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U.S. Sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil: Benjamin Hilgenstock Explains the Impact on Russia’s Oil Revenues
The United States has imposed its toughest sanctions yet on Russia’s energy industry, focusing on Rosneft and Lukoil. These are the country’s two largest oil producers. The measures aim to restrict Moscow’s access to global markets and increase pressure on the Kremlin’s war financing.
In a detailed Financial Times analysis, experts examined how these sanctions could reshape global oil trade. They may also deepen Russia’s fiscal strain as the government faces a tightening budget environment.
Benjamin Hilgenstock on Russia’s Budget Vulnerability
“The sanctions come at a time of heightened vulnerability for the Russian budget,” said Benjamin Hilgenstock, head of macroeconomic research and strategy at the Kyiv School of Economics Institute (KSE Institute).
He explained that energy revenues make up about one-quarter of Russia’s federal income. Moreover, these revenues have fallen by 20 percent year-on-year in 2025. Therefore, Washington’s new sanctions could further intensify financial pressure on the Kremlin and limit its ability to sustain long-term spending.
Market Reaction: Rising Oil Prices and Global Adjustments
The Financial Times report also looked at market reactions following the sanctions announcement. Brent crude prices rose by 9 percent, as traders assessed possible disruptions to Russian exports. However, analysts warned that while China and India may initially resist pressure from Washington, secondary sanctions could change their stance. Over time, refiners might diversify their oil supplies, testing Russia’s ability to maintain production and revenue.
Read the Full Analysis
To read Benjamin Hilgenstock’s complete commentary and the full Financial Times article, visit FT.com. In addition, explore the KSE Institute’s homepage for more insights and expert research.
Further Reading: Sanctions and Russia’s Energy Economy
Energy exports remain a cornerstone of Russia’s economy and a major source of geopolitical power. By targeting the oil and gas sector, sanctions aim to reduce state revenues and limit Moscow’s ability to wage war against Ukraine. For deeper insights, visit the Sanctions Portal Evidence Base to explore current research on energy sanctions and their impact on Russia’s economy.
Russian Oil Revenues Dip to $13.5B on Lower Prices
Russian oil revenues fell to $13.5 billion in August 2025, down $0.9 billion from July, according to the September Russian Oil Tracker by the KSE Institute. The decline came as prices for crude oil and most oil products, except naphtha, dropped despite stable export volumes. Crude oil revenues slipped by $0.4 billion to $8.8 billion, while oil product revenues fell by $0.6 billion to $4.8 billion.
Falling Russian Oil Revenues
Seaborne exports of crude oil declined by 1.4%, and oil product exports by 1.7% compared to July. Only 21% of crude oil and 82% of oil products were shipped on tankers covered by the International Group (IG) P&I insurance, underscoring Russia’s growing reliance on uninsured or “shadow” vessels.
The Shadow Fleet Expands
According to the KSE Institute, 155 Russian shadow fleet tankers transported crude and oil products in August 2025, including those engaged in ship-to-ship (STS) transfers. Alarmingly, 86% of these vessels were over 15 years old, which raises significant safety and environmental concerns.
India and Turkey Remain Key Buyers
India held its position as the largest importer of Russian seaborne crude, taking in 1,504 kb/d in August, down 11% month-on-month but still 45% of total Russian exports. Turkey continued to dominate oil product imports, purchasing around 425 kb/d, highlighting the nation’s central role in processing and reselling Russian fuel.
Sanctions and Price Caps Under Pressure
Western allies, including the EU, US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, have sanctioned 535 Russian oil tankers. Yet, the number of tankers violating sanctions continues to rise monthly, showing gaps in enforcement.
In August 2025, Urals crude traded below the G7/EU price cap, while ESPO crude traded well above it. All refined products, except naphtha, remained below the cap, reflecting how outdated cap levels have become.
Key Research Findings on Russian Oil Revenues
- Total revenues: Down to $13.5 billion in August 2025.
- Crude oil: $8.8 billion; oil products: $4.8 billion.
- Shadow fleet: 86% of tankers are over 15 years old.
- India: 45% of seaborne crude imports.
- Sanctions: Weak enforcement allows rising violations.
