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Polish Pre-Election Polls Seem Unmoved by Electoral Giveaways

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As in every election, numerous electoral pledges have been made prior to the election that will take place in Poland on the 9th of October. It seems however, that support for different parties has remained largely unaffected by the scale of the giveaways.

As in every elections, numerous electoral pledges have been made prior to those that will take place in Poland on the coming Sunday, the 9th of October. It seems, however, that support for different parties has remained largely unaffected by the scale of the giveaways.

As the elections get nearer, the electoral race between the main contenders, the ruling Civic Platform (PO, popular support at about 32%) and the main opposition party Law and Justice (PiS, 29%), seems to be getting closer, with the result of Sunday’s vote remaining wide open. Behind the two leaders in opinion polls are the Polish People’s Alliance (PSL, 5%) which has been in coalition with PO for the past four years, and the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD, 10%) together with two recently formed parties – Palikot’s Movement (RP, 8%) and Poland is Most Important (PJN, 2%). To guarantee seats in the parliament any of the parties need to cross the 5% support threshold.

In the second part of its Pre-election Report published on 28th of September, the Centre for Economic Analysis (CenEA) presented a detailed analysis of electoral proposals focused on tax and benefit policies which would directly affect the financial situation of Polish households (Myck, et al., 2011a).

The two coalition parties (PO and PSL) have approached electoral declarations with surprising modesty by either fuzzy non-specific commitments (like the PSL) or electoral slogans which sound generous but are in fact relatively cheap to implement. The Civic Platform promised a “radical increase in the tax credit for the third and subsequent children in the family”. As the Report shows this would only affect about 30% of “3+” families or about 5% of all Polish families, and would cost only about 70m euro per year (0.02% of the GDP) – a burden that may be possible to bear even at the difficult times of the crisis.

The opposition parties are much more generous with PiS and SLD both offering to increase pensions and broaden eligibility criteria for family benefits. These policies in each case would cost about 1,5 billion euro (0.5% of the GDP). On top of that the SLD proposed a new benefit for low income families who cannot take advantage of the existing child tax credit. This policy would stretch the government’s budget further by another billion euro. Neither of the two parties suggest convincing ways of financing of the proposals and they are both adamant that they would not raise taxes.

The most stunning proposals came from the recently formed PJN, a party established after last year’s presidential elections by former members of PiS close to the late President Lech Kaczyński. PJN’s program promises extremely generous additional resources for families with children. When put together with additional proposals of changes in personal taxes, and minimum pensions the overall cost of the giveaways adds up to about 17bn euro, or about 5% of the GDP. Some of the resources for this purpose would come from introducing a uniform rate of the VAT, but the full package still leaves a hole in of about 12 billion euro (3.7% of the GDP). This cost seems impossible to pay at the time when the government is struggling with a very high level of debt and desperately tries to reduce the budget deficit.

The recent discussions concerning the parties’ spending plans may be one of the reasons behind the narrowing of the gap between PO and PiS, but other more generous electoral promises of other parties – do not seem to have caused much change in support. In fact, the party which has recently gained most in the polls (RP) is the only one which, with its suggestion of linear income tax and a uniform VAT rate – both at 18%, would significantly raise household taxes by nearly 3% of the GDP.

Such outcome may be interpreted in many different ways. First, it might relate to the failure of parties to clearly explain which population group would gain once the proposed changes get implemented. Secondly, the public opinion may generally have poor understanding of consequences of different solutions. It must be said that for a long time the campaign focused much more on personalities and several general issues than on specific details and proposals in the area of taxation or social support. Moreover, as demonstrated in the first part of CenEA’s Pre-election Report (Myck et al., 2011b), the ruling parties over the last two terms of parliament have generally failed to deliver their earlier promises related to tax and benefit policy. This may have made voters skeptical of what has been announced this year. The slogan that “no one will give you more than the politicians will promise” has been very popular in Poland over the recent weeks. Such slogans get reinforced by the fact that parties fail to identify convincing sources of funding for their new policies.

Politicians who want their promises to be taken seriously must realize that any proposed additional expenses may only be financed by extra taxes or through credible solutions concerning savings. The experience of this year’s campaign in Poland shows that until both sides of the equation are taken seriously by the parties, voters won’t pay too much attention to what is announced.

References:

Myck, M., Morawski, L., Domitrz, A., Semeniuk, A. (2011a) „Raport Przedwyborczy CenEA, część I. Wybory parlamentarne 2011: kto zyska, a kto straci i ile to będzie kosztowało?” (CenEA’s Pre-election Report. Elections 2011: who will gain, who will lose and how much it will cost?), Microsimulation Report 02/11, Centre for Economic Analysis, Szczecin.

Myck, M., Morawski, L., Domitrz, A., Semeniuk, A. (2011b) „Raport Przedwyborczy CenEA, część I. 2006-2011: kto zyskał, a kto stracił?” (CenEA’s Pre-election Report: 2006-2011 who gained and who lost? ), Microsimulation Report 01/11, Centre for Economic Analysis, Szczecin.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

What Do Recent Insights From Development Economics Tell Us About Foreign Aid Policy?

Policy Brief Image Representing Insights from Development Economics

The short answer is: quite a lot, but different parts of the literature offer different recommendations. The problem is that these different recommendations are partly in conflict, and that political and bureaucratic incentives may reinforce these frictions when putting aid policy into practice. It follows that reforms aiming at improving aid effectiveness have to find a way to deal with this conflict and also balance the tendency of institutional sclerosis within bureaucratic agencies against short sighted incentives of politicians.

The currently predominant field of development economics focuses on impact evaluation of different economic and social interventions. These studies are all micro-oriented, looking at the impact on the level of the individual or household, rather than at the nation as a whole. One example is evaluations of the effects of different interventions on school participation, such as conditional cash transfers, free school meals, provision of uniforms and textbooks, and de-worming. Other well-known studies have looked at educational output, moral hazard versus adverse selection on financial markets, how to best allocate bed-nets to prevent malaria, and the role of information in public goods provision and health outcomes.

What has sparked the academic interest in these types of impact evaluations is the application of a methodology well known from clinical trials and first introduced in the field of economics by labor economists, randomized field experiments. The purpose of impact evaluation is to establish the causal effect of the program at hand. Strictly speaking this requires an answer to the counterfactual question; what difference does it make for the average individual if he is part of the program or not. Since an individual cannot be both part of, and not part of, the program at the same time, an exact answer to that question cannot be reached. Instead evaluators must rely on a comparison between individuals participating in the program and those that do not, or a before and after comparison of program participants. The challenge when doing this is to avoid getting the comparison contaminated by unobservable confounding factors and selection issues. For instance, maybe only the most school motivated households are willing to sign up for conditional cash transfer programs, so a positive correlation between program involvement and school participation may all be due to a selection bias (these households would have sent their children to school anyway). In this case participation is what economists refer to as “endogenous”, individual characteristics that may impact the outcome variable may also drive participation in the program.

To get around this problem, the evaluator would want strictly “exogenous” variation in the participation in the program, i.e. individuals should not get an opportunity to self-select into participation or not. The solution to this problem is to select a group of similar individuals/households/villages and then randomize participation across these units. This creates a group of participants in the program (the “treated”, using the language of clinical studies) and a group of non-participants (the “control group”) who are not only similar in all observable aspects thought to possibly affect the outcome, but who are also not given the opportunity to self-select into the program based on unobservable characteristics. Based on this methodology, the evaluator can then estimate the causal effect of the program. Exactly how that is done varies, but in the cleanest cases simply by comparing the average outcome in the group of treated with that in the group of controls.

So what has this got to do with aid policy? A significant part of aid financing goes of course to projects to increase school participation, give the poor access to financial markets, eradicate infectious diseases, etc. Both the programs evaluated by randomization, and the randomization evaluations themselves, are often financed by aid money. The promise of the randomization literature is thus that it offers a more precise instrument to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of aid financed projects, and also helps aid agencies in their choice of new projects by creating a more accurate knowledge bank of what constitutes current best practices. This can be particularly helpful since aid agencies often are under fire for not being able to show what results their often generous expenditures generate. Anyone who has followed the recent aid debate in Sweden is familiar with this critique, and the methodology of randomization is often brought forward as a useful tool to help estimate and make public the impact of aid financed development projects.

Limits to Randomization

Taken to the extreme, the “randomization revolution” suggests that to maximize aid effectiveness all aid should be allocated to clearly defined projects, and only to those projects that have been shown through randomization to have had a cost-effective causal effect on some outcome included in the aid donors objective (such as the millennium development goals). Yet, most aid practitioners would be reluctant to ascribe to such a statement. Why is that? Well, as is typically the case there are many potential answers. The cynic would argue that proponents of aid are worried that a true revelation of its dismal effects would decrease its political support, and that aid agencies want to keep their relative independence to favor their own pet projects. Better evaluation techniques makes it easier for politicians and tax payers to hold aid agencies accountable to their actions, and principal-agency theory suggests that governments then should put more pressure on agencies to produce verifiable results.

There are other more benevolent reasons to be skeptical to this approach, though, and these reasons find support in the more macro oriented part of the literature. In recent papers studying cross national differences in economic growth and development almost all focus is on the role of economic and political institutions. The term “institutions” has become a bit of a catch-phrase, and it sometimes means quite different things in different papers. Typically, though, the focus lies on formal institutions or societal norms that support a competitive and open market economy and a political system with limited corruption, predictability and public legitimacy. Critical components include protection of property rights, democracy, honest and competent courts, and competition policy, but the list can be made much longer. Also this time the recent academic interest has been spurred by methodological developments that have permitted researchers to better establish a causal effect from institutions to economic development. Estimating cleanly the effect of institutions on the level or growth rate of GDP is complicated since causality is likely to run in both directions, and other variables, such as education, may cause both. What scholars have done is to identify historical data that correlates strongly with historic institutions and then correlated the variation in current institutions that can be explained by these historical data with current day income levels. If cross national variation in current institutions maps closely to cross national variation in historical institutions (“institutional stickiness”) and if current day income levels, or education rates, do not cause historical institutions (which seems reasonable) then the historical data can be used as a so called “instrument” to produce a cleaner estimate of the causal effect of institutions.

Note that randomization and instrumentation are trying to solve the same empirical challenge. When randomization is possible it will be superior if implemented correctly (because perfect instruments only exist in theory), but there is of course a fairly limited range of questions for which randomized experiments are possible to design. In other cases scholars will have to do with instrumentation, or other alternatives such as matching, regression discontinuity or difference-in-difference estimations to better estimate a causal effect.

A second insight from this literature is that what constitutes successful institutions is context specific. Certain economic principles may be universal; incentives work, competition fosters efficiency and property rights are crucial for investments. However, as the example of China shows, what institutions are most likely to guarantee property rights, competition and the right incentives may vary depending on norms and historical experiences among other things. Successful institutional reforms therefore require a certain degree of experimentation for policy makers to find out what works in the context at hand. To just implement blueprints of institutions that have worked elsewhere typically doesn’t work. In other words, institutions must be legitimate in the society at hand to have the desired effect on individual behavior.

Coming back to aid policy, the lesson from this part of the literature is that for aid to contribute to economic and social development, focus should be on helping partner country governments and civic society to develop strong economic and political institutions. And since blueprints don’t work, it is crucial that this process involves domestic involvement and leadership in order to guarantee that the institutions put in place are adapted to the context of the partner country at hand, and has legitimacy in the eyes of both citizens and decision makers. Indeed, institution building is also a central part of aid policy. This sometimes takes an explicit form such as in financing western consultants with expertise in say central banking reform or how to set up a well-functioning court system. But many times it is also implicit in the way the money is disbursed, through program support rather than project support (where the former is more open for the partner country to use at their own priorities), through the partner country’s financial management systems and recorded in the recipient country budget. Also in the implementation of projects there is an element of institution building. By establishing projects within partner government agencies and actively involving its employees, learning and experience will contribute to institutional development.

