Tag: Russia
The Russian economy under Putin (so far)
Russians are heading to the polling booths on March 18, but where will the economy head after Putin has been elected president again? This brief provides an overview of the economic progress Russia has made since 2000 as well as an economic scorecard of Putin’s first three tenures in the Kremlin and uses this to discuss what can be expected for the coming six years. Although significant growth has been achieved since 2000, all of this came in the first two tenures of Putin in the Kremlin on the back of increasing oil prices. In order to generate growth in his upcoming presidential term, Putin and his team will need to address the significant needs for reforms in the institutions that form the basis for modern market economies. Otherwise, Russia will continue to be hostage to the whims of the international oil market and eventually lose most of its exports and government revenues as the world moves towards a carbon free future. Perhaps this is beyond the scope of Putin as president, but not beyond the horizon of young Russians that will be casting their votes on Sunday and in future elections.
Let’s assume that Putin will be elected president again on March 18 (for once a very realistic assumption made by an economist). What will this mean for the Russian economy in the coming six years given what happened during his previous and current tenures in the Kremlin? To assess the future as well as to understand Putin’s power and popularity, this brief starts by looking back at the economic developments in Russia since Putin first became president.
Although many different factors enter the power and popularity function of Putin, economic developments have a special role in providing the budget constrain within which the president can operate. A higher income level means more resources to devote to any particular sector, project, voting group or power base. This is not unique to Russia, but sometimes forgotten in discussions about Russia, that often instead only focus on military power or control of the security apparatus and media. These are of course highly relevant dimensions to understand power and popularity in Russia, but so is economic development, particularly in the longer run.
Russia’s economy in the world
The economic greatness and progress of a country is usually assessed in terms of the size of the economy, how much growth that has been generated, and how well off the citizens are relative to the citizens of other countries. So, by our common indicator gross domestic product (GDP), has Russia become a greater and more powerful country since Putin first became president? Table 1 shows two things, the absolute level of GDP measured in USD at market exchange rates and the rank this gives a country in a sample of 192 countries in the world that the IMF collects data on (this brief is too short for a long discussion of the most relevant GDP measure, but GDP at market exchange rates makes sense when comparing the economic strength of countries in a global context, Becker 2017 provides a discussion of alternative measures as well). When Putin become president for the first time in 2000, the value of domestic production was estimated at $279 billion, which implied a 19th place in the world rankings of countries’ GDP. In 2016, almost three presidential terms of Putin later, Russia’s GDP had increased by 4½ times to $1281 billion and its ranking improved to 12th place in the world. This clearly is an impressive record by most standards. However, the Russian economy is still the smallest economy of the BRIC countries and corresponds to only 7 percent of the US economy in 2016. In other words, impressive progress by Russia but the country is (still) not a global superpower in the economic arena.
Table 1. Russia in the world (GDP in USD bn)
Source: IMF (2017)
For the average Russian, income per capita is a measure more closely connected to consumption and investment opportunities or ‘welfare’. Progress in this area is also more likely to affect how individuals assess the performance of its political leaders. Of course, progress in terms of overall GDP and GDP per capita is closely linked unless something unusual is happening to population growth. Therefore, it is not surprising that GDP per capita also increased by around 4½ times between 2000 and 2016 (Table 2). This is the first order effect of the economic development in Russia, but in addition, citizens of Russia moved up from a world income rank of 92nd to 71st. This has implications when Russian’s compare themselves with other countries and can in itself provide a boost of national pride.
It also directly affects opportunities and status for Russians visiting other countries. Being at place 71 may not be fully satisfactory to many, but we should remember that due to the rather uneven income distribution in Russia, many of the people that travel abroad are far higher up on the global income ranking than what this table indicate. Nevertheless, Russia is far behind the Western and Asian high-income countries in terms of GDP per capita. And although the picture would look less severe if purchasing power parity measures are used, the basic message is the same; Russia has still a lot of catching up to do before its (average) citizens enjoy the economic standards of high-income countries.
Table 2. Russian’s in the world (GDP/capita)
Source: IMF (2017)
The macro scorecard of Putin
So what generated the impressive 4½ times increase in income in USD terms from 2000 to 2016 and can we expect high growth during Putin’s next six years in office? The short answer to the first question is the rise in international oil prices and to the second question, we don’t know. Table 3 provides a comparison of different economic indicators for Putin’s two first terms in office compared with his current term (where GDP data ends in 2016 so the sample is cut short by a year). It is evident that the impressive growth over the full period is entirely due to the strong growth performance in the first two presidential tenures. Rather than generating growth in the most recent period, the economy has shrunk. This is explained by the evolution of international oil prices, which quadrupled in the first eight years and instead halved in the more recent period. These swings in oil prices have also been accompanied by significant shifts in foreign exchange reserves, the exchange rate, and the value of the stock market.
In Becker (2017) I discuss in more detail the importance of international oil prices in understanding the macro economic development in Russia. In particular, it is important to note that it is changes in oil prices that correlate with GDP growth and other macro variables and that the problems with predicting oil prices makes it very hard to make good predictions of Russian growth.
Table 3. A macro scorecard of Putin in office
Source: Becker (forthcoming)
Policy conclusions
To break the oil dependence and take control of the economic future of Russia, the president will need to implement serious institutional reforms that constitute the basis for a modern, well-functioning market economy in his next term. Otherwise, Russia will continue to be hostage to unpredictable swing in international oil prices and nobody—including the president, the central bank, the IMF and financial markets—will be able to predict where the Russian economy is heading in the next couple of years.
Figure 1. Reforms (still) needed
Source: World Bank (2017)
In the longer run, the prediction is much easier. With the world moving towards a green economy, the price of oil will see a structural decline that will rob Russia (and other oil exporters) of most of its export and government revenues. The reforms which basically every economist agree are needed are related to market institutions and Figure 1 provides a clear illustration of key reform areas. The progress during Putin’s years in office has been modest at best. Swedish institutions in 2016 have been added to the figure as a comparison and it is clear that the institutional gap between Russia and Sweden is significant. Of course, all countries are different, but Russian policy makers that are interested in reforming its economy are most welcome to Sweden for a discussion of what we have done to build our institutions.
References
- Becker, T. (2017). ‘Macroeconomic Challenges’, in Rosefielde, S., Kuboniwa, M., Mizobata, S. and Haba K. (eds.) The Unwinding of the Globalist Dream: EU, Russia and China, Singapore: World Scientific Publishing.
- Becker, T. (forthcoming), ‘Russia’s economy under Putin and its impact on the CIS region’, Chapter 2 in T. Becker and S. Oxenstierna (eds.) Perspectives on the Russian Economy under Putin, London: Routledge.
- IMF (2017), World Economic Outlook database, April 2017 edition available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/01/weodata/index.aspx
- World Bank (2017), Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 2017 update available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home
School Financing, Teacher Wages and Educational Outcomes in Russia
The policy proposal to increase the share of budget spent on public education implies that higher financing leads to better quality of education. This, however, is far from certain. We test and compare the effects that different levels of financial resources available to schools and relative teacher wages have on educational outcomes. Russia provides a good opportunity for testing this relationship due to its high level of regional heterogeneity. We find that increasing school financing per se does not noticeably improve educational outcomes. Only when additional financing leads to an improvement of the position of teachers in the regional wage distribution, we observe higher educational outcomes for students. We provide some tentative evidence on the possible channels of this effect.
School education is a complex and multifaceted process, and measurable educational outcomes are affected by many different factors. These may include students’ innate abilities and family resources as well as various characteristics of the school environment and teaching practices. In the literature, one of the important factors is the level of school financing provided by the government. This is also one of the key issues in the debates about the public policy in education. However, there is no consensus in the academic literature about the degree of influence of financial resources available to schools on educational outcomes.
The effect of school financing should depend on how it is spent. Since education is a human capital-intensive sector, a major part of this money is spent on teacher remuneration. Whether the size and structure of teacher pay affect the effectiveness of their work and ultimately the student outcomes is still an open question. Some studies argue that it is not absolute but that relative teacher wages matter (Loeb and Page, 2000; Britton and Propper, 2016). Hanushek et al. (2017) use cross-country data and show that the relative position of teachers in the wage distribution affects self-selection into the teaching profession in terms of skills, and that teacher skills in turn affect student outcomes.
While there are studies looking at various determinants of the quality of school education in the transition-economy context (e.g. Amini and Commander, 2012), the effect of school financial resources has not yet been studied. In Lazareva and Zakharov (2018), we exploit spatial variation in educational resources in Russia to try to answer this question. We test and compare the effects of school budget financing and relative teacher wages on educational outcomes for the period 2006–2014. We estimate these effects for two different measures of educational outcomes at different levels of school education system.
Institutional Context and Data
In Russia the system of general education covers eleven years: the first nine years are compulsory for all children, after that one can continue to high school for two more years or move into vocational education system. The school system is predominantly financed by the government and the share of private schools is very low.
In the 1990s and early 2000s, the system of general education was heavily underfinanced. Teacher remuneration was quite low compared to the average wage in the economy, and a job as a schoolteacher was not very attractive. In the mid-2000s, with the fast economic growth, the Russian government made an effort to increase school financing and to raise teacher wages. Importantly, schools are financed at the regional level, through the budgets of the regions, which results in significant cross-regional variation.
There are 85 administrative regions currently in Russia and they differ a lot in terms of economic conditions, regional budget income and expenditures. We use data on regional-level budget expenditures on general education from the Russian Treasury statistics (http://www.roskazna.ru/). In order to account for inflation and cross-regional differences in prices, we normalize the per-student amount of school budget financing by the minimum regional cost of living (as estimated by the Russian statistical office) in a particular year.
As our data show, the amount of budget financing of the general education system has been growing in real terms during 2006–2013. The average regional budget financing per student (adjusted for the differences in the cost of living across regions and years) has increased by 40% during this period. A large part of this growth occurred in 2012. In that year a presidential decree was adopted which required that teachers’ wages should be raised to the level of the average regional wage. Regions had to allocate more money for teacher wages during the following years in order to meet this target. Even after adjusting for the regional cost of living, the level of school financing differs a lot across regions throughout the period.