Future Outlook for Russian Oil Revenues
Under current caps and sanctions, the KSE Institute projects Russian oil revenues of $155 billion in 2025 and $125 billion in 2026. If discounts widen to $40/barrel (Urals) and $30/barrel (ESPO), revenues could plunge to $136 billion in 2025 and just $46 billion in 2026. However, if sanctions enforcement remains weak, revenues may climb to $161 billion in 2025 and $146 billion in 2026, a significant boost despite international restrictions. Since March 2022, total Russian oil export losses are estimated at $159 billion, reflecting the lasting financial impact of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Meet the Researchers
- Borys Dodonov, KSE Institute
- Benjamin Hilgenstock, KSE Institute
- Anatolii Kravtsev, KSE Institute
- Yuliia Pavytska, KSE Institute
- Nataliia Shapoval, KSE Institute
Read the Full Report
Read the complete “Russian Oil Tracker – September 2025” on the KSE Institute website for detailed charts and policy scenarios.
Additional Reading
Explore other policy papers and reports on Ukraine’s economic transition and development on the KSE Institute’s website. Read more policy briefs on Eastern Europe and emerging economies on the FREE Network’s website.
Benjamin Hilgenstock on Closing Sanctions Gaps Against Russia
Despite several rounds of Western sanctions, Russian drones and missiles still include Western-made parts. In Deutsche Welle’s report, “Western parts in Russian drones: Are sanctions working?”, Benjamin Hilgenstock, a senior economist at the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE), explains why export controls have not fully closed the sanctions gaps against Russia.
Export Controls and the Rise of Complex Trade Networks
“Export controls on many of these goods were imposed right at the beginning of the major Russian offensive in the spring of 2022. Yet, many of these sanctioned components still reach Russia through complex trade networks involving intermediaries in countries like China, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Kazakhstan,” Benjamin Hilgenstock, Senior Economist at KSE
According to Hilgenstock, many indirect trade networks operate beyond EU or U.S. jurisdiction. As a result, restricted technologies continue entering Russian markets. These supply chains often involve intermediaries and shell companies, which makes enforcement difficult. Moreover, they reveal weaknesses in global export control systems.
Closing Sanctions Gaps Through Stronger Oversight
Hilgenstock notes that sanctions have raised costs and slowed Russia’s access to advanced technologies. However, there are still gaps that could be closed. Hilgenstock believes manufacturers of restricted goods should face tougher due diligence obligations. In addition, he suggests the financial sector’s compliance model could guide improvements in export enforcement.
How Indirect Trade Enables Sanctions Evasion
The Deutsche Welle report shows that re-export routes through countries such as Turkey, Kazakhstan, and the UAE allow restricted components to return to Russia. Consequently, these sanctions evasion networks weaken the impact of Western policies. To counter this, Hilgenstock emphasizes the need for international coordination, real-time trade monitoring, and greater transparency in global supply chains.
Read the full article on Deutsche Welle for Benjamin Hilgenstock’s analysis of sanctions enforcement and export control challenges.
Learn More About Sanctions
Visit the KSE Institute Sanctions Hub to explore in-depth monitoring of international sanctions against Russia. The Hub maintains a consolidated sanctions database and provides detailed reports on the impact of sanctions on Russia’s economy. It also features analyses of sanctions effectiveness, revealing patterns of enforcement and circumvention, as well as position papers and sectoral reports offering expert insights into key industries and policy recommendations from KSE researchers.
Visit the SITE Sanctions Portal to gain insights into sanctions on Russia and its economic retaliation measures. This resource provides a detailed timeline and comprehensive evidence base that brings together data, analysis, and expert commentary. It helps researchers, journalists, and policymakers navigate the evolving sanctions landscape. The SITE Sanctions Portal explores the economic consequences of Western sanctions and Russia’s strategic responses.
Russian Budget Deficit Widens as Growth Stalls and Oil Revenues Fall
Russia’s economy narrowly avoided a technical recession in the second quarter of 2025, but growth remains weak. Inflation eased, yet high interest rates continue to pressure consumers and businesses. Meanwhile, the Russian budget deficit widens as oil revenues decline and government spending rises.
The latest KSE Institute Russia Chartbook (September edition), “Economy Avoids Technical Recession; Budget Targets Revised Once Again,” highlights growing fiscal challenges despite temporary stabilization in output.
