Tag: Russia Ukraine War
Development Day 2025: Ukraine’s and Moldova’s Path Towards EU Membership
The European Union’s enlargement policy has re-emerged as a central geopolitical instrument in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine and sustained destabilization efforts in its neighbourhood. For Ukraine and Moldova, EU accession is no longer a distant aspiration, but an existential strategic choice tied to security, economic development, and democratic survival. At this year’s SITE Development Day, policymakers, researchers, and practitioners gathered to take stock of where the two countries stand on their accession paths, which challenges risk undermining progress, and what role the EU and international partners can play in sustaining momentum. This policy brief synthesizes key insights from the conference discussions, focusing on three interlinked dimensions of accession: economic preconditions and foreign financing, democratic resilience under hybrid threats, and human capital development.
Introduction
The EU accession process continues to enjoy strong political and societal support in both Ukraine and Moldova, despite the profound challenges each country faces. Opening the conference, Dag Hartelius, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, emphasized that both countries have demonstrated sustained commitment to European integration, while underlining the need for stable, reliable, and predictable engagement from European partners. In Ukraine, Russia’s full-scale invasion has consolidated a broad societal consensus around a European future, with support for EU accession remaining high despite the immense economic and human costs of war. Moldova, meanwhile, has reaffirmed its European course through the election of a strong pro-EU parliamentary majority, even as it remains exposed to significant geopolitical pressure, as highlighted by Carolina Perebinos, State Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Moldova.
Yet, speakers stressed that political support should not be taken for granted. As noted by Vadym Halaichuk, First Deputy Chair of the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the EU of the Verkhovna Rada, prolonged delays, blocked negotiations, or unclear signals from the EU risk creating space for Eurosceptic narratives, particularly as wartime economic hardship persists in Ukraine.
Participants mentioned the risk of a “Balkan trap,” where candidate countries remain in prolonged negotiations despite credible reform progress. For Ukraine and Moldova, time is a critical factor.
Economic Outlook and Foreign Aid
Economic resilience is a central pillar of sustained support for EU accession. Ukraine’s economy has been recovering since the initial collapse in 2022, but the recovery remains slow and uneven across sectors. Wartime destruction, disrupted supply chains, labor shortages due to large-scale displacement, and rising defense needs continue to constrain growth. As discussed at the conference, Ukraine requires predictable external support to maintain macroeconomic stability and finance reconstruction.
In Moldova, decades of low growth, repeated external shocks, and adverse demographic trends, including population decline and ageing, have left the economy vulnerable. While macroeconomic stability has improved and inflation has fallen to historically low levels, productivity remains low and the economy insufficiently diversified, underscoring the need for greater access to capital and investment opportunities. At the same time, business sentiment has improved, with recent survey evidence (Partnerships for New Economy, 2025) suggesting that most firms believe the country is moving in the right direction and that the business community places significant importance on EU integration.
The economies of Ukraine and Moldova remain critically dependent on foreign support, but there is a need to adapt to a changing landscape for development cooperation. Potential reductions in traditional official development assistance, particularly from major bilateral donors, increase the importance of mobilising private capital, diaspora resources, and blended finance instruments. However, private investors continue to perceive Ukraine and Moldova as high-risk environments, often overestimating political and sovereign risk relative to actual default rates and recovery outcomes. Expanding guarantees and de-risking instruments in the form of EU grants for public sector projects and providing technical assistance to develop bankable projects are critical to narrowing this perception gap. Across both cases, conference participants stressed that EU accession is perceived not only as a political anchor but also as a central mechanism for addressing long-standing economic constraints.
Democratic Resilience and Hybrid Threats
A defining feature of both accession processes is the persistent pressure from Russian hybrid warfare. Moldova’s recent elections illustrated the breadth of these tactics, ranging from vote-buying schemes and disinformation to energy manipulation and attempts to overwhelm law enforcement institutions. Ukraine faces similar challenges under more extreme conditions, as democratic governance continues under martial law and constant security threats.
While corruption remains a serious concern, participants emphasized that institutions have been strengthened rather than collapsed despite the challenging circumstances. In Ukraine, anti-corruption agencies continue to function, and political scandals have not displaced the broader reform agenda or public support for European integration. Moldova’s experience demonstrates that coordinated institutional cooperation with European partners can significantly enhance the state’s ability to counter hybrid interference.
Crucially, supporting democratic resilience in Ukraine and Moldova is a core European interest, with direct implications for EU security, democratic stability, and the integrity of the enlargement process itself.
