Location: Russia

Hedging EU’s “Winter Risk” by Curbing Gas Demand: Solidarity, Nudge, and Market Solutions

Posted on July 27, 2022 | Policy Brief

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The concern of Russian gas supply disruption and its implications has never been as serious. Experts agree that supply-side measures would not be enough to cover the shortage. Demand cuts are needed. The EC has just proposed a solidarity-based plan of 15% gas demand reduction across the EU Member states. However, getting all EU countries to commit to this plan has been challenging due to asymmetries in their exposure to the Russian gas crisis. As a result, the EU approved a compromise plan with numerous exemptions. This brief argues that market-based solutions may improve participation incentives helping the EU to coordinate decreasing gas demand.  Nudging energy consumers to lower their demand may be an efficient complementary solution. All member states should adopt this latter strategy now, as it takes time to trigger behavior changes in energy consumption. Acting now should strengthen resilience in the coming winter.

Background

Since the beginning of the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, both politicians and analysts have expressed concerns about cuts in Russian gas supply and their implications for the European economy. These concerns have only deepened as the crisis has unfolded. First, Russia stopped gas deliveries to five EU member states in April 2022 following their refusal to pay for gas in rubles. Then, Gazprom cut the capacity of the NordStream pipeline, initially by 40% and then by another 20% in June 2022, claiming technical problems originating from sanctions (i.e., a sanction-driven late return of a gas turbine repaired in Canada).

Gazprom’s July 18th announcement of its inability to deliver contracted gas amounts due to “force majeure” further added to the concern. Meanwhile the EU has dismissed the alleged technical failure stressing political reasons. According to EC President Ursula von der Leyen, the delivery stop reflects a “use of energy as a weapon”.
The panic somewhat settled on July 21, 2022, when Russian gas shipments via Nord Stream resumed at 40% of its original capacity, i.e., the mid-June level. However, Gazprom just announced another cut to 20% of the original capacity from July 27th. Overall, Russian gas exports to the EU are unprecedently low, see Figure 1.

Figure 1. Russian gas exports 2021 vs. 2022

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Source: McWilliams, B., G. Sgaravatti, G. Zachmann (2021) ‘European natural gas imports’, Bruegel Dataset, based on Entsog

Whether Russian gas supplies are likely to be stopped completely in a very close future is unclear. In similar vein, the IEA Executive Director, Dr Fatih Birol, warns that “…it would be unwise to exclude the possibility that Russia could decide to forgo the revenue it gets from exporting gas to Europe in order to gain political leverage”. Regardless of this risk, large-scale adjustments are necessary even under the more optimistic scenario with Russian gas supplies kept at the current level.

The most direct way to tackle the shortage of Russian gas is from the supply side. It can be done via three main channels: diversification of gas suppliers, replacement by alternative fuels, or use of storage. Multiple sources have studied these options extensively (see, e.g., SITE (2022) for an overview of earlier assessments, as well as Di Bella et al. (2022) for more recent estimates and a literature overview). Despite different shortage estimates across reports, experts agree that supply adjustment will not be enough to compensate for ‘the missing Russian gas. This suggests that curbing demand will be a substantial part of gas crisis management.

Most of the demand-linked measures decided by the EU member states have been to counteract the sky-rocking gas prices and subsidize gas consumption by setting a price cap or providing an energy check (see von der Fehr et al. 2022 for an overview). While such measures may protect consumers against increased energy bills in the short run, they foster energy consumption rather than curb it. However, on July 20th, the European Commission issued a plan for the EU nations to cut their gas consumption by 15% between August 2022 and March 2023. This move is part of a wider EU strategy to respond to the gas crisis by pushing for a solidarity mechanism between the member states, including pooling (i.e., sharing) of economic losses. While the targets in this plan would be voluntary, the restrictions could become binding in an emergency. The main demand restrictions would apply to the industrial consumers, but countries are also expected to facilitate households’ demand adjustments. This plan faced resistance from a range of EU Member states, claiming unfairness of 15% cut for their countries, or objecting binding demand cuts for their countries. The resulting compromise agreement, accepted by the EU states on July 26th, incorporated numerous exemptions for both countries and industries.

This brief focuses on the current options in the EU to curb energy demand. We discuss the feasibility of a solidarity mechanism in this context and offer economic mechanisms that may improve its functionality. We also stress the important policy features in incentivizing consumer response.

Solidarity Rule and Market Mechanism

Solidarity and coordination between Member states constitute a crucial part of EU’s response to the current gas crisis. Implementing these rules would limit the direct (gas shortage) and indirect (price-driven) shocks through, e.g., mutual backing-up and buyer power (see, e.g., Le Coq and Paltseva, 2012, 2022 or IEA, 2022).

The solidarity approach was discussed long before the current gas crisis, at least since 2006 (EC, 2006). However, its implementation has proven challenging because of the energy-related asymmetries between Member states in terms of import dependency, diversification of suppliers, energy portfolio, etc. These asymmetries undermine a “one size fits all” policy approach and make some countries consistently benefit more from solidarity mechanisms than others. The solidarity mechanism may also create moral hazard problems (Le Coq and Paltseva, 2008). As a result, the EU could never fully adopt a common energy policy approach.

The recent EU call to cut energy demand by 15% is subject to the same shortcomings. The EU countries are unequally affected by the current gas crisis due to differences in their exposure to Russian gas, access to storage or alternative fuels, gas transportation bottlenecks, etc. These differences undermine countries’ willingness to coordinate as witnessed by Portugal’s and Spain’s explicit opposition to the call on the ground that their energy reduction would be unfair given their energy portfolio with almost no Russian gas. Poland, whose gas storage is full, and Hungary, whose government imposed an export ban on gas earlier in July, have also objected the deal.

There are several ways to improve coordination: one could provide part-taking incentives via a monetary transfer scheme, incorporate demand-side energy cuts into a larger political agenda so that the (asymmetric) losses in one area are compensated by gains in another one (Le Coq and Paltseva, 2008). However, both solutions are likely unfeasible in the current, relatively short-run context, as they require the collection of large volumes of information to determine the correct transfer size. Additionally, the incentives for EU countries to correctly report such details might be low. One can also design a mutual support scheme with country-specific participation requirements/exemptions. This solution, while also informationally demanding, may be easier to achieve. It is likely to improve participation incentives, but the effects of solidarity may be weaker than under a plan without exemptions.

The EU decided to follow this latter route: On July 26th, the EU managed to reach an agreement on a softer plan with multiple exemptions from the 15% cut, accounting for countries’ energy market asymmetries (as well as much more demanding procedure to make the demand cut binding). While this agreement is definitely a step forward, it is currently uncertain whether it would be sufficient to meet the gas demand challenges in the coming winter.

A number of market solutions can potentially improve on the situation. For example, one could establish a market for energy demand reduction quotas in line with the cap-and-trade program designed for CO2 emissions. Alternatively, an emergency gas auction (like the one discussed in Germany for industrial firms) could allow gas savings to be offered in an auction. The winning, cheapest bid would get a market-price level compensation. Of course, such market mechanisms are likely to imply (at least some) consumers will face surging gas prices, but this appears inevitable in view of the difficulties to implement rationing mechanisms to cope with the reduced gas supply.

Market solutions could also be implemented at member state level. However, such an implementation would likely limit solidarity between member states and increase the costs associated with reduced gas consumption. Indeed, purely national solutions (almost by definition) lack solidarity mechanisms between member states and in addition inhibit that the gas reductions take place where they are the least costly.

Nudging and Information Campaign

Given the gas crisis and implementation frictions, the EU should benefit from complementing the regulatory and market solutions (mainly targeting the industry) by incentivizing the demand-cutting behavior of private consumers. There are many ways to trigger behavioral change, from changing legislation to nudging consumers to persuade them to lower their gas (and energy) consumption. Some nudging policies have been successful in the past. One example is Japan’s “setsuden” (electricity-saving) campaign, run after the 2011 Fukushima nuclear plant disaster. It started as an unofficial movement and continued into regulatory restrictions for large firms and voluntary but highly encouraged household targets. The information campaign stressed how close the country was to blackout and successfully prevented blackouts.

In the current crisis the EU states’ policies towards consumers were concentrating on shielding them from high energy prices (see von der Fehr et al, 2022 for an overview). Nudging and energy-saving information campaigns in the EU are yet to gain momentum. Some of the larger EU members are leading the movement. For example, in France, the president called for an immediate “energy sobriety” on the last National Day. Businesses and public buildings were asked to switch off the light at night and anticipate a lower winter heating consumption. While fines for infringement are under discussion, the French government is hoping for a nudging effect. Similarly, Germany has started an intense information campaign to convince individuals to reduce their electricity consumption by taking fewer showers and turning down the air conditioning. However, much broader, intensive energy-saving campaigning is urgently needed to lower energy demand effectively.

Several results from the experimental economic literature motivate such campaigns. The first point concerns the usefulness of nudging in the energy context. The evidence on the effect of incentivizing consumers’ energy saving behavior via monetary or non-monetary interventions is mixed (see Andor and Fels, 2018 and Lingyun Mi et al., 2022 for an overview). However, a recent meta-study combining the results from 112 field trials between 1976 and 2021 (Lingyun Mi et al., 2022) supports the effectiveness of non-monetary incentives (such as nudging by providing information or offering social comparisons) in creating energy-saving behavior. Moreover, it finds that non-monetary incentives are also more effective and longer lasting in promoting energy conservation than the monetary ones. One possible reason for this finding is that non-monetary incentives may affect individual’s values and their intrinsic motivation to save energy. This result implies that information campaigns, target-setting, and providing social comparisons can be an effective and relatively cost-efficient way to lower energy demand.

The second question concerns the timing of such intervention. Again, while there is no clear-cut evidence concerning the long-term impact of nudging, some literature documents effects lasting months and even years after the intervention stopped (Andor and Fels, 2018 overview a few such studies). Further, the same meta-study by Lingyun Mi et al., 2022 found that interventions lasting 1–6 months were the most effective. A combination of antecedent (before actual behavior, such as goal setting) and consequence (when the incentives to act are affected by the results of the action) nudge-based interventions produced the best energy-saving effect. These findings suggest that campaigns should start now to be ready for the winter 2022-23 season.

