Tag: propaganda

Democratic Backsliding and Electoral Autocracies: Research Shared at the 2023 FROMDEE Conference

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On October 13th, 2023, the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) and the Forum for Research on Media and Democracy in Eastern Europe (FROMDEE) hosted an academic conference on “Democratic Backsliding and Electoral Autocracies”. This brief provides a short summary of the keynote lecture and research presentations featured at the conference.

The most recent report by the V-Dem Institute concludes that “72 percent of the world’s population […] live in autocracies by 2022” and “the level of democracy enjoyed by the average global citizen in 2022 is down to 1986 levels” (V-Dem Institute, 2023). In Europe, these declines have manifested in the previous Polish government undermining judicial independence, in tightened political repression in Belarus, and most prominently in Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. But the rise of electoral autocracies and democratic backsliding are not confined to Europe – their strategies of propaganda, corruption, electoral manipulation, as well as attacks on judicial and media independence are a global phenomenon. The October 13th FROMDEE Conference gathered researchers from economics, law and political science to bring insight into why and where reversals are taking place, and what measures are needed to reverse the negative trend. This policy brief provides an overview of the research shared at the conference.

Populism and Autocracy – the Case of Russia

In the keynote lecture, Arturas Rozenas (New York University) focused on the roots of populism, challenging the common view of illiberal democracies as a mix between democracies and dictatorships. Rather, dictatorships evolve into populist dictatorships that then take one of two paths: either the path to democracy, or the path towards electoral autocracy, illiberal democracy, or totalitarianism. In this framework, populist dictatorships have historically made use of populist elements we recognize from modern times, i.e., democratic-seeming institutions misused for the ruler’s purposes.

In a populist dictatorship, Rozenas continued, there is a monopoly of power. Institutions such as elections and parliamentary representation, serve not to allocate power but to legitimise it. The transition from passive to active dictatorships coincided with a move away from the common notion of a king or similar leader deriving rightful power from God to rule the masses, to a reality built on the idea that the ruler’s legitimacy stems from the masses. This historic transformation should however not be interpreted as a transition to democracy. In fact, Rozenas showed that for most of recent history, the majority of elections and expansions of suffrage took place in dictatorships rather than in democracies. These seemingly populist institutions serve not only to legitimise governments, but also to coopt the population in a public display of the ruler’s strength. Rozenas argued, that in an active populist dictatorship, the ruler creates a setting which suppresses dissent and expectations of dissent, through institutionalised expressions of support (in the form of political participation, elections, large rallies etc.).

Turning to the Russian setting, the first thing to notice is the deep tradition of autocracy – from tsarism to Stalinism. In Russia, the words “society” and “the people” briefly blossomed during past revolutions or uprisings but have largely been absent in the Russian language and are once again on the decline under the rule of Putin. Further, the Russian population has time and again been exploited by its rulers during succession crises for displays of power and dominance. Examples of this are the mandatory elections held under Stalin two weeks after the invasion of the Baltic States in 1939 and more recently under Putin in the occupied territories of Luhansk and Donetsk in Ukraine in 2021. Such populist autocratic strategies are nothing new in Russia, concluded Rozenas – rather they derive from the internal logic of dictatorship that has played out throughout Russian history.

Continuing the notion of the “absent” Russian society, Olha Zadorozhna (Kozminski University) began her presentation by explaining that protests are infrequent in Russia and have surprisingly few attendees given the country’s large population. While there were mass protests in the run-up to the collapse of communism in the 1980’s and protests took place against corruption in 2017-2018, and in relation to the arrest of Alexey Navalny in 2021, protests in Russia are typically not motivated by an overarching ideology or broader political questions. Rallies in favor of authoritarianism and ethno-nationalism are a more common occurrence. Moreover, there are few indications that the invasion of Ukraine, sanctions and subsequent economic downturn have negatively affected the Russian population’s support for the regime. Still, literature has shown that war-related deaths can mobilize opposition against war participation (e.g., the U.S. participation in the Vietnam War). Considering this, Zadorozhna evaluates whether the deaths of Russian soldiers provoke a reaction among the Russian population. By combining social media data on fallen soldiers with protest activity for the first four months of the Russian invasion in 2022, the study find that casualties lead to an increase in protest activity, indicating that deaths can in fact mobilize public opposition in Russia.

