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Russian Oil and Gas: What to Expect?
For decades, Russian oil and gas have been a cornerstone of Europe’s energy supply, powering industries and heating millions of homes. However, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, energy flows to the West have sharply declined. Experts speculate that it could stop entirely, either through sanctions or policy decisions from Russia itself, posing a significant challenge to Europe’s energy security.
This shift raises two critical questions:
- How will reduced Russian oil and gas exports affect global energy markets?
- And what are the long-term consequences for both the European Union and Russia’s economy?
Together, they examined how the reduction of Russian oil and gas flows reshapes energy trade and accelerates Europe’s transition to renewables. This shift also challenges global market stability and raises new concerns for Europe and its energy security.
Event Panelists:
- Julius Andersson, Assistant Professor, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE)
- Chloé Le Coq, Professor, Université Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas and Research Fellow at SITE
- Sergej Gubin, Research Fellow, BICEPS
- Paweł Wróbel, Managing Director, BalticWind.EU
Together, they examined how the reduction of Russian oil and gas flows reshapes energy trade, accelerates Europe’s transition to renewables, and challenges global market stability.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed during events, seminars, and conferences are those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Fleeing the War Zone: Will Open Hearts be Enough?
The invasion of the Russian Federation in Ukraine has resulted in the loss of lives and destruction of infrastructure and has forced millions to flee from the war zone.
By March 14th 2022 over 2,8 million people have found refuge outside of Ukraine and many more have been displaced within its borders. The UNHCR estimates the total number of those forced to flee Ukraine may grow to 4 million.
Program
On March 14, 2022 experts from Ukraine, Sweden and Poland discussed the consequences of the invasion for the Ukrainian population.
- Maciej Duszczyk (University of Warsaw)
- Hanna Vakhitova (Kyiv School of Economics)
- Jesper Roine (Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics)
- Annika Sunden, (Migration Studies Delegation)
- Moderated by Michal Myck (Centre for Economic Analysis)
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed during events, seminars and conferences are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Sanctions on Russia: How They Impact Europe Energy Security and the Region
As Russia’s war in Ukraine continues, Western sanctions are beginning to chip away at the Kremlin’s war machine. Although President Vladimir Putin appears undeterred, the sanctions are draining resources that could otherwise fund the conflict.
How Sanctions Work?
According to Maria Perrotta Berlin, Assistant Professor at the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), sanctions are most effective when they come as a surprise. “If the threat of sanctions didn’t deter aggression, their implementation is unlikely to change behavior — unless they are more severe than expected,” she explains.
Sanctions, however, are a blunt instrument. They can unintentionally harm other economies and are rarely effective on their own. Maria Perrotta Berlin notes that “the stick of sanctions works best when paired with a carrot”. For instance, offering a clear path toward lifting restrictions, as was done in Iran’s nuclear negotiations.
The Three Types of Sanctions on Russia
Currently, three main categories of sanctions are in place against Russia:
- Financial sanctions: including restrictions on the Russian Central Bank, disconnection from the SWIFT system, and asset freezes. These measures have the most immediate impact.
- Trade sanctions: particularly on technology imports and energy exports. These take longer to affect the Russian economy and are more costly to sender countries.
- Sanctions of inconvenience: such as airspace closures, travel bans, and exclusion from international sports and cultural events. While symbolic, they contribute to isolating Russia on the global stage.
Such isolation can influence public opinion within Russia. It may generate opposition to the government — or conversely, trigger a “rally around the flag” effect that strengthens domestic support for Putin.
Signaling and Solidarity
Despite Putin’s resistance, the sanctions are sending a powerful signal both within Russia and abroad. They demonstrate the unity of Western nations and highlight that much of the world condemns Russia’s actions in Ukraine.
Experts say there is still room to tighten sanctions by expanding the list of targeted individuals, banks, and sectors, as well as closing loopholes used to bypass restrictions.
Regional Impacts: Belarus and Georgia
The FREE Network webinar, “The Sanctions on Russia, and Their Impact on the Region,” brought together experts from Belarus and Georgia to assess the broader consequences.
Belarus faces additional sanctions due to its support for Russia’s aggression. The country has already lost key export routes through both Russia and Ukraine. Its economy is reeling from the depreciation of the Russian ruble and fears of a banking crisis.
In Georgia, the war in Ukraine revives painful memories of the 2008 Russian invasion. While Georgia relies less on Russian gas than the EU, it remains vulnerable to rising oil prices and inflation, already at 13.7%. Nearly 90% of Georgia’s wheat comes from Russia, making food security a growing concern.
Learn More About the Russian War Economy and Sanctions
To learn more about Western sanctions and Russia’s countermeasures, visit the Sanctions Timeline. And for details on sanctions imposed on Russia and their effects, see the Evidence Base section of the sanctions portal. Explore more policy briefs on sanctioning Russia here.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed during events, seminars and conferences are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Securing Women’s Safety at the Time of War
As the Russian invasion of Ukraine continues, millions of women are facing grave risks from displacement, violence, and loss. On this International Women’s Day, it is crucial to recognize the unique challenges women experience during armed conflicts — from direct violence to long-term psychological and economic harm. Evidence from past wars shows that gender-based violence increases sharply during and after conflicts, demanding urgent international attention and support.
Women’s Vulnerability During the Ukraine War
The war in Ukraine has caused immense human suffering, forcing over 1.5 million people to flee by early March 2022. Russian attacks have targeted cities, disrupted humanitarian aid, and endangered civilians. Research shows that women in war zones face multiple layers of risk — including sexual violence, psychological abuse, and displacement-related exploitation. Gender-based violence often extends beyond physical assault, encompassing coercion, loss of freedom, and systemic mistreatment (Wirtz et al., 2014).
Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War
Scholars now recognize sexual violence in armed conflicts as a deliberate tool of warfare rather than random brutality (Skjelsbaek, 2001). Studies indicate that aggressors from gender-unequal societies are more likely to use such violence (Taylor, 1999; Meger, 2016; Guarnieri & Tur-Prats, 2020). Even after fleeing, women face heightened threats in refugee camps, where sexual and domestic violence often persist (Araujo et al., 2019; Stark & Ager, 2011).
Protecting Women in Conflict and Displacement
Governments, humanitarian organizations, and the international community must prioritize women’s safety, justice, and empowerment. Key steps include:
- Ensuring safe evacuation from conflict zones.
- Holding perpetrators of sexual violence accountable, with zero tolerance for impunity.
- Including sexual violence in sanctions regimes, per UN Security Council Resolution 1820.
- Involving refugee women in leadership roles in protection programs.
- Providing training and awareness on gender-based violence prevention.
- Enabling legal work opportunities for displaced women to prevent exploitation.
- Offering mental health and trauma support for survivors.
A Call for Global Solidarity
As we hope for peace and the safe return of displaced families, this International Women’s Day should serve as a call to action — to strengthen protection for women, prevent gender-based violence in conflict, and ensure justice for survivors.
The FREE Network and the Forum for Research on Gender Economics (FROGEE) continue to advocate for women’s safety and empowerment, supported by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA).
References
- Araujo, J. D. O., Souza, F. M. D., Proença, R., Bastos, M. L., Trajman, A., & Faerstein, E. (2019). Prevalence of sexual violence among refugees: a systematic review. Revista de saude publica, 53.
- Meger, S. (2016). Rape loot pillage: The political economy of sexual violence in armed conflict. Oxford University Press
- Ray S, Heller L. (2009). Peril or protection: the link between livelihoods and gender-based violence in displacement settings. New York (NY): Women’s Refugee Commission.
- Skjelsbaek, I. (2001). Sexual violence and war: Mapping out a complex relationship. European journal of international relations, 7(2), 211-237.
- Spangaro, J., Adogu, C., Ranmuthugala, G., Powell Davies, G., Steinacker, L., & Zwi, A. (2013).What evidence exists for initiatives to reduce risk and incidence of sexual violence in armed conflict and other humanitarian crises? A systematic review. PLoS ONE. 2013;8(5):1–13.
- Spangaro, J., Adogu, C., Zwi, A. B., Ranmuthugala, G., & Davies, G. P. (2015). Mechanisms underpinning interventions to reduce sexual violence in armed conflict: A realist-informed systematic review. Conflict and health, 9(1), 1-14.
- Stark, L., & Ager, A. (2011). A systematic review of prevalence studies of gender-based violence in complex emergencies. Trauma, Violence, & Abuse, 12(3), 127-134.
- Taylor, C. C. (1999). A gendered genocide: Tutsi women and Hutu extremists in the 1994 Rwanda genocide. PoLAR, 22, 42.
- Willman, A. M., & Corman, C. (2013). Sexual and Gender-Based Violence: What is the World Bank Doing and What Have We Learned, A Strategic Review. Washington (DC): World Bank.
- Wirtz, A. L., Pham, K., Glass, N., Loochkartt, S., Kidane, T., Cuspoca, D., & Vu, A. (2014). Gender-based violence in conflict and displacement: qualitative findings from displaced women in Colombia. Conflict and health, 8(1), 1-14.
- UNHCR. (2011). Action against sexual and gender-based violence: an updated strategy. Geneva: UNHCR Division of International Protection.
The Sanctions on Russia, and Their Impact on the Region
As the war in Ukraine intensifies, the international community continues to respond with new measures. Understanding the economic impact of sanctions on Russia has therefore become critical. On 3 March, the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) and the FREE Network hosted a timely webinar titled “The Sanctions on Russia, and Their Impact on the Region.”
The discussion brought together leading economists and policy experts. They analyzed how Western sanctions are reshaping Russia’s economy, influencing neighboring countries, and altering regional stability.
Expert Panelists
- Torbjörn Becker, Director of SITE
- Larry Samuelson, Professor at Yale and Cowles Foundation
- Lev Lvovsky, Research Fellow at BEROC
- Nataliia Shapoval, Chairman of KSE Institute
- Yaroslava V. Babych, Lead Economist at ISET Policy Institute
- Tamar Sulukhia, Director at ISET – International School of Economics
Together, the panelists explored the financial, trade, and geopolitical consequences of the sanctions. Moreover, they highlighted key challenges faced by Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia. They also discussed possible long-term outcomes for the European and global economies.
Understanding the Regional Effects
The experts emphasized that sanctions on Russia extend far beyond its borders, affecting energy markets, trade routes, and financial stability in neighboring nations. They also underlined the importance of international solidarity and coordinated policy responses to mitigate regional disruptions.
About the FREE Network and SITE
The FREE Network and SITE continue to provide in-depth analysis on transition economics, sanctions policy, and Eastern European economies, promoting evidence-based dialogue among researchers and policymakers.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed during events, seminars and conferences are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Investing, Producing and Paying Taxes Under Weak Property Rights
Oil majors often choose to operate in countries with weak property rights. This may appear surprising, since the lack of constraints on governments may create incentives to renege on initial promises with firms and renegotiate tax payments once investments have occurred and, in the worst case, expropriate the firm. In theory, backloading investments, production and tax payments may be used to create self-enforcing agreements which do not depend on legal enforcement. Using a new dataset covering the universe of oil majors’ assets that started production between 1974 and 1999, we indeed show in a recent CEPR Working Paper (Paltseva, Toews, and Troya-Martinez, 2022) that investments, production and tax payments are delayed by two years in countries with weak institutions relative to countries with strong institutions. Extending the dataset back to 1960 and exploiting the transition to a new world oil order where expropriation became easier, allows us to interpret our estimates as causal. In particular, prior to the transition expropriations were not feasible, due to the omnipresent and credible military threat imposed by the oil majors’ countries of origin. As the new order sat in, a new equilibrium emerged, in which expropriations became a feasible option. This transition incited an increase in expropriations and forced firms to adjust to the new reality by backloading contracts.
The Hold-up Problem
In December of 2006, when the oil price was climbing towards new heights, the Guardian reported that the Russian government was about to successfully force Shell into transferring their controlling stake in a huge liquified gas project back into the hands of the government. While officially this was motivated by environmental concerns surrounding the Sakhalin-II project, most observers agreed that this might be considered a textbook example of the hold-up problem faced by oil firms when investing in countries with limited constraints on the executive. At its core, the hold-up problem refers to the idea that the government may renege on the initial promise and appropriate a bigger share of the pie once investments have been made. Obviously, this is not an oil-specific issue and concerns any type of investment in countries with weak property rights. Academics, who worked on resolving these issues, suggest the use of self-enforcing agreements (Thomas and Worrall, 1994). These agreements use future gains from trade (as opposed to third-party enforcement) to incentivize the governments not to expropriate. And while the theoretical literature has prolifically developed over the last 30 years (Ray, 2002), to the best of our knowledge no empirical evidence has been provided on the use and dynamic patterns of self-enforcing backloaded contracts.
Data and Sample
In Paltseva, Toews and Troya-Martinez (2022), we rely on micro-level data on oil and gas projects provided by Rystad Energy, an energy consultancy based in Norway. Its database contains current and historical data on physical, geological and financial features for the universe of oil and gas assets. We focus on the assets owned by the oil majors (BP, Chevron, ConocoPhilips, Eni, ExxonMobile, Shell, and Total) using all assets that started production between 1960 and 1999, leaving us with a total of 3494 assets. An asset represents a production site with at least one well, operated by at least one firm, and with the initial property right being owned by at least one country. Being able to conduct the analysis on the asset level is particularly valuable since it allows us to control for a large number of confounding factors and rule out several alternative explanations of our main finding.
Moreover, there are three advantages of focusing our analysis on the oil and gas sector in general and the oil majors in particular. First, the sunk investments in the development of oil and gas wells are enormous, making the hold-up problem in the oil sector particularly severe. Second, oil majors have been around for many years since all of them were created before WWII. This provides us with a sufficiently long horizon to capture backloading over time. Third, the majors are simultaneously investing in many countries which provides us the necessary cross-sectional variation in institutional quality. To differentiate between countries with weak and strong institutions, we use a specific dimension from the Polity IV dataset measuring the constraints on the executive. The location of all the assets disaggregated by firm as well as a binary distinction in a country’s institutional quality is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Spatial distribution of assets and institutional quality