Last but not least, there is evidence that energy conservation goal-setting is effective only when the goals are realistic. For example, in Harding and Hsiaw (2014), a moderate energy saving goal set by a household led to a sizable consumption reduction, and the effect lasted for one and a half years. With more ambitious goals the initial strong response quickly vanished. Finally, there is no consumption adjustment pattern with unrealistically high goals. One possible, even if somewhat stretched, interpretation of these results could be that a drastic change in consumption may be more challenging to incentivize through nudging than a series of more minor adjustments. This consideration provides another rationale for the early start of nudging policies, suggesting a meager initial consumption reduction, and gradually increasing the threshold.

Conclusion

Cutbacks in gas consumption are essential to surviving the EU energy crisis, especially in case of a complete Russian gas halt. The EC has recently proposed a plan for the EU nations to decrease their gas consumption by 15% between August 2022 and March 2023. This plan is included in a wider solidarity approach to EU energy crisis management. However, approval of this plan by the EU nations faced difficulties due to asymmetries in exposure to Russian gas across EU member states and the resulting unwillingness to share the costs of the crisis. The resulting compromise plan features multiple exemptions from the 15% rule. Market solutions, such as trade in demand reduction quotas, may help to improve EU coordination on demand reduction. Another essential component of crisis management is the EU-wide nudging of private consumers encouraging energy saving behavior. Based on historical examples and the experimental literature such nudge-based policy may be effective and cost-efficient if started now.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Understanding the Economic and Social Context of Gender-based and Domestic Violence in Central and Eastern Europe – Preliminary Survey Evidence

Posted on May 11, 2022 | FROGEE PROJECT, Policy Brief

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This brief presents preliminary findings from a cross-country survey on perceptions and prevalence of domestic and gender-based violence conducted in September 2021 in eight countries: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Sweden and Ukraine. We discuss the design and content of the study and present initial information on selected topics that were covered in the survey. The collected data has been used in three studies presented at the FROGEE Conference on “Economic and Social Context of Domestic Violence” and offers a unique resource to study gender-based violence in the region.

While the COVID-19 pandemic has amplified the academic and policy interest in the causes and consequences of domestic violence, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has tragically reminded us about the gender dimension of war. There is no doubt that a gender lens is a necessary perspective to understand and appreciate the full consequences of these two ongoing crises.

The tragic reason behind the increased attention given to domestic violence during the COVID-19 lockdowns is the substantial evidence that gender-based violence has intensified to such an extent that the United Nations raised the alarm about a “shadow pandemic” of violence against women and girls (UN Women on-line link). Already before the pandemic, one in three women worldwide had experienced physical or sexual violence, usually at the hands of an intimate partner, and this number has only been increasing. The tragic reports from the military invasion of Ukraine concerning violence against women and children, as well as information on the heightened risks faced by war refugees from Ukraine, most of whom are women, should only intensify our efforts to better understand the background behind these processes and study the potential policy solutions to limit them to a minimum in the current and future crises.

The most direct consequences of gender-based and domestic violence – to the physical and mental health of the victims – are clearly of the highest concern and are the leading arguments in favour of interventions aimed at limiting the scale of violence. One should remember though, that the consequences and the related social costs of gender-based and domestic violence are far broader, and need not be caused by direct acts of physical violence. Gender-based and domestic violence can take the form of psychological pressure, limits on individual freedoms, or access to financial resources within households. As research in recent decades demonstrates, such forms of abuse also have significant consequences for the psychological well-being, social status, and professional development of its victims. All these outcomes are associated with not only high individual costs, but also with substantial social and economic costs to our societies.

This policy brief presents an outline of a survey conducted in eight countries aimed at better understanding the socio-economic context of gender-based violence. The survey, developed by the FREE Network of independent research institutes, has a regional focus on Central and Eastern Europe, with Sweden being an interesting benchmark country. The data was collected in September 2021 in Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Sweden and Ukraine. The socio-economic situation of all these countries irrevocably changed with the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the ongoing war, and its dramatic consequences. The world’s attention focused on the unspeakable violence committed by the Russian forces in Ukraine, the persecution in Belarus and Russia of their own citizens who were protesting against the invasion, and the challenges other neighbouring countries have faced as a result of an unprecedented wave of Ukrainian refugees. This change, on the one hand, calls for a certain distance with which we should judge the survey data and the derived results. On the other hand, the data may serve as a unique resource to support the analysis of the pre-war conditions in these countries with the aim to understand the background driving forces behind this dramatic crisis. In as much as the gender lens is necessary to comprehend the full scale of the consequences of both the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, it will be equally indispensable in the process of post-war development and reconciliation once peace is again restored.

Survey Design, Countries, and Samples

The survey was conducted in eight countries in September 2021 through as a telephone (CATI) survey using the list assisted random digit dialling (LA-RDD) method covering both cell phones and land-lines, and the sampling was carried out in such a way as to make the final sample representative of the respective populations by gender and three age group (18-39; 40-54; 55+). The collected samples varied from 925 to 1000 individuals. The same questionnaire initially prepared as a generic English version was fielded in all eight countries (in the respective national languages). The only deviations from the generic version were related to the education categories and to a set of final questions implemented in Latvia, Russia and Ukraine with a focus on the evaluation of national IPV legislation.

Table 1 presents some basic sample statistics, while Figure 1 shows the unweighted age and gender compositions in each country. The proportion of women in the sample varies between 49.4% in Sweden and 55.0% in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. The average sample age is between 43 (Armenia) and 51 (Sweden), while the proportion of individuals with higher education is between 29.3% in Belarus and 55.4% in Georgia. The highest proportion of respondents living in rural areas could be found in Armenia at 62.9%, while the lowest was in Georgia at 24.1%. Figure 1 illustrates good coverage across age groups for both men and women.

Table 1. FROGEE Survey: samples and basic demographics

Source: FROGEE Survey on Domestic and Gender-Based Violence.

Figure 1. FROGEE Survey: gender and age distributions

Source: FROGEE Survey on Domestic and Gender-Based Violence.

Socio-economic Conditions and Other Background Characteristics

To be able to examine the relationship between different aspects of domestic and gender-based violence to the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents, an extensive set of questions concerning the demographic composition of their household and their material conditions were asked at the beginning of the interview. These questions included information about partnership history and family structure, the size of the household and living conditions, education and labour market status (of the respondent and his/her partner) and general questions concerning material wellbeing. In Figure 2 we show a summary of two of the latter set of questions – the proportion of men and women who find it difficult or very difficult to make ends meet (Figure 2A) and the proportion who declared that the financial situation of their household deteriorated in the last two years, i.e. since September 2019, which can be used as an indicator of the material consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. We can see that the difficulties in making ends meet are by far lowest in Sweden, and slightly lower in the other EU countries (Latvia and Poland). The differences are less pronounced with regard to the implication of the pandemic, but also in this case respondents in Sweden seem to have been least affected.

 Figure 2. Making ends meet and the consequences of COVID-19

a. Difficulties in making ends meet


b. Material conditions deteriorated since 2019

Source: FROGEE Survey on Domestic and Gender-Based Violence.

Perceptions and Incidence of Domestic and Gender-Based Violence and Abuse

Frequency of differential treatment and abuse

The set of questions concerning domestic and gender-based violence started with an initial module related to the different treatment of men and women, with respondents asked to identify how often they witnessed certain behaviours aimed toward women. The questions covered aspects such as women being treated “with less courtesy than men”, being “called names or insulted for being a woman” and women being “the target of jokes of sexual nature” or receiving “unwanted sexual advances from a man she doesn’t know”, and the respondents were to evaluate if in the last year they have witnessed such behaviours on a scale from never, through rarely, sometimes, often, to very often. We present the proportion of respondents answering “often” or “very often” to two of these questions in Figure 3A (“People have acted as if they think women are not smart”) and 3B (“A woman has been the target of jokes of a sexual nature”). We find significant variation across these two dimensions of differential treatment, and we generally find that women are more sensitive to perceiving such treatment. It is interesting to note that the proportion of women who declared witnessing differential treatment in Sweden is very high in comparison to for example Latvia or Belarus, which, as we shall see below, does not correspond to the proportion of women (and men) witnessing more violent types of behaviour against women.

Figure 3. Frequency of differential treatment (often or very often)

a. People have acted as if they think women are not smart


b. A woman has been the target of jokes of a sexual nature

Source: FROGEE Survey on Domestic and Gender-Based Violence.

Questions on the frequency of witnessing physical abuse were also asked in relation to the scale of witnessed behaviour. Here respondents were once again asked to say how often “in their day-to-day life” they have witnessed specific behaviours. These included such types of abuse as: a woman being “threatened by a man”, “slapped, hit or punched by a man”, or “sexually abused or assaulted by a man”. The proportion of respondents who say that they have witnessed such behaviour with respect to two of the questions from this section are presented in Figure 4. In Figure 4A we show the proportion of men and women who have witnessed a woman being “slapped, hit or punched” (sometimes, often or very often), while in Figure 4B being “touched inappropriately without her consent”. Relative to the perceptions of differential treatment the incidence of a woman being hit or punched (4A) declared by the respondents seems more intuitive when considered against the overall international statistics of gender equality. The proportions are lowest in Sweden and Poland, and highest in Armenia and Ukraine. However, the perception of inappropriate touching by men with respect to women (Figure 4B) shows a similar extent of such actions across all analysed countries.

Figure 4. Frequency of abuse (sometimes, often or very often)

a. A woman has been slapped, hit or punched by a man


b. A woman has been touched inappropriately, without her consent, by a man

Source: FROGEE Survey on Domestic and Gender-Based Violence.