Other populist strategies to ensure support for Putin in Russia relate to political participation and the judiciary. Nicholas James (University of Oxford) analysed electoral rule changes in the Russian Duma – from mixed member majoritarianism to proportional representation (PR) – by measuring their effect on floor participation. Applying a difference-in-differences framework, James found that deputies experiencing a change from PR included less words in their speeches following the switch (about 15-20 percent of an average speech). This effect should be understood in the political context of the ruling party’s (United Russia) increased influence during this time period (2010s). In fact, James concluded, the results point in the direction of the regime tampering with the Duma in an impromptu and reactionary manner with the overall goal of obtaining closer control and the appearance of support for the regime.

Yulia Khalikova’s (University of Hamburg) presentation gave further insight into how ostensibly democratic institutions can be exploited to make an authoritarian regime appear legitimate. In her work, Khalikova considers judicial references to international law that may be employed strategically, without necessarily adhering to the spirit or content of the law. Looking specifically at international law citations in 601 judgements made in the Russian Constitutional Court (RCC) between 2000 and 2021, Khalikova find evidence that the RCC has increasingly cited international courts when making judgements on topics related to politics and physical rights, indicating that state policy influences citation patterns. The change in citation patterns also points to the RCC currently using international law to support the regime and uphold its legitimacy, meaning that international law – adopted with the ambition of enhancing democratic values and ensuring human rights – is misused for undemocratic and repressive purposes.

Censorship and Propaganda

Information control is an important feature of autocratic regimes. Philine Widmer (ETH Zurich) considers the Chinese setting – where the regime controls the amount of foreign information available on the internet via a countrywide firewall. Research has shown that autocracies make use of censorship strategies to control their citizens, but these are associated with high reputational costs and can be overcome by tech-savvy citizens. Using a machine learning algorithm, Widmer first predicts a newspaper article’s alignment with the Chinese regime before comparing the placement of more/less aligned articles on news websites. Her results show that front-page news stories in Chinese newspapers are more aligned with the regime’s stance than other content. Front-page placement in turn matters for information uptake. Widmer ended the presentation by comparing the additional cost of finding less aligned articles to the technological costs required to access outside media (e.g. VPNs). For an autocracy to achieve its information control objectives, independent news may just need to be relatively harder to access. It does not need to make it impossible to access for all citizens.

Censorship is typically accompanied by, and complementary with, propaganda. Restricting other narratives allows autocratic regimes to spread their own. While propaganda is a common feature within autocracies, Jaakko Meriläinen’s (Stockholm School of Economics) presentation evaluated the effect of autocratic propaganda in a democratic setting.

Meriläinen’s study focuses on a rogue experiment in which some Finnish children in the 1970’s were taught history and social sciences using material from the Soviet Union – material which was in essence Soviet propaganda. By exploiting geographical and cohort variation, Meriläinen use a difference-in-differences approach to compare the 213 exposed children to children taught the regular Finnish curriculum. The long-term outcomes show that exposed children had lower incomes in adulthood, worked fewer months per year and were engaged in more left-leaning and publicly beneficial occupations (such as, nurses and firefighters).

Information and Accountability

The use of technological innovations to access otherwise restricted information was central to Arieda Muço’s (Central European University) presentation. She studies the spread of the Xerox photocopying machine in communist Hungary in the 1980’s – a setting characterised by limited freedom of speech and restrictions on the media. She reported that areas with early placement of Xerox machines are found to exhibit higher shares of pro-democratic voting. Muço ascribes these outcomes to the fact that the machines allowed for the spread of information and eased coordination of the opposition, suggesting that new technologies and information can act as key facilitators in the fall of autocratic regimes.

Providing citizens with information was also a key feature in Enrique Seira Bejarano’s (Michigan State University) presentation. He began by discussing two potentially related trends: in Latin America recent years have seen (i) increased levels of corruption and (ii) increased dissatisfaction with democracy among citizens. The number of corruption-related news articles have increased threefold in Spanish and doubled in English and the share of people perceiving corruption to be the greatest challenge to their country has doubled in the last decade. The study uses two empirical strategies to identify the effect of corruption on democratic values. Firstly, Seira Bejarano described an observational study, in which data on major corruption scandals were combined with Latinobarometer data on support for democracy. The authors find that corruption scandals increase corruption perceptions while decreasing stated support for democracy. Secondly, Seira Bejarano reported the results of a randomized controlled trial in which some respondents were shown videos of a politician accepting bribes. This had a negative effect on preferences for democracy and on trust more broadly. Both studies show that revelations of corruptions decrease the support for democracy, suggesting a potential tradeoff between the public’s belief in democratic institutions and increased transparency which is important for accountability but can also expose corruption.

