Tag: Ukraine
Trust and Economic Reforms
This brief discusses the importance of trust in economic development. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, many countries experienced a decline in the level of both general trust and trust and confidence in the government and market institutions. Trust is important for economic growth as it facilitates economic transactions by reducing uncertainty and risk. A lack of trust in the government hinders implementation of structural reforms needed for economic development. Hence, policies aimed at rebuilding trust in the government and institutions become especially important for countries like Ukraine.
Recent events in Ukraine have highlighted an acute crisis of trust in the Ukrainian society (such as trust in the government, politicians, institutions, etc.). Over the past two decades, in the absence of a fair and transparent legal and court system, Ukrainians have become accustomed to relying on informal and often corrupt ways of living and doing business. According to a poll conducted in December 2013, less than 20 percent of the Ukrainian population said that they trust the government, police and courts.
A low level of trust in society is not, however, limited to Ukraine; this problem is also pronounced in many other parts of the world. According to the 2012 Edelman Trust Barometer survey, the general level of trust in most countries surveyed decreased compared to 2011. The most notable decline was in Brazil (36.3%), Japan (33.3%) and Spain (27.5%). These countries also experienced large drops in the level of confidence in the government: Brazil went down by 62.4%, Japan by 51% and Spain by 53.5%. According to the OECD report, generally, less than half (40%) of the citizens trust their government (OECD, 2013).
General trust is important for economic life as it reduces uncertainty and costs associated with economic transactions. Trust affects the functioning of businesses, financial markets, and government intuitions. The level of general trust varies significantly across countries (see Figure 1). While only 3.8 percent of people in Trinidad and Tobago fully trust most people, the Scandinavian countries’ share of trusting people exceeds 60 percent (Algan and Cahuc, 2013).
Economists have in their studies repeatedly appealed to the problem of trust because there are several channels through which trust may influence economic development. First, trust creates favorable conditions for long-term investment and financial market development (Algan and Cahuc, 2013). Second, a higher level of trust in various regulatory authorities increases the level of compliance with the rules and regulations if citizens believe in the fairness of such rules and regulations (Murthy, 2004). In Tabellini (2010), the level of economic development (measured by GDP per capita) of different regions of the EU member countries is compared to their level of trust (defined as in the Figure 1) and respect (defined as the proportion of people who mentioned the quality “tolerance and respect for other people” as being important). Using data from the World Value Survey rounds conducted in the 1990s, he shows that regions with a high level of trust and respect are also the regions that are the most economically developed.
In his Master thesis, the graduate of the Kyiv School of Economics Oleksii Khodenko (Khodenko 2013) analyzed the relationship between the level of trust in the government and the attitude towards market economy (in particular, the attitude towards competition and private property). For this purpose, he used data from the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey. His results have different implications for developed and less developed countries. While a lack of trust in the government in developed countries is transformed into a desire to see more market mechanisms in the economy, this mistrust of the government in developing countries (including Ukraine) undermines the faith in the entire market economy.
Khodenko’s results highlight important policy implications for transition countries: people who grew up in a centrally planned economy tend to underestimate the benefits of the free market and, therefore, only puts confidence in the government and the state as a whole to achieve the development of market mechanisms. Thus a lack of trust hinders, or even prevents implementation of structural economic reforms, which are often “painful” for some groups or for society as a whole. In countries with a low level of trust, the long-term promise of the implemented reforms to improve the lives of people is not perceived as credible. Instead of being viewed by the general public as a today’s sacrifice in the name of future prosperity, they are rather viewed as a deadweight loss (Györffy, 2013).
Figure 1. The Level of Trust in the World
Source: Yann and Cahuc (2013), Figure 1.
Note: Trust is computed as the country average from responses to the trust question in the five waves of the World Values Survey (1981-2008), the four waves of the European Values Survey (1981-2008) and the third wave of the Afrobarometer (2005). The question regarding trust asks: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” Trust is equal to 1 if the respondent answers ”Most people can be trusted” and 0 otherwise.
Moreover, low levels of trust affect all types of structural reforms. Elgin and Garcia (2012) show that the effect of the tax reform on the economy can significantly differ depending on the level of trust in the government; under low levels of trust the announced tax cuts do not lead to exit from the informal sector.
The question is then how to revive or rebuild trust? Knack and Zak (2003) argue that the most efficient policies for building general trust are policies that (1) reduce income inequality since people in countries with more equal income distribution tend to have higher levels of interpersonal trust, and (2) strengthen civil society to increase government accountability. Income inequality often resulting from unequal opportunities can be reduced via increases in educational attainment and income redistribution programs. The presence of a strong civil society with free press ensures that the government is accountable and responsive to its citizens. A government needs to be reliable, open and transparent to effectively address citizens’ demands (OECD, 2013). All these policies cannot be implemented without a fair legal system that guarantees equal treatment of all citizens.
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References
- Algan, Y. and P. Cahuc (2013) “Trust, Growth and Well-being: New Evidence and Policy Implications”, IZA Discussion Paper No. 7464
- Elgin, C. and M. Solis-Garcia (2012), “Public Trust, Taxes and the Informal Sector”, Journal Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, 26(1), pp. 27-44
- Györffy, D. (2013), Institutional Trust and Economic Policy: Lessons from the History of the Euro, Central European University Press
- Knack, S. and P.J. Zak (2003), “Building Trust: Public Policy, Interpersonal Trust, and Economic Development”, Supreme Court Economic Review, 10, pp.91-107
- Khodenko, Oleksii (2013). How Does Confidence in the State Authorities Shape Pro-market Attitudes?
- Murthy, K. (2004), “The Role of Trust in Nurturing Compliance: A Study of Accused Tax Avoiders”, Centre for Tax System Integrity, Working paper No49
- OECD (2013), Government at a Glance 2013, OECD Publishing.
- Tabellini, G. (2010), “Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of
- Europe”, Journal of the European Economic Association, 8(4), pp. 677–71
The Arab Spring Logic of the Ukrainian Revolution
Motivated by the unusual patterns and dynamics of the Arab Spring, we construct a model explaining the vulnerability of the newly established incumbent to popular unrest. Using this model for the case of similar protests in Ukraine, we find that the current combination of availability of information, military capacity of the incumbent and his radicalization, together with the opportunity costs of participation in a protest, are likely to result in the formation of new government that is also vulnerable to popular protests. The persistence of the protests after the formation of a temporal government in Ukraine supports this hypothesis. Additionally, as the policy position of Viktor Yanukovych was relatively mild, his potential successor might be more radical. Exponential growth of social media users, reduction of military capacity, relatively high unemployment and the possible radicalization of the Ukrainian President might put the country into an “instability zone” with recurrent protests.
On the night of 21 November 2013 spontaneous protests erupted in Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, after the Ukrainian government suspended preparations for signing an Association Agreement and a Free Trade Agreement with the European Union in favor of agreements with Russia. The movement concentrated on Independence Square (Maidan Naseljenosti) soon took on the name “Euromaidan”. Soon the protest spread to other cities in the country. The initial agenda of closer relations with the EU was soon encompassed in the wider protest against Viktor Yanukovych, elected President in 2010. He fled the country on February 21 under the pressure of popular protests, exacerbating the leadership crisis. Temporary leadership was taken up by the Speaker of the Supreme Rada – Oleksander Turchinov, while new elections were scheduled to take place on May 25.
Despite the successful removal of Victor Yanukovich from power and a promise of new elections in May, the protests on Maidan did not cease. The major factor of uncertainty comes from the very nature of the protests. For many months, it ran without organizers or formal leadership so that the future course of action remains unclear. It is hard to comply with the demands of Maidan, as no clear set of demands are formulated. Though five figures of Maidan: Tymoshenko, Klitschko, Tyagnybok, Yatsenuk and Yarosh remain the most visible, none of them has sufficient support of Maidan. Whichever course prevails – resumed Eurointegration or an alliance with Russia (which became a less likely option)– the number of people who oppose the new course is likely to be enough to fill a new Maidan.
The swift happenings in Maidan are highly reminiscent of the events of the Arab Spring at its crux: it also was a leaderless protest, coordinated mainly with social media, and encompasses people of vastly different socio-economic, political and demographic characteristics.
Using social media technologies, Euromaidan has created an interactive map of logistics (http://maydanneeds.com/) that provides detailed information on and locations of where to eat, makeshift hospitals, information booths, and the barricades. Clicking on the icons of the map, one discovers not only the locations of the facilities but also their needs, which enables coordination of protesters’ efforts to contribute to the common cause. However, just as in case of Tahrir Square or the Tunisian unrest, the common cause is poorly defined: aside from dissatisfaction with Viktor Yanukovych, the protesters exhibited very different preferences for the future course of action, and the three most prominent figures of the protest – Klitschko, Tyagnybok and Yatsenuk – were shunned as they spoke about the common agenda.
The aftermath of the Arab Spring remains unclear for both protesters and the world. The Syrian social unrest has resulted in ongoing violent conflict, while Libyan society still experiences serious problems with the formation of a new government after the murder of Kaddafi and the end of civil war. Tunisia and Egypt were able to choose new Presidents and form new governments. The latter were themselves dismissed soon after they came to power: the first elected post-Mubarak government collapsed in mid-2013 after a year of almost uninterrupted protests. These two cases are especially interesting as constitutional exits of leaders who were in autocratic office for less than one year were generally caused by coups and not protests between 1945 and 2002 (Svolik, 2009).