Perceptions of abuse

The questions concerning the scale of witnessed behaviours were complemented by a module related to the evaluation of certain behaviours from the perspective of their classification as abuse and the degree to which certain types of gender-specific behaviours are acceptable. Thus, for example respondents were asked if they consider “beating (one’s partner) causing severe physical harm” to be an example of abuse within a couple (Figure 5A) or if “prohibition to dress as one likes” represents abuse (Figure 5B). This module included an extensive list of behaviours, such as “forced abortion”, “constant humiliation, criticism”, “restriction of access to financial resources”, etc. As we can see in Figure 6, with respect to the clearest types of abuse – such as physical violence – respondents in all countries were pretty much unanimous in declaring such behaviour to represent abuse. With respect to other behaviours the variation in their evaluation across countries is much greater – for example, while nearly all men and women in Sweden consider prohibiting a partner to dress as he/she likes to be abusive (Figure 5B), only about 57% of women and 36% of men in Armenia share this view.

The questionnaire also included questions specifically focused on the perception of intimate partner violence. These asked respondents if they knew about women who in the last three months were “beaten, slapped or threatened physically by their intimate partner”, and the evaluation of how often intimate partners act physically violent towards their wives.

Figure 5. Perceptions of abuse: are these examples of abuse within a couple?

a. Beating causing severe physical harm


b. Prohibition to dress as one likes

Source: FROGEE Survey on Domestic and Gender-Based Violence.

A further evaluation of attitudes towards violent behaviour was done with respect to the relationship between a husband and wife and his right to hit or beat the wife in reaction to certain behaviours. In Figure 6 we show the distribution of responses regarding the justification for beating one’s wife in reaction to her neglect of the children (6A) or burning food (6B). The questions also covered such behaviour as arguing with her husband, going out without telling him, or refusing to have sex. As we can see in Figure 6, once again we find substantial country variation in the proportion of the samples – both men and women – who justify such violent behaviour within couples. This was particularly the case when respondents were asked about justification of violent behaviour in the case of a woman neglecting the children. In Armenia as many as 30% of men and 22% of women agree that physical beating is justified in those cases. These proportions are manyfold greater than what can be observed in countries such as Latvia, where 3% of men and women agreed that abuse was justifiable under these circumstances, or Sweden, where only 1% of men and women agreed.

Figure 6. Perceptions of abuse: is a husband justified in hitting or beating his wife

a. If she neglects the children


b. If she burns the food

Source: FROGEE Survey on Domestic and Gender-Based Violence.

Seeking help and the legal framework

The final part of the questionnaire focused on the evaluation of different reactions to incidents of domestic and gender-based violence. Respondents were first asked if a woman should seek help from various people and institutions if she is beaten by her partner – respondents were asked if she should seek help from the police, relatives or friends, a psychologist, a legal service or if, in such situations, she does not need help. In Figure 7 we show the proportion of people who agreed with the last statement, i.e. claimed that it is only the couple’s business. The proportions of respondents who declare such an attitude is higher among men than women within each country, and is highest among men in Armenia (48%) and Georgia (25%). Again, these proportions are in stark contrast to men in Sweden, or even Poland, where only 4% and 8% of men agreed, respectively. Nevertheless, looking at the total survey sample, a vast majority believe that a woman who is a victim of domestic violence should seek help outside of her home, indicating that at least some forms of institutionalised support for women are popular measures with most people.

Figure 7. Proportions agreeing that domestic violence is only the couple’s business

Source: FROGEE Survey on Domestic and Gender-Based Violence.

The interview also included questions on the need for specific legislation aimed at punishing intimate partner violence and on the existence of such legislation in the respondents’ countries. The latter questions were extended in three countries – Latvia, Russia and Ukraine – to evaluate the specific sets of regulations implemented recently in these countries and to facilitate an analysis of the role IPV legislation can play in reducing violence within households. Legislation on domestic violence is relatively recent. During the last four decades, though, changes accelerated in this respect around the world. Legislative measures have been introduced in many countries, covering different aspects of preventing, protecting against and prosecuting various forms of violence and abuse that might happen within the marriage or the family. Research strives to offer evaluations on what legal provisions are most effective, in a setting in which statistics and information are still far from perfect, and as a consequence of the dearth of strong evidence the public debate on the matter is often lively. For legislation to have an effect on behaviour through shaping the cost of committing a crime, on the one hand, and the benefit of reporting it or seeking help, on the other, or more indirectly through changing norms in society, information and awareness are key. For how can deterrence be achieved if people do not know what the sanctions are? And how can reporting be encouraged if victims do not know their rights? The evidence on legislation awareness is unfortunately quite scarce. A survey of the criminology field (Nagin, 2013) concludes that this is a major knowledge gap.

Figure 8 shows the proportions of answers to questions concerning the need for and existence of legislation specifically targeted towards intimate partner violence. We can see that while support for such legislation is quite high (Figure 8A), it is generally lower among men (in particular in Armenia, Russia and Belarus). Awareness of existence of such laws, on the other hand, is much lower, and it is particularly low among women. It should be pointed out that all countries have in fact implemented provisions against domestic violence in their criminal code, but only around half of the population, sometimes much fewer, are aware of that.

Figure 8. Need for and awareness of IPV legislation

a. State should have specific legislation aimed at punishing IPV


b. Country has specific legislation aimed at punishing intimate partner violence

Source: FROGEE Survey on Domestic and Gender-Based Violence.

Recent reforms of DV legislation that were implemented in Russia in 2017, in Ukraine in 2019 and in Latvia just a few months ago (at the time of the survey, the changes were at the stage of a proposal) were the subject of the final survey questions in these countries. We find that awareness of these recent reforms is very low in all three countries, and knowledge about the reform content (gauged with the help of a multiple-choice question with three alternative statements) is even lower. Our analysis suggests that gender and family situation are the two factors that most robustly predict support for legislation, while education and age are associated with awareness and knowledge of the reforms. Minority Russian speakers are less aware of the reforms in both Ukraine and Latvia, in Ukraine are also less likely to answer correctly about the content of the reform, and in Latvia are less supportive of DV legislation in general.

Analyses of this type are useful for policy design, to better understand which groups lack relevant knowledge and should be targeted by, for example, information campaigns to combat DV, such as those many governments around the world implemented during the covid-19 pandemic.

Future Work Based on the Survey

The above is just a small sample of the rich source of information that has resulted from conducting the survey. Already from this simple overview we can see some interesting results. There are, for example, clear differences between men and women in perceptions of how common certain types of abusive behaviour are. However, for many questions differences between countries are larger than those between men and women within a country. Interestingly such differences are also different depending on the severity of the abuse or violence. In Sweden the perception of women being victims of less violent abuse is higher than in some other countries where instead some more violent types of abuse are reported as being more common. This could, of course, be due to actual differences in actual events but it is also possible that there are differences in what types of behaviour are considered to represent harassment and abuse in different societies. More careful data work is needed to try to answer questions like this and many others. Currently there are a number of ongoing research projects based on the survey results, three of which will be presented at the FREE-network conference on “Economic and Social Context of Domestic Violence” in Stockholm on May 11, 2022. Our hope is that this work will help in taking actions to prevent gender-based abuse and domestic violence based on a better understanding of underlying cross-country differences in social norms and attitudes and their relation to socio-economic factors.

About FROGEE Policy Briefs

FROGEE Policy Briefs is a special series aimed at providing overviews and the popularization of economic research related to gender equality issues. Debates around policies related to gender equality are often highly politicized. We believe that using arguments derived from the most up to date research-based knowledge would help us build a more fruitful discussion of policy proposals and in the end achieve better outcomes.

The aim of the briefs is to improve the understanding of research-based arguments and their implications, by covering the key theories and the most important findings in areas of special interest to the current debate. The briefs start with short general overviews of a given theme, which are followed by a presentation of country-specific contexts, specific policy challenges, implemented reforms and a discussion of other policy options.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

The Effects of Sanctions

Posted on May 10, 2022 | Policy Brief

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Sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine are argued to be the strongest and farthest-reaching imposed on a major power after WWII, more numerous and more comprehensive than all other measures currently in force against all other sanctioned countries. A question often asked, which is hard to answer, is whether sanctions are effective. In the present case, the effect most associate with success would be a swift end of the hostilities, perhaps accompanied by a regime change in Russia. But even when it seems these prizes are out of reach, sanctions certainly have effects, all too often glossed over by the debate but nonetheless of significance.

Why Are Sanctions Seen as Ineffective?

Sanctions are restrictions imposed on a country by one or more other countries with the intent to pressure in effect some desirable outcome, or conversely to condemn and punish some undesired action already taken. When evaluating sanctions, therefore, the focus is naturally on whether they succeed to discourage this particular course of action, or to remove the decision-makers responsible for it. And on this account, sanctions are overwhelmingly seen as unsuccessful. However, a few complications cloud this conclusion.

First of all, sanctions that are implemented already failed at the threat stage. If the threat of a well-specified and credible retribution did not deter the receiving part from pursuing the sanctioned course of action, it is because they reckoned that they can afford to ignore it. So, unless this punishment goes beyond what was expected, in scope or in time, its implementation will also fall flat. This implies that any effort to evaluate sanctions retrospectively suffers from the negative selection problem, when almost exclusively cases of failure, intended in this particular sense, are observed.

Second, sanctions are a rather blunt instrument, that often cannot be targeted with the precision one would desire. Even though sanctions have over time become “smarter”, in the sense that stronger efforts are made to target the regime, or elites that may have the clout to actually affect the regime (think the oligarchs in Russia), they often fail to reach or affect in a meaningful way those individuals that are the real objective, for various reasons. Instead, they can cause significant “collateral damage”, to groups of a population that often are quite far removed from any real decisional power, including those in the sending countries, and even third parties who are extraneous to the situation. The damage inflicted to those parties can only in very special circumstances be part of a causal link eventually impacting the intended outcome. For instance, citizens struggling in an impoverished economy could be led to a riot, or in some other way put pressure on their government – but this implies that the country is sufficiently free for riots to take place or for voters’ opinions to be taken into consideration.