Note: Location and ownership of assets are provided by Rystad Energy. The executive constraint indicator is taken from Polity IV and we use the median from the period 1950 to 1975 to define whether the country is considered to have strong or weak institutions. The cut-off of 5 implies that roughly 1/3 of the countries are defined as having strong institutions and roughly 50% of all the assets which started operation between 1950 and 2000 are located in countries with weak institutions.
A Stylized Fact
For the empirical analysis, our variables of interest are investment, production and tax payments normalized by the respective asset-specific cumulative sum over a period of 35 years. The resulting cumulative shares are depicted in Figure 2. We focus on physical production which, in addition to being considered the most reliable measure of an asset’s activity, does not require discounting. Real values of investment and tax payment depict a very similar picture. Most importantly, the dashed lines illustrate that 2/3 of cumulative production shares are reached approximately two years earlier in countries with strong institutions, in comparison to countries with weak institutions. The average asset size does not differ significantly between these groups. Such delays are costly for countries with weak institutions. Our back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the average country loses around 120 million US$ per year due to the delayed production and the respective tax payments. We confirm that the two-year delay cannot be explained by geographical, geological or financial confounders such as the location of the well, fuel type or contract features.
Figure 2. Years to reach 66% of cumulative flows in 35 years

Note: We use the Epanechnikov kernel with an optimally chosen bandwidth to plot the cumulative production over the 35-year life span of the asset. We group countries into two groups with weak and strong institutions according to Polity IV. This figure contains assets that started producing between 1975 and 1999.
The Transition to a New World Order
To push towards a causal interpretation of the results, we exploit the global transition to a new world oil order. This change affected the probability of expropriations in countries with weak institutions while leaving countries with strong institutions unaffected. In particular, the post-WWII weakening of the OECD members as political and military actors provides a natural experiment of global proportions. Expropriations are first viewed as impossible due to the military threat of British, French and US armies, and then become possible due to a global movement aiming at returning sovereignty over natural resources to the resource-rich economies. In the words of Daniel Yergin (1993): “The postwar petroleum order in the Middle East had been developed and sustained under American-British ascendancy. By the latter half of the 1960s, the power of both nations was in political recession, and that meant the political basis for the petroleum order was also weakening. […] For some in the developing world […] the lessons of Vietnam were […] that the dangers and costs of challenging the United States were less than they had been in the past, certainly nowhere near as high as they had been for Mossadegh, [the Iranian politician challenging UK and US before the coup d’etat in 1953], while the gains could be considerable.” Consequently, the number of expropriations has grown substantially since 1968, marking the transition to a new world order (Figure 3). However, Kobrin (1980) finds that even during the peak of expropriations in 1960-1976, only less than 5 % of all foreign-owned firms in the developing countries were expropriated. We suggest that this is, at least partly, thanks to the use of backloaded self-enforcing contracts.
Figure 3. Transition to a new world order