The amount of school financing is also significantly correlated with the gross regional product per capita, i.e. with the level of economic development of the region. We observe the largest gap in school financial resources between the small group of the richest regions (Moscow, Sankt Petersburg and resource extracting regions) and the remaining regions. Such persistent inequality in school resources may lead to unequal access to high quality education across Russian regions. This inequality is exacerbated by the fact that in less economically developed regions families have fewer resources to compensate for the underfinancing of public schools.
The structure of school expenditures in the regional budgets shows that the major part of financing (about 80 percent) is spent on remuneration of teachers and school administration. Hence, the effect of regional school expenditures on student outcomes should go through teacher wages. We use data on average regional teacher wages from Rosstat (Russian Federal State Statistics Service) and the Russian Ministry of Education. As we argued previously, it is important to test the effect of relative teacher salary. Our data show that the average regional school wage relative to the average regional wage has grown during the observation period, in particular in 2008–2009 and, at a higher rate, in 2012–2013 (due to the presidential decree mentioned above). Again, there is a significant variation among regions, which is observed throughout the period.
Empirical Results
In order to test the effect of school resources and teacher wages on educational outcomes, we use two measures of educational outcomes. First, we use the average regional score on Unified State Examination (USE). It was introduced in all Russian regions starting from 2009 and students graduating from grade 11 take the test. This is a high stakes examination as the result of this exam is accepted as entrance exams at universities throughout the country. USE in mathematics and Russian language are compulsory for all graduates of grade 11. Therefore, we will use the scores in these subjects. Note that USE scores measure educational outcomes of those students that stayed in high school after grade 9 – this is about 60 percent of the age cohort.
An alternative measure of educational outcomes is the data from PISA international educational assessment (PISA – Programme for International Student Assessment run by OECD, http://www.oecd.org/pisa/). Russia participates in PISA since 2003. We use data from waves 2006, 2009, 2012, and 2015. Students take this test at the age of 15, which means that the majority of this age cohort is in grade 9.
In our regression analysis on regional data, we additionally control for a number of regional characteristics that may be correlated with school financing or teacher wages, such as population size, share of urban population, regional poverty (share of population below the poverty line), within-region income inequality (decile coefficient), and gross regional income per capita (also adjusted for the cost of living). Since we have panel data, we use a panel fixed effects estimation method, which accounts for all unobserved time-invariant regional heterogeneity.
Our results show that the level of per-student school financing does not significantly affect USE results. At the same time, we find a significant positive effect of relative teacher wages on USE results both in math and Russian language with the lag of one to two years. We find the same results on PISA data: individual student scores in math, reading and science are significantly positively affected by the level of the relative regional teacher wages. Our results hold in instrumental variable estimation, which we conduct in order to account for potential endogeneity problems.
What are the potential channels through which relative teacher wage may affect student results? One possible channel is self-selection of teachers. When teacher wages increase relative to other jobs, being a teacher become more attractive for higher skilled individuals. Higher skilled teachers help students to achieve better educational results. We cannot directly test this channel, as we do not have data on teacher turnover in Russian schools. Besides, we observe a positive effect of relative teacher wages on student scores with a lag of just one-two years. This seems to be a too short time period for teacher turnover to have a significant effect.
Another potential channel of the observed effect is an improvement in teacher motivation or teacher morale. We can only provide some suggestive evidence for this effect. In the early and mid-2000s, when teacher pay was quite low, a significant share of teachers were considering quitting their jobs or switching to another occupation. As teacher survey data show, after the significant increase in teacher pay in 2008–2012 this share declined and teacher motivation and job satisfaction improved. Additional evidence in support of this hypothesis comes from the school-level data in the PISA 2012 survey. We estimate the effect of relative regional school wage on teacher morale (as evaluated by a school head) and find a positive and statistically significant relationship.
Conclusion
We find that increasing school financing from the regional budgets per se does not noticeably improve educational results. Only when additional financing leads to an improvement of the position of teachers in the regional wage distribution, we observe higher educational outcomes for students. The potentially interesting future direction of research is to study how not just the relative size, but also the structure of teacher wages (i.e. elements of incentive pay introduced in Russian schools) affects educational outcomes.
References
- Amini, Chiara & Commander, Simon, 2012.”Educational Scores: How does Russia Fare?” Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 508-527.
- Britton, Jack and Carol Propper, 2016, Teacher pay and school productivity: Exploiting wage regulation, Journal of Public Economics 133 (2016) 75–89.
- Hanushek, Eric A., Marc Piopiunik, Simon Wiederhold, 2017, The Value of Smarter Teachers: International Evidence on Teacher Cognitive Skills and Student Performance, NBER Working Paper w20727.
- Lazareva, O. and A. Zakharov, 2018, School Financing, Teacher Wages and Educational Outcomes: Evidence from the Russian School System.
- Loeb, Susanna and Marianne E. Page, 2000, Examining the Link between Teacher Wages and Student Outcomes: The Importance of Alternative Labor Market Opportunities and Non-Pecuniary Variation, the Review of Economics and Statistics 2000 82:3, 393-408.
Individual Retirement Timing in Russia: Implications for Pension Age
This policy brief summarizes the findings in a paper where individual exit trajectories of Russians from the labor market to economic inactivity are examined using survival analysis methods based on the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey for 1995-2015. Among other results, the analysis shows that the statutory retirement age has a significant impact on the time of exit from the labor market for both men and women, but the effect is very high for women. This is an interesting and unexpected result, given no penalty for working beyond the pension age of those already retired, the five-year difference in statutory retirement age between males and females, and the low pension age in Russia on an international scale. This questions the painlessness of rising the retirement age for women, should the decision finally be taken.
An ageing population, combined with a slowdown in economic growth, challenges the Russian public finances with an increased deficit of the Pension fund. In addition, the persistently negative natural population growth against the backdrop of ageing has predetermined a decline in the working-age population in the foreseeable future. Older cohorts are therefore becoming a potentially attractive source to increase the size of the labor force. All this has actualized the discussion about the need to increase the Russian retirement age (see, for instance, Maleva and Sinyavskaya, 2010). However, little is known about the labor market situation of older age groups and, in particular, about the process of their exit from the labor market
The Russian pension system, unlike the pension systems of many developed countries, hardly penalizes continuation of work after reaching retirement age and documenting a pension (working pensioners lose only pension indexation). The changes in pension law that have entered into effect since 2015 encourage continued work without recourse to retirement, but there have been few responses to the innovation so far. Coupled with the low pension replacement rate (i.e., the proportion of wages substituted by pension), this makes the process of leaving the labor market nontrivial, since a large number of people of retirement age remain on the labor market after reaching retirement age.
Denisova (2017) examines individual exit trajectories of Russians from the labor market to pension-age economic inactivity applying survival analysis to the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS-HSE). The major research questions are the following: What determines the length of stay of older age groups in the Russian labor market? What is the role of the statutory retirement age in this process?
Data and research methodology
The RLMS-HSE for the period of over 20 years, from 1995 to 2015, is the empirical basis of the research (http://www.cpc.unc.edu/rlms). I limit the sample to age 45-72 as there is practically no retirement by age before age 45, and 72 years is the upper boundary of the working age definition internationally accepted by statisticians. I exclude from the sample those who are on retirement and did not work or seek work for the entire period of observation, since their decision to end working activity remained outside the observation period.
An episode in the survival analysis of exit from the labor market into pension-age inactivity is an episode of working life. The analytical time in this case is the age of the respondent. The failure event (the moment of exit from the labor market to pension-age economic inactivity) is defined by the simultaneous fulfillment of three conditions: the respondent does not work, does not look for a job, and receives retirement pension. Only the final exits from the labor market into inactivity are considered, while temporary exits are disregarded.
I evaluate proportional hazard models, which suggest that exogenous economic factors shift the baseline hazard function (which reflects the average entire sample hazard rate at each age) proportionally. A semi-parametric Cox model specification with robust errors clustered at individual level is used.
The vector of explanatory characteristics includes education; marital status; experience in the labor market (work at an enterprise with a state share; entrepreneurship versus work for wages); health characteristics (subjective and objective); settlement type; and attainment of statutory retirement age. In all cases, I control for the year of the survey.
Given the differences in the behavior of men and women in the labor market, the regression analysis is run separately for the subsamples of men and women. The statistical significance of the differences in returns to factors between men and women is tested based on the results of the full sample regression with interaction terms.
Averaged process of exit from the labor market
The averaged process of leaving the labor market pending on age is conveniently described through so-called Kaplan-Mayer’s survival function (an estimate of the survival process). As seen from Figure 1, the process of exit prior to age 55 for women and 60 for men is very slow, while the rate of exit becomes almost permanent and slows down after 70 years. Men stay in the labor market longer: 25% of women leave the labor market at the age of 58 years, whereas for men this age is 60. The threshold of 75% of the sample that left the labor market is reached in the sample of women by the age of 70, and 71 for men.
Determinants of exit
The analysis of older cohorts’ exit from the labor market via survival methods confirms important determinants of the process, previously identified in literature. The impacts of health and of financial incentives are in this group of results.
Figure 1. Survival functions, men and women
Source: Author’s calculations based on RLMS-HSE 1995-2015 data
Health status is the key factor for men’s exit into inactivity: the exit to inactivity is accelerated by 71 percentage points for males with bad health, whereas for women this factor is statistically irrelevant.
A higher per capita household income is correlated with later exit from the labor market. A higher income from the main place of employment has no statistically significant effect when we control for household income and is at an extended boundary (15%) of statistical significance if we do not. Both variables indirectly reflect the pension replacement rate, and I interpret the results as an indirect confirmation that workers at the top part of the income distribution, being inadequately insured by the pension system, remain on the labor market longer.
The identified peculiarities of the exit to pension-age inactivity of the Russian elderly are of major interest. Unlike many developed countries, only highly skilled persons remain in the labor market longer than others, while the behavior of middle-skilled groups, and skilled and unskilled workers does not statistically differ between them.
Employment at state-owned enterprises slows down women’s exit to inactivity but is not significant for men. Self-employment and entrepreneurship prolong the presence in the labor force, by 41 percentage points for women.