Human Capital Development
Investments in human capital are critical for long-term growth and development, yet brain drain is a major concern in both Ukraine and Moldova. Survey evidence indicates that many students are choosing to study abroad, driven by a combination of security concerns, education quality, and economic factors (see Vaskovska, 2025). At the same time, many students express willingness to return, with EU accession perceived as a key condition for long-term stability and opportunity.
Strengthening demand for skills—through private-sector involvement and public-sector capacity building—was seen as essential to raising returns to local education. Moreover, speakers stressed the importance of treating the diaspora as an asset rather than a loss, and supporting targeted mobility schemes, professional networks, and research and teaching initiatives that facilitate knowledge transfer. Comparative reflections on Poland’s accession underscored that human capital and public infrastructure investments can start a path to sustained convergence even before formal membership.
Conclusion
Discussions at the conference underscored that Ukraine and Moldova have demonstrated a high degree of political commitment and societal support for EU accession under exceptionally challenging conditions. At the same time, the sustainability of this support depends on the credibility, pace, and predictability of the accession process. Prolonged uncertainty, blocked negotiations, or reduced predictability of foreign assistance risk creating space for Eurosceptic narratives.
Both countries face significant structural economic constraints and heightened financing needs, while private investment remains constrained by elevated risk perceptions. Addressing these challenges requires not only continued macroeconomic and financial support but also targeted assistance to develop bankable investment opportunities and reduce perceived risks. Effective implementation of reforms—particularly at the local level—and efforts to retain and mobilise human capital depend on sustained institutional cooperation, strengthened local capacity, and a visible European presence on the ground.
For the EU, supporting Ukraine and Moldova is of strategic self-interest. As emphasized throughout the conference, integration is not merely an enlargement decision — it is a long-term investment in Europe’s economic stability, democratic resilience, and security.
References
- Partnerships for New Economy (2025). “Barometrul antreprenorilor” (“Entrepreneurs’ Barometer”), retrieved Dec 18, 2025.
- Vaskovska Anhelina (2025). “Strengthening Human Capital: How Ukraine and Moldova Can Retain and Reconnect Their Students“, FREE Policy Brief Series, December 2025.
List of Participants
- Torbjörn Becker, Director of SITE
- Raj M. Desai, Professor of International Development at Georgetown University
- Stefan Falk, Director, Swedfund Project Accelerator
- Kata Fredheim, Executive Vice President of Partnerships and Strategy, SSE Riga
- Vadym Halaichuk, First Deputy Chair of the Committee on Ukraine’s Integration into the EU of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
- Dag Hartelius, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Anders Olofsgård, Deputy Director of SITE
- Klara Lindström, Analyst at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS)
- Michal Myck, Director at CenEA, Szczecin
- Anders Olofsgård, Deputy Director of SITE
- Carolina Perebinos, State Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Moldova
- Dumitru Pintea, Expert at Partnerships for New Economy, Chisinau
- Rustam Romaniuc, Associate Professor at Montpellier Business School
- Nataliia Shapoval, Chairman of KSE Institute
- Tobias Thyberg, Deputy Director General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- Viorel Ursu, Moldovan Ambassador to Sweden
- Anhelina Vaskovska, International Relations Specialist
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Saving Lives During War: How to Make Evacuation Messages More Effective
When war threatens civilian populations, effective evacuation messages can mean the difference between life and death. Drawing on a controlled survey experiment conducted with 2,006 Ukrainians during the 2022 Russian invasion, we find that providing clear evacuation plans dramatically improves a message’s perceived effectiveness, while sophisticated message framing makes little difference. Our results indicate that people facing war are not naive about dangers—they need practical information on how to escape, not persuasion about why they should leave. This is especially true for those who do not have the means to evacuate autonomously. These findings offer guidance for authorities and humanitarian organizations: focus on providing concrete evacuation logistics rather than crafting perfect messaging.
The Life-or-Death Challenge of Wartime Evacuations
Each year, tens of thousands of civilians die in armed conflicts worldwide. Many of these deaths could be prevented through timely evacuations from danger zones. Yet despite imminent threats, many civilians hesitate to leave their homes. Understanding how to increase the effectiveness of evacuation messages has become a critical challenge for saving lives.
In July 2022, five months into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we conducted the first experimental study testing the effectiveness of evacuation messages during an active war. Working with 2,006 Ukrainians from regions directly affected by combat, focusing on areas that experienced occupation, shelling, and ground fighting, we tested two fundamental approaches to improving evacuation messaging.