Nevertheless, we can apply the knowledge acquired there to the new Ukrainian protest we observed on Maidan and try to predict its development by the means of stylized models suggested in Dagaev, Lamberova, Sobolev and Sonin (2013).
Our approach relies on four simple parameters that drive the dynamics of the protests. First, we consider the costs of collective action – the opportunity costs of spending time on Maidan. The second parameter is the military capacity of the incumbent that can be devoted to the suspension of the protest. The higher it is, the more numerous should the protest be to succeed. The third parameter we use is the degree of the radicalization of the incumbent (the difference between his position and the preferred policy of the majority of the population). Finally, we use an information availability parameter (how many people are aware of the place and time of the occurrence of the protest).
With the electric telegraph, a communication tool of the 19th century, information availability was low and many of those who would have been glad to pay the costs of collective actions to replace the incumbent stay at home as they are not aware of the protest taking place. With Facebook and Twitter, the availability of information is much higher. According to our findings, the crucial role in dynamics of contemporary mass actions is played by the ratio of military capacity to the information availability rather than their values per se.
Our framework assumes that each citizen’s decision of whether to participate in the protest or not is based on the difference between her position and the preferred policy of the incumbent. According to this decision, all citizens can be classified into two groups – those who participate in a protest against the incumbent, and those who do not. We define a person, who has the median position among the protesters, as the expected new incumbent. So if the elections were held among the protesters, he would receive the widest support. If the number of citizens participating in the protest is sufficient to overcome the military capacity of the current incumbent, the protest becomes successful, and the expected new incumbent of the protest becomes the new incumbent. The combination of military capacity, opportunity costs and costs of coordination determine the size of the stability zone – a segment of policy space where the incumbent is not vulnerable to mass protest.
The model allows us to predict the dynamics of the protests that is generated by different combinations of the parameters. For illustrative purposes, the availability of information about the protest is proxied by data on Facebook penetration and military capacity is described by the number of military personnel per capita in 2009 collected by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (Hackett, 2010). The incumbent policy position is proxied by the Legitimacy Index from Polity IV, where a higher index corresponds to lower legitimacy of the incumbent and his regime. Finally, the costs of participation in a protest are proxied by the employment rate. A recent study by Campante and Chor stresses unemployment as important determinants of opportunity costs of taking to the streets during Arab Spring (Campante & Chor, 2012). As unemployed individuals have fewer options of how to spend their time, one should expect that a substantial number of unemployed people corresponds to a relative ease of sparking unrest.
Using these parameters, we can explain success or failure of the protest, and predict some proprieties of its aftermath.
For example, high military capacity, opportunity costs and costs of coordination generate a broad stability zone, so that even a radical incumbent would not face a threat of revolution. The decline of any of three parameters can narrow the zone of stability and make the autocrat vulnerable to mass protest. As the incumbent is highly radical, a significant part of the population takes to the streets. As a result, the new incumbent’s position is sufficiently close to the one of the median voter and is, thus, inside the stability zone. An example of such a scenario is the overturn of Slobodan Milosevic after the fall of communism, when there were eight failed and one successful attempts to form a wide coalition of opposition parties (Spoerri, 2008). The process of finding a common ground started in 1990 with the emergence of the coalition of six parties, the Associated Opposition of Serbia, which broke shortly after a series of power struggles, policy disagreements, and personality clashes. It was only ten years later that the protest which facilitated Milosevic’s downfall took place, as the leader of the united opposition, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, was able to ensure the non-involvement of the crucial military unit on behalf of Milosevic (Bujosevic & Radanovic, 2003).
In contrast, the events of the Arab Spring had different political dynamics. Low military capacity and high unemployment of Egypt and Tunisia determined a narrow stability zone ex ante. The absence of protests of these long-lived regimes can be explained by the relatively moderate position of the incumbent. In 2010, the Egyptian and Tunisian regimes had scores of 5 and 4 (out of 12) of Political Legitimacy from Polity IV, respectively. However the emergence of social media that enabled the users to coordinate their actions easily narrowed the relatively small stability zone. As the incumbent was less radical, fewer citizens benefit from its replacement and take to the streets. Thus, the new incumbent is defined by protesters, her policy position is more radical and now is out of the stability zone. The new incumbent immediately faces the new social unrest.
Table 1 presents the stylized results of our study. Locating the combination of parameters of the country in the table allows us to make the prediction about the dynamics of the protest. There are several possible courses of events: the protest can be weak and die out soon, with the incumbent staying in place; it can be significant, but yet not large enough to overthrow the incumbent; it can lead to the replacement of the incumbent, followed by the period of stability; and, finally, it can result in the replacement of the incumbent, but not cessation of the protest.
Table 1. Protest Outcome as a Function of Parameters
What do our findings tell us about Ukraine? The previously used proxy for the information index there is not a good choice, as the majority of users prefer the Russian version of Facebook – Vkontakte – as the major social network of the country. Thus, we rely on the Vkontakte penetration data (as of 2013, 18.5 million of people in Ukraine were using the network, constituting 40.6% of the population, see report of Ukranian IT-news agency AIN.UA: http://ain.ua/2013/11/28/503853).
The military parameter, that reduces the likelihood of successful protest, is low, compared to the countries of Arab Spring and constitutes 2.8 active military per 1000 people (see the Ukrainian law “Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2013”, http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc34?id=&pf3511=49126&pf35401=283834), which is half of the one in Egypt at the beginning of the protests. The unemployment parameter fell to 8.6 during the incumbency of Victor Yanukovych, which corresponds to the pre-protest unemployment in Egypt in 2010.
The legitimacy measure presents a difficulty for comparison with the Arab Spring cases, as the Legitimacy Index has not yet been updated. However, the harsh actions of Victor Yanukovych during the 2013-2014 protests (including the suppression of the protest and the passage of laws denying freedom of assembly and freedom of expression, as well as the refusal to repeal his earlier changes of the constitution towards more presidential form of government) suggest that his legitimacy level fell by approximately 50% (and was about 20% right before he was ousted from power), which is corroborated by polls (“Ukraine’s future in peril under President Yanukovych”, The Washington Post, 2 December, 2013). Thus, the conservative estimate is that his legitimacy index shifted from 3 to 4 or 5, as shown on Figure 1.
For the purpose of comparison, we plot the Arab Spring countries and Ukraine in the space of our variables in Figure 1. The X-axis shows the incumbent’s departure from the median population-preferred policy (proxied by the Legitimacy Index from Polity IV). We use the value of the index in the year prior to the start of unrest, and the index value in 2010 for countries with no protests (Morocco, Oman, Djibouti). The Y-axis corresponds to the employment level. The size of the bubble corresponds to the ratio of military capacity and Facebook (or Vkontakte) penetration (data from the Arab Spring Social Media Report).
The shading of the bubble reflects the type that country belongs to: striped (no significant protest), light gray (continuing protest), and dark grey (multiple protests). Syria is excluded from the classification and is marked white, because of the civil war and international intervention.
Figure 1. Legitimacy index (X-axis), Employment (Y-axis), Military capacity / Social media penetration (size of the bubble) in Arab Spring countries and Ukraine
Figure 1 illustrates that countries appear in tight clusters in line with our theoretical predictions. The countries with continuing protests that did not lead to the downfall of the incumbent are divided into two groups. The first group (Kuwait, Jordan, Lebanon, and Bahrain) has relatively a moderate incumbent policy position and extremely high level of development of new media. The reasons why these countries are not «striped» is high military capacity of the government that could be employed against protesters, combined with high opportunity costs of protesting (low unemployment rates).
The second group of countries (Syria, Algeria, Iraq, Yemen, and Mauritania) has more radical incumbents and higher unemployment rates (so the incentives to protests are higher there), but is poor in terms of IT development. The ratio of military capacity and Facebook (Vkontakte) penetration is high, which is reflected by the size of bubbles that are much larger than in the first groups. That is why in a country with a small military capacity (such as Yemen), the protests did not lead to the incumbent’s replacement.
Two Arab Spring countries belong to the “multiple protests” group. Both Egypt and Tunisia had relatively mild incumbents in the pre-protest era, with Tunisia’s Bashar al-Assad being the milder of the two. Both countries had relatively high unemployment rates and wide Facebook coverage, both factors alleviating the problem of organizing a collective action. Despite the fact that before the start of the protests Facebook coverage in Egypt had close to average values among the countries of Arab Spring, they grew at exponential rates and Egypt attained leading positions in the region in usage of new media several months later. Moreover, low rates of military capacity made protest activity less risky in both Tunisia and Egypt. The remaining differences in Facebook coverage and employment rates in Egypt and Tunisia account for the different structure of recurrent protests, predicted by our model.
Comparison of the Arab Spring countries data with the Ukrainian case shows that high military capacity, new media penetration and unemployment generate even more narrow stability zones than one observes in the cases of Egypt and Tunisia. The reason why the incumbent was not vulnerable to mass protests can be explained by the political legitimacy of Yanukovych as the winner of relatively free elections in 2010.