Actual aid policy often falls short of these ambitions, though. Nancy Birdsall has referred to the impatience with institution building as one of the donors’ “seven deadly sins”. The impatience to produce results leads to insufficient resources towards the challenging and long term work of creating institutions in weak states, and the search for success leads to the creation of development management structures (project implementation units) outside partner country agencies. The latter not only generates no positive spill-overs of knowledge within government agencies, but can often have the opposite effect when donors eager to succeed lure over scarce talent from government agencies. The aid community is aware of these problems and has committed to improve its practices in the Paris declaration and the Accra Agenda, but so far progress has been deemed as slow.

Micro or Macro?

So, I started out saying that there is a risk that these two lessons from the literature may be in conflict if put into practice for actual aid policy. Why is that? At a trivial level, there is of course a conflict over the allocation of aid resources if we interpret the lessons as though the sole focus should be on either institutional development or best practice social projects respectively. However, most people would probably agree that there is a merit to both. In theory it is possible to conceive of an optimal allocation of aid across institutional support and social project support, in which the share of resources going to project support is allocated across projects based on best practices learned from randomized impact evaluations. In practice, however, it’s important to consider why these lessons from the literature haven’t been implemented to a greater extent already. After all, these are not completely new insights. Political economy and the logic of large bureaucratic organizations may be part of the answer. Once these factors are considered, a less trivial conflict becomes apparent, showing the need to think carefully about how to best proceed with improving the practices of aid agencies.

As mentioned above, one line of criticism against aid agencies is that they have had such a hard time to show results from their activities. This is partly due to the complicated nature of aid in itself, but critics also argue that it is greatly driven by current practices of aid agencies. First of all there is a lack of transparency; information about what decisions are made (and why), and where the money is going is often insufficient. This problem sometimes becomes acute, when corruption scandals reveal the lack of proper oversight. Secondly, money is often spent on projects/programs for which objectives are unclear, targets unspecified, and where the final impact of the intervention on the identified beneficiaries simply can’t be quantified. This of course limits the ability to hold agencies accountable to their actions, so focus instead tends to fall on output targets (have all the money been disbursed, have all the schools been built) rather than the actual effects of the spending. So why is this? According to critics, a reason for this lack of transparency and accountability is that it yields the agencies more discretion in how to spend the money. Agencies are accused of institutional inertia, programs and projects keep getting financed despite doubts about their effectiveness because agency staff and aid contractors are financially and emotionally attached.

In this context, more focus on long run, hard to evaluate institutional development may be taken as an excuse for continuing business as usual. Patience, a long run perspective and partner country ownership is necessary, but it cannot be taken as an excuse for not clearly specifying verifiable objectives and targets, and to engage in impact evaluation. It is also important that a long term commitment doesn’t have to imply an unwillingness to abandon a program if it doesn’t generate the anticipated results. It is of course typically much harder to design randomized experiments to evaluate institutional development than the effect of say free distribution of bed-nets. But it doesn’t follow that it is always impossible, and, more importantly, it doesn’t preclude other well founded methods of impact evaluation. The concern here is thus that too much emphasis on the role of institutional development is used as an excuse for not incorporating the main lesson from the “randomization revolution”, the importance of the best possible impact evaluation, because actual randomization is not feasible.

The concern discussed above is based on the implicit argument that aid agencies due to the logic of incentives and interests within bureaucratic institutions may not always do what is in their power to promote development, and that this is made possible through lack of transparency and accountability. The solution would in that case seem to be to increase accountability of aid agencies towards their politicians, the representatives of the tax payers financing the aid budget. That is, greater political control of aid policy would improve the situation.

Unfortunately, things aren’t quite that easy, which brings us to the concern with letting the ability to evaluate projects with randomized experiments being a prerequisite for aid financing. We have already touched upon the problem that programs for institutional development are hard to design as randomized experiments. It follows that important programs may not be implemented at all, and that aid allocation becomes driven by what is feasible to evaluate rather than by what is important for long run development. But there is also an additional concern that has to do with the political incentives of aid. The impatience with institution building is often blamed on political incentives to generate verifiable success stories. This is driven by the need to motivate aid, and the government policies more generally, in the eyes of the voters. It follows that politicians in power often have a rather short time horizon, that doesn’t square well with the tedious and long run process of institution building. Putting aid agencies under tighter control of elected politicians may therefore possibly solve the problem outlined above, but it may also introduce, or reinforce, another problem, the impatience with institution building.

Unfortunately, the perception that randomization makes it possible to more exactly define what works and what doesn’t, may have further unintended consequences if politicians care more about short term success than long term development. We know from principal-agent theory that the optimal contract gives the agent stronger incentives to take actions that contribute to a project if it becomes easier to evaluate whether the project has been successful or not. Think now of the government as the principal and the aid agency as the agent, and consider the case when the government has a bias towards generating short run success stories. In this case the introduction of a new technology that makes it easier to evaluate social projects (i.e. randomization) will make the government put stronger incentives on the aid agency to redirect resources towards social projects and away from institutional development. This would not be a problem if the government had development as its only objective, because then the negative consequences on effort at institution building would be internalized in the incentive structure. But in a second best world where politics trump policy, the improved technology may have perverse and unintended consequences. Greater political control will lead to less focus on institutional development than what is desired from a development perspective. A very benevolent (naïve?) interpretation of the motivation behind aid agencies’ tendencies to design social projects such that their effects are hard to quantify could thus be that it decreases the political pressure to ignore institutional development.

Concluding Remarks

The challenge to heed the two lessons from the literature thus goes beyond the mere conflict of whether to allocate the resources to institutional development or to best practice social projects once political economy and bureaucratic incentives are considered. Improved agency accountability may be necessary to avoid “institutional sclerosis” in the name of institution building and make sure that best practices are followed, but too much political meddling may lead to short sightedness and a hunt for marketable success stories. It is even possible, that the “randomization revolution” may make matters worse, if it becomes an excuse for neglecting the tedious and long term process of institution building and reinforces the political pressure for short term verifiable results.

What is then the best hope for avoiding this conflict of interest? That is far from a trivial question, but maybe the best way to make sure that agency accountability towards their political principals doesn’t lead to impatience with institution building is to form a broad-based political consensus around the objectives, means and expectations of development aid. The pedagogical challenge to convince tax payers that aid helps and that they need to be patient remains, but at least the political temptation to accuse political opponents of squandering tax payers money without proven effects and to pretend to have the final solution for how to make aid work, should be mitigated. But until then the best bet is probably to stay skeptical to anyone claiming to have the final cure for aid inefficiency, and to allow some trust in the ability of experienced practitioners to do the right thing.

Recommended Further Reading

  • Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson and J.A. Robinson (2001) “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation“, American Economic Review 91(5), 1369-1401.
  • Banerjee, A. (Ed.) (2007), “Making Aid Work”, MIT Press.
  • Bannerjee, A. and E. Duflo (2008), “The Experimental Approach to Development Economics”, NBER Working Paper 14467.
  • Birdsall, N. (2005), “Seven Deadly Sins: Reflections on Donor Failings”, CGD Working Paper 50.
  • Birdsall, N. and H. Kharas (2010), “Quality of Official Development Assistance Assessment”, Working Paper, Brookings and CGD.
  • Duflo, E., R. Glennerster and M. Kremer (2007), “Using Randomization in Development Economics Research: A Toolkit”, CEPR Discussion Paper 6059.
  • Easterly, W. (2002), “The Cartel of Good Intentions: The problem of Bureaucracy in Foreign Aid”, Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 5, 223-50.
  • Easterly, W. and T. Pfutze (2008), “Where Does the Money Go? Best and Worst Practices in Foreign Aid”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22, 29-52.
  • Knack, S. and A. Rahman (2007), “Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients”, Journal of Development Economics, 83(1), 176-97.
  • Rodrik, D. (2008), “The New Development Economics: We Shall Experiment, but how Shall We Learn?”, JFK School of Government Working Paper 55.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Baltic Shadow Economies

Policy Brief Image of Two Shadows from Walking Men Representing Shadow Economies

This policy brief summarises the results and implications of a recent study of the size and determinants of the shadow economies in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The results suggest that the shadow economy in Latvia in 2010 is considerably larger than in neighboring Estonia and Lithuania. While the shadow economy as a percentage of GDP in Estonia contracted from 2009 to 2010, it expanded in Latvia and Lithuania. An important driver of shadow activity in the Baltic countries is the entrepreneurs’ dissatisfaction and distrust in the government and the tax system. Involvement in the shadow economy is more pervasive among younger firms and firms in the construction sector. These findings have a number of policy implications, which are discussed at the end of this brief.

Background and Aims

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the shadow economies in the Baltic countries and other emerging Central and Eastern European countries are substantial in size relative to GDP. This is an important issue for these countries because informal production has a number of negative consequences.

First, countries can spiral into a ‘bad equilibrium’: individuals go underground to escape taxes and social welfare contributions, eroding the tax and social security bases, causing increases in tax rates and/or budget deficits, pushing more production underground and ultimately weakening the economic and social basis for collective arrangements. Second, tax evasion can also hamper economic growth by diverting resources from productive uses (producing useful goods and services) to unproductive ones (mechanisms and schemes to conceal income, monitoring of tax compliance, issuance and collection of penalties for non-compliance). Third, informal production can constrain entrepreneurs’ ability to obtain debt or equity financing for productive investment because potential creditors/investors cannot verify the true (concealed) cash flows of the entrepreneur. This can further impede growth. Finally, shadow activities distort official statistics such as GDP, which are important signals to policy makers.

The aim of our study is to measure the size of the shadow economies in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and to analyse the factors that influence participation in the shadow sector. We use the term ‘shadow economy’ to refer to all legal production of goods and services that is deliberately concealed from public authorities. The study also makes a methodological contribution by developing an index of the size of the shadow economies as a percentage of GDP. It is foreseen that the index will be published regularly.

Although an index invites comparisons, and maybe even ‘competitions’ between countries, the purpose here is not to create a ‘Baltic championship’ on shadow economies. The index should primarily be seen as a tool to promote discussion on the size and role of the shadow economy and to provide a metric which can be used to measure the degree of success in fighting the shadow economy.

Method of Measuring the Shadow Economies

Estimates the size of the shadow economies are derived from surveys of a stratified random sample of entrepreneurs in the three countries (591 in Latvia, 536 in Lithuania and 500 in Estonia). The rationale for this approach is that those most likely to know how much production or income goes unreported, are the entrepreneurs who themselves engage in the misreporting and shadow production.

Survey-based approaches face the risk of underestimating the total size of the shadow economy due to non-response and untruthful response given the sensitive nature of the topic. We minimise this risk by employing a number of surveying and data collection techniques shown in previous studies to be effective in eliciting more truthful responses (e.g., Gerxhani, 2007; Kazemier and van Eck, 1992; Hanousek and Palda, 2004).

These approaches include framing the survey as a study of satisfaction with government policy, gradually introducing the most sensitive questions after less sensitive questions, phrasing misreporting questions indirectly, e.g., asking entrepreneurs about the shadow activity among ‘firms in their industry’ rather than ‘their firm’, and, in the analysis, controlling for factors that correlate with potential untruthful response, such as tolerance towards misreporting. We aggregate entrepreneurs’ responses about misreported business income, unregistered or hidden employees, as well as unreported ‘envelope’ wages to obtain estimates of the shadow economies as a proportion of GDP.

There are three common methods of measuring GDP: the output, expenditure and income approaches. Our index is based on the income approach, which calculates GDP as the sum of gross remuneration of employees (gross personal income) and gross operating income of firms (gross corporate income). Computation of the index proceeds in three steps: (i) estimate the extent of underreporting of employee remuneration and underreporting of firms’ operating income using the survey responses; (ii) estimate each firm’s shadow production proportion as a weighted average of the two underreporting estimates with the weights reflecting the proportions of employee remuneration and firms’ operating income in the composition of GDP; and (iii) calculate a production-weighted average of shadow production across firms. Taking weighted averages of the underreporting measures rather than a simple average is important for the shadow economy index to reflect a proportion of GDP.