Right-wing Populism

Yet another threat to democracy is the rise of right-wing populism – currently a reality in many well-established democracies across Europe. In Germany, the far-right party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) enjoys around 21 percent of voters’ support according to recent polls. To understand their rise in popularity, Navid Sabet (Goethe University Frankfurt) builds on previous literature on cultural conflict as a driver for right-wing party support. The paper he presented examines the role of violent conflict in the form of terrorist acts. It evaluates whether acts of terror can alter the political landscape and shift support to the far-right. To avoid selection problems, the authors compare successful terror attacks to attacks that failed. Sabet reported that successful small-scale attacks (predominantly targeting migrants) increase AfD’s vote share by about 6 percentage points in state elections (in the time period 2013-2021). The acts of terror were found to increase voter turnout, by mobilizing otherwise idle voters, but also by gaining votes at the cost of other parties. Exploring the mechanisms behind these results, the authors study the language used by political parties and the way successful attacks were covered in the media. Relative to coverage of unsuccessful attacks, media coverage used a more negative tone, more words related to Islam and terror and fewer words related to right-wing populism. This suggests that media plays an important role in shaping the public’s response to acts of terror and that far right parties are able to exploit this dynamic.

Concluding Remarks

The 2023 FROMDEE Conference brought together academics from different fields to shed light on some of the main challenges to democracy today. In part, the research presented supported the prevailing narrative that democracies are backsliding in many parts of the world. However, by analysing how autocracies and populist leaders operate, the presenters also highlighted the vulnerability of dictatorships.

Arturas Rozenas cited the example of a rally in Bucharest in 1989, which was organised to display support for Ceauşescu’s regime and descended into an anti-government protest. Dictatorships can benefit by coopting the populist elements of democracy but, in doing so, they risk creating a vehicle for genuine democratic expression.

The audience learned about autocracies’ efforts to control the flow of information but also about citizens’ ability to circumvent restrictions whether in 1980s Hungary or present-day China. Several presentations focused on the extent of autocratic control in Russia but even in this setting, the death of soldiers in Ukraine motivates citizens to participate in protests.

Recent trends suggest that democratic institutions should not be taken for granted in any country. Societies can become more resilient to the threat of democratic backsliding, in part by better understanding how both democracies and autocracies operate and what makes them vulnerable. Researchers around the world are using innovative methods to expand our knowledge in this area, as reflected in the presentations at the 2023 FROMDEE Conference.


Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Russia’s Data Warfare

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After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, a broad spectrum of previously publicly available statistics on economic indicators has been removed from the public eye. This reduced transparency affects any analysis of the state of the Russian economy and assessments of the effects of sanctions. The strategy is also part of a larger disinformation campaign that has become an integral part of Russia’s war on Ukraine. In this brief we provide a short overview of the main indicators on economic activity that have been masked in various forms by Russia’s data producing institutions. We also touch upon some alternative strategies, employed to gain a better understanding of the actual state of the Russian economy while official data is unavailable or unreliable.

Following Russia’s war on Ukraine, Russia has ceased to publish large amounts of previously publicly available statistics on economic indicators. This reduced transparency affects any attempts to analyze the Russian economy with regular data and models, and is an integral part of the information war that has followed Russia’s aggression. In particular, it aims to reduce or obscure the analysis of the effects of sanctions that have been imposed on Russia by Ukraine’s partners. The reduced precision of this analysis is then used in various propaganda channels to claim that sanctions are useless and that they are, instead of hurting Russia, harming the EU, the US and other sanctions implementing countries.

In this brief we present a short overview of some of the most important statistics on Russia’s economic performance no longer publicly available (with a detailed list to be found in the Online Appendix). We also discuss some alternative measures to track the Russian economy which can be used to provide more accurate assessments of the effect of sanctions and thus reduce the impact of Russia’s data warfare.

What Data is Being Masked?

Russia’s cessation of statistical publications has occurred across several dimensions including foreign trade, budget, and finance.  Most notably, data has been masked by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (CBR), the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation (Ministry of Finance), the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) and the Federal Customs Service of Russia.

Budget Data

Data on federal and consolidated budgets in Russia was previously easily accessible on the Ministry of Finance’s and Rosstat’s webpages.