To this, it should be added that, once a course of action has been taken, it might be not obvious how to change or undo it, notwithstanding the signaled displeasure from the sanctioning parties. Sanctions are therefore rarely working in isolation. When positive outcomes are achieved, it is often the case that diplomatic channels were kept open and clear incentives offered for a way out. But then it might be unclear whether it was the sanctions or something else that led to the success.

Other Effects of Sanctions

The pitfalls highlighted above, which make it tricky to answer whether sanctions are effective at reaching their aim, also apply when studying other effects that sanctions might have. There is of course a range of outcomes that might be affected: in this literature we find studies looking at inequality (Afesorgbor et al., 2016), exchange rates (Dreger et al., 2016), trade (Afesorgbor, 2019; Crozet et al. 2020), the informal sector (Early et al, 2019), military spending (Farzanegan, 2019), women’s rights (Drury, 2014), and many more. But as it often happens the most studied outcome is GDP, as this is a measure that efficiently summarizes the whole economy and correlates very nicely with many other outcomes we care about.

Suppose then that we would like to investigate what is the effect of sanctions on a target country’s GDP.  One problem is identifying an appropriate counterfactual; to observe what would have happened in the target country in the absence of sanctions. It is also an issue that the incidence of international sanctions is often a product of a series of events in the target or sender country (e.g. the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or the apartheid system in South Africa), which also have impacts on the economy that would need to be isolated from the impact of sanctions themselves.

A variety of econometric techniques can be of help in this situation. One first idea is to use, as a reference, cases where sanctions were almost implemented. Gutmann et al. (2021) compare countries under sanctions to countries under threat of sanctions, while Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2015) contrast implemented sanctions to vetoed sanctions, in the context of UN decisions. Both studies find a relatively sizeable negative impact on GDP, in a large group of countries over a long period of time. In the first study, the target country’s GDP per capita decreases on average by 4 percent over the two first years after sanctions imposition and shows no signs of recovery in the three years after sanctions are removed. The second study estimates a reduction in GDP growth that starts at between 2,3 and 3,5 percent after the imposition of UN sanctions and, although it decreases over time, only becomes insignificant after ten years. It should be considered that a lower growth rate compounds over time: experiencing a slower growth even by only 1 percent over ten years implies a total loss of almost 15 percent. As a comparison, the average GDP loss due to the Covid-19 pandemic is estimated to be 3,4 percent in 2020.

These studies have limitations. Countries under threat of sanctions are probably making efforts to avoid punishment, which might imply that these countries are precisely the ones who would be most negatively affected by the sanctions. If so, the impact found by Gutmann et al. (2021) is probably underestimated. Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2015) only look at UN sanctions, which on one hand might give a larger impact because of the multilateral coordination. But on the other hand, the issue of an appropriate counterfactual emerges again: countries whose sanctions are vetoed might be larger, more influential, and better connected within the international community or to some of the major powers, which may also affect their economic success in other ways.

Kwon et al. (2020) adopt a different technique and come to a different conclusion. They use an instrumental variable (IV) approach and find that standard OLS overestimates the negative effect of sanctions, in other words, that sanctions’ effects are less negative than we think. They find an instantaneous effect on per capita GDP that becomes insignificant in the long run, just as if sanctions never happened.

Our confidence in these estimates hinges upon the validity of the IV used. In this case, the actual imposition of sanctions is replaced by its estimated likelihood based on sender countries’ variation in institutions and diplomatic policies (which are exogenous to the target country’s economic developments) and pre-determined country-pair characteristics (trade and financial flows, travels, colonial ties). Therefore, episodes where sanctions are imposed because the sender country happens to be in a period of hawkish foreign policy and because the target does not have strong historical relations with them are contrasted to episodes in which the opposite is true, and sanctions are therefore not implemented, everything else being equal.

The results also show that there is heterogeneity across types of sanctions, with trade sanctions having both a short and long run negative impact, while smart sanctions (i.e. sanctions targeted on particular individuals or groups) have positive effects on the target country’s economy in the long run.  This is quite an important point in itself. Often, sweeping statements about effectiveness of “sanctions” lump all the different measures together, and fail to appreciate that there may be substantial differences. However, the effect of one or another type of sanctions will vary depending on the structure of the economy that is hit.

A third approach is the synthetic control method. Here the researcher tries to replicate as closely as possible the path of economic development in the target country up to the point of sanctions’ implementation, using one or a weighted average of several other countries. In this way, evolution after sanctions’ inception can be compared between the actual country and its synthetic control. Gharehgozli (2017) builds a replica of Iran based on a weighted combination of eight OPEC member countries, two non-OPEC oil-producing countries and three neighboring countries, that match a set of standard economic indicators for Iran over the period 1980-1994. The study finds that over the course of three years the imposition of US sanctions led to a 17.3 percent decline in Iran’s GDP, with the strongest reduction occurring in 2012, one year after the intensification of sanctions (2011-2014) was initiated.

This is a stronger effect than those presented earlier. However, it only speaks to the special case of Iran, rather than estimating a broader global average effect. Another study focusing on Iran (Torbat, 2005) makes the important point that the effect of sanctions varies by type: financial sanctions are found to be more effective (in lowering Iran’s GDP) than trade sanctions – which contrasts with what is found to be true on average by Kwon et al. (2020).

Finally, the relation between economic damage and the effectiveness of sanctions in terms of reaching their goals is debatable. In a theoretical model, Kaempfer et al. (1988) suggest that this relation might even be negative and that the most effective sanctions are not necessarily the most damaging in economic terms. The sanctions most likely to facilitate political change in the target country are those designed to cause income losses on groups benefiting from the target country’s policies, according to the authors.

The Effect of Sanctions on Russia

Are these results from previous studies useful to form expectations about the effects of the current sanctions on Russia? The invasion of Ukraine which started at the end of February was a relatively unexpected event, at least in character and scale, in contrast to what can be said in the majority of situations involving sanctions. However, the context leading up to it was not one of normality either. Besides the global pandemic, Russia was already under sanctions following the Crimean Crisis in 2014. The impact of those economic sanctions, and of the counter-sanctions imposed by Russia as retaliation, is still unclear – and will be in all probability completely dwarfed by the current sanction wave as well as other exogenous shocks, such as significant changes in oil prices in this period. Kholodilin et al. (2016) estimated the immediate loss of GDP in Russia to be 1,97 percent quarter-on-quarter, while no impact on the aggregate Euro Area countries’ GDP could be observed. A Russian study (Gurvich and Prilepsky, 2016) forecasted for the medium term a loss of 2,4 percentage points by 2017 as compared to the hypothetical scenario without sanctions. This pales in comparison to the magnitude of consequences that are being contemplated now. Even the potentially optimistic, or at least conservative, assessment of the current situation by the Russian Federation’s own Accounts Chamber, in the words of its head Alexei Kudrin, suggests that: “For almost one and a half to two years we will live in a very difficult situation.” At the end of April, they published revised forecasts on the economic situation, among which the one for GDP is shown below. Russian Central Bank chief Elvira Nabiullina also sounded bleak, speaking in the State Duma: “The period when the economy can live on reserves is finite. And already in the second – the beginning of the third quarter, we will enter a period of structural transformation and the search for new business models.” The World Bank has forecasted that Russia’s 2022 GDP output will fall by 11.2% due to Western sanctions. These numbers do not yet factor in the announcement of the sixth EU sanction package, which famously includes an oil embargo (see an earlier FREE Policy Brief on the dependency of Russia on oil export).

Figure 1. Revised forecasts of growth rates for the Russian economy

Source: Macroeconomic survey of the Bank of Russia, April 2022.

Are these estimates realistic, and what would have been the counterfactual development without sanctions? If we believe the studies reviewed in the previous section, and also taking into account the unprecedented scale and reach of the current sanctions, at least the time horizon, if not the size, of the consequences forecast by Russian authorities is, though substantial, certainly underestimated. But there is too much uncertainty at the moment, hostilities are still ongoing and sanctions are not being lifted for quite some time in any foreseeable scenario. One reason why these sanctions are not likely to be relaxed, and why their impact is expected to be more severe than in most cases, is that a very broad coalition of countries is backing them. Not only this but the sanctioning countries see Russia’s conduct as a potential threat to the existing world order, so their motivation to contrast it is particularly strong relative to, say, the cases of Iran, North Korea, or Burma.

Moreover, these loss estimates do not yet factor in the announcement of the sixth EU sanction package, which famously includes an oil embargo. Oil is a fundamental driver of growth in Russia. An earlier FREE Policy Brief shows how two-thirds of Russia’s growth can be explained by changes in international oil prices. This is not because oil constitutes such a large share of GDP but because of the secondary effect oil money generates in terms of domestic consumption and investment. Reducing export revenues from the sale of oil and gas will therefore have significant effects on Russia’s GDP, well beyond what the first-round effect of restricting the oil sector would imply.

In short, it is too early to venture an assessment in detail, however, the scale of loss that can be expected is clear from these and many other indicators. In the longer run, it will only be augmented by the relative isolation in which Russia has ended up, implying lower investments and subpar capital inputs at inflated prices, and by the ongoing brain drain (3,8 million people have already left the country since the war began).

Conclusion

In conclusion, the debate about economic sanctions as a tool of foreign policy is often restricted to a binary question: do they work or not? There is ample support in the literature studying sanctions to say that this question is too simplistic. Even if we do not see immediate success in reaching the main aim of the sanction policy, they do cause damage, in many dimensions, and such damage is non-negligible. The political will and the regime behind it may be unaffected, but the resources they need to continue with their course of action will unavoidably shrink in the longer run.

