Tag: Russia

A Decade of Russian Cross-Domain Coercion Towards Ukraine: Letting the Data Speak

20200217 A Decade of Russian Cross-Domain Coercion FREE Network Policy Brief Image 01

Russia’s coercion towards Ukraine has been a topic of major international events, meetings and conferences. It regularly makes the headlines of influential news outlets. But the question remains open – do we really understand it? We diligently collect and analyze data to make informed decisions in practically all domestic issues but is the same done for international relations? This research paper introduces a number of tools and methods that could be used to study Russia’s coercion towards Ukraine beyond its most visible manifestation, looking into latent trends and relations that could reveal more.

Introduction

For the past decade, Ukraine has been in the headlines of the major world news outlets more frequently than ever before. Ukrainian-Russian relations have been and still remain the topic of international summits and other events. The occupation of a part of Ukraine’s territory has been denounced and Russia’s coercion towards Ukraine is now generally accepted as a fact. But what do we really know about the underlying empirics and dynamics and how can this multi-domain assertiveness be measured and tracked? This paper presents a number of data-driven approaches that allow looking beyond the headline stories to identify and track various dimensions of Russia’s coercion towards Ukraine and the dynamics of its development.

Academic Interest

Mapping the landscape of scholarly literature reveals a number of interesting results. First, the body of works studying Russia’s coercion towards Ukraine remains relatively modest. It quintupled in 2014 but afterwards the interest started tapering off. A search for papers on this topic in Scopus and Web of Science with a very precise query (to increase the accuracy of search) and publication time of 2009-2019 returned 155 papers most of which were published in or after 2014.

Figure 1. Scholarly publications on Russian-Ukrainian relations.

Source: WoS and Scopus, 2009-2019

A closer look at the content of these works with the use of a bibliometric software called CiteSpace shows that the majority of papers focus on Putin, once again emphasizing the significant role of his personality in Russia’s coercion towards Ukraine. The second largest cluster has the “great power identity” as its main theme and presumably looks beyond actions of Russia to identify its ideological grounds. Another group of publications is devoted to sanctions, pointing to their important role in studying Russian-Ukrainian relations.

Figure 2. The landscape of topics in scholarly publications on Russian-Ukrainian Relations.

Expressions of Coercion

The “practical” side of Russia’s coercion towards Ukraine is also frequently associated with the personality of Vladimir Putin and his attitudes towards Ukraine. To analyze this perception further, we created a corpus of speeches of Russian presidents published on the Kremlin website, filtered them to keep only those that mention Ukraine, divided them into pre-2014 and 2014 and after, and then analyzed them using an LDA topic modeling algorithm. This algorithm is based on the assumption that documents on similar topics use similar words. So, the latent topics that a certain document covers can be identified on the basis of probability distributions over words. Each document covers a number of topics that are derived by analyzing the words that are used in it. In simple terms, the model assigns each word from the document a probabilistic score of the most probable topic that this word could belong to and then groups the documents accordingly.

Figure 3. Speeches of Russian presidents before 2014, LDA topic modeling.

Figure 4. Speeches of Russian presidents in 2014 and after, LDA topic modeling.

Quite surprisingly, we discovered that the overall rhetoric of speeches is very similar for the two periods. Although some speeches do differ and the later corpus includes new vocabulary to reflect some changes (i.e “Crimea”, “war”) the most common words remain practically the same. Thus, regardless of the apparent shift in relations between the two countries, Russian leadership still relies on the same notions of collaboration, interaction, joint activities, etc. The narrative of “brotherhood” between the nations persists despite and beyond the obvious narrative of conflict.

To include a broader circle of Russia’s leadership we also looked at the surveys of the Russian elite conducted regularly by a group of researchers led by William Zimmerman and supported by various funders over the years (in 2016 – the National Science Foundation and the Arthur Levitt Public Affairs Center at Hamilton College). Seven waves of the survey already took place; the most recent one in 2016. The respondents were the representatives of several elite groups (government, including executive and legislative branches, security institutions, such as federal security service, army, militia, private business and state-owned enterprises, media, science and education; for practical reasons from Moscow only).

The survey revealed a number of interesting observations. For instance, while the prevailing Russian opinion on Russia’s occupation of Crimea had been that it was not a violation of international law, a closer look at the demographic characteristics of respondents shows that they were not as coherent as it might seem from the outside. While the “green” answers from respondents with backgrounds such as media or private business may have been anticipated, the number of members of the legislative and especially executive branch and the military that had at least some doubt on the legality was surprisingly quite sizable, and they even demonstrated some support of the “violation of law” interpretation.

Figure 5. Elite and public opinion on Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

Comparing these elite opinions to the public opinion poll by Levada Center conducted in the same year shows that even the general public is slightly more likely to choose the most extreme “full legality” option than the respondents from the executive branch.

Beyond the elite or general opinion polls, we tried to develop a metric that might allow us to track Russian sensitivities towards Ukraine. For that, we examined two different ways of expressing “in Ukraine” in Russian language: ‘на Украине (the ‘official’ Russian expression) vs. ‘в Украине (the version preferred by Ukrainians). [In English, this can be compared so saying ‘Ukraine’ vs ‘the Ukraine’.]

Our first visual plots how many search queries were done on Google Search with both versions over the last decade.

Figure 6. Search queries for “в Украине” (green) versus “на Украине” (red), Google Trends, 2009-2019.

We can clearly observe that during less turbulent times the more politically sensitive version is much more common. This however drastically changes during the peaks of Russia’s coercion towards Ukraine when the number of searches with the less politically correct term increases significantly.

A different trend can be observed if we look at official media publications stored in the Factiva database. We estimated the ratio of search volumes for each term and observed that until the beginning of 2013, about a third of articles and news reports used “in Ukraine”. This changed around January 2013 when the ratio starts to decrease for “in Ukraine” searches and plummets to a mere 10% of outlets still preferring this term.

Figure 7. The ratio of “в Украине” to “на Украине” occurrences in large Russia media (2009 – 2019), Factiva.

Tracking Coercion Itself

What is the track record of Russia’s actual coercion over this decade? For this, we turn to a few recent datasets that try to systematically capture verbal and material actions (words and deeds): the automated event datasets. The largest one of those, called GDELT (Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone), covers the period from 1979 to the present, and contains over three quarters of a billion events. It is updated every fifteen minutes to include all “events” reported in the world’s various news outlets. To exclude multiple mentions of the same event by one newswire, the events are “internally” deduplicated. The events are not compared across newswires.

An event consists of a “triple” coded automatically to represent the actor (who?), the action (what?) and the target (to whom?) as well as a number of other parameters such as type (verbal or material; conflict or cooperation; diplomatic, informational, security, military, economic), degree of conflict vs cooperation etc. Other similar datasets include ICEWS (Integrated Crisis Early Warning System) and TERRIER (Temporally Extended, Regular, Reproducible International Events Records). For this analysis, we filtered out only those events in which Russia was the source actor and Ukraine was the target country. We present two metrics: (1) the percentage of all world events that this subset of events represents and (2) the monthly averages of the Goldstein score, which captures the degree of cooperation or conflict of an event and can take a value from -10 (most conflict) to +10 (most cooperation). Also, to add a broader temporal perspective, we looked beyond the last decade. It can be clearly seen that the number of events before 2013 was significantly lower, especially in “material” domains. Some verbal assertions from Russia towards Ukraine happened during the Orange Revolution and so-called “gas wars”.

The situation changes radically starting from 2013. The proportion of events increases with some especially evident peaks (i.e. during the occupation of Crimea). The verbal events remain quite neutral while the actions towards Ukraine move from some fluctuations to steadily conflictual.

Figure 8. Russia’s negative assertiveness towards Ukraine, 2000-2019.

Measuring Influence

We have seen that the past decade was exceptional in the scale of Russian assertiveness towards Ukraine. But what do we know about Russia’s influence on Ukraine and Ukraine’s dependence on Russia? Influence measures the capacity of one actor to change the behavior of the other actor in a desired direction. In an international context this often concerns the relations between countries. Influence can be achieved by various means, one of which is to increase the dependence of the target country upon the coercive one. This strategy is frequently employed by Russia willing to regain and/or increase control over the former post-Soviet countries. The Formal Bilateral Influence Capacity (FBIC) Index developed by Frederick S. Pardee (Center for International Future) looks at several diplomatic (i.e. intergovernmental membership), economic (trade, aid) and security (military alliances, arms import) indicators allowing to identify the level of dependence of one country upon another. This is especially interesting from a comparative perspective. Figure 9 shows that countries such as Armenia and Belarus remain highly dependent on Russia. For half of the decade, Ukraine was number three on this list. Today the situation has changed. Ukraine’s dependence on Russia has gradually decreased and has become even smaller than Moldova’s, moving closer to the steadily low level of dependence of Georgia. This may signify a positive trend and a break of a decade-long relationship of dependence.

Figure 9. Dependence of post-Soviet countries on Russia, FBIC.

Conclusion

Consequently, Russia and Ukraine have become much more visible in the international academic and policy research efforts. This can be measured through a number of instruments, including a comprehensive mapping of the academic landscape itself with regard to salience and topics that are being studied, analysis of the word choice (that could be represented by the use of the terms to describe events in Ukraine by the government media and Google search users (“на Украине” versus “в Украине”); speeches of Russian presidents that use the same rhetoric of collaboration when talking about Ukraine despite the obvious change in relationships) and material coercion (significant increase in number of assertive conflictual Russia’s actions towards Ukraine). Some findings do give hope for change: the opinions of the Russian elite on recent Russian actions towards Ukraine while remaining generally unfavourable are not as cohesive as it might appear and Ukraine’s dependence on Russia has decreased significantly.

Disclaimer

This research is a part of a larger research effort titled RuBase funded by the Carnegie Foundation of New York and implemented jointly by The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and Georgia Tech with the help of the Kyiv School of Economics StratBase team in Ukraine. The ‘Ru’ part of the title stands for Russia; and ‘base’ has a double meaning – both the knowledge base built during the project, and the (aspirationally) foundational nature of this effort. The project intends to look beyond the often-shallow traditional understanding of coercion and apply innovative tools and instruments to study coercion in its multifaceted form. This is only a small selection of the tools that have been successfully tested in the course of this (ongoing) research project and applied to the study of Russia’s coercion in different domains. The prospects of any progress in resolving the Russian-Ukrainian conflict are currently slim, thus further work that would allow identifying patterns and trends that the human eye may oversee to understand Russia better and develop an informed foreign policy strategy both for Ukraine and the West is crucially important.