The Ministry of Finance has however, as of January 2022, ceased publishing data on budget expenditures. This includes monthly data for a wide range of budget expenditure categories such as spending for public administration, national defense and law enforcement, environmental protection, education, healthcare, social politics, mass media and culture. This data is no longer available despite the webpage for budget expenditures being updated as late as March 17th 2023.

Data on certain budget indicators is also missing on Rosstat’s webpage. While statistics on taxes, fees and other mandatory payments are available for 2022, budget expenditures are available only for 2021. This is however not surprising given that Rosstat receives its figures on the financial sector, including figures on public finances partly from the Ministry of Finance.

Foreign Trade Data

Foreign trade statistics is normally published by the Federal Customs Service of Russia, CBR and Rosstat.

Since the invasion, the Federal Customs Service of Russia has however stopped publishing statistics on foreign trade and commodity structure. The latest available monthly data on Russian foreign trade with its main partners (the EU, Commonwealth of Independent States countries and others), and the commodity structure of exports and imports – including processed goods and oil and gas – is from January 2022 (as of April 3rd 2023).

Foreign trade data from CBR has been withheld throughout 2022. CBR has however recently resumed parts of their publications and, as of April 3rd 2023, monthly data on total export and import is available for all of 2022 as well as for January 2023. Still, these figures display total exports and imports only and are not broken down by trade partner or commodity.

Similar to CBR’s publishing pattern, figures on export and import as part of GDP by use were unavailable on Rosstat’s webpage from February 2022 and throughout the year.  As of April 7th 2023, quarterly aggregated data is however available for all of 2022.  Monthly data on export and import by country is nonetheless still available only for 2021, despite the webpage being updated in November 2022.

Financial Data

To provide information on the national finance system and its dynamics is a main tasks of any country’s central bank, with Russia being no exception. Despite this there are about 40 financial indicators that, since the beginning of 2022, are no longer available on CBR’s webpage (as of April 3rd 2023). This contravenes CBR’s calendar, which states that statistics are supposed to be published in the next reporting period, i.e. the next quarter/month for quarterly and monthly data respectively.

The most deferred data (more than 20 indicators) can be found, or rather can’t be found, in the so-called External Sector Statistics category. For example, monthly data on balance of payments, remittances and financial transactions in the private sector, and international investment position of the banking sector is missing as of January 2022. Similarly, quarterly data on foreign investments, foreign assets and liabilities in the banking sector has been unavailable since January 2022. The same goes for data on external debt of the corporate sector of the Russian Federation in the form of loans, credits and deposits raised as a result of non-resident placement of Eurobonds and other debt securities.

In the so-called Banking Sector Statistics category, data on indicators such as assets, risks, operational data, international reserves and volume of FX operations is no longer available. Furthermore, figures on turnover of the interbank spot and forward markets have also been unavailable since February 2022.

Two comments are due considering the ease of access to above mentioned data/data sources. Firstly, in order to access the CBR’s and the Federal Customs Service of Russia’s webpages, one at times needs make use of a Virtual Private Network (VPN). Secondly, there are, for all sources mentioned, large discrepancies between the Russian language and the English language webpages, with the latter being severely patchier in its information.

Hiding Data: Reasons and Implications

What drives the authorities to mask seemingly relevant figures? Alexandra Prokopenko, an expert on Russian economic policy, argues that Russian authorities mask certain numbers related to the sanctions to impede evaluations of the effect of sanctions (Prokopenko 2023). Making the data less transparent and accessible in order to hide sanctions’ effect across various sectors to try and paint a better picture of the economic activity has also been a Russian policy goals. The head of the Federal Customs Services, Vladimir Bulavin, in April 2022 announced trade statistics were masked partly to “avoid […] speculation and discrepancies in import deliveries” (Uvarchev, 2022).

In this context, it is worth mentioning that Russia is obliged to report to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on several of the previously discussed indicators since the country is subscribing to the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) as of 2005. SDDS aims at providing transparent economic and financial data to the public and according to the IMF “Serious and persistent nonobservance of the SDDS, therefore, will be cause for action” (IMF, 2023). If Russia does not publish data according to the SDSS commitments, it could be excluded from the list of countries that subscribe to the SDSS.  This affects how the country is viewed by investors and others and will further increase the risk premia that is applied to dealing with Russia.