References

  • Afesorgbor, S. K. (2019). The impact of economic sanctions on international trade: How do threatened sanctions compare with imposed sanctions?. European Journal of Political Economy, 56, 11-26.
  • Afesorgbor, S. K., & Mahadevan, R. (2016). The impact of economic sanctions on income inequality of target states. World Development, 83, 1-11.
  • Crozet, M., & Hinz, J. (2020). Friendly fire: The trade impact of the Russia sanctions and counter-sanctions. Economic Policy, 35(101), 97-146.
  • Dreger, C., Kholodilin, K. A., Ulbricht, D., & Fidrmuc, J. (2016). Between the hammer and the anvil: The impact of economic sanctions and oil prices on Russia’s ruble. Journal of Comparative Economics, 44(2), 295-308.
  • Drury, A. Cooper and Dursun Peksen. “Women and economic statecraft: The negative impact international economic sanctions visit on women.” European Journal of International Relations 20 (2014): 463 – 490.
  • Early, B., & Peksen, D. (2019). Searching in the shadows: The impact of economic sanctions on informal economies. Political Research Quarterly, 72(4), 821-834.
  • Farzanegan, Mohammad Reza. (2019). “The Effects of International Sanctions on Military Spending of Iran: A Synthetic Control Analysis.” Organizations & Markets: Policies & Processes eJournal .
  • Gharehgozli, O. (2017). An estimation of the economic cost of recent sanctions on Iran using the synthetic control method. Economics Letters, 157, 141-144.
  • Gurvich E., Prilepskiy I. (2016). The impact of financial sanctions on the Russian economy.  Voprosy Ekonomiki. ;(1):5-35. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2016-1-5-35
  • Gutmann, J., Neuenkirch, M., and Neumeier, F., 2021. ”The Economic Effects of International Sanctions: An Event Study” CESifo Working Paper No. 9007
  • Kaempfer, W. H., & Lowenberg, A. D. (1988). The theory of international economic sanctions: A public choice approach. The American Economic Review, 78(4), 786-793.
  • Kholodilin, Konstantin A. and Netsunajev, Aleksei. (2016) Crimea and Punishment: The Impact of Sanctions on Russian and European Economies. DIW Berlin Discussion Paper No. 1569, SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2768622
  • Kwon, O., Syropoulos, C., & Yotov, Y. V. (2020). Pain and Gain: The Short-and Long-run Effects of Economic Sanctions on Growth. Manuscript.
  • Neuenkirch, M., & Neumeier, F. (2015). The impact of UN and US economic sanctions on GDP growth. European Journal of Political Economy, 40, 110-125.
  • Torbat, A. E. (2005). Impacts of the US trade and financial sanctions on Iran. World Economy, 28(3), 407-434.
  • World Bank. (2022). “War in the Region” Europe and Central Asia Economic Update (Spring), Washington, DC: World Bank.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

The EU Import Bill and Russian Energy Sanctions

Posted on April 28, 2022 | Policy Brief

20220428 Image of Gazprom office in Russia representing Russian Energy Sanctions

Since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war, the West has been contemplating sanctions on Russian oil and gas imports. For the EU, this plan poses a significant challenge due to the long-existing sizable dependency on Russian energy. In this brief, we outline the possible effects of banning Russian oil and gas on the energy import bill across the EU. While the effects of such a ban will go beyond a direct increase in the import costs of oil and gas, our estimates provide a useful reference point in discussing the impact of such sanctions on the EU. Our estimates suggest that the relative increase in the import costs in the case of an oil embargo would be more evenly spread across the Member States, than in the case of a natural gas ban. This parity makes an EU-wide Russian oil embargo a more straightforward sanction policy. In turn, a full replacement of Russian gas imports across the EU – due to either a gas embargo or retaliation from Russia in response to an oil ban – is likely to require some kind of solidarity mechanism.

Introduction

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the West has been discussing the idea of sanctioning the aggressor by banning Russian energy imports. The motivation is quite straightforward. In 2021, Russian oil and gas exports constituted 49% of Russian goods exports or 14 % of Russian GDP, and the Western world (in particular, the European Union) is the main recipient of these exports. Banning Russian oil and gas export would, thus, lead to heavy pressure on the Russian economy.

The discussion has been quite heated. The US actually implemented a ban on Russian oil and gas in early March 2022, but this gesture has been largely seen as relatively symbolic, as the US dependency on Russian energy imports is quite limited. EU politicians have voiced different opinions about the feasibility of Russian energy sanctions. While some advocate an immediate ban, others argue for a more gradual decrease in imports or even for continuing imports effectively in a business-as-usual fashion. While the EC has announced plans to cut down the consumption of Russian gas by two-thirds in 2022 and mentioned the implementation of “some form of oil embargo” as part of their 6th sanction package, there is still no consensus across the EU. Sanctions on Russian oil and gas imports have not been implemented in the EU by the time of writing this brief.

The main reason for this hesitation is the extent to which Russia remains the main energy supplier. In 2020, 39% of gas and 36% of oil and oil products in the EU were imported from Russia, and the feasibility and consequences of replacing these with alternative supplies are debatable. Since the beginning of the war academics, international organizations and consultancies have offered a variety of analytical materials on the feasibility and implications of such energy sanctions (see e.g., Bachmann et al. 2022. Chepeliev et al, 2022, Fulwood et al., 2022, Guriev and Itskhoki, 2022, Hilgenstock and Ribakova, 2022, IEA, 2022, RYSTAD 2002a,b, Stehn, 2022 to name just a few).

This brief contributes to these estimates by discussing how a Russian oil and gas ban could affect the energy import bill across individual EU countries. We start by providing details on the EU’s dependency on Russian oil and gas imports. We then proceed to access the scope of the costs that a ban on Russian energy could imply for the EU energy sector. We conclude with a discussion about the feasibility of political agreement on such sanctions.

Import Dependency and Dependency on Russian Energy Across the EU

The two primary channels through which a Russian energy ban would affect the vulnerability of an EU country are the dependency on Russian oil and gas, and the overall energy import dependency. The former matters since a ban would imply an immediate necessity to replace missing volumes of energy. This would lead to an increase in energy prices widely across markets, thereby signifying the importance of the latter channel, the overall import dependency.

Figures 1 and 2 depict the dependency on Russian oil and gas across the EU member states. In Figure 1, the dependency is measured as a ratio of Russian energy imports to the gross available energy for each energy type separately – crude oil, oil and oil products, and natural gas. However, this measure may not reflect the importance of the respective energy type in a country’s energy portfolio. For example, in Finland, Russian gas imports constitute 67% of gross available natural gas. However, natural gas is less than 7% of the country’s energy mix, thus the overall effect of Russian gas on the Finnish energy sector and economy is rather limited. To account for this, Figure 2 offers an overview of the contribution of Russian energy imports to the cumulative energy portfolio across the EU.

Both figures show that there is a large variation both in terms of the contribution of individual energy types and in terms of overall dependency on Russian fuels. For example, the latter is almost negligible for Cyprus and well over 50% for Lithuania (however, Figure 2 accounts for re-exports and, thus, overestimates the role of Russian energy imports for Lithuanian domestic available energy in 2020.

Figure 1. Share of Russian energy imports in gross available energy, by fuel, 2020.

Note: Gross available energy indicates the overall available energy supply on the territory of the country. It is defined as Gross available energy = Primary production + Recovered and recycled products + Imports – Exports + Change in stock. . In several EU member states natural gas transit may be included in the imports. As a result, the high share of Russian energy may reflect not only imports for consumption but also for transit, as well as fuels for refinement and further export (e.g. oil products in Estonia (cut at Figure 1, 285%), Lithuania (cut at Figure 1, 201%), Slovakia and Finland). Austrian data on natural gas imports from Russia are confidential and not represented in the diagram. Denmark and Croatia did not report Russian gas imports data for 2020 to Eurostat. Source: Eurostat

Figure 2. Share of Russian energy imports in total gross available energy, 2020. Source: Eurostat

Note: See Figure 1. Source: Eurostat

While the above data summarizes the EU dependency on Russian energy imports in volume terms, it is also useful to have a sense of the costs of this dependency. As we are not aware of any source that has accurate data on the value of imports across the EU states, we construct a back-of-the-envelope assessment of the costs of Russian energy imports to the EU in 2021 using the available trade data for 2021 and the allocation of imports across the EU Member States for 2020 (see Appendix 1 for more details). Admittedly, these estimates only account for the differences in prices of energy imports from Russia vs. other suppliers; it does not capture e.g., the difference in prices of Russian gas across the Member States. Still, they offer useful insight into the scope of these expenses, in levels (Figure 3) and the share of GDP (Figure 4).

The results suggest that, while the expenses are quite sizable – e.g., the total value of Russian fossil energy imports to the EU in 2021 exceeds 110 bln EUR, – they correspond to around 0.7% of European GDP. Again, there is variation across the Member States, but in most cases – effectively all cases that do not account for re-export – the share of Russian energy imports is below 2% of GDP.

Figure 3. Value of Russian fossil energy imports, bln EUR, 2021.

Source: Eurostat, GazpromExport, Central Bank of Russia, author’s own calculations, see Appendix 1.

Figure 4. Share of oil, oil products and gas imports in GDP, 2021.

Source: Eurostat, GazpromExport, Central Bank of Russia, author’s own calculations, see Appendix 1.

Figure 4 also touches upon the second source of vulnerability towards a ban on Russian energy, mentioned at the beginning of this section. It depicts not only the value of Russian oil and gas imports as a percent of GDP but the overall dependency on imports of oil and gas as a share of GDP. The larger this dependency is, the bigger is the impact of an increase in energy prices for a country. Figure 4 not only confirms the abovementioned variation across the Member States but also shows that some countries with little-to-moderate direct dependency on Russian oil and gas – e.g., Portugal or Spain, – are still likely to experience a sizable negative shock to their energy expenses due to the market price increase.

Importantly, these figures give only a very rough representation of the potential damage that a ban on Russian energy imports may cause to the EU economies. Two EU Member States with a comparable dependency could react to the shortage of Russian gas in very different ways, depending on a variety of other factors – the extent and scalability of domestic production, diversification of their remaining energy portfolio in terms of energy suppliers and types of oil the economy relies on (e.g., light vs. heavy), energy infrastructure (e.g., LNG regasification facilities or storage), consumption structure, etc. Le Coq and Paltseva (2009, 2012) discuss in detail some of these factors, and the possibilities to account for them. However, for the sake of simplicity, in this brief we focus on the (volume- and value-based) measures of dependency.

