Location: Ukraine
The Russian Economy in the Fog of War | New Report
A new report highlights the growing instability of the Russian economy as it grapples with the effects of war and sanctions. Official figures on inflation and GDP growth present an overly optimistic picture, according to the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE). The report reveals that Russia’s fiscal resources are under severe strain, threatening its economic future.
Economic Instability in the Russian War Economy
Russia’s war in Ukraine has caused unprecedented challenges for its economy. The report shows that Russia’s heavy reliance on oil exports remains a double-edged sword. International oil prices continue to dictate economic performance, but sanctions and declining demand have strained this vital revenue stream. This has deepened the instability in the Russian war economy.
Sanctions have blocked Russia from Western markets, forcing it to use costly and inefficient trade routes through China and other “friendly” nations. As a result, costs have surged and profits have shrunk, further destabilizing the economy.
Key Research Findings
- Official statistics likely understate the real inflation rate and overestimate GDP growth.
- Russia’s financial reserves, vital for war spending, may be depleted within a year, raising economic risks.
- Fiscal policies are unsustainable, with rising public spending at odds with monetary tightening.
- Sanctions are undermining long-term economic growth, especially in the energy sector.
Sanctions and Long-term Risks for the Russian War Economy
The report explains how international sanctions are driving the Russian economy toward long-term decline. Sanctions are not only limiting financial resources but also cutting off access to key technology and raising trade costs. This erosion of Russia’s industrial base, coupled with heavy war spending, has reduced investment in critical infrastructure and innovation. The future of the Russian war economy looks bleak, with the risks continuing to grow as the conflict drags on.
Read the Full Report “The Russian Economy in the Fog of War”
For a comprehensive understanding of Russia’s economic challenges in the context of war, read the full report by the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE). Access the complete report on the Institute’s website.
About SITE
SITE was set up as a research institute at the Stockholm School of Economics (SSE) in 1989 with the mandate of studying developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Today, SITE is a leading research-based policy institute on these issues. SITE has also built a network of research institutes in the region (FREE Network) that includes the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE). KSE not only provides a premier economics education to future leaders in Ukraine but is also involved in the analysis of the Ukrainian, as well as the Russian, economy, including analysis of the role of sanctions in limiting Russia’s destructive capacity. KSE has been an important contributor of the data and analysis that underlies this report. For more information, visit SITE’s homepage.
To read more policy briefs published by SITE’s experts, visit the Institute’s page on the FREE Network’s website.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in policy briefs, news posts, and other publications are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Active Labor Market Policy in the Baltic-Black Sea Region
This brief outlines the characteristics of active labor market policy (ALMP) in four countries in the Baltic-Black Sea region: Belarus, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine. An analysis of the financing expenditure structure within this framework reveals significant differences between the countries, even for Poland and Lithuania, where the policies are to be set within a common EU framework. Countries also differed in terms of their ALMP reaction to the economic challenges brought about by the Covid-19 pandemic, as Poland and Lithuania increased their ALMP spending, while Ukraine, and, especially, Belarus, lagged behind. Despite these differences, all four countries are likely to benefit from a range of common recommendations regarding the improvement of ALMP. These include implementing evidence-informed policymaking and conducting counterfactual impact evaluations, facilitated by social partnership. Establishing quantitative benchmarks for active labor market policy expenditures and labor force coverage by active labor market measures is also advised.
Introduction
This policy brief builds on a study aimed at conducting a comparative analysis of labor market regulation policies in Belarus, Ukraine, Lithuania, and Poland. In comparing the structure of labor market policy expenditures, the aim was to identify common features between Poland and Lithuania, both of which are part of the EU and employ advanced labor market regulation approaches. We also assessed Ukraine’s policies, currently being reformed to align with EU standards, contrasting them with Belarus, where economic reforms are hindered by the post-Soviet authoritarian regime.
The analysis of the labor market policies for the considered countries is based on an evaluation of the structure of pertinent measures between 2017 and 2020 (Mazol, 2022). We used the 2015 OECD systematization of measures of active labor market policy, as presented in the first column of Table 1.
Our study reveals substantial differences in active labor market policies within the four considered countries. Still, motivated by OECD’s approach to ALMP, we provide a range of common policy recommendations that are relevant for each country included in the study. Arguably, aligning with the OECD approach would have more value for current EU and OECD members, Poland and Lithuania, and the aspiring member, Ukraine. However, these recommendations also hold value when considering a reformation of the Belarusian labor market policy.
ALMP Expenditures in Belarus, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine
Labor market policy comprises of active and passive components. Active labor market policy involves funding employment services and providing various forms of assistance to both unemployed individuals and employers. Its primary objective is to enhance qualifications and intensify job search efforts to improve the employment prospects of the unemployed (Bredgaard, 2015). Passive labor market policy (PLMP) encompasses measures to support the incomes of involuntarily unemployed individuals, and financing for early retirement.
Poland and Lithuania are both EU and OECD members, so one would expect their labor market policies to be driven by the EU framework, and, thus, mostly aligned. However, our analysis showed that the structure of their expenditures on active labor market policies in 2017-2019 differed (Mazol, 2022). In Lithuania, the majority of the funding was allocated to employment incentives for recruitment, job maintenance, and job sharing. From 2017 to 2019, the share for these measures was between 18 and 28 percent of all expenditures for state labor market regulation. In Poland, the majority of funding was allocated to measures supporting protected employment and rehabilitation. The spending on these measures fluctuated between 23 and 34 percent of all expenditures for state labor market regulation between 2017 and 2019.
The response to the labor market challenges during the Covid-19 pandemic in Poland and Lithuania resulted in a notable surge in state labor market policy spendings in 2020, amounting to 1.78 percent of GDP and 2.83 percent of GDP, respectively. Both countries sharply increased the total spending on employment incentives (see Table 1 which summarizes the expenditure allocation for 2020). Poland experienced a nine-fold increase in costs for financing these measures (29.4 percent of total expenditures on state labor market regulation). Meanwhile, in Lithuania, financing for employment incentives increased more than tenfold, amounting to 42.5 percent of all expenditures for state labor market regulation. In both countries it became the largest active labor market policy spending area.
Table 1. Financing of state labor market measures in Baltic-Black Sea region countries in 2020 (in millions of Euro).
Source: DGESAI, 2023. Author’s estimations based on World Bank data (World Bank, 2023), National Bank of Belarus data, National Bank of Ukraine data.
In Ukraine, the primary focus for active labor market policy expenditures was, from 2017 to 2020, directed towards public employment services, comprising 18 to 24 percent of total labor market policy expenditures. Notably, despite the Covid-19 pandemic, there were no significant changes in either the structure or the volume of active labor market policy expenditures in Ukraine in 2020. Despite Ukraine’s active efforts to align its economic and social policies with EU standards, the government has underinvested in labor market policy, with expenditures accounting for only 0.33-0.37 percent of GDP between 2017 and 2020. This is significantly below the levels observed in Lithuania and Poland.
In Belarus, labor market policy financing is one of the last priorities for the government. In 2020, financing accounted for about 0.02 percent of GDP, amounts clearly insufficient for having a significant impact on the labor market. Moreover, Belarus stood out as the sole country in the reviewed group to have reduced its funding for labor market policies, including both active and income support measures, during the Covid-19 pandemic. The majority of the financing for labor market policy has been directed towards protected and supported employment and rehabilitation, including job creation initiatives for former prisoners, the youth and individuals with disabilities.
ALMP Improvement Recommendations
As illustrated above, the countries under review do not have a common approach to active labor market policy spendings. Further, countries like Poland and Lithuania took a more flexible stance on addressing labor market challenges caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, by implementing additional financial support for active labor market policies. However, Ukraine and Belarus did not adjust their expenditure structures accordingly. Part of these cross-country differences can be attributed to differing legal framework: Poland and Lithuania are OECD and EU member states, and, thus, subject to corresponding regulations. Ukraine is in turn motivated by the prospects of EU accession, while Belarus currently has no such prosperities to take into account.
Another important source of deviation arises from the differences in current labor market and economic conditions in the respective countries, and the governments’ need to accommodate these. While such a market-specific approach is well-justified, aligning expenditure structures with current labor market conditions necessitates obtaining updated and reliable information about the labor market situation and the effectiveness of specific labor market measures or programs. An effective labor market policy thus requires establishing a reliable system for assessing the efficiency of government measures, i.e., deploying evidence-informed policy making (OECD, 2022).
To achieve this, it is crucial to establish a robust system for monitoring and evaluating the implementation of specific measures. This involves leveraging data from various centralized sources, enhancing IT infrastructure to support data management, and utilizing modern methodologies such as counterfactual impact evaluations (OECD, 2022).
Moreover, an effective labor market regulation policy necessitates the ability to swiftly adapt existing active measures and service delivery methods in response to changes in the labor market. This might entail rapid adjustments in the legal framework, underscoring the importance of close cooperation and coordination among key stakeholders, and a well-functioning administrative structure (Lauringson and Lüske, 2021).
To accomplish this objective, it is vital to foster close collaboration between the government and institutions closely intertwined with the labor market, capable of providing essential information to labor market regulators. One of the most useful tools in this regard appears to be so-called social partnerships – a form of a dialogue between employers, employees, trade unions and public authorities, involving active information exchange and interaction (OECD, 2022).
A reliable system to assess labor market policy and in particular to facilitate their targeting, is an essential component of this approach.