The regression analysis demonstrates that the statutory retirement age has a significant impact on the time of exit from the labor market for both men and women, and the effect is significantly higher for women: the hazard rate of inactivity rises by 63 percentage points when a woman reaches 55 years, and by 25% when a man reaches 60. For men, an effect comparable in size is the self-assessment of health as poor.
Discussion
The results, on the one hand, confirm those for developed countries: health status is the key factor for men’s exit into inactivity, and financial motives have a significant impact. At the same time, the peculiarities of the Russian labor market are reflected in a differing labor market exit process of various professional groups, in the sense that self-employment and entrepreneurship and work at state enterprises postpone exit into inactivity. The high sensitivity of women to the statutory retirement age, which by 2.5 times exceeds the sensitivity of men, is one of the new and unexpected results, taking into account that the statutory retirement age for women in Russia is very low by international standards. This questions the painlessness of rising the retirement age for women, should the decision finally be taken. Indeed, given the very low pension age for females, an (gradual) increase in the retirement age for women would seem not to raise strong objections. However, our result testifies that the normative border of the retirement age has a decisive influence on women’s choice of time of exit from the labor market, even under control (as far as data permits) on differences in education, situation in the labor market and family circumstances. In this situation, the process of rising the retirement age, if such a decision is taken, can be rather painfully accepted by those who so strongly focus on its current meaning in their life plans.
References
- Denisova, Irina, 2017, “Exit of senior age cohorts from the labor market: survival analysis approach” – forthcoming in Population and Economics.
- Maleva T.M., Sinyavskaya O.V., 2010 “Raising the retirement age: pro et contra, Journal of the New Economic Association, No. 8, pp. 117-139.
Russian Financial Markets, Pension Funds and ETFs
In this brief, I consider problems arising from the virtual non-existence of index funds and/or Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) in the Russian financial markets. While the Russian economy requires cheaper money for firms’ investments and better options for pensioners, there are almost no instruments that allow stocks for long-term value acquisition by the pension funds. I argue that more passive options and better representation of Russian stock indices may be beneficial for both the real economy and future pensioners.
Russian financial markets
In Russia, banks play a more important role in the economy than financial markets (see Danilov et al., 2017). Comparing the two, we observe bank assets to GDP ratio of about 100%, and financial markets to GDP of less than 45%. The current proportion of sources of corporate and household financing (2/3 of banks and 1/3 of financial markets), and the value of financial markets to GDP, is similar to Germany. However, the banking system in Russia is smaller and less stable. For example, it attracts passives that are very short-term, with average duration of less than 3 years.
One of the causes of the underdeveloped financial markets is the low amount of money in non-government pension funds, and the restrictive regulation that requires them to protect initial capital of future pensioners. This reduces the investment opportunity set of these pension funds, as volatile stocks are unattractive to them, and instead the funds mostly choose to invest in bonds. This is specific to the Russian market: for example, there are no such restrictions in the European approach (European Commission, 2017). However, both in developed countries and in emerging markets, stocks provide higher long-term returns than bonds. Thus, future pensioners in Russia lose on the upside, and the economy sticks to banks as the main source of investment.
The macro economy is also less effective due to the small financial markets. In the data (see Cournède et al., 2015), we see a positive correlation between the growth of outstanding stocks/bonds and the economic growth for low enough levels of total value of financial markets. While causality goes in both directions (higher GDP means need for more financial instruments), this is a compelling reason to develop financial markets.
Finally, people in Russia do not “believe” in stocks and bonds. If one compares the deposit rate in a bank with the yields of the same bank, the former is almost uniformly lower than the latter. Yet, even in the case of Sberbank, the largest bank in Russia, individuals prefer to keep their money in deposits or in foreign currency. This is a signal of low financial literacy, as well as of low income, or lack of trust; this is evident in many surveys (S&P, 2015).
Therefore, our research question is: what could be done to make the Russian market more attractive to domestic investors, and make them invest and save for pensions?
Indexing
There are many papers regarding diversification and investment opportunities of individual investors. As recent research shows (see Bessembinder, 2017), individual stocks are not good for investment even on US market. Namely, most stocks return less than Treasury bills at monthly horizons. Due to this property of financial markets, it is important that domestic investors have access to wide indices.
Moreover, Berk and Binsbergen (2015) demonstrate that active mutual funds generate as much of profits as they retain as fees. This means that individual investors are better off if they choose passive options, like index funds or Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs), as their main investment vehicle. Index funds and ETFs mostly invest in one index, say S&P500 of the 500 largest US stocks, and their explicit mandate is to stick to this index. Index funds can only be bought through a broker, while ETFs are traded on an exchange, like stocks. This makes them different in terms of possibility of active portfolio rebalancing. However, both are very passive by nature.
These arguments lead to the first conclusion: to improve investment opportunities of pension funds and individual investors, as well as the macroeconomic stability, the regulator might motivate institutional market participants to provide more passive, diversified, and stock-based portfolios.
ETFs and robo-advising in Russia
One way to increase the number of passive options is to allow more ETFs in Russian stock exchanges. As ETFs and their availability to investors have to be confirmed by the regulator (the Central Bank), one cannot immediately add new ETFs to the market. Index funds are another option. However, they have a long and sad history in the Russian market: most (about 95%) of the so-called “index funds” deviate from their benchmarks and do not follow indices. This has to do with the openness of the funds: while mutual funds and index funds have to report their stock/bond/cash holdings once a quarter, ETFs publish it daily. So one can check that ETFs follow their mandates with ease. Moreover, ETFs are usually cheaper and thus save returns for investors.
While existing ETFs on the Moscow Stock Exchange already cover a wide range of markets and even some sectors (including the Russian stock market, US S&P500, Europe and China), they are still too small in terms of assets under management (about $150 millions) and are issued by one company (FinEx). Currently, FinEx ETFs are almost the only option to invest passively, and to diversify, in the Russian market. At the same time, in most markets, index funds are marginally better saving/retirement/investment vehicle as they require less trading fees and thus save returns for low-income investors.
Regulators can facilitate the process of indexation in at least two following ways: (i) allow introduction of more index funds or ETFs in the market (requires regulator’s supervision and confirmation); and (ii) provide incentives to brokers and financial advisors to make them their first recommendation to individual investors and pension funds (as is done in the US, see BNY Mellon, 2016).
Another way to cater to low-income investors is robo-advising – an ongoing revolution in the financial markets. This tool allows investors to get wealth management advice for a small fee (about 0.15% in the best case), and it mostly invests in low-cost, passive ETFs that allow diversification of investments. While this is still new for Russia (and done by FinEx with partners from banks), it has become more widespread in developed markets. Assets under management with robo-advisors increase rapidly and now exceed $220 billions. This tool is useful for investors who are not financially literate, do not have economic or financial education, but still need good investment opportunities. In Russia, robo-advising may become a norm for so-called “non-qualified” investors – people with low enough savings and no educational certificates on financial markets. The regulator has not yet confirmed this, but we see many signs that it will go in this direction. One problem for this market is that it is still not official, and human financial advice is considered as a norm for non-qualified investors if they would like to expand their investment universe to say derivatives.
A big positive side of robo-advising is the reduction of human errors. As Richard Thaler, Nobel Prize winner of 2017, has persuasively shown in his research that humans make many judgement errors. These mistakes lead to lower returns on investment, too much trading that eats returns due to fees, and higher wealth inequality. Robo-advisers avoid all that and allow individual investors to save and invest more long-term.
The second conclusion is: regulators should help the financial industry to develop better robo-advising software that uses ETFs; use these robo-advisers as replacement for human advisers; and advertise this as the option for long-term investment, including pension funds.
Conclusion
Russian financial markets should provide more financial instruments to Russian firms and higher flexibility for investors. The Central Bank as the supervisor of financial markets, and the Ministry of Economic Development as the main government branch responsible for economic growth, may take additional steps to increase availability of passive investment options for Russian citizens. Reforms of incentives of brokerage firms might be needed, yet the ultimate goal is to improve well-being and pensions, and probably make good use of the money of long-term domestic investors. One possible option is to widen already existing ETFs market and allow individual investors to use robo-advising to invest in many instruments, even if these investors are not highly qualified or wealthy.
References
- Bessembinder, Hendrik, 2017. “Do Stocks Outperform Treasury Bills?”, Journal of Finance, Forthcoming. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2900447.
- Berk, Jonathan B. and Jules H. van Binsbergen, 2015. “Measuring skill in the mutual fund industry”, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 118, issue 1, 1-20. https://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeejfinec/v_3a118_3ay_3a2015_3ai_3a1_3ap_3a1-20.htm.
- BNY Mellon, 2016. “Accelerating Growth: The Department of Labor Conflict of Interest Rule and its Impact on the ETF Industry”, memo. https://www.bnymellon.com/_global-assets/pdf/our-thinking/accelerating-growth-the-dol-conflict-of-interest-rule.pdf
- Cournède, Boris; Oliver Denk, and Peter Hoeller, 2015. “Finance and Inclusive Growth”, OECD economic policy papers. http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/finance-and-inclusive-growth_5js06pbhf28s-en?crawler=true
- Danilov, Y.A.; A.E. Abramov and O.V. Buklemishev, 2017. “Reform of financial markets and non-banking financial sector” (in Russian), Policy report. https://csr.ru/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Report-Financial-markets-v2-web.pdf.
- European Commission, 2017. “Pan-European Personal Pension Product (PEPP)”, memo. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-1798_en.htm
- S&P Global Finlit Survey, 2015. http://gflec.org///initiatives/sp-global-finlit-survey/
Highlights for Commemoration of the 1917 Russian Revolution – Hints for Further Study
Professional historians in general have an ambivalent attitude towards anniversaries and commemorations of historical events, be they epochal or not. On the one hand, centennials and similar memorials may alleviate the funding of one’s research projects as the authorities likewise wish to highlight certain events. On the other hand, jubilee years can tend to divert historians from their ordinary research directions. Not for nothing would even frank scholars from Oxford, England complain in 2014 of the “tyranny of celebrations” and wish that nothing comparative to the centennial of the Great War 1914-1918 would appear soon.