Potential Costs of Russian Energy Import Ban

In this section, we discuss the potential implications of banning imports of Russian oil and gas on the costs of fossil energy imports in the EU. We offer a few historical parallels in order to assess the potential scope of the price reaction to such a ban. Furthermore, we proceed to provide estimates of the costs of oil and gas imports across the EU Member States, would such sanctions be implemented.

Oil Imports Ban

We start with a potential ban on Russian oil and oil product imports. To put things in perspective, it might be useful to present some numbers. According to the IEA, Russia recently surpassed Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest oil and oil products exporter. In December 2021, global Russian crude and oil product exports constituted 7.8 million barrels per day (mb/d), with exports of crude oil and condensate at 5 mb/d. Out of the total 7.8 mb/d, exports to OECD countries constituted 5.6 mb/d, with crude oil exports amounting to 3.9 mb/d. Assuming that the size of the global oil market in 2021 returns to its pre-pandemic 2019 level (the actual data for 2021 global oil consumption is not available yet), Russian crude oil exports to the OECD constitute 8.6% of global crude exports. The corresponding figure for oil products is 6.8% (BP, 2021).

So, what would happen if the developed world – which for the purpose of this analysis we proxy by OECD – bans Russian oil exports? In the recent public discussion, many voices have compared this potential development to the 1973 oil crisis. This crisis was initiated by OAPEC’s – the Arab members of OPEC, – oil embargo on the US in response to their support of Israel during the Yom Kippur War. The OAPEC, the biggest group of oil exporters at the time, completely banned oil exports to the US (and a number of other western countries), and also introduced production restraints that affected the global oil market. The (WTI) oil price during this episode went up by a factor of three (see, e.g, Baumeister and Kilian, 2016).

However, a few important features are likely to differ between the oil crisis of 1973 and the potential impact of the Russian imports ban. First, the net loss of oil supplies during the Arab embargo was around 4.4 mb/d, which at that point constituted around 14% of traded oil (Yergin, 1992). Recall that Russian supplies to OECD are around half of this share. Moreover, it is likely that the ban would not lead to a complete withdrawal of these amounts from the market, but rather to a partial rerouting of Russian oil to Asia and, consequently, a readjustment of world oil trade flows. Second, Yergin (1992) points out that, at the time of the 1973 oil crisis, oil consumption was growing at 7.5% per year, which exacerbated the impact of the embargo. In contrast, the current assessments of oil demand growth are at around 2% per year (IEA, 2022). Third, the energy portfolios are much more diversified now than in 1973, with gas and renewables playing a more substantial role. In the case of an isolated oil imports ban (not extending to gas imports), this would argue in favor of a more moderate price impact. Finally, the oil embargo of 1973 was a never-seen-before episode in the history of the oil market. The uncertainty about future developments has likely contributed to the oil price increase. While there is substantial uncertainty associated with the impact of a Russian oil imports ban, it is arguably lower than in 1973. Based on these considerations, a three-fold oil price increase in the case of a Russian oil export ban seems highly unlikely.

As a possible lower bound of the price impact, one can consider a much more recent price shock brought about by drone attacks on the oil processing facilities Abqaiq and Khurais in Saudi Arabia in 2019. In the initial assessment of the damage, Saudi Arabian authorities stated that the attack decreased the national oil production by 5.7 mb/d – which is more than the total of Russian oil exports to OECD. As a reaction, the intraday oil price went up by 20 %, and the daily oil price by 12%. In two weeks, production and export capacity was almost back to normal and the price returned to pre-shock levels.

Notice that the scale of the daily shortage in this episode exceeds the likely shortage under the Russian imports ban. However, a moderate price reaction, in this case, was clearly driven by expectations for the temporary nature of the shortage, as the damage was to be repaired in a matter of a few weeks, if not days. In comparison, the Russian oil ban is likely to last much longer. In this way, a price increase of 12%, or even 20%, would be an underestimation of the effect of a Russian oil imports ban.

While the above discussion suggests some bounds for the possible price effects of a Russian oil ban, the uncertainty around such price developments is very high.  Figure 5 shows the cost estimates of oil and oil products imports to the EU for two potential price levels – $120/b, and $180/b. Each price would roughly correspond to an increase of 33%, and 100%, respectively, relative to the pre-invasion price of $90/b. In the estimation, we simplistically assume that the price of oil products increases by the same amount as the price of crude oil. We also assume that the missing Russian oil can be replaced by alternatives, such that oil consumption does not change compared to the 2021 level for the lower price scenario and that it decreases by 2% for the high-cost scenario due to the demand adjustments.

Figure 5. Estimated effect of Russian oil ban on oil and gas imports in 2022: value of oil and oil products imports, EUR bln (left axis), and oil import expenses relative to 2021 level (right axis).

Source: Eurostat, GazpromExport, Central Bank of Russia, author’s own calculations, see Footnote 1.

The estimates suggest that the total oil and oil products import costs for the EU would be just above EUR 640 bln for the $120/b price level and EUR 940 bln for the $180/b price level. Furthermore, the costs across the EU Member States would vary greatly depending on the size of the economy and its exposure to oil imports.

This shows that – provided that the Russian oil will be fully replaced but at a higher price – the expected cost of this is in the range of 1.7-1.9 times the 2021 expenses at 120$/b, and 2.5-2.8 times that if the price would be 180$/b. While there is some variation across Member States, mostly driven by the removal of the somewhat cheaper Russian oil from the consumption basket, it is rather limited. Figure 5 also demonstrates that the ban on Russian oil imports is going to affect not only countries that directly depend on Russian oil but also countries with large oil and oil products imports due to the market price effects.

Gas Imports Ban

Now we proceed to discuss the costs of banning Russian gas imports into the EU. While LNG has increased the fungibility of the natural gas market, it remains sizably segmented. Therefore, we concentrate on the effect on the European market.

Russian gas constituted around 39% of the EU gas consumption volumes in 2020, and just below 30% in 2021 due to restricted supply during the second half of the year (McWilliams, Sgaravatti and Zachmann, 2021). It is currently a common understanding that fully substituting 155 Bcm of Russian gas imports in 2021 with imports from other pipeline suppliers, LNG, storage, and increasing domestic production is not feasible in 2022. Different sources have given different estimates on the extent of the resulting shortage, see e.g. Table 1.

Table 1. Alternatives to replace EU imports of Russian natural gas

Source: Rystad Energy (2022a, 2022b), Fulwood et.al (2022), IEA (2022).

As shown in Table 1, the net missing gas consumption ranges between 12% and 22% across different scenarios. As there are no historical episodes in the gas market to which such a development can be compared, it is difficult to assess the potential price reaction. One rough comparison can be made based on the oil market situation during the Arab oil embargo of 1973 discussed above. Then, the net loss of oil constituted about 9% of the oil consumption in “the free world” (Yergin, 1982), even lower than the most optimistic prognosis in Table 1. However, 33 Mcb of Russian gas (or 6% of 2021 the EU’s gas consumption) has already been imported to the EU since the beginning of 2022, making the potential gas shortage quite comparable to the oil shortage of 1973. Subject to all differences between the two shocks, one can, perhaps, still argue that the gas price increase following a ban on Russian gas imports should not exceed three-fold from before the invasion.

It is important to stress here that the EU gas market situation in the case of the Russian gas embargo would be principally different from the oil market one. Due to supply shortage not coverable by the alternative gas sources, a gas embargo would lead not only to a stronger price increase than in the case of oil, but also to significant downward demand adjustments, rationing and, perhaps, even price controls. (This, again, parallels the developments during the 1973 oil crisis). The negative effect of such rationing is not accounted for by the import bill. On the contrary, a shortage of supply would imply lower gas import volumes, biasing the impact on the gas import bill downward. In this way, an import bill reaction to sanctions in the case of natural gas may more strongly underestimate the overall impact on the economy than in the case of oil.

While the above argument suggests a higher price increase in the case of a gas embargo in comparison to an oil ban, there is still a lot of uncertainty in forecasting the gas price. Figure 6 depicts the estimates for the natural gas cost across the EU for two potential price levels – EUR 160/Mwh, and EUR 240/Mwh, a two- and three-fold increase relative to the pre-invasion price level of EUR 80/Mwh. Both estimates assume a (moderate) 8% decrease in the demand reflecting the abovementioned supply shortage and demand adjustments. We assume that the shortage is affecting both the importers of Russian gas and those who use other suppliers due to the common gas market in the EU and the use of reverse flow technology – as was the case for Poland which was denied Russian gas on April 27th, 2022 due to not paying for it in Rubles (see Appendix 1 for a discussion of implications of this assumption).

Not surprisingly, the gas import costs increase drastically in comparison to 2021. The total figures for the EU would be just below EUR 680 bln in the two-fold price increase scenario, and exceed 1 trn EUR in the case of a three-fold increase, in contrast to EUR 185 bln in 2021. Again, the largest economies bear the highest costs in absolute value.

When it comes to the relative increase in gas import value, two further observations follow from Figure 6. First, there is a huge variation in the increase in the value of gas imports across the Member States, from no effect in Cyprus which does not import natural gas, to 7.7 times in the case of a price doubling and 11.5 times in the case of a price tripling. Again, this variation originates from the necessity to replace cheaper Russian gas with more expensive gas sources, and the effect is much stronger than for oil. However, just like in the oil case, the states not directly importing Russian gas will still experience a huge negative shock from such a price hike. (Recall also, that the variation of the impact across the Member States is likely underestimated here, as the gas bill does not account for potential rationing which may differentially impact the importers of Russian gas).

Second, the increase in the value of gas imports exceeds the scale of the price increase even for the least affected Member States (excluding Cyprus). This is due to the unprecedented gas price increase during the EU gas crisis that took place between late 2021 and the beginning of 2022. Due to this increase, the pre-invasion gas price in February 2022 was 60% higher than the average gas price in 2021.