Further, in its efforts to restrict insight into how the Russian economy is faring following the sanctions, the authorities have however created a large uncertainty also for Russian domestic markets, adding to the sanction’s effects. For instance, Elvira Nabiullina, Russia’s Central Bank Governor, has been arguing to revoke the decision to classify large amounts of data saying that investors, analysts and researchers simply need the data to do their work properly (CBR News, 2023).

Alternative Ways of Understanding the Real State of the Russian Economy

How can we learn about the state of affairs in Russia without the previously discussed data? While deducing Russia’s budget expenditures and many financial indicators may be cumbersome, more can be done when it comes to trade data. Specifically, a BOFIT Policy Brief by Simola (2022) proxied Russia’s imports and exports by tracking the imports of Russia’s main trading partners (17 economies) between March and June 2022. Similar proxying efforts have been made by Darvas, Martins and McCaffrey (2023), who tracked Russia’s foreign trade by considering detailed trade data from China, the United States, South Korea, Japan, India, the United Kingdom, Turkey and the EU, putting together publicly available datasets which span from January 2019 to January 2023.

Proxying trade data by considering trade partner’s statistics is emphasized by Sonnenfeld et al. (2022), who not only considers such data but rather a wide variety of available and reliable data sources – emphasizing the need to also crosscheck data from official Russian statical sources with more reliable ones (for a full overview of the methodologies used, the estimated indicators on the Russian economy and the implications from this, see Sonnenfeld et al. 2022).

Other efforts to map out Russia’s economic activity consider more creative methods such as using satellite data and/or ship location (AIS) data. Examples of such efforts include a recent Bruegel dataset which tracks Russian crude oil trade (Heusaff et al., 2023) and CREA’s “Russia Fossil Tracker”. For both examples, the authors utilize the location data for individual crude oil tankers, and (for Heusaff et al. 2023) combine it with data from OPEC, BP and Eurostat, to assess monthly crude oil exports from Russia to a set of major destinations (mainly the EU, China and CIS countries).

Similarly, satellite data has been previously used to estimate carbon emissions from flaring (Böttcher et al., 2021). While there is an ongoing debate on whether flaring can be trusted to give insight into gas and oil production (World Bank, 2023), one could potentially make use of such data to get a better view of the productivity within the Russian oil and gas sector following the imposed price cap mechanism and sanctions.

The struggle of creating reliable estimates for an economy polishing or masking information did not arise with the withdrawal of certain Russian statistics. The actual status of the North Korean economy remains much of a mystery to analysts (see The Economist) as the country, in 2017, was yet to publish a Statistical Yearbook. While Russia is far from North Korea in several aspects, the reality is that the alternative measures used to estimate North Korea’s economic activity (such as making use of Chinese trade data etc.) are partly the ones now being undertaken by analysts looking beyond the figures from Kremlin.


Russia’s decision to stop publishing regular economic data is part of the disinformation and propaganda efforts that are integral parts of its war on Ukraine, with the purpose being to complicate any analysis of what is going on in the Russian economy. While being partially successful in this regard, the data withholding likely creates further negative implications for Russia’s external economic relations and undermines the functioning of its domestic markets.

Given the lack of data following Russia’s disinformation efforts it is essential that any analyst concerned with mapping the Russian economy not only considers alternative but also multiple sources and consult experts with a plethora of competencies. Already today, new creative ways of getting hold of relevant data is providing increasing insight into the state of the Russian economy. With continued efforts, these measures will progress over time, improving our understanding of how sanctions affect the Russian economy.

Online Appendix

An overview of all indicators discussed in this brief can be found in the Online Appendix. The information in the Appendix is valid as of April 7th 2023.


Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Understanding Currents in the Contesting Information Spheres

Computers and internet merely added new forms to age-old forms of propaganda. Its general purpose is, as it always has been, dualistic: to shape citizens’ image of their own country, and to streamline their views of foreign partners, competitors or enemies. Studies on information wars are often one-dimensional, i.e. presenting only actions directed against one’s own state. New Russian textbooks on information wars have a more complex approach and present long historical retrospective overviews.

Reports on disinformation campaigns are nowadays regular in the information sphere in Sweden, as in the West in general. The changes of today’s propaganda compared to classic stereotypes of the Cold War confrontations seem obvious. However, many debates on how to counter a feared information war or fake news campaigns apparently lack a long-term historical perspective. Therefore, they appear unnecessarily alarmist and might even miss their claimed purpose – to promote a sound political debate on domestic and international affairs.