In Russia, similar attitudes seem not to have appeared with respect to the centennial of the 1917 revolutions, the February and October revolution as traditionally called. In my April 2017 policy brief, I noted how universities all over Russia organized conferences devoted to various aspects of 1917. Many more publications have appeared as well as translations or new editions of classical works. Here I only hint at some accomplishments that may deserve to be studied for anyone who is genuinely interested in the historical debates in Russia.
This autumn, the leading institutes of the Academy of Sciences, the Institute for General History (IVI RAN) and the Institute for Russian History (IRI RAN) held their grand events with participation of leading scholars from the West, inter alia Hélène Carrère-d’Encausse and Alexander Rabinovich, to mention only a few. The IRI RAN presented its two-volume “The Russian revolution in 1917: The Power, Society, Culture” with the same emphasis as the main theme of the conference, i.e. how the historiography of the February and October revolution changed over time (see http://iriran.ru/?q=node/1699).
Western mass media and Russia observers in particular have during 2017, in my view, one-sidedly focused on how Kremlin would, or not, ‘celebrate’, ‘commemorate’, or even ‘want to forget’ the epochal events in Russia one hundred years ago. In contrast to other anniversaries, the 200th of Napoleon’s war on Russia or the 100th of the First World War, the highest political spheres have, as it seems for good reasons, left the information sphere quite free for the professional historians, film and TV producers, and others to commemorate at their own behest the 1917 revolution.
One important source of information about the commemoration of the 1917 Russian Revolution is the book published by AIRO-XXI, Association for the Study of Russian History in the 21th Century, led by the renowned historiographer Gennadyi Bordiugov. Just as for the anniversaries of the Victory in World War Two (in 2005 and 2015), Bordiugov and his colleagues in AIRO-XXI started a huge monitoring project in late 2016 in order to follow how various groups and centres all over Russia, as well as in major Western countries, were to commemorate the 1917 Russian revolution. The monitoring is by now complete and the result is the mighty book “Revolution-100. A Reconstruction of the Jubilee” (http://www.airo-xxi.ru/-2017-/2395–100-). This will for a long time serve as the best introduction to how Russia – in the broadest terms – comes to grips with the jubilee. The first articles give the background – how the October revolution was celebrated in the Soviet era and the major changes in the post-1991 Russia. Several contributions give the present-day context – how parallels are drawn between contemporary events in Russia and abroad, on the one hand, and the Russian revolution, on the other hand. The virtual sphere today, the Internet and blogosphere take up a much more important space for the younger generation than books and encyclopaedias; therefore the monitoring project also includes surveys of which aspects of the revolution are treated therein.
In contrast to what originally was set as leitmotiv for the commemoration – a reconciliation among groups and personalities with divided approaches to the Bolshevik takeover in particular and the Soviet experiment in general, most publications, exhibitions and meetings that the AIRO-XXI have monitored show that the epochal historical cataclysms one hundred years ago still are as divisive as before. The great contrast is that disputes are formalized and fact-based, that arguments from any side are given due consideration, and that most accept the device that “there is no final truth in history, merely arguments without end”.
The AIRO-XXI monitoring also treats the cinema, television and Internet series that were shown in connection with the jubilee. Much media interest was connected with the protests from the Orthodox Church against the film “Matilda” as it allegedly defamed the last tsar Nikolai II for showing his love affair in the 1890s with a prima ballerina. The artistic freedom finally triumphed and the debates only slightly influenced the mass of cinemagoers. We can also note that Russian television channels have sent pedagogical and dramatic series on some of the major figures of the revolution. One on the mythical Aleksandr Parvus (Helphand) with his views on revolutionizing Russia during the war, even with the help of the German General Staff; the other on Leo Trotskii as people’s commissar of war from 1918. These series and many others are vividly described in the AIRO-XXI volume by the philologist Boris Sokolov, who clearly presents where historical facts might have been twisted for the sake of art.
Mention should finally be made, for those who wish to follow how Russia’s leading professional historians analyse the revolution, that many lectures given at universities during 2017 are available at YouTube. Suffice it here to mention Vladimir Buldakov (for his books, see my previous policy brief), who since the 1980s researched the Russian revolutions and presented his main theses in “Krasnaya Smuta” (Red Troubled times). In 2017, he has lectured on this theme for various audiences (compare https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SG9T3H55Hrk;https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JnRXgCqGBrg; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9UPYYBnYow8)
To appreciate how an academic discussion on the ‘Great Russian Revolution ‘ – as many scholars today prefer to treat the events in 1917 – at its best can deepen our understanding, it is well worth pondering the arguments by renowned historians Aleksandr Shubin, Aleksandr Vatlin, Tatiana Nekrasova, Gennadii Bordiugov and Vladimir Pantin in the Kultura Channel program series “Chto delat?” (What is to be done) (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KQF0o8adIDw). Although each of the specialists had their own interpretations and various approaches, the mentor Vitalii Tretiakov, well-known journalist and formerly chief-editor of “Nezavisimaya Gazeta, managed to step-by-step highlight the issues that have divided historians in the past, as well as such matters that will call for renewed research.
In early 2017, some hoped that commemorative arrangements on the 1917 revolution would lead towards reconciliation between those opposing groups who still reason and argue as one or the other political parties of that era, between those who sympathized with the socialists in general and/or the Bolsheviks in particular, on the one hand, and those who ideologically has more affinity with the Liberal, Conservative or Monarchist groups, on the other hand. While such reconciliation is not yet in sight, the many articles in mass media, museum exhibitions and TV series have definitely heightened the older generations’ understanding of the very complex, intricate nature of the political, social and military forces that first led to the dissolution of tsarism, their fact-based knowledge of the tentative to establish a full democratic country even in the framework of the world war, and finally to a better grasp – than the standard Soviet orthodox narratives – of why and how the seemingly minuscular Bolshevik party could successfully grasp power in November 1917 and in the end also triumph in the devastating civil war.
It goes without saying that for school teachers all over Russia, the commemorative arrangements have provided a golden opportunity to engage their pupils and students in various forms of so-called living history, i.e. combining the state’s grand story with the localities’ and the families’ own histories.
On Economics of Innovation Subsidies in Russia
Following the general agreement that innovation is a source of economic growth, the Russian government has provided various stimuli to foster domestic innovation. One of the mechanisms of innovation policy is research subsidies. This policy brief starts off with a discussion of the theoretical predictions and empirical evidence, which relates the economic incentives of research subsides to innovation and growth. We then address the potential adverse effects of focusing innovation subsidies mainly on large public companies in Russia. Finally, we attempt to establish a link between the innovation rate and market competition within Russian industries.
Overview
According to data from the Russian Statistical Agency, the R&D intensity – measured by R&D expenditure as percent of sales – increases with company size. Companies with 50 to 500 employees spend 1% of their sales on R&D, while the R&D intensity varies from 2 to 5% of sales for larger businesses (see Figure 1). The size non-neutrality of R&D in Russia contradicts the findings in the theoretical and empirical literature, which hold for companies in the developed countries (Cohen, 2010). An explanation may be the excessive government support to public companies in Russia, and in particular, to larger public corporations. A positive consequence of such policies is that public corporations come ahead of private companies, not only in R&D intensity, but also in innovation rates (see Figures 2–3).
However, government support towards innovation does not necessarily have a positive impact on overall economic activity. The purpose of this brief is to discuss the unwanted effects of the government policy in the form of research subsidies, both in theory and in an application to public companies and corporations in Russia. We base our analysis on the outcomes of the 2014–2017 micro surveys by the Analytical Center under the Government of the Russian Federation.
The role of government
Fighting under-provision of innovation
According to the seminal paradigm of the endogenous growth models with technological change, companies are engaged in quality competition, and their innovations are explained by a rational decision to raise profits through expanding the markets for existing products or entering markets for new products (Schumpeter, 1942; Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Kletter and Kortum, 2004). The innovation becomes one of the causes of economic growth, which is proved in empirical applications for developed countries, such as the U.S., Japan and the Netherlands (Akcigit and Kerr, 2010; Lentz and Mortensen, 2008; Grossman, 1990).
Figure 1. Innovation rate and R&D intensity by company size (number of employees)
Source: Indicators of Innovation in the Russian Federation: 2017. Tables 2.4, 2.16, Data for 2015. Innovative rate is % of companies involved in innovative activity.
However, the technological change is closely linked to knowledge disclosure, which means that new products become vulnerable to imitation, and that the non-rival character of knowledge causes an under-provision of innovation on the market (Arrow, 1962). The argument supports the cause for government policies through the system of intellectual property rights on the legal side, and research subsidies as an economic mechanism (Rockett, 2010; Hall and Lerner, 2010). Research subsidies are expected to have a positive effect on innovation rate, as is empirically shown for the U.S. in Acemoglu et al. (2016) and Wilson (2009). However, the impact on economic growth is ambiguous (Acemoglu et al., 2013; Grossman, 1990).
Figure 2. Innovation rate and R&D intensity by ownership
Source: Indicators of Innovation in the Russian Federation: 2017. Tables 2.6, 2.17, Data for 2015, public corporations are different from organizations by regional/federal government.
Figure 3. Share of public funds in R&D financing, % of company budget
Notes: Indicators of Innovation in the Russian Federation: 2017. Table 1.13; Innovation Development Programmes of Russian State-Owned Companies, Fig.4.
Unwanted effects of subsidies
Two concerns are associated with subsidization of innovation. First, while research subsidies may stimulate innovation among the targeted companies, the growth effect is likely to be heterogeneous across companies in the industry or economy, leading to a neutral or even negative overall effect. For instance, the increased innovation rate in subsidized large incumbents may curb entry of new (and more productive) firms, so the net outcome is deceleration of growth in the economy (Acemoglu et al., 2013). Research subsidies may even cause a shrinking of the high-tech sectors: if skilled labor moves from manufacturing to research labs, manufacturing may experience a shortage of labor, resulting in the net effect being a decrease in production (Grossman, 1990).
Another extreme of subsidizing entrants, in view of antitrust policies, occurs when former entrants change their market status to incumbents: now they face lower profits relative to newer entrants and hence, become less incentivized in their economic activity (Segal and Whinston, 2007).