Size of the Shadow Economies

Table 1 indicates that the shadow economy as a proportion of GDP is considerably larger in Latvia (38.1%) compared to Estonia (19.4%) and Lithuania (18.8%) in 2010. Only Estonia has managed to marginally decrease the proportional size of its shadow economy from 2009 to 2010 – a statistically significant decrease of 0.8 percentage points. In contrast, the proportional size of the shadow economies in Lithuania and Latvia has increased by an estimated 0.8 and 1.5 percentage points, respectively.

Table 1. Shadow economy index for the Baltic countries

 

Note: This table reports point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the size of the shadow economies as a proportion of GDP. The third column reports the change in the relative size of the shadow economies from 2009 to 2010.

Form of Shadow Activity

Figure 1 illustrates the average levels of underreporting (business profits, number of employees and salaries) in each of the countries in 2009 and 2010. The average levels of underreporting in all three areas are in the order of two to three times higher in Latvia compared to Lithuania and Estonia. In Latvia and Lithuania, the degree of underreporting of business profits and salaries (‘envelope’ wages) is approximately twice as large as the underreporting of employees. The exception to this trend is the relatively low amount of underreported business profits in Estonia, likely to be a result of low corporate tax rates. Bribery in Latvia and Lithuania constitutes a similar fraction of firms’ revenue, approximately 10%, whereas in Estonia bribery is less pervasive and constitutes around 6% of firms’ revenue.

Figure 1. Simple averages of underreporting and bribery among Estonian (EE), Lithuanian (LT) and Latvian (LV) firms in 2009 and 2010.

 

Determinants of Involvement in the Shadow Economy

The literature on tax evasion identifies two main groups of factors that affect the decision to evade taxes and thus participate in the shadow economy. The first set emerges from rational choice models of the decision to evade taxes. In such models individuals or firms weigh up the benefits of evasion in the form of tax savings against the probability of being caught and the penalties that they expect to receive if caught. Therefore the decision to underreport income and participate in the shadow economy is affected by the detection rates, the size and type of penalties, firms’ attitudes towards risk-taking and so on. These factors are likely to differ across countries, regions, sectors of the economy, size and age of firm, and entrepreneurial orientation (innovativeness, risk-taking tendencies, and pro-activeness).

Empirical studies find that the actual amount of tax evasion is considerably lower than predicted by rational choice models based on pure economic self-interest. The difference is often attributed to the second, broader, set of tax evasion determinants – attitudes and social norms. These factors include perceived justice of the tax system, i.e., attitudes about whether the tax burden and administration of the tax system are fair. They also include attitudes about how appropriately taxes are spent and how much firms trust the government. Finally, tax evasion is also influenced by social norms such as ethical values and moral convictions, as well as fear of feelings of guilt and social stigmatisation if caught.

Our study uses regression analysis to identify the factors that are statistically related to firms’ involvement in the shadow economy. The results indicate that the size of the shadow economy is smaller in Estonia and Lithuania relative to Latvia, after controlling for a range of factors.

Tolerance towards tax evasion is positively associated with the firm’s stated level of income/wage underreporting. Satisfaction with the tax system and the government is negatively associated with the firm’s involvement in the shadow economy, i.e. dissatisfied firms engage in more shadow activity, satisfied firms engage in less.

This result is consistent with previous research on tax evasion, and offers an explanation of why the size of the shadow economy is larger in Latvia than in Estonia and Lithuania; namely that Latvian firms engage in more shadow activity because they are more dissatisfied with the tax system and the government as illustrated in Figure 2. Analysing each of the four measures of satisfaction separately we find that shadow activity is most strongly related to dissatisfaction with business legislation, followed by the State Revenue Service, the government’s tax policy, and finally the government’s support for entrepreneurs.

Figure 2. Average satisfaction of firms with the tax system and government in 2010.

Note: These questions use a 5-point scale: 1=“very unsatisfied”; 2=“unsatisfied”; 3=“neither satisfied nor unsatisfied”; 4=“satisfied”; and 5=“very satisfied”. SRS is State Revenue Service.

Another strong determinant of involvement in the shadow economy is firm age, with younger firms engaging in more shadow activity than older firms. This effect dominates relations between firm size and shadow activity. A possible explanation for the relation is that young firms entering a market made up of established competitors use tax evasion as a means of being competitive in their early stages. The regression results also provide some evidence that after controlling for other factors, firms in the construction sector and firms that have a pro-active entrepreneurial orientation tend to engage in more shadow activity.

Policy Implications

First, the relatively large size of the shadow economies in the Baltic countries, and their different expansion/contraction trends, cause significant error in official estimates of GDP and its rates of change, because although statistics bureaus in each of the countries attempt to include some of the shadow production in GDP estimates they do not capture the full extent. Not only is GDP used in key policy ratios such as government deficit to GDP, debt to GDP, but also the rate of change is used as a key indicator of economic performance and therefore guides policy decisions. When the shadow economy is expanding (as in Latvia and Lithuania) official GDP growth rates underestimate true economic growth and when the shadow economy is contracting (as in Estonia) official GDP growth rates overstate true economic growth. At a minimum, policy makers need to be aware of these biases in official statistics, but ideally, statistical bureaus would implement more rigorous methods to estimate and incorporate shadow production in official statistics.

Second, our results suggest that to reduce the size of the shadow economies in the Baltic countries by encouraging voluntary compliance, a key factor that needs to be addressed is the high level of dissatisfaction with the tax system and with the government. Addressing this issue could involve actions such as making tax policy more stable (less frequent changes in procedures and tax rates), and increasing the transparency with which taxes are spent.

Finally, our estimates of the size of the shadow economies suggest that there is significant scope for all three governments to increase their revenues by bringing production ‘out of the shadows’. Investment in programs aimed at reducing the size of the shadow economies could be rather profitable for the Baltic governments, because even a small influence on entrepreneurial behaviour could result in significant revenue increases.

References

  • Gerxhani, K. (2007) “‘Did you pay your taxes?’ How (not) to conduct tax evasion surveys in transition countries”, Social Indicators Research 80, pp. 555-581.
  • Hanousek, J., and F. Palda (2004) “Quality of government services and the civic duty to pay taxes in the Czech and Slovak Republics, and other transition countries”, Kyklos 57(2), pp.237-252.
  • Kazemier, B., and R. van Eck (1992) “Survey investigations of the hidden economy”, Journal of Economic Psychology 13, pp. 569-587.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Do Russians Oppose Anti-Tobacco Policy?

Policy Brief Image with Smoking Cigarette Placed on the Ground that Represents if Russians Oppose Anti-Tobacco Policy

Russia is known as a persistent leader in terms of high adult mortality rates among the middle-income countries. Unhealthy lifestyle, smoking and excessive alcohol consumption have been confirmed as major causes of the high mortality rates in Russia. Each of these causes are estimated to cost about 10 years of life. While alcoholism receives some attention in public debate (though not that much in policy decisions), the dangers of smoking are often downplayed. This is in a country where 60% of males and 22% of females smoke, cigarettes are very cheap (about 60 euro cents per pack), and smoking prevalence among teenagers is very high: almost 25% of those in the 15-18 age group smoke.

The tobacco industry lobby has used the threat of potential protests by the Russian public as an argument against policies to fight smoking. The New Economic School and Quirk Global Strategies conducted a survey of 1200 adults in December 2010 in order to gauge attitudes of the Russian public towards a national policy for reducing tobacco use. The fieldwork was conducted by Moscow-based ROMIR in 93 urban and rural settlements across the country.

Russians believe that smoking is harmful and that tobacco use is a serious problem

The vast majority of Russians (95%) believe that smoking cigarettes are harmful (72%, including a majority of smokers, say that it is very harmful) . In addition, nearly seven out of ten Russians think that smoking and tobacco use is a “very serious” problem in the country.


Figure 1. Attitudes towards a national policy to reduce tobacco use.

Eight in ten Russians (80%) support a national tobacco control policy to help reduce tobacco use in the country (see Figure 1). The policy has support across Russia’s demographic and geographic spectrum. Even nearly two-thirds of regular smokers (63%) support a national policy to help reduce tobacco use. Overall, just 14% of Russians oppose the idea.

Increasing the price of tobacco products and tobacco taxes

Most Russians believe that the price of a pack of cigarettes is either about right (40%) or too low (31%). Very few (16%) think that the price of cigarettes is too high. Even among regular smokers, just 20% view the current cost of cigarettes as too high, which is nearly identical to the number of regular smokers who think that cigarettes are too cheap (19%).

There is support for the idea of increasing the price of tobacco products, including raising tax on tobacco, as part of an effort to reduce tobacco use in the country (Figure 2). It was found that 70% of Russians support price increases, and 41% strongly support such increases. The share of respondents who oppose increasing the price of tobacco products is 27%, and very few (7%) are in strong opposition.

Figure 2. Attitudes towards a price increase.

There is majority support for higher prices for cigarettes in every region of the country, although the level of support varies. The strongest level is in the Southern region (82%), while the Volga (61%) and Ural regions (66%) are less supportive. A slight majority of regular smokers opposes raising prices for cigarettes (51% against 47% in favor), including tobacco tax increases. However, nearly two-thirds (65%) of the occasional smokers, support the idea.

A majority (54%) of Russians believe that smoking rates will stay the same and 24% believe that smoking rates will decrease after the modest tax increase announced by the Russian Ministry of Health goes into effect. However, a plurality (44%) believes that smoking rates would decrease if cigarette prices tripled to approximately 75-100 rubles per pack.

If the Russian Government did decide to increase the price of tobacco products to approximately 75-100 rubles per pack, fewer than one in ten Russians (9%) would be very displeased (a total of 28% indicate that they would be displeased). Indeed, a plurality (38%) of Russians would be pleased with such a significant price increase for cigarettes and another 27% would be apathetic.

Russians support other specific policies to reduce tobacco use

Strong majorities in Russia favor other specific policies to help address tobacco use in the country. These policies include a ban on tobacco advertising (86%), funding tobacco prevention programs (85%), stronger health warnings on cigarette packs (81%), and prohibiting smoking entirely in public places and workplaces, including restaurants and bars (82%).

The latter result is reinforced by the finding that 72% of Russians view the rights of customers and employees to breathe clean air in restaurants and bars as more important than the rights of smokers to smoke and business owners to allow smoking (see Figure 3). Even 53% of regular smokers think the same. It was found that 24% of Russians consider the rights of smokers to smoke and business owners to allow smoking in restaurants and bars as more important.

Figure 3. Attitudes towards the right to breathe clean air and the right to smoke in restaurants and bars.

To sum up, the vast majority of Russians think that tobacco use is a serious problem in the country. Accordingly, there is a high level of support for a national policy to reduce tobacco use in Russia. In addition, there is support for the idea of increasing the price of tobacco products, including raising tax on tobacco, as part of an effort to reduce tobacco use in the country.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Incomes of Polish Households in the Context of 2005-2011 Tax and Benefit Reforms: A Pre-Election Analysis

Policy Brief Image of a Man and Polish Household Representative with Polish Flags Days Before Government Elections

On October 9, Polish voters will decide who will form the new government. In an analysis of tax and benefit reforms introduced over the last two terms of Parliament, the independent Centre for Economic Analysis, CenEA, examines who gained and who lost on the implemented changes. The reforms that have been implemented since 2006 include significant tax reductions and important changes to family benefits, as well as a recent increase in the VAT. In the context of declarations made in earlier electoral campaigns, the actually implemented economic policies introduced, offer little guidance to the voters regarding the reliability of promises made during this current campaign.

The last two terms of office for the Polish parliament includes the period October 2005 till November 2007, and the current four-year term which followed a snap-election in 2007, and which will now come to an end with parliamentary elections scheduled for October 9.

During 2005-2007, the ruling coalition was led by the Law and Justice party (PiS) who then lost the 2007 elections to the Civic Platform (PO). This year, these two parties remain the main contenders for electoral victory.

The years since 2005 have been marked by a series of significant reforms with substantial influence on disposable incomes of Polish households. These reforms are analyzed in the first Pre-election Report recently published by the independent Centre for Economic Analysis, CenEA (Myck et al., 2011). This report analyses the extent of the most important economic reforms undertaken in the last two terms of office and their distributional consequences. The analysis is done using the Polish microsimulation model SIMPL based on a dataset from the Polish Household Budgets’ Survey.