Ukraine and Belarus are underfunding their labor market policies, both in comparison to the levels observed in Poland and Lithuania, and in absolute terms. It is therefore advisable to establish quantitative benchmark indicators to act as guidance for these countries, in order to ensure that any labor market policy implemented is adequately funded. Here, a reasonable approach is to align the costs of implementing labor market measures with the average annual levels for OECD countries (which are 0.5 percent of GDP for active measures and 1.63 percent for total labor market policy expenditures (OECD, 2024). Furthermore, it’s essential to ensure a high level of labor force participation in active labor market regulation measures. A target standard could be set, based on the average annual coverage from active labor market measures, at 5.8 percent of the national economy labor force, as observed in OECD countries (OECD, 2024).
Conclusion
The countries under review demonstrate varying structures of active labor market expenditures. Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, employment incentives received the most financing in Lithuania. In Poland the largest share of expenditures was instead directed to measures to support protected employment and rehabilitation. In Ukraine, the main expenditures were directed towards financing employment services and unemployment benefits while Belarus primarily allocated funds to protected and supported employment and rehabilitation. Notably, Lithuania and Poland responded to the economic challenges following Covid-19 by significantly increasing spending on employment incentives, while Ukraine and Belarus did not undertake such measures.
Part of the diverging patterns may be attributable to the countries varying legal framework and differences in the countries respective labor market and economic conditions.
While some of the differences in labor market policies are thus justified, ensuring funding at the OECD level for labor market measures, alongside adequate tools for monitoring and evaluating labor market policies, are likely to benefit all four Baltic-Black Sea countries.
References
- Bredgaard, T. (2015). Evaluating What Works for Whom in Active Labour Market Policies. European Journal of Social Security, 17 (4), 436-452.
- DGESAI. (Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion). (2023. Expenditure by LMP intervention – country https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/empl/redisstat/databrowser/explore/all/lmp?lang=en&subtheme=lmp_expend.lmp_expend_me&display=card&sort=category&extractionId=LMP_EXPME
- Lauringson, A. and Lüske M. (2021). Institutional Set-up of Active Labour Market Policy Provision in OECD and EU Countries: Organisational Set-up, Regulation and Capacity. OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers no. 262.
- Mazol, A. (2022). Active Labor Market Policy in the Countries of the Baltic-Black Sea Region. BEROC Policy Paper Series, PP no. 115.
- OECD. (2015). OECD Employment database – Labour market policies and institutions https://www.oecd.org/employment/Coverage-and-classification-of-OECD-data-2015.pdf
- OECD. (2022). Impact Evaluation of Vocational Training and Employment Subsidies for the Unemployed in Lithuania. Connecting people with jobs. Paris: OECD Publishing.
- OECD. (2024). OECDstats: Labor market programs https://stats.oecd.org
- World Bank. (2023). World Development Indicators. https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Using the Financial System to Enforce Export Controls
A new Bruegel working paper shows how Russia’s export controls could work better if banks and firms play a larger role. Despite sweeping sanctions, Russia’s imports of “battlefield goods” bounced back close to pre-invasion levels in 2023. To close loopholes, the authors suggest bank-style due diligence for lenders and manufacturers. This approach could choke off illicit tech flows more effectively.
Why Export Controls Matter Now
Russia still gets critical microelectronics and navigation gear through complex routes. In 2023, it imported $12.5 billion of high-priority items, just 2% below pre-war levels. Import patterns shifted. Mainland China accounted for 56.3% and Hong Kong for 19.3%. Meanwhile, Turkey rose to 5.7% and the UAE to 4.2%.
In addition, 40% of these goods are produced for companies headquartered in sanctioning countries. Even more striking, 95% of identifiable foreign parts in Russian weapons still come from Western producers. These figures show why tighter export controls remain urgent.
What the Study Set Out to Do
The authors asked why current export controls underperform. As a solution, they outline a practical plan. First, banks should identify and block suspicious trade payments. Second, non-financial firms should adopt “know your customer” checks across their distributor networks. Together, these steps would help reduce illicit flows.
Key Research Findings
- Russia’s battlefield goods imports rebounded quickly after spring 2022 and are again near pre-invasion levels.
- Third-country hubs, especially China and Hong Kong, now dominate shipment routes, as shown in the report’s charts.
- Western technology remains embedded. Forty percent of the import value is tied to coalition producers. Moreover, 95% of foreign parts in Russian weapons are Western.
- Leveraging banks’ AML/CFT systems and tightening disclosure, such as item descriptions and HS codes, would make export controls stronger.
What This Means
In practice, turning banks into frontline enforcers could flag risky payments before goods move. For example, trade finance documents often reveal items and counterparties. Furthermore, extending similar diligence to manufacturers, backed by penalties for negligence, would close loopholes. As a result, sensitive parts would find it harder to reach Russia. Finally, stronger guidance and wider data sharing are essential to make export controls credible.
Read the Full Report
Learn more about the role of export controls, the challenges of implementation, and the financial system’s contribution in the latest working paper from KSE Institute and Bruegel.
Meet the Researchers
- Benjamin Hilgenstock: KSE Institute.
- Elina Ribakova: Bruegel.
- Anna Vlasyuk: KSE Institute.
- Guntram Wolff: Bruegel.
Can Farmland Market Liberalization Help Ukraine in its Reconstruction and Recovery?
The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine has inflicted massive damage and losses on Ukraine, already amounting to more than 2.5 times Ukraine’s 2023 GDP. Despite substantial and continuing international political and financial support to help Ukraine in its recovery and reconstruction, it is becoming increasingly clear that it will need to mobilize its own resources and private financing as well – not just for the country’s reconstruction but also for its long-term development. From a government perspective, it is important for Ukraine to leverage scarce public and donor resources and to undertake necessary reforms to facilitate and crowd in private financing. Farmland market liberalization is one of the key reforms in this respect. Its scale, with farmland accounting for more than 70 percent of Ukraine’s territory, and capacity for private financing generation for agriculture and rural areas, is, however, often underestimated.
An Unbearable War Toll and the Need for Private Financing
The raging Russian war on Ukraine enters its third year, imposing an immense toll in terms of human life, economic stability, and regional security. About 20 percent of Ukraine’s territory has been occupied. More than 10 million Ukrainians have left their homes, including 6.45 million refugees that have resettled across Europe (UNHCR, 2024). Ukraine’s military casualties are reported to be approaching 200,000 (The New York Times, 2023) and at least 10,000 civilians have been killed (United Nations, 2023). Ukraine’s GDP plunged by 30 percent in 2022, and the documented total damages to Ukraine’s economy have reached US$ 155 billion, as of January 2024 (KSE, 2024). Similarly, economic losses amount to around US$ 500 billion (as of December 2023). At the same time Ukraine’s reconstruction and recovery needs are estimated at about US$ 486 billion (World Bank, 2024). This immense number make up more than 2.5 times Ukraine’s 2023 GDP.
While there is a substantial and continuing international political and financial support for Ukraine’s defense, recovery, and reconstruction, this will not be enough (World Bank, 2023). Ukraine needs to mobilize its own resources and private financing, not just for its reconstruction but also for its long-term development. The Ukrainian government must leverage scarce public and donor resources and undertake necessary reforms to facilitate and crowd in private investments. One of the crucial reforms in this regard is the ongoing liberalization of the farmland market. The scale of its impact and capacity to generate private financing for agriculture and rural areas is frequently undervalued.
Ukraine’s Farmland Market and Reform
Almost 71 percent of Ukraine’s territory (or 42.7 million ha, including occupied territories) is farmland and 33 million ha is arable. This is far more than in the largest countries in the EU. Ukraine also has one-third of the world’s most fertile black soils. This resource has however been heavily underutilized for agricultural and overall economic development (KSE, 2021). Over the last two decades, Ukraine has turned into an increasingly important global supplier of staple foods (von Cramon-Taubadel and Nivievskyi, 2023), but this has largely happened without a full-fledged farmland market in Ukraine capable of facilitating even further agricultural productivity growth.
The farmland sales market was virtually non-existent for over three decades, instead rental transactions dominated. The farmland sales market began operating only in July 2021, and in a very limited format. Only individuals could purchase farmland plots and with a 100-ha cap per person. The minimum price was set at the normative monetary land value, and tenants had pre-emptive purchase rights while foreigners and legal entities were excluded; state and communal farmland remained under the 2001 sales ban. The farmland sales market opening was part of a large-scale land reform to support an efficient and transparent farmland market. This included a legislation package aimed at preventing land raiding, decentralizing land management, introducing electronic land auctions, establishing tools for land planning and use, creating a national infrastructure for geospatial data, establishing institutions for supporting small scale farmers, and empowering small scale farmers capacity to compete for land (KSE, 2021).
In general, there are two broad benefits of sales and lease transactions. First, the farmland market, via transactions, sorts out more efficient farms from less efficient ones, thus increasing the overall sector value added. Another important benefit, specifically linked to the farmland sales market, is that a functioning farmland sales market makes farmland a collateral which can generate productive investments in increased agricultural and non-agricultural productivity growth (Deininger and Nivievskyi, 2019).
Early Reform Outcomes
Almost two out of the first two and a half years of the reform phase unfolded amidst the profound shock from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Following this, nearly 20 percent of Ukraine’s farmland has been occupied (Mkrtchian and Mueller, 2024), almost a third of the agricultural sector has been ruined – the total damages and losses to the agricultural sector amount to US$ 80 billion (Neyter at al., 2024). As a result, a very restrictive first-phase format of the market, on top of the war challenges, effectively limited the expected benefits of the market liberalization.
The war has put a sizable drag on the farm-land sales market development, effectively slashing the transacted volume almost by half (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Cumulative market transactions and the effect of the war.
Source: Nivievskyi and Neyter, 2024.