Trends in Swedish information spheres – a retrospective overview

From time to time, a dominant political climate and consensus is challenged. During the prosperous 1950s, Sweden formed a self-image of the “golden middle way” between capitalism and socialism. Many aspects of this self-image were indeed partly myths. A Swedish author, Göran Palm, happened to be one of the succinct observers to challenge our prejudiced visions. His books “An unjust reflection” and “Indoctrination in Sweden” reached a wide audience and forced many to reconsider our achievements as a welfare state. Gunnar Fredriksson, editor of a Social-Democratic newspaper, alerted readers to the intricacies of “the politicians’ language” as a means to distort realities or evoke positive or negative emotions.

These books from the late 1960s were milestones for heightening the public awareness of mass media manipulation. A similar trend and radical change of Sweden’s self-image is taking place today. Until recently, the predominant view has been that Sweden represents a successful experience in forming a multicultural society, despite a few obvious crisis phenomena.

However, an awareness concerning the stress on the social fabric has spread from outsiders in the political scene towards mainstream parties. One example can highlight how changes have occurred. In January 2017, the Swedish journalist Katerina Janouch was scolded for an interview on Czech television, in which she inter alia stated her own personal view of the many problems that Sweden definitely is confronted with. After a vivid debate with harsh arguments involving even high-ranking politicians over her apparently controversial statements, she wrote a diary-like book “The Image of Sweden”. On a micro level, this fascinating personal experience succinctly shows how the image of Sweden changed over the last year, what has been accepted and what is still hotly debated concerning economics, migration and social problems.

Picture 1. “Bilden av Sverige” Book Cover

Over a short period, new political trends appeared. The political agenda has changed; serious debates treat formerly taboo topics. This is essentially because objective challenges to the economic stability, social fabric and cohesion cannot be ignored.

Even more noteworthy is, that given the outcome of the US presidential election campaign and the Brexit plebiscite of 2016, in particular the alleged role of outsiders’, supposedly decisive, involvement in these political events, Sweden has revitalized its organs on countering foreign political propaganda, which had been inactive after the Cold War era. Leading newspapers jointly with radio and TV intend to cooperate in order to thwart any attempts in 2018 to covertly interfere or overtly influence the upcoming parliamentary elections in September. Alerts against supposed disinformation campaigns by Russian mass media were at the center-stage of an annual defense policy conference in Sälen. The previous attempts to describe and analyze the supposed Russian information war efforts towards Sweden as presented hitherto seem, in my view, to lack in source collection from Russian mass media and blogospheres. They merely illustrate rather than form a structured picture of the Russian information spheres as a multiform complex.

Contests between the information spheres in Russia and the West

Therefore, as the Swedish proverb goes, “let’s turn the keg” and try to see things in a new perspective, by turning our usual modes of thought and preconceptions upside-down. A broad awareness on state propaganda in Russia, in the past as well as at present, can deepen our understanding of ongoing information wars. How does a Russian student in political sciences become aware of the formations of their nation’s self-image, as well as of foreign propaganda against their country? How do Russian scholars analyze their recent conflicts with neighboring states? What can they tell us of the general awareness concerning information warfare in the Russian public?

Three Russian historians, Viktor Barabash, Gennadii Bordiugov and Elena Kotelenets, all active in AIRO-XXI about which you can read more of here, give a broader perspective on how state propaganda has changed since the early 20th century till our times. They illustrate how countries at war, starting during World War I, directed propaganda to mass armies with, in general, literate soldiers and by that tried to influence the enemy’s morale. They evaluate how effective various forms of propaganda were, given the new technologies radio and TV during the Second World War and the Cold War eras.

After several in-depth chapters on the technological changes in the information era, on the cyber technological advances that have radically transformed traditional espionage, they finally describe how the information wars were carried out in Russia’s conflicts since 2000 (South Ossetia in 2008, Ukraine during the “Orange Revolution” and “Euro-Maidan”). Particular emphasis is devoted to how the conflicting parties formed their propaganda to their own population, on the one hand, and versus the opposing state, on the other hand.

Picture 2. ”Gosudarstvennaia propaganda i informatsionnye voiny” Book Cover

It is striking that in contrast to the Russian textbook by Barabash, Bordiugov and Kotelenets, very few analysts in Sweden have managed to present the contemporary information wars as a two-sided conflict; with two sides mutually intertwined in their mass media and social media strivings. Instead, information warfare is described as originating solely from more or less sophisticated “troll factories” in various locations in Russia. A couple of obviously forged “documents” ascribed to Swedish political leaders are sometimes referred to, although their actual effects have been nil.