Note: Data on firm expropriations across all industries from Kobrin (1984).
Indeed, focusing on the years around the transition to the new world oil order, we show that there have not been any differences in investment, production or tax payments dynamics between countries with weak and strong institutions in the early years of the 1960s. But investment, production and the payments of taxes started experiencing significant delays after 1968 in the countries with weak institutions, using countries with strong institutions as a control. Intuitively, the omnipresence of a credible military threat in response to an expropriation served as an effective substitute for strong local formal institutions and eliminated the need for contracts to be self-enforced and backloaded in countries with weak institutions. Once this threat disappeared, contracts had to be self-enforcing and investment, production and tax payments had to be backloaded to decrease the risk of being expropriated by the governments of resource-rich economies. Theoretically, these initial differences in contract backloading between countries with strong and weak institutions should disappear in the long run, because the future gains from trade need to materialize eventually. We confirm empirically that this point is reached on average 20 years after firms start a contractual relationship with a country.
Conclusion
We provide evidence that oil firms seem to backload contracts in countries with weak institutions. We show that such backloading appears in the data during the transition to a new world order since 1968, when firms were in need of a new mechanism to deal with weak property rights and the risk of expropriations. We estimate the cost of such delays to be around 120 US$ per country and year. While this cost is high, it is important to emphasize that in the absence of such backloading, forward-looking CEOs of oil majors would often choose not to invest in the first place, since they would anticipate the severe commitment problems (Cust and Harding, 2020). Thus, as a second-best, the cost of the backloading may be marginal compared to the value added from trade when oil majors are willing to invest in countries with weak institutions and questionable property rights.
References
- Cust, J. & Harding, T. (2020). “Institutions and the location of oil exploration”. Journal of the European Economic Association, 18(3): 1321–1350.
- Kobrin, S. J. (1980). “Foreign enterprise and forced divestment in LDCs”. International Organization, 65–88.
- Kobrin, S. J. (1984). “Expropriation as an attempt to control foreign firms in LDCs: trends from 1960 to 1979.” International Studies Quarterly, 28(3): 329–348.
- Paltseva, E, Toews, G & Troya Martinez, M. (2022). ‘I’ll pay you later: Relational Contracts in the Oil Industry‘. London, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
- Debraj, R. (2002). “The time structure of self-enforcing agreements.” Econometrica, 70(2): 547–582.
- Jonathan, T. & Worrall, T. (1994). “Foreign direct investment and the risk of expropriation.” The Review of Economic Studies, 61(1): 81–108
- Yergin, D. (2011). The prize: The epic quest for oil, money & power. Simon and Schuster.
From East to West: A Paper Curtain in Swedish Foreign News Coverage?
How much a country is talked about in the media can determine its place in the public debate. In this brief, we collect data on the mentions of Eastern and Western European countries in the main Swedish newspapers over the past decades. We find consistently more coverage devoted to Western compared to Eastern Europe in the Swedish press. We investigate several factors that could explain this pattern. We find that while Eastern European countries are on average not more geographically distant from Sweden, Sweden tends to have closer trade links with Western European countries. Sweden is more culturally similar to the average Western European country in terms of language, religion and attitudes, cultural values and social norms. Trade relations and cultural proximity are associated with higher media coverage.
The media plays a vital role in modern societies by keeping the public informed and policymakers accountable. Whether and how events are covered by the news determines their relevance in the public debate. There is ample empirical evidence on the agenda-setting power of the news media. For example, Snyder and Strömberg (2010) show that local press coverage affects how informed US voters are about their representatives and in turn how much their politicians work in the interest of their constituencies. Eisensee and Strömberg (2007) find that news coverage affects how much disaster relief the US sends to foreign countries.
In this brief, we study the amount of news coverage devoted to European countries in the Swedish press. We document a systematic difference between Western and Eastern Europe and explore underlying factors that could be important in explaining this East-West divide.
The East-West Divide
We choose the four most widely read Swedish newspapers (Aftonbladet, Expressen, Dagens Nyheter, and Svenska Dagbladet) and use the newspaper database Retriever Research Media Archive to obtain statistics on the number of mentions of each country between 1995 and 2021. A country mention is an article in which the name of a country appears. Since two or more countries can be named in the same article, the total number of mentions does not correspond to the number of articles. As a percentage of all articles published by the four newspapers in 2021, roughly 20% mention at least one of these countries. While this simple measure of news coverage can be informative, it does not take into account many other aspects of a country’s prominence in the news, such as the length of articles, where articles appear, the tone of coverage, etc.
Figure 1 plots the sum of annual number of mentions by region over time. We see a clear difference in the amount of coverage devoted to Eastern and Western European countries. Over the entire time period, the 21 Western European countries were mentioned on average 2.7 times more than the 22 Eastern European countries.
While there does not appear to be a trend in relative coverage, there is considerable variation from year to year. The year when the relative difference in the number of mentions is smallest is 2014. The two most mentioned Eastern European countries in that year were Russia and Ukraine. Coverage likely increased due to the Crimean Crisis, when Russia invaded and annexed the Crimean Peninsula in Southern Ukraine. The relative difference was also low in 2008, coinciding with the Russo-Georgian war in August. In that year, other newsworthy events, such as the Global Financial Crisis or the UEFA European Football Championship, have a more ambiguous effect on relative media coverage.
Figure 1. Country mentions in Swedish newspapers

Note: Countries included in Eastern Europe: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine. Countries included in Western Europe: Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom.
What Explains This Discrepancy Between East and West?
There are a number of potential reasons why some countries systematically receive more attention in the press. In this section, we correlate the mean annual mentions of each country between 2019 and 2021 with different aspects of that country’s relationship with Sweden.
Distance and Population
Figure 2 shows how news coverage of a country depends on its geographic distance to Sweden and its population size. Overall, the further a country is from Sweden, the less that country is covered in the Swedish press. On average, Eastern European countries (in yellow) are covered less than Western European countries (in blue), for a given distance to Sweden. For example, Poland and Germany are both around 1000km away from Sweden, but Germany is mentioned almost twice as often in the Swedish press. As we measure the distance between the most populous city of each country and Stockholm, some of this difference in coverage is driven by the fact that countries sharing a border with Sweden receive extensive coverage. For instance, Denmark, Finland, and Norway are on average covered more than six times as much as Latvia.
Population also plays a role, that is, larger countries (e.g., Germany, Russia, Spain, and Poland) receive more coverage than smaller countries (e.g., Lithuania, Ireland, and Estonia). As Eastern European countries have on average smaller populations than Western European countries, population can partly explain the East-West difference in news coverage. One counterexample is Russia, which has more than twice as many people as France or the UK, but receives less coverage in the Swedish press.
Figure 2. Geographical distance and population

Note: Geodesic distances are calculated between the latitudes and longitudes of the most populous city of each country and Stockholm. Marker sizes are weighted by population averaged over 2019-2021, and fitted line is unweighted. Source: CEPII’s GeoDist dataset (Mayer and Zignago, 2006) and the World Bank. See Figure 1 for a list of countries included.
Trade and GDP
Figure 3 shows that Sweden’s economic relationship with a country affects how much the country features in Swedish news. We find a strong positive correlation of 0.8 between a country’s total trade volume with Sweden and country mentions in Swedish newspapers. As Sweden’s largest trading partners tend to be in Western Europe, this partly explains the relative coverage of East and West. Another factor is the overall size of a country’s economy (as measured by its GDP). Swedish newspapers more commonly mention countries with higher GDP, and these are more likely to be in Western than Eastern Europe.
Figure 3. Trade and GDP