But if the Arab Spring protests were triggered by rapid growth of new (cheap) communication technologies, the successful protest against Yanukovych can be explained by his radicalization. The radicalization took the form of parliamentary acts that put significant constraints on political rights and civil liberties and violent suppression of dissident actions.
Employing the proposed approach and contrasting the Ukrainian case with the countries of the Arab Spring allows us to draw several conclusions.
Firstly, the current combination of availability of information, military capacity of the incumbent and his radicalization, together with the opportunity costs of staying on Maidan, are likely to result in successful and recurrent protest. The persistence of the protests after the formation of a temporal government supports this hypothesis.
Secondly, it is worthwhile to note that as the policy position of Viktor Yanukovych was relatively mild, his potential successor might be more radical.
Thirdly, the exponential growth of social media, the reduction of military capacity and relatively high unemployment puts Ukraine into an “instability zone”. This implies that the 2004 scenario of the Orange Revolution is unlikely to repeat. The protest of 2004 resulted in a general election, and the elected president Viktor Yushchenko served his term without interruption. The protests of 2013 are more likely to result in a rapid change of incumbents and a period of instability.
One factor can strengthen the possible incumbent’s vulnerability. The external pressure of the Russian government reduces costs of collective resistance to the new Ukrainian authorities among pro-Russian citizens, while the promise of Western countries to support fast EU integration can incentivize politicians to accelerate reforms opposed by significant parts of the population.
References
- Bujosevic, D., & Radanovic, I. (2003). The fall of Milosevic: the October 5th revolution. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Campante, F. R., & Chor, D. (2012). Why was the Arab world poised for revolution? Schooling, economic opportunities, and the Arab Spring. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 167–187.
- Dagaev, D., Lamberova, N., Sobolev, A., & Sonin, K. (2013). Technological Foundations of Political Instability. Centre for Economic Policy Research Working Paper Series
- Hackett, J. (2010). The Military Balance 2010: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defense E conomics. London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies.
- Spoerri, M. (2008). Uniting the opposition in the run – up to electoral revolution – Lessons from Serbia 1990 – 2000. Totalitarismus Und Demokratie, 5(2005), 67–85.
- Svolik, M. (2009). Power sharing and leadership dynamics in authoritarian regimes. American Journal of Political Science, 53(2), 477–494
The crisis in Ukraine and the Georgian economy
We analyze how the crisis in Ukraine will likely impact the Georgian economy and distinguish between short-run and long-run effects. We argue that the short-run effects are transmitted through trade and capital flows and that they are rather negative for Georgia and can hardly be bolstered. In the long-run, however, the crisis could improve the competitiveness of the Caucasus Transit Corridor, an important trading route between Europe and Central Asia Georgia participates in. We give recommendations how political decision makers could support such a development in the wake of an impairment of the northern Ukrainian transit routes.
Introduction
When Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovich decided not to sign the association agreement with the European Union and instead opted for a Russian package of long-term economic support, many Ukrainians perceived this not to be a purely economic decision. Rather, they feared this to be a renunciation of Western cultural and political values, and – to put it mildly – were not happy about this development.
The Russian political system, characterized by a prepotent president, constrained civil rights, and a government controlling important parts of the economy through its secret service, is not exactly the dream of young Ukrainians. Russia can offer economic carrots, but these do not count much against the soft power of Europe that comes in the form of political freedom, good governance, and economic development to the benefit of not just a small group of oligarchs.
Hence, it was all but surprising when many young Ukrainians took their anger about Yanukovich to the streets. After protests that lasted for nearly three months, President Yanukovich fled the country, a temporary government took over, and chaos broke out on the Crimean peninsula.
The dispute about the Crimea has the potential to impede the relations between Russia and the West for a long time to come, in particular if Russia enforces an annexation of the territory. Moreover, the tensions could quickly turn into a military conflict. The aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush was moved into an operational distance to the Crimea, accompanied by 20 smaller U.S. warships, and 12 additional fighter planes will be stationed in Poland. Yet even if there will be no direct confrontation between official Russian and U.S. forces, Ukraine could become the battleground of a proxy war, a kind of conflict that was common in the Cold War era. In this respect, one can already read the writing on the wall: the new Ukrainian government begs the U.S. for supplying arms and ammunition, and while the Obama administration is still reluctant to give in to such requests, the call is supported by hawkish U.S. congressmen who might finally prevail.
Ukraine is a country that is geographically close to Georgia and, like Georgia, has vital economic stakes in the Black Sea area. Georgia will not be unaffected by whatever happens in Kiev and Simferopol. In this policy brief, we will inform policy makers about the likely short-run and long-run economic consequences of the turmoil in Ukraine, discuss the challenges and opportunities that may arise, and derive some policy recommendations.
Short-run economic consequences
The crisis in Ukraine will almost instantaneously affect trade and capital flows between Georgia, Ukraine, and Russia. The effects will likely be negative and hit Georgia in a situation of economic recovery.
The Georgian real GDP growth rates were 6.3% in 2010, 7.2% in 2011, and 6.2% in 2012, and the real GDP per capita evolved from about 2,600 USD to about 3,500 USD in this time, but the upsurge discontinued in 2013 (if no other source is mentioned, figures presented in this policy brief (including those in the graphs) come from the Georgian statistical office GeoStat). ISET-PI, in its February 2014 report on the leading GDP indicators for Georgia, estimates the GDP in 2013 to be 2.6%, while GeoStat, the statistical office of Georgia, believes it to be 3.1%.
The unsatisfactory performance of the Georgian economy in 2013 was arguably caused by political uncertainties resulting from the government change that took place in late 2012, and as these uncertainties are largely overcome, most economists believe that Georgia will get back to its remarkable growth trajectory in 2014. The IMF, in its Economic Outlook, predicts a real GDP Growth of 6% in 2014, and the government of Georgia expects this number to be 5%. With an escalating crisis in Ukraine, it is questionable whether these rosy forecasts are still realistic.
Effects on imports
In 2013, Ukraine and Russia were the 3rd and the 4th largest importers to Georgia, respectively. Graph 1 shows the top five importers to Georgia, which together make up about 50% of total imports. The imports from Ukraine and Russia are mainly comprised of consumption goods: of all goods that were imported between 2009 and 2013 from Ukraine and Russia, about 30% were foodstuff. The ten main import goods in this time (in order of monetary volume) were cigarettes, sunflower oil, chocolate, bread, cakes, meat other than poultry, poultry, and sugar.
If the supply of these goods would be reduced through a breakdown of production and logistics, roadblocks, damaged infrastructure etc., the consequences for Georgia would not be utterly severe. From Ukraine and Russia, Georgia receives few goods that are (1) needed for investment projects and (2) cannot be produced domestically (an example of sophisticated investment goods that need to be imported would be ski lifts for tourism projects). Moreover, as Ukraine and Russia supply primarily standard goods that are produced almost everywhere, it is unlikely that a cutback in their imports would lead to sharp price rises in Georgia. Very quickly, increased imports from other countries would close any supply gaps. In addition, many imported consumption goods, like Ukrainian orange juice, are but luxury for ordinary Georgians, who buy their food in cheap domestic markets that sell almost exclusively local products.
Effects on exports
A small anecdote may illustrate the status of Georgian products in the Russian market. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Stalin used to invite his comrades to his Kuntsevo dacha almost every night. At these occasions, he drank only semi-sweet Georgian red wine. His clique, usually preferring Russian vodka, adopted this habit out of fear to displease the dictator. Yet the real highlight of these nightly gatherings took place after midnight, when an opulent feast began, featuring all the delicacies of the Georgian cuisine. Through Stalin (and the fact that Georgia was a preferred destination of Soviet tourism), Georgian food obtained an excellent reputation in most countries of the former Soviet Union, and, to the dismay of Georgians, some younger Russians even do not know that Khinkali is not an originally Russian dish.
As can be seen in Graph 2, Russia and Ukraine are among the top 5 destinations for Georgian produce, together absorbing about 14% of total Georgian exports in 2013. In 2006, two Georgian products that are traditionally highly popular in Russia, namely wine and mineral water (the famous “Borjomi” brand), were banned from the Russian market. Yet in the wake of the diplomatic thaw that set in after the new government assumed power last year, this ban was lifted, and in 2013, the export of these goods regained momentum. In 2013, 68% of all wine exported from Georgia was sold in Russia and Ukraine (44 and 24 percentage points, respectively). In both countries, Georgian wines are sold at the higher end of the price range and are typically consumed by people with middle and high income. It is likely that these exports, in particular those to Ukraine, will be affected considerably by the crisis. This may happen through decreased demand for luxury foods and through a possible depreciation of the Ukrainian hryvna and the ruble vis-à-vis the Georgian lari.
Another sector that may be affected by the situation in Ukraine is the car re-export business. Georgia imports huge numbers of used cars from the U.S., Europe, and Japan, and passes them on to countries in the region. While this business hardly yields potential for real economic progress, it accounts for roughly 25% of Georgian exports! Of these 25%, about 7 percentage points go to Russia and Ukraine. Moreover, many cars are imported to Georgia on the land route from Europe through Ukraine and Russia (often driven by private, small-scale importers). If it will become more difficult to cross the border between Russia and Ukraine, this business, providing income to many low-skilled Georgians, may be at risk.