References

The Russian Food Embargo: Five Years Later

20191014 The Russian Food Embargo FREE Network Policy Brief Image 01

In this brief, we report the results of a quantitative assessment of the consequences of counter-sanctions introduced by the Russian government in 2014 – Russian food embargo. We consider several affected commodity groups: meat, fish, dairy products, fruit and vegetables. Applying a partial equilibrium analysis to the data from several sources, including Rosstat, Euromonitor, UN Comtrade, industry reviews etc. as of 2018, we obtain that consumers’ total loss amounts to 445 bn Rub, or 3000 Rub per year for each Russian citizen. This is equivalent to a 4.8% increase in food expenditure for those who are close to the poverty line. Out of this amount, 84% is distributed towards producer gains, 3% to importers, while the deadweight loss amounts to 13%. Based on industry dynamics, we identify industries where import substitution policies led to positive developments, industries where these policies failed and group of industries where partial success of import substitution was very costly for consumers.

The full text of the underlying paper is forthcoming in the Journal of the New Economic Association in October 2019.

In August 2014, in response to sectoral sanctions against Russia, the national government issued resolution No. 778, which prohibited import of processed and raw agricultural products from the United States, the EU, Ukraine and a number of other countries (Norway, Canada, Australia, etc.).  The goal was to limit market access for countries, which supported sectoral sanctions. The other rhetoric of the counter-sanctions was to support domestic producers via trade restrictions, or by other words – import substitution.

This brief provides an update of welfare analysis of counter-sanctions based on partial equilibrium  model of domestic market. The initial estimations based on 2016 data can be found in another FREE Policy Brief here. This time we compare the consumption, outputs and prices of the counter sanctioned goods as of 2018 relative to 2013. The estimated consumer surplus changes, producer gains and prices are reported in Table 1.

Table 1. Welfare effects of counter-sanctions in 2018 relative to 2013.

Data sources: Rosstat, Euromonitor, UN COMTRADE
* Negative losses correspond to gains
** Negative gains correspond to losses
Green color was used to mark the commodity groups with a noticeable consumption growth in 2013-2018 and red color those with consumption decrease.

Effect on production

From the point of view of price dynamics, on the one hand, and consumption and output, on the other, the studied products can be divided into three groups.

The first group which we call “Success of import substitution”  includes goods for which real prices (in 2013 level) increased by 2016 but afterwards, the growing domestic production ensured that by 2018 prices fell below the level of 2013 with a corresponding increase in consumption. This group includes tomatoes, pork, poultry and, with some reservation, beef. For beef, growing domestic production pushed prices down after 2016, but the level of consumption and prices have not yet reached the pre-sanction level.

For the second group, import substitution has not resulted in a price decrease, we call this group “Failure of import substitution”. For products in this group, the initial increase in prices by 2016 was not reverted afterwards. Their consumption decreased significantly compared to 2013, and domestic production either continued to fall after 2016, or its growth turned out to be fragile. This group includes apples, cheese, fish, as well as condensed milk and processed meat.

We call the third group “Very expensive import substitution”. It includes fromage, sour milk, milk and (to a lesser extent) butter. This group is characterized by increase in consumption and output in the period 2016–2018, but real prices over this period still remain very high.

Effect on consumers

By comparing the losses and gains of consumers in different categories of goods due to changes in real prices and real consumption, our analysis provides the following monetary equivalents. For all considered counter-sanctioned product groups, with the exception of poultry, pork and tomatoes, consumer losses are around 520 billion rubles per year (in 2013 prices). In three product groups (poultry, pork, tomatoes), in which there was a decrease in prices and a significant increase in consumption, the consumer gains are equivalent to 75 billion rubles per year. Thus, the total negative effect from counter-sanctions for the consumers amounted to 445 billion rubles a year, or about 3000 rubles for a person per year.

Given the cost of the minimum food basket, defined in Russia as 50% of the subsistence level, the impact of counter-sanctions on the budgets of Russian consumers can be estimated as follows. 3000 rubles account for approximately 4.8% of the annual cost of the minimum food basket. The minimum food basket is a set of food products necessary to maintain human health and ensure its vital functions that is established by law. In other words, one can say that 3000 rubles a year are equivalent to a 4.8% increase in food expenditure for those who are close to the poverty line.

Consumer surplus losses were significantly redistributed in favor of domestic production, totaling 374 billion, or 2500 rubles per year per person. Another 56 billion rubles (or 390 rubles per person) correspond to the deadweight loss, i.e., reflect the inefficiency increase of the Russian economy, and 16 billion rubles (110 rubles per person) is the equivalent of redistribution in favor of foreign producers, who get access to Russian market with higher priced products than before counter-sanctions.

Effect on foreign partners

As a result of the selective embargo, the geography of Russian imports of the affected goods has changed. Traditional suppliers of these goods, primarily from Europe, were replaced by suppliers from other countries due to trade diversion. Given the changes in the composition of importers after the imposition of sanctions, we single out countries that have lost and countries that have gained access to the Russian market. We use the change in trade volumes from the respective countries as indicators of growth and decrease in share of these importers in the Russian market. Below we consider in detail the three groups of goods with the largest gains for importers in 2018 compared with 2013: cheese, apples, butter.

Cheese imports decreased significantly after the imposition of counter-sanctions, in 2018 accounting for only 42% of their dollar value in 2013. The total gain of importers due to the growth of domestic prices in 2013-2018 amounted to 17.3 billion rubles (Table 1) and was distributed among following importing countries: Belarus (78%), Argentina (6%), Switzerland (4%), Uruguay (3%), Chile (3%), other countries (6%). Countries that lost their shares of the Russian cheese market included Ukraine, Holland, Germany, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, France, Denmark, Italy and Estonia. As mentioned earlier, domestic production and Belarusian imports were not able to fully compensate for imports from countries on the counter-sanctions list, and in 2016-2018 cheese consumption in Russia decreased significantly.

Apple imports after the initial drop in 2016 partially recovered in 2018, amounting to 66% of their dollar volume in 2013. The total gain of importers in 2018 compared to 2013 amounted to 15.0 billion rubles (Table 1); it was distributed between Serbia (22%), Moldova (19%), China (13%), Turkey (10%), Iran (10%), Azerbaijan (7%), South Africa (4%), Chile (3%), Brazil (3%) and other countries (9%). Poland suffered the most from the ban on apple imports; it accounted for about 80% of all losses. Other losers from counter-sanctions include Italy, Belgium and France. The reorientation of trade flows did not completely replace Polish imports, so apple consumption in 2016-2018 was significantly lower than in 2013.

Imports of butter in 2018 was also below the level of 2013 (67% of dollar value). The gain of importers in 2018 compared to 2013 amounted to 11.2 billion rubles and was distributed among the following  trading partners: Belarus (90%), Kazakhstan (4%), Kyrgyzstan (3%) and other countries (3%). Among the countries bearing most of the negative burden of the diversion of trade, one should mention Finland and Australia.

Conclusions

Five year after counter-sanctions were put in place Russian consumers continue paying for them out of their pockets. While few industries have demonstrated a positive effect of import substitution policies, most are not effective enough to revert the price dynamics.

References

Short-Run and Long-Run Effects of Sizeable Child Subsidy: Evidence from Russia

20191007 Short-Run and Long-Run FREE Network Policy Brief Image 01

How to design the optimal pro-natalist policy is an important open question for policymakers around the world. Our paper utilizes a large-scale natural experiment aimed to increase fertility in Russia. Motivated by a decade-long decrease in fertility and population, the Russian government introduced a sequence of sizable child subsidies (called Maternity Capitals) in 2007 and 2012. We find that the Maternity Capital resulted in a significant increase in fertility both in the short run and in the long run. The subsidy is conditional and can be used mainly to buy housing. We find that fertility grew faster in regions with a shortage of housing and with a higher ratio of subsidy to housing prices. We also find that the subsidy has a substantial general equilibrium effect. It affected the housing market and family stability. Finally, we show that this government intervention comes at substantial costs.

In all European and Northern American countries the fertility is below the replacement level (United Nations, 2017). Following this concern, most of the developed countries have implemented various large scale and expensive pro-natalist policies. Yet, the effectiveness of these policies is unclear, and the design of the optimal pro-natalist policy remains a challenge.

There are several important open research questions on the evaluation of these programs. The first is whether these programs can induce fertility in the short-run and/or in the long-run horizon. Indeed, very few of these expensive and large-scale policies are proved to be an effective tool to increase fertility (Adda et al, 2017). The next set of questions deals with further evaluation of the programs: What are the characteristics of families that are affected by this policy? How costly is the policy, i.e. how much is the government paying per one birth that is induced by the policy? Finally, what are the non-fertility related effects of these policies? While most of the studies that analyze the effect of pro-natalist policies concentrate on fertility and mothers’ labor market outcomes, these, usually large-scale, policies may have important general equilibrium and multiplier effects that may affect economies both in the short run and long run (Acemoglu, 2010).

In our paper we utilize a natural experiment aimed to increase fertility in Russia to address these questions.

Motivated by a decade-long decrease in fertility and depopulation, the Russian government introduced a sizable conditional child subsidy (called Maternity Capital). The program was implemented in two waves. The first wave, the Federal Maternity Capital program, was enacted in 2007. Starting from 2007, a family that already has at least one child, and gives birth to another, becomes eligible for a one-time subsidy. Its size is approximately 10,000 dollars, which exceeds the country’s average 18-month wage and exceeds the country’s minimum wage over a 10-year period. The recipients of the subsidy can use it only on three options: on housing, the child’s education, and the mother’s pension. Four years later, at the end of 2011, Russian regional governments introduced their own regional maternity programs that give additional – on the top of the federal subsidy – money to families with new-born children.