Second, innovation policy (for instance, in the form of subsidies) may sometimes not even increase the innovation rate. Indeed, incumbents have no incentives to innovate in order to keep their market power or to prevent entry of higher quality firms in industries with non-perfect competition (Rockett, 2010; Qian, 2007).
Both mechanisms are likely to hold for Russian industries, where the protection of large public corporations has led to low competition, various forms of distortions on the market and hence, weak incentives to innovate.
Potential adverse effects in Russia
Large companies are likely to attract public attention owing to their obvious advantages in spreading fixed costs of innovations (Cohen,
2010). Russia is no exception to the phenomenon, so public corporations, which are commonly of a large size, received government subsidies. However, the subsidy is primarily used for acquiring new technologies and perfecting design, rather than conducting R&D (See Figure 4 with comparison available for communications and IT industry). The fact points to a possibility of a small effect of innovations on growth of public companies. Only if the research subsidy is spent on delegating the R&D research to specialized firms, with a subsequent acquiring of the resulting technology, the existing policy of supporting public corporations may induce their growth and/or growth of the corresponding industry.
Figure 4. Structure of spending the research subsidy in communications and IT in 2013, %
Notes: Indicators of Innovation in the Russian Federation: 2017. Table 1.134 Innovation Development Programmes of Russian State-Owned Companies, Fig.3.
In an attempt to formally assess the effect of innovation subsidies on company growth, we focus on the time profiles of the common proxies for company size: sales, profits and employment (Akcigit et al., 2017; Akcigit and Kerr, 2010; Acemoglu et al., 2013). The macroeconomic literature predicts that innovation becomes one of the channels for an increase of each of the three variables through a rise in quality. Motivated by this literature, the micro-data analysis “On the Interaction of the Elements of the Innovation Infrastructure”, conducted by the Analytical Center under the Government of the Russian Federation (2014), asked companies to assess their changes in sales, profits and employment in response to the innovation subsidy. As a result, the outcomes of the above analysis allow for a comparative assessment of the impact of the government’s innovation subsidy for public and private companies.
In particular, the results point to higher growth across private companies owing to research subsidies: the percent of private companies with new employees is higher than that of public companies. Similarly, the percentage of private companies that increased market share or raised profits/export due to subsidies exceed those of the public companies (see Figure 5). Here, we interpret new hires as employment growth and increase of market share as a potential indicator of sales growth.
Figure 5. Economic activity owing to research subsidies, % of companies
Source: Analytical Center under the Government of the Russian Federation, 2014. Fig.22
The innovation activity in private Russian companies lead to a higher prevalence of new products in comparison with public companies. The fact goes in line with a more important role of research and development in the innovative activity of private Russian companies (see Figure 4).
Finally, we attempt to establish a link between the innovation rate and market competition at the level of Russian industries. For this purpose, we use the results of the annual surveys “An assessment of the competitiveness in Russia”, conducted in 2015–2017 by the Analytical Center across 650–1500 companies from 84 Russian regions. The respondents were asked if they implemented R&D as a strategy for raising their competitiveness. We use the percentage of firms doing R&D as a proxy for the innovation rate. Competition in the industry was evaluated by respondents on a five-point scale (no competition, weak, median, high and very high), and we combine the prevalence of the two top categories as a proxy for competition in the industry.
Figure 6. Competition and R&D in Russian industries, % of firms
Source: Analytical Center under the Government of the Russian Federation, 2017, pp.8, 18.
The results show that innovative activity in the form of R&D or product modification is observed in industries with relatively high competition in Russia – for instance, in machinery and electric/electronic equipment (Figure 6). At the same time, industries where competition is not as high (e.g. woodworking, construction) show absence of either type of innovation. The findings go in line with the economic theory about market competition being a prerequisite for the rational choice of companies about innovation. Moreover, if the purpose of government subsidies is to foster innovation, the effective allocation of subsidies would imply the focus on Russian industries with high competition – here various forms of innovation do play a role in the company strategy on the market.
Conclusion
Our analysis outlines the theoretical foundations for the potential adverse effects of innovation policies in the form of research subsidies. The unwanted outcomes may relate to heterogeneity of companies and absence of the association between innovation activity and growth on non-competitive markets.
We offer the empirical evidence, which points to the undesired effects of subsidizing public companies in Russia. For instance, compared to the overall Russian sector of communications and IT, the innovative activity in public corporations has a weaker association with research and development. Additionally, compared to private companies, the innovations may result in smaller prevalence of increased exports, profits or new hires, as well as in a less frequent development of new products by public companies in Russia.
References
- Acemoglu, D., Akcigit, U., Bloom, N., Kerr, W. R., 2013. “Innovation, reallocation and growth”, National Bureau of Economic Research Working paper, No. 18993.
- Acemoglu, D., Akcigit, U., Hanley, D., Kerr, W. (2016). Transition to clean technology. Journal of Political Economy, Volume 124(1), pages 52-104.
- Akcigit, U., Kerr, W. R., 2010. “Growth through heterogeneous innovations” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, No. 16443.
- Analytical Center under the Government of the Russian Federation, 2014. “On the Interaction of the Elements of the Innovation Infrastructure”, Analytical report, in Russian.
- Analytical Center under the Government of the Russian Federation, 2015-2017. “An Assessment of the Competitiveness in Russia”, Analytical reports, in Russian.
- Arrow, K., 1962. “Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention”, In The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Ssocial Factors, Princeton University Press, pages 609-626.
- Cohen, W. M., 2010. “Fifty years of empirical studies of innovative activity and performance”, Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, Volume 1, pages 129-213.
- Grossman, G. M., Helpman, E., 1991. “Quality ladders in the theory of growth”, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 58(1), pages 43-61.
- Grossman, G.M., 1990. ”Explaining Japan’s innovation and trade”, BOJ Monetary and Economic Studies, Volume 8(2), pages 75-100.
- Hall, B. H., Lerner, J., 2010. “The financing of R&D and innovation”, Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, Volume 1, pages 609-639.
- Indicators of Innovation in the Russian Federation: 2017. N. Gorodnikova, L. Gokhberg, K. Ditkovskiy et al.; National Research University Higher School of Economics, in Russian.
- Innovation Development Programmes of Russian State-Owned Companies: Interim Results and Priorities, 2015. M. Gershman, T. Zinina, M. Romanov et al.; L. Gokhberg, A. Klepach, P. Rudnik et al. (eds.), National Research University Higher School of Economics, in Russian.
- Klette, T. J., Kortum, S., 2004. “Innovating firms and aggregate innovation”, Journal of Political Economy, Volume 112(5), pages 986-1018.
- Lentz, R., Mortensen, D.T., 2008. “An empirical model of growth through product innovation”, Econometrica, Volume 76(6), pages 1317–1373.
- Qian, Y., 2007. “Do national patent laws stimulate domestic innovation in a global patenting environment? A cross-country analysis of pharmaceutical patent protection, 1978–2002”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Volume 89(3), pages 436-453.
- Rockett, K., 2010. “Property rights and invention”, Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, Volume 1, pages 315-380.
- Romer, P. M. (1990). Endogenous technological change. Journal of political Economy, 98(5, Part 2), S71-S102.
- Segal, I., Whinston, M.D., 2007. “Antitrust in innovative industries”, American Economic Review, Volume 97(5), pages 1703-1730.
- Schumpeter, J., 1942. “Creative destruction”, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, pages 82-83.
- Wilson, D. J., 2009. Beggar thy neighbor? The in-state, out-of-state, and aggregate effects of R&D tax credits. The Review of Economics and Statistics, Volume 91(2), pages 431-436.
Intergenerational Mobility of Russian Households
To understand the nature of income inequality one needs to know how persistent the inequality is across generations. The same inequality levels could conceal different intergenerational mobility. We utilize the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS-HSE) to find out how large intergenerational mobility in Russia is as measured by income, educational and occupational mobility. We find that although a sizeable upward intergenerational educational mobility, there is a pronounced occupational immobility and a low level of intergenerational income mobility. Indeed, the position of children in the income distribution is highly correlated with the income position of their parents, especially their mothers.
Sizeable and non-decreasing inequality in Russia poses a threat to social stability and long-term sustainability. Inequality in Russia has remained high throughout the transition period, and even slightly increased in the 2000s; the Gini inequality index rose from 0.397 in 2001 to 0.416 in 2014. The ratio of average incomes of the highest decile to those of the lowest decile also increased from 13.9 to 16 during this same period. This income gap is driven primarily by the gap between incomes of the top decile and all of the others: the top decile is estimated to have thirty percent of total monetary income in the economy. Furthermore, income inequality originates in earnings inequality: the top decile of wage earners gets thirty five percent of total wage earnings in the economy.
A key question is how persistent the inequality is, given that the same inequality levels could conceal different intergenerational mobility. In particular, social stability is challenged when income inequality is stable across generations, or put differently; there is little intergenerational mobility. Economic developments of the last 25 years seem to increase the risks of getting this problem in Russia.
Data and research methodology
We employ Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS-HSE) to find out how large intergenerational mobility in Russia is as measured by income, educational and occupational mobility (Denisova and Kartseva, 2016). The RLMS-HSE questionnaires in 2006 and 2011 contain questions on dates of birth, education and occupation of the father and mother of the respondent when the respondent was 15 years old.
To study occupational and educational mobility, we use the subsample of respondents of 25-55 years old and utilize the information on education and occupation of the respondent and his/her parents. We then estimate whether the parental education level predicts the probability that children have a university degree, a secondary or a junior professional degree.
To study intergenerational occupational mobility, we estimate influence of parental occupation on the probability that the child works as a manager, a professional, a technician or professional associate, a clerk, a qualified worker or an unskilled worker.
To study the child-parent income correlation based on RLMS is trickier. There is a panel component in RLMS but it is not long enough to study intergenerational mobility directly since we for most cases are not able to observe both parents and children during their working ages. To overcome the problem we impute wages for parents. In particular, we choose respondents aged 25-35 (children) in 2006 (and 2011). We then identify respondents born in the period 1945-1961 (1945-1966 for children in 2001) (‘parents’) and use the labor market information for this group as of 1995 (2001 as robustness check) to impute parental wages. We estimate a wage equation (separately for males and females) on the sample of ‘parents’ and then use the estimated returns (coefficients) and the reported age and education of respondent’s mother and father to impute wages of respondent’s parents.