It should also be noted that Ukrainians and Russians make up an ever-increasing share of the tourists coming to Georgia (though the biggest group of tourists are Israelis). Also through this channel, an economic downturn in Ukraine and Russia will have unpleasant consequences for Georgia.
Effects on capital flows
According to the National Bank of Georgia, in 2013 a total of 801 mln USD was flowing in from Russia (see Graph 3). Ukraine contributed 45 mln USD to the money inflows, still significant for an economy as small as Georgia’s. An economic downturn in Russia and Ukraine would hit many Georgian citizens, often pensioners and elderly people, who depend on remittances of their children and other family members sent from these countries. This may aggravate a trend that already exists: in January 2014, money inflows decreased by 4% from Russia and by 5% from Ukraine (compared to January 2013).
Long-run economic consequences
Most of the economic dynamics Georgia experienced since 2003 was “catch up growth”. A country permeated by corruption, with a dysfunctional police and judicial system, without protection of property rights and contract enforcement, will grow almost automatically when the government restarts to fulfill its basic functions. Yet once this phase of returning to normal economic circumstances is over (Georgia probably is already in this situation), high growth rates can hardly be achieved without a strong export orientation of the economy, in particular when an economy is as small as Georgia’s. Most economists concerned with Georgia are therefore struggling to identify economic sectors where Georgia is in a good position to develop export potential. The National Competitiveness Report for Georgia, written in 2013 by the ISET Policy Institute on behalf of USAID, therefore extensively discusses the question what Georgia can deliver to the world. Though not related to export in a classical sense, the report points out that one of the advantages Georgia has is its geographical location, providing for possibilities to transform Georgia into a logistics hub.
There are three main routes to transport goods from Europe to the Central Asian countries (e.g. from Hamburg to Taraz in Kazakhstan). One route goes via the Baltic ports of Klaipeda or Riga, and then through Ukraine and Russia, and another route goes overland through Ukraine. A third one, the so called Caucasian Transit Corridor, has the Georgian port city of Poti and Turkey as its Western connection points, then goes through Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the Caspian Sea, and further east it splits up into a Kazakhstan and a Turkmenistan branch.
According to the Almaty based company Comprehensive Logistics Solutions, the fastest and cheapest route is the one through the Baltic ports. The transport from Hamburg to Taraz takes around 33 days and costs 6,220 USD per standard container. The overland transport via Ukraine takes around 34 days and costs 7,474 USD. Finally, transport through the CTC currently takes the longest time, namely around 40 days, and costs 6,896 USD.
Unlike many other economic activities, competition for transportation is more or less a zero-sum game played by nations. If transport through Ukraine and Russia will be restrained due to closed borders and political and economic instability, the total transport volume will not change substantially. Rather, instead of going through the northern routes, the goods will flow through the CTC. A similar development could be observed when the embargo against Iran was tightened and shipping goods through Iranian ports became increasingly difficult for Armenia and Azerbaijan. As a result, Azerbaijan, traditionally importing through Iran and exporting through Poti, now facilitates both its imports and exports through Poti.
This is a great chance for Georgia if it wants to become serious about transforming into a logistics hub. In our policy recommendations, we will speak about how to utilize on this opportunity.
Policy recommendations
Georgia can do little to bolster the short-run effects that are transmitted through the trade and capital flow channels. Political decision makers should be aware of problems that might arise for particularly vulnerable groups in the population, like pensioners who lose income in case remittances from Russia and Ukraine run dry, and help out with social support if necessary.
Regarding the long-run impact, Georgia should use this opportunity for gaining ground in the competition with northern transit routes. The Caucasus Transit Corridor can become much faster and cheaper if (a) a deepwater port and modern port facilities with warehouses will be built in Poti, (b) the road and train infrastructure will be improved, and (c) it will be easier to bring cargo over the Caspian Sea. Regarding the latter point, it would be important to assist Azerbaijan in improving the port management at Baku (in particular reducing corruption), and in reforming the monopolistic Azerbaijani State Caspian Sea Shipping Company.
Azerbaijan invests 775 mln USD into the Georgian part of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, proving their serious interest to upgrade CTC. Given this impressive commitment of Azerbaijan, Georgia should not stand back.
Conclusion
The crisis in Ukraine yields short-run risks and long-run opportunities for the Georgian economy. While there is little that can be done about the risks, the opportunities call for courageous steps to improve the Caucasus Transit Corridor. If the countries that hold stakes in the CTC are now further reducing the cost of transportation and make the route faster and more customer-friendly, the CTC may establish itself as the main trading route connecting Europe and Central Asia. Once critical investments have taken place, CTC’s advantage could be sustained beyond the current crisis. It is a competitive route that simply needs upgrading, which can happen now as a fallout of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia.
References
- Leading GDP Indicators for Georgia, The ISET Policy Institute, February 2014, http://www.iset-pi.ge/index.php?article_id=711
- The National Competitiveness Report for Georgia, The ISET Policy Institute, 2013, http://www.iset-pi.ge/index.php?article_id=713
- World Economic Outlook, The International Monetary Fund, October 2013, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/
The relationship between education and labor market opportunities: the case of Ukraine
Author: Hanna Vakhitova, KSE and Tom Coupe, KSE
This brief is based on a research project that analyses the extent to which the educational system in Ukraine contributes to better local employment opportunities, hence diminishing the outflows. According to the results, additional year of education increases the chance of finding a job by 2-3%. However, the effect of education on wages is small, especially when compared to other transition countries (1-5% wage premium for a year of education). In addition, while in 8 out of 10 countries education has zero or positive impact on the probability of starting a business, this impact is negative and significant in Ukraine. *)
The Charity of the Extremely Wealthy
Analyzing data from the Giving Pledge (a public pledge to give away at least half of one’s fortune during one’s lifetime, launched by Bill Gates and Warren Buffett in 2010) and the Forbes billionaires’ list, I find that self-made billionaires are substantially more likely to give away large amounts of money, than do billionaires who inherited their money. Policy makers in many emerging markets with ‘new’ billionaires thus better quickly modernize their charity laws.
In 2010, two billionaires Bill Gates and Warren Buffett launched the Giving Pledge, a public pledge to give away at least half of one’s fortune during one’s lifetime (http://givingpledge.org/), which by now has been signed by 114 people. 114 are not much, you might think, and you might want to add your own name to the list. But, unfortunately, not everybody is invited to make this pledge. Gates and Buffet focus only on the extremely wealthy people: 85 of the signatories of the pledge are among the 1426 billionaires identified by Forbes in 2013, and most of the others were on Forbes’ billionaire list in earlier years. Of these 1426, 135 billionaires come from Central and Eastern Europe or the Former Soviet Union (see table I)
Worldwide, about 6% of billionaires (85/1426) have made this pledge. Among the signatories is one Russian billionaire, Vladimir Putanin, and one Ukrainian billionaire, Victor Pinchuk, which makes Ukraine score above average, with one out of ten, or 10% of Ukrainian billionaires signing.
Table 1. Number of 2013 Forbes Billionaires from the Former Soviet Union|
# 2013 Forbes Billionaires |
# of Selfmade |
Giving Pledge |
Name of Signatory |
|
|
Russia |
110 |
110 |
1 |
Vladimir Potanin |
|
Ukraine |
10 |
10 |
1 |
Victor Pinchuk |
|
Kazakhstan |
5 |
4 |
0 |
|
|
Czech Republic |
4 |
4 |
0 |
|
|
Poland |
4 |
4 |
0 |
|
|
Romania |
1 |
1 |
0 |
|
|
Georgia |
1 |
1 |
0 |
In my most recent working paper, Claire Monteiro of Georgetown University and myself investigate whether it is possible to explain why these 6 % have signed, and the other 94% have not (yet) signed the Pledge. Or to put it in a more interesting way, why Putanin and Pinchuk signed but the other CEE/FSU oligarchs have not.
We investigate this question by analyzing whether generous billionaires have specific characteristics in common, characteristics that not so generous billionaires do not have. Doing this is possible because Forbes publishes not only a ranking of billionaires, it also provides background information about each billionaire like the billionaire’s education, age, how many children (s)he has and so on.
My analysis shows that three factors have a significant effect on the chance that a billionaire will be generous. First, a billionaire who is self-made is about three to four times more likely to sign than a billionaire who inherited his/her billion(s). This finding that how one earned one’s money affect how one spends this money is consistent with University of Chicago professor Richard Thaler’s ‘mental accounting’ theory and with earlier research showing that the propensity to consume is bigger if income received is framed as a bonus rather than if it is framed as a rebate, and the research showing that windfall gains (money won in a lottery) is more readily consumed than non-windfall gains (money for which one had to work). Note that all but one billionaire from the CEE/FSU are categorized by Forbes as self-made.
Second, billionaires with more money are more likely to sign the Giving Pledge and promise to give away half their fortune – for example, compared to an average billionaire who has about 4 billion dollar in estimated net worth (like Victor Pinchuk), a billionaire with an estimated net worth of about 15 billion dollars (like Vladimir Potanin) is roughly 50% more likely to promise to give away half of her/his fortune. Third, billionaires whose fortune comes from the technology/telecommunications industry are about twice as likely to announce that they will give away at least half of their fortune, compared to billionaires from other sectors.