Figure 1. Surveyed regions with the relative share of respondents.
Source: Martinez et al. (2025)
Testing What Works: Plans vs. Persuasion
Our experiment compared two strategies:
Strategy 1: Persuasive Nudges
We tested different message framings inspired by behavioral economics, emphasizing either the gains from evacuating (saving lives) or losses from staying (risking death), and highlighting either deteriorating living conditions or benefits to military effectiveness. These techniques have proven effective in other contexts, from increasing vaccination rates to promoting energy conservation.
Strategy 2: Practical Evacuation Plans
We tested whether adding concrete evacuation instructions improved message effectiveness. Half of our messages included specific details: free buses available at designated locations, phone numbers for reserving seats, and clear departure times.
Participants evaluated how effective each message would be in convincing residents of their city to evacuate, using a scale from 0 (completely ineffective) to 10 (very effective).
Key Finding: People Need Logistics, Not Persuasion
Our results deliver a clear message for policymakers and humanitarian organizations:
Providing evacuation plans works
Messages that included concrete evacuation plans were rated approximately 5% more effective than those without. This improvement is both statistically significant and practically meaningful—in Donetsk oblast alone, where 350,000 civilians remained in Ukrainian-controlled areas during our study, a 5% increase in evacuation rates could mean 17,500 additional lives moved to safety.
Message framing makes little difference
Surprisingly, none of our carefully crafted persuasive messages performed better than a simple, standard evacuation notice. Whether we emphasized gains or losses, living conditions or military benefits, the framing made no significant difference to perceived effectiveness.
Different groups respond differently
The evacuation plan’s effect was strongest among those who had not previously evacuated, which is exactly the population authorities most need to reach. This particular segment of the population is characterized by lower financial means and, therefore, a lower likelihood of owning a car, which turned out to be a crucial factor when it comes to timely evacuations. Finally, women responded more strongly to evacuation plans than men.
Figure 2. Experimental Treatment Effects.
Source: Martinez et al. (2025)
Understanding the Psychology of War Zone Evacuations
Why do practical plans matter more than persuasive messaging? Our findings suggest that people experiencing war are far from naive about the dangers they face. Among our respondents:
- 82% perceived real risk of death or injury from missile strikes
- 40% had already evacuated at least once
- 50% of those who stayed had considered evacuating
Which seems to suggest that the barrier is not understanding risk—it is knowing how to act on it. Our correlational analysis supports this interpretation: those offered transportation during the early invasion were 12-18 percentage points more likely to evacuate, while simply receiving evacuation information showed weaker effects.
Policy Recommendations
Based on our findings, we recommend that authorities and humanitarian organizations prioritize the following:
- Focus resources on logistics, not messaging
Instead of investing in sophisticated communication strategies, dedicate resources to organizing concrete evacuation support: transportation, clear meeting points, advance booking systems, and designated evacuation routes.
- Provide specific, actionable information
Every evacuation message should include: exact locations for transportation pickup, specific departure times, contact information for coordination, clear instructions for what evacuees can bring, and confirmation of free transportation.
- Target messages strategically
Prioritize delivering evacuation plans to those who have not previously evacuated, women who show higher responsiveness to organized evacuations, and areas where residents lack personal evacuation plans, that is most likely in the lower socio-economic status neighborhoods.
- Act on timing
Our research captured a relatively stable period in the conflict. During acute escalations, rapid deployment of evacuation logistics likely matters even more than message optimization.
Implications Beyond Ukraine
While our study focused on Ukraine, approximately 50 active conflicts worldwide threaten civilian populations. Our findings suggest a fundamental shift in how international organizations approach emergency evacuations: from persuasion to facilitation.
The lesson is sobering, but actionable. People facing mortal danger do not need convincing that threats are real. They need practical help escaping them. This insight should reshape how humanitarian organizations allocate resources, how militaries plan for civilian protection, and how governments prepare for crisis scenarios.
Conclusion
Effective evacuation during war is not about finding the perfect words; it is about providing clear paths to safety. Our research suggests that even simple additions of logistical information can meaningfully improve an evacuation message’s perceived effectiveness. In contexts where every percentage point of improved evacuation rates translates to lives saved, focusing on practical evacuation support over persuasive messaging represents both an evidence-based and morally imperative policy choice. For the millions of civilians who may face evacuation decisions in current and future conflicts, the message from our research is clear: authorities must move beyond telling people to leave and start showing them exactly how.