In our paper, we document that the Maternity Capital program results in a significant increase in fertility rates both in the short run (by 10%) and in the long run (by more than 20%). This effect can be seen from both within-country analysis and from comparing the long-term growth of fertility rates in Russia with Eastern and Central European countries that face similar economic conditions and had similar pre-reform fertility trends. Like Russia, Eastern European countries experienced a drop in fertility rates right after the collapse of the Soviet Union and had similar trends in fertility up until 2007. Our results show that while having similar trends in fertility before 2007, afterward Russia significantly surpassed all the countries from this comparison group.

Figure 1 illustrates the effect of the Maternity Capital on birth rates. The top two panels show monthly birth rates (simple counts and de-seasoned); the bottom panels show total fertility rates in Russia versus Eastern European countries, and versus the European Union and the US.

Figure 1. Total Fertility Rate, Russia, Eastern European countries, USA and EU.

Source: Sorvachev and Yakovlev (2019), and http://www.fertilitydata.org/.

The effects of the policy are not limited to fertility. This policy affects family stability: it results in a reduction in the share of single mothers and in the share of non-married mothers.

Also, the policy affects the housing market. Out of three options (education, housing and pension), 88% of families use Federal Maternity Capital money to buy housing. We find that the supply of new housing and housing prices increased significantly as a result of the program. Confirming a close connection between the housing market and fertility, we find that in regions where the subsidy has a higher value for the housing market, the program has a larger effect: the effect of maternity capital was stronger, both in the short run and long run, in regions with a shortage of housing, and in regions with a higher ratio of subsidy to price of apartments (i.e. those regions where the real price of subsidy as measured in square meters of housing is higher).

Figure 2 below shows the effect of Federal Maternity Capital on birth rates in different regions. It shows no effect on fertility in Moscow, small effect in Saint-Petersburg; whereas the sizable effect of maternity capital in other Russian regions.

Figure 2. Effect of Federal Maternity capital, by regions

Source: Sorvachev and Yakovlev (2019), and http://www.gks.ru/.

These results suggest that cost-benefit analysis of such policies should go beyond the short-run and long-run effects on fertility. Ignoring general equilibrium issues may result in substantial bias in the evaluation of both short-run and long-run costs and benefits of the program.

While there are many benefits of the program, we show that this government intervention comes at substantial costs: the government’s willingness to pay for an additional birth induced by the program equals approximately 50,000 dollars.[1]

For more detailed evaluation of the results see Evgeny Yakovlev and Ilia Sorvachev, 2019, “Short-Run and Long-Run Effects of Sizable Child Subsidy: Evidence from Russia”, NES working Paper # 254, 2019.

References

  • Acemoglu, Daron 2010 “Theory, General Equilibrium, Political Economy and Empirics in Development Economics”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(3), pp. 17-32. 2010
  • Adda, Jérôme, Christian Dustmann and Katrien Stevens 2017. “The Career Costs of Children”. Journal of Political Economy, 125, 2, 293-337.
  • Ilia Sorvachev and Evgeny Yakovlev, 2019, “Short-Run and Long-Run Effects of Sizable Child Subsidy: Evidence from Russia”, NES working Paper #254 and LSE IGA Research Working Paper Series 8/2019

[1] Roughly, the WTP (US$50,000) exceeds nominal US$10,000 subsidy because the government pays for all (100%) families that give birth to a child to induce additional (20%) increase in fertility. See paper for more accurate elaboration.

Social Media and Xenophobia

Man with a cell phone in hands spending time on social media

We study the causal effect of social media on hate crimes and xenophobic attitudes in Russia, using variation in social media penetration across cities. We find that higher penetration of social media leads to more ethnic hate crimes, but only in cities with a high baseline level of nationalist sentiment prior to the introduction of social media.  Consistent with a mechanism for the coordination of crimes, the effects are stronger for crimes with multiple perpetrators. We show that social media penetration also had a persuasive effect on young and uneducated individuals, who became more likely to have xenophobic attitudes.

In recent years, the world has witnessed a large increase in expressions of hate, particularly of xenophobia. Candidates and platforms endorsing nationalism and views associated with intolerance toward specific groups have also gathered increased popular support both in the U.S. and across Europe. There is a lot of speculation about the potential drivers of this increase in the expression of hate. In our recent paper (Enikolopov et al, 2019) we study the role of social media in this process. This brief introduces the topic and offers a short outline of our findings.

Conceptually, social media could foster hate being expressed through different channels. First, social media reduces the cost of coordination. For example, there is evidence that it facilitates political protest (Enikolopov, Makarin, Petrova, 2018). Coordination facilitated through social media might be particularly relevant for illegal and stigmatized activities, such as hate crime: social media might make it easier to find like-minded people (through targeted communities and groups); it might also reduce the cost of asking or exposing oneself by providing a more anonymous forum for social interactions. Social media might also influence people’s opinions: tolerant individuals might be more exposed to intolerant views, while intolerant individuals might end up in an “echo chamber” (Sunstein 2001, 2017, Settle 2018) that make their views even more extreme. In our paper, we study the causal effect of social media exposure on xenophobic crimes and xenophobic attitudes in Russia and provide evidence on the particular mechanisms behind these effects.

The challenge in identifying a causal effect of social media is that access and consumption of social media are not randomly assigned. To surmount this challenge, we follow the approach of Enikolopov et al. (2018) and exploit a feature of the introduction of the main Russian social media platform – VKontakte (VK). This social media, which is analogous to Facebook in functionality, was the first mover on the Russian market and secured its dominant position with a user share of over 90% by 2011. VK was launched in October 2006 by Pavel Durov, its founder, who at that time was an undergraduate student at St Petersburg State University (SPbSU). Initially, users could only join the platform by invitation, through a student forum of the University, which was also created by Durov.

As a result, the vast majority of the early users of VK were students of SPbSU. This, in turn, made their friends and relatives more likely to open an account. And since SPbSU attracted students from around the country, this sped up the development of VK in the cities, from which these students were coming from. Network externalities magnified these effects and, as a result, the idiosyncratic variation in the distribution of the home cities of Durov’s classmates had a long-lasting effect on VK penetration. Following this logic, we use fluctuations in the distribution of student of SPbSU across cities as an instrument for the city-level penetration of VK. We then evaluate the effect of higher VK penetration on hate crimes and hate attitudes, combining data on hate crimes for the period between 2007 and 2015 collected by a reputable Russian NGO SOVA with survey data on hate attitudes.

Previous findings indicate that whether information from media induces people to be involved in the active manifestation of xenophobic attitudes or not depends on predispositions of the population. For example, Adena et al (2015) demonstrate that radio propaganda by the Nazis in the 1930’s was effective only in areas with a historically high levels of anti-Semitism. The role of the underlying level of nationalism is likely to be even stronger for social media, in which the content of the media itself directly reflects the attitudes of the population. This is particularly relevant for hate crimes committed by multiple perpetrators, in which social media can facilitate the coordination of such crimes.

Thus, we test whether the effect of social media depends on the pre-existing level of nationalism. To get at this underlying sentiment, we break cities by their level of support for the Rodina (“Motherland”) party, which ran in the national 2003 elections (the last parliamentary elections before the creation of VK) on an explicit nationalistic, xenophobic platform.

We find that penetration of social media leads to more ethnic hate crimes, but only in cities with a high baseline level of nationalist sentiment prior to the introduction of social media. For example, in cities with a maximum level of support of Rodina an increase in the number of VK users by 10% lead to an increase in ethnic hate crimes by 20%, while it had no significant effect on hater crime in cities with minimal support of Rodina. There is also no evidence that future social media penetration is related to ethnic hate crimes before the creation of social media, regardless of the level of pre-existing nationalistic attitudes.

Further evidence is consistent with social media playing a coordination role in hate crimes. The effect of social media is stronger for crimes perpetrated by multiple individuals (as opposed to crimes committed by a single person), where coordination is more important. These heterogeneous effects are also not consistent with results being simply driven by a higher likelihood of hate crime in places with higher social media penetration, unless this effect were present precisely in cities with higher support for Rodina and for crimes with multiple perpetrators, for example – which we find unlikely.

Having found evidence of a causal effect of social media on ethnic hate crimes, consistent with a mechanism of coordination, we turn next to the impact of social media on xenophobic attitudes. We designed and organized an online survey, and launched it in the summer of 2018, reaching 4,327 respondents from 64 cities. To measure xenophobic attitudes, we examined answers to the question “Do you feel irritation of dislike for individuals from some other ethnicities?” Note that, unlike the coordination of hate crimes, the persuasive effects of social media are not necessarily expected to be strongest in cities with higher baseline nationalistic sentiment since individuals on social media can get as easily connected to people outside their city. In fact, it is conceptually possible that the persuasion would be stronger in cities with lower baseline nationalistic sentiment: individuals might have previously been less aware of and less exposed to these types of views before the introduction of social media.

Since there might be a stigma in reporting xenophobic attitudes even in anonymous surveys, we use a “list experiment” to approximate “truly-held” xenophobic attitudes. In particular, the list experiment works as follows: first, respondents are randomly assigned either into a control group or a treatment group. Respondents in all groups are asked to indicate the number of policy positions they support from a list of positions on several issues. Support for any particular policy position is never indicated, only the total number of positions articulated on the list that a respondent supports. In the control group, the list includes a set of contentious, but not stigmatized, opinions. In the treatment group, the list includes all the contentious opinions from the control list, but also adds the opinion of interest, which is potentially stigmatized. The degree of support for the stigmatized opinion can be assessed by comparing the average number of issues supported in the treatment and control groups. The question of interest, randomly added to half of the questionnaires, was “Do you feel irritation of dislike for individuals from some other ethnicities?”.

The results indicate that the average share of people who agree with the statement is 37%. While there is no significant effect of social media penetration on xenophobic attitudes for the whole sample, there is a significant effect for important subsamples, which are at a higher risk of being involved in hate crime, such as respondents with lower levels of education or young respondents. Of course, the individuals that became more likely to engage in hate crime are not necessarily the same that have been persuaded to have more xenophobic attitudes (especially given the question used to assess attitudes) – though it is possible that some individuals who would have been close to committing crimes in the absence of social media might have been persuaded enough to switch their behavior in the presence of social media.