Russia Avoids Recession but Faces Persistent Economic Strains
The Russian economy expanded by 0.4% in the second quarter of 2025, following a 0.6% contraction in the first quarter, enough to avoid a technical recession. However, overall momentum remains fragile, with annual growth expected to hover around 1%.
The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) reduced inflation to 8.1% in August, down from around 10% earlier in the year, through tight monetary policy. Yet, borrowing conditions remain difficult as interest rates, cut from 21% to 17%, are still high in real terms.
Persistent issues such as a rising budget deficit, a tight labor market, and sanctions continue to weigh on the outlook. Ongoing Ukrainian attacks on Russian refineries may further raise fuel prices, complicating the balance between price stability and the government’s war-driven fiscal spending.
Russia Budget Deficit Widens Despite Revised Targets
From January to August 2025, Russia’s budget deficit reached 4.2 trillion rubles, slightly better than the 4.8 trillion rubles recorded in January–July. However, oil and gas revenues dropped 20% year over year, while non-oil revenues increased 14%, and expenditures surged 21%.
The government raised its full-year deficit target to 5.7 trillion rubles due to weaker revenues but left spending unchanged. Current trends suggest Russia may exceed this target by year-end.
Looking ahead to 2026, the Russian Ministry of Finance proposes raising and broadening value added tax (VAT) to offset declining oil and gas income. While war-related adjustments are common, the Kremlin aims to stabilize military and security spending, signaling a shift from the sharp increases of recent years.
Key Research Report Findings on Russia’s Budget Deficit
- The federal deficit reached 4.2 trillion rubles in January–August, already 74% of the revised 5.7 trillion rubles target (page 8).
- Oil and gas revenues fell 20% year over year, while spending jumped 21% (page 9).
- Domestic bond (OFZ) issuance hit 3.3 trillion rubles in Jan–Aug, up 104% from a year earlier, with a notably flat yield curve (page 10).
- Liquid assets in the National Welfare Fund (NWF) are down to about 4.0 trillion rubles and could be used up within 6–12 months if trends persist (page 12).
The Broader Economic Backdrop
GDP grew 0.4% quarter-on-quarter in the second quarter of 2025, following athe 0.6% contraction in the first quarter in 2025. Inflation slowed to 8.1% year over year in August, but policy rates remain high, and the ruble weakened again. Labor markets are tight, so spare capacity is limited.
What the Widening Budget Deficit Means
Financing the Russian budget deficit will likely rely more on banks and the shrinking NWF buffer. If oil prices slip further, revenue pressure will rise. Enforcement against the shadow tanker fleet is tightening, which may also weigh on export earnings. Together, these forces point to constrained growth and frequent budget revisions.
Meet the Researchers
- Benjamin Hilgenstock: KSE Institute, Head of Macroeconomic Research and Strategy.
- Yuliia Pavytska: KSE Institute, Manager of the Sanctions Programme.
- Matvii Talalaievskyi: KSE Institute, Analyst.
Read The Full Report
Explore the full findings and detailed analysis by reading the complete report on the KSE Institute’s website. Additionally, you can view more policy briefs from the KSE Institute on the FREE Network’s website.
Explore Other Editions of KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – August 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – July 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – June 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – May 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – April 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – March 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – February 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – January 2025
Torbjörn Becker: Drone Strikes Undermine Russia’s War-Funding Revenues
A surge of Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil refineries has triggered widespread gasoline shortages across the country. These attacks directly threaten one of Russia’s main sources of income, its energy sector.
Drone Strikes Expose Russia’s Dependence on Energy Revenues
In a report by Finland’s public broadcaster YLE, experts analyzed the coordinated assaults and their mounting economic consequences. At least 14 of Russia’s 38 refineries have been hit, disrupting roughly 20 percent of the nation’s refining capacity. The campaign represents a new stage in Ukraine’s efforts to erode Russia’s revenue base and weaken its wartime economy.
“They remind the Russian people that a war is ongoing in Ukraine, but they also strike at Russian revenues. Oil and gas income is absolutely essential for financing Russia’s offensive war against Ukraine,” said Torbjörn Becker, Director of the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE).
Torbjörn Becker further emphasized that economic pressure has become a central pillar of Ukraine’s broader defense strategy.