Note: Trade data are from 2019. Marker sizes are weighted by national GDP, and fitted line is unweighted. GDP figures are averaged over 2019-2021 and measured in current prices, PPP adjusted, international dollars. Source: The World Bank’s WITS database and the IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2021. See Figure 1 for a list of included countries.
Culture
There is a large literature documenting the link between cultural factors and the economic relationship between nations. For instance, studies show that similarities in ancestry, language, religion, norms and values can influence bilateral trade (Melitz, 2008; Guiso et al., 2009) and the diffusion of technology (Spolaore et al., 2009). In this section, we show how the amount of press coverage correlates with differences in language, religion, and values and norms using cultural distance data from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016).
Figure 4.a shows that Swedish newspapers are more prone to cover countries whose languages are similar to Swedish. The language similarity measure originally developed by Fearon (2003) is based on the prevalence of languages within a country and distance between languages. The distance measure is calculated using linguistic trees provided in Ethnologue. It ranges from 0 (close) to 1 (distant) and reflects the expected number of common linguistic nodes between two randomly chosen individuals from each country and takes into account that countries can be linguistically heterogeneous (for more details, see Fearon 2003). Norway and Denmark are linguistically closest to Sweden, however, these are also two neighboring countries with which Sweden conducts extensive trade. On average, Eastern European countries are more linguistically distant from Sweden, although some Western European countries (such as France and Spain) are as linguistically distant from Sweden as many of the Eastern European countries and receive considerably more press coverage.
The religious distance measure by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016) is calculated analogously to the linguistic distance measurement. It is based on the prevalence of different religions within a country and the distance between religions. Figure 4.b shows that countries that are religiously different from Sweden receive less coverage in the Swedish media. With the exception of the three Scandinavian countries, Eastern and Western European countries have similar levels of religious distance to Sweden. Based solely on this metric, the Swedish press mentions Eastern European countries less (and Western European countries more) than their religious distance to Sweden would predict.
Figure 4.c shows an index of a country’s cultural proximity to Sweden, that is, its distance in terms of cultural values, attitudes and norms based on average responses to the World Value Surveys from 1981 to 2010 (see Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2016). This cultural proximity index aggregates the Euclidian distances in survey responses between each country and Sweden. The index is standardized so that 0 shows the average country’s cultural distance to Sweden and negative (positive) values indicate above (below) average cultural similarity. Western European countries are significantly closer to Sweden than Eastern European countries based on this measure. As Swedish press coverage is on average declining in a country’s cultural distance to Sweden, this difference in country’s values and attitudes can explain some of the East-West difference in media coverage.
Figure 4. Cultural distance
Panel a. Linguistic distance

Note: We use the indicator of tree-based weighted linguistic distance from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016) and originally developed in Fearon (2003). This measure is an estimate of the expected or weighted number of common linguistic nodes between two randomly chosen individuals from each country. The data on language prevalence is compiled from a number of different sources and assembled in Fearon (2003). Countries included in Eastern Europe: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine. Countries included in Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (average between East and West Germany), Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom
Panel b. Religious distance

Note: We use the tree-based weighted religious distance from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016). This measure is an estimate of the expected distance between the religions of two randomly chosen individuals from each country. See Figure 4.a for a list of included countries.
Panel c. Distance in cultural values, attitudes, and norms

Note: We use the distance in cultural norms and values from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016). This measure is based on all value-related questions from the World Values Survey Integrated Questionnaire from 1981–2010. The mean distance across countries is standardized to zero. See Figure 4.a for a list of countries included.
Conclusion
As the public and policymakers primarily receive information from the mass media, news coverage can have profound effects on public debate and policy decisions. Using data on the content of the four most widely read Swedish newspapers over the past decades, we measure how much the Swedish press covers Eastern and Western European countries. We find that over the past 25 years, there have been 2.7 times more mentions of Western than Eastern European countries. We find that the Swedish press is more likely to mention countries that are geographically closer, more populous, have a larger GDP and more trade with Sweden. Cultural proximity (as measured by language, religion and values, attitudes and social norms) also correlates with higher coverage. These factors are of course not independent from each other. For instance, the other Scandinavian countries with whom Sweden shares a border and a history, are culturally similar to Sweden and some of Sweden’s most important trading partners. They are also some of the countries that are most covered by the Swedish press. Some of these factors, such as sharing similar values, appear to explain the gap in coverage between East and West, while others, such as geographic distance, do not. More recently, concerns over energy security in the EU (see e.g., Le Coq and Paltseva, 2022) and the rise in military tension between Russia and Ukraine illustrate how developments in Eastern Europe can directly affect life here in Sweden. Perhaps it is time for Sweden to pay more attention to her eastern neighbours?
References
- Eisensee, T., & Strömberg, D. (2007). “News droughts, news floods, and US disaster relief”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(2), 693-728.
- Fearon, J. (2003) “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country”, Journal of Economic Growth, 8, 195–222.
- Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2009). “Cultural biases in economic exchange?”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(3), 1095-1131.
- Le Coq, C. & Paltseva, E. (2022). “What does the Gas Crisis Reveal About European Energy Security?” FREE Policy Briefs.
- Mayer, T. & Zignago, S. (2006). “GeoDist: The CEPII’s Distances and Geo-graphical Database” MPRA Paper No. 31243.
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- Spolaore, E., & Wacziarg, R. (2009). “The diffusion of development”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(2), 469-529.
- Spolaore, E., & Wacziarg, R. (2016). “Ancestry, language and culture”. In The Palgrave Handbook of Economics and Language (pp. 174-211). Palgrave Macmillan, London.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Paradise Leaked: An Analysis of Offshore Data Leaks
In recent years, there have been several high-profile leaks of documents related to the offshore financial industry, such as the Pandora Papers released last year. Some of the data contained in the leaked documents have now been made public. In this brief, we discuss the advantages and pitfalls of using these data for economic analysis. We show that despite some caveats, there are patterns in these data that can shed light on a secretive industry. For instance, the number of offshore entities linked to a country increases significantly when that country experiences a change in political leadership. By contrast, financial sanctions on a given country result in a reduction in the number of established offshore entities. In the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis, many countries signed bilateral treaties with tax havens in order to promote transparency. Our analysis of the leaked data shows that the overwhelming majority of offshore entities are not governed by these treaties.
“… that I may see and tell of things invisible to mortal sight.”
John Milton, Paradise Lost
Offshore Tax Haven Leaks
Zucman (2013) estimates that household wealth held in offshore tax havens is equivalent to 10% of world GDP. While there are many legitimate reasons for wealthy individuals to use offshore financial services, the secrecy surrounding offshore holdings has also enabled tax evasion and money laundering. The international community has launched several initiatives trying to increase the transparency of offshore wealth holdings. Over the past decade, several large collections of documents from offshore financial service providers have been leaked to the media: Pandora Papers (2021), Paradise Papers (2017/2018), Bahamas Leaks (2016), Panama Papers (2016), and Offshore Leaks (2013). Investigative journalists have used information from the leaks to expose many instances of secretive financial dealings linked to political leaders. Examples from FREE network countries include: the connections between a close ally of Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko and a gold mining venture in Zimbabwe, the offshore business holdings of past and present Ukrainian presidents and their respective allies, and the wealth of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s close associates and childhood friends (see, for instance, Cosic 2021, Mylovanov and Mylovanova 2016).
The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) has made public information on more than 800,000 offshore entities that are part of the offshore data leaks (see ICIJ Offshore Leaks database). The data contain information on the names of companies or people who set up offshore entities, their country of origin, the offshore jurisdiction, and the dates of incorporation and deactivation for offshore entities.
What Can We Learn from the Data?
Despite the wealth of information that this database contains, there has been relatively little academic research using the offshore leaks data. Two notable exceptions are Alstadsæter, Johannesen and Zucman (2019), and Londoño-Vélez and Ávila-Mahecha (2021), who link information from the Panama Papers to administrative records from Scandinavia and Columbia, respectively. They find that tax evasion is concentrated among the richest households. Guriev, Melnikov and Zhuravskaya (2021) use the revelation of the Panama Papers to study its effect on perceptions of corruption.
There are several challenges to using the offshore leaks data for systematic data analyses. First, there are both legitimate and illegal uses of offshore financial services, and without further information, it is not possible to distinguish between them. Second, as this information is obtained through leaks at specific offshore services providers, the data are unlikely to be representative of overall offshore financial activity. Third, there is no information on financial transactions, and we do not know the amounts of money involved in the offshore entities. Finally, more sophisticated offshore structures may make it impossible to deduce the ultimate owner of each entity and its country of origin. Especially for the second and third reasons, economists have tended to focus on balance of payments statistics and cross-border bank deposit data when estimating flows to offshore accounts. For example, Andersen, Johannesen, Lassen and Paltseva (2017) show how the oil wealth of countries with weak institutions is diverted into secret offshore accounts. Becker (2019) investigates recent trends in Russian capital flows and shows that a significant share of Russian money flows to Western European banks. See also Nyreröd and Spagnolo (2018, 2021) for discussions of the role of European banks in recent money laundering scandals.
With these caveats in mind, Figure 1 shows the correlation between the number of offshore entities in the data (on the y-axis) and the offshore wealth holdings of each country’s households (on the x-axis) as estimated by Alstadsæter, Johannesen and Zucman (2018). While the chart shows a positive correlation of 0.56 between these two measures, it also illustrates that the number of leaked entities may be a poor proxy for the stock of offshore wealth. Countries with a significant fraction of offshore wealth in European tax havens are underrepresented in the leaks (e.g., France, Germany, and Italy) while the UK, Russia, and Latvia account for a disproportionate share of leaked offshore entities.
Figure 1. Number of offshore entities and estimated offshore wealth