At the same time, we do not find that social media leads to an increase in xenophobic attitudes when measured with a direct question. The results are confirmed if we use a much larger, nationally representative survey of more than 30,000 respondents conducted by one of the biggest Russian survey companies FOM in 2011. In principle, it is possible that social media not only changed real attitudes but also the perception of the social acceptability of expressing these attitudes. However, we do not find any evidence that social media reduces the stigma of admitting xenophobic attitudes. The fact that we find the effect of social media on actual attitudes, but not on the expressed ones suggests, that if anything the stigma increased, at least for the respondents who acquired xenophobic attitudes as a result of social media influence. This highlights the importance of using a survey method that reduces concerns with social acceptability, such as list experiments.

Overall, our results indicate that social media lead to an increase in both ethnic hate crimes and xenophobic attitudes in Russia. However, the effect on hate crime is observed only in cities in which there was already a high level of nationalism. Additional evidence indicates that this effect is driven both by facilitating the coordination of nationalists and by persuading people to become more xenophobic. These findings contribute to a growing body of evidence that social media is a complex phenomenon that has both positive and negative effects on the welfare of people (see also Allcott et al, 2019), which has to be taken into account in discussing policy implications of the recent changes in media technologies.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Russia’s Real Cost of Crimean Uncertainty

Blue sky with fighter jets flying across the sky representing Russias Real Cost of Crimean Uncertainty

The annexation of Crimea has real costs to the Russian economy beyond what is measured by some items in the armed forces’ budget; social spending in the occupied territories; or the cost of building a rather extreme bridge to solve logistics issues. Russia’s real cost of the annexation of Crimea is also associated with the permanent loss of income that the entire Russian population is experiencing due to increased uncertainty, reduced capital flows and investment, and thus a growth rate that is significantly lower than it would have been otherwise. Since the years of lost growth are extremely hard to make up for in later years, there will be a permanent loss of income in Russia that is a significant part of the real cost of annexing Crimea and continuing the fighting in Eastern Ukraine. It is time to stop not only the human bleeding associated with Ukraine, but also the economic.

Estimating the real cost of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the continued involvement in Eastern Ukraine is complicated since there are many other things going on in the Russian economy at the same time. In particular, oil prices fell from over $100/barrel in late 2013 to $30/barrel in 2016 (Figure 1). Becker (2016) has shown that 60-80 percent of the variation in GDP growth can be explained by changes in oil prices, so this makes it hard to just look at actual data on growth to assess the impact of Crimea and subsequent sanctions and counter sanctions.

Figure 1. Russian GDP and oil price

Source: Becker (2019)

The approach here is instead to focus on one channel that is likely to be important for growth in these circumstances, which is uncertainty and its impact on capital flows and investment.

From uncertainty to growth

The analysis presented here is based on several steps that link uncertainty to GDP growth. All the details of the steps in this analysis are explained at some length in Becker (2019). Although this brief will focus on the main assumptions and estimates that are needed to arrive at the real cost of Crimea, a short description of the steps is as follows.

First of all, in line with basic models of capital flows, investors that can move their money across different markets (here countries) will look at relative returns and volatility between different markets. When relative uncertainty goes up in one market, capital will leave that market.

The next step is that international capital flows affect investment in the domestic market. If capital leaves a country, less money will be available for fixed capital investments.

The final step is that domestic investments is important for growth. Mechanically, in a static, national accounts setting, if investments go down, so does GDP. More long term and dynamically, investments have a supply side effect on growth, and if investments are low, this will affect potential as well as actual growth negatively.

These steps are rather straightforward and saying that uncertainty created by the annexation of Crimea leads to lower growth is trivial. What is not trivial is to provide an actual number on how much growth may have been affected. This requires estimates of a number of coefficients that is the empirical counterparts to the theoretical steps outlined here.

Estimates to link uncertainty to growth

In short, we need three coefficients that link: domestic investments to growth; capital flows to domestic investments; and uncertainty to capital flows.

There are many studies that look at the determinants of growth, so there are plenty of estimates on the first of these coefficients. Here we will use the estimate of Levine and Renelt (1992), that focus on finding robust determinants of growth from a large set of potential explanatory variables. In their preferred specification, growth is explained well by four variables, initial income, population growth, secondary education and the investments to GDP ratio. The coefficient on the latter is 17.5, which means that when the investment to GDP ratio increases by 10 percentage points, GDP grows an extra 1.75 percentage points per year. Becker and Olofsgård (2018) have shown that this model explains the growth experience of 25 transition countries including Russia since 2000 very well, which makes this estimate relevant for the current calculation.

The next coefficient links capital flows to domestic investments. This is also a subject that has been studied in many empirical papers. Recent estimates for transition countries and Russia in Mileva (2008) and Becker (2019) find an effect of FDI on domestic investments that is larger than one, i.e., there are positive spillovers from FDI inflows to domestic investments. Here we will use the estimate from Becker (2019) that finds that 10 extra dollars of FDI inflows are associated with an increase of domestic investments of 15 dollars.

Finally, we need an estimate linking uncertainty with capital flows. There are many studies looking at risk, return and investment in general, and also several studies focusing on international capital flows and uncertainty.  Julio and Yook (2016) look at how political uncertainty around elections affect FDI of US firms and find that FDI to countries with high institutional quality is less affected by electoral uncertainty than others. Becker (2019) estimates how volatility in the Russian stock market index RTS relative to the volatility in the US market’s S&P 500 is associated with net private capital outflows. The estimate suggests that when volatility in the RTS goes up by one standard deviation, this is associated with net private capital outflows of $30 billion.

These estimates now only need one more thing to allow us to estimate how much Crimean uncertainty has impacted growth and this is a measure of the volatility that was created by the annexation of Crimea.

Measuring Crimean uncertainty

In Becker (2019), the measure of volatility that is used in the regression with net capital outflows is the 60-day volatility of the RTS index. Since we now want to isolate the uncertainty created by Crimea related events, we need to take out the volatility that can be explained by other factors in order to arrive at a volatility measure that captures Crimean induced uncertainty. In Becker (2019) this is done by running a regression of RTS volatility on the volatility of international oil prices and the US stock market as represented by the S&P 500. The residual that remains after this regression is the excess volatility of the RTS that cannot be explained by these two external factors. The excess volatility of the RTS index is shown in figure 2.

It is clear that the major peaks in excess volatility are linked to Crimea related events, and in particular to the sanctions introduced at various points in time. From March 2014 to March 2015, there is an average excess volatility of 0.73 standard deviations with a peak of almost 4 when the EU and the USA ban trade with Crimea. This excess volatility is our measure of the uncertainty created by the annexation of Crimea.

Figure 2. RTS excess volatility

Source: Becker (2019)

From Crimean uncertainty to growth

The final step is simply to use our measure of Crimean induced uncertainty together with the estimates that link uncertainty in general to growth.

The estimated excess volatility associated with Crimea is conservatively estimated at 0.7 standard deviations. Using this with the estimate that increasing volatility by one standard deviation is associated with $30 billion in capital outflows, we get that the Crimean uncertainty would lead to $21 billions of capital outflows in one quarter or $84 billions in one year. If this is in the form of reduced FDI flows, we have estimated that this means that domestic investments would fall by a factor of 1.5 or $126 billions.

In this period, Russia had a GDP of $1849bn and fixed capital investments of $392bn. This means that $126 billions in reduced investments correspond to a reduction in the investments to GDP ratio of 7 percentage points (or that the investments to GDP ratio goes from around 21 percent to 14 percent).

Finally, using the estimate of 17.5 from Levine and Renelt, this implies that GDP growth would have been 1.2 percentage points higher without the estimated decline in investments to GDP.

In other words, the Crimean induced uncertainty is estimated to have led to a significant loss of growth that has to be added to all the other costs of the annexation of Crimea and continued fighting in Eastern Ukraine. Note that recent growth in Russia has been just barely above 1 percent per year, so this means that growth has been cut in half by this self-generated uncertainty.

Of course, the 1.2 percentage point estimate of lost growth is based on many model assumptions, but it provides a more sensible estimate of the cost of Crimea than we can get by looking at actual data that is a mix of many other factors that have impacted capital flows, investments and growth over this period.

Policy conclusions

The annexation of Crimea and continued fighting in Eastern Ukraine carry great costs in terms of human suffering. In addition, they also carry real costs to the Russian economy. Not least to people in Russia that see that their incomes are not growing in line with other countries in the world while the value of their rubles has been cut in half. Some of this is due to falling oil prices and other global factors that require reforms that will reorient the economy from natural resource extraction to a more diversified base of income generation. This process will take time even in the best of worlds.

However, one “reform” that can be implemented over night is to stop the fighting in Eastern Ukraine and work with Ukraine and other parties to get out of the current situation of sanctions and counter-sanctions. This would provide a much-needed boost to foreign and domestic investments required to generate high, sustainable growth to the benefit of many Russians as well as neighboring countries looking for a strong economy to do trade and business with.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Economic Growth and Putin’s Approval Ratings —The Return of the Fridge

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This brief discusses how the approval ratings of president Putin covaries with economic growth. In most years the relationship between approval ratings for Putin and growth looks like approval ratings for politicians in most countries so that when growth is higher, the president is more popular. Or to use an American expression “it’s the economy stupid”. The caveat in Russia is that external events at times overshadow the importance of growth to the extent that the president’s ratings stay high and can even go up despite a faltering economy. In a time of low Russian growth, this is not good news for geopolitics unless Putin can be convinced to focus on policies that generate high, sustainable growth instead of international turbulence. That said, it is clear that poor economic growth carries a political cost also in Russia. The only sustainable way of maintaining high approval ratings for the president is by fostering economic growth since in the contest between “the TV and the fridge”, the fridge will eventually win.

Russia is a complex country and culture. Instead of the simple American saying “it’s the economy stupid”, Russians talk about “the TV vs the fridge”. This translates into that concerns about the economic situation can be made irrelevant by propaganda so that voters turn their eyes away from the half-empty fridge to follow how Russia’s armed forces fight the enemy in foreign countries.

The propaganda messages have of course varied over the years, but it seems that external enemies that threaten the nation are at the heart of many of the messages. This theme in propaganda is of course not unique to Russia, but it seems to carry more weight in Russia than in other countries.

The observation that propaganda is used and that it seems to work to a relatively large extent at times can lead to the conclusion that “it’s not the economy stupid” when it comes to approval ratings of the Russian leadership.