We follow Björklund and Jantti (1997) to estimate the child-parent correlation of earnings based on the equation:
delta= β0 + β1X+ β2 delta_father + β3 delta_mother + ε
where delta=log(wage/average wage in respective sample), X – age, education, settlement type, region. Standard errors are clustered on primary sampling unit.
Intergenerational educational mobility
Our analysis shows that the education of parents, high professional (university) and secondary professional in particular, is a major determinant of children’s education. Moreover, there are clear signs of upward educational mobility across generations for both males and females: the coefficients in the transition parent-child matrix are significantly higher above the diagonal (Table 1).
Table 1. Father-child education matrix
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RLMS
The probability to have a university degree is 2.4 percentage points higher if the mother’s education is at university level (as compared to secondary school), and 2.1 percentage points higher if the father’s degree is at university level (as compared to secondary school). A secondary professional degree of parents also increases the probability of a child getting a university degree by about 1 percentage point. The probability of having secondary professional degree decreases if the father or mother has a university degree.
Intergenerational correlation of occupations
There are signs of sizeable occupational rigidity between generations, especially for the top two occupational groups (managers and professionals). The probability that a child works in the same occupational group is the highest for parents-professionals: it is 40% for fathers-professionals and 35% for mothers-professionals. Surprisingly, it is also rather high for parents employed as skilled workers – about 20%. These patterns survive controlling for other variables.
Income mobility
The correlation of parent-child wages measured for 2006 data are presented in Table 2. The results point to the sizeable average intergenerational rigidity of relative wages: the wage elasticity of children’s wages with respect to parental wages is about 0.4. This is at the level of the intergenerational wage rigidity in the US (Solon 1999).
There is sizeable gender asymmetry in the rigidity: we observe a high and significant correlation of son-mother wages, but an insignificant correlation of son-father wages. There is no significant correlation of daughter-parents wages.
Table 2. Parent-child income correlations, 2006
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RLMS
Conclusion
Generational poverty stemming from low intergenerational income mobility is a threat for sustainable development in any country. The economic and social development in transition seems to increase the risks of having this problem in Russia. Our estimates show that although there is sizeable upward intergenerational educational mobility in Russia, there is a pronounced occupational immobility, and low level of intergenerational income mobility. Indeed, the position of children in the income distribution is highly correlated with the income position of their parents, especially mothers. These findings are worrisome signals important for the design of policies of sustainable development.
References
- Björklund, Anders; and Markus Jantti, 1997. “Intergenerational Income Mobility in Sweden Compared to the United States,” American Economic Review, 87(5), 1009–18.
- Denisova, Irina; and Marina Kartseva, 2016, “Intergenerational Mobility of Russian Households”, mimeo
- Solon, Gary, 1999. “Intergenerational Mobility on the Labor Market,” Chapter 29 in Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol.3 edited by O.Ashenfelter and D.Card , 1761-1800.
To Commemorate the 1917 Revolution in Russia – Occasions More for Reflections than for Celebrations
The centennial of the 1917 revolution in Russia provide opportunities for the public to refresh knowledge of the tumultuous events that dramatically changed the country’s history. Conferences, television series and debates, exhibitions at historical and art museums are some of the activities that will illuminate the February and October revolutions in 1917. The complex, intertwined and contradictory historical process and the following tragic Civil war 1918 – 1922 calls for careful, objective and dispassionate approaches and evaluations.
Over the last years, Russia has officially sponsored or encouraged great historical commemorations, e.g. the bicentennial of the war against Napoleon in 1812 and the centenary of the outbreak of the First World War. In contrast, this year’s commemoration of the 1917 revolution(s) in Russia – the first in February and the other in October (old style calendar) – pose a whole range of difficult questions. In the contemporary school curriculum in Russia, the most often used concept is ‘the Great 1917 Revolution in Russia’, thereby avoiding the previous, inappropriately counter posed February vs. October revolution. Instead, emphasis shifts to a continuous spectrum of revolutionary processes on different levels of the state and in various social groups throughout 1917. Likewise, this concept captures the multi-ethnic character of the revolution better than ‘the Russian revolution’.
In this brief, I outline the expected results from professional historians and archivists, by academic institutions and museums. In a forthcoming study of recent Russian historiographic debates (Samuelson, 2018), I intend to analyze also the changing official assessments of the 1917 revolutions.
In the Soviet era until the glasnost in the late 1980s, party-controlled historians described the ‘Great Socialist October revolution’ tendentiously, with many obfuscations and ‘white spots’. Not only were the opponents of the Bolsheviks depicted in caricature forms; also, the later oppositionists to Stalin’s party line were eliminated from the 1917 history, or mentioned merely for the alleged mistakes. In the West, on the other hand, there existed a plethora of interpretations of the Russian revolution, reflecting ideologies and worldviews of liberals, conservatives, as well as exiled Russian politicians (see e.g. Mazour, 1971 or Laqueur, 1967).
In the decades since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian historians have profoundly enriched our knowledge of the 1917 revolutionary process as well as the ensuing Civil war. ‘Un-persons’ like Lev Trotsky, and hundreds of other who were expelled later from the Communist party, got back their due place in history. Works have been published of monarchists, liberals and socialists who led the Provisional governments during 1917. Historical studies by exiled scholars, as well as memoirs by politicians and diplomats that were once published in the West, have now been reprinted by Russian publishing companies (for the best survey, see Gennadyi Bordiugov, 2013 (1,520 pages!!)).
In today’s Russia, there co-exist an abundance of interpretations and assessments of the 1917 revolutions. The February strikes and uprising in Petrograd triggered the abdication of tsar Nikolay II, led to the founding of a republic and the formation of new government. The revolutionary changes outside the capital, throughout the whole empire, took quite different forms and only in recent years, regional scholars could describe them objectively.
Naturally, the fundamental changes in the political landscape in Russia after the return from exile of Vladimir Lenin in spring 1917 have attracted interest by scholars. Solid biographies of Lenin by Dmitrii Volgogonov (1994), Vladlen Loginov(2017), Anatolii Latyshev(1996) and Elena Kotelenets(2017), to mention only a few, give the Russian public a more nuanced figure than the more hagiographic works published in the Soviet epoch. The British historian Catherine Merridale (2016) gives a fascinating narrative of how Lenin’s return from exile in Switzerland would completely change the perspectives of the revolution. The renowned Russian specialist Vladimir Buldakov wrote profound reinterpretations of the ‘Red Troubled times’ (Krasnaya smuta) of 1917 in the first of a series of path-breaking research in the central and regional archives (Buldakov 2010, 2015).
As we approached the centennial of this decisive and deeply divisive year in Russia’s long history, many observers wondered how it was to be officially observed. Just like similar jubilee years, for example in 1989 of the French Revolution, it seemed obvious that this was not a time for triumphant celebrations as had been the case of the annual October Revolution holiday (on 7th November, new calendar) in the Soviet era. On the other hand, it would equally be unfortunate to pass over in silence this eventful revolutionary year. So by support from the Ministry of Culture, the Russian Historical Society (abbrev. RIO) set up a vast program of conferences, round tables, exhibitions and publications. Universities all over the Russian Federation will organize gatherings for historians and students. Central and regional archives arrange exhibitions, the explicit purpose of which is, not to give any definite value judgments, but to let the public form their own views on the personalities by pondering over original documents on Tsar Nikolai II and the tsarist family, the politicians of various parties, as well as on Lenin, Bolsheviks and others of the Left.
The call from the Russian political leaders has been to strive for a balanced, as dispassionate as possible, reassessment of the 1917 revolution in Russia. The ensuing civil war 1918–1922 created a generation-long, deep division among Russians, inside the country and in exile. Just as was the case in other countries, e.g. Finland and Spain, where civil wars scarred the national fabric in the 20th century, at present, the goal should be for reconciliation and mutual understanding of the historical actors on all sides of the political spectrum.
This spring, the Siberian branch of the Academy of Sciences in Novosibirsk organized a round-table on the 1917 revolution. Dozens of scholars presented their research findings and opinions on various events in the region; the protocol’s understatement that “the discussions had often a polemical character” indicate that the Russian revolution is still a subject of hot controversies, even in academic circles. On 29–31 March, the Moscow State University arranged the first of several grand international conferences planned this year. In twenty sessions, hundreds of scholars from all over Russia and from foreign countries gave papers on widely different aspects of the revolutionary processes. Likewise, universities in Samara, Volgograd, Cheliabinsk and other cities have announced their forthcoming conferences on the 1917 Revolution.
The main depository of political archives, RGASPI, in Moscow has contributed over 800 archival documents to a special exhibition, ‘1917. The Code of the Revolution’ at the Central Museum of Contemporary Political History. (https://www.sovrhistory.ru/events/exhibition/58becc2aa0e5981d9da515c4, accessed 31.03 2017). Two grand exhibitions projects with less-known archival documents attempt to give new perspectives, first, on Tsar Nikolai II, and, later this year, on Vladimir Lenin; both are of course well-known personalities, but the archivists and museums’ commissars hope to inspire visitors to renew their perspectives. In St. Petersburg, besides conferences, round-tables and exhibitions, there will be theatrical performances to reproduce dramatic events of 1917 and precisely on the streets and squares where they once upon a time took place. Russian Internet sites will provide pieces of contemporary news from 1917 for each day (https://project1917.com/).
Publishing houses have started new series devoted to the 1917 revolution in Russia, and the shelves in bookshops give abundant ‘food for thought’ for eager readers. Here one can find not only Trotsky’s own renowned History of the Russian Revolution written in his exile in the USSR. There are also memoirs by officers in the White Army during the Civil war, and a multitude of new popular-history works that reflect today’s ‘lessons of history’. The leading publishing company Rosspen will edit an archival documentary series, and compile an encyclopedia on the 1917 Revolution, thus hopefully summing up what has been accomplished in the former states of the USSR concerning the dramatic year of 1917 that was to profoundly change not only the country’s history, but even global history for many years ahead.