Source: ICIJ Offshore Leaks database, Alstadsæter, Johannesen and Zucman (2018) and authors’ calculations.
Timing of Offshore Entity Creation
While the number of overall leaked entities per country might not be a perfect measure of the amount of offshore wealth, we find that there are systematic patterns in the timing of the creation of offshore entities. In particular, more offshore entities are created when individuals face political uncertainty in their own countries and fewer offshore entities are created by individuals from countries under financial sanctions.
Elections and Change of Leadership
Figure 2 shows the average number of newly incorporated offshore entities linked to a given country (on the y-axis), depending on that country’s political situation. Panel A shows no clear pattern of offshore entities being created by companies or individuals around the time of elections. Elections are often predictable and frequently result in the reelection of the incumbent government. In contrast, Panel B shows a clear increase in the number of offshore entities linked to a country around the time when that country experiences a change in the de facto political leader. Around four months before there is a change in political leadership, the average number of entities created per country per month almost doubles. Offshore entity creation falls back to normal levels typically around half a year following the transition of power. This pattern suggests that wealth leaves countries at times of political uncertainty and is consistent with the findings of Andersen, Johannesen, Lassen and Paltseva (2017) and Earle, Shpak, Shirikov and Gehlbach (2021).
Figure 2. Offshore entity creation and national political situation
Panel a. Elections

Panel b. Change of political power

Source: ICIJ Offshore Leaks database, The Rulers, Elections, and Irregular Governance (REIGN) Dataset and authors’ calculations. A change of power is defined as a change in the de-facto political leader (e.g., due to the incumbent losing an election or the collapse of a coalition government).
International Sanctions
Figure 3 shows the impact of sanctions from the United Nations, European Union, and the United States on the average number of offshore entities linked to a given country (on the y-axis). Panel A shows that when a country is subject to financial sanctions, the number of linked offshore entities created falls to around 10 per year from an average of 25 before the introduction of sanctions. The impact of sanctions can already be seen in the year before the start of the sanctions, which could reflect measurement and reporting errors or anticipation of the sanctions. In contrast, Panel B shows that trade sanctions that are not accompanied by financial sanctions have no significant impact on offshore activities. These charts suggest that financial sanctions may have some impact on how much capital can be moved from countries under sanctions to offshore accounts.
Figure 3. Offshore entity creation and international sanctions
Panel a. Financial sanctions

Panel b. Trade (without financial) sanctions

Source: ICIJ Offshore Leaks database, Global Sanctions Data Base and authors’ calculations.
Promoting Transparency
After the Financial Crisis in 2009, G20 countries compelled offshore tax havens to sign bilateral treaties to allow for the exchange of banking information under the threat of economic sanctions. More than 300 treaties were signed by tax havens that year. The effectiveness of this policy has been debated. For instance, Johannesen and Zucman (2014) show that the treaties lead to a relocation of bank deposits from compliant to less compliant offshore tax havens.
The G20 crackdown required each tax haven to sign at least 12 bilateral treaties. Relative to a comprehensive multilateral agreement, this policy had two limitations. Firstly, it leaves room for the diversion of funds identified by Johannesen and Zucman (2014). Secondly, tax havens were able to choose freely among potential partner countries – regardless of the underlying financial flows. Figure 4 shows that only a small fraction of the entities in the offshore leak database have a country of origin that signed a treaty with the tax haven in which they were incorporated. In addition, the small share of entities that will be subject to treaties suggests that havens did not always sign treaties with the most important counterparts. While the leaked entities may not be representative of offshore finance as a whole, this picture appears inconsistent with the OECD’s claim that “the era of bank secrecy is over” (OECD 2011)
Figure 4. Entity creation by treaty status

Source: ICIJ Offshore Leaks database, treaty events from Johannesen and Zucman (2014) and authors’ calculations.
Conclusion
A series of leaks over the past decade have exposed over 40 million documents related to the secretive offshore financial industry. Information related to over 800,000 offshore financial entities has been made public by the ICIJ. While a few high-profile cases received significant media coverage and gave rise to further investigations, the vast majority of references to networks of individuals, trusts, and shell corporations are difficult to decipher. This brief argues that, collectively, these leaked documents can be informative. They can be used to analyze the reasons for moving money offshore (such as domestic political uncertainty) as well as the constraints individuals face when doing so (such as international sanctions or bilateral treaties on bank secrecy).
In an effort to further increase transparency, 102 jurisdictions committed to a new standard for the automatic exchange of certain financial account information between tax authorities from 2019. Until such reforms are successful, leaks by whistleblowers are likely to remain a valuable source of information on the offshore financial industry.
References
- Alstadsæter, Annette, Niels Johannesen, and Gabriel Zucman. 2018. “Who owns the wealth in tax havens? Macro evidence and implications for global inequality.” Journal of Public Economics, 162, 89-100.
- Alstadsæter, Annette, Niels Johannesen, and Gabriel Zucman. 2019. “Tax evasion and inequality.” American Economic Review, 109, no. 6, 2073-2103.
- Andersen, Jørgen Juel, Niels Johannesen, David Dreyer Lassen, and Elena Paltseva. 2017. “Petro rents, political institutions, and hidden wealth: Evidence from offshore bank accounts.” Journal of the European Economic Association. 15, no. 4. 818–860.
- Becker, Torbjörn. 2019. “Capital Flows from Russia — The Bigger Picture“. FREE Policy Brief.
- Bell, Curtis, Besaw, Clayton., Frank, Matthew. 2021. “The Rulers, Elections, and Irregular Governance (REIGN) Dataset.” Broomfield, CO: One Earth Future.
- Cosic, Jelena. 2021. “A roundup of Pandora Papers reporting from Eastern Europe”. International Consortium of Investigative Journalists
- Earle, John, Solomiya Shpak, Anton Shirikov, and Scott Gehlbach (2021) “The Oligarch Vanishes: Defensive Ownership, Property Rights, and Political Connections” Forthcoming, Quarterly Journal of Political Science
- Felbermayr, Gabriel, Aleksandra Kirilakha, Constantinos Syropoulos, Erdal Yalcin, and Yoto V. Yotov, 2020. “The Global Sanctions Data Base,” European Economic Review, Volume 129, 103561
- Guriev, Sergei, Nikita Melnikov, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. 2021. “3g internet and confidence in government.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 136, no. 4, 2533-2613.
- ICIJ, 2022. “Offshore Leaks Database.”
- Johannesen, Niels, and Gabriel Zucman. 2014. “The end of bank secrecy? An evaluation of the G20 tax haven crackdown.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. 6, no. 1, 65-91.
- Londoño-Vélez, Juliana, and Javier Ávila-Mahecha. 2021. “Enforcing wealth taxes in the developing world: Quasi-experimental evidence from Colombia.” American Economic Review: Insights. 3, no. 2, 131-48.
- Mylovanov, Tymofiy and Zoya Mylovanova. 2016 “Here is What the “Panama Papers” Tell Us About the President of Ukraine.” Vox Ukraine
- Nyreröd, Theo and Giancarlo Spagnolo. 2018. “Money Laundering: Regulatory or Political Capture?“. FREE Policy Brief.
- Nyreröd, Theo and Giancarlo Spagnolo. 2021. “From Russia with Love?“. FREE Policy Brief.
- OECD. 2011. “The Era of Bank Secrecy is Over“.Zucman, Gabriel. 2013. “The missing wealth of nations: Are Europe and the US net debtors or net creditors?.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128, no. 3, 1321-1364.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
What does the Gas Crisis Reveal About European Energy Security?
The recent record-high gas prices have triggered legitimate concerns regarding the EU’s energy security, especially with dependence on natural gas from Russia. This brief discusses the historical and current risks associated with Russian gas imports. We argue that decreasing the reliance on Russian gas may not be feasible in the short-to-mid-run, especially with the EU’s goals of green transition and the electrification of the economy. To ensure the security of natural gas supply from Russia, the EU has to adopt the (long-proclaimed) coordinated energy policy strategy.
In the last six months, Europe has been hit by a natural gas crisis with a severe surge in prices. Politicians, industry representatives, and end-energy users voiced their discontent after a more than seven-fold price increase between May and December 2021 (see Figure 1). Even if gas prices somewhat stabilized this month (partly due to unusually warm weather), today, gas is four times as expensive as it was a year ago. This has already translated into an increase in electricity prices, and as a result, is also likely to have dramatic consequences for the cost and price of manufacturing goods.
Figure 1. Evolution of EU gas prices since Oct 2020.

