crisis
More recently, there have also been large differences across regions: while the CIS was in recession, the non-CIS countries doing much better.
- The CIS countries suffered from falling commodity prices, and from the impact of sanction on Russia.
- By contrast, the non-CIS countries saw a gradual acceleration of GDP growth, on the back of a pick-up of domestic demand in the euro area. Labor markets in many EU New Member States (NMS) are tightening rapidly, and unemployment is quickly approaching pre-crisis lows, though GDP growth rates are well below those in the pre-crisis years.
How can we boost Convergence going forward?[3]
GDP per capita is the product of GDP per worker (labor productivity) and the share of the population that works (the employment rate):
Low GDP per capita can thus be the result of both low labor productivity and a low employment rate. In CESEE, both factors play a role:
- In most CESEE countries, the employment rate is below that in Western Europe (Figure 18). Low employment rates are a particular problem in SEE and some CIS countries.
- The labor productivity gap with Western Europe is still large, even though it has declined in the past twenty years.
Figure 16. Big differences in growth among regions
Figure 17. Labor markets in EU new member states
Figure 18. Labor utilization and productivity
To raise labor productivity more investment is needed. The capital stock per worker in a typical CESEE economy is only about a third of that in advanced Europe. Domestic saving rare are too low in most the region; policies should, therefore, focus on institutional reforms that reduce inefficiencies and increase returns on private investment and savings.
Boosting total factor productivity (TFP) is important as well. CESEE countries have to address structural and institutional obstacles that prevent efficient use of available technologies or lead to an inefficient allocation of resources. The recent IMF CESEE report suggests the largest efficiency gains are likely to come from improving the quality of institutions (protection of property rights, legal systems, and healthcare); increasing the affordability of financial services (especially for small but productive firms), and improving government efficiency.
Conclusion
Since the fall of communism, there have been large differences in the convergence of income levels with the US among CESEE countries. Much of these differences reflect differences in policies. Countries that reformed more and earlier saw faster growth than countries that reformed less or later. Macro-stability also helped, and countries that avoided boom-busts tended to grow faster.
Continued convergence will require a higher investment, higher TFP, and higher employment rates. The capital stock per worker is still below that in Western Europe. Higher investment rates will require higher saving rates, lest large current account deficits emerge anew. Addressing structural and institutional obstacles would also help convergence, as it will support higher labor force participation and allow for a more efficient allocation of resources.
Notes and References
- [1] Bas B. Bakker is the Senior Resident Representative and Krzysztof Krogulski an economist in the IMF’s Regional Office for Central and Eastern Europe in Warsaw. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.
- [2]This is not to say that the rapid and seamless approach was without problems, notably large losses of output and high unemployment in the short run. Thus, reform will always have to worry about the social safety net and, under some circumstances, may benefit from external assistance, which is where the IMF and others can come in.
- [3]The IMF addressed this question in depth in the spring 2016 issue of “CESEE Regional Economic Issues.”
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy papers and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Traces of Transition: Unfinished Business 25 Years Down the Road?
This year marks the 25-year anniversary of the breakup of the Soviet Union and the beginning of a transition period, which for some countries remains far from completed. While several Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) made substantial progress early on and have managed to maintain that momentum until today, the countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) remain far from the ideal of a market economy, and also lag behind on most indicators of political, judicial and social progress. This policy brief reports on a discussion on the unfinished business of transition held during a full day conference at the Stockholm School of Economics on May 27, 2016. The event was organized jointly by the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) and the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and was the sixth installment of SITE Development Day – a yearly development policy conference.
A region at a crossroads?
25 years have passed since the countries of the former Soviet Union embarked on a historic transition from communism to market economy and democracy. While all transition countries went through a turbulent initial period of high inflation and large output declines, the depth and length of these recessions varied widely across the region and have resulted in income differences that remain until today. Some explanations behind these varied results include initial conditions, external factors and geographic location, but also the speed and extent to which reforms were implemented early on were critical to outcomes. Countries that took on a rapid and bold reform process were rewarded with a faster recovery and income convergence, whereas countries that postponed reforms ended up with a much longer and deeper initial recession and have seen very little income convergence with Western Europe.
The prospect of EU membership is another factor that proved to be a powerful catalyst for reform and upgrading of institutional frameworks. The 10 countries that joined the EU are today, on average, performing better than the non-EU transition countries in basically any indicator of development including GDP per capita, life expectancy, political rights and civil liberties. Even if some of the non-EU countries initially had the political will to reform and started off on an ambitious transition path, the momentum was eventually lost. In Russia, the increasing oil prices of the 2000s brought enormous government revenues that enabled the country to grow without implementing further market reforms, and have effectively led to a situation of no political competition. Ukraine, on the other hand, has changed government 17 times in the past 25 years, and even if the parliament appears to be functioning, very few of the passed laws and suggested reforms have actually been implemented.