In Sweden, as well as in the West in general, much has been stated on the real or imagined disinformation campaigns launched by Russia. Sometimes, they are said to direct public opinion in other states or even to influence the electorate (USA, United Kingdom). The role of relatively peripheral news agencies like RT (Russia Today) or Sputnik have seen their role amplified beyond reasonable belief. A further simplification is to reduce any Russian interpretation of events as a piece of falsification (fake news). Warnings of “Putin’s narrative” or “Russian Television fake stories” are common in mass media. In comparison, students of the Barabash textbook must undertake textual analyses of conflicting Russian and foreign opinions.

If one does not know history, you are likely to repeat its mistakes – so goes the proverb. Just as likely is the case where one repeat past generations’ mistakes because you are leaning on the mythology surrounding many events in your country’s past.

Minister of Culture Vladimir Medinskii has carried out a broad research project on the shifting images of Russia in the West, from eldest time when written sources by travelers are available. Although other historians criticized his original thesis on this subject for certain methodological flaws, there is no doubt that Medinskii accomplished a great feat as a popularizer of intricate phases in Russia’s history.

One book concerns the new historiography of the 1939–45 war on the Eastern Front. Since the late 1980s, many formerly taboo topics concerning the war were studied based on formerly secret archives as well as on interviews with veterans. In his book on the Great Patriotic War, Medinskii carefully unravels old myths and rejects new simplifications or distortions of battle histories.

Picture 3. “Mify o Rossii” Book Cover

Every historical nation tends to develop its own historiographical paradigm, which might be more or less objective and in conformity with general interpretations in other nations. However, just as often one nation’s image of their neighbors, former enemies or partners may differ substantially; thus are created the stereotypes of “the others”. In his grand comparative survey of Russia from the 12th century to the present, Medinskii provides the engaged reader with a plethora of examples of distortions of Russia’s history, created not only by foreign observers but also by ideologically motivated compatriots. Many legends on “eternal traits” in Russia are challenged. A Western reader of Medinskii’s book is bound to reflect on the various measures by which his or her country is evaluated in comparison with Russia.

In conclusion, the information contests or wars are only one element in the wider concept of cyber and hybrid wars. Observing our Swedish debate on the nefarious effects of alleged Russian disinformation, the absence of self-awareness is remarkable on how our own image of Russia (in our mass media and in the public opinion) is in itself the unconscious product of a pre-war attitude (sometimes alluded to as our age-long Russia-fear /Rysskräck/).

On the contrary, the legacy of the Soviet epoch has apparently raised the cultural curiosity among the Russian public. Mass media and publishing companies created a multidimensional panorama of their country’s past. The concerned Russian readers seem fairly well aware of politicization of historical issues and international affairs. Not for nothing do they often get substantial “food for thought” from the foreign news media translations, provided online by the InoSmi.ru site; a translation bureau, which took over the task of the Soviet-era magazine “Za Rubezhom”, and which lends its commentary fields open for anyone to comment. Even a cursory survey of commentary fields reveals their spontaneous character, rather than something created by Kremlin’s purported “troll armies”.

It goes without saying that a general and highly sophisticated awareness of overt or covert forms of meddling by a foreign state in the political process of any country must be welcomed and promoted. However, it is an open question how successful certain organized counter-disinformation strategies will be, e.g. EU’s site EUvsDisinfo.eu, NATO’s East StratCom Task Force or the Swedish joint public radio and TV with leading newspapers to “combat fake news”. Leaving much broader fields in the information sphere for freer opinion making in mainstream media as well as in the blog sphere might prove to be a sounder path towards dialogues, debates and mutual understanding.


  • Barabash, V. & G. Bordiugov & E, Kotelenets, Gosudarstvennaia propaganda i informatsionnye voiny (2015),  AIRO-XXI
  • Fredriksson, G., Det politiska språket (1966 and later editions), Tiden.
  • Janouch, K., Bilden av Sverige (2017), Palm Publishing.
  • Palm, G., En orättvis betraktelse, (1966) and Indoktrineringen i Sverige (1968), PAN/Norstedts
  • Medinskii, V., Voina: Mify SSSR, 1939 – 1945 (2011) and Mify o Rossii (2015), Abris/OLMA

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.