Overall, about 1.1 percent of total farmland area, or about 1.3 percent of Ukraine’s total controlled farmland (equivalent of 200,000 sales transactions or 444,300 ha) has been traded since the opening of the market. Regionally, the outcome is quite diverse (see Figure 2).
This is nonetheless an encouraging outcome as it is quite comparable to developed countries benchmarks where, on average, roughly 1 percent (and up to 5 percent) of the total agricultural land area is transacted annually (Nivievskyi et al., 2016). Another important outcome is that the transacted farmland has remained in agricultural production.
Farmland price development is also positive, especially for commercial farmland (see Figure 3). Since the commencement of the farmland sales market in Ukraine, the capitalization has increased by US$ 5.5 billion (KSE Agrocenter, 2024).
In fact, farmland market capitalization might be even greater. There are indications that the actual market price should be much higher, on average, than the officially registered one, as transacting parties may try and evade fees and taxes (Nivievskyi and Neyter, 2024).
Figure 2. Transacted area as share of total oblast (administrative region) area.
Source: The Center for Food and Land Use Research at Kyiv School of Economics (KSE Agrocenter), 2024.
Continued Farmland Market Liberalization and Associated Expectations
As of January 1, 2024, legal entities gained the right to acquire farmland that had, from 2001, been under sales ban. Also, in this second stage, the farmland accumulation cap per beneficiary increased to 10,000 hectares. Other restrictions remain, including that legal entities with a foreign beneficiary still cannot purchase farmland.
The first results of the second stage are premature, and firm conclusions cannot be drawn, yet the preliminary results are quite encouraging. The new market participants have already increased the volume of transactions and corresponding price by 13 percent, on average (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Average farmland prices, in thousands UAH.
Source: KSE Agrocenter (2024). Note: Demonstration and estimations are based on the State GeoCadaster Data.
Another encouraging result highlights that legal entities bring further transparency into the market. For half of the transactions involving individuals, the sales price did not exceed the minimum price by more than 1.5 percent, while in half of the farmland transactions with legal entities, the price exceeded the minimum one by more than 44 percent.
These early results provide insight into the market’s direction and the associated benefits. The expected economic benefits from liberalizing the farmland market for legal entities could amount to an annual increase of 1-2.7 percent of GDP over the next three years. The scale depends on many factors, including the availability of financing and financial support for small farmers (KSE Agrocenter, 2023).
Rural and agricultural financing is of particular interest as land is generally considered a high-quality collateral which could be utilized to attract loans and investments. This is particularly important during the current wartime period, as agricultural producers are facing significant collateral damage and severe financial difficulties for the third consecutive year. Currently, despite its potential, only a meager share of all farming loans is secured by farmland – far below global benchmarks.
Under current registered farmland prices, the total farmland market capitalization is equivalent to roughly US$ 35.5 billion. This could potentially generate an additional US$ 12.4 billion of loans (under the current low liquidity risk ratio of 0.35), already much greater than the current agricultural debt of about US$ 3.5 billion. Adding legal entities to the pool of farmland buyers (as of January 2024), is expected to increase farmland prices by an additional 40 percent. Thus, the farmland market will grow to almost US$ 50 billion, and the volume of land-secured financing could amount to US$ 17.5 billion. Further liberalization of the farmland market, such as a strengthening of its transparency, boosting the market liquidity, and accumulating necessary market statistics, may allow the National Bank of Ukraine to reconsider the liquidity risk ratio for farmland – potentially considering it as collateral similar to other types of real-estate (see the National Bank of Ukraine Resolution #351, June 30, 2016). A liquidity risk ratio at the level of developed countries (0.6-0.8) could further increase the volume of potential land-secured financing available to agriculture and rural areas/landowners to at least US$ 35 billion. This would, in turn, close the more than US$ 20 billion current financing gap for agricultural reconstruction, recovery and development. It would also contribute to Ukraine’s nearly US$ 500 billion reconstruction and recovery needs.
Further significant strides toward liberalizing Ukraine’s farmland sales market are anticipated as part of the country’s journey towards EU membership (European Commission, 2024), aligning with Chapter 4 ‘Free Movement of Capital’. Specifically, this pertains to allowing foreigners (EU citizens and legal entities) the right to purchase Ukrainian farmland (Nivievskyi and Neyter, 2024).
Conclusion
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has inflicted massive damage and losses to Ukraine, already amounting to more than 2.5 times Ukraine’s 2023 GDP. The recently estimated reconstruction and recovery needs measure at nearly US$ 500 billion. This is an unbearable burden for Ukraine alone. Despite substantial and continuing support from international partners and donors, Ukraine will need to heavily draw on its own resources and capacity to generate private financing, not just for the country’s reconstruction, but also for its long-term development. It is therefore essential, from the Ukrainian government’s perspective, to focus on necessary reforms and optimize policy decisions to leverage the scarce public and donor resources and facilitate and crowd in private investments. Continued farmland market liberalization is one such critical reform, providing hope to generate substantial private investment in the agricultural sector and rural areas.
The size of the farmland market is immense (with farmland accounting for more than 70 percent of Ukraine’s territory). The first two years following the opening of the farmland sales market demonstrate a substantial potential for private financing generation for agriculture and rural areas. The results from regular market monitoring and the early findings, as discussed above, suggest that further farmland market liberalization and increased transparency could generate about US$ 35 billion of financing for agricultural producers and rural areas/landowners. That could, in turn, close the current agricultural financing gap of more than US$ 20 billion for rebuilding and recovery, as well as partially close the nearly US$ 500 billion financing gap for Ukraine’s overall reconstruction and recovery. The expected economic benefits from liberalizing the farmland market for legal entities are estimated at 1-2.7 percent of GDP annually, over the next three years. A further liberalization of the farmland market, and a step towards EU membership, would include granting foreigners (EU citizens and legal entities) the right to buy Ukrainian farmland – expected to bring even further benefits.
References
- Deininger, K. and Nivyevskyi, O. (2019). Economic And Distributional Impact From Lifting The Farmland Sales Moratorium. Full Version, Vox Ukraine (20 November 2019)
- European Commission. (2024). Ukraine’s EU path.
- KSE Agrocenter. (2024). Land Market Review. January 2024.
- KSE Agrocenter. (2023). Land Market Review. 3Q 2023
- KSE. (2024). Damages to Ukraine’s Infrastructure. January 2024
- KSE. (2021). Strategy for the development of land relations in Ukraine, WHITE PAPER
- Mkrtchian, A. and Mueller, D. (2024). Satelitendaten Zeigen hohen Verlust an ukrainischen Anbauflaechen als Folge der russischen Invasion. Ukraine-Analysen #294
- Neyter, R. Zorya, S. and Muliar, O. (2024). Agricultural War Damages, Losses, and Needs Review, KSE Agrocenter
- Nivievskyi, O. and Neyter, R. (2024). Zwischenbilanz zum Krieg: Schäden und Verluste der ukrainischen Landwirtschaft, Ukraine-Analysen, Nr. 294, pp. 2-7
- Nivievskyi, O. and Neyter, R. (2024). Further Liberalization of the Farmland Sales Market in Ukraine. NL # 183
- Nivievskyi, O. Nizalov, D. and Kubakh, S. (2016). Restrictions on farmland sales markets: a survey of international experience and lessons for Ukraine, Kyiv School of Economics
- The New York Times. (2023). Troop Deaths and Injuries in Ukraine War Near 500,000, U.S. Officials Say
- United Nations. (2023). Civilian Deaths in Ukraine War Top 10,000 UN Says
- UNHCR. (2024). Ukraine Situation Flash Update #63
- von Cramon-Taubadel, S. and Nivievskyi, O. (2023). Rebuilding Ukraine – the Agricultural Perspective, EconPol Forum 2, Volume 24, pp. 36-40
- World Bank. (2023). Private Sector Opportunities for a Green and Resilient Reconstruction in Ukraine. Synthesis Report. October 2023
- World Bank. (2024). Ukraine. Third Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA3). February 2022 – December 2023
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Sanctions on Russia: Getting the Facts Right
The important strategic role that sanctions play in the efforts to constrain Russia’s geopolitical ambitions and end its brutal war on Ukraine is often questioned and diminished in the public debate. This policy brief, authored by a collective of experts from various countries, shares insights on the complexities surrounding the use of sanctions against Russia, in light of its illegal aggression towards Ukraine. The aim is to facilitate a public discussion based on facts and reduce the risk that the debate falls prey to the information war.
Sanctions are a pivotal component in the array of strategies deployed to address the threat posed by Russia to the rule-based international order. Contrary to views minimizing their impact, evidence and research suggest that sanctions, particularly those targeting Russian energy exports, have significantly affected Russia’s macroeconomic stability [1,2,3]. Between 2022 and 2023:
- merchandise exports fell by 28 percent,
- the trade surplus decreased by 62 percent,
- and the current account surplus dropped by 79 percent (see the Bank of Russia’s external sector statistics here).
Although 2022 represents an extraordinarily high baseline due to the delayed impacts of energy sanctions, the $190 billion decrease in foreign currency inflows during this time has already made a significant difference for Russia. This amount is equivalent to about two years of Russia’s current military spending, or around 10 percent of Russia’s yearly GDP, depending on the figures. Our estimates suggest that Russia’s losses due to the oil price cap and import embargo alone amount to several percent of its GDP [3,4]. These losses have contributed to the ruble’s continued weakness and have forced Russian authorities to sharply increase interest rates, which will have painful ripple effects throughout the economy in the coming months and years. Furthermore, the international sanctions coalition’s freezing of about $300 billion of the Bank of Russia’s reserves has significantly curtailed the central bank’s ability to manage the Russian economy in this era of war and sanctions.