The report considers the following economic reforms:

  1. reductions in disability rates of social security contributions (SSC) in 2007 and 2008,
  2. introduction of a generous child tax credit (CTC) in the personal income tax system in 2007,
  3. introduction of a two-rate (18% and 32%) instead of a three-rate (19%, 30%, 40%) system of personal taxation (PIT reform) in 2009,
  4. a series of reforms to the means-tested system of family benefits (FB) in 2006 and 2009,
  5. a VAT reform which increased the basic rate from 22% to 23% and changed the operation of lower rates at 5% and 8% instead of 3% and 7%.
Table 1. Effect of changes in Social Security Contributions, Personal Income Tax and Health Insurance on the balance of public finance in tax systems from 2005-2011 (year to year changes, in million euro)

Source: based on Myck et al. (2011), Table 4.
Annual values are given in Euros; differences in SSCs are computed as net changes accounting for changes in the public sector’s employer contributions. Exchange rate: 1 Euro = 4.3595 PLN.

While the big reforms grabbed the headlines, subsequent governments which oversaw their implementation, followed the policy of raising taxes and lowering expenditures through policies of freezing the value of tax credits and eligibility thresholds for family benefits. In the latter case, this generated a reduction in the number of children eligible to family benefits by 18%. At the same time, the value of benefits to those receiving them increased, on average, by 60%, with the net effect being a 7% increase in family benefit spending.

It is shown in our report that the reform package implemented in the 5th term of Parliament, and which included, in particular, the SSC reforms (2007/08), the CTC (2007), and a reform of the FB system (2006), has been distributed very evenly across different income groups. Households in income deciles 1-9 saw their incomes grow by about 4.5%, while those in the top decile gained about 3%. The implementation of the tax reform in 2009 brought about significant gains only to high income households. This tax reform was legislated prior to the financial crisis in 2008. The policy of freezing tax credits and benefit-eligibility thresholds, introduced in 2008 and 2011, resulted in losses for middle-income groups but meant that the bottom decile gained about 1%. This was largely through changes in the value of family benefits for families receiving them.

The entire 2006-2011 package of tax and benefit reforms, had a direct impact on households’ incomes since it increased real disposable incomes, on average, by 5.4%. Here, the households in the top income decile gained the most (9.2%). The lowest gains were found in the 3rd decile (3.4%). Moreover, the poorest 10% of households gained, on average, 5.7% from the introduction of the entire package.
The nature of these reforms had an interesting distribution in terms of age and family type with the highest gains going to working-age individuals, in particular to married couples with children (10.2%). On the other hand, single pension-age individuals saw their income fall slightly as a result of the reforms (-0.3%), and only small gains have been seen for pensioner couples (0.5%).

In the report, we set the implemented policies against promises and declarations made by the principal parties during electoral campaigns and government goals declared in the Prime Ministers’ exposé’s.

Out of the main policies implemented by the 2005-07 government, only the PIT reform of 2009 has been introduced in a form declared in the 2005 PiS electoral program. Its introduction was, however, legislated for 2009 and fell therefore under the current term of office. The introduced reductions in the rates of the SSC, one of the most costly reforms, were not mentioned in the electoral pledges.

Moreover, the declared form of the CTC in the electoral program of PiS, was very different from the one introduced in 2007. The introduced program centered on the theme of a “solidarity package”, whereas the declared CTC was to be focused on low-income families. The introduced policy, about 9 times as expensive as the declared one, transferred resources to low-income families but was most generous to high earners who pay enough tax to take advantage of the generous maximum amounts of the credit. The generosity of the CTC makes it the most costly “tax expenditure” item in the Polish system of direct taxes, with a value of 0.4% of GDP (Finance Ministry, 2010).

In terms of the PO’s program and the Prime Minister Tusk’s exposé’s, the report analyzes the focus on further reduction of taxes. In the midst of the financial crisis, the current coalition oversaw the introduction of the 2009 PIT reduction but withdrew from implementing a 15% flat tax, one of its flagship policies prior to 2007. However, despite a reduction in the basic rate of tax from 19% to 18%, income taxes grew on average among low and middle-income households (1-6th decile) because of the freezing of the tax credits. The net effect of income tax policies, in the current term of office, has meant gains for higher income households, with a substantial reduction in income taxes for those in the top decile group (on average 23%).

In light of the growing level of public debt, the current government implemented a VAT reform that raised indirect taxes by about 0.3% of GDP. The combination of an increased basic rate, with a reduction of lower rates on main food items, produced a proportional distribution of the tax burden.

Overall, the tax record of the current government is mixed. The implemented reductions were legislated already prior to its arrival, and the net result of the packages implemented in recent years hangs importantly on the level of households’ income. On average, only the top three deciles of households have seen their tax burden fall.

Each of the coalitions have their excuses for failing to deliver the promised policies. For the 2005-07 coalition, it is the early dissolution of Parliament. The current government, led by the Civic Platform, had to maneuver through the difficult years of the financial crisis and an economic slowdown. At the same time, one could interpret the policies implemented in the first two years of the 2005-07 Parliament as an expression of policy priorities, whereas the policies implemented during the current Parliament, can be confronted with their previous declarations to examine which groups of society they have prioritized.

In Poland, household income has grown fast in recent years. On the one hand, due to growing wages and earnings, on the other, due to introduced packages of tax and benefit reforms. Despite the financial crisis, the Polish economy has so far performed relatively well.

The reforms implemented in the last two terms of office, offer however little guidance to the credibility of electoral declarations on socio-economic policy. Even though the Law and Justice party (PiS), the leading party of the 2005-2007 government, legislated one of its key promises while in office (the PIT 2009 reform), it also implemented substantial reforms which were either not originally in their electoral program, or which took a very different shape and benefited other segments of the population. Even if the current government withdrew from the promises of further tax reductions when faced with the challenges of the financial crisis, it oversaw the implementation of significant tax cuts legislated in the 5th term of Parliament. Overall, however, the implemented policies increased taxes of lower income households.

To conclude, our results suggest that if Polish voters’ decisions are to be guided by declarations in the area of socio-economic policy, they will face a tricky choice on the 9th of October.

Figure 1. Changes in disposable incomes of Polish households as a result of tax and benefit policies implemented between 2006 and 2011, by income deciles.

Source: CenEA, Myck et al. (2011). Notes: average monthly values per household in a given decile group.

References

  • Finance Ministry (2010) “Tax Expenditures in Poland”, Polish Finance Ministry, Warsaw.
  • Morawski, L., and Myck, M. (2010) “‘Klin’-ing up: Effects of Polish Tax Reforms on Those In and on those Out”, Labour Economics, 17(3), str.556-566.
  • Myck, M., Morawski, L., Domitrz, A., Semeniuk, A. (2011) „Raport Przedwyborczy CenEA, część I. 2006-2011: kto zyskał, a kto stracił?” (CenEA’s pre-election report: 2006-2011 who gained and who lost? ), Microsimulation Report 01/11, Centre for Economic Analysis, Szczecin.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Tax Meat to Save the Baltic Sea

Portion of meat placed on a wooden pallet representing idea of tax meat to save the Baltic Sea

In a world of perfect markets, where prices are “right”, consumers’ choice should, with few exceptions, be limited only by their budget constraints. But in the case of agricultural products, the “right” prices are not in place. One reason is that producers in this sector do not bear the costs for the externalities they generate. Focusing on the case of the Baltic Sea, this brief provides some insights into why livestock producers are, by and large, exempted from environmental policies, and raises the question whether something should be done about it.

An Italian expression describes the attempt to juggle too many projects or attain too many goals at once, with the tacit implication that something is bound to fail. “Avere troppa carne al fuoco“: literally, to have too much meat on the grill. This, in a metaphorical but also quite literal sense, is the dominant impression left by some summer reading about the situation of the Baltic Sea.

The Baltic Sea is home to the world’s largest anthropogenic “dead zone”. The main culprit is the unsustainable livestock production in the region, generating externalities (i.e., costs that economic actors impose on others without paying a price for it) that short-circuit the functioning of the markets, creating a case for regulatory intervention. The concept of externalities is today most famously related to the issue of carbon dioxide emissions and climate change, felt by many as the most pressing challenge mankind has to deal with at present. In recent years, a lot of brain power has been spent on this, but there is more to environmental degradation and climate change than just CO2 and rising temperatures. A very conspicuous example is literally under our eyes, in the water body that lies between our lands. What should we do about it?

A Layman Understanding of the Background

For at least three decades, eutrophication (i.e., nutrient accumulation) and hypoxia (i.e., oxygen depletion) in the Baltic Sea has triggered and boosted each other in a vicious cycle. The nutrients discharged in the water fertilize the ocean floor resulting in an excess algal bloom. This underwater forest consumes oxygen, thus altering the balance between chemical elements in the water, so that even more nutrients are released and the cycle continues (for further references, see [16, 19, 21]). Beyond the algae and the decreased transparency of the water, these deep changes in the sea environment start to make them noticed in fish stocks depletion, but can more generally become devastating to both the marine and terrestrial ecosystems. Moreover, according to researchers, these conditions are going to increase the sensitivity of the area to the global climatic changes expected in the near future. This is seriously threatening a large part of economic activities in the whole catchment of the sea, an area of 22,500,000 km2 over nine countries with 85 million inhabitants.

Since 1974, all sources of pollution around the sea have been subject to a single convention, the Helsinki Convention, signed by the then seven Baltic coastal states. The Helsinki Commission, or HELCOM, is the governing body of the Convention, whose present Contracting Parties are Denmark, Estonia, the European Community, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia and Sweden. For over three decades, HELCOM has monitored the situation. Alarming reports have followed one upon the other, together with policy recommendations to the contracting parties.

As stated on its website, “the work of HELCOM has led to improvements in various fields, but further work is still needed [… and] the remaining challenges are more difficult than earlier obstacles”. Reductions in emissions achieved so far are low hanging fruits, concerning major point sources, such as larger cities’ sewage treatment plants and industrial wastewater outlets. Due to both technical and socio-economic obstacles, achieving further reductions will be a tougher task. This is because it is now time to address diffuse sources of nutrients such as run-off from over-fertilized agricultural lands. Nevertheless, according to numerous studies (among others, [19, 23]), a substantial reduction of the nutrient load discharged into the sea appears necessary in order to reduce further damage; all the more, so given that it takes many decades for the sea to recover. The question is hence whether more stringent policy instruments might be needed.

According to researchers at HELCOM, eutrophication of the Baltic Sea is due to the excess of nitrogen and phosphorus loads coming from land-based sources. About 75% of nitrogen and 52% of phosphorus come from agriculture and the livestock sector. In particular, the main reason for the sharp increase in nutrient loads during the last 50 years is the intensification and rationalization process. This was partly stimulated by the EU Common Agricultural Policy in its early phase, with a geographic separation between crop and animal production [6, 9, 10]. On the one hand, animal farms grew ever bigger, in the order of tens of thousands of animals for cattle, hundreds of thousands for swine and millions for chicken farms. These giant facilities produce way more manure than what could be absorbed by crop production in their vicinity. Cheap fodder to these extremely dense animal populations is produced on large scale crop fields elsewhere, too far away for transport of manure to be feasible and instead using high-yield chemical fertilizers. This way, the nutrient surplus is multiplied at both locations; it leaks through the ground or in the waterways from the big heaps of manure that cannot be properly stored or disposed of, and it leaks from the over-fertilized fields (shocking case studies are reported by HELCOM [11]).

However, a different type of agriculture exists in the area known as Ecological Recycling Agriculture (ERA). This is based on more traditional methods and means that farms have a lower animal density and use the manure as fertilizer in an integrated production of crop to be used for animal feed. In this way, ERA manages to better close the cycle of nutrients with very little dispersion to the environment. Scenarios simulations [12] show that, expanding the presence of ERA from the negligible shares it currently accounts for (between zero and a few percentage points, varying by sector and country) would contribute considerably to solving the problem. The nitrogen surplus discharged into the sea yearly could decrease by as much as 61% if all agricultural production in Poland and the Baltic states were converted to the standard of the best ERA facilities currently operating (the Swedish ones), without affecting the current volumes of crop and animal products. However, this is not likely to happen spontaneously, precisely because of the externalities discussed above. As long as the external costs are unaccounted for and ignored, scale economies push in the direction of concentration and intensification, which is the current development path of the sector.