Economic Fallout Deepens as Russia Faces Fuel Shortages and Export Bans
The YLE article also explored the economic and political fallout within Russia. Gasoline shortages have been reported in at least 21 regions, prompting authorities to extend export bans and enforce rationing. Analysts cautioned that prolonged attacks could force refinery closures, limit exports, and damage Russia’s image as a reliable energy supplier. Becker added that the strikes could send shockwaves through global energy markets, increasing volatility and uncertainty.
To read the full YLE report and Torbjörn Becker’s full commentary, visit the complete article. For additional expert insights from SITE, explore the institute’s official webpage.
Further Reading
Reducing Russia’s financial capacity to sustain its unjust war against Ukraine requires a comprehensive, multi-layered approach. Explore the latest research on sanctions against Russia in the Sanctions Portal Evidence Base. Learn about the major sanction packages introduced by Western allies following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as well as the corresponding countermeasures, by visiting the Timeline of Western Sanctions and Russian Counteractions.
To read more policy briefs on sanctions and the Russian economy, visit the FREE Network website.
Torbjörn Becker on Sanctions Evasion Through Third Countries
Aftonbladet reports that Russian drones shot down in Ukraine contained ball bearings marked “SKF”, despite strict sanctions banning such exports. The Gothenburg-based manufacturer SKF is prohibited from selling to Russia under EU sanctions. Yet, Aftonbladet discovered SKF-branded ball bearings from the company’s Chinese factory inside Russian military drones.
SKF denies producing these parts, stating they are counterfeits. However, according to Russian customs data and Corisk’s analysis, up to half a billion SEK worth of SKF-labeled products may have entered Russia via indirect or shadow trade routes.
“It is a violation of sanctions if you knowingly sell a product to, for example, Turkey, and you know that the Turkish company will send it on to Russia,” said Torbjörn Becker, Director of the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), in an interview with Aftonbladet.
Becker also emphasized the complexity of tracing global supply chains. While counterfeit goods are common in sanctioned economies, he questioned whether Russia can replicate high-precision components like advanced ball bearings. Instead, Becker suggested that such copying might occur outside Russia before the products reach it through parallel trade networks.
To read the full investigation and Becker’s analysis, visit Aftonbladet and Göteborgs-Posten.
Further Reading
Sanctions on trade aim to disrupt Russia’s economic activity and military capabilities by restricting access to critical goods, technologies, and supply chains. These measures are designed to raise the cost of aggression and limit resources that sustain the war effort. Explore current research on trade sanctions in the Sanctions Portal Evidence Base.
Explore the main sanction packages imposed by Western allies after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Review Russian countermeasures, including retaliatory actions and domestic policies to reduce the sanctions’ impact. Visit the Timeline of Western Sanctions and Russian Countermeasures to learn more.
Georgia’s SME Digitalization Lags Behind EU Despite IT Growth
Digital transformation is reshaping how businesses worldwide operate, yet SME digitalization in Georgia continues to lag despite strong IT sector growth. Many small and medium-sized firms struggle to adopt key digital tools like ERP, CRM, AI, and e-commerce. This raises questions about whether Georgia’s growing tech industry is truly driving digital progress across the wider economy. A new ISET Policy Institute study tracks SME digitalization from 2020 to 2024, comparing Georgia’s progress with EU benchmarks to reveal key gaps and opportunities for growth.
Why SME Digitalization in Georgia Matters
Across advanced economies, digital technologies fuel productivity and national growth. Investments in ICT, automation, and innovation enhance resilience and efficiency. Studies show that firms using e-commerce, digital payments, and remote work tools recover faster from disruptions and perform better overall. Yet, in both the EU and Georgia, smaller firms lag far behind large enterprises in adopting advanced technologies such as ERP, CRM, and AI. Bridging this divide is central to both the EU’s 2030 Digital Decade goals and Georgia’s economic modernization efforts.
How Georgia Compares to the EU
While EU SMEs steadily embrace digital tools, Georgia trails in both basic and advanced tech.
- Only 50% of Georgian SMEs have broadband speeds of at least 30 Mbps, compared to 89% in the EU.
- Just 7% of Georgian SMEs have websites with advanced features, versus 78% of EU firms.