Sanctions Enforcement
Addressing the enforcement of sanctions, it is crucial to acknowledge the extensive and continuous work undertaken by governments, think tanks, and the private sector to identify and close loopholes that facilitate sanctions evasion. Suggesting that such efforts are futile, often with arguments that lack solid evidence, potentially undermines these contributions, and furthermore provides (perhaps unintended) support to those advocating for a dismantling of the sanctions regime. We do not deny that several key aspects are facing challenges, from the oil price cap to export controls on military and dual-use goods. However, the path forward is to step up efforts and strengthen the implementation and enforcement – not to abandon the strategy altogether. Yes, Russia’s shadow fleet threatens the fundamental mechanism of the oil sanctions and, namely its reliance on Western services [4,5,6]. However, recent actions by the U.S. Treasury Department have shown that the sanctioning coalition can in fact weaken Russia’s ability to work around the energy sanctions. Specifically, the approach to designate (i.e., sanction) individual tankers has effectively removed them from the Russian oil trade. More vessels could be targeted in a similar way to gradually step-up the pressure on Russia [7]. While Russia continues to have access to many products identified as critical for the military industry (for instance semiconductors) [8], it has been shown that Russia pays significant mark-ups for these goods to compensate for the many layers of intermediaries involved in circumvention schemes. Sanctions, even when imperfect, thus still work as trade barriers. In addition to existing efforts and undertakings, companies which help Russia evade export controls can be sanctioned, even when registered in countries outside of the sanctioning coalition. Furthermore, compliance efforts within, and against, western companies, who remain extremely important for Russia, can be stepped up.
The Russian Economy
Many recent newspaper articles have been centered around the theme of Russia’s surprisingly resilient economy. We find these articles to generally be superficial and missing a key point: Russia is transitioning to a war economy, driven by massive and unsustainable public spending. In 2024, military spending is projected to boost Russia’s GDP growth by at least 2.5 percentage points, driven by a planned $100 billion in defense expenditures [9]. However, seeing this for what it is, namely war-spending, raises significant concerns about the sustainability of this growth, as it eats into existing reserves and crowds out investments in areas with a larger long-term growth potential. The massive spending also feeds inflation in consumer prices and wages, in particular as private investment levels are low and the labor market is short on competent labor. This puts pressure on monetary policy causing the central bank to increase interest rates even further, to compensate for the overly stimulating fiscal policy.
Further, it is important to bear in mind that, beyond this stimulus, the Russian economy is characterised by fundamental weaknesses. Russia has for many years dealt with anaemic growth due to low productivity gains and unfavourable demographics. Since the first round of sanctions was imposed on Russia, following its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, growth has hovered at around 1 percent per year on average – abysmal for an emerging market with catch-up potential. More recently, current sanctions and war expenditures have made Russia dramatically underperform compared to other oil-exporting countries [10]. Moreover, none of the normal (non-war related) growth fundamentals is likely to improve. Rather, the military aggression and the ensuing sanctions have made things worse. Hundreds of thousands of Russians have been killed or wounded in the war; many more have left the country to either escape the Putin regime or mobilization. Those leaving are often the younger and better educated, worsening the already dire demographic situation, and reinforcing the labor market inefficiencies. Additionally, with the country largely cut off from the world’s most important financial markets, investments in the Russian economy are completely insufficient [11].
As a result, Russia will be increasingly dependent on fossil fuel extraction and exports, a strategy that holds limited promise as considerations related to climate change continue to gain importance. With the loss of the European market, either due to sanctions or Putin’s failed attempt to weaponize gas flows to Europe, Russia finds itself dependent on a limited number of buyers for its oil and gas. Such dependency compels Russia to accept painful discounts and increases its exposure to market risks and price fluctuations [12].
The Cost of Sanctions
Sanctions have not been without costs for the countries imposing them. Nonetheless, the sanctioning countries are in a much better position than Russia. Any sanction strategy is necessarily a tradeoff between maximizing the sanctioned country’s economic loss while minimizing the loss to the sanctioning countries [9], but there are at least two qualifications to bear in mind. The first is that some sanctions imply very low losses – if any – while others may carry limited short term losses but longer term gains. This includes the oil-price cap that allows many importing countries to buy Russian oil at a discount [3], and policies to reduce energy demand, which squeezes Russia’s oil-income [13]. These policies may also initially hurt sanctioning countries, but in the long term facilitate an investment in energy self-sufficiency. Similarly, trade sanctions also imply some protection of one’s own industry, meaning that such sanctions may in fact bring benefits to the sanctioning countries – at least in the short run. The second qualification is that, in cases where sanctions do imply a cost to the sanctioning countries, the question is what cost is reasonable. Russia’s economy is many times smaller than, for instance, the EU’s economy. This gives the EU a strategic advantage akin to that in Texas hold’em poker: going dollar for dollar and euro for euro, Russia is bound to go bankrupt. Currently, Russia allocates a significantly larger portion of its GDP to its war machine than most sanctioning countries spend on their defense. That alone suggests sanctioning countries may want to go beyond dollar for dollar as it is cheaper to stop Russia economically today than on a future battlefield. This points to the bigger question: what would be the future cost of not sanctioning Russia today? Many accredit the weak response from the West to the annexation of Crimea in 2014 as part of the explanation behind Putin’s decision to pursue the current full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Similarly, an unwillingness to bear limited costs today may entail much more substantial costs tomorrow.
When discussing the cost of sanctions, one must also take into account Russia’s counter moves and whether they are credible [14]. Often, they are not [3, 15]. Fear-inducing platitudes, such that China and Russia will reshape the global financial system to insulate themselves from the West’s economic statecraft tools, circulate broadly. We do not deny that these countries are undertaking measures in this direction, but it is much harder to do so in practice than in political speeches. For instance, moving away from the U.S. dollar (and the Euro) in international trade (aside from in bilateral trade relations that are roughly balanced) is highly challenging. In such a trade, conducted without the U.S. dollar, one side of the bargain will end up with a large amount of currency that it does not need and cannot exchange, at scale, for hard currency. As long as a transaction is conducted in U.S. dollar, the U.S. financial system is involved via corresponding accounts, and the threat of secondary sanctions remains powerful. We have seen examples of this in recent months, following President Biden’s executive order on December 22, 2023.
One of Many Tools
Finally, we and other proponents of sanctions do not view them as a panacea, or an alternative to the essential military and financial support that Ukraine requires. Rather, we maintain that sanctions are a critical component of a multi-pronged strategy aimed at halting Putin’s unlawful and aggressive war against Ukraine, a war that threatens not only Ukraine, but peace, liberty, and prosperity across Europe. The necessity for sanctions becomes clear when considering the alternative: a Russian regime with access to $300 billion in the central bank’s reserves, the ability to earn billions more from fossil fuel exports, and to freely acquire advanced Western technology for its military operations against Ukrainian civilians. In fact, the less successful the economic statecraft measures are, the greater the need for military and financial aid to Ukraine becomes, alongside broader indirect costs such as increased defense spending, higher interest rates, and inflation in sanctioning countries. A case in point is the West’s provision of vital – yet expensive – air defense systems to Ukraine, required to counteract Russian missiles and drones, which in turn are enabled by access to Western technology. Abandoning sanctions would only exacerbate this type of challenges.
Conclusion
The discourse on sanctions against Russia necessitates a nuanced understanding of their role within the context of the broader strategy against Russia. It is critical to understand that shallow statements and misinformed opinions become part of the information war, and that the effectiveness of sanctions also depends on all stakeholders’ perceptions about the sanctioning regime’s effectiveness and long run sustainability. Supporting Ukraine in its struggle against the Russian aggression is not a matter of choosing between material support and sanctions; rather, Ukraine’s allies must employ all available tools to ensure Ukraine’s victory. While sanctions alone are not a cure-all, they are indispensable in the concerted effort to support Ukraine and restore peace and stability in the region. The way forward is thus to make the sanctions even more effective and to strengthen the enforcement, not to abandon them.
References
[1] “Russia Chartbook”. KSE Institute, February 2024
[2] “One year of sanctions: Russia’s oil export revenues cut by EUR 34 bn”. Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air, December 2023
[3] “The Price Cap on Russian Oil: A Quantitative Analysis”. Wachtmeister, H., Gars, J. and Spiro, D, July 2023
[4] Spiro, D. Gars, J, and Wachtmeister, H. (2023). “The effects of an EU import and shipping embargo on Russian oil income,” mimeo
[5] “Energy Sanctions: Four Key Steps to Constrain Russia in 2024 and Beyond”. International Working Group on Russian Sanctions & KSE Institute, February 2024
[6] “Tracking the impacts of G7 & EU’s sanctions on Russian oil”. Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air
[7] “Russia Oil Tracker”. KSE Institute, February 2024
[8] “Challenges of Export Controls Enforcement: How Russia Continues to Import Components for Its Military Production”. International Working Group on Russian Sanctions & KSE Institute, January 2024
[9] “Russia Plans Huge Defense Spending Hike in 2024 as War Drags”. Bloomberg, September 2023
[10] “Sanctions and Russia’s War: Limiting Putin’s Capabilities”. U.S. Department of the Treasury, December 2023
[11] “World Investment Report 2023”. UNCTAD
[12] “Russia-China energy relations since 24 February: Consequences and options for Europe”. Swedish Institute of International Affairs, June 2023
[13] Gars, J., Spiro, D. and Wachtmeister, H. (2022). “The effect of European fuel-tax cuts on the oil income of Russia”. Nature Energy, 7(10), pp.989-997
[14] Spiro, D. (2023). “Economic Warfare”. Available at SSRN 4445359
[15] Gars, J., Spiro, D. and Wachtmeister, H., (2023). “Were Russia’s threats of reduced oil exports credible?”. Working paper
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Trending? Social Media Attention on Russia’s War in Ukraine
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is one of the most important geopolitical events of the 21st century. For almost two years, international news outlets have been covering the war, often providing daily or even hourly updates. But what is the level of public interest and public engagement in countries around the world? When does the war capture an international audience’s attention and what are the events that supplant it? This brief uses data on X (formerly Twitter) trends in 62 countries to address these questions.