References
- Martinez, Seung-Keun; Pompeo, Monika; Sheremeta, Roman; Vakhitov, Volodymyr; Weber, Matthias; and Zaika, Nataliia, 2025. “Civilian Evacuation During War: Evidence from Ukraine“, The Economic Journal (2025): ueaf075.
- Benartzi, Shlomo et al., 2017. “Should governments invest more in nudging?” Psychological Science, 28(8), 1041-1055.
- Thompson, Rebecca R.; Garfin, Dana R.; and Silver, Roxane C., 2017. “Evacuation from natural disasters: A systematic review of the literature“, Risk Analysis, 37(4), 812-839.
- Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2024. UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (v24.1). Uppsala University.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
U.S. Sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil: Benjamin Hilgenstock Explains the Impact on Russia’s Oil Revenues
The United States has imposed its toughest sanctions yet on Russia’s energy industry, focusing on Rosneft and Lukoil. These are the country’s two largest oil producers. The measures aim to restrict Moscow’s access to global markets and increase pressure on the Kremlin’s war financing.
In a detailed Financial Times analysis, experts examined how these sanctions could reshape global oil trade. They may also deepen Russia’s fiscal strain as the government faces a tightening budget environment.
Benjamin Hilgenstock on Russia’s Budget Vulnerability
“The sanctions come at a time of heightened vulnerability for the Russian budget,” said Benjamin Hilgenstock, head of macroeconomic research and strategy at the Kyiv School of Economics Institute (KSE Institute).
He explained that energy revenues make up about one-quarter of Russia’s federal income. Moreover, these revenues have fallen by 20 percent year-on-year in 2025. Therefore, Washington’s new sanctions could further intensify financial pressure on the Kremlin and limit its ability to sustain long-term spending.
Market Reaction: Rising Oil Prices and Global Adjustments
The Financial Times report also looked at market reactions following the sanctions announcement. Brent crude prices rose by 9 percent, as traders assessed possible disruptions to Russian exports. However, analysts warned that while China and India may initially resist pressure from Washington, secondary sanctions could change their stance. Over time, refiners might diversify their oil supplies, testing Russia’s ability to maintain production and revenue.
Read the Full Analysis
To read Benjamin Hilgenstock’s complete commentary and the full Financial Times article, visit FT.com. In addition, explore the KSE Institute’s homepage for more insights and expert research.
Further Reading: Sanctions and Russia’s Energy Economy
Energy exports remain a cornerstone of Russia’s economy and a major source of geopolitical power. By targeting the oil and gas sector, sanctions aim to reduce state revenues and limit Moscow’s ability to wage war against Ukraine. For deeper insights, visit the Sanctions Portal Evidence Base to explore current research on energy sanctions and their impact on Russia’s economy.
Corporate Complicity: Global Firms Funded Russia with $20B in 2024
A new report by the KSE Institute and B4Ukraine reveals that many global corporations continued doing business in Russia throughout 2024. These companies paid $20 billion in taxes to the Russian government, indirectly helping fund the war. This corporate complicity has drawn widespread criticism for undermining sanctions and supporting aggression.
Global Business and War: A Dangerous Link
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the international response included economic sanctions and public pressure for firms to exit Russia. Yet as of mid-2025, only 12% of global firms had fully withdrawn. 1377 firms or 33% have officially declared that they are completely shutting down, or have announced they are temporarily reducing operations, but haven’t yet fully exited. A staggering 55% remain active in Russia, paying taxes, generating profit, and keeping operations running.
Many companies claim to have paused or scaled back operations. However, their tax contributions tell another story. In 2024 alone, foreign firms earned $201 billion in Russia and paid $20 billion in taxes—enough to fund more than one million soldiers based on Russia’s $18,400 recruitment bonus per soldier.
Why Companies Choose to Stay
Some firms chose profits over principles. The finance and consumer goods sectors led the way, with banks and brands like PepsiCo, Nestlé, and Mars topping revenue and tax lists. Despite early promises to leave, many companies either delayed their exit or quietly expanded. Others, like Mondelez and Coca-Cola, have been accused of masking their continued presence with rebranding or shifting operations to subsidiaries.
Key Research Findings on Corporate Complicity
- In 2024, foreign companies earned $201 billion and paid $20 billion in taxes to Russia.
- Only 12% of firms fully exited the Russian market; 55% stayed.
- U.S. and EU firms paid more than $3.8 billion in profit taxes combined.
- The finance and consumer sectors were the top contributors to the Russian war economy.
Western Values Undermined by Business-as-Usual
The report argues that continued business in Russia by Western firms directly undermines their governments’ aid to Ukraine. Companies headquartered in the U.S., Germany, and France are among the largest contributors to Russia’s tax base.