The influence of other factors is small and less precisely estimated: older billionaires tend to be more likely to sign (possibly because being closer to the end of one’s life makes one think more about what one wants to leave behind), as do those who have more children (maybe because having more children makes it more likely that the inheritance will lead to fights among family members) or those having a Ph.D. Moreover, billionaires from the food and retail industry tend to be less likely to sign than those from the metallurgy industry.
Taken together my model predicts for Ukraine that Victor Pinchuk is the Ukrainian billionaire who is most likely to sign (4% probability), being 10 times more likely to sign than Yuriy Kosiuk (the Ukrainian billionaire who is least likely to sign with 0.4% probability). The difference in estimated net worth (3.8 billion versus 1.6 billion), age (52 versus 44), the number of children (4 versus 1) and education (Ph.D versus bachelor), and the sector in which they are active (metals and mining versus food and retail) explain this difference in probability. Victor Pinchuk is also about 30% more likely to sign than Rinat Akhmetov – while the latter has a higher estimated net worth (15.4 billion versus 3.8 billion), the effect of education (bachelor versus Ph.D), age (46 versus 52) and children (2 versus 4) play in favor of Victor Pinchuk, outweighing the wealth effect.
While it is definitely fun to do these kinds of computations, my research also has serious implications. The fact that inherited billionaires are much less charitable than the self-made billionaires means that academics should not assume that ‘all money is equal’ as they typically do – how you acquire money affects what you will do with it. It also implies that the countries from CEE/FSU with lots of ‘new’ wealth should modernize their charity laws quickly – once the self-made billionaires pass their wealth on to their children, it will become much more difficult to turn this massive wealth into charity.
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References
- Tom Coupé and Claire Monteiro, The Charity of the Extremely Wealthy, Kyiv School of Economics, Discussion Papers 51.
* A version of this policy brief has been published in Russian at Forbes.ua.
Academic Inbreeding in Ukraine
In Ukraine, having a university degree only provides a noisy signal of one’s productivity, which means social ties and personal relations play a relatively more important role in the Ukrainian economy in general. Therefore it should not come as a surprise that inbreeding is very common in Ukrainian academia; for example, about 50% of faculty obtained their university degree from the university that employs them. Given the absence of clear “quality signs” for fresh university graduates, inbreeding can be viewed as a second-best option for hiring decisions. Our econometric analysis shows that inbred faculty does not differ in its (observable) quality from non-inbred faculty. At the same time, ceteris paribus, inbred faculty has somewhat lower salaries. We also find that the extent of inbreeding is slightly higher in universities with a “national” status and lower in very small universities (of less than 1000 students).
Academic inbreeding is the practice of universities hiring their own graduates to academic positions. Inbred faculty is thus faculty employed at the same university from which they graduated. Inbreeding implies a low level of competition for faculty vacancies possibly resulting in low quality hires. However, inbred faculty can be cheaper, reduce the chance of a mismatch between university and faculty member, and can be better “tailored” to the needs of a certain university or discipline. For some specific narrow disciplines inbreeding can be the only way to hire faculty (for example, if only one university in a region provides courses in a certain discipline, teachers of that discipline most probably will be inbred). In research, inbreeding can help to pass on tacit knowledge but it can also prevent “fresh blood” and new ideas from entering into the university. In developed countries, universities usually try to limit inbreeding in order to first, “disseminate” their graduates and earn a good reputation, and second, hire the best graduates on the market through an open competition. In less developed countries, inbreeding is more common because of the higher role of personal relations in hiring decisions in general.
Although very widespread, academic inbreeding in Ukraine has received little or no attention from researchers or policy makers. Data on inbred faculty is similarly scarce. There is only one recent exception – in the summer of 2013, the Centre for Social Research surveyed about 400 university professors. The survey contains information on a wide range of aspects of faculty employment, such as working hours, publications, participation in conferences, income size etc., including the question on whether a person works at the same university from which (s)he graduated. We used this data to do an econometric analysis of the factors that determine inbreeding and the impact of inbreeding. We complemented the survey data by data from an online questionnaire we distributed among KSE graduates whom we know work in academia, their acquaintances and among the network of KSE partners who work in academia (a total of 59 responses).
Causes of Inbreeding
Besides providing a person with knowledge and skills necessary for a white-collar job, education has several other functions. One of them is signaling, i.e. people who successfully graduate from an educational institution should have higher abilities (ceteris paribus) than those with lower grades or dropouts. This function of education is almost entirely lost in Ukraine because of widespread corruption. In Ukraine, good students can obtain good skills and knowledge together with good grades. However, “bad” students can obtain the same grades for money: besides paying professors for exam grades, students can buy a course paper, a diploma thesis and even a doctoral dissertation. Cheating and plagiarism are also very widespread; not only in students’ work, but also in academic research. Hence, based on the diploma alone, a potential employer will have difficulties telling apart a “good” student from a “bad” one. Therefore, other screening mechanisms are relatively important in Ukraine.
Many private-sector employers, for example, will pay more attention to previous work experience and personal recommendations than formal education. For example, the ULMS-2007 survey shows that from 48% to 68% of people found a job through relatives or friends, which is comparable to the extent of inbreeding found by this study in academics (48.6% in the CSR-2013 survey, 68% in our online survey). This situation pushes students, who do not expect to be hired by relatives or friends, to find a full-time job already in the first or second year of studies, providing them with both incentives and funds to “buy” a diploma. This creates a “vicious circle” – the low value of a diploma makes employers looking at previous work experience, and the need to gain that experience further devalues diplomas.
For universities, “previous work experience” is the student’s performance during their studies. Hence, by inbreeding their own students, universities reduce uncertainty, which they would be facing if they looked for needed candidates on an open market. As the academic career of a person develops, (s)he can develop additional signals of his/her “quality”; first of all, scientific degrees (Candidate of Sciences, Doctor of Sciences) and/or ranks (Docent or Professor) and connected to them publications in Ukrainian and foreign journals (with the last ones being much more valuable). Therefore, as we show, younger and less distinguished faculty (with shorter teaching experience and without a Doctor degree or Professor rank) is more likely to work at a university from which they graduated.
Estimation Results
Our econometric estimation showed that the extent of inbreeding does not depend on the quality of a university as measured by its rank in Ukraine. Inbreeding is less common in very small universities (of less than 1000 students), and is independent of the university size after this threshold. Universities with a “national” status have slightly higher level of inbreeding.
We also show that inbred faculty does not differ in “quality” (measured as the number of publications in Ukrainian and foreign journals and the probability to get a foreign fellowship) from other faculty, although, ceteris paribus, inbred faculty do get lower salaries.
Results from both the CSR-2013 survey and our online questionnaire indicate that personal connections are very important both for entering a university and for further promotion. Usually an academic career starts when a person begins his/her Ph.D. studies; at the same time, (s)he starts working as an assistant or a lecturer (when admitting students to Ph.D. studies, universities prefer their own MA graduates). To move up the career ladder, a person should earn scientific degrees or ranks, have certain duration of teaching experience and a minimal required number of publications (all the formal requirements for certain academic positions are stipulated in a Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers). According to the law, currently there is no tenure system, and faculty is hired with one- three- or five-year contracts (the longest contracts can last up to seven years, but only in the universities with a “national” status).
Hiring Procedures at Universities
When a vacancy is open (e.g. a contract expires), a university should make an announcement in a pedagogical journal and/or on its website; then candidates should be interviewed at a chair meeting, and a selected candidate should be approved by the faculty dean. A candidate should have a required teaching experience and publications. There are about 1500 journals on the list of Higher Attestation Commission (the body that organizes the dissertations defense), which means that practically all universities issue at least one journal, and very few of them are refereed. This means that publishing in the home university’s journal is the cheapest and easiest way for a faculty member to get the needed number of publications. Therefore, publications are very often of very poor quality and do not contain any real research, especially in social sciences. To mitigate this problem, the Ministry of Education and Science introduced a new requirement for scientific degrees – since 2013, 20% of publications should be in foreign-refereed journals.
When hiring, all formal requirements and procedures are typically observed – a competition is announced, the chair meeting held, the candidate has the required duration of work experience and the number of publications (their quality is discussed above). However, in reality there is very often just one candidate “for” whom the vacancy is opened, and outside people, even if they apply for a vacancy, are ignored. Usually a chair meeting supports the opinion of a chair head, but either way, a dean could overturn a chair meeting decision, so despite seemingly open procedures, in reality a person’s employment depends on his/her relations with a chair head and/or a faculty dean. Studying at a university is the most common but not the only way to establish these relations. A person can get acquainted with a chair head or a faculty dean at a conference, be his/her relative or friend, or be recommended by his/her relative or friend.
Such a widespread reliance on personal connections is a legacy from the Soviet times when personal ties replaced market mechanisms, and students were allocated to their first workplaces rather than hired on a competitive basis. Since universities were situated in cities, staying at a university implied a better living environment, and salaries were also good. Therefore many students tried to stay at their alma mater by establishing good relations with a chair head or a faculty dean. Nowadays, university salaries are not competitive so students staying at universities are not necessarily the best ones. However, they are not the worst ones either because otherwise they would not be offered a position.