- Adoption of ERP, CRM, and AI systems remains minimal among Georgian SMEs.
Key Findings from the ISET Study
- In 2024, only 6–7% of small firms used ERP and 3% used CRM, compared to 68% and 41% among large firms.
- AI use was just 2% for small firms versus 20% for large ones.
- Georgian SMEs lag EU peers in ERP (7% vs 42%), social media (30% vs 56%), and AI (2% vs 13%).
- Only 3% of Georgian SMEs sell online, compared with 20% in the EU.
Economic Implications for Georgia
The SME digitalization gap threatens long-term productivity and export potential. Still, progress is visible. Fast broadband access for small firms rose from 33% in 2020 to 49% in 2024. Local e-transactions jumped 135% from 2020 to 2023, signaling growing online demand. Targeted support for digital skills, financing ERP/AI adoption, and simple e-commerce onboarding programs could help Georgian SMEs catch up with EU counterparts.
Meet the Researchers
- Ana Burduli: ISET Policy Institute.
- Zizi Galustashvili: ISET Policy Institute.
- Giorgi Papava: ISET Policy Institute.
Read the Full Report
Read the full report on the ISET Policy Institute websiteto explore the complete findings. Explore more policy briefs on economic growth and development on the FREE Network website.
Record-Breaking Russian Budget Deficit as Oil Revenues Collapse and Economy Stalls
The record-breaking Russian budget deficit has become a central challenge for the country’s economy in 2025. Consequently, falling oil and gas revenues have collided with soaring government spending, pushing the fiscal gap to record levels. Moreover, analysts warn that this trend highlights the increasing strain on Moscow’s financial system and its ability to maintain stability. Therefore, the latest KSE Institute report stresses that these pressures will continue shaping Russia’s economic outlook in the months ahead.
A Record-Breaking Russian Budget Deficit
The Russian budget deficit reached 4.9 trillion rubles in January through July 2025, or 129% of the full-year target (KSE Institute, August 2025). Furthermore, this shortfall is 4.5 times larger than during the same period in 2024 and exceeds all recent records.
The growing Russian budget deficit highlights worsening fiscal stress, fueled by weak oil revenues and expanding government spending. As a result, Brent crude is projected to fall near 60 dollars per barrel by year-end, which will increase fiscal pressure. Consequently, Moscow will likely miss its 3.8 trillion ruble target.
Analysts warn that financing the gap will drain sovereign reserves and require more debt issuance. However, both approaches carry lasting economic risks. In addition, the imbalance raises concerns about economic stability under sanctions and falling global energy prices.
Oil and Gas Revenues Slump Despite Stable Exports
Russia’s oil export volumes remain steady. However, oil and gas revenues fell 19% year-on-year in the first seven months of 2025 (Bank of Russia). Although July saw a temporary boost from quarterly tax payments, this did not reverse the decline. Revenues were still 27% below July 2024.
Export earnings rose to 14.3 billion dollars in July, thanks to a brief oil price rise. Russian export prices averaged 60 dollars per barrel, the G7 price cap. Nevertheless, markets expect weaker global oil prices in late 2025 and early 2026. That trend would deepen the Russian budget deficit.
Debt Issuance Grows as Welfare Fund Shrinks
The Ministry of Finance issued 3.0 trillion rubles in OFZ bonds between January and July, a 114% increase from 2024 (MinFin). Moreover, yields remain low, which shows continued demand from domestic banks.
At the same time, the liquid portion of the National Welfare Fund fell to 4.0 trillion rubles, or 48 billion dollars, in July. The government also sold about 16% of its gold reserves (KSE Institute, August 2025). As a result, analysts caution that liquid NWF reserves could run out within a year. This would leave Russia more vulnerable to its growing budget deficit.
Inflation Moderates but Growth Falters
Inflation slowed to 8.8% in July, down from double-digit levels earlier in 2025 (Central Bank of Russia). Consequently, policymakers cut the key interest rate by 300 basis points to 18%. This marks the beginning of limited monetary easing.
However, the gains come at a cost. GDP growth fell to 1.1% year-on-year in the second quarter, down from 1.4% in the first. On a quarterly basis, growth stalled completely. In addition, severe limits on labor and capital remain. Forecasts from the IMF, OECD, and World Bank predict weaker growth in 2025 and 2026.