This observation is tempting as another piece of evidence on how Russia is different and unique, but this brief will show that in most times, it is indeed “the economy stupid” also in Russia.

Putin’s ratings and growth

The idea that Russia is different in that growth would not be important for the president’s approval rating can be justified empirically when we look at the full series of approval ratings of Putin as measured by the Levada center and corresponding quarterly growth rates going back to 1999 (Figure 1).

Instead of showing a strong positive correlation as we would expect, the correlation is negative 0.3. However, a more careful look at the observations in the scatter plot suggests that there are a few clusters of observations that create this negative correlation. In the figure, three distinct clusters are marked; first there is the period when Russia rebounded strongly from the 1998 crisis in 1999-2000, with growth rates that have not been seen before or after that time in Russia. The growth was an artefact of the previous massive decline in income in combination with a large devaluation, and later followed by oil price increases. This happened in Putin’s initial time in the highest offices when he was prime minister, interim president and then elected president. Although Putin enjoyed high ratings as a consequence, it was not in line with the extreme growth rates that were the result of events preceding his tenure and can thus be regarded as outliers.

The second cluster is related to the global financial crisis in 2008/09 when Russian growth took a major hit as oil prices collapsed and the exchange rate was not allowed to appreciate correspondingly. However, this crisis was blamed (as in many other countries) on the US and the West and did not cost Putin in terms of approval ratings.

The final cluster is related to the annexation of Crimea and ongoing involvement in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. This period also coincides with a sharp drop in oil prices that taken together led to negative growth that then remained low for a prolonged period. We should note that before the annexation of Crimea, growth rates in 2013 were very low at 1-2 percent with approval ratings going down to 63 percent, which was an all-time low since Putin’s first year in office.

Figure 1. Ratings and growth

Source: Becker (2019)

If we purge the data from the three exceptional episodes that we have identified above, we get Figure 2. Note that the scale has not been changed from Figure 1. Now there are no observations of negative growth rates, but the distribution of growth rates is still rather spread out, going from around 1 to 9 percent growth. The spread of the growth distribution is important since it allows us to identify the relationship between growth and approval ratings more clearly.

The relationship between approval ratings and growth in Figure 2 is strongly positive with a correlation coefficient of 0.7, and in line with what we would expect in other countries. This is a quite remarkable shift from the negative correlation in Figure 1. Note that if approval ratings in 2014 had been behaving as in “normal” years, the regression line would have put them around 60 percent instead of the actual approval rating that peaked at 86 percent after the annexation of Crimea. Such is the strength of the TV.

Figure 2. Ratings and growth

Source: Becker (2019)

This is very clear evidence that Russia is a “normal” country in “normal” times, but that there are also times when other forces overshadow this normalcy.

Policy conclusions

Are there any policy conclusions that can be drawn from the stark contrast between figures 1 and 2? The answer is a very clear “yes”, both for the Russian leadership but also for the rest of the world that has economic interests and security concerns with Russia.

For the Russian president, the message is that it pays in terms of high approval ratings to generate growth and “keeping the fridge well stocked”. It is also clear that the high popularity rating that was seen after the annexation of Crimea has been followed by several years of poor growth. A forthcoming brief discusses how the increased uncertainty created by this event has led to lower capital inflows, lower domestic investments and lower growth.

Not surprisingly, the sustained low growth has started to show in terms of falling approval ratings. The polls at the end of 2018 and early 2019 (for when there is not yet data on growth rates) indicate a significant decline in approval ratings, down to 64 percent from over 80 percent at the end of 2017. This is linked to protests over pension reforms, but they in turn are a result of lower government revenues in an economy that lacks growth.

In other words, if growth does not return before the propaganda loses its appeal, this will eventually result in falling approval ratings for the president, which is what we are seeing now.

There are potentially also some policy conclusions for Russia’s foreign investors, trading partners and neighbors. When growth in Russia is low and no credible reform programs are on the horizon, expect external actions that take the attention away from poor economic performance while increasing the level of uncertainty both in Russia and abroad.

For the more pro-active external actors, finding ways to support Russia’s return to growth through dialogue on real economic reforms could perhaps be both politically feasible and of mutual interest to Russia and the West. There are clearly some geopolitical issues that may interfere with this process, but it should still remain high on the wish list of regular people in Russia and elsewhere. Let the fridge rule!

References

  • Becker, T., 2019. “Russia’s macroeconomy—a closer look at growth, investment, and uncertainty”, forthcoming SITE Working Paper.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Losers and Winners of Russian Countersanctions: A welfare analysis

20181001 Losers and Winners of Russian Countersanctions Image 01

In this brief we provide a quantitative assessment of the consequences of countersanctions introduced by the Russian government in 2014 in response to sectoral restrictive measures initiated by a number of developed countries. Commodity groups that fell under countersanctions included meat, fish, dairy products, fruit and vegetables.  By applying a basic partial equilibrium analysis to data from several sources, including Rosstat, Euromonitor, UN Comtrade, industry reviews etc., we obtain that total consumers’ loss due to countersanctions amounts to 288 bn Rub or 2000 rubles per year for each Russian citizen. Producers capture 63% of this amount, importers 26%, while deadweight loss amounts to 10%. 30% of the transfer from Russian consumers toward importers was acquired by Belarus. The gain of Belarusian importers of cheese is especially impressive – 83% of total importer’s gains on the cheese market.

In August 2014, in response to sectoral sanctions initiated by some countries against Russia, the national government issued resolution No. 778, which prohibited import of processed and raw agricultural products from the United States, the EU, Ukraine and a number of other countries (Norway, Canada, Australia, etc.).

Russian countersanctions were, in particular, imposed on meat, fish, dairy products, fruit and vegetables. Later the list of counter sanctioned goods was edited: inputs for the production of baby food and medicines have been deleted from the ban list, while new items were added. Salt was added to the list in November 2016 and animal fats in October 2017.

The popular idea behind the countersanctions was to limit market access for countries, which supported sectoral sanctions. The other rhetoric of the countersanctions was to support domestic producers via trade restrictions, or by other words – import substitution.

We apply a basic partial equilibrium analysis in order to evaluate the effect of countersanctions on the welfare of main stakeholders – consumers, producers and importers. The overall results are in line with general microeconomic consequences of trade restrictions in a small open economy, that is, we observe a decline in consumer surplus, increase in producer surplus and redistribution across importers. Perhaps, even more interestingly, we are able to provide a numerical assessment of redistribution effects between Russian consumers and producers, on the one hand, and among importers from different countries, on the other.

Partial equilibrium welfare analysis

We apply a framework of the classical analysis of import tariff increases to Russian countersanctions. Countersanctions resulted in increased domestic prices, declining consumption and increased domestic production. Given the increase in prices and declined volumes of consumption, we evaluate the losses by consumers as a decline in consumer surplus. Respectively, given the increase in prices and increase in domestic output we identify the producers gains as an increase in producer surplus. The only difference with a classical analysis is the lack of increase in government revenues. In this case increases in domestic prices were driven by restrictions on trade with historical partners which were substituted by more costly producers. Given the changes in the composition of importers after sanctions, we identify countries which lost and gained access to the Russian market. We use changes in volumes of trade as a measure of respective gains and losses. Figure 1 presents all relevant concepts.

In order to measure all relevant welfare changes, we rely on consumption, production and price data from Rosstat and Euromonitor, trade data from the UN Comtrade database. We use data for 2013 as a benchmark before countersanctions and compare it to 2016. The measures of own price elasticities of Russian demand and supply were taken from the literature. We use real price (in terms of 2013 prices) and volume information for consumption and supply in 2016 as the resulting points on the supply (point C) and demand (point A) curves as shown on Figure 1. Then we restore the consumption and production points on these curves (points F and B) as they would have been in 2013 given the own price elasticities of demand and supply and price level as of 2013.

Figure 1. Visualization of deadweight losses, consumer and producer surplus changes

Welfare analysis

Data

We consider 12 commodity groups that were included in 2014 in the countersanctions list: pork, cheese, poultry, apples, beef, tomatoes, processed meat, fromage frais, butter, oranges, condensed milk, grapes, cream, sour milk products, milk, and bananas.

Prices and volumes information are taken from Rosstat official statistics, which in a few cases were adjusted by data from Euromonitor. Import values were obtained from the UN Comtrade database. The summary of the original data and results of welfare analyses are reported in table 1. Below we discuss in details the situation in three markets – beef, apples and cheese.

Table 1. Summary table of the welfare effects of countersanctions

Group Price (RUR per kg, 2013) Production (thous. tons) Consumption (thous. tons) Elasticity Consumer losses, RUR mn Producer surplus, RUR mn Deadweight loss, RUR mn Importer gains, RUR mn
2016 2013 2016 2013 2016 2013 demand supply
Beef 376 357 238 240 600 897 -0.78 0.1 11311 4388 234 6690
Poultry 109 108 4468 3610 4577 4084 -0.78 0.45 3263 3173 13 77
Pork 286 289 2042 1299 2282 1919 -0.78 0.2 -7167 -6447 38 -757
Milk 55 47 5540 5386 5704 5595 -0.93 0.3 48234 42507 4443 1284
Butter 343 271 251 225 340 340 -0.93 0.18 27468 17680 3370 6419
Cheese 358 283 605 435 748 764 -0.93 0.28 63493 44259 8437 10797
Fromage frais 233 190 407 371 456 457 -0.93 0.3 21803 17104 2600 2099
Apples 84 70 324 313 986 1665 -0.85 0.1 15225 4562 1238 9425
Bananas 61 47 0 0 1141 1165 -0.9 0.1 18967 0 2315 16652
Oranges 65 59 0 0 932 1059 -0.9 0.1 6054 0 272 5782
Grapes 175 131 174 101 366 459 -0.85 0.1 18312 7527 2351 8435
Tomatoes 82 65 1130 863 1583 1718 -0.97 0.1 28824 18177 3290 7357

Data sources: Rosstat, Euromonitor, UN COMTRADE

Bold figures were used to mark the commodity groups with a noticeable consumption growth in 2013-2016, italic figures – for those with consumption decrease, and underlined – for groups where consumption changed insignificantly during the period.