Figure 6. Estimated effect of Russian natural gas ban on gas imports in 2022: value of gas imports, EUR bln (left axis), and gas import expenses relative to 2021 level (right axis).

Source: Eurostat, GazpromExport, Central Bank of Russia, author’s own calculations, see Footnote 1.

Conclusions

The above estimates suggest that a ban on Russian oil and gas imports is going to be costly for the EU. While uncertainty is very high concerning the possible energy price increase following such a ban, historical parallels together with the market characteristics suggest that both the price increase and the rise in the value of imports are going to be stronger for natural gas. The resulting increase in the EU-wide import values relative to 2021 ranges from 1.8 to 2.6 times for the considered oil scenarios, and from 3.7 to 5.5 times for the natural gas scenarios.

Unsurprisingly, the most sizable import costs will be faced by the larger EU Member States, as well as those most dependent on oil and gas imports. However, all EU countries are going to be affected due to the market price increase. While the relative rise in the import costs of oil and oil products will be fairly uniformly met across the EU states, the increase in the costs of gas exports will vary greatly, with the largest relative losses faced by the EU states that are currently more exposed to Russian gas imports.

The above figures provide a rough assessment of the potential costs of a Russian fossil fuels ban. The approach does not take into account substitutability between different fuels and resulting cross-effects on prices, which implies that the costs could be both under- and overestimated. It has a very limited and simplistic take on the demand reaction to a price increase, which again may lead to either over- or underestimation of the effect. Neither does it account for the consequences of such price increases on the costs of electricity and implications for the non-energy sector within the economies. The latter may, again, be differentially affected depending on the industrial composition and their relative energy intensity. Another factor to consider is the interconnectivity between the EU economies – for example, an increase in Germany’s energy bill is likely to have a large impact on the entire EU. Moreover, the use of the import bill as a proxy for the overall effect on the economy may have further limitations in the case of supply shortage and rationing. To provide a more precise estimate of the impact of such a ban on the entire economy, for instance on GDP, one would require an extensive and sophisticated model along the lines of the CGE approach, relying on large amounts of data (Bachmann et al. (2022) provide an excellent example of such a study of the effect on Germany). This, however, is beyond the scope of the current assessment.

Still, even this relatively simplistic assessment of import costs of a Russian energy ban offers sufficient food for thought for the discussion of the scale of damage across the EU Member States and the feasibility of oil and gas sanctions. For example, the assessment suggests that an oil ban is likely to yield relative parity across the Member States in terms of the increase in the 2022 oil import bill as compared to the 2021 level. This would imply that, were the EU to decide on a gradual sanctioning of Russian oil and gas, it would be easier to reach an EU-wide agreement on oil sanctions. In turn, moving away from Russian gas – due to either the decision to ban gas imports or retaliation from Russia in response to oil sanctions, -implies very uneven import cost exposure. Thus, to face the challenge of replacing Russian gas imports, the EU would likely need to implement some kind of energy solidarity mechanism.

References

  • Baumeister, C., & Lutz Kilian. (2016). “Forty Years of Oil Price Fluctuations: Why the Price of Oil May Still Surprise Us.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30 (1): 139-60.
  • Bachmann, R., D., Baqaee, C., Bayer, M., Kuhn, B., Moll, A., Peichl, K., Pittel & M. Schularick. (2022). “What if? The Economic Effects for Germany of a Stop of Energy Imports from Russia”, ECONtribute Policy Brief 28/2022.
  • BP. (2021). Statistical Review of World Energy
  • Chepeliev, M., T. Hertel and D. van der Mensbrugghe. (2022). “Cutting Russia’s fossil exports: Short-term pain for long-term gain”, VoxEU.org, 9 March.
  • Fulwood, M., Sharples J., & J. Henderson. (2022). ”Ukraine Invasion: What This Means for the European Gas Market”, The Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, March
  • Guriev, S. & O. Itskhoki. (2022). “The Economic Rationale for Oil and Gas Embargo on Putin’s Regime”.
  • IEA. (2022). “A 10-Point Plan to Reduce the European Union’s Reliance on Russian Natural Gas”.
  • Hilgenstock, B. & E. Ribakova. (2022). “Macro Notes – Russia Sanctions: A Possible Energy Embargo”, Institute of International Finance
  • Le Coq, C. & E. Paltseva. (2009). “Measuring the security of external energy supply in the European Union”, Energy Policy 37: 4474-4481.
  • Le Coq, C. & E. Paltseva. (2012). “Assessing Gas Transit Risks: Russia vs. the EU”, Energy Policy, 4: 642-650.
  • McWilliams, B., Sgaravatti G., Tagliapietra S., & Zachmann G. (2022). “Can Europe Survive Painlessly without Russian Gas?”, Bruegel, 27 February.
  • McWilliams, B., Sgaravatti G.,  & Zachmann G. (2021). “European Natural Gas Imports”, Bruegel Datasets
  • Rystad Energy. (2022a). “Energy Impact Report, Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, public version”, March 2
  • Rystad Energy. (2022b). “Energy Impact Report, Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, public version”, March 21
  • Stehn, S. J., Ball, S., Durre, A., Radde, S., Schnittker, C., Taddei, F. & Quadr, I. (2022). “The Impact of Gas Shortages on the European Economy”, Goldman Sachs, March
  • Y. Daniel. (1992). The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

German Dependence on Russian Energy, Economic Stress and Green Transition

Posted on April 5, 2022 | Videos

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The invasion of Ukraine has created a reassessment in many European governments of the risks that Russia inflicts on countries and the current world order. This has implications for both the military buildup and the reliance on trade and exchange with Russia in particular in the area of oil and gas.

Perhaps nowhere has this turnaround been more significant than in Germany. Probably the country within Europe that has maintained the closest business ties with Russia since 1991.

Anders Olofsgård, Deputy Director at the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, and Associate Professor at the Stockholm School of Economics discusses the turnaround of German policy towards Russia with Guido Friebel, Professor at the Goethe University in Frankfurt.

Professor Guido Friebel is also a Fellow at CEPR, IZA, a VP of SIOE, a founding member of the Organizational Economics Committee of the German Economic Association (VfS), and a member of the Scientific Advisory Board of Sciences Po, and of ConTrust at Goethe University. He also serves as a Scientific Director of CLBO. Before joining Goethe, I held positions at the Toulouse School of Economics and EHESS, and at SITE, Stockholm School of Economics.

Ukrainian Refugees in Poland: Current Situation and What to Expect

Posted on March 17, 2022 | Policy Brief

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The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has forced millions to flee from the war zone. This brief addresses Ukrainian refuge in Poland. It provides an overview of the current situation, discusses the ongoing solutions and potential future challenges, and stresses the key areas for urgent policy intervention. It is based on a presentation held at the FREE Network webinar Fleeing the war zone: Will open hearts be enough?, which took place on March 14, 2022. The full webinar can be seen here.

The latest data (from March 15, 2022) shows that since February 24, 1.8 million refugees have already crossed the Polish-Ukrainian border. This number represents over 60 percent of Ukrainians who have fled the country thus far. Among this group that relocated to Poland, approximately 97 percent were people with Ukrainian citizenship. Most of the foreign nationals living in Ukraine before the war, and who came to Poland after its outbreak, have already returned to their countries of origin.

Figure 1. The influx of refugees from Ukraine to Poland since February 24, 2022.

Note: The vertical axis shows the number of refugees per million. Source: Data from Polish Border Guard

Our estimates show that there are currently about 1.1 million Ukrainian war refugees in Poland. Many stay in large cities such as Warsaw, Kraków or Wrocław. The rest of those who crossed the Polish border transited to the other EU Member States or countries outside of Europe, such as Canada or the USA, reuniting with their families and friends.

In the first days after the outbreak of the war, refugee assistance in Poland was mostly provided by Polish families and households, as well as owners of guesthouses and hotels who made them available for the purpose of providing accommodation.

A similar situation took place at the border and at railway and bus stations where refugees were arriving, with a majority of support coming from volunteering citizens. This assistance largely consisted of the provision of basic necessities such as food, hygiene products, and medical or psychological first aid. The level of mobilization among non-governmental organizations, grass-roots initiatives, private citizens, and civil society, in general, is extremely commendable and should be accredited with providing the safe welcome refugees received upon arrival. For example, during the first days, Polish families sheltered several hundred thousand refugees, often in their own houses or apartments. There are currently two main Ukrainian social groups arriving in Poland: women with children and older persons over the age of 60. This is a result of Ukraine’s internal regulations, which prohibit men aged between 18 and 60 from leaving the country.

Among those who have managed to escape the war, there is a large group of people requiring very specialized support, e.g. children suffering from oncological diseases, and elderly with a high degree of disability. So far, these groups have been provided with the necessary support, but if these needs become more frequent, a review of the capacity of the Polish healthcare system and the system of support for the disabled will be needed.

In the first days after the war broke out, the situation at the border was very difficult. The waiting time for crossing reached up to 70 hours. However, this was related to problems with the information system and the limited number of border guards on the Ukrainian side. Currently, crossing the border is quick and seamless. Every day the Polish Border Police register 80 to 100 thousand individuals, a vast majority of them crossing into Poland. This is a many-fold increase compared to pre-war migration flows, which fluctuated around 12-15 thousand people per day. At the same time, over 80.000 people, mainly men, have crossed the Polish border to Ukraine in the last 20 days with the goal of joining the army or territorial defense.

For a long time, the Polish government held the position that there would be no need to build refugee centers. However, the government recently reversed this decision and decided to open a dozen centers, located in market and sports halls. Currently, over 100,000 people are staying in these types of temporary accommodation facilities. However, these centers are not sufficiently adapted for stays longer than a few days. It is necessary to prepare housing infrastructure (temporary accommodation centers equipped with habitable containers) in which refugees can stay for two or three months until they find another place to live.