A Fragile Outlook for Russia’s Economy
The August 2025 Chartbook shows an economy under serious strain. Oil revenues are weak, expenditures are high, reserves are shrinking, and growth is slow.
With sanctions tightening and global oil prices falling, Moscow may depend heavily on domestic borrowing and possibly money creation. Both options aim to fund military spending and social programs. Ultimately, analysts conclude that the Russian budget deficit is unsustainable and threatens fiscal stability heading into 2026.
Record-Breaking Russian Budget Deficit: Insights, Experts, and Further Resources
Explore Other Editions of KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – August 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – July 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – June 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – May 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – April 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – March 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – February 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – January 2025
Meet the Researchers
- Benjamin Hilgenstock — KSE Institute.
- Yuliia Pavytska — KSE Institute.
- Matvii Talalaievskyi — KSE Institute.
Additional Reading
Explore other policy papers and reports on Ukraine’s economic transition and development on the KSE Institute’s website. Read more policy briefs on Eastern Europe and emerging economies on the FREE Network’s website.
Benjamin Hilgenstock on Trump’s New Sanctions Threat Over Russian Oil
In a recent Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty article, experts analyzed U.S. President Donald Trump’s call for NATO members to halt imports of Russian crude oil as a condition for Washington to impose tougher sanctions on Moscow. The proposal would primarily impact Turkey, Hungary, and Slovakia, the only NATO countries still purchasing Russian oil.
“Trump’s threats have so far been directed mostly at India and, to some extent, China. Turkey was never really part of that conversation, so this marks an interesting new development,” said Benjamin Hilgenstock, Senior Economist at the KSE Institute.
Turkey’s Crucial Role in Russian Oil Imports
The report underscores that Turkey is now the world’s third-largest importer of Russian crude, benefiting from steep price discounts and profitable refining operations that supply European markets. However, analysts warn that Ankara’s deep energy dependence on Moscow, coupled with its delicate political balancing act between Russia and the United States, could make compliance with Trump’s demands especially challenging.
Hilgenstock noted that cutting off Turkey’s imports would likely force Russia to offer even deeper discounts to attract alternative buyers, further straining its already fragile economy. Still, he emphasized that the political costs for NATO members to take such a step remain significant.
Further Reading
To explore Benjamin Hilgenstock’s full commentary and gain deeper insight into Trump’s evolving sanctions strategy against Russia, read the full article.
Energy exports remain central to Russia’s economy, serving as a key tool of geopolitical leverage. Sanctions on Russia’s energy sector aim to curb state revenues and reduce its influence over dependent nations. Discover the latest data and research on Russia sanctions and energy policy in the Sanctions Portal Evidence Base.
For more expert insights and economic analysis from KSE Institute, visit the KSE Institute homepage.
Torbjörn Becker on Russia’s Hidden Economic Troubles
As Western leaders consider new sanctions on Russia, The Guardian sheds light on Russia’s hidden economic troubles and growing doubts about Moscow’s ability to sustain its war-driven economy. The article examines President Donald Trump’s renewed threats of financial measures and the ongoing debate among U.S. and EU officials over coordinated sanctions.
Despite extensive restrictions since 2022, Russia’s economy continues to function. But experts warn that the reality may be far worse than official data suggest.
“Russia’s official economic data are questionable. The situation is worse than it appears. Inflation and deficits are understated, and GDP is overstated. Russia will struggle to maintain the war at its current level by mid-2026,” said Torbjörn Becker, Director of the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE).
The Guardian report also examines the limits of current sanctions, loopholes in the oil and gas trade, and the role of non-Western intermediaries that help Moscow circumvent restrictions. With Trump signaling openness to “major sanctions” if NATO allies align, analysts emphasize that political unity and global coordination will be critical to any future economic pressure on Russia.
Read the full article and Torbjörn Becker’s expert analysis in The Guardian / CNN Prima News.
Further Reading
Energy exports remain central to Russia’s economy, serving as a major source of geopolitical leverage. Sanctions targeting the Russian energy sector aim to reduce state revenues and curb Moscow’s global influence. Explore the latest research on sanctions, energy exports, and Russia’s economy in the Sanctions Portal Evidence Base.
For more economic insights and expert commentary, visit the SITE website.