A Difficult Question

Zooming out from the Baltic Sea and looking at the bigger picture, one starts to wonder why the agricultural sector is so seldom a part of environmental policy or even the debate. Recent research has raised awareness about the contribution of the agriculture and livestock sector to climate change [5, 8, 14, 17]. Beyond nitrogen and phosphorus, the expansion of livestock farming is behind the rising emissions of methane. It is the next most common greenhouse gas after CO2 and responsible for 19% of global warming from human activities. This is more than the share of all transportation in the world combined [18].

A new American Economic Review paper [13] provides a broad picture of the sources of air pollution in the American economy, for the first time computed separately by sector and industry, and with the purpose of incorporating externalities into national accounts. Crop production and livestock production stand out among the five industries with the largest gross external damage (GED), defined as the dollar value of emissions from sources within the industry. In fact, the agricultural sector has the highest GED to value added ratio.

However, greenhouse gases are not the only externality generated by livestock production. The animals’ living conditions under modern farming methods favor the emergence of infections and new diseases that reach much further than through direct consumption of related products, as the recent E. coli episode in Europe brought to attention. The generalized use of antibiotics in animal feed, legal and widespread in some countries [3], constitutes an even bigger health threat. This is because it has the potential of generating antibiotic-resistant mutations of bacteria against which we would be completely defenseless should they pass to humans.

Moreover, the public has from an animal-rights and ethics perspective become increasingly concerned about the animals’ living conditions. 77% of respondents to the Eurobarometer 2005 believe that the welfare-protection of farm animals in their country needs to be improved. 96% of American respondents to the Gallup 2003 survey say that animals deserve legal protection, and 76% say that animal welfare is more important than low meat prices. Additionally, a comparable share advocates passing strict laws concerning the treatment of farmed animals.

In rich countries, the increased share of meat in the diet, which has been stimulated by decreasing relative prices, constitutes according to some medical research a health hazard in itself. In developing countries, raising livestock is an inefficient and expensive converter of fossil fuels into calories for human consumption. In addition, fodder production often displaces other important land uses such as forests.

It is easy to rationalize the absence of these issues from the policy agenda. It is not just a matter of powerful lobbies. The ownership structure and size composition make the agricultural sector so heterogeneous that the challenges in regulating it can easily be imagined. Adding to this, is the special role of food in culture, the “local” products so often linked to national identity, the romantic idea of the land nourishing its people, and of course the strategic role of being food self-sufficient [7]. In the past, the latter was linked to wars and famines. Perhaps, even in our projections about the future, self-reliance in food production still plays an important role in the perspective of global climate changes and accordingly limited or modified trade flows. However, we cannot afford to grant this sector a special status and ignore all the social costs it generates. Can we learn anything from current research on how all these externalities should be addressed?

Policy Tools

In the terminology of Baumol and Oates’ classic book on environmental policy, instruments can be categorized as “command and control”. For example, explicit regulation of standards and technologies with associated prohibitions and sanctions; information provision, that then lets the power in the hands of the consumers; and price-based instruments, in the form of taxes, subsidies or trading schemes. These can be imposed on inputs or output, with different implications [4].

The relatively high-level standards of EU environmental legislation (legally stipulated maximum livestock density per hectare, requirements of minimum manure storage capacity, ban on winter manure spreading) is effectively enforced in some countries. In the newer members states, on the other hand, issues have been reported [15] in the form of incomplete translation of EU legislation into the national regulations and ineffective enforcing, significant examples of unlawful practices by foreign companies (e.g. Danish companies in Poland and Lithuania) and limited public access to environmental information. When it comes to non-EU members in the Baltic Sea area, these problems are scaled up, with very large animal farms, lack of many important environmental regulations (no limits on livestock density, capacity of manure storage or ammonia emissions from stored and utilized manure, too generous limits for amount of manure allowed, etc.) and an insufficient environmental information system.

Information undoubtedly plays an important role, but to rely on consumers’ pressure might not be sufficient to solve this type of issues. Consumers are not famously a very effective pressure group, because of organizational issues and the classic collective action problems. Direct regulation of activities is certainly necessary, especially when it comes to the most important rules of the game for producers. However, the heterogeneity of the sector creates a trade-off between environmental precision and transaction costs of implementation and control in practice. For example, the damage of nitrate leaching depends on the type of soil; the policy measure is precise when it restricts leaching losses on sites that have specific characteristics. However, the costs of enforcing measures only at these sites are high. Alternatively, curbing nitrate use in general has low transaction cost, but because it will also affect sites without problems of nitrate in the groundwater, it also has low precision. This may be considered unfair or illegitimate [24].

Another limit of this approach is the lack of flexibility: once a particular practice becomes forbidden, it is likely that some other behavior emerges from the creativity of the actors involved that was not foreseen by the norm but could potentially present the same problems as the forbidden one. This will happen as long as the private incentives of the actors are not aligned with the policy goal.

Often the best way to curb a particular activity that, as in this case, has a number of unwanted side effects, is not to ban it but to put a price on it. As in the case made for CO2, a market based approach could also in this area offer the advantage of being cost-effective and at the same time stimulate creative new solutions, e.g. new technologies for manure processing. Therefore, one immediate questions concerns why the agriculture sector is not included in the European emission trading scheme (ETS)?

The European Union launched already in 2005 its version of a cap and trade scheme, covering some 11,000 power stations and industrial plants in 30 countries. As from 2013, the scope of the European ETS will be extended to include more sectors such as aviation, but not agriculture or livestock. The main limitation of ETS is that it does not address spatial concentration problems. When emissions have an immediate effect on the local environment, permit trading does not guarantee the achievement of targets at each location. On the contrary, the possibility of trading emission permits combined with economies of scale might lead to the emergence of emission hotspots, sites with highly concentrated amounts of pollutants locally affecting the environment and the population. A proposed variation is a scheme for tradable concentration permits, either for manure [20] or for animal production [2]. A concentration permit is defined as the permission to deposit a quantity of pollutants at a specific location. The permits can then enter a trading system, but the use of the right remains linked to the site. Some authors believe that in practice, such systems generate high transaction costs and cannot achieve cost-effectiveness.

An input tax, for example on chemical fertilizers or imported fodder, or a direct tax on emissions would only affect the balance between domestic production and imports from countries that do not have the same regulation. Moreover, as discussed above, emissions are far from being the only problem. An alternative, as argued by Wirsenius, Hedenus and Mohlin at the Chalmers University of Technology and University of Gothenburg [22] is an output tax, i.e. a tax on meat consumption, on the grounds that costs of monitoring emissions are high, there are limited options for reducing emissions apart from output reduction, and the possibility for output substitution in the consumption basket are substantial. Moreover, a tax on consumption would avoid international competition from products that are not produced with the same standards.

A meat tax has shortly appeared in the public debate, for example in the Netherlands and in Sweden, but it has failed to gain much popularity so far. Meat consumption in the area has increased considerably in recent years –between 30% in Germany and 160% in Denmark since 1960 – and relative prices have fallen. By a combination of price and income effects, it has become a norm to eat meat every day, or even at every meal. It must be recognized, though, that while each single policy instrument discussed above has its shortcomings, because of the many interrelated aspects of the problem, a reduction in output, perhaps through a consumption tax, would address in a more comprehensive way all the different externalities related to meat production. After all, maybe there is just too much meat on our grills.

Recommended Further Readings

  • [1] ”Slaktkropparnas kvalitet i ekologisk uppfödning”. Technical report, Ekokött, 2006.
  • [2] J. Alkan-Olsson. Sustainable Water Management: Organization, Participation, Influence, Economy., volume 5, chapter Alternative economic instruments of control. VASTRA, Gothenburg University, 2004.
  • [3] Mary D. Barton. “Antibiotic use in animal feed and its impact on human health”. Nutrition Research Reviews, 13:279–299, 2000.
  • [4] W.J. Baumol and W.E. Oates. The theory of environmental policy. Cambridge Univ Pr, 1988.
  • [5] J. Bellarby, B. Foereid, and A. Hastings. Cool Farming: Climate impacts of agriculture and mitigation potential. Greenpeace International, 2008.
  • [6] M. Brandt and H. Ejhed. Trk transport-retention-källfördelning. Belastning på havet. Naturvårdsverket Rapport, 5247, 2002.
  • [7] F. Braudel, S. Reynolds, and S. Reynolds. The structures of everyday life: The limits of the possible. Harper & Row, Publ., 1981.
  • [8] A. Golub, B. Henderson, and T. Hertel. Ghg mitigation policies in livestock sectors: Competitiveness, emission leakage and food security. In Agricultural and Applied Economics Association 2011 Annual Meeting, July 24-26, 2011, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, 2011.
  • [9] A. Granstedt. Increasing the efficiency of plant nutrient recycling within the agricultural system as a way of reducing the load to the environment–experience from Sweden and Finland. Agriculture, ecosystems & environment, 80(1-2):169–185, 2000.
  • [10] A. Granstedt and M. Larsson. “Sustainable governance of the agriculture and the Baltic Sea – agricultural reforms”, food production and curbed eutrophication. Ecological Economics, 69:1943–1951, 2010.
  • [11] HELCOM. “Balthazar project 2009-2010: Reducing nutrient loading from large scale animal farming in Russia”. Technical report, 2010.
  • [12] M. Larsson and A. Granstedt. “Sustainable governance of the agriculture and the Baltic Sea–agricultural reforms, food production and curbed eutrophication”. Ecological Economics, 69(10):1943–1951, 2010.
  • [13] Nicholas Z. Muller, Robert Mendelsohn, and William Nordhaus. “Environmental accounting for pollution in the United States economy”. American Economic Review, 101:1649–1675, 2011.
  • [14] T. Nauclér and P.A. Enkvist. “Pathways to a low-carbon economy: Version 2 of the global greenhouse gas abatement cost curve”. McKinsey & Company, pages 26–31, 2009.
  • [15] J. Skorupski. “Report on industrial swine and cattle farming in the Baltic Sea catchment area”. Technical report, Coalition Clean Baltic, 2006.
  • [16] B. Smith, A. Aasa, R. Ahas, T. Blenckner, T.V. Callaghan, J. Chazal, C. Humborg, A.M. Jönsson, S. Kellomäki, A. Kull, et al. “Climate-related change in terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems”. Assessment of Climate Change for the Baltic Sea Basin, pages 221–308, 2008.
  • [17] P. Smith, D. Martino, Z. Cai, D. Gwary, H. Janzen, P. Kumar, B. McCarl, S. Ogle, F. OMara, C. Rice, et al. “Greenhouse gas mitigation in agriculture”. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B: Biological Sciences, 363(1492):789–813, 2008.
  • [18] H. Steinfeld, P. Gerber, T. Wassenaar, V. Castel, M. Rosales, and C. de Haan. “Livestock’s long shadow: environmental issues and options”. 2006.
  • [19] E. Vahtera, D.J. Conley, B.G. Gustafsson, H. Kuosa, H. Pitkänen, O.P. Savchuk, T. Tamminen, M. Viitasalo, M. Voss, N. Wasmund, et al. “Internal ecosystem feedbacks enhance nitrogen-fixing cyanobacteria blooms and complicate management in the Baltic Sea”. AMBIO: A journal of the Human Environment, 36(2):186–194, 2007.
  • [20] B. Van der Straeten, J. Buysse, S. Nolte, L. Lauwers, D. Claeys, and G. Van Huylenbroeck. “Markets of concentration permits: The case of manure policy”. Ecological Economics, 2011.
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Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Between East and West: Regional Trade Policy for Ukraine

Policy Brief Building in Kyiv, Ukraine and Globe

Given Ukraine’s geographical location between Europe and Russia, the country often has to make difficult choices in its foreign policy. Trade policy is not an exception. In particular, Ukraine is currently negotiating a comprehensive free trade agreement with the EU, which is fostering hopes of joining it in the near future. However, at the same time, Russia is ‘inviting’ Ukraine to join the Customs Union it has created together with two other former Soviet Republics; Belarus and Kazakhstan. Since Ukraine cannot be part of both regional agreements simultaneously, it will again have to choose between the EU and Russia.