Source: https://tradingeconomics.com/commodity/eu-natural-gas.
These ever-high gas prices have triggered legitimate concerns regarding the security of gas supply to Europe, specifically, driven by the dependency on Russian gas imports. Around 90% of EU natural gas is imported from outside the EU, and Russia is the largest supplier. In 2020, Russia provided nearly 44% of all EU gas imports, more than twice the second-largest supplier, Norway (19.9%, see Eurostat). The concern about Russian gas dependency was exacerbated by the new underwater gas route project connecting Russia and the EU – Nord Stream 2. The opponents to this new route argued that it will not only increase the EU’s gas dependency but also Russia’s political influence in the EU and its bargaining power against Ukraine (see, e.g., FT). Former President of the European Council Donald Tusk stated that “from the perspective of EU interests, Nord Stream 2 is a bad project.”.
However, neither dependency nor controversial gas route projects are a new phenomenon, and the EU has implemented some measures to tackle these issues in the past. This brief looks at the current security of Russian gas supply through the lens of these historical developments. We provide a snapshot of the risks associated with Russian gas imports faced by the EU a decade ago. We then discuss whether different factors affecting the EU gas supply security have changed since (and to which extent it may have contributed to the current situation) and if decreasing dependence on Russian gas is feasible and cost-effective. We conclude by addressing the policy implications.
Security of Russian Gas Supply to the EU, an Old Problem Difficult to Tackle
Russia has been the main gas provider to the EU for a few decades, and for a while, this dependency has triggered concerns about gas supply security (see, e.g., Stern, 2002 or Lewis, New York Times, 1982). However, the problem with the security of Russian gas supplies was extending beyond the dependency on Russian gas per se. It was driven by a range of risk factors such as insufficient diversification of gas suppliers, low fungibility of natural gas supplies with a prevalence of pipeline gas delivery, or use of gas exports/transit as means to solve geopolitical problems.
This last point became especially prominent in the mid-to-late-2000s, during the “gas wars” between Russia and the gas transit countries Ukraine and Belarus. These wars led to shortages and even a complete halt of Russian gas delivery to some EU countries, showing how weak the security of the Russian gas supply to the EU was at that time.
Reacting to these “gas wars”, the EU attempted to tackle the issue with a revival of the “common energy policy” based on the “solidarity” and “speaking in one voice” principles. The EU wanted to adopt a “coherent approach in the energy relations with third countries and an internal coordination so that the EU and its Member States act together” (see, e.g., EC, 2011). However, this idea turned out to be challenging to implement, primarily because of one crucial contributor to the problem with the security of Russian gas supply – the sizable disbalance in Russian gas supply risk among the individual EU Member States.
Indeed, EU Member States had a different share of natural gas in their total energy consumption, highly uneven diversification of gas suppliers, and varying exposure to Russian gas. Several Eastern-European EU states (such as Bulgaria, Estonia, or Czech Republic) were importing their gas almost entirely from Russia; other EU Member States (such as Germany, Italy, or Belgium) had a diversified gas import portfolio; and a few EU states (e.g., Spain or Portugal) were not consuming any Russian gas at all. Russian natural gas was delivered via several routes (see Figure 2), and member states were using different transit routes and facing different transit-associated risks. These differences naturally led to misalignment of energy policy preferences across EU states, creating policy tensions and making it difficult to implement a common energy policy with “speaking in one voice” (see more on this issue in Le Coq and Paltseva, 2009 and 2012).
Figure 2. Gas pipeline in Europe.