References
- Dmitrii Volkogonov, Lenin: A New Biography, New York, 1994;
- Vladlen Loginov, Lenin: How to become a leader, Glasgow 2017;
- Anatolii Latyshev, Rassekrechennyi Lenin (The declassified Lenin), Moscow 1996;
- Elena Kotelenets, Bitva za Lenina. Noveishie issledovaniia i diskussii (The Fight over Lenin: Recent research and discussions), Moscow 2017.
- Catherine Merridale, Lenin on the train (Swedish edition Lenins resa: Vägen till revolutionen 1917), London 2016.
- Vladimir Buldakov, Krasnaya smuta: Priroda i posledstviia revoljutsionnogo nasiliya (The Red Troubled Times: The nature and consequences of revolutionary violence), Moscow 2010;
- Vladimir Buldakov, Voina, porodivshaia revoliutsiiu (The War that brought along the revolution), Moscow 2015.
- Lennart Samuelson, Sovjetepoken i backspegeln.The Soviet Epoch in the Rear-view Mirror’, forthcoming in 2018
- Anatole G. Mazour, The Writing of History in the Soviet Union, Stanford: Hoover University Press, 1971;
- Walter Laqueur, The Fate of the Revolution: Interpretations of Soviet History from 1917 to the Present, London: Macmillan, 1967.
- Gennadyi Bordiugov (ed.), Mezhdu kanunami: Istoricheskie issledovaniia v Rossii za poslednie 25 let, Moscow: AIRO-XXI, 2013
The photograph to this policy brief shows Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin and other Russian exiles in Stockholm, 13 April 1917, on their way from Switzerland, to change the course of the Russian Revolution and world history of the 20th century. Social democrat Ture Nerman is talking with Lenin (4th from right, with umbrella).; behind them – mayor Carl Lindhagen and Aleksandra Kollontay, radical feminist who spent World War One here and in the 1930s to return to Stockholm as ambassador of the USSR.
Note: This Swedish photograph is in the public domain in Sweden because one of the following applies: (i) The work is non-artistic (journalistic, etc.) and has been created before 1969, (ii) The photographer is not known, and cannot be traced, and the work has been created before 1944.
Too High or Too Low? The Pros and Cons of Regulating the Reserve Price in Public Procurement in Russia
In theory, an optimally set reserve price leads to an optimal outcome in all standard auctions. In reality, however, it is difficult to identify the optimal reserve price. In public procurement auctions, a higher reserve price may lead to a higher competition for the contract, because more suppliers will find the contract profitable. Thereby a higher reserve price may lead to lower prices. But on the other hand, if competition in the market is already quite low or the risk of collusion is high, a higher reserve price will just lead to higher contract prices. The controlling bodies in Russia become suspicious when the reserve price in public procurement auctions is too low because they are afraid it is a sign of collusion between the procurer and the seller. Indeed it may be the case that the reserve price is set low to exclude other sellers from competing, thus acting against efficiency. Using data on public procurement of gasoline in 11 Russian regions in 2011-2013, we show that a higher reserve price did not lead to lower contract prices, and that low competition in the private market was a major obstacle to efficiency.
Why is the reserve price important?
The reserve price is widely discussed in the auction and procurement literature. Standard auction theory says that an optimally set public reserve price results in the optimal outcome in all standard forms of auctions with risk-neutral agents and independent private values (Myerson, 1981). But practice is far from pure theory. The procurer does not have all information to set the optimal price and this leads to losses in social welfare (Klemperer, 2004; Dimitri et al, 2006).
There are several concerns for a practitioner here. First, there is the question of whether the reserve price should be known to everybody in advance (Dimitri et al, 2006; Brisset et al, 2015; Eklof&Lunander, 2003). Second, the reserve price influences the entry decision and competition for the contract (Klemperer, 2004; Krishna, 2009; Wang, 2016). Generally, a higher reserve price may lead to higher competition for the contract, because more suppliers will find that contract profitable, which may in turn lead to lower prices. But on the other hand, if there is a high probability of collusion in the market, a higher reserve price will just lead to higher contract prices due to coordinated behavior of the potential sellers (Wang, 2016). The procurer could use lower reserve prices to decrease gains from collusion (Krishna, 2009), but in a corrupt environment a lower reserve price is treated as an instrument to restrict entry for the favor of preferred bidders in exchange for bribe (Guide to Combating Corruption & Fraud in Development Projects).
Hence, there are various arguments for and against setting the reserve price in public procurement auctions higher rather than lower. We are interested in showing which of them hold true in practice, or in other words, do higher reserve prices lead to lower contract prices in public procurement auctions?
In Russian public procurement, the reserve price in an auction is set by the procurer and is visible to everybody. Moreover, before April 2011, procurers were free to set the reserve price, and they could easily set it unreasonably high, and then share the surplus with a seller. Starting from April 2011, procurers are obliged to prove that the reserve price is set at a reasonable level. In the explanations to the Law from Ministries of Economy and Finance, there are recommendations to set the reserve price higher rather than lower. Regulators are much more afraid of corruption than a high price of the contract.
Using data on public procurement of gasoline in 11 Russian regions in 2011-2013, we show that a higher reserve price did not lead to lower contract prices, and that low competition in the private market was a major obstacle to efficiency.
How does public procurement of gasoline work in Russia?
To make it clear how auctions in Russia are held, we will now present some details on Russian public procurement of gasoline.
First, the public procurement law is the same for all Russian regions. Second, the detailed information on public procurements – including calls for bids, chosen procedure, auction protocols, and supporting technical documentation – is published online at a unified website. If the reserve price is below 500000 rubles, public buyers of gasoline may choose between sealed-bid “paper” auctions and open-bid electronic auctions. If the reserve price is above 500000 rubles, they should use open electronic auctions.
To set the reserve price, a procurer may ask a few firms to provide estimates of an expected price of the contract at which they would agree to sign the contract. Alternatively, procurers may search for price information on the Internet or in other open sources on prices of goods and services (some gasoline stations publish its prices online, e.g.). The reserve price may then be calculated on the basis of these prices.
The procedures start when a procurer publishes the call for bids, stating basic characteristics of the contract and the reserve price. In sealed-bid auctions the bidders send their price quotations and the supporting documents. The bids are opened simultaneously, and the lowest bid (or the earliest bid in case where two or more equal prices are announced) wins. Open-bid auctions are conducted in two stages. By the first deadline all perspective bidders should provide a statement of interest, including the supporting documents and in some cases monetary deposits. Procurer may assess the statements of interest and exclude the firms that do not meet the basic requirements at the bidding stage. At the second stage, the preselected bidders show up at the auction and make descending open bids. The lowest bid wins the contract.
Data, empirical strategy, and results
To figure out whether higher reserve prices lead to lower contract prices in public procurement auctions, we used data on public procurement procedures available at a unified official public procurement website. In particular, we collected data on all public purchases of gasoline with octane number 92 at the regional level in 2011-2013 in 11 regions of Russia (1559 observations).
Among the characteristics of the procurement procedures, the most important are the number of bidders, the type of the procurement procedure (sealed-bid or open), and the characteristics of the contract (the volume and duration). We also take into account the number of price quotations the procurer uses to calculate the reserve price and some other characteristics of the purchase: the number of procurers in centralized purchase, the number of purchases of gasoline this procurer made in 2011-2013, and whether the procurer requested some special conditions from the seller (e.g., that the seller should have a network of gasoline stations).
The information allowed identifying:
- Procurements with only one bidder;
- Procurements with no or a very small price decrease as a result of the auction;
- Procurements with a reserve price higher than the market price;
- Procurements with a reserve price higher than the maximum of the price quotations.
Using these new variables, we test whether the probability that there is only one bidder (which is not what a regulating body would wish to see) correlates with auction characteristics and the fact that the reserve price is higher than the maximum of the price quotations (implying it is unreasonably and probably inefficiently high).
Table 1 Regression results
| Probabilty | Probabilty | |
| VARIABLES | One bidder | Discount = 0 |
| one bidder | 1.074*** | |
| (0.115) | ||
| open auction | 0.749*** | -0.191* |
| (0.0973) | (0.115) | |
| volume | 8.62e-06*** | -3.03e-06 |
| (2.51e-06) | (1.96e-06) | |
| duration | 0.000828* | 0.00209*** |
| (0.000454) | (0.000610) | |
| number of price quotations | -0.126*** | 0.386*** |
| (0.0436) | (0.0539) | |
| reserve price is higher than max of quotations | -0.469*** | 0.560*** |
| (0.108) | (0.136) | |
| Constant | -0.264** | -0.694*** |
| (0.126) | (0.160) | |
| Observations | 931 | 932 |
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
We also test whether the probability that there is no price decrease during the auction (discount equals zero) correlates with the auction characteristics and the fact that the reserve price was higher than the maximum of the price quotations or just higher than the market price.
Table 1 shows that a higher reserve price does not lead to a higher competition, but leads to higher probability of the situation that there will be no price decrease at all. Hence, there is no evidence that setting the reserve price at a higher level will attract more bidders and result in lower contract prices.
Conclusion
Auctions are viewed as one of the best ways to achieve lower prices. But in reality there are many factors that make this questionable. In this policy brief, we focus on the regulation of the reserve prices in public procurement. Is it reasonable to recommend procurers to set high reserve prices? We look at a specific market with high entry barriers, and a relatively low number of suppliers active on the public procurement market. Such markets face high collusion risk. We show that high prices do not attract more bidders and auctions with reserve prices set higher than all quotations end up with no price decreases during the auction. A big share of auctions (46% in our data set) in Russia is inconsistent (only one bidder comes to bid), and in such an environment high reserve prices can only increase government spending. It is more reasonable to follow the ideas mentioned by Krishna (2009) and use low reserve prices to decrease contract prices and, thus, gains of suppliers from colluding behavior, even if it happens. Our study shows that general recommendations that do not take into account market specifics could not help procurers achieve efficient results.
References
- Krishna, Vijay. Auction theory. Academic press, 2009, ch.11.
- Klemperer, Paul. “Auctions: Theory and Practice.” Princeton University Press, 2004, ch.1,3,4.