Over the last decade, the European Union has become the most important trading partner of Ukraine. The share of Ukraine’s exports of goods to the EU is now around 25-30 percent, while its share in Ukraine’s exports of services has increased twofold from 17 percent in 1994 to 34 percent in 2008. The share of Ukraine’s imports from the EU is even larger: around 35 percent in goods and more than 50 percent in services. This growth in trade shares has occurred despite the fact that there are still substantial barriers, both tariff and non-tariff, to free trade between Ukraine and the EU. The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) which Ukraine and the EU are currently negotiating is intended to remove many of these barriers.

The EU-Ukraine FTA is part of the so-called New Enhanced Agreement between the EU and Ukraine and consists of a set of provisions stipulating the liberalization of trade in goods and services, capital movement and payments, and government procurement.

A big part of the agreement is devoted to the trade in goods. This is perhaps not surprisingly so given that trade in goods accounts for 80 percent of their total bilateral trade in goods and services. Tariffs that Ukraine currently applies to the EU non-agricultural imports vary from 0 to around 20 percent. Under the new agreement, the tariffs on many of these goods will be reduced.

Apart from tariffs, the agreement stipulates an elimination of many non-tariff barriers to trade. This will be achieved by harmonization and simplification of the procedures related to customs and licensing, capital movement, government procurement, and intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, as well as competition policy, energy security and others. Ukrainian legislation must be standardized to conform to the respective European laws, with some procedures becoming more transparent (tenders), while others becoming more stringent (IPR). For example, Ukrainian producers will have to abide by the legislation on trademarks and geographical names. According to the Ukrainian deputy minister of Economy, the EU has offered a grace period of 5-10 years to Ukrainian producers to re-brand their products.

The FTA negotiation process between the EU and Ukraine started on February 18, 2008. Since then, more than fifteen rounds have taken place. Initially, there were hopes that the agreement would be signed before the end of 2010. However, in the fall of 2010, it became clear that this was not going to happen. Currently, the more pessimistic experts expect the agreement to be signed only in 2013.

In parallel with the EU integration processes, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan have created a customs union and are actively trying to involve Ukraine in their union. On the one hand, the Customs Union is attractive for Ukraine since it offers free trade with Russia, which is still one of Ukraine’s biggest trading partners, both in terms of imports and exports.

This union promises access to cheaper energy resources, which would be beneficial for Ukraine given its high energy dependence, especially in the exporting sectors like metals and chemicals. However, joining this Customs Union would jeopardize the FTA negotiations with the EU and would even endanger the WTO membership of Ukraine.

So far, the Ukrainian government has not taken a clear stance on whether Ukraine is going to become a full member of the Customs Union. Instead, it has cautiously offered a “3+1” arrangement.

In the light of the above discussion, the natural question to ask is then: what integration strategy would Ukraine benefit the most from?

Regional Trade Agreements

The idea that regional trade agreements (RTA) are beneficial to a country is best supported by the fact that such agreements have become increasingly popular over the last twenty years. As of July 31, 2010, there were around 400 RTAs reported to the WTO with 193 being in force. According to the World Bank, on average, a WTO member has regional agreements with more than 15 partner countries. RTAs exist predominantly as free trade agreements (FTA) and customs unions (CU). The former removes barriers to trade in goods and services among member countries but allows individual members to set their own tariffs against third parties. The latter type is a stricter arrangement since customs unions act as a single agent in the world markets and have a unified external tariff regime.

The analysis of RTAs and customs unions in particular, dates back to Viner in 1950 who introduced the terms trade creation versus trade diversion. Trade creation refers to a situation where member countries begin to trade goods and services with each other after the creation of an RTA, whereas previously they produced them domestically. Trade diversion, on the other hand, occurs when member countries shift their imports from outside partners to inside partners. Obviously, while trade creation is viewed as a good consequence of a RTA, trade diversion is undesirable. This, since the lower tariffs, make member countries shift away from the most efficient outside producer to an RTA partner.

There are two approaches in the literature to evaluate the impact of the RTAs: gravity models and general equilibrium (GE) models. Gravity models are estimated on the actual trade data while GE models are used for simulations. The typical findings on the effect of RTA’s are that: (a) excluded countries almost always lose, (b) there is a trade creation effect but it is rather small, and (c) the effect of the RTAs differs across their members, in particular, smaller countries tend to experience a larger increase in their exports (World Bank, 2005; Berthelon, 2004).

In addition, the so-called South-North RTAs (agreements between developed and developing countries), are found to be more beneficial for the latter than South-South agreements. Finally, the literature shows that on average FTAs are associated with lower levels of tariffs compared to customs unions.

Ukraine’s Choice of Trade Policy

The above presented empirical findings on existing RTAs, can offer guidance in which of the regional agreements Ukraine would benefit the most from. First, on the one hand, both of the FTA with the EU and the Customs Union with Russia are likely to lead to higher trade volumes (trade creation). On the other hand, the FTA with the EU can be regarded as a South-North agreement and could, therefore, be expected to have larger benefits for Ukraine than the Customs Union with Russia. Another argument in favor of the EU-FTA, is that Ukraine’s other trading partners are likely to face higher tariffs if Ukraine became a member of the Customs Union, than if she signed an FTA with the EU.

A recent study by Shepotylo (2010) addresses this issue and can be used as a benchmark for the analysis. Shepotylo uses a gravity model to compare potential export gains from deeper integration with the CIS countries to those from integration with the EU. Shepotylo’s analysis evaluates whether integration would be trade creating or not, leaving aside the issue of trade diversion.

Based on past experiences of Eastern European and CIS countries, Shepotylo builds two thought experiments. The first one is based on the scenario in which Ukraine would have become more deeply integrated into the CIS structure. That is, the experiment allows us to see what would have happened to Ukrainian foreign trade over the period 2004-2007 if Ukraine had developed closer ties with the CIS countries. The second experiment envisages what would have happened if Ukraine would have joined the EU in 2004.

According to the results, Ukraine would have benefited under both integration scenarios relative to the current situation of no integration. However, the benefits would have been twice as high under the EU integration strategy. Shepotylo’s results suggest that the EU integration could have increased Ukrainian exports in 2004-2007 by 10 percent, while the deeper CIS integration would only have increased exports by about 4 percent.

The highest expected benefits of Ukraine’s integration into the EU would have come from a substantial increase in export of various types of machinery and equipment, road vehicles and transport equipment, as well as apparel and closing accessories. These gains would have been virtually uniformly positive and economically large across all groups of countries regardless of the membership in EU. For example, export of road vehicles to the CIS countries would have been 88 percent higher under the EU integration scenario than under the CIS integration scenario, while their exports to the Western Europe would have been 82 percent higher. The export of raw materials, on the other hand, would have either declined (nonferrous metals), or remained relatively stable (iron and steel).

More importantly, gains under the EU scenario would also have come from a more diversified trade structure. A higher export diversification would be achieved because of the rapid expansion of manufactured exports, the share of which in total export would have been 26 percent under the EU scenario and only 16 percent under the CIS scenario.

In our view, diversification of trade flows is very important since a more diversified export structure with a high share of manufactured products can better protect a country from negative terms-of-trade shocks. For example, export diversification reduces the effect of idiosyncratic shocks. This was found by Koren and Tenreyro (2007). According to their findings, low-income countries which specialize in fewer and more volatile sectors, experience higher aggregate volatility in terms of GDP growth rates and trade volumes, etc. Another reason to why a more diversified trade flow (i.e. moving away from exports of primary goods to exports of manufactured products) is desirable, is the general trend of declining prices of primary commodities relative to the prices of manufactured goods. Also, a diversified export structure with a higher share of technologically advanced products has been found to be conducive for higher economic growth (Hausmann et al., 2007).

Conclusion

The above analysis suggests that signing a deep FTA with the EU would benefit Ukraine the most. This, given that it is likely to lead to a substantial increase in total exports and a favorable change in export composition towards a more diversified structure with a higher share of technologically advanced goods. These developments could in turn lower macroeconomic volatility and boost economic growth. Also, the EU integration scenario considered by Shepotylo (2010) did not allow for a substantial liberalization of trade in agriculture – an area where the large EU market is most protected. If the Ukrainian government manages to negotiate more open trade in agriculture, Ukraine may potentially gain much more than predicted in Shepotylo’s experiment.

On the other hand, joining the Customs Union with Russia would enhance the trade with its members and secure a lower price for energy resources. However, the benefits are likely to be outweighed by the potential losses of other markets and complications with the WTO due to the increased level of protectionism – an inevitable consequence of joining the Customs Union. In addition, the Ukrainian trade structure would become even more concentrated and skewed towards primary commodities, making the country even more vulnerable to shocks and slowing down its economic development.

Recommended Further Reading

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Shock “Therapy” the Market Way

Policy Brief Image with Tall Buildings Representing Transition, Market Economy and Shock Therapy

Twenty years after transition began and the merits of “shock therapy” were argued the most hotly, (former) transition countries are hard hit by global shocks originating in Western market economies. Although discussions now focus on troubles in Western developed countries, countries in Eastern Europe and the CIS were particularly hard hit in 2008/09. This should not come as a surprise given their pre-crisis vulnerabilities. As transition countries opened up to trade and capital flows—like other countries that want to reap the benefits of the global economy—they also became subject to the shocks that hit open economies. The very high current account deficits and/or reliance on commodity exports prior to the crisis exposed many countries in this region to two of the shocks that have been most costly to emerging markets and developing countries in the past, namely sudden stops in capital flows and terms of trade shocks. However, the lesson from the crisis should not be that opening up is bad in general, but that shock absorbers should be put in place to minimize the damage market-based “shock therapy” can do.

Shock Therapy and Transition

It is now twenty years since the failed 1991 coup that led to the breakup of the Soviet Union and started the transition from plan to market in (then) communist countries. A few years earlier, in 1989, the Stockholm Institute of East European Economies was set up at the Stockholm School of Economics. Its first director was Anders Åslund who was a strong proponent of shock therapy (see Åslund 1992). The basic idea was that a rapid transition from plan to market through changing institutions, privatizations and other liberal reforms would minimize the cost of transition. There are still different views on the merits of shock therapy as a reform strategy, but this brief will not address this debate.

In the wake of the academic debate of shock therapy, the broader research agenda was put under the heading “transition economics”, which became a new field in economics. This also lead Erik Berglöf, the new director of the Stockholm Institute of East European Economies, to change the institute’s name to the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, or SITE for short, the name we still use today. The economics of transition was also the title of the fifth Nobel symposium in Economics (Berglöf and Roland, 2007).

The use of the label “transition economics” may see a revival in the aftermath of the Arab spring. However, the economic issues that now face the (former) transition countries are much the same issues that emerging markets, developing countries and also advanced countries around the world grapple with. This is not least true when we look at what has happened in the current crisis.

Below this brief will argue that the shock therapy ex-communist countries were subject to in the early 90’s has been changed to the shock “therapy” open market economies around the world have been facing for a very long time. And just as there were heated debates on what the right therapy was then, the world is now debating what the “therapy” for the current shocks should be.

Output Drops Around the World

Significant drops in output have not only been observed in countries transitioning from plan to market but have occurred with regularity throughout modern history in countries around the world. The figure from Becker and Mauro (2006) shows the frequency of countries that entered into a major output loss event—defined as a cumulative loss of at least 5 percent of initial GDP in an event that last at least two years—during the 20th century. In the after-war period, a relative modest 5 to 10 percent of countries have entered into a period of significant output loss. However, in the great depression, almost half of the countries for which data is available entered into a period of significant loss of output.