The competition for attention is a defining feature of our information landscape. From the relentless stream of social media updates to the myriad of news articles vying for our clicks, individuals are constantly bombarded with information, each competing for a slice of their limited attention. Amidst this cacophony of voices, certain topics rise to the forefront, capturing the collective consciousness and dominating public discourse.
Social Media Engagement and Global Attention to Russia’s War in Ukraine
Russia’s war in Ukraine has, for obvious reasons, commanded significant media coverage over the past two years. It has been described as a hybrid war, where conventional military tactics are increasingly combined with non-traditional methods. This includes an information war, fought with narratives to manipulate people’s perceptions, spread falsehoods, or enlist support. To a large extent, this information war has taken place on social media. On the one hand, social media platforms have been used to spread disinformation and propaganda. For example, we’ve seen the spread of false narratives about the causes of the war, the actions of the different parties involved, and the suffering of the Ukrainian people. But on the other hand, social media has also been used to counter this disinformation, with fact-checking initiatives and grassroots efforts to promote accurate information.
This policy brief analyses the prominence of the war in social media discourse. While the content on traditional media outlets provides a snapshot of the supply of information, platforms like X/Twitter offer a unique window into the broader population’s demand for that information and how they evolve over time. Whether or not hashtags related to Russia’s war in Ukraine are trending in a given country, depends not just on the public’s interest in the war relative to other events in the news, but also on the level of interest relative to sport, music, television, and cats. By tracking the prevalence of trending hashtags, we can gain insights into the public’s engagement with Russia’s war in Ukraine, going beyond traditional media narratives and high-level governmental discussions to uncover the conversations and sentiments that shape broader public opinion.
The X/Twitter data suggest that in most countries, social media attention in the Russian war on Ukraine has been short-lived and sporadic. On February 24, 2022, Ukraine-related hashtags were trending in 100 percent of the countries in our dataset. Two weeks later, on March 9, 2022, they were trending in only 3 percent of the countries. We find that geographical proximity to the conflict is a strong predictor of social media interest. Related hashtags trend most frequently in Eastern, Central and Northern Europe. We also document spikes in interest around events that link a country to the war in Ukraine: announcements of military assistance or visits by Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyj. Finally, we compare the hashtags trending in NATO countries to those trending in countries that either sided with Russia or abstained from voting in a critical UN resolution and show significant differences between the two groups.
Data and Methodology
The source for our dataset is archive.twitter-trending.com – a website that records trending hashtags on X/Twitter across countries and over time. We scrape this website to collect (i) the five highest volume topics in each country on each day and (ii) the five longest-trending topics in each country on each day (these two categories can overlap). Our sample consists of the 62 countries available on the website and covers the timeframe July 2021 to December 2023. From this, we construct a country-by-day panel dataset with 55,862 observations.
We identify 11 topic categories that collectively account for the overwhelming majority of trending topics related to Russia’s war in Ukraine. These topics and their relative frequency are shown in Figure 1. The three dominant categories are “Ukraine”, “Russia” and ”Putin”. We use Google’s translation software to translate non-English tweets which account for a significant fraction of the dataset.
Figure 1. Frequency of hashtags in 11 category topics.
Note: This chart shows the number of times topics assigned to our 11 war-related categories were among the top five longest trending topics (in orange) or the top five highest volume topics (in blue) in any country on any day in our dataset. The source are data scraped from archive.twitter-trending.com
Figure 1 shows that it is more common for war-related topics to be among the highest volume topics on a given day than among the longest trending topics. This suggests that these topics attract a lot of interest in a narrow timeframe (e.g. when news breaks) but are relatively less likely to remain prominent over a whole day. Despite this difference, we find that the distinction between highest-volume and longest-trending does not affect any of the patterns we observe when comparing across countries or time. For simplicity, the results shown below all use the highest-volume measure.
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of the X/Twitter data. Firstly, the population actively using X/Twitter is not representative of the overall population. Secondly, the composition of users may differ across countries which complicates cross-country comparisons. Trending hashtags provide an indicator of public interest that is informative only because we do not have high frequency, nationally representative surveys that are comparable across countries. Finally, we are only able to observe the top-five hashtags in a country on any given day. In principle, a war-related topic could increase in absolute volume from one day to the next, while still being crowded out of the top five.
Geographic Variation in Attention
Social media attention to the war in Ukraine varies greatly across countries. The map in Figure 2 shows the proportion of days when any hashtag from the considered categories was among the top-five most tweeted, for each country in the database since the start of the war. Interest has, on average, been higher in Europe as well as in Anglo-Saxon countries. In contrast, other regions of the world exhibited less sustained interest, as indicated by the lower frequency of related hashtags among the top-five most tweeted topics.
Figure 2. Prevalence of war-related hashtags.
Note: The map shows the share of days on which war-related hashtags (in our 11 categories) were among the top five highest volume topics on X/Twitter between 24/02/2022 and 18/12/2023. Countries in white are not among the 62 countries in the dataset. The source are data scraped from archive.twitter-trending.com
To some extent, this heterogeneity is explained by distance. Figure 3 plots the frequency of war-related trends against geographical proximity to the conflict zone (represented by the distance from each country’s capital to the city of Kharkiv in eastern Ukraine, a major point of focus during the ongoing war). The relationship is clearly negative, suggesting that physical distance from the crisis reduces the intensity of online discourse and public interest. Unsurprisingly, the number of related trends is highest in countries directly or indirectly involved in the conflict – Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus – as well as in Latvia which borders both Russia and Belarus.
Figure 3. Frequency of war-related hashtags and distance from Kharkiv.
Note: The chart shows the log of the distance from each country’s capital city to the city of Kharkiv in km on the x-axis and the logged frequency of war-related topics among the top five highest volume topics in that country between 24/02/2022 and 18/12/2023 on the y-axis. The source are data scraped from archive.twitter-trending.com
Variation in Attention Over Time
Over the past two years, the war has sustained a relatively high intensity. By contrast, global attention on X/Twitter has been more sporadic, spiking around specific events. This is shown in Figure 4, which plots the day-to-day variation in the number of battle events as recorded by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) (in blue) as well as the share of countries where war-related tweets are trending (in orange). Attention was highest at the time of the invasion in February 2022 and the days of the Wagner Group rebellion in June 2023. Overall, the correlation between twitter trends and conflict intensity is positive but relatively weak.
Figure 4. Frequency of war-related hashtags and intensity of conflict.
Note: The chart shows the number of daily battle events in Ukraine as classified by ACLED on the left axis (in blue) and the share of countries where war-related topics were trending on the respective day on the right axis (in orange). The sources are ACLED’s Ukraine conflict monitor and data scraped from archive.twitter-trending.com
Attention also reacts to other major global events. Figure 5 compares the number of top-five trending hashtags related to the categories of interest in each country on two specific dates: February 24, 2022, the day of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and October 7, 2023, the day of a Hamas terror attack on Israel. On the day of the Russian invasion, the majority of countries in our sample exhibited the highest value. In contrast, on the day of the Hamas attack, related hashtags were trending almost nowhere outside Ukraine and Russia, indicating that global attention and engagement with this new ongoing crisis significantly overshadowed the focus on the situation in Ukraine. This shift in attention demonstrates how breaking news can capture the public’s interest and divert focus from ongoing crises, affecting the level of engagement on social media and potentially influencing the global response and discourse surrounding these events.
Figure 5. Map of prevalence of war-related hashtags on two different dates.
Note: The maps show the share of the top five highest volume topics on twitter related to Russia’s war on Ukraine. The map on the left shows 24/02/2022 – the day of Russia’s invasion. The map on the right shows 07/10/2023 – the day of a Hamas terror attack on Israel. Countries in white are not among the 62 countries in the dataset. The source are data scraped from archive.twitter-trending.com
While some events impact attention globally, others affect the salience of the conflict for a specific country. Figure 6 shows that people pay more attention to the war when there is a tangible connection to their own country. The panel on the left shows that war-related topics were more likely to trend in a country around the days where the country announced an aid package for Ukraine (military, financial or humanitarian). It shows an increasing trend in the preceding days and a peak on the day of the announcement. The panel on the right shows that war-related topics were more likely to trend in a country around the days of a visit from President Zelenskyj. This effect is large in magnitude but only lasts for around three days.
Figure 6. Likelihood of hashtags trending in relation to country-specific event.
Note: The charts show variation in the share of countries where at least one war-related topic was among the top five highest volume topics on days relative to a specific event. In the left chart, day 0 represents the day on which a country’s government announces an aid package for Ukraine. In the right chart, day 0 represents the day on which President Zelenskyj arrived in a country for an official visit. The source for these charts are: (i) the Kiel Institute’s Ukraine Support Tracker (Trebesch et al., 2023), (ii) Wikipedia’s list of official visits by President Zelenskyj and (iii) data scraped from archive.twitter-trending.com
While the events above act as drivers of attention, it is also interesting to consider what causes war-related topics to drop out of the top five trending topics. We distinguish between two reasons why war-related hashtags could stop trending: (i) a loss of interest that results in a reduction in the absolute number of related tweets (ii) the rise of other topics that displace war-related tweets from the top five. Figure 7 focuses on days where war-related topics dropped out and compares the volume of tweets on the last day where they were in the top five, to the threshold they would have had to surpass in order to make the top five on the subsequent day. In cases where the threshold is lower than the previously observed volume of tweets (a ratio of less than 1), the topic would have kept trending had it sustained its volumes, and one can conclude there was an absolute loss of interest. In cases where the ratio is greater than one, it is possible that the topic sustained its previous volume of tweets but was crowded-out by the rise of a new trending topic. Figure 7plots the histogram of this ratio. 73 percent of the cases are in the first category (loss of attention) and 27 percent are in the possible crowding out category. This provides further evidence to suggest that attention to the war on social media is typically fleeting.