Beef

The Russian beef market experienced a drastic decrease in consumption during two years under countersanctions.  In 2013 constant prices, the average real of 1 kg of beef increased by 5.3% from 357 Rub/kg in 2013 up to 376 Rub/kg in 2016. Domestic output decreased by 0.8% and to 238 thousand tons in 2016 from 240 in 2013. Domestic consumption decreased by 33.1% to 600 thousand tons in 2016 from 897 in 2013. Our estimations indicate that  consumer losses amount to  11.3 bn Rub or 3.5% of beef consumption in 2013; producers’ gains are 4.4 bn Rub or 1.4%; deadweight losses are estimated at 0.2 bn Rub or 0.07%; and importers’ gains equal 6.7 bn Rub or 2.1%.

Out of total 6.7 bn Rub of importers’ gains, importers from Belarus acquire the major share (88%) – 5.9 bn Rub. Importers of beef from India and Colombia gained 0.4 bn Rub (6% of total) and 0.3 bn Rub (5%) respectively. Beef importers from Mongolia gained 0.03 bn Rub, from Kazakhstan – 0.01 bn Rub. Importers of beef from Brazil, Paraguay, Australia, Uruguay, Ukraine, Lithuania, Poland, and Argentina lost market shares in over the period 2013-2016.

Cheese

Average real price for 1 kg of cheese increased by 26.5% up to 358 Rub/kg in 2016 from 283 Rub/kg in 2013, both in constant 2013 prices. Domestic output increased by 39.1%  to 605 thousand tons in 2016 from 435 thous. tons in 2013. Domestic consumption decreased by 2.1% to 748 thous. tons in 2016 from 764 thous. tons in 2013. Our results indicate the following effects of countersanctions on cheese market: consumers’ losses amounted to 63.5 bn Rub or 29.4% of cheese consumption in 2013; producer’s gain is 44.3 bn Rub or 20.5%; deadweight loss is estimated at 8.4 bn Rub or 3.9%; importers’ gains equal 10.8 bn Rub or 5.0%.

Out of a total 10.8 bn Rub of importer’s gains on the cheese market, importers of cheese from Belarus acquired the major share (82.9%) – 9.0 bln Rub, importers of cheese from Argentina gained 0.5 bn Rub (4.8% of total importers’ gain), importers from Uruguay gained 0.4 bn Rub (3.9%), Swiss cheese importers gained 0.2 bn Rub, importers from Armenia – 0.2 bn Rub (1.8%). While importers of cheese from Ukraine, the Netherlands, Germany, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, France, Denmark, Italy, and Estonia lost market access over 2013-2016.

Apples

In 2013 constant prices, average real price for 1 kg of apples increased by 20.0%  up to  84 Rub/kg in 2016 from 70 Rub/kg in 2013. Domestic output increased by 3.5% to 324 thous. tons in 2016 from 313 thous. tons in 2013. Domestic consumption decreased by 40.8% to 986 thous. tons in 2016 from 1665 thous. tons in 2013. According to our analysis, the  effects of countersanctions on the apple market are the following: consumers’ losses amounted to 15.2 bn Rub or 13.1 of apple consumption in 2013; producer’s gain is 4.6 bn Rub or 3.0%; deadweight loss is estimated at  1.2  bn Rub or 1.1%; importers’ gains equal 9.4  bln Rub or 8.1%.

Out of a total 9.4 bn Rub of importer’s gains, importers from Serbia acquired the major share (49.7%) – 4,7 bn Rub, importers of apples from China gained 1.6 bn Rub (16.7% of total importers’ gains), those importing from Macedonia gained 0.8 bn Rub (8.4%), from Azerbaijan 0.6 bn Rub (6.0%), and from South Africa 0.4 bn Rub (4.5% of total importers’ gains). While importers of apples from Poland, Italy, Belgium, and France lost market access.

Overall effects for 12 commodity groups

We calculated the welfare effects for 12 commodity groups: beef, poultry, milk, cheese, cottage cheese, ton butter, dairy products, apples, bananas, oranges, grapes and tomatoes.

Total consumers’ loss due to countersanctions amounts to 288 bn Rub, producers gain 63% out of this amount (182 bn Rub), 26% of total consumers’ loss is redistributed to importers (75 bn Rub), deadweight losses amount to 10% (31 bn Rub).

Distribution of importers’ gains

Belarus is the major beneficiary of Russians countersanctions: its exporters gain 29.4 bn Rub (38%), Ecuador’s exporters are in the second place with 16.4 bln Rub (21). Exporters from Serbia gained 5.1 bn Rub (7%).

Conclusion

There is no doubt that countersanctions were paid out of the pockets of Russian consumers: our estimation of total consumer losses amounts to 288 billion rubles, i.e. each Russian citizen paid 2000 rubles per year.  Out of this sum, Russian producers received 144 billion rubles, i.e. transfer from Russian consumers to producers equals 1260 rubles per person per year. Among Russian sectors, major gains and associated increases in production happened in pork industries (50%), poultry (20%), dairy products (10-30%), fruit and vegetables (10-50%).

The transfer from Russian consumers toward importers from non-sanctioned countries equals 75 billion rubles a year (520 rubles per person per year), out of which 30% was acquired by Belarusian importers. Countersanctions lead to deadweight losses in the efficiency of Russian economy equal to 31 billion rubles or 215 rubles per person per year.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Conflict, Minorities and Well-Being

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We assess the effect of the Russo-Georgian conflict of 2008 and the Ukrainian-Russian conflict of 2014 on the well-being of minorities in Russia. Using the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), we find that the well-being of Georgians in Russia suffered negatively from the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict. In comparison, we find no general effect of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict of 2014 on the Ukrainian nationals’ happiness. However, the life satisfaction of Ukrainians who reside in the southern regions of Russia in close proximity to Ukraine is negatively affected. We also show that the negative effect of conflict is short-lived with no long-term legacy. Additionally, we analyze the spillover effect of conflict on other minorities in Russia. We find that while the well-being of non-Slavic and migrant minorities who have recently moved to Russia is negatively affected, there is no effect on local minorities who have been living in Russia for at least ten years.

Militarized conflict affects a myriad of socioeconomic outcomes, such as the level of GDP (Bove et al. 2016), household welfare (Justino 2011), generalized trust and trust in central institutions (Grosjean 2014), social capital (Guriev and Melnikov 2016), and election turnout (Coupe and Obrizan 2016). Importantly, conflict has also been found to directly affect individual well-being (Frey 2012, Welsch 2008).

However, previous research studying individual well-being in transition countries largely abstracts from heightened political instability and conflict proneness, while this has been particularly pertinent in transition countries. Examples of transition countries facing various types of conflicts are abound, such as Yugoslavia, Ukraine, Tajikistan, Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and so on. Therefore, it is imperative to explore how conflict shapes well-being in transition countries.

In a new paper (Gokmen and Yakovlev, forthcoming), we add to our understanding of well-being in transition in relation to conflict. We focus on the effect of Russo-Georgian conflict of 2008 and the Ukrainian-Russian conflict of 2014 on the well-being of minorities in Russia. The results suggest that the well-being of Georgians in Russia suffered negatively from the 2008 Russo-Georgian conflict. However, we find no general effect of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict of 2014 on the Ukrainian nationals’ happiness, while the life satisfaction of Ukrainians who reside in the southern regions of Russia in close proximity to Ukraine is negatively affected. Additionally, we analyze the spillover effect of conflict on other minorities in Russia. We find that while the well-being of non-slavic and migrant minorities who have recently moved to Russia is negatively affected, there is no effect on local minorities who have been living in Russia for at least ten years.

Data and Results

We employ the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) which contains data on small neighborhoods where respondents live. Starting from 1992, the RLMS provides nationally-representative annual surveys that cover more than 4000 households with 10000 to 22000 individual respondents. The RLMS surveys comprise a broad set of questions, including a variety of individual demographic characteristics, health status, and well-being. Our study utilizes rounds 9 through 24 of the RLMS from 2000 to 2015.

In this survey, we identify minorities with the question of “What nationality do you consider yourself?” Accordingly, anybody who answers this question with a non-Russian nationality is assigned to that minority group.

We employ three measures of well-being. Our main outcome variable is “life satisfaction.” The life satisfaction question is as follows: “To what extent are you satisfied with your life in general at the present time?”, and evaluated on a 1-5 scale from not at all satisfied to fully satisfied. Additionally, we use “job satisfaction” and “health evaluation” as outcomes of well-being.

Our results suggest that our primary indicator of well-being, life satisfaction, for Georgian nationals has gone down in the Russo-Georgian conflict year of 2008 compared to the Russian majority (see Figure 1). The magnitude of the drop in life satisfaction is about 39 percent of the mean life satisfaction. Our estimates for the other two well-being indicators, job satisfaction and health evaluation, also indicate a dip in the conflict year of 2008. Lastly, our estimates show that the negative impact of the conflict does not last long. Although there is a reduction in the well-being of Georgians both on impact in 2008 and in the immediate aftermath in 2009, the rest of the period until 2015 is no different from the pre-2008 period.

Figure 1. Life Satisfaction of Georgian Nationals in Russia


Source: Authors’ own construction based on RLMS data and diff-in-diff estimates.

Furthermore, when we investigate the effect of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict of 2014, we find no negative effect on the life satisfaction of Ukrainians. One explanation for why the happiness of Ukrainians in Russia does not seem to be negatively affected in 2014 is that the degree of integration of Ukrainians into the Russian society is much stronger than the degree of integration of Georgians. On the other hand, our heterogeneity analysis reveals that in the southern parts of Russia closer to the Ukrainian border, where there are more Ukrainians who have ties to Ukraine, Ukrainian nationals are differentially more negatively affected by the 2014 conflict. The differential reduction in the happiness of Ukrainians is about 19 percent of the mean life satisfaction.

Moreover, we also look into whether there is any spillover effects of the Russo-Georgian and the Ukrainian-Russian conflicts on the well-being of other minorities. We first carry out a simple exercise on non-Slavic minorities of Russia. We pick the sample of non-Slavic ex-USSR nationals that are similar to Georgians in their somatic characteristics, such as hair color and complexion. This group of people include the nationals of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. We treat this group as “the countries with predominantly non-Slavic population” as their predominant populations are somatically different from the majority Russians, and thus, might either have been subject to discrimination or might have feared a minority backlash to themselves during the times of conflict. This conjecture finds some support below in Figure 2 in terms of violence against minorities. We observe in Figure 2 that hate crimes and murders based on nationality and race peak in 2008.