Concluding Remarks
In Ukraine, academic inbreeding provides universities with a relatively cheap and well-prepared workforce. On the other hand, it also fosters isolation of universities and conservation of existing “traditions” – whether good or bad. Given low academic mobility of both students and professors, this situation prevents dissemination of knowledge and lowers competition, which necessarily leads to degradation.
Currently, inbreeding is not on the agenda of either researchers or policy makers. In fact, no one seems to have considered it as a problem. Perhaps, it will not be discussed as a problem any time soon because there are many other “bigger” problems in Ukrainian higher education. To name a few, these are:
- high centralization and insufficient level of university autonomy;
- low salaries and high teaching workload of professors;
- low extent of university research and very low quality of the existing research, especially in humanities and social sciences;
- high corruption and low standards of studying and research work (ubiquitous cheating and plagiarism);
- low sensitivity of educational programs to the needs of modern economy.
Perhaps, introduction of formal limits on inbreeding (setting a quota for both MA graduates admitted to Ph.D. programs and for Ph.D. graduates hired to teaching positions at the same university) could bring some “fresh air” into the system. This measure would extend the pool of candidates available to a university and introduce an element of competition between them. It would also create incentives both for universities to improve their Ph.D. programs and for students to put greater effort into studies.
References
- Bilyk, Olga and Iuliia Sheron (2012) Do Informal Networks Matter in the Ukrainian Labor Market? EERC Working paper No 12/11E.
- Coupe, Tom and Hanna Vakhitova (2010). Recent Dynamics of Returns to Education in Transition Countries, KSE/KEI Working paper.
- Osipian, Ararat (2009). Corruption and Reform in Higher Education in Ukraine, Canadian and International Education, vol. 38, pp. 104-122.
- Shaw, Marta, Chapman, David and Nataliya Rumyantseva (2011). The Impact of the Bologna Process on Academic Staff in Ukraine, Higher Education Management, vol. 23, pp. 71–91.
- Stephens, Jason, Romakin, Volodymyr and Mariya Yukhymenko (2010). Academic Motivation and Misconduct in Two Cultures: A Comparative Analysis of US and Ukrainian Undergraduates, International Journal for Educational Integrity, vol. 6, pp. 47–60.
Trade Policy Uncertainty and External Trade: Potential Gains of Ukraine Joining the CU vs. the Signing Free Trade Agreement with the EU
This policy brief summarizes the results of recent research which predicts gains in Ukrainian exports from signing a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement with EU, and compares these gains with predicted gains from joining the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia. We argue that the gains would be mostly due to elimination of uncertainty in trade policy of Ukraine with the CU and the EU countries. We find that European integration brings higher potential for export growth, and that it also shifts the structure of Ukrainian exports towards capital goods, reducing the share of raw materials in total export.
Trade Policy Uncertainty and Export
Trade policy uncertainty (TPU) is a powerful negative factor that prevents economy from the realization of its export potential. In a recent paper, Handley and Limao (2012) argue that since the exporting decision involves substantial fixed costs, TPU significantly affects investment and entry decisions in international trade. In particular, they show that preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are important even when the pre-PTA tariff barriers are low. Comparing pre- and post-EU accession patterns of Portuguese exports, they find that Portuguese trade increased dramatically after 1985. The increase was the largest towards the EU partners, suggesting that it was caused by the accession. Export expanded through considerable entry of Portuguese firms into EU markets, even in industries where applied tariffs did not change. Handley and Limao estimated that the tariff reduction, which averaged 0.66 percentage points, has been responsible for only 20 percent of the increase in exports to EU10 after the EU accession, while 80 percent of the increase was due to resolving TPU.
Handley and Limao further argue that the Portuguese example should be highly relevant for any small open economy, facing important trade policy choices. In this regard, Ukraine is facing a very hard choice of selecting its regional integration strategy – towards the EU or the Customs Union (CU) with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, resulting in severe TPU. The options are mutually exclusive since the CU trade policy is not compatible with neither the WTO commitments of Ukraine, or with the parameters of the deep and comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) between Ukraine and the EU, finalized in 2012. Average tariff protection within the CU in 2012 was 10 percent (Shepotylo and Tarr, 2012), while the average WTO binding tariff rates in Ukraine were only 5 percent; the parameters of the FTA with the EU are even less protective, which would cause even stronger disagreements regarding the tariff schedules. Moreover, technical and phyto-sanitary standards in the EU and the CU are different; therefore, it would be extremely hard to harmonize the Ukrainian standards with both of them.
Despite low tariff protection, uncertainty on the parameters of the long run trade policy of Ukraine with the CU and EU countries is extremely high. It is crucial for both foreign and domestic investors to understand in what direction the regional integration will proceed before making decisions on investing or exporting, since these decisions can incur substantial sunk costs. Suppose that a large European multinational firm were interested in including Ukrainian companies in its production chains only if Ukraine signs the FTA with the EU (integrate vertically). If Ukraine instead joined the CU, this presumed European company would rather be interested in horizontal integration and invest by building a plant for final assembly of products to serve the Ukrainian and CIS markets. For Russian companies the situation would be the reversed. They would be interested to integrate vertically if Ukraine is a member of the CU and integrate horizontally if Ukraine signed FTA with EU. However, since vertical and horizontal integration are quite different strategies, neither European nor Russian companies invest in Ukraine before the uncertainty is resolved. The same holds true for domestic companies which would like to extend their export activities to new markets. Since entrance to new markets is costly and requires some irreversible investment, it is optimal to wait until the policy uncertainty is resolved.
Modeling Trade Policy Options of Ukraine
In Shepotylo (2013), we investigate which integration scenario is more preferable for Ukraine under the assumption that TPU is fully resolved and Ukraine trades up to its potential. Based on export data in 2001-2011, we estimate the gravity model by Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) method, adjusted for panel data case and endogeneity of a decision to sign a PTA. Using this model, we predict bilateral exports of Ukraine under three counterfactual scenarios: a) Ukraine joined the Customs Union in 2009 (CU); b) Ukraine signed the FTA with the EU in 2009 (EU FTA); c) Ukraine joined the EU in 2009 (EU). The model predictions take into account the level of economic development, geographical location, industrial structure, and quality of government and regulatory agencies. It also accounts for macro trends, including the global trade collapse of 2008-2009.
The results are not intended for a short-term forecast, but should be rather used as indicators of the long-run effects. Their interpretation is as follows. Suppose that Ukraine has signed the FTA with the EU in 2009. Taking into account all observable characteristics of Ukraine, what would be the level of Ukrainian export of product k to country j, if Ukraine, in all other respects, would behave as a typical country-member of the FTA EU? That would involve removal of the trade policy uncertainty, stronger integration of domestic companies into the global supply chains, and increase in foreign direct investments from the EU countries.
Unlike the studies based on the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) method, which assumes that the policy choice affects the economy only marginally through reduced tariff barriers, and that the underlying economic structure and expectations of the economic agents remain intact, the gravity model captures all changes that occur in the economy over the investigated period and extract the differences in export flows between any two counterfactual scenarios, given all background economic changes.
Results
Our main results are as follows. First, the actual exports of Ukraine are far below their potential, compared with performance of both the CU countries and the FTA EU countries. The expected long run gains in Ukrainian exports to all countries under the CU scenario are equal to 17.9 percent above the export level in 2009-2011. The corresponding number for the FTA EU scenario is 36 percent, and for the full EU scenario, 46.1 percent. Based on 2011, the export of Ukraine would have been 98 billion US dollars under the EU scenario, 91 billion US dollars under the FTA EU scenario, and 72 billion US dollars under the CU scenario. All these numbers should be compared with the actual 68 billion US dollars of Ukrainian export in 2011.
Figure 1. Ukrainian Export under the Different Scenarios
Second, any scenario predicts that Ukraine severely underperforms in its trade with both CIS and EU countries, while its export to the rest of the world is in line with the predictions of the model. These results are consistent with the theory that unresolved TPU in relationships with the CIS and EU countries severely hurts the Ukrainian export potential to these countries.
Table 1. Ukrainian Export under the Different Scenarios
Note: CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States; EU12 – countries that joined EU after 2003; EU15 – countries that joined EU before 2004; RoW – rest of the World
Third, CU integration would be more beneficial for the Ukrainian agriculture and food industry, while FTA EU or full EU integration would be more beneficial for textiles, metals, machinery and electrical goods, and transportation. Conditional on not worsening its market access to Russia, Ukraine would expand its trade in these sectors to all countries, including Russia and other members of CU.
Figure 2. Expected Increase of Ukrainian Export under the Different Scenarios 
Finally, the CU integration would lead to a small increase in the share of capital goods from 17 percent to 20 percent of total exports. FTA EU would increase the share of capital goods to 28 percent, while full EU integration would increase it to 29 percent. In all scenarios, the share of raw materials would decline from 16 percent to 10-12 percent. The share of intermediate goods would decline from 48 percent to around 40 percent under the two EU scenarios and would only marginally decrease under the CU scenario. The share of consumer goods would remain stable around 20 percent.