Figure 7. Loss of attention vs crowding out.
Note: The sample are country-days where war-related topics were among the top five highest-volume topics but then dropped out of the top five the next day. The chart provides a histogram of the ratio of the threshold for making the top five on the subsequent day to the highest volume of tweets of a war-related topic. Values below 1 (in blue) indicate that the volume was above the next day’s threshold and the topic declined in absolute terms. Values above 1 (in orange) indicate that the volume was below the next day’s threshold. The source are data scraped from archive.twitter-trending.com
We also examine the content of discussions on the first day after war-related hashtags drop out of the top five. The word cloud in Figure 8 suggests that on such days, people primarily discuss entertainment topics like music and football.
Figure 8. Word cloud of hashtags trending on days war-related categories drop out.
Note: The figure provides a word cloud of trending topics on country-days where no war-related topic was among the top five highest volume topics, but at least one war-related topic had been in the top five on the previous day. The source are data scraped from archive.twitter-trending.com
Content and Context of War-Related Discourse
In addition to providing insight into the level of engagement, hashtag analysis can also reveal the content and context of popular discourse surrounding the war. By examining words trending on the same days as those from our 11 categories, we can gain a better understanding of the topics people are discussing and how the conversation varies across different regions. Figure 9 illustrates this through word clouds, showing the language used in NATO countries on the left and in countries that abstained or voted against the United Nations General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1 on the right. This resolution, dated March 2, 2022, condemned the brutal invasion of Ukraine and demanded that Russia immediately withdraw its forces and comply with international law.
This exercise allows us to compare the dominant themes and narratives in these two groups of countries and observe any differences in public perception and discourse regarding the conflict. The prevalence of cryptocurrency and NFT (non-fungible tokens) references in the word cloud on the right is suggestive of how economic interests and alternative financial systems could be relevant for the positions of countries that abstained or voted against the resolution, and how this might affect their involvement or response to the conflict. On the left, words like “NATO”, ”Biden”, and ”Trump” clearly stand out, suggesting that these topics are central to the discourse on the war in NATO countries. This could indicate a focus on geopolitical alliances, international cooperation, and the role of key political figures in shaping the response to the conflict. Interestingly, “Putin” is very prominent in the left word cloud while “Russia” and “Russian” are more prominent on the right. This could indicate that Putin is seen and discussed as the primary antagonist in NATO countries.
Figure 9. Word cloud of hashtags in NATO countries vs Russia-friendly countries.
Note: These word clouds represent topics that trend on days where at least one war-related topic is trending in the respective country. The cloud on the left shows NATO countries. The cloud on the right shows countries that either abstained or voted against United Nations General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1. The source are data scraped from archive.twitter-trending.com
Conclusion
This brief uses X/Twitter trends as a barometer of public interest in Russia’s war in Ukraine. We show how attention fluctuates over time in response to developments in the conflict, to other breaking news, and to local events that make the conflict salient for a domestic audience. We also provide descriptive evidence on the variation across geographical regions and among different groups of countries. Additionally, we analyse the instance where Ukraine-related topics stop trending and find suggestive evidence that this is typically due to a gradual loss of interest rather than crowding out by new distracting trends.
Public attention and engagement drive policy in democratic countries, and the sustained support of its democratic allies is vital for Ukraine during this critical time. Understanding the patterns and influences of public attention is crucial for developing effective strategies to sustain engagement and support. This can be achieved for example by regularly highlighting the ongoing significance and bearing of Russia’s war against Ukraine, even as other events dominate the headlines. Emphasizing the impact of the conflict on individuals and communities, as well as its broader implications for international relations and global security, can help sustain public interest and engagement.
References
- ACLED. Ukraine Conflict Monitor. https://acleddata.com/ukraine-conflict-monitor/
- Trebesch, C., Antezza, A., Bushnell, K., Bomprezzi, P., Dyussimbinov, Y., Frank, A., Frank, P., Franz, L., Kharitonov, I., Kumar, B., Rebinskaya, E., Schade, C., Schramm, S., and Weiser, L. (2023). The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how? Kiel Working Paper, 2218, 1-75.
- Twitter Trending Archive. Scraped on ##/12/2023. https://archive.twitter-trending.com/
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Addressing the Impact of War on Human Capital and Higher Education in Ukraine
On February 6, 2024, the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) and the Friends of KSE initiative partnered with the Nordic Ukraine Forum to host an event, aiming to examine and bolster the vital cause of higher education in Ukraine.
During this occasion, the spotlight shifted to the crucial impact of war on human capital and higher education in Ukraine. Participants delved into the indispensable role of human capital in shaping Ukraine’s future, particularly in its pursuit of prosperity within the European Union.
A focal point was the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE), lauded for its pivotal role in educating Ukraine’s future leaders and providing essential policy analysis amidst the challenges of war. Alongside SITE and the Stockholm School of Economics (SSE), KSE highlighted initiatives supporting Ukrainian students and academics, emphasizing the necessity of investing in human potential.
Representatives from Swedfund and the Nordic Ukraine Forum stressed the importance of fostering collaborations and seizing opportunities in Ukraine. The event underscored the collective effort required to preserve and nurture Ukrainian human capital, crucial for successful post-war reconstruction.
Video Recording and Photos
Participants
- Tymofiy Mylovanov, President of the Kyiv School of Economics
- Nataliia Shapoval, Chairman of the Kyiv School of Economics Institute
- Alina Zubkovych, Head of Nordic Ukraine Forum and Visiting Professor from KSE
- Katarina Hägg, Chief Executive Officer of SSE Executive Education
- Anders Olofsgård, Deputy Director of SITE
- Stefan Falk, Director of Swedfund Project Accelerator
- Volodymyr Kykot, student representative from SSE
- Alina Kotliarova, student representative from SSE
- Lesia Rublevska, student representative from SSE
- Torbjörn Becker, Director at SITE
Ukrainian Refugees: Who Returns and Why?
Of the 17 million Ukrainians who have fled the country since the full-scale Russian invasion in spring 2022, over 60 percent have returned to the country. Based on survey data of Ukrainians who were previously abroad but have returned and those who have remained abroad, we look at the factors that impact their respective decisions to return or to stay. We find that having family in Ukraine is an important factor, but so is missing one’s home, a wish for children to study in Ukraine and a desire to participate in the reconstruction of Ukraine. People who emigrated with their spouse, and those who had planned to emigrate prior to the full-scale war, are more likely to stay abroad. We also find that those staying in a host country are highly involved in Ukrainian affairs and argue that the Ukrainian government should consider them a resource rather than lost human capital.
One of the major consequences of the Russian war on Ukraine has been the mass exodus of Ukrainians fleeing the war. As of February 2022, the Ukrainian statistical agency has ceased publishing population data for both technical and security reasons, so the exact number of Ukrainians that have left the country is unknown. However, on the basis of mirror statistics from other countries, data from international organizations or surveys, it can be estimated that about 17 million people have fled the country since February 2022. Out of those, over 60 percent have returned to Ukraine, while 6 million Ukrainians have remained abroad.
As people are key in the future reconstruction and development of Ukraine, it is of great importance to understand what factors drive people to return (or not to return) to Ukraine. A recent paper (Sologoub, 2024) aims at addressing this question using a representative survey implemented by the Factum Group in July-August 2023. The survey includes 1400 people who, since early 2022, have fled Ukraine. Half of the respondents had returned to Ukraine at the time of the survey while the other half remained abroad. The first group is from here on referred to as returnees and the latter as refugees.
To look at the factors that determine individual’s decisions to return or stay abroad, the paper specifically considers the factors that impact three probabilities:
- the probability that a person stays abroad;
- the probability that a person who stays abroad plans to return (64 percent of the refugees);
- and the probability that a person who returned plans to stay in Ukraine (56 percent of the returnees).
This policy brief briefly describes the survey data, summarizes the key findings and concludes with policy implications and recommendations.
Main Characteristics of the Survey Respondents
The survey data shows that out of the entire sample of people who have returned to Ukraine and who have remained abroad, over 80 percent are women, and out of these 44 percent emigrated from Ukraine with children. About a quarter of our respondents stay or have stayed in Poland or Germany, 7 percent in the Czech Republic, while other countries have accommodated up to 4 percent of the Ukrainian migrants in our sample. The main reason for emigration is safety – almost half of the respondents reported it being the main reason for leaving Ukraine (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Stated reasons for migration choices.
Source: Factum Group survey, own calculations. Note: Blue bars are for returnees, orange bars are for refugees (i.e. individuals who have stayed in host country). A dark color denotes the main reason, and a light color denotes other reasons.
Half of the respondents who had a job in Ukraine prior to the war lost their jobs at onset of the full-scale invasion, 18 percent quit their jobs and 30 percent continued to work remotely. 53 percent of the refugees had a job at the time of the survey, and 9 percent of those who remained abroad worked online for a Ukrainian organization. Of those who worked abroad at the time of the survey, 61 percent remained on the same qualification level, while 37 percent changed their qualification level – the majority of those changed to a lower qualification level.