Evidently, economic transition takes time and was harder than many initially expected. In some areas of reform, such as liberalization of prices, trade and the exchange rate, progress could be achieved relatively fast. However, in other crucial areas of reform and institution building progress has been slower and more diverse. Private sector development is perhaps the area where the transition countries differ the most. Large-scale privatization remains to be completed in many countries in the CIS. In Belarus, even small-scale privatization has been slow. For the transition countries that were early with large-scale privatization, the current challenges of private sector development are different: As production moves closer to the world technology frontier, competition intensifies and innovation and human capital development become key to survival. These transformational pressures require strong institutions, and a business environment that rewards education and risk taking. It becomes even more important that financial sectors are functioning, that the education system delivers, property rights are protected, regulations are predictable and moderated, and that corruption and crime are under control. While the scale of these challenges differ widely across the region, the need for institutional reforms that reduce inefficiencies and increase returns on private investments and savings, are shared by many.
To increase economic growth and to converge towards Western Europe, the key challenges are to both increase productivity and factor input into production. This involves raising the employment rate, achieving higher labor productivity, and increasing the capital stock per capita. The region’s changing demography, due to lower fertility rates and rebounding life expectancy rates, will increase already high pressures on pension systems, healthcare spending and social assistance. Moreover, the capital stock per capita in a typical transition country is only about a third of that in Western Europe, with particularly wide gaps in terms of investment in infrastructure.
Unlocking human potential: gender in the region
Regardless of how well a country does on average, it also matters how these achievements are distributed among the population. A relatively underexplored aspect of transition is to which extent it has affected men and women differentially. Given the socialist system’s provision of universal access to education and healthcare, and great emphasis on labor market participation for both women and men, these countries rank fairly well in gender inequality indices compared to countries at similar levels of GDP outside the region when the transition process started. Nonetheless, these societies were and have remained predominantly patriarchal. During the last 25 years, most of these countries have only seen a small reduction in the gender wage gap, some even an increase. Several countries have seen increased gender segregation on the labor market, and have implemented “protective” laws that in reality are discriminatory as they for example prohibit women from working in certain occupations, or indirectly lock out mothers from the labor market.
Furthermore, many of the obstacles experienced by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are more severe for women than for men. Female entrepreneurs in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries have less access to external financing, business training and affordable and qualified business support than their male counterparts. While the free trade agreements, DCFTAs, between the EU and Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, respectively, have the potential to bring long-term benefits especially for women, these will only be realized if the DCFTAs are fully implemented and gender inequalities are simultaneously addressed. Women constitute a large percentage of the employees in the areas that are the most likely to benefit from the DCFTAs, but stand the risk of being held back by societal attitudes and gender stereotypes. In order to better evaluate and study how these issues develop, gendered-segregated data need to be made available to academics, professionals and the general public.
Conclusion
Looking back 25 years, given the stakes involved, things could have gotten much worse. Even so, for the CIS countries progress has been uneven and disappointing and many of the countries are still struggling with the same challenges they faced in the 1990’s: weak institutions, slow productivity growth, corruption and state capture. Meanwhile, the current migration situation in Europe has revealed that even the institutional development towards democracy, free press and judicial independence in several of the CEEC countries cannot be taken for granted. The transition process is thus far from complete, and the lessons from the economics of transition literature are still highly relevant.
Participants at the conference
- Irina Alkhovka, Gender Perspectives.
- Bas Bakker, IMF.
- Torbjörn Becker, SITE.
- Erik Berglöf, Institute of Global Affairs, LSE.
- Kateryna Bornukova, Belarusian Research and Outreach Center.
- Anne Boschini, Stockholm University.
- Irina Denisova, New Economic School.
- Stefan Gullgren, Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- Elsa Håstad, Sida.
- Eric Livny, International School of Economics.
- Michal Myck, Centre for Economic Analysis.
- Tymofiy Mylovanov, Kyiv School of Economics.
- Olena Nizalova, University of Kent.
- Heinz Sjögren, Swedish Chamber of Commerce for Russia and CIS.
- Andrea Spear, Independent consultant.
- Oscar Stenström, Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- Natalya Volchkova, Centre for Economic and Financial Research.
Urban Land Misallocation and Markets in Russian Cities
Authors: Paul Castañeda Dower, CEFIR and William Pyle, Middlebury College.
Former socialist countries inherited factory-dominated cityscapes since planners made industrial location decisions in relative ignorance of land’s opportunity costs. Drawing on unique survey evidence and policy variation across territorial units within Russia, this brief discusses the relationship between land tenure reforms and land reallocation. The evidence points to land privatization as an important factor in the reallocation of land in Russian cities.