Conclusions
Ukraine would be better off by signing a deep and comprehensive trade agreement with the EU and integrate into its production chains than joining the CU. Right now, Ukraine severely underperforms by exporting far below its potential. Evidence shows that high trade policy uncertainty plays a large role in Ukraine’s poor performance, since the gap between actual and potential exports are mainly due to low levels of export to the EU and CIS countries. Moreover, Ukraine should be interested in moving the integration process even further, because EU accession would bring even better results.
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References
- Handley, K., & Limão, N. (2012). Trade and investment under policy uncertainty: theory and firm evidence (No. w17790). National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Helpman, E., Melitz, M., & Rubinstein, Y. (2008). Estimating trade flows: Trading partners and trading volumes. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,123(2), 441-487.
- Shepotylo, O., & Tarr, D. (2012). Impact of WTO accession and the customs union on the bound and applied tariff rates of the Russian federation. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, (6161).
Recent Dynamics of Returns to Education in Transition Countries
While, in an international comparison, transition countries spend a relatively large share of their GDP on education, and the population in transition countries is fairly highly educated, the returns to education in transition countries have been found to be relatively low, especially in comparison to other developing countries. In our paper, ‘Recent Dynamics of Returns to Education in Transition Countries’, we investigate whether the economic boom that transition countries experienced up to the 2008 financial crisis, increased the returns to education in these countries. Theories of skilled-biased technical change typically predict that periods of fast economic growth go together with an increase in the relative demand for skilled labor and hence an increase in the returns to education.
Using data from the 2007 wave of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), the estimated return to an additional year of schooling in transition countries varied between a low 5.2 percent in Ukraine to a high of about 10 % in Poland (see Figure 1). Returns in transition countries were relatively low compared to developing countries in the ISSP sample, and on average not unlike OECD countries.
Figure 1. Returns to Education by Countries, 2007 Wave – Basic Specification
Note: Coefficients of the years of schooling variable in earning regressions. Dependent variables are monthly earnings. Specification includes: potential experience (linear and squared), dummy for gender. Source: Ukraine – ISSP 2008, all other countries – ISSP 2007.
The estimated dynamics in returns to education in the period 2002-2007 further suggest that the economic boom that took place in that period did not affect people with different amounts of education in different ways. Returns to education increased slightly in some transition countries and decreased slightly in others, but overall returns to education remained relatively moderate. More specifically, from table 2 we can see a decrease in returns in Bulgaria, Latvia and Poland, and an increase in the Czech Republic, Russia, Slovakia and Slovenia. Both increases and decreases are small in size however.
Table 1. Dynamics of Returns, Basic Specification
Note: Coefficients of the years of schooling variable in earning regressions with few controls as specified in the text.Source: Estimates for 1991-2002 are from Flabbi et al. (2008); estimates for 2007 and for Ukraine are by the authors.
A more detailed analysis for Ukraine using data from the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, confirmed that economic growth did not have a major impact on the returns to education. The analysis for Ukraine however does suggest that, while in 2003 a secondary degree resulted in a somewhat higher wage, just having secondary education was no longer a differentiating factor in 2007.Moreover, only academic education made a difference, possibly because less and less people were paid very small wages (i.e. less than the official minimum wage).
The relatively limited importance of education for success on the labor market does not only show itself in the low estimated returns to education, it is also clear from the opinions people express about the factors that are important to get ahead. Table 3 gives the percentage of people who say a given factor is essential, important or fairly important to get ahead in a given country (based on the 2009 ISSP).
Table 2. To get ahead, it is essential, important or fairly important to
In most transition countries in the sample, most people think that hard work and ambition is the key to get ahead. Ukraine is no exception with hard work being thought to be essential, important or fairly important by about 94 percent of the respondents. Having a good education is thought to be at least fairly important by only about 73 percent of the respondents, with four other factors, besides hard work, scoring better on this criterion: having political connections, having ambition, having a wealthy family and knowing the right people. Also for the other transition countries in our sample, good education ranks only 5th, 6th or 7th.
Optimists could interpret these results as implying that at least education does not create the same social inequalities in the transition countries as it does in some other countries. Pessimists, on the other hand, who see education as an important driver of economic growth, will argue that low returns to education mean there is a low incentive for people to invest in education and that it is better to have education as a source of inequality rather than political or social connections, or having a wealth family.
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The Effect of Municipal Strategic Planning on Urban Growth in Ukraine
Authors: Denys Nizalov and Olena Nizalova, KEI.
In a downturn, the pressure is especially high on governments to produce sensible and effective development strategies to generate needed jobs and increased earnings. A large number of economic development tools were used in the past by local and national governments around the world, designed to facilitate regional and local economic growth. This brief presents the preliminary results from the evaluation of a program implemented in Ukraine.
Bradshaw and Blakely (1999) distinguish three historical waves of popularity for different tools used in economic development, with reference to the US states’ development policy:
- 1st wave – Incentive-based competition for industrial location, so called smokestack chasing (direct incentives to firms, reimbursement of relocation and infrastructure costs, tax-breaks);
- 2nd wave, from the early 80s – Cost-benefit-based assistance, focusing on internal growth (business incubators, start-up funds, trainings);
- 3rd wave, over the last two decades – Building of a “soft infrastructure” (institutions) conducive to economic growth (strategic planning, marketing, public-private partnerships, financing, regulation, intergovernmental collaboration).
While the effect of the first two waves on various growth outcomes was studied extensively (for reviews, see Bartik 1991; Fisher 1997; Wasylenko 1997; Goss and Phillips 1999; Buss 2001) the effect of the policies representing the third wave is less known. There are several reasons for that. These policies were developed relatively recently, they are hard to measure and compare and are most likely to have a long run effect.
A unique example of a third-wave policy was recently evaluated in Ukraine. The Local Economic Development (LED) Project in Ukraine, started by the USAID in 2004, introduced a process of municipal strategic planning into the practice of local government decision making. This Strategic Planning process involves setting goals and priorities for community economic development and coordination of activities in different areas of community life. It also allows the establishment of partnerships among various stakeholders and interest groups, and the mobilization of public and private resources to facilitate economic development.
Until recently, the effect of municipal strategic planning has been assessed exclusively by case-studies. See for example, the cases of Randstad (Priemus, 1994), Lisbon (Alden and Pires, 1996), London (Newman and Thornley, 1997), Hong Kong (Jessop and Sum, 2000), Guangzhou (Li, Yeung, Seabrooke, 2005; Wu and Zhang, 2007), and Hangzhou (Wu and Zhang, 2007). Although the above mentioned cases describe the planning process and the perceived benefits in great detail, they do not address the question of whether the Strategic Planning causes a higher rate of community economic growth or not. There are several reasons for these limitations. The procedure of planning, beyond general similarities, differs greatly in the implementation details from case to case, which makes any comparisons complicated. Moreover, the decision to start the planning process in those cases is thought to be endogenous since cities that are more likely to benefit from strategic planning are also more likely to get involved in this.
The LED example is much more suitable for evaluation. The implementation of the strategic planning system in the participating cities has been performed using a standardized procedure with the help of LED advisors. With one exception, the implementation took from 4 to 12 months. Also, the selection of the participating cities was done by LED personnel based on clear participation rules. Altogether, the LED activities targeted the same goal in each city – FDI growth and creation of new jobs. Moreover, a relatively large number of communities – 74 cities from all regions of Ukraine – were involved in the project by mid-2008.
Internal reports point to a great success of the project. More than 30 cities had by mid-2008 reported an increase in FDI. Collectively, the partner cities reported $700 million of inflowing investment and an addition of about 12,000 jobs.
The impact of the LED project on the following outcomes was evaluated using more rigorous statistical procedures:
- Number of businesses per capita;
- Fixed capital investment per capita;
- Number of jobs per capita;
- Unemployment rate; and
- FDI per capita.
It was found that the LED project had a positive overall effect on the number of businesses, fixed capital investment, and the number of jobs. In absolute values, the introduction of strategic planning lead to 6 to 12 new jobs per 1,000 of population, 18 to 50 new businesses per 100,000 of population, and 5 to7 million USD of investments in fixed capital per 100,000 (controlling for other factors of influence). However, differences in the project effect among the cities were found. The reasons for these differences in impact include:
- the effect was observed at different points of time after the implementation of planning (1 to 45 month by Dec. 2008);
- the cities had different implementation teams (composed of 6 advisors); and
- the municipalities had different administrative subordination (58 cities and 16 small towns of rayon subordination);
The project effects on the number of businesses, fixed capital investment, number of jobs, and the unemployment rate increased each month. The administrative subordination affects only the effectiveness of investments and job creation: the effect is larger for cities than for rural towns. Team-specific differences are evident on all outcomes. This confirms that the implementation have a significant impact on the success of this intervention.
Finally, the effect of LED was compared to the effect of a similar project implemented in Ukraine by UNDP. Provided that the results presented above are robust, it turns out that the effects of the two projects introducing strategic planning are very similar in magnitude and significance.
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References
- Bartik, T.J., 1991. Who Benefits from State and Local Economic Development Policies? Upjohn Institute for Employment Research: Kalamazoo, MI.
- Buss, T.F., 2001. “The Effect of State Tax Incentives on Economic Growth and Firm Location Decisions: An Overview of the Literature,” Economic Development Quarterly 15(1), 90-105.