- Dimitri, Nicola, Gustavo Piga, and Giancarlo Spagnolo, eds. Handbook of procurement. Cambridge University Press, 2006, ch.11.
- Myerson, Roger B. “Optimal auction design.” Mathematics of operations research 6.1 (1981): 58-73.
- Brisset, Karine, François Cochard, and Julie Le Gallo. “Secret versus public reserve price in an “outcry” English procurement auction: Experimental results.” International Journal of Production Economics 169 (2015): 285-298.
- Eklöf, Matias, and Anders Lunander. “Open outcry auctions with secret reserve prices: an empirical application to executive auctions of tenant owner’s apartments in Sweden.” Journal of Econometrics 114.2 (2003): 243-260.
- Wang, Hong. “Information Acquisition Versus Information Manipulation in Multi-period Procurement Markets.” Information Economics and Policy (2016).
- Guide to Combating Corruption & Fraud in Development Projects, http://guide.iacrc.org/
The Economics of Russian Import Substitution
This policy brief discusses the economic mechanisms triggered by import substitution policies, associated losses and conditions that ensure positive economic effects. Numerical estimations of potential effects of Russian import substitution policies indicate a decline in GDP, decrease in output of unprotected sectors and consumers’ welfare losses. We conclude with a discussion of the role imports play in economic efficiency.
Import substitution: pro and contra
Two years after joining the WTO, in the new political reality, Russia began implementing a series of import substitution policies. Supported sectors range from agriculture and production of metal products, to computer equipment and special purpose vehicles. The potential economic effects of these policies are of substantial interest and importance both for researchers, policymakers and the general public. However, they have not yet been quantitatively assessed. This policy brief summarizes the results of a study of these effects conducted at CEFIR in 2016 (Volchkova and Turdyeva, 2016).
Import substitution can be implemented by a range of instruments aimed at creating preferential conditions for domestic producers of imported goods compared to foreign competitors. Barriers to trade are the most common and easily available policy tools. Trade barriers lead to price increase on domestic market relative to the world price of the good.
Domestic manufacturers in the protected industry enjoy higher prices on domestic market, thereby securing higher revenues at the same costs. The protected sector also is able to put into operation those capacities that were generating losses in the absence of protective measures. However, if the economy works at full employment in absence of import substitution, then in order to increase production in the protected sectors, factors should be reallocated there from the other sectors. As a result of the import-substituting policy, producers in unprotected sectors will decrease the scale of production, and some will exit the industry. That is, producers that were efficient enough before import substitution policies will be forced out by those that cannot compete at international prices. From the point of view of welfare economics, this maneuver is accompanied by a loss of economic efficiency.
Economic literature discusses several cases when import substitution can be justified, such as a presence of positive external effects from protected sectors to the economy; learning-by-doing effects in protected sectors; and an infant industry argument. All of these cases imply market failures in the absence of government intervention, leading to lower than socially optimal output of the sector in question. Then, government interventions aiming to increase output – such as import substitution – might bring additional welfare improvement to the economy. If any of these effects do take place then the gain brought by protected sectors may compensate for the loss by the unprotected. To validate any of these cases one needs to perform a thorough and independent analysis of the economy based on very detailed information.
Estimates of static and dynamic effects of import substitution
In order to illustrate the potential effects of import substitution policies in the current Russian situation, we use a static CGE model of the Russian Federation constructed at CEFIR.
Based on publicly available documents (Russian Government’s Decrees №2744-Р 29.12.2015 and № 2781-р 31.12.2015), we identify the sectors that are targeted by the import substitution policy: agriculture and four manufacturing sectors (metal production; machinery and equipment; cars; sea crafts, airplanes and spaceships).
To model the effects of import substitution, we calculate an ad valorem tariff equivalent, which ensures a 10% decline of the volume of import in each of five industries. In order to simulate proposed policy measures, we conduct six experiments: increase in import tariffs in each of five industries individually, and a comprehensive policy change with an increase in all five tariffs simultaneously.
If import substitution policy is implemented not by trade policy instruments but only through producer support measures then it will be accompanied only by changes in relative prices for producers while consumer prices will not be affected and will be determined solely by international prices. In this case, our estimates will represent an upper bound of possible consumers’ losses. Since the distortion of relative prices for producers do not depend on a particular instrument chosen to implement import substitution policy then the consequences for other sectors and for efficiency of the overall production will be the same under trade or domestic policy interventions.
Table 1 shows the results of our calculations. Columns (1) – (5) present the estimates of the effects of the import-substitution measures in the relevant sectors. Column (6) reports the results of the comprehensive policy reform.
Table 1. Consequences of the decline in imports by 10% in the protected sector (s).
| Agriculture | Metals | Machinery, and equipment | Cars | Sea crafts, airplanes and space ships | Tariff change in all industries | |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | |
| Ad valorem tariff equivalent, % | 2.9 | 3.9 | 6.1 | 6.7 | 5.6 | |
| Change in | ||||||
| CPI, % | 0.04 | 0.09 | 0.39 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 1.0 |
| Protected sectors’ output, % | 0.7 | 2.5 | 9.8 | 10.3 | 8.3 | 3.8 |
| All other production, % | -0.2 | -0.4 | -0.5 | -0.2 | -0.5 | -2.3 |
| GDP, % | -0.002 | -0.011 | -0.023 | -0.005 | -0.018 | -0.049 |
| Welfare, % | -0.015 | -0.020 | -0.074 | -0.041 | -0.080 | -0.215 |
Source: Authors’ own estimation.
Our results illustrate the anticipated effect of import substitution policy in economy with full employment. The protected industries increase their output at the expense of other industries. An increase in economic inefficiency is reflected by a fall in GDP.
In order to capture dynamic effects of the proposed import substitution policy, we simulate an import tariff increase in a Solow-type growth model calibrated for the Russian economy. The proposed policies result in a deeper economic decline in 2016 than in the baseline scenario (-0.76% in the baseline scenario and -0.79% in the import substitution scenario), followed by somewhat faster growth in subsequent years due to a lower base. The aftermath of the import substitution policy is still visible in 2020: GDP growth in 2020 relative to 2015 in the baseline equals 2.4365%, while the import restriction in all targeted industries will reduce economic growth in a five-year term by 0.007 percentage points, to 2.4295%. The numbers correspond to the expected reduction in economic efficiency as a result of the import substitution measures.
While numbers in terms of GDP do not look particularly large, the annual losses in GDP in nominal figures correspond to $650 million in value added, which is roughly equivalent to 30,000 jobs lost in Russia due to import substitution. Besides, effect on growth adds to 5,000 more jobs lost over 5 years.
As we mentioned above these losses might potentially be justified by the positive external effect from an increased output of the protected industries on the rest of economy. To ensure this, the selection of industries for protection should have been done through independent expertise based on a thorough analysis of sectoral interaction over time. However, the way the economic policy is formulated in modern Russia, with heavy influence of lobbying groups and very little contribution from independent economic research, we can hardly expect that the industries targeted for import substitution satisfy the objective criteria of positive external effects.
Imports as drivers of competitiveness
Classical trade theory shows that imports are a major cause of gains from trade integration. Modern trade theory complements the classical mechanism by selection effects among heterogeneous firms when only the most productive firms are able to sell in foreign markets (Melitz , 2003).
Keeping in mind that a substantial part of manufacturing trade flows consists of intermediate products that are used as inputs in subsequent production (in the case of Russia, the share of intermediates in imports is more than 60%) then the above reasoning implies that the competitiveness of domestic production is determined, among other things, by the availability of cheap imports.
Numerous empirical studies for many countries confirmed that industries with a higher share of imported intermediate goods are more productive than industries with a lower share (Feenstra, Markusen, and Zeile, 1992). Recent studies, analyzing data at the level of individual firms (Bernard at al., 2012; Castro, Fernandes, and Farolec, 2015; Feng, Li, and Swenson, 2016), confirm that the effect takes place at firm level: firms importing more intermediate goods have higher productivity than firms importing less, other things being equal, which suggests that imports of intermediate goods is an important source for the growth of firms’ competitiveness.
A study conducted for Russian firms showed that labor productivity in Russian companies which import intermediate goods is 20% higher compared to similar firms not importing intermediates (Volchkova, 2016).
On this basis, we have every reason to believe that import is one of the sources of economic competitiveness that enhances effectiveness of the economy. Thus import substitution policies in the absence of objective information and a profound selection procedure for protected sectors, are harmful to the economy. In an open economy, the effect of the firms’ selection and the availability of cheap imports ensure growth of sectoral productivity, but productivity declines in “protected” sectors. That is, while our estimates above assess the direct negative impact on Russian economic output and welfare from inefficient reallocation of factors of production, the implementation of import substitution policies also puts the Russian economy in a disadvantaged position relative to more liberal economies on the international markets due to forgone competitiveness. This creates additional obstacles for Russia on its way to export diversification and sustainable growth.
References
- Feenstra, Robert C, James R Markusen, and William Zeile. 1992. “Accounting for Growth with New Inputs: Theory and Evidence.” The American Economic Review 82 (2). American Economic Association: 415–21. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2117437.
- Feng, Ling, Zhiyuan Li, and Deborah L. Swenson. 2016. “The Connection between Imported Intermediate Inputs and Exports: Evidence from Chinese Firms.” Journal of International Economics 101: 86–101. doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2016.03.004.
- Melitz, Marc J. 2003. “The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity.” Econometrica 71 (6). Blackwell Publishing Ltd: 1695–1725. doi:10.1111/1468-0262.004
- Pierola Castro, Martha D., Ana Margarida Fernandes, and Thomas Farolec. 2015. “The Role of Imports for Exporter Performance in Peru.”
- Volchkova, Natalya A. 2016. “Prospects of the export diversification:” Dutch Disease “or the failures of economic policy?” in “Seven lean years: the Russian economy on the verge of structural changes: the round table materials” / ed. Rogov. -Moscow: Foundation “Liberal Mission” (in Russian)
- Volchkova, Natalya A., and Natalia A. Turdyeva 2016, “Microeconomics of Russian import substitution”, Journal of New Economic Association, forthcoming (in Russian)