Our estimates also support the above hypothesis and propose that there is some negative effect of the 2008 conflict on non-slavic minorities’ happiness as well as their job satisfaction, whereas 2014 conflict has no effect.

Figure 2. Hate Murders in Russia over Time

Source: Sova Center

Next, we investigate the spillover effects of conflict on Migrant Minorities. Migrant minorities are minorities who have been living in their residents in Russia for less than 10 years. We conjecture that these minorities, as opposed to the minorities who have been in place for a long time, could be more susceptible to any internal or external conflict between Russia and some other minority group for fear that they themselves could also be affected. Whereas other types of longer-term resident minorities, which we call Local Minorities, are probably less vulnerable since they have had more time to establish their networks, job security, and most likely also have Russian citizenship. Our estimates back up the above conjecture and demonstrate that migrant minorities suffer negatively from the spillover effects of the 2008 conflict onto their well-being captured by any of the three measures, and not from the 2014 conflict, whereas there is no negative impact on local minorities.

Conclusion

In this paper, instead of focusing on the direct impact of conflict on happiness in war-torn areas, we contribute to the discussion on conflict and well-being by scrutinizing the well-being of people whose country of origin experiences conflict, but they themselves are not in the war zone. Additionally, we show that some other minority groups also suffer from such negative spillovers of conflict. Being aware of such negative indirect effects of conflict on well-being is essential for policy makers, politicians and researchers. Most policy analyses ignore such indirect costs of conflict, and this study highlights the bleak fact that the cost of conflict on well-being is probably larger than it has been previously estimated.

References

  • Bove, V.; L. Elia; and R. P. Smith, 2016. “On the heterogeneous consequences of civil war,” Oxford Economic Papers.
  • Coupe, T.; and M. Obrizan, 2016. “Violence and political outcomes in Ukraine: Evidence from Sloviansk and Kramatorsk”, Journal of Comparative Economics, 44, 201-212.
  • Frey, B. S., 2012. “Well-being and war”, International Review of Economics, 59, 363-375.
  • Gokmen, Gunes; and Evgeny Yakovlev, forthcoming. “War and Well-Being in Transition: Evidence from Two Natural Experiments”, Journal of Comparative Economics.
  • Grosjean, P., 2014. “Conflict and social and political preferences: Evidence from World War II and civil conflict in 35 European countries” Comparative Economic Studies, 56, 424-451.
  • Guriev, S.; and N. Melnikov, 2016. “War, inflation, and social capital,” American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, 106, 230-35.
  • Justino, P., 2011. “The impact of armed civil conflict on household welfare and policy,” IDS Working Papers.
  • Welsch, H., 2008. “The social costs of civil conflict: Evidence from surveys of happiness” Kyklos, 61, 320-340.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Understanding Currents in the Contesting Information Spheres

Computers and internet merely added new forms to age-old forms of propaganda. Its general purpose is, as it always has been, dualistic: to shape citizens’ image of their own country, and to streamline their views of foreign partners, competitors or enemies. Studies on information wars are often one-dimensional, i.e. presenting only actions directed against one’s own state. New Russian textbooks on information wars have a more complex approach and present long historical retrospective overviews.

Reports on disinformation campaigns are nowadays regular in the information sphere in Sweden, as in the West in general. The changes of today’s propaganda compared to classic stereotypes of the Cold War confrontations seem obvious. However, many debates on how to counter a feared information war or fake news campaigns apparently lack a long-term historical perspective. Therefore, they appear unnecessarily alarmist and might even miss their claimed purpose – to promote a sound political debate on domestic and international affairs.

Trends in Swedish information spheres – a retrospective overview

From time to time, a dominant political climate and consensus is challenged. During the prosperous 1950s, Sweden formed a self-image of the “golden middle way” between capitalism and socialism. Many aspects of this self-image were indeed partly myths. A Swedish author, Göran Palm, happened to be one of the succinct observers to challenge our prejudiced visions. His books “An unjust reflection” and “Indoctrination in Sweden” reached a wide audience and forced many to reconsider our achievements as a welfare state. Gunnar Fredriksson, editor of a Social-Democratic newspaper, alerted readers to the intricacies of “the politicians’ language” as a means to distort realities or evoke positive or negative emotions.

These books from the late 1960s were milestones for heightening the public awareness of mass media manipulation. A similar trend and radical change of Sweden’s self-image is taking place today. Until recently, the predominant view has been that Sweden represents a successful experience in forming a multicultural society, despite a few obvious crisis phenomena.

However, an awareness concerning the stress on the social fabric has spread from outsiders in the political scene towards mainstream parties. One example can highlight how changes have occurred. In January 2017, the Swedish journalist Katerina Janouch was scolded for an interview on Czech television, in which she inter alia stated her own personal view of the many problems that Sweden definitely is confronted with. After a vivid debate with harsh arguments involving even high-ranking politicians over her apparently controversial statements, she wrote a diary-like book “The Image of Sweden”. On a micro level, this fascinating personal experience succinctly shows how the image of Sweden changed over the last year, what has been accepted and what is still hotly debated concerning economics, migration and social problems.

Picture 1. “Bilden av Sverige” Book Cover

Over a short period, new political trends appeared. The political agenda has changed; serious debates treat formerly taboo topics. This is essentially because objective challenges to the economic stability, social fabric and cohesion cannot be ignored.

Even more noteworthy is, that given the outcome of the US presidential election campaign and the Brexit plebiscite of 2016, in particular the alleged role of outsiders’, supposedly decisive, involvement in these political events, Sweden has revitalized its organs on countering foreign political propaganda, which had been inactive after the Cold War era. Leading newspapers jointly with radio and TV intend to cooperate in order to thwart any attempts in 2018 to covertly interfere or overtly influence the upcoming parliamentary elections in September. Alerts against supposed disinformation campaigns by Russian mass media were at the center-stage of an annual defense policy conference in Sälen. The previous attempts to describe and analyze the supposed Russian information war efforts towards Sweden as presented hitherto seem, in my view, to lack in source collection from Russian mass media and blogospheres. They merely illustrate rather than form a structured picture of the Russian information spheres as a multiform complex.

Contests between the information spheres in Russia and the West

Therefore, as the Swedish proverb goes, “let’s turn the keg” and try to see things in a new perspective, by turning our usual modes of thought and preconceptions upside-down. A broad awareness on state propaganda in Russia, in the past as well as at present, can deepen our understanding of ongoing information wars. How does a Russian student in political sciences become aware of the formations of their nation’s self-image, as well as of foreign propaganda against their country? How do Russian scholars analyze their recent conflicts with neighboring states? What can they tell us of the general awareness concerning information warfare in the Russian public?

Three Russian historians, Viktor Barabash, Gennadii Bordiugov and Elena Kotelenets, all active in AIRO-XXI about which you can read more of here, give a broader perspective on how state propaganda has changed since the early 20th century till our times. They illustrate how countries at war, starting during World War I, directed propaganda to mass armies with, in general, literate soldiers and by that tried to influence the enemy’s morale. They evaluate how effective various forms of propaganda were, given the new technologies radio and TV during the Second World War and the Cold War eras.

After several in-depth chapters on the technological changes in the information era, on the cyber technological advances that have radically transformed traditional espionage, they finally describe how the information wars were carried out in Russia’s conflicts since 2000 (South Ossetia in 2008, Ukraine during the “Orange Revolution” and “Euro-Maidan”). Particular emphasis is devoted to how the conflicting parties formed their propaganda to their own population, on the one hand, and versus the opposing state, on the other hand.

Picture 2. ”Gosudarstvennaia propaganda i informatsionnye voiny” Book Cover

It is striking that in contrast to the Russian textbook by Barabash, Bordiugov and Kotelenets, very few analysts in Sweden have managed to present the contemporary information wars as a two-sided conflict; with two sides mutually intertwined in their mass media and social media strivings. Instead, information warfare is described as originating solely from more or less sophisticated “troll factories” in various locations in Russia. A couple of obviously forged “documents” ascribed to Swedish political leaders are sometimes referred to, although their actual effects have been nil.

In Sweden, as well as in the West in general, much has been stated on the real or imagined disinformation campaigns launched by Russia. Sometimes, they are said to direct public opinion in other states or even to influence the electorate (USA, United Kingdom). The role of relatively peripheral news agencies like RT (Russia Today) or Sputnik have seen their role amplified beyond reasonable belief. A further simplification is to reduce any Russian interpretation of events as a piece of falsification (fake news). Warnings of “Putin’s narrative” or “Russian Television fake stories” are common in mass media. In comparison, students of the Barabash textbook must undertake textual analyses of conflicting Russian and foreign opinions.

If one does not know history, you are likely to repeat its mistakes – so goes the proverb. Just as likely is the case where one repeat past generations’ mistakes because you are leaning on the mythology surrounding many events in your country’s past.

Minister of Culture Vladimir Medinskii has carried out a broad research project on the shifting images of Russia in the West, from eldest time when written sources by travelers are available. Although other historians criticized his original thesis on this subject for certain methodological flaws, there is no doubt that Medinskii accomplished a great feat as a popularizer of intricate phases in Russia’s history.

One book concerns the new historiography of the 1939–45 war on the Eastern Front. Since the late 1980s, many formerly taboo topics concerning the war were studied based on formerly secret archives as well as on interviews with veterans. In his book on the Great Patriotic War, Medinskii carefully unravels old myths and rejects new simplifications or distortions of battle histories.

Picture 3. “Mify o Rossii” Book Cover

Every historical nation tends to develop its own historiographical paradigm, which might be more or less objective and in conformity with general interpretations in other nations. However, just as often one nation’s image of their neighbors, former enemies or partners may differ substantially; thus are created the stereotypes of “the others”. In his grand comparative survey of Russia from the 12th century to the present, Medinskii provides the engaged reader with a plethora of examples of distortions of Russia’s history, created not only by foreign observers but also by ideologically motivated compatriots. Many legends on “eternal traits” in Russia are challenged. A Western reader of Medinskii’s book is bound to reflect on the various measures by which his or her country is evaluated in comparison with Russia.