39 percent of all respondents had school-aged children. A quarter of them reported that their children studied only online in Ukrainian schools in 2022/23. Over 60 percent stated that their children studied in a host country, but most of these children took additional classes within the Ukrainian school program – in an online or offline environment, with tutors or on their own.
When asked to compare different aspects of their life abroad and in Ukraine, approximately equal shares of the respondents reported an improvement or a worsening of these aspects. Worsening aspects was mainly reported to concern relations with friends, psychological state, and healthcare. The respondents also stated reasons for their return to Ukraine (or willingness to return), which allowed for estimation of the significance of these reasons. Generally, we found that pull factors (factors attracting people to return to Ukraine) are much more powerful than push factors (factors that force people out of host countries).
Main Results from the Probability Models
Demographic factors (age, education, family status, or income group) are non-significant across all models with the exception of marital status. People who are single are more likely to return to Ukraine, while those who migrated together with their spouse and those who do not have children are more likely to stay abroad.
Significantly positive for the probability that a person had returned at the time of the survey were pull factors such as missing family or home, the wish for children to study in Ukraine, better job opportunities in Ukraine, having property in Ukraine, and returning friends. Some significant push factors were loneliness or integration hardship, as well as feeling humiliated for living on subsidies/state support.
Among respondents who lived abroad at the time of the survey, 64 percent planned to return to Ukraine someday, 13 percent did not plan to return to Ukraine and the rest were undecided. One should however keep in mind that peoples’ intentions can change rather quickly – in the qualitative part of the survey, some respondents explained that their decision to return was spontaneous.
The probability that a person plans to return was lower for people who had planned to emigrate prior to 2022, for people who hadn’t been to Ukraine since they fled, and for people with refugee status (in some countries, people may lose refugee protection status if they exit the host country and travel to Ukraine).
Safety improvements and better job prospects increase the probability that a refugee plans to return, as well as a wish for children to study in Ukraine and a desire to participate in Ukraine’s reconstruction. Over 70 percent of the respondents believe that their experiences from abroad will be useful for the reconstruction and over 50 percent state that the new skills they’ve gained abroad can be applied during the reconstruction of Ukraine.
Significant push factors are lacking integration into the local community and an inferior social life abroad compared to life in Ukraine. Higher levels of general well-being and life satisfaction abroad expectedly reduce the probability that a person plans to return.
Lastly, those who had returned to Ukraine at the time of the survey were asked whether or not they planned to stay in Ukraine. 56 percent said yes, 7 percent plan to emigrate again, while the rest will consider the circumstances. The main factors that keep a person in Ukraine are family, the wish for one’s children to study in Ukraine and a willingness to participate in the reconstruction of the country. Improved safety is also a significant factor – which might explain why people who are originally from the Western part of Ukraine are more likely to stay (the regional factor is significant only in this third probability model). Finally, people who planned to emigrate prior to 2022, or those whose life in Ukraine is considerably inferior to that abroad, are less likely to stay.
Ukrainians’ Liaison with Their Country
60 percent of the refugees read Ukrainian news daily, and over 90 percent read them at least several times a week. The majority of the readers spread these news in their local communities and/or in their social networks. Generally, Ukrainian refugees are quite active, over 40 percent attend rallies in support of Ukraine, almost 40 percent participate in volunteer projects, over 70 percent donate to Ukrainian organizations (and the same share help their relatives in Ukraine) and 15 percent work at a non-governmental organization.
Not surprisingly, the opinion among Ukrainian refugees on reforms in Ukraine is very similar to the opinion among returnees: anti-corruption and judicial reform have the highest priority. In line with this, the fear of corruption derailing the reconstruction of Ukraine is greater than the fear that Russia will continue with their missile attacks on Ukraine. Therefore, the determination of the Ukrainian government to fight corruption will likely not only improve life for people in Ukraine but also increase the probability that refugees return to Ukraine.
Conclusion
Most of the Ukrainians who initially fled the war have already returned to Ukraine, with the majority planning on staying in the country. For those who are still abroad, the majority wish to return when safety improves. When analysing the factors behind such wishes, it is evident that among the pull factors lie not only personal drivers, such as missing one’s home or family, but also civic factors such as a willingness to participate in the reconstruction of Ukraine or a wish for one’s children to study in Ukraine, thus contributing to preserving their identity. Moreover, Ukrainians who are living abroad are highly involved in Ukrainian affairs.
Therefore, we suggest that the Ukrainian government consider refugees as a valuable resource rather than as a loss. For example, government representatives could ask refugees to donate to Ukraine, and engage in individual or collective actions (e.g. inform their local friends about the situation in Ukraine, join rallies or flashmobs in support of Ukraine etc.). Such “people’s diplomacy” is important to ensure continued support for Ukraine.
We also recommend that the governments of host countries make it easier for refugees to stay connected with Ukraine. Specifically, refugees should be allowed to travel to Ukraine without losing their protection status.
Lastly, the strongest precondition for refugees’ return to Ukraine is supplying the country with weapons and other crucial support to win the war. A Ukrainian victory will not only bring about reconstruction and development of Ukraine but also promote and enforce global democracy.
References
- Sologoub, I. (2024). Return or stay? What factors impact the decisions of Ukrainian refugees. VoxUkraine.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
How to Undermine Russia’s War Capacity: Insights from Development Day 2023
As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine continues, the future of the country is challenged by wavering Western financial and military support and weak implementation of the sanction’s regime. At the same time, Russia fights an information war, affecting sentiments for Western powers and values across the world. With these challenges in mind, the Stockholm Institute for Transition Economics (SITE) invited researchers and stakeholders to the 2023 Development Day Conference to discuss how to undermine Russia’s capacity to wage war. This policy brief shortly summarizes the featured presentations and discussions.
Holes in the Net of Sanctions
In one of the conference’s initial presentations Aage Borchgrevink (see list at the end of the brief for all presenters’ titles and affiliations) painted a rather dark picture of the current sanctions’ situation. According to Borchgrevink, Europe continuously exports war-critical goods to Russia either via neighboring countries (through re-rerouting), or by tampering with goods’ declaration forms. This claim was supported by Benjamin Hilgenstock who not only showed that technology from multinational companies is found in Russian military equipment but also illustrated (Figure 1) the challenges to export control that come from lengthy production and logistics chains and the various jurisdictions this entails.
Figure 1. Trade flows of war-critical goods, Q1-Q3, 2023.
Source: Benjamin Hilgenstock, Kyiv School of Economics Institute.
Offering a central Asian perspective, Eric Livny highlighted how several of the region’s economies have been booming since the enforcement of sanctions against Russia. According to Livny, European exports to Central Asian countries have in many cases skyrocketed (German exports to the Kyrgyzs Republic have for instance increased by 1000 percent since the invasion), just like exports from Central Asian countries to Russia. Further, most of the export increase from central Asian countries to Russia consists of manufactured goods (such as telephones and computers), machinery and transport equipment – some of which are critical for Russia’s war efforts. Russia has evidently made a major pivot towards Asia, Livny concluded.
This narrative was seconded by Michael Koch, Director at the Swedish National Board of Trade, who pointed to data indicating that several European countries have increased their trade with Russia’s neighboring countries in the wake of the decreased direct exports to Russia. It should be noted, though, that data presented by Borchgrevink showed that the increase in trade from neighboring countries to Russia was substantially smaller than the drop in direct trade with Russia from Europe. This suggests that sanctions still have a substantial impact, albeit smaller than its potential.
According to Koch, a key question is how to make companies more responsible for their business? This was a key theme in the discussion that followed. Offering a Swedish government perspective, Håkan Jevrell emphasized the upcoming adoption of a twelfth sanctions package in the EU, and the importance of previous adopted sanctions’ packages. Jevrell also continued by highlighting the urgency of deferring sanctions circumvention – including analyzing the effect of current sanctions. In the subsequent panel Jevrell, alongside Adrian Sadikovic, Anders Leissner, and Nataliia Shapoval keyed in on sanctions circumvention. The panel discussion brought up the challenges associated with typically complicated sanctions legislation and company ownership structures, urging for more streamlined regulation. Another aspect discussed related to the importance of enforcement of sanctions regulation and the fact that we are yet to see any rulings in relation to sanctions jurisdiction. The panelists agreed that the latter is crucial to deter sanctions violations and to legitimize sanctions and reduce Russian government revenues. Although sanctions have not yet worked as well as hoped for, they still have a bite, (for instance, oil sanctions have decreased Russian oil revenues by 30 percent).
Reducing Russia’s Government Revenues
As was emphasized throughout the conference, fossil fuel export revenues form the backbone of the Russian economy, ultimately allowing for the continuation of the war. Accounting for 40 percent of the federal budget, Russian fossil fuels are currently mainly exported to China and India. However, as presented by Petras Katinas, the EU has since the invasion on the 24th of February, paid 182 billion EUR to Russia for oil and gas imports despite the sanctions. In his presentation, Katinas also highlighted the fact that Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) imports for EU have in fact increased since the invasion – due to sanctions not being in place. The EU/G7 imposed price cap on Russian oil at $60 per barrel was initially effective in reducing Russian export revenues, but its effectiveness has over time being eroded through the emergence of a Russia controlled shadow fleet of tankers and sales documentation fraud. In order to further reduce the Russian government’s income from fossil fuels, Katinas concluded that the whitewashing of Russian oil (i.e., third countries import crude oil, refine it and sell it to sanctioning countries) must be halted, and the price cap on Russian oil needs to be lowered from the current $60 to $30 per barrel.