Source: S&G Platt. https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/blogs/natural-gas/010720-so-close-nord-stream-2-gas-link-completion-trips-at-last-hurdle
The introduction of Nord Stream 1 in 2011 is an excellent example of the problem’s complexity. This new gas transit route from Russia increased the reliability of Russian gas supply for EU countries connected to this route (like Germany or France), as they were able to better diversify the transit of their imports from Russia and be less exposed to transit risks. The “Nord Stream” countries (i.e., countries connected to this route) were then willing to push politically and economically for this new project. Le Coq and Paltseva (2012) show, however, that countries unconnected to this new route while simultaneously sharing existing, “older” routes with “Nord Stream” countries would experience a decrease in their gas supply security. The reason for this is that the “directly connected” countries would now be less interested in exerting “common” political pressure to secure gas supplies along the “old” routes.
This is not to say that the EU did not learn from the above lessons. While the “speaking in one voice” energy policy initiative was not entirely successful, the EU has implemented a range of actions to cope with the risks of the security of gas supply from Russia. The next section explains how the situation is has changed since, outlining both the progress made by the EU and the newly arising risk factors.
Security of Russian Gas Supply to the EU, a Current Problem Partially Addressed
Since the end of the 2000s, the EU implemented a few changes that have positively affected the security of gas supply from Russia.
First, the EU put a significant effort into developing the internal gas market, altering both the physical infrastructure and the gas market organization. The EU updated and extended the internal gas network and introduced the wide-scale possibility of utilizing reverse flow, effectively allowing gas pipelines to be bi- rather than uni-directional. These actions improved the gas interconnections between the EU states (and other countries), thereby making potential disruptions along a particular gas transit route less damaging and diminishing the asymmetry of exposure to route-specific gas transit risks among the EU members. Ukraine’s gas import situation is a good illustration of the effect of reverse flow. Ukraine does not directly import Russian gas since 2016, mainly from Slovakia (64%), Hungary (26%), and Poland (10%) (see https://www.enerdata.net/publications/daily-energy-news/ukraine-launches-virtual-gas-reverse-flow-slovakia.html). The transformation of the gas market organization brought about the implementation of a natural gas hub in Europe and change in the mechanism of gas price formation. It is now possible to buy and sell natural gas via long-term contracts and on the spot market. With the gas market becoming more liquid, it became easier to prevent the gas supply disruption threat.
Second, Europe has made certain progress in diversifying its gas exports. According to Komlev (2021), the concentration of EU gas imports from outside of the EU (excluding Norway), as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, has decreased by around 25% between 2016 and 2020. While the imports are still highly concentrated, with the HHI equal to 3120 in 2020, this is a significant achievement. A large part of this diversification effort is the dramatic increase in the share of liquified natural gas (i.e., LNG) in its gas imports – in 2020, a fair quarter of the EU gas imports came in the form of LNG. An expanded capacity for LNG liquefaction and better fungibility of LNG would facilitate backup opportunities in the case of Russian gas supply risks and improve the diversification of the EU gas imports, thereby increasing the security of natural gas supply.
However, the above developments also have certain disadvantages, which became especially prominent during the ongoing gas crisis. For example, the fungibility of LNG has a reverse side: LNG supplies respond to variations in gas market prices across the world. This change has intensified the competition on the demand side – Europe and Asia might now compete for the same LNG. This is likely to make a secure supply of LNG – e.g., as a backup in the case of a gas supply default or as a diversification device – a costly option.
In turn, new mechanisms of gas price formation in Europe included decoupling the oil and gas prices and changing the format of long-term gas contracts. The percentage of oil-linked contracts in gas imports to the EU dropped from 47% in 2016 to 26% in 2020. In particular, 87% of Gazprom’s long-term contracts in 2020 were linked to spot and forward gas prices and only around 13% to oil prices (Komlev, 2021). This gas-on-gas linking may have contributed to the current gas crisis: Indeed, it undermined the economic incentives of Gazprom to supply more gas to the EU spot market in the current high-price market. Shipping more gas would lower spot prices and prices of hub-linked longer-term contracts for Gazprom. In that sense, the ongoing decline in Russian gas supplies to the EU may reflect not (only) geopolitical considerations but economic optimization.
Similarly, this new mechanism also finds reflection in the ongoing situation with the EU gas storage. The current EU storage capacity is 117 bcm, or almost 20% of its yearly consumption, and thus, can in principle be effective in managing the short-term volume and price shocks. However, the current gas crisis has shown that this option might be far from sufficient in the case of a gas shortage (see, e.g., Zachmann et al., 2021). One of the reasons for this insufficiency can be Gazprom controlling a sizable share of this storage capacity (see https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2021-004781_EN.html). For example, Gazprom owns (directly and indirectly) almost one-third of all gas storage in Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands. Combining this storage market position with a long-term gas contract structure may also lead to strategic behavior for economic (on top of potential political) purposes.
Last but not least, the EU gas market is likely to be characterized by increased demand due to the green transition agenda (see Olofsgård and Strömberg, 2022). Being the least carbon-intensive fossil fuel, natural gas has an important role in facilitating green transition and increasing the electrification of the economy. For example, Le Coq et al. (2018) argues that gas capacity should be around 3 to 4 times the current capacity by 2050 for full electrification of transport and heating in France, Germany, or the Netherlands. In such circumstances, the EU is not likely to have the luxury to diminish reliance on Russian gas.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
Keeping the above discussion in mind, should the EU try to diminish its dependence on Russian gas to improve its energy security? This may be true in theory, but in practice, this might be too costly, at least in the short-to-medium run.
The current situation on the EU gas market suggests that simply cutting gas imports from Russia is likely to lead to high prices both in the energy sector and, later, in other sectors of the economy due to spillovers. Substituting gas imports from Russia with gas from other sources, such as LNG, is likely to be very costly and not necessarily very reliable. Alternative measures, e.g., improving interconnections between the EU Member States or controlling transit issues via the use of reverse flow technology, are effective but have limited impact. Simply cutting down gas demand is not a viable strategy. Indeed, with the EU pushing for a green transition and the electrification of the economy, the EU’s gas imports may have to increase. Russian gas may play an important role in this process.
As a result, we believe that the solution to keep the security issue of Russian gas supply at bay lies in the area of common energy policy. It is essential that the EU implements and effectively manages a coordinated approach in dealing with Russian gas supplies. The EU is the largest buyer of Russian gas, and given Russian dependency on hydrocarbon exports, such a synchronized approach would give the EU the possibility to exploit its “large buyer” power. While the asymmetry in exposure to Russian gas supply risks among the EU Member States is still sizable, the improvements in the functioning of the internal gas market and gas transportation within the EU make their preferences more aligned, and a common policy vector more feasible. Furthermore, recent EU initiatives on creating “strategic gas reserves” by making the Member States share their gas storage with one another would further facilitate such coordination. Implementing the “speaking in one voice” gas import policy will allow the EU to fully utilize its bargaining power vis-à-vis Gazprom and spread the benefits of new gas routes from Russia – such as Nord Stream 2 – across its Member States.
References
- European Commission, 2011, “Speaking with one voice – the key to securing our energy interests abroad“, press release, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_11_1005
- Komlev, S. 2021, “Evolution of Russian Gas Supple to Europe: Contracts and Prices”, Presentation at 34th WS2 GAC, https://minenergo.gov.ru/system/download/14146/158148
- Le Coq C. and E. Paltseva (2020), Covid-19: News for Europe’s Energy Security, FREE Policy brief. https://freepolicybriefs.org/2020/05/07/covid-19-energy-security-europe/
- Le Coq C., J. Morega, M. Mulder, S Schwenen (2018) Gas and the electrification of heating & transport: scenarios for 2050, CERRE report.
- Le Coq C. and E. Paltseva (2013) EU and Russia Gas Relationship at a Crossroads, in Russian Energy and Security up to 2030, Oxenstierna and Tynkkynen (Eds), Routledge.
- Le Coq C. and E. Paltseva (2012) Assessing Gas Transit Risks: Russia vs. the EU, Energy Policy (4).
- Le Coq C. and E. Paltseva (2009) Measuring the Security of External Energy Supply in the European Union, Energy Policy (37).
- Lewis, Paul, “Gas pipeline is producing lots of steam among allies“, New York Times, Feb. 14, 1982, https://www.nytimes.com/1982/02/14/weekinreview/gas-pipeline-is-producing-lots-of-steam-among-allies.html
- Olofsgård A., and S. Strömberg (2022) Environmental Policy in Eastern Europe | SITE Development Day 202, FREE Policy Brief, https://freepolicybriefs.org/2022/01/10/environmental-policy-in-eastern-europe-site-development-day-2021/
- Stern, J., 2002. Security of European Natural Gas Supplies—The Impact of Import Dependence and Liberalization, Royal Institute of International Affairs, available at: 〈http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/3035_sec_of_euro_gas_jul02.pdf〉
- Zachmann, G., B. McWilliams and G.Sgaravatti, 2021, How serious is Europe’s natural gas storage shortfall? https://www.bruegel.org/2021/12/how-serious-is-europes-natural-gas-storage-shortfall/
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Environmental Policy in Eastern Europe | SITE Development Day 2021
The need for urgent climate action and energy transformation away from fossil fuels is widely acknowledged. Yet, current country plans for emission reductions do not reach the requirements to contain global warming under 2°C. What is worse, there is even reasonable doubt about the commitment to said plans given recent history and existing future investment plans into fossil fuel extraction and infrastructure development. This policy brief shortly summarizes the presentations and discussions at the SITE Development Day Conference, held on December 8, 2021, focusing on climate change policies and the challenge of a green energy transition in Eastern Europe.
Climate Policy in Russia
The first section of the conference was devoted to environmental policy in Russia. As Russia is one of the largest exporters of fossil fuel in the world, its policies carry particular importance in the context of global warming.
The head of climate and green energy at the Center for Strategic Research in Moscow, Irina Pominova, gave an account of Russia’s current situation and trends. Similar to all former Soviet Union countries, as seen in Figure 1, Russia had a sharp decrease in greenhouse gas emissions (hereinafter referred to as GHG emissions) during the early 90s due to the dramatic drop in production following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since then, the level has stabilized, and today Russia contributes to about 5% of the total GHG emissions globally. The primary source of GHG emissions in Russia comes from the energy sector, mainly natural gas but also oil and coal. The abundance of fossil fuels has also hampered investments in renewable resources, constituting only about 3% of the energy balance, compared to the global average of 10%
Figure 1. Annual greenhouse gas emissions per capita