The report highlights that increasing numbers of foreign firms have stopped publishing their financial reports, a trend particularly noticeable among large corporations. Of the 100 largest foreign companies operating in Russia in 2021, 86 disclosed their financials in 2023. This number has halved in 2024 to just 43. The decision not to disclose financial statements may reflect an effort by companies to avoid further reputational damage linked to the scale of their economic support for the war effort.
Read the Full Report
Explore the full findings and detailed analysis by reading the complete report on the Kyiv School of Economics website. Additionally, you can view more policy briefs from the KSE Institute on the FREE Network’s website.
Learn More About the Russian War Economy and Sanctions
To learn more about Western sanctions and Russia’s countermeasures, visit the Sanctions Timeline. And for details on sanctions imposed on Russia and their effects, see the Evidence Base section of the sanctions portal. Explore more policy briefs on sanctioning Russia here.
Russian War Economy Faces Slowdown Despite Resilience
Since 2022, the Russian economy has surprised many with its resilience under Western sanctions. Growth was fueled by wartime spending and high energy revenues. Now, signs suggest this “war bump” is fading. In a recent Financial Times interview, Elina Ribakova explains why the Russian war economy faces serious challenges ahead. Elina Ribakova is vice-president for foreign policy at the Kyiv School of Economics. She spoke with Sam Fleming, economics editor at the Financial Times.
Sanctions and Short-Term Resilience
When Western nations imposed sanctions on Russia, many expected a collapse. Instead, wartime spending and high oil revenues propped up growth. Ribakova notes that Russia’s ability to redirect resources into military production created a temporary boom. But this resilience came at the cost of long-term growth in the Russian war economy.
Why the Russian War Economy Is Slowing
Russia is now hitting hard limits. Labor shortages, soaring inflation, and overstretched industrial capacity are beginning to bite. Ribakova points out that unemployment has fallen to unsustainably low levels, while non-military sectors are stagnating. Even the defense industry, once booming, is showing signs of strain across the Russian war economy.
China’s Critical Role
One reason Russia has endured sanctions is its growing reliance on China. Ribakova highlights how Chinese exports—from consumer goods to vital military components—have allowed Moscow to sustain its war economy. Yet this partnership is highly lopsided: for China, Russia is a marginal partner; for Russia, China is a lifeline.
The Postwar Challenge
Looking ahead, Ribakova warns that ending the war will not mean an easy recovery. Russia faces deep demographic challenges, heavy reliance on military production, and decades of failed economic diversification. Rebuilding a sustainable postwar economy may prove “devastatingly hard” for the Russian war economy.
Listen to the Original Interview
The slowdown of the Russian war economy is more than an economic story; it shapes global energy markets, security, and geopolitics. To hear the full conversation and Ribakova’s detailed analysis, listen to the original Financial Times interview here.
Learn More About the Russian War Economy and Sanctions
To learn more about Western sanctions and Russia’s countermeasures, visit the Sanctions Timeline. And for details on sanctions imposed on Russia and their effects, see the Evidence Base section of the sanctions portal. Explore more policy briefs on sanctioning Russia here.
Sergei Guriev: Spin Dictators, Information Wars, and the Conflict in Ukraine
In recent decades, a new generation of media-savvy authoritarian leaders has emerged. They have adapted their strategies to a digitally connected and information-driven world. These rulers, often called “Spin Dictators”, maintain control not through violence or fear but through careful manipulation of media narratives and public opinion.
The concept of Spin Dictators is crucial for understanding how modern autocrats sustain power while appearing democratic. In this discussion, Sergei Guriev, co-author of Spin Dictators: The Changing Face of Tyranny in the 21st Century, joins Maiting Zhuang, Assistant Professor at the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE).
Sergei Guriev on Spin Dictators and Putin’s Shift to Fear Dictatorship
Sergei Guriev, Professor of Economics at Sciences Po, explains how modern autocrats differ from their 20th-century predecessors. Instead of relying solely on repression, Spin Dictators use propaganda, controlled media, and strategic disinformation to build legitimacy.
However, Guriev argues that Vladimir Putin’s transformation from a “Spin Dictator” into a “Fear Dictator” marks a turning point. As the Russia-Ukraine war continues, both repression and censorship have intensified. Consequently, the spin-based model of control is collapsing, giving way to classic fear-driven authoritarianism. This shift demonstrates how fragile image-based regimes can be once truth and credibility begin to erode.