In his research presentation, Daniel Spiro also focused on oil sanctions targeted towards Russia – what he referred to as the “Energy-economic warfare”. According to Spiro, the sanctions regime should aim at minimizing Russia’s revenues, while at the same time minimizing sanctioning countries’ own costs, keeping in mind that the enemy (i.e. Russia) will act in the exact same way. The sanctions on Russian oil pushes Russia to sell oil to China and India and the effects from this are two-fold: firstly, selling to China and India rather than to the EU implies longer shipping routes and secondly, China and India both get a stronger bargaining position for the price they pay for the Russian oil. As such, the profit margins for Russia have decreased due to the price cap and the longer routes, while India and China are winners – buying at low prices. Considering the potential countermoves, Spiro – much like Katinas – emphasized the need to take control of the tanker market, including insurance, sales and repairs. While the oil price cap has proven potential to be an effective sanction, it has to be coupled with an embargo on LNG and preferrable halted access for Russian ships into European ports – potentially shutting down the Danish strait – Spiro concluded.
Chloé Le Coq presented work on Russian nuclear energy, another energy market where Russia is a dominant player. Russia is currently supplying 12 percent of the United States’ uranium, and accounting for as much as 70 percent on the European market. On top of this, several European countries have Russian-built reactors. While the nuclear-related revenues for Russia today are quite small, the associated political and economic influence is much more prominent. The Russian nuclear energy agency, Rosatom, is building reactors in several countries, locking in technology and offering loans (e.g., Bangladesh has a 20-year commitment in which Rosatom lends 70 percent of the production cost). In this way Russia exerts political influence on the rest of the world. Le Coq argued that energy sanctions should not only be about reducing today’s revenues but also about reducing Russian political and economic influence in the long run.
The notion of choke points for Russian vessels, for instance in the Danish strait, was discussed also in the following panel comprising of Yuliia Pavytska, Iikka Korhonen, Aage Borchgrevink, and Lars Schmidt. The panelists largely agreed that while choke points are potentially a good idea, the focus should be on ensuring that existing sanctions are enforced – noting that sanctions don’t work overnight and the need to avoid sanctions fatigue. Further, the panel discussed the fact that although fossil fuels account for a large chunk of federal revenues, a substantial part of the Russian budget come from profit taxes as well as windfall taxes on select companies, and that Russian state-owned companies should in some form be targeted by sanctions in the future. In line with the previous discussion, the panelists also emphasized the importance of getting banks and companies to cooperate when it comes to sanctions and stay out of the Russian market. Aage Borchgrevink highlighted that for companies to adhere to sanctions legislation they could potentially be criminally charged if they are found violating the sanctions, as it can accrue to human rights violations. For instance, if companies’ parts are used for war crimes, these companies may also be part of such war crimes. As such, sanctions can be regarded as a human rights instrument and companies committing sanctions violations can be prosecuted under criminal law.
Frozen Assets and Disinformation
The topic of Russian influence was discussed also in the conference’s last panel, composed of Anders Ahnlid, Kata Fredheim, Torbjörn Becker, Martin Kragh, and Andrii Plakhotniuk. The panelists discussed Russia’s strong presence on social media platforms and how Russia is posting propaganda at a speed unmet by legislators and left unchecked by tech companies. The strategic narrative televised by Russia claims that Ukraine is not a democracy, and that corruption is rampant – despite the major anti-corruption reforms undertaken since 2014. If the facts are not set straight, the propaganda risks undermining popular support for Ukraine, playing into the hands of Russia. Further, the panelists also discussed the aspect of frozen assets and how the these can be used for rebuilding Ukraine. Thinking long-term, the aim is to modify international law, allowing for confiscation, as there are currently about 200 billion EUR in Russian state-owned assets and about 20 billion EUR worth of private-owned assets, currently frozen.
The panel discussion resonated also in the presentation by Vladyslav Vlasiuk who gave an account of the Ukrainian government’s perspective of the situation. Vlasiuk, much like other speakers, pointed out sanctions as one of the main avenues to stop Russia’s continued war, while also emphasizing the need for research to ensure the implications from sanctions are analyzed and subsequently presented to the public and policy makers alike. Understanding the effects of the sanctions on both Russia’s and the sanctioning countries’ economies is crucial to ensure sustained support for the sanction’s regime, Vlasiuk emphasized.
Joining on video-link from Kyiv, Tymofiy Mylovanov, rounded off the conference by again emphasizing the need for continued pressure on Russia in forms of sanctions and sanctions compliance. According to Mylovanov, the Russian narrative off Ukraine struggling must be countered as the truth is rather that Ukraine is holding up with well-trained troops and high morale. However, Mylovanov continued, future funding of Ukraine’s efforts against Russia must be ensured – reminding the audience how Russia poses a threat not only to Ukraine, but to Europe and the world.
Concluding Remarks
The Russian attack on Ukraine is military and deadly, but the wider attack on the liberal world order, through cyber-attacks, migration flows, propaganda, and disinformation, must also be combatted. As discussed throughout the conference, sanctions have the potential for success, but it hinges on the beliefs and the compliance of citizens, companies, and governments around the world. To have sanctions deliver on their long-term potential it is key to include not only more countries but also the banking sector, and to instill a principled behavior among companies – having them refrain from trading with Russia. Varying degrees of enforcement undermine sanctions compliant countries and companies, ultimately making sanctions less effective. Thus, prosecuting those who breach or purposedly evade sanctions should be a top priority, as well as imposing control over the global tanker market, to regain the initial bite of the oil price cap. Lastly, it is crucial that the global community does not forget about Ukraine in the presence of other conflicts and competing agendas. And to ensure success for Ukraine we need to restrain the Russian war effort through stronger enforcement of sanctions, and by winning the information war.
List of Participants
Anders Ahnlid, Director General at the National Board of Trade
Aage Borchgrevink, Senior Advisor at The Norwegian Helsinki Committee
Torbjörn Becker, Director at the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics
Chloé Le Coq, Professor of Economics, University of Paris-Panthéon-Assas, Economics and Law Research Center (CRED)
Benjamin Hilgenstock, Senior Economist at Kyiv School of Economics Institute
Håkan Jevrell, State Secretary to the Minister for International Development Cooperation and Foreign Trade
Michael Koch, Director at Swedish National Board of Trade
Iikka Korhonen, Head of the Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT)
Martin Kragh, Deputy Centre Director at Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS)
Eric Livny, Lead Regional Economist for Central Asia at European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
Anders Leissner, Lawyer and Expert on sanctions at Advokatfirman Vinge
Tymofiy Mylovanov, President of the Kyiv School of Economics
Vladyslav Vlasiuk, Sanctions Advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine
Nataliia Shapoval, Chairman of the Kyiv School of Economics Institute
Yuliia Pavytska, Manager of the Sanctions Programme at KSE Institute
Andrii Plakhotniuk, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to the Kingdom of Sweden
Daniel Spiro, Associate Professor, Uppsala University
Adrian Sadikovic, Journalist at Dagens Nyheter
Kata Fredheim, Executive Vice President of Partnership and Strategy and Associate Professor at SSE Riga
Lars Schmidt, Director and Sanctions Coordinator at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
SITE’s Development Day Conference Showcases Strategies to Strengthen Sanctions on Russia
The Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) hosted its highly anticipated annual Development Day conference at the Stockholm School of Economics on December 5. The event brought together experts, policymakers, and industry representatives to explore effective measures to reduce financing to the Russian war machine, contain the Russian economy, and support Ukraine’s reconstruction efforts, all while winning the information war.
Under the theme of “Taking Action for a Secure Future”, the conference featured a series of insightful presentations and engaging discussions. Attendees had the opportunity to gain valuable insights into the multifaceted challenges posed by Russia’s aggressive actions and explore innovative strategies to counter them.
“We are thrilled to have brought together such a diverse and knowledgeable group of individuals who are committed to addressing the complex issues surrounding Russian influence,” said Anders Olofsgård, Deputy Director of SITE. “Our annual Development Day conferences serve as platforms for sharing ideas, fostering collaboration, and ultimately working towards a more secure and stable world.”
The Ukrainian Government’s view
Vladyslav Vlasiuk, Sanctions Advisor to the Office of the President of Ukraine.
The Russia sanctions as a human rights instrument: Violations of export controls regarding war-critical goods to Russia
Aage Borchgrevink, Senior Advisor at The Norwegian Helsinki Committee. See and download the presentation here!
Reducing Russian government revenues
Petras Katinas, Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air. See and download the presentation here!
Daniel Spiro, Associate Professor, Department of Economics, Uppsala University. See and download the presentation here!
Chloé Le Coq, Professor of Economics, University of Paris-Panthéon-Assas, Economics and Law Research Center (CRED). See and download the presentation here!
Yuliia Pavytska, Manager of the Sanctions Programme at KSE Institute. See and download the presentation here!
Reducing the Russian economic capacity
Benjamin Hilgenstock, Senior Economist at Kyiv School of Economics Institute. See and download the presentation here!
Eric Livny, Lead Regional Economist for Central Asia at EBRD. See and download the presentation here!
Michael Koch, Director at Swedish National Board of Trade. See and download the presentation here!
The Swedish Government’s Perspective
Håkan Jevrell, State Secretary to the Minister for International Development Cooperation and Foreign Trade.
Concluding remarks
Torbjörn Becker, Director of SITE, and Tymofiy Mylovanov, President of the Kyiv School of Economics.
Thank you
We would like to thank everyone who participated during this year’s SITE Development Day conference “How to undermine the Russian war effort and support Ukraine” on December 5th, 2023, at the Stockholm School of Economics. We hope to see you all again in the next Development Day conference.