Note: Greenhouse gas emissions are expressed in metric tons of CO2 equivalents. Source: Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR).
Pominova noted that it is a massive challenge for the country to reach global energy transformation targets since the energy sector accounts for over 20% of national GDP and 28% of the federal budget. Yet, on a positive note, the number of enacted climate policies has accelerated since Russia signed the Paris Agreement in 2019. One notable example is the federal law on the limitation of GHG emissions. This law will be enforced from the end of 2021 and will impose reporting requirements for the country’s largest emitters. The country’s current national climate target for 2030 is to decrease GHG emissions by 30% compared to the 1990 level. As shown in Figure 1, this would imply roughly a 10 percent reduction from today’s levels given the substantial drop in emissions in the 1990’s.
Natalya Volchkova, Policy Director at CEFIR in Moscow, discussed energy intensity and the vital role it fills in Russia’s environmental transition. Energy intensity measures an economy’s energy efficiency and is defined as units of energy per unit of GDP produced. Volchkova emphasized that to facilitate growth in an environmentally sustainable way it is key to invest in technology that improves energy efficiency. Several regulatory policy tools are in place to promote such improvements like bottom-line energy efficiency requirements, sectoral regulation, and bans on energy-inefficient technologies. Yet, more is needed, and a system for codification and certification of the most environmentally friendly technologies is among further reforms under consideration.
As a Senior Program Manager at SIDA, Jan Johansson provided insights on this issue from an international perspective. Johansson gave an overview of SIDA’s cooperation with Russia in supporting and promoting environmental and climate policies in the country. The main financial vehicle of Swedish support to Russia with respect to environmental policy has been a multilateral trust fund established in 2002 under the European Union (EU) Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP). One of the primary objectives of the cooperation has been to improve the environment in the Baltic and Barents Seas Region of the Northern Dimension Area. Over 30 NDEP projects in Russia and Belarus have been approved for financing so far. Seventeen of those have been completed, and the vast majority have focused on improving the wastewater treatment sector.
Johansson also shed light on the differences that can exist between governments in their approach to environmental policy. For example, in the area of solid waste management, Russia prefers large-scale solutions such as landfills and ample sorting facilities. In Sweden and Western Europe, governments have a more holistic view founded on spreading awareness in the population, recycling, corporate responsibility, and sorting at the source.
Environmental Transition in Eastern Europe
In the second part of the conference environmental policies and energy transformation in several other countries in the region were discussed.
Norberto Pignatti, Associate Professor and Centre Director at ISET Policy Institute, talked about the potential for a sustainable energy sector and current environmental challenges in Georgia. The country is endowed with an abundance of rivers and sun exposure, making it a well-suited environment for establishing the production of renewable energy such as wind, solar, and hydro. As much as 95 % of domestic energy production comes from renewable sources. Yet, domestic energy production only accounts for 21% of the country’s total consumption, and 58% of imported energy comes from natural gas and 33% from coal. Furthermore, the capacity of renewable energy sources has declined over the last ten years, and particularly so for biofuel due to the mismanagement of forests. A notable obstacle Georgia faces in its environmental transition is attracting investors. Low transparency and inclusiveness from the government in discussions about environmental policy, along with inaccurate information from the media, has led to a low public willingness to pay for such projects. Apart from measures to overcome the challenges mentioned, the government is currently working on a plan to impose emission targets on specific sectors, invest in energy efficiency and infrastructure, and support the development of the renewable energy sector.
Like Georgia, Poland is a country where energy consumption is heavily reliant on imports and where coal, oil, and gas stand for most of the energy supply. On top of that, Poland faces significant challenges with air quality and smog and a carbon-intensive energy sector. On the positive end, Poland established a government-industry collaboration in September 2021, that recognizes offshore wind as the primary strategic direction of the energy transition in Poland. Pawel Wróbel, Founder and Managing Director of BalticWind.EU, explained that the impact of the partnership will be huge in terms of not only energy security but also job creation and smog mitigation. The plan implies the installation of 5.9 GW of offshore wind capacity by 2030 and 11GW by 2040. Wróbel also talked about the EU’s European Green Deal and its instrumental role in accelerating the energy transition in Poland. By combining EU-wide instruments with tailor-made approaches for each of the member states, the Deal targets a 55% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 through decarbonization, energy efficiency, and expanding renewable energy generation. Michal Myck, Director of CenEA, highlighted the role of social acceptance in accelerating the much-needed energy transition in Poland. In particular, to build political support, there is a crucial need for designing carbon taxes in a way that ensures the protection of vulnerable households from high energy prices.
Adapting to the European Green Deal will also create challenges for countries outside of the EU, especially if a European Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms (CBAM) is put in place in 2026 as suggested. Two participants touched on this topic in the context of Belarus and Ukraine respectively. Yauheniya Shershunovic, researcher at BEROC, talked about her research on the economic implications of CBAM in Belarus. It is estimated that the introduction of CBAM can be equivalent to an additional import duty on Belarusian goods equal to 3.4-3.8% for inorganic chemicals and fertilizers, 6.7-13.7% for metals, and 6.5-6.6% for mineral products. Maxim Fedoseenko, Head of Strategic Projects at KSE, shared similar estimations for Ukraine, suggesting that the implementation of CBAM will lead to an annual loss of €396 million for Ukrainian businesses and a decrease in national GDP of 0.08% per year.
An example of Swedish support to strengthen environmental policies in Eastern Europe was presented by Bernardas Padegimas, Team Leader at the Environmental Policy and Strategy Team at the Stockholm Environment Institute. The BiH ESAP 2030+ project is supporting Bosnia and Herzegovina in preparing their environmental strategy. This task is made more challenging by the country’s unique political structure with two to some extent politically autonomous entities (and a district jointly administered by the two), and elites from the three different major ethnic groups having guaranteed a share of power. The project therefore aims to include a broad range of stakeholders in the process, organized into seven different working groups with 659 members on topics ranging from waste management to air quality, climate change and energy. The project also builds capacity in targeted government authorities, raises public awareness of environmental problems, and goes beyond just environmental objectives: mainstreaming gender equality, social equity and poverty reduction. The project is 80 percent finished and will produce a strategy and action plan for the different levels of governance in the country’s political system. There is also a hope that this process can serve as a model for consensus building around important but at times contentious policy issues more generally in the country.
Public Opinion and Energy Security
Finally, Elena Paltseva, Associate Professor at SITE, and Chloé le Coq, Professor at the University of Paris II Panthéon-Asses (CRED), shared two joint studies relating to the green transition in Europe.
Recent research shows that individual behavioral change has a vital role to play in the fight against climate change, both directly and indirectly through changes in societal attitudes and policies motivated by role models. A precondition for this to happen is a broad public recognition of anthropogenic climate change and its consequences for the environment. The first presentation by Paltseva and Le Coq focused on public perceptions about climate change in Europe (see this FREE policy brief for a detailed account). Using survey data the study explores variation in climate risk perceptions between Western Europe, the non-EU part of Eastern Europe, and Eastern European countries that are EU members. The results show that those living in non-EU Eastern European countries are on average less concerned about climate change. The regional difference can partly be explained by low salience and informativeness of environmental issues in the public discourse in these countries. To support this explanation, they study the impact of extreme weather events on opinions on climate change with the rationale that people who are more aware of climate change risks are less likely to adjust their opinion after experiencing an extreme weather event. They find that the effect of extreme weather events is higher in countries with less independent media and fewer climate-related legislative efforts, suggesting that the political salience of the environment and the credibility of public messages affects individuals’ perceptions of climate change risks.
The second presentation concerned energy security in the EU, and the impact of the environmental transition. It was argued that natural gas will play an important role in Europe’s green transition for two reasons. First, since the transition implies a higher reliance on intermittent renewable energy sources, there will be an increased need for use of gas-fired power plants to strengthen the supply reliability. Second, the electrification of the economy along with the phasing out of coal, oil, and nuclear generation plants will increase the energy demand. Today, about 20% of EU’s electricity comes from natural gas and 90% of that gas comes from outside EU, with 43% coming from Russia. To emphasize what issues can arise when the EU relies heavily on external suppliers, the presentation discussed a Risky External Energy Supply Index (Le Coq and Paltseva, 2009) that considers the short-term impact of energy supply disruptions. This index assesses not only the importance of the energy type used by a country but also access to different energy suppliers (risk diversification). The index illustrates that natural gas is riskier than oil or coal since natural gas importers in the EU depend to a greater extent on a single or few suppliers. Another crucial component of the security of gas supplies arises from the fact that 77% of EU’s net gas imports arrive through pipelines, which creates an additional risk of transit. Here, the introduction of new gas transit routes (from already existing suppliers) may increase diversification and decrease risks to the countries having direct access to the new route. At the same time, countries that share other pipelines with countries that now have direct access may lose bargaining power vis-à-vis the gas supplier in question, as demand through those pipelines could fall. Le Coq illustrated this point applying the Transit Risk Index developed in Le Coq and Paltseva (2012) to the introduction of the North Stream 1 pipeline. She concluded that the green transition and associated increase in demand for natural gas is likely to be associated with higher reliance on large gas producers, such as Russia, and resulting in energy security risks and imbalance in the EU. One way to counteract this effect is to exercise EU’s buyer power vis-a-vis Russia within the EU common energy policy. While long discussed, this policy has not been fully implemented so far.
Concluding Remarks
This year’s SITE Development Day conference gave us an opportunity to highlight yet another key issue, not only for Eastern Europe, but for the whole world: global warming and energy transformation. Experts from across the region, and policymakers and scholars based in Sweden, offered their perspectives on the challenges that lie ahead, but also highlighted initiatives and investments hopefully leading the way towards a brighter future.
List of Participants
- Chloé Le Coq, Professor of Economics at the University of Paris II Panthéon-Assas (CRED). Paris, France. Research Fellow at SITE.
- Maxim Fedoseenko, Head of Strategic Projects at KSE Institute. Kyiv, Ukraine.
- Jan Johansson, Senior Program Manager, SIDA. Stockholm, Sweden.
- Michal Myck, Director of CenEA. Szczecin, Poland.
- Bernardas Padegimas, Team Leader: Environmental Policy and Strategy, Stockholm Environmental Institute. Stockholm, Sweden.
- Elena Paltseva, Associate Professor, SITE/SSE/NES. Stockholm, Sweden
- Norberto Pignatti, Associate Professor of Policy at ISET-PI, and Head of the Energy and Environmental Policy Institute at ISET-PI. Tbisili, Georgia.
- Irina Pominova, Head of Climatwe and Green Energy at the Center for Strategic Research. Moscow, Russia.
- Yauheniya Shershunovic, Researcher at BEROC, Minsk, Belarus. PhD Candidate at the Center for Development Research (ZEF). Uni Bonn.
- Natalya Volchkova, Policy Director at CEFIR, Assistant Professor at the New Economic School (NES). Moscow, Russia.
- Pawel Wróbel, Founder and Managing Director of BalticWind.EU. Poland.
- Julius Andersson, Researcher at SITE. Stockholm, Sweden.
- Anders Olofsgård, Associate Professor and Deputy Director at SITE. Stockholm, Sweden.