Since the methodology used in Becker and Mauro follows countries until they return to pre-crisis levels of GDP, it is too early to provide a full account of what the number would be in the current crisis that started in 2008. Nevertheless, it is straightforward to compute how many countries have experienced output losses in 2008/09 (which is the first criteria to satisfy in the Becker and Mauro measure) and this number is close to fifty percent, on par with the great depression. This is not to say that the total output loss will be as high as in the great depression, but it clearly tells the story that this is the worst global crisis we have seen since then in terms of how many countries have been affected. The share of countries affected at the onset of this crisis varied greatly in different parts of the world and at different levels of development. The most surprising statistic from this crisis is that 90 percent of advanced economies experienced an output drop whereas “only” 40 percent of emerging market countries did. The regional differences between emerging markets are also striking; 85 percent of countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and more than half of CIS countries saw output decline, far above other regions.

Shocks 2.0

The Becker and Mauro paper also looks at the correlates of major output drops and focuses on a number of domestic and external macro, financial and political shocks as triggers of output collapses. A large dataset of shocks and output drops is used to compute the frequency of the different shocks; the likelihood that a particular shock leads to an output collapse (as defined above); and the output loss associated with such event. These numbers are then used to calculate how much different types of shocks have cost in terms of lost output for emerging markets and developing countries. The scale in the chart shows how much it would be worth in terms of GDP per annum to avoid a certain shock.


For emerging market countries, the worst shock has been sudden stops in capital flows that cost almost a percent of GDP per year. Unless countries have high levels of foreign exchange reserves, sudden stops in capital flows mean that (often large) current account deficits have to contract and even become surpluses quickly because there is no external financing available for a deficit. This, in turn, affects domestic production and demand and can have a serious effect on output. Add to this the financial uncertainty that is often associated with sudden stops and it makes it the number one shock to worry about for emerging market countries integrated in the global economy and financial markets.

Less developed countries are in several cases dependent on concentrated commodity exports to generate foreign exchange. This makes this group of countries more vulnerable to terms-of-trade shocks. The estimates of how costly these shocks are range from around half a percent of GDP per year, as is shown in the chart, to around 2.5 percent of GDP if a more extensive sample including very long-lasting output events is used.

Other shocks like currency, political and debt crisis have also been associated with significant losses in output, but tend to occur less frequently, which makes the cost per year smaller.

The 2008/09 Crisis

As was mentioned previously, not enough time has passed since the start of the crisis in 2008 to use the methodology in Becker and Mauro to compute cumulative output losses since many countries are still below their pre-crisis GDP levels. However, projected losses can be computed by using the IMF’s World Economic Outlook forecasts of GDP growth rates. If we then rank the countries according to worst output performance, CEE and CIS countries dominate the “top-ten” list with seven entries. Latvia at the top of the list is projected to lose a cumulative 40 plus percent of pre-crisis GDP during the 11 years it is projected to take the country to return to the GDP level it enjoyed in 2007. The other Baltic countries, Ukraine and Armenia have also been hit particularly hard in this crisis. Russia and Romania are close behind three advanced countries that had to seek IMF and EU assistance to deal with the crisis; Ireland, Iceland and Greece.

The forecasts used for these calculations are constantly being revised and the ranking of countries based on actual outcomes will certainly look different years from now. We can only hope that the current forecasts are too pessimistic although right now many revisions go in the wrong direction.

Could we have predicted what countries were hit in this crisis based on history? Based on the Becker and Mauro (2006) paper: Yes and no. “No” regarding the fact that overall, many advanced countries were hit this time. The paper found that in the past, the frequency of output collapses have decreased with the income level of countries, contrary to what has been the case this time. “Yes” for the fact that CEE and CIS countries were hit significantly more that other emerging markets since they were particularly vulnerable to the sudden stops and terms-of-trade shocks that the paper showed often are associated with severe output losses.

The signs of vulnerability in CEE and CIS countries were easy to see, but warnings ignored; the Baltic countries and Romania had double-digit current account deficits that where to a large part financed by external debt. For example, current account deficits in Latvia passed 20 percent of GDP in some years, far beyond the 4-5 percent deficits some Asian countries had prior to the Asian crisis in 1997. Ukraine also had large current account deficits and concentrated (metal) exports on top of that, exposing the country to both sudden stops and terms-of-trade shocks.

Russia’s dependency on energy and mineral exports was also well known, with 80 percent of export revenues coming from this source. However, the pre-crisis boom in oil and mineral prices had made Russian policy makers think this was a strength and not a vulnerability. On top of that, the strong external position of the government and central bank obscured the external financial vulnerabilities that had built up in the private sector. With the sharp decline in oil prices in the crisis, Russia was hit both by a terms-of-trade shock and a sudden stop in capital flows to the private sector.

There were of course individual countries in other regions that were showing vulnerabilities and were hit in the crisis, but the countries in the CEE and CIS region stood out as particularly vulnerable to the shocks that hit emerging market and developing countries in the past. The IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report from October 2008 summarizes these vulnerabilities in its Table 1.5 on macro and financial indicators for emerging markets very well. The shaded boxes that indicate potential problems in the table completely dominated the picture for CEE and CIS countries whereas other regions looked significantly less vulnerable. In short, history told us what shocks matter and the vulnerability indicators clearly showed where the shocks would do most damage.

Therapy 2.0

What are the policy lessons from this? Countries will always be subject to different types of shocks, and the question is how these shocks can best be absorbed to minimize the economic costs. In other words, what is the “therapy” needed to deal with these shocks? A key challenge is to find the policies and tools that strike the right balance between crisis prevention and high sustainable growth. Isolation to protect against external shocks is certainly not the answer.

Early warning systems (EWS) that identify vulnerabilities ahead of time and give policy makers time to reduce these vulnerabilities and thus avoid crisis is of course what everyone dreams of. The IMF and others have worked on various EWS models since the Mexican and Asian crises with mixed success (see Berg, Borensztein and Pattillo, 2005). With this crisis, the G20 and other groups of policy makers have made new calls for developing EWS, at times seemingly unaware of past efforts and the limited success in this area.

However, at the IMF the more formalized or mechanical EWS models are complemented with both bi-lateral and multilateral surveillance with the bulk of the findings made publicly available and communicated to relevant policy makers. These surveillance efforts contain much more information than more limited EWS models and also come with policy recommendation on how to deal with potential vulnerabilities.

There are of course limitations also with the surveillance by the IMF and other international and domestic organizations. First of all, they have to get it right and at the right time. This is far from trivial, not least because of our limited understanding of the links between the financial sector and the real economy. And even when the analysis gets it “right” in the sense of identifying vulnerabilities, it may take a long time before vulnerabilities translate into real problems and during this time, the analysis and recommended policies may seem misguided.

This is linked to the second major issue; to make relevant policy makers (politicians) listen to and take action on the advice. There is a reason Reinhart and Rogoff called their book “This time is different” since this is often the response to warnings from the IMF and others that suggest a party has been going on for too long and the punch bowl needs to be taken away.

Given the limitations of early warnings and surveillance more generally, there remains a strong need to reduce vulnerabilities in a systematic manner and develop tools to deal with the crises that were not prevented. This will require both domestic measures and a strong commitment to international cooperation. The latter part is of course extremely important right now in order to find appropriate solutions (read debt resolutions) to the problems cross-border banking and capital flows have created. It will also be key in setting up the rules for the future: what capital requirements should banks have; (how) should financial transactions or institutions be taxed; how can cross-border supervision be made more efficient; what type of crisis resolution mechanisms should be put in place both at the international and regional levels; etc, etc. Unless there is broad international agreement on these issues they will do little to address the weaknesses that were at the heart of this crisis.

On the domestic side, the usual IMF recommendation of creating a stable macroeconomic environment—with fiscal room to maneuver and a monetary policy that leads to stable prices—is always going to be part of a countries ability to absorb shocks. For countries that are integrated in international financial markets, exchange rate flexibility and a reasonable level of international reserves seem to be advisable. Jeanne and Rancière (2008) analyze optimal foreign exchange reserves for countries that are subject to sudden stops. Becker (1999) instead looked at accumulation of government assets as part of an optimal public debt and asset management strategy in a world with bailouts of the private sector which seems particularly relevant today.

The macro side should of course be combined with strong domestic supervision of the financial sector; structural policies that lead to sustainable growth in a competitive global environment; and strategies in commodity exporters to reduce the vulnerabilities associated with a narrow export base.

Although advanced countries get most of the attention in the international financial press today, emerging market and developing countries should not think that this is a new world were the shocks of the past do not matter to them. They do, so better get ready for “shock therapy” the market way while there still is time.

Bibliography

  • Becker, T., (1999), “Public debt management and bailouts”, IMF WP 99/103.
  • Becker, T. and P. Mauro, (2006), “Output drops and the shocks that matter”, IMF WP 06/172.
  • Berg, A., E. Borensztein, and C. Pattillo, (2005), “Assessing Early Warning Systems: How Have They Worked in Practice?”, IMF Staff Papers, 52:3, 462-502.
  • Berglöf, E. and G. Roland (2007), The economics of transition—The fifth Nobel symposium in economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) and Palgrave Macmillan.
  • IMF (2008), Global Financial Stability Report, “Financial stress and deleveraging”, October, Table 1.5 p.46.
  • Jeanne, O. and R. Rancière, (2008), “The optimal level of international reserves for emerging market countries: A new formula and some applications”, CEPR Discussion Papers 6723.
  • Reinhart, C. and K. Rogoff, (2009), “This time is different: eight centuries of financial folly”, Princeton University Press.
  • Åslund, A., (1992) “Post-Communist Economic Revolutions: How Big a Bang?”, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington D.C..

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

What Does Modern Political Economics Tell Us About the Fate of Russia’s Reforms?

20110905 Policy Brief Image Russia Kremlin Saint Basil Cathedral

After the 2008-09 crisis, Russia is facing a new set of challenges. The pre-crisis sources of growth have been exhausted. In order to implement its growth potential and catch up with OECD countries, Russia must improve its investment and business climate. Although the reform agenda has been repeatedly discussed, it is not being implemented. The explanation is provided by modern political economics: what is good policy (in terms of social welfare and growth) is not necessarily good politics (for a country’s rulers). In this sense, modern Russia is a perfect example of the non-existence of a political Coase theorem. Although everybody understands that the status quo is suboptimal, the most likely outcome is further postponement of reforms.

Whither Russia?

In 2009, the New Economic School joined the Russia Balance Sheet project launched by two DC-based think tanks: the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Peterson Institute for International Economics. The aim of the project was to assess Russia’s assets and liabilities. Similarly to compiling a company’s balance sheet, the project estimated the potential for long-term development and growth, and the problems that could prevent Russia from realizing this potential.

The main output of the project in 2009-10 was the book “Russia after the Global Economic Crisis”, which was published in English in the Spring 2010 and in Russian in the fall of the same year. The book looked at a broad range of issues that could be classified as Russia’s “assets” and “liabilities”, extending from economic, political and social issues to energy, foreign relations, climate change, innovation and military reform. Interestingly, despite the breadth of the analysis, the authors of the book’s different chapters arrived at similar conclusions, which might be summarized as follows: while Russia came out of the crisis in a reasonably good shape and has nothing to fear in the near term, it has serious long-term problems that need to be addressed as soon as possible; however, it is, unfortunately, the case that Russia is unlikely to implement the required reforms, since they go against the interests of the ruling elite.

This argument is especially clear with respect to Russia’s economic problems – that Aleh Tsyvinski and I analyzed in the first chapter of the book. In the short run the Russian economy is certainly doing quite well. So long as oil prices stay high, the budget remains balanced, the economy grows, and sovereign debt is virtually non-existent (in marked contrast with debt burdens of OECD countries). Contrary to what is claimed by many critics of the government, pre-crisis growth did trickle down to all parts of Russian society, and that has ensured that the government enjoys sufficient political support.