Economic and Media Implications for Russia
During the conversation, Guriev analyzes how the war in Ukraine has transformed Russia’s economy and information environment. The suppression of independent media has forced citizens to rely on state-controlled news outlets. As a result, the gap between perception and reality continues to widen. The shift from Spin Dictator to Fear Dictator shows the regime’s rising insecurity and declining legitimacy. Therefore, understanding this transition is essential for policymakers, journalists, and citizens seeking to grasp the new dynamics of modern authoritarianism.
About Sergei Guriev
Sergei Guriev is a Russian economist and Professor of Economics at Sciences Po. From 2016 to 2019, he served as Chief Economist at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Before that, he was the Rector of the New Economic School (NES) in Moscow, where he also held the Morgan Stanley Professorship in Economics.
In addition, Guriev is a co-founder of True Russia, an organization that collects donations for Ukrainian refugees and promotes freedom of speech and democratic values. He is also known for his outspoken criticism of the Russia-Ukraine war, making him one of the most prominent academic voices on authoritarianism and democracy today.
About Maiting Zhuang
Maiting Zhuang is an Assistant Professor at the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) and an Affiliated Researcher at the Mistra Center for Sustainable Markets. She received her PhD from the Paris School of Economics in 2020.
Her research focuses on Political Economy, Development Economics, and the Economics of Media. Moreover, her work sheds light on how information systems sustain or undermine authoritarian regimes, aligning closely with Guriev’s analysis of Spin Dictators.
Explore More on Sergei Guriev Spin Dictators
To learn more, watch the full discussion with Sergei Guriev and Maiting Zhuang.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Sanctions on Russia: How They Impact Europe Energy Security and the Region
As Russia’s war in Ukraine continues, Western sanctions are beginning to chip away at the Kremlin’s war machine. Although President Vladimir Putin appears undeterred, the sanctions are draining resources that could otherwise fund the conflict.
How Sanctions Work?
According to Maria Perrotta Berlin, Assistant Professor at the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), sanctions are most effective when they come as a surprise. “If the threat of sanctions didn’t deter aggression, their implementation is unlikely to change behavior — unless they are more severe than expected,” she explains.
Sanctions, however, are a blunt instrument. They can unintentionally harm other economies and are rarely effective on their own. Maria Perrotta Berlin notes that “the stick of sanctions works best when paired with a carrot”. For instance, offering a clear path toward lifting restrictions, as was done in Iran’s nuclear negotiations.
The Three Types of Sanctions on Russia
Currently, three main categories of sanctions are in place against Russia:
- Financial sanctions: including restrictions on the Russian Central Bank, disconnection from the SWIFT system, and asset freezes. These measures have the most immediate impact.
- Trade sanctions: particularly on technology imports and energy exports. These take longer to affect the Russian economy and are more costly to sender countries.
- Sanctions of inconvenience: such as airspace closures, travel bans, and exclusion from international sports and cultural events. While symbolic, they contribute to isolating Russia on the global stage.
Such isolation can influence public opinion within Russia. It may generate opposition to the government — or conversely, trigger a “rally around the flag” effect that strengthens domestic support for Putin.
Signaling and Solidarity
Despite Putin’s resistance, the sanctions are sending a powerful signal both within Russia and abroad. They demonstrate the unity of Western nations and highlight that much of the world condemns Russia’s actions in Ukraine.
Experts say there is still room to tighten sanctions by expanding the list of targeted individuals, banks, and sectors, as well as closing loopholes used to bypass restrictions.
Regional Impacts: Belarus and Georgia
The FREE Network webinar, “The Sanctions on Russia, and Their Impact on the Region,” brought together experts from Belarus and Georgia to assess the broader consequences.
Belarus faces additional sanctions due to its support for Russia’s aggression. The country has already lost key export routes through both Russia and Ukraine. Its economy is reeling from the depreciation of the Russian ruble and fears of a banking crisis.
In Georgia, the war in Ukraine revives painful memories of the 2008 Russian invasion. While Georgia relies less on Russian gas than the EU, it remains vulnerable to rising oil prices and inflation, already at 13.7%. Nearly 90% of Georgia’s wheat comes from Russia, making food security a growing concern.
Learn More About the Russian War Economy and Sanctions
To learn more about Western sanctions and Russia’s countermeasures, visit the Sanctions Timeline. And for details on sanctions imposed on Russia and their effects, see the Evidence Base section of the sanctions portal. Explore more policy briefs on sanctioning Russia here.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed during events, seminars and conferences are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.