In conclusion, the information contests or wars are only one element in the wider concept of cyber and hybrid wars. Observing our Swedish debate on the nefarious effects of alleged Russian disinformation, the absence of self-awareness is remarkable on how our own image of Russia (in our mass media and in the public opinion) is in itself the unconscious product of a pre-war attitude (sometimes alluded to as our age-long Russia-fear /Rysskräck/).

On the contrary, the legacy of the Soviet epoch has apparently raised the cultural curiosity among the Russian public. Mass media and publishing companies created a multidimensional panorama of their country’s past. The concerned Russian readers seem fairly well aware of politicization of historical issues and international affairs. Not for nothing do they often get substantial “food for thought” from the foreign news media translations, provided online by the InoSmi.ru site; a translation bureau, which took over the task of the Soviet-era magazine “Za Rubezhom”, and which lends its commentary fields open for anyone to comment. Even a cursory survey of commentary fields reveals their spontaneous character, rather than something created by Kremlin’s purported “troll armies”.

It goes without saying that a general and highly sophisticated awareness of overt or covert forms of meddling by a foreign state in the political process of any country must be welcomed and promoted. However, it is an open question how successful certain organized counter-disinformation strategies will be, e.g. EU’s site EUvsDisinfo.eu, NATO’s East StratCom Task Force or the Swedish joint public radio and TV with leading newspapers to “combat fake news”. Leaving much broader fields in the information sphere for freer opinion making in mainstream media as well as in the blog sphere might prove to be a sounder path towards dialogues, debates and mutual understanding.

References

  • Barabash, V. & G. Bordiugov & E, Kotelenets, Gosudarstvennaia propaganda i informatsionnye voiny (2015),  AIRO-XXI
  • Fredriksson, G., Det politiska språket (1966 and later editions), Tiden.
  • Janouch, K., Bilden av Sverige (2017), Palm Publishing.
  • Palm, G., En orättvis betraktelse, (1966) and Indoktrineringen i Sverige (1968), PAN/Norstedts
  • Medinskii, V., Voina: Mify SSSR, 1939 – 1945 (2011) and Mify o Rossii (2015), Abris/OLMA

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Is There a Dutch Disease in Russian Regions?

20180319 Is There a Dutch Disease Image 01

The low economic diversification in Russia is commonly blamed on the abundance of energy resources. This brief summarizes the results of our research that investigates the presence of Dutch disease effects across Russian regions. We compare manufacturing subsectors with different sensitivity to the availability of natural resources across Russian regions with varying natural resource endowments. We find no evidence of differential deindustrialization across subsectors, thereby offering no support for a Dutch disease. This finding suggests that the impact of energy resources on Russian manufacturing is more likely to go through the “institutional resource curse” channel. Thereby, we argue that more efficient policies to counteract the adverse effect of resources on the Russian economy should focus on improving the institutional environment.

Russian abundance in oil and gas, and the ways it could negatively affect long-term economic performance and institutional development is not a new debate. One of the key concerns is the influence of energy resources on Russian industrial structure. Energy resources are often blamed for the low diversification of the economy, with an extensive resource sector and the dominant oil and gas export share.

In a forthcoming chapter (Le Coq, Paltseva and Volchkova), we contribute to this debate by exploring the channels through which abundance in energy resources influences the industrial structure in Russia. Our main focus is on the deindustrialization due to the expansion of the natural resource sector, the so-called ‘Dutch disease’. Specifically, we explore the impact of energy resources on the growth of manufacturing subsectors in Russian regions. Adopting a regional perspective allows us to separate the Dutch disease mechanism from the main alternative channel of the institutional ‘resource curse’. This brief summarizes our findings.

Dutch disease vs. institutional resource curse

The Dutch disease and the institutional resource curse are, perhaps, the most discussed mechanisms proposed to explain the influence of natural resources on economic performance (see e.g., earlier FREE brief by Roine and Paltseva for a review). In an economy facing a Dutch disease, a resource boom and resulting high resource prices shift production factors from manufacturing industries towards resource and non-tradable sectors. As a result, a country experiencing a resource boom would end up with a slow-growing manufacturing and an under-diversified economic structure. Since the manufacturing sector is often the main driver of economic growth, the economic development may be delayed. If, instead, an economy is suffering from the institutional ‘resource curse’, it is the interplay of weak institutions and adverse incentives created by resource rents that leads to a slow growth of manufacturing and delayed development.

Importantly, offsetting the potential negative impact of these two channels requires different policy interventions. In the case of a Dutch disease, a state can rely on direct industrial policy mechanisms targeted towards increasing the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector and isolating it from the effect of booming resource prices. For example, it can use subsidies or targeted trade policy instruments, or channel money from increased resource prices out of the economy through reserve fund investments abroad.

In the case of an institutional resource curse, on the other hand, resource rents and weak institutions may undermine and disrupt the effect of such policies. In this case, state policies should be targeted, first and foremost, towards promoting good institutions such as securing accountability and the transparency of the state, and protecting property rights. This suggests that properly understanding the channels through which resource wealth impacts the economy is necessary for choosing appropriate remedial measures.

In our analysis, we address the differential impact of energy resources in Russian regions. This regional perspective allows us to single out the Dutch disease effect, and disregard the mechanisms of a political resource curse to the extent that the relevant institutions do not differ much across regions.

Resource reallocation effect vs. spending effect

The mechanism of a Dutch disease implies two channels through which a resource boom negatively affects the manufacturing sector. First, a resource boom implies the reallocation of production factors from other sectors of economy such as manufacturing or services to the resource sector, a so-called ‘resource reallocation effect’. Second, an additional income resulting from a boom in the resource sector leads to an increase in demand for all goods and services in the economy. This increase in demand will be accommodated differently by different sectors, depending on their openness to world markets. Namely, in non-tradable sectors, isolated from international competition, there will be an increase in prices and output. This, in turn, will increase the prices on domestic factor markets. For tradable manufacturing sectors the price is determined internationally and cannot be adjusted domestically. As a result, production factors will also reallocate away from manufacturing to non-tradable sectors, a so-called “spending effect”.

The strength of either effect is likely to be different across different subsectors of manufacturing depending on the sectoral specificities. In particular, subsectors with higher economies of scale are likely to be more affected by the outflow of factors towards the resource sector through the “resource reallocation effect”. Similarly, subsectors that are more open to international trade are likely to be affected by the “spending effect”.

These observations give raise to our empirical strategy: we access differences in growth of regional manufacturing subsectors with different sensitivity to the availability of energy resources, where sensitivity reflects economies of scale, for the first mechanism, and openness to the world market, for the second mechanism. In other words, we test whether manufacturing subsectors with higher economies of scale (or openness) grow slower than subsectors with lower economies of scale (or openness) in regions rich in energy resources, as compared to the regions poor in energy resources. Observing differential deindustrialization, depending on the industry’s exposure to the tested mechanism, would offer support to the presence of a Dutch disease.

Note that the validity of our empirical strategy relies on the fact that there is high variation in resource abundancy and structure of the manufacturing sectors across Russian regions (as illustrated by Figures 1 and 2).

Figure 1. Geographical distribution of fuel extractions relative to gross regional product; 2014, percent.

Source: Authors’ calculation based on Rosstat data. Note: Figures for regions exclude contribution of autonomous okrugs where applicable.

Figure 2. Regional diversity in manufacturing structure, 2014.

Source: Rosstat.

Data and results

Our empirical investigation covers the period 2006—2014. The data on manufacturing subsector growth and regional energy resource abundancy come from Rosstat, the sensitivity measures across different manufacturing sectors are approximated based on data from Diewert and Fox (2008) (economies of scale in US manufacturing), and OECD (sectoral openness to trade).

The results of our estimation show that the differences in growth rates of manufacturing subindustries across Russian regions with varying natural resource endowments cannot be explained by the sensitivity of these subindustries to the availability of energy resources. This can be seen from Table 1, where the coefficient of interest – the one of the interaction term between the measure of sectoral sensitivity if resource abundance and regional energy resource wealth – is not significantly different from zero, no matter how we measure the sensitivity: by the returns to scale or by openness to international trade.

Table 1. Estimation of Dutch disease effect with different sensitivity measures.

Dependent variable: average annual growth index of sectoral output
Sensitivity measure: Economies of scale Sensitivity measure: Openness
Subsector sensitivity * Size of the fuel extraction sector in the region

 

-0.0353

(0.0873)

0.0674

(0.0954)

Subsector fixed effect YES YES
Region fixed effect YES YES
Observations 1,185 1,185
R-squared 0.1574 0.1577

Source: Authors’ calculations.

These results hold true if we control for differences in regional taxes, labor market conditions, and other region-specific characteristics by including regional and sectoral dummy variables, if we consider alternative measures of energy resource wealth, and if we use other, non-parametric estimation methods.

In other words, our data robustly offers no support for the presence of a Dutch disease in Russian regions.

Conclusion and policy implications

Diversification is often mentioned by the Russian government, as one of the top economic policy priorities, and the need for ‘diversification’ has been used in the political debate as an argument for an active industrial policy.

However, the policy measures that are necessary to counter the effect of abundant energy resources on diversification and, more generally, on economic development may be highly dependent on the prevailing channel through which resources affect the economy. In particular, while active industrial policy may be justified as a remedy in the case of a Dutch disease, industrial policy may well be ineffective, or even harmful, in the presence of an institutional resource curse mechanism.

In our study, we find no support for the Dutch disease effect when looking at the impact of energy resources on the growth of regional manufacturing sectors. Thereby, to counterbalance the resource curse effect on the Russian economy, we argue that it may be more efficient to improve the institutional environment than to use active government policies affecting industrial structures.

References

  • Diewert, W. E and Fox, K. J. (2008) ‘On the estimation of returns to scale, technical progress and monopolistic markups’, Journal of Econometrics, 145(1-2): 174-93.
  • Le Coq, C., Paltseva E., and Volchkova N., forthcoming. “Regional impacts of the Russian energy sector”, in Perspectives on the Russian economy under Putin, eds. Becker and Oxenstierna, London, Routledge.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.