However, in the long run, the situation is very different. The pre-crisis sources of economic growth (rising oil prices, low capacity utilization and an underemployed labor force) have all been exhausted. Oil prices are high, but are unlikely to rise much further. Production capacity and infrastructure are over-utilized. The labor market is very tight. In order to grow at the rates, which Korea and other fast-growing countries achieved when they were at Russia’s level of development, Russia needs new investment. Hence, Russia has to improve the business climate and the investment climate. This, in turn, depends on reducing corruption, improving protection of property rights, building an effective and independent judiciary, and opening the economy to competition (both domestic and international).

Good Policy, Bad Policy

The changes that are needed in order to ensure strong growth are obvious, but they are unlikely to happen. The reason is very simple: the political equilibrium is such that Russia’s political elite is not interested in change. There is nothing unusual about this. As Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) have argued: good policy may be bad politics and vice versa. If achievement of economic growth depends on surrendering control over the commanding heights of the economy (through privatization, strengthening the rule of law, deregulation, and encouragement of competition), the ruling elite may fear a weakening of its hold on power and ultimate loss of power as the price of achieving growth. In this case, the ruling elite will prefer to stay in charge of a stagnating economy (and enjoy a big piece of a small cake) rather than risk losing power (and having no piece of a bigger cake).

Can society somehow buy out the vested interests of the rulers? One of the most powerful theoretical results in economics, the Coase theorem, would suggest that the answer is yes. However, the conditions of the Coase theorem are not met in the instance of political economy, which we are considering. In our case the ruling elite does not merely trade goods or even assets: by allowing reforms it would lose the power to expropriate and protection from being expropriated. Unsurprisingly, there is no “political Coase theorem” (see Acemoglu, 2003).

As we discuss in Guriev et al. (2009), this problem is particularly acute in resource-rich transition economies without established political and legal institutions. In such economies, the lack of institutions means that the rulers are less accountable and can therefore appropriate a large share of the resource rents. The resource rents increase the incentives to hold on to power and provide the rulers with the resources which they need in order to maintain the status quo.

In the opening chapter of “Russia After the Global Economic Crisis”, Aleh Tsyvinski and myself argued that this is precisely Russia’s problem. We punningly defined the status quo as a “70-80 scenario”: if the oil price stayed fairly high ($70-80 per barrel) then Russia would be likely to follow the 1970-80s experience of the Soviet Union, when reforms were shelved and the economy stagnated. That period ended with the bankruptcy and disintegration of the Soviet Union.

Certainly, the differences between modern Russia and the 1970-80s Soviet Union are substantial. Although the government controls the commanding heights of the modern Russian economy, the nature of the latter is capitalist and not command. Also, Russian economic policymakers are much more competent and, unlike their Soviet predecessors, they can easily believe that if a country runs out of cash, the government is removed from office: they have seen it happen to those same Soviet predecessors.

This brings us to a conundrum: if it is clear that the status quo is a dead-end, what is the ruling elite hoping for? On the one hand, the elite understands all too well that reforms are risky – everybody remembers the last Soviet government, which initiated change and lost power as a result of that change. On the other hand, it is clear that in order to remain in power the government needs growth and that growth can only come from reforms.

Rational Overconfidence

The solution to this conundrum is to be found, not in modern political economics, but in the realm of behavioral economics and studies of leadership. In recent years, economists have been keen to integrate insights from psychology into their models of markets and organizations.

Psychologists know very well that human beings want to be happy, and are therefore disposed to forget bad news and remember only good news. They also like to persuade themselves that they are good (or at least better than others). This explains why investors always want to believe in more optimistic scenarios (hence bubbles, see Akerlof and Shiller, 2009). Furthermore, a certain degree of over-optimism on the part of leaders is actually “rational” or “optimal” (see Van den Steen, 2005, and Guriev and Suvorov, 2010). Over-optimistic leaders are more resolute, and they attract more capable and enthusiastic followers. In this sense, in an environment with weak political institutions, over-optimistic political leaders always crowd out more realistic leaders (who do not promise as much). Where there are strong political institutions that ensure political accountability (e.g. via political parties), this behavior is not sustainable. But if there is no accountability, over-optimism almost inevitably prevails as a result of political selection.

This may explain why the Russian political leadership hopes for the better. So far the model “whenever we are in trouble, the oil price goes up and saves us” has worked, and it will keep working until the oil price goes down and undermines both macroeconomic and political stability. Once again, resource abundance is important as it helps to feed the over-optimism: the fortunate leaders that rule during the period of high oil prices can easily believe that their luck is permanent and their belief (or, as the leadership literature calls it, “vision”) will be consistent with the evidence – but only until the oil price plunge.

The 70-80 Scenario: Two Years On

We started to write the 70-80 chapter in the fall of 2009, when the oil price was already back from $40 per barrel to the fiscally comfortable range of $70-80 dollars. What has happened since then to the likelihood and sustainability of our scenario?

What we find is that, although the 70-80 pun no longer works, our main argument has been reinforced. First, the oil price is no longer in the range of $70-80 per barrel, but has risen higher due to events in the Middle East and Japan, as well as increased demand for oil as a store of value reflecting diminished confidence in dollar and euro assets. Second, the Arab Spring has made the Russian government suspect that its hold on power is more tenuous than it previously believed, and it has started to spend even more aggressively. Russia’s budget is no longer in surplus at $70 per barrel: it can now only be balanced if the oil price is at $125 per barrel (!). In this sense, $70-80 per barrel is no longer a “high” price – it is both below the current market’s expectations and below the Russian government’s fiscal benchmarks.

However, our main argument has been reconfirmed. High oil prices have encouraged the Russian government to become further entrenched in the status quo scenario. While there has been a substantial increase in rhetoric about privatization, deregulation, competition, rule of law etc., actual change has been lacking. On the contrary, there is increasing reliance on government ownership and increasing probability that Russia will move further down the road to stagnation after the presidential elections of 2012.

Can There Be An Alternative to Stagnation?

In “Russia After the Global Economic Crisis” we also charted an alternative scenario based on reforms that help to realize Russia’s substantial growth potential. Is this scenario feasible? Certainly, the laws of political economy are not deterministic. Even though the status quo path is preferable for the country’s rulers, a leader (or a sub-group in the elite) may emerge who is long-term-oriented and is not over-optimistic. If this leader or group manages to create a critical mass of stakeholders for reforms, there may be a “run” on the status quo. For example, if the oil price decreases and there is fiscal pressure to privatize, then a critical mass of private owners may emerge who are interested in protection of property rights and the rule-of-law.

However, even though a positive scenario is possible, it is not very likely. Investors have already reached this conclusion: Russia has been experiencing large capital flight since the fall of 2010 (net capital outflow is about of 5% of GDP). Investors are not yet ready to bet their money on the good scenario. Nor would political economists recommend them to do so.

References

  • Acemoglu, Daron (2003). “Why Not A Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment, And Politics,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 31: 620-652.
  • Akerlof, George A., and Robert J. Shiller (2009). “Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism”. Princeton University Press.
  • Åslund, Anders, Sergei Guriev and Andrew Kuchins (2010). Russia after the Global Economic Crisis. Peterson Institute for International Economics. Washington, D.C.
  • Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow (2003). “Logic of Political Survival”. MIT Press.
  • Gilbert, Daniel (2006). “Stumbling on Happiness”. Knopf.
  • Guriev, Sergei, Alexander Plekhanov, and Konstantin Sonin (2009). “Development Based on Commodity Revenues.” European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Working Paper No. 108. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1520630 (Also available as Chapter 4 in the Transition Report 2009).
  • Guriev, Sergei, and Anton Suvorov (2010). “Why Less Informed Managers May Be Better Leaders.” Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1596673
  • Van den Steen, Eric J. (2005). “Organizational Beliefs and Managerial Vision.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 21: 256-283.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Energy Security in Belarus: Economic, Geopolitical, and Environmental Dimensions

20110905 Policy Brief Energy Security in Belarus Image 01

Energy security is a complex issue that integrates economic, social, and environmental aspects. This brief outlines the fundamental dimensions of energy security in Belarus, highlighting key challenges and opportunities for decision-makers, policy analysts, and the general public. It examines how domestic policies, international relations, and environmental factors interact to shape the country’s long-term energy stability.

Understanding Energy Security in Belarus

Energy security is a growing concern for policymakers worldwide. In many post-Soviet countries, heavy dependence on Russian energy imports remains a critical vulnerability. This dependence is compounded by the high energy intensity inherited from Soviet-era industrial systems and decades of limited technological modernization.

Belarus, a landlocked country of around 10 million people, faces one of the toughest energy security challenges in Eastern Europe. It must balance its reliance on Russian resources with a need for diversification and modernization in an evolving geopolitical landscape.

Economic Growth and Dependence on Russia

During the early 2000s, Belarus experienced strong economic growth — averaging 7.7% GDP annually, outperforming Ukraine and Russia. However, the 2010 global economic crisis exposed a major structural weakness: Belarus’s dependence on Russia for both trade and energy.

Although Belarus’s economy weathered the 2010 downturn better than its neighbors, it became clear that the country needed to diversify its economic base. Russia continues to exert influence through energy pricing, gas pipelines, and political leverage, complicating Belarus’s efforts to achieve full economic independence.

Drivers of Belarusian Economic Growth

Belarus’s early economic success relied on three main factors:

  1. Privileged access to Russian markets for exports and energy imports.
  2. Preferential support for large, state-owned industries producing for export.
  3. Government wage and price controls, which temporarily improved export competitiveness.

However, productivity growth — once the main driver of industrial performance — is slowing. Much of Belarus’s earlier progress came from “low-hanging fruit” investments in existing capacity, which are now nearly exhausted. Future growth will depend on innovation and energy efficiency.

Energy Efficiency Progress and Challenges

Between 1996 and 2008, Belarus improved its energy efficiency by almost 50%, supported by national energy-saving programs and major investments in modernization. Despite this success, Belarus remains more energy-intensive than its Western neighbors.

In 2008, the country required 1.17 tons of oil equivalent (toe) to produce USD 1,000 of GDP — far higher than Poland (0.41) or Lithuania (0.46). Closing this gap could raise annual GDP growth by up to 7%, underscoring the economic importance of improving energy efficiency and diversification.

Primary Energy Sources: Heavy Dependence on Natural Gas

Belarus’s energy system depends heavily on natural gas, which provides about 63% of the total energy supply. Over 80% of heating plants and 95% of electricity generation rely on gas as a primary fuel. Crude oil and petroleum products contribute another 29%, while renewables remain marginal.

This heavy dependence makes Belarus vulnerable to Russian supply disruptions. Strengthening renewable energy development and alternative fuel sources is essential for long-term security.

International Trade and Geopolitical Risks

Belarus produces only 14% of its primary energy and imports nearly all its oil and gas from Russia. While discounted energy prices once acted as implicit subsidies, Russia is now reducing these advantages.

To diversify, Belarus has sought alternative oil suppliers, including Venezuela, through agreements involving seaports in Odessa, Klaipeda, and Muuga. However, transport costs and geopolitical tensions with Moscow continue to pose challenges.

Meanwhile, Russia’s construction of the Nord Stream pipeline bypassing Belarus and Ukraine reduces their leverage as transit countries, threatening long-term energy and political stability in the region.

Environmental Impacts of Energy Use

Belarus ranks near the European average in pollution intensity, but energy-related emissions remain a concern. Improving energy efficiency and investing in modern technology could significantly reduce pollution.

The country still carries the legacy of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, which affected nearly 20% of its territory and caused long-term economic, health, and environmental damage. Public concern remains high regarding the new Astravets Nuclear Power Plant, reflecting ongoing fears about nuclear safety.

Key Takeaways and Future Trends

Belarus’s energy security depends on three main pillars:

  1. Diversification of energy sources and suppliers.
  2. Improvement in energy efficiency and technological modernization.
  3. Balanced environmental management and renewable development.

Future trends likely to reshape Belarus’s energy landscape include the shale gas and LNG revolution, Nord Stream operations, and the construction of the Astravets plant. How Belarus adapts to these changes will determine its economic sovereignty and energy independence over the next decade.

Further Reading

Read more about Belarus’s growth drivers, the dimensions of energy security, and the environmental impacts of energy use in the policy brief “A Multidimensional Approach to Energy Security Analysis in Belarus.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.