- Fisher, R.C., 1997. “The Effect of State and Local Public Services on Economic Development,” New England Economic Review March/April, 53-67.
- Goss, E. and J. Phillips, 1999. “Do Business Tax Incentives Contribute to a Divergence in Economic Growth?” Economic Development Quarterly 13(3), 217-228.
- Wasylenko, M., 1997. “Taxation and Economic Development,” New England Economic Review March/April, 37-52.
Can the Baby- and Woman-Friendly Maternity Wards Save Lives?
Improving the health and well-being of mothers, infants and children has been an important public-health goal for many countries, which is reflected in the Millennium Development Goals (4 and 5), set by the United Nations. The well-being and health of mothers, infants and children determine future population health and thus public health challenges as well as economic development prospects. Although Ukraine and the other countries of the Former Soviet Union have fared well compared to the less developed countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, their maternal and infant mortality and morbidity rates are 3 to 5 times higher than those in the European countries (including those of the Former Socialist block). There are many factors behind this situation. Nevertheless, a lot can be done to improve maternal and infant health by simply changing the way labor and delivery services are provided. New evidence-based medicine (EBM) standards introduced by the Mother and Infant Health Project (MIHP) are more baby- and woman-friendly and include: partner deliveries; avoidance of unnecessary C-sections, amniotomies and episiotomies; use of free position during delivery; immediate skin-to-skin contact; early breastfeeding; and the rooming-in of mothers and newborns. The impact of the Project culminates with 3 mothers’ and 11 newborns’ lives saved every two years in an average participating region.
Infant mortality/morbidity has often been a focus of health economics and medical research as a major indicator of a country’s well-being. In contrast, maternal health outcomes have been much less investigated. There are several potential reasons for such negligence. One is that the rates of maternal deaths are quite low in developed countries. The second is attributed to the difficulty of measuring maternal health outcomes in developing countries where the rates of maternal mortality are particularly high. Nevertheless, the issue of maternal health attracts considerable attention from society due to the fact that most of maternal deaths and health deteriorations are preventable. Moreover, recent evidence demonstrates that improvements in health outcomes for mothers and infants are not as much related to the availability of care (structural quality), as to the way this care is provided (process quality) (Barber and Gertler, 2002). Furthermore, some studies find that access to low quality providers in fact contribute to higher child morbidity and mortality (Sodemann et al., 1997).
Although the population health in Ukraine compares favorably to the situation in the developing world, it is still lagging far behind the developed countries in terms of maternal and infant mortality and morbidity. During the latest years, the level of anemia among pregnant women has increased 4.5 times, maladies of genital urinary system about 3 times, and diseases of blood circulation system 2 times. The average maternal mortality ratio fluctuates around 18-22 women per 100,000 live births, which is 3.5 times higher than in the EU. At the same time, infant mortality (9.5/1000) is two times higher than that in the EU, while the rate of stillbirth (16.89/1000) is four times higher. Additionally, the incidence of congenital anomalies of newborns has increased over time and reached the number of 2878 per 100,000, which is 77% higher than the EU average.
Another alarming problem related to maternal health is persistently high rate of abortions, which most likely originates from ignorance in modern family planning methods. In contemporary Ukraine, 71% of pregnancies end up in abortions. Although the number of abortions decreased twice between1991 and 2003 (from 1532/1000 live births to 728/1000 live births respectively), the incidence is still 3.5 times higher than that in the EU (Center of Medical Statistics of Ukraine 2007).
Mother and Infant Health Project Description
The Mother and Infant Health Project is an eight-year project advocating evidence-based medical practices aimed to improve women’s reproductive and newborns’ health. With funding from the USAID and private sources, and with the support from the Ministry of Health of Ukraine, the project has been implemented by the JSI Research and Training Institute. The first phase of the project was initiated in September 2002 in four regions of Ukraine, but the first four maternities joined the Project in mid-December 2003. By the end of 2006, the Project had expanded to 20 maternity hospitals in twelve pilot regions.
Following the Millennium Development Goals (MEU, 2005), the MIHP pioneers to introduce new evidence-based medicine (EBM) standards: partner deliveries; avoidance of unnecessary C-sections, amniotomies and episiotomies; use of free position during delivery; immediate skin-to-skin contact; early breastfeeding; and the rooming-in of mothers and newborns. In addition, the Project actively supports the provision of training on effective perinatal technologies for the staff of the MIHP maternities, development of “centers of excellence” that serve as models in training/education of medical practitioners of the corresponding oblast, and organizing a health awareness campaign on healthy lifestyles. The MIHP also aims to reinforce liaisons with local governmental institutions.
Furthermore, the Project works on integration of the EBM standards into a package of perinatal practices throughout Ukraine. It also targets revision of the current curricula for medical universities and colleges in order to increase the evidence base of educational programs for medical students and health care providers.
The MIHP in Ukraine belongs to a family of maternal and infant health improving initiatives throughout the world and builds upon their experience, JSI Mother Care (1998-2000) being the largest among them. However, the MIHP in Ukraine is unique both with respect to the institutional setting and to its scope and length, which allows for rigorous evaluation. Most of the earlier projects implemented by the JSI have mainly focused on specific issues (e.g. pregnancy of adolescent girls in Uganda and Zambia, anemia in Malawi) and have been short-term (the longest have been two-year projects in Egypt, Pakistan, and Zambia).
The Impact of the Mother and Infant Health Project
The evaluation of the impact of the first phase (2002-2006) of the Mother and Infant Health Project in Ukraine allows for an identification of improvements in the maternal and infant health outcomes due to enhancements in the quality of labor and delivery services. The identification of the quality improvement effect has been possible for two reasons. First, the basic perinatal and obstetrics care is universally available in Ukraine. Hence, the estimated impact of the small region participating in the MIHP can be attributed to the improvement in medical technologies rather than the availability of the services per se. Second, the variation in the project participation over time and across regions allows for control of the overall population health trend in the country.
Taking into account the effect of the other maternal health programs and personnel training outside the Project, Nizalova and Vyshnya (2010) find that the MIHP impact is in general health improving. Decreases in both maternal and infant mortality and morbidity in participating regions are more pronounced after the start of the Project. Among the infant health characteristics, the MIHP impact is observed for stillbirths and infant mortality and morbidity resulted from deviations in perinatal period and congenital anomalies.
Concerning maternal health, the MIHP is most effective in combating anemia, blood circulation, veins, and urinary-genital system complications, and late toxicosis. The analysis suggests that the effects are due to early attendance of antenatal clinics, lower share of C-sections, and greater share of normal deliveries.
For some outcomes (maternal mortality, normal deliveries, and anemia) there exists a significant effect of the MIHP trainings (without joining the Project), although it is about twice as small in magnitude for normal deliveries and anemia than the direct MIHP impact.
Cost-Benefit Considerations
A comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of the MIHP project is limited, since the majority of maternal and infant health indicators are hard to assess in monetary terms (e.g. increase in early neonatal visits of mothers; decrease in the number of cases of late toxicosis and complicated deliveries; decrease in infant morbidity due to various reasons etc.). Therefore, the focus is on the most “tangible” cost effectiveness indicators: (i) average annual per maternity cost of the Project and (ii) average annual per maternity “tangible” benefits.
The average annual per maternity cost is about 60,000 USD and it is calculated as an overall cost of the first phase of the project – 6 million USD – distributed over 20 treatment sites during 2002-2006, including the first year of the Project setup. Set of “tangible” benefits includes savings due to (i) a switch from C-sections to vaginal deliveries (cost savings of around USD 2,500 per maternity per year), (ii) a switch away from medicine-intensive ways of leading both C-sections and vaginal deliveries (around USD 65,000 per maternity per year), and (iii) saved lives of mothers and infants due to the implementation of the MIHP practices (around USD 5.8 million per maternity per year ).
Overall, the project cost to benefit ratio is 1 to 97 (60 to 5,847 thousand USD) if one takes into account the value of lives saved and it is 1 to 1.08 (60 to 65 thousand USD) if one considers only cost savings due to change in C-section and vaginal delivery practices and the switch away from C-sections to vaginal deliveries. The latter represents the lowest bound of the Project’s benefits since it does not take into account any health-improving impact of the MIHP. Although the range is quite wide and this preliminary calculation suffers from several limitations, it seems unlikely that given the estimated impact the true costs would exceed the true benefits.
References
- Barber, Sarah L and Paul J Gertler. 2002. “Child Health And The Quality of Medical Care.” University of California-Berkeley Working Paper .
- Giergiczny, Marek. 2008. “Value of a Statistical Lifethe Case of Poland.” Environmental and Resource Economics 41 (2).
- MEU. 2005. “Millennium Development Goals. Ukraine.” Ministry of Economy of Ukraine .
- Olena Y. Nizalova & Maria Vyshnya, 2010.”Evaluation of the impact of the Mother and Infant Health Project in Ukraine,” Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(S1): 107-125.
- Sodemann, M., M.S. Jakobson, I.C. Molbak, I.C. Alvarenga, and P. Aaby. 1997. “High mortality despite good care-seeking behavior: a community study of childhood deaths in Guinea-Bissau.” Bulletin of the World Health Organization 3 (75):205–12.