So far, Poland has essentially dealt with two of three possible migratory waves. In the first, people with family members or friends living in Poland or in other EU Member States arrived. Before the war, there were already approximately 800 thousand Ukrainians working or studying in Poland. In the second wave, after the bombing of civilian facilities in large cities, people without family or friends living in Poland started arriving. They require full assistance. A third wave is possible, and this one may be much larger than the previous two. It may occur if the situation at the front worsens and the repressions by Russian troops become harsher. Such reports are already coming from eastern Ukraine. If the situation worsens, Poland could even face a couple of additional million people that would leave Ukraine. Under these circumstances, we should assume that the third wave would include young men in addition to women, children, and the elderly. This scenario is currently very unlikely, but cannot be completely ruled out.

Since the beginning of March, Poland has seen an increase in the activity of both local representatives of the government administration and the central government. Information has been gathered about vacancies in smaller cities and local communities where refugees could be accommodated. This is because large cities are on the verge of reaching their capacity for the number of refugees they are able to manage. In addition, a special law entered into force on March 13, which provides for a catalogue of support tools for refugees. The main issues are:

1. The possibility of obtaining an individual identification number, which will enable the opening of a bank account and grant access to the labor market, education, and social benefits. It will be possible to apply for the ID number from March 16. Certainly, large queues can be expected in the first days, as the procedure is complicated and rather bureaucratic. The government decided to require all the necessary information at the start of the application process, which could be complicated for some applicants and lead to additional delays. Based on recent numbers, up to 1 million Ukrainians may apply for an individual identification number in the near future.

2. Reimbursement of the costs of hosting refugees from Ukraine in Polish family homes and in private hotels. The government has agreed to cover the value of around 8 euros per day for each person. However, receiving this refund requires submitting a special application to the local administration offices, which may again cause various kinds of perturbations, and even resignation from obtaining such support.

3. Ukrainian children can be enrolled in Polish schools. It will also be possible to open school branches in temporary accommodation centers, as well as parallel Ukrainian classes inside Polish schools. At present, however, the preferred model is the inclusion of Ukrainian children in Polish classrooms. Currently, no major problems have been reported with this process, but only around 10% of Ukrainian children have entered Polish schools so far. Numerous challenges connected with this integration process are expected. Part of the solution could be distance learning or hybrid learning. The priority is to involve children in education as fast as possible so that they do not lose time while living in Poland from an educational development point of view.

4. A simplified system of qualifications recognition has been implemented for nurses and doctors. Unfortunately, contrary to the advice of experts, the act does not provide guidelines for a simplified qualification recognition of teachers, educators or psychologists from Ukraine. In his media statements, the Minister of Education and Science did not rule out introducing a simplified procedure in the near future. Such recognition could, to some extent, solve the problem of understaffing in Polish schools.

5. All adults from Ukraine who arrived after February 24 have open access to the labor market.

Until early March, the Polish government did not apply for support from other EU member states. Now, this position has changed. Over the first weekend of March alone, more than 20 trains were organized that made it possible for refugees interested in moving from Poland to countries such as Germany or other destinations within the EU. Additional relocation measures are expected in the near future. However, in contrast to the European migrant crisis in 2015, the relocation scheme of Ukrainian refugees is carried out on a voluntary, rather than a compulsory basis.

It is very difficult to predict what will happen in the next days or weeks. While it should be emphasized that Poland is managing the migration challenge well, this is not least due to the exceptional commitment of civil society. Certainly, in the coming months, Poland will not be able to cope with the integration of more than 800.000 people into the labor market and education system. Of course, it is possible to provide ad-hoc support, but that is completely different than integrating refugees into Polish society. Ukrainians are still treated as guests who are expected to return to their homes when possible. Such an assumption should not be changed until May when the situation in Ukraine will be more predictable. We must also be aware that we are dealing with dispersed families who will want to reunite as soon as possible. It is not known, however, whether this will take place in Poland or in Ukraine. It depends on how the situation develops in the weeks and months to come.

In the coming weeks, the key issue will be the relocation of Ukrainian refugees from large to smaller cities within not only Poland but also the European Union. It is absolutely necessary to coordinate activities both at the level of the Polish government and the European Commission. As far as the Polish government is concerned, a task force should be established to maintain constant contact with the European Commission and the EU Member States regarding the ability to relocate refugees from Poland to other countries. This team should be composed mainly of civil servants from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior. It is also necessary to appoint a team coordinating the actions of voivodes, who are responsible for crisis management in accordance with Polish law. It is also critical to ensure the flow of information between local administrations and the government, as well as to coordinate the activities of non-governmental organizations, whose activity is key in dealing with the challenges related to the migration crisis. In the next stages, it will be necessary to adopt a systemic approach to the inclusion of Ukrainian children in the education system (Polish and Ukrainian, but functioning in Poland – remote learning), and adult refugees to the labor market.

In the end, I would like to recall my opinion, which is now popular in the media and among representatives of the central government, local governments and non-governmental organizations: “Helping refugees and managing migration crises is a marathon, not a sprint.” We must keep this in mind.

The webinar “Fleeing the war zone: Will open hearts be enough?”, was hosted by the FREE Network together with the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) and can be seen here.

Fleeing the War Zone: Will Open Hearts be Enough?

Posted on March 11, 2022 |

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The invasion of the Russian Federation in Ukraine has resulted in the loss of lives and destruction of infrastructure and has forced millions to flee from the war zone. 

Program

By March 9th 2022 over 2,1 million people have found refuge outside of Ukraine and many more have been displaced within its borders. The UNHCR estimates the total number of those forced to flee Ukraine may grow to 4 million. 

Join the webinar on March 14 to discuss the consequences of the invasion for the Ukrainian population with:

Registration

The webinar will be available to join via the Zoom platform. However, registration is required. Please register via Zoom (click here). After registration, you will receive a confirmation email which includes the Zoom link and passcode.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed during events, seminars and conferences are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Securing Women’s Safety at the Time of War

Posted on March 8, 2022 | FROGEE PROJECT, News

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On this year’s International Women’s Day, we would like to draw attention to the women impacted by the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation. Evidence from other armed conflicts suggests that women are particularly vulnerable both at the site of the war and in displacement, and that gender-based violence heightens in conflict and post-conflict societies. With this in mind, the international community should pay particular attention to protection, support and well-being of affected women in this tragic time.

The invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation sets a tragic background for this year’s International Women’s Day. The war has resulted in the loss of human life as well as suffering and displacement of hundreds of thousands of individuals. By March 6th 2022 over 1,5 million people fled Ukraine to neighbouring countries, while Russian forces have indiscriminately targeted Ukrainian towns and cities and failed to establish safety corridors for the civilian population and for humanitarian support. There exists extensive evidence that military conflicts put women at particular risk. This is the case both at the site of direct military confrontation, as well as a consequence of vulnerabilities generated by the need to flee their home. While one is clearly most concerned about the most direct expressions of gender-based violence, such as rape, sexual abuse or beating, we should also bear in mind that gender-based violence often takes the form of non-physical mistreatment, psychological pressure, or limitations on individual freedoms and displacement (Wirtz et al, 2014).

Indeed, the use of sexual violence during armed conflicts is by now broadly understood as a premeditated and deliberate technology of war, rather than the brutal expression of some base instinct triggered by the stress of conflict situations (Skjelsbaek, 2001), and there is evidence that aggressors from societies that are more gender-unequal are more likely to use it (Taylor, 1999; Meger, 2016, Guarnieri and Tur-Prats, 2020). Also, after fleeing conflict zones the spectre of sexual and gender-based violence follows displaced populations: the risk for sexual violence is heightened in refugee camps (Araujo et al, 2019). Further, it has been shown that rates of intimate partner violence during complex emergencies are much higher than rates of wartime sexual violence perpetrated outside of homes (Stark and Ager, 2011), and that domestic violence may be exacerbated by conflict and displacement (Wirtz et al, 2014).

Thus, the international community, the governments of countries which welcome families escaping the war, and the countless organised and improvised support groups, ought to pay particular attention to the risks to the welfare of women at this extraordinary time.

All agencies involved in assisting the Ukrainian population, both within and outside its borders, should be particularly aware of broad aspects of gender-based violence which the international academic community has been stressing for Securing women’s safety at the time of war the last few decades. As the war continues the international community, the governments of the host countries, and the European Union ought to ensure that:

  • Women and vulnerable groups that want or need to leave conflict zones are allowed to do so in a safe way.
  • All perpetrators of violence, including sexual violence, are eventually brought to justice. For this, there should be no question of impunity. For this to be possible safe spaces, infrastructure and reporting practices need to be established and enforced.
  • As per UN Security Council Resolution 1820 (first applied to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2008) sexual violence ought to be used as part of the designation criteria in sanctions regimes. This implies that “targeted and graduated” measures can be imposed against warring factions who commit rape and other forms of violence against women and girls.
  • Refugee women are involved in the design, management or leadership of gender-based violence protection measures in refugee camps, if such were to be established (UNHCR, 2011)
  • Training programmes concerning gender-based violence, including sexual violence, and available legal mechanisms to prevent it are provided for volunteers, staff and refugees to minimize the risk for fleeing women (Spangaro et al 2013).
  • In the medium and longer term, in case of an inability to return to their homes, host countries facilitate legal work among refugees to avoid a cycle of vulnerability that may lead displaced women to seek precarious means of earning income (Ray et al. 2009).
  • Social support through individual or group therapy and skilled support groups is offered to reduce mental distress (Willman, 2013).

As we await the peaceful end of the invasion of Ukraine and the safe return of hundreds of thousands of families to their homes, may this year’s International Women’s Day be a day of reflection and resolution on appropriate means and strategies to prevent and combat sexual and gender-based violence, both on the scene of the the armed conflict as well as against all women who find refuge from the war in foreign countries.

On March 7th 2022 the FREE Network was planning to host a conference on “Economic and social context of domestic violence” as part of the Forum for Research on Gender Economics (FROGEE). The conference has been postponed until representatives of all the FREE Network institutes can safely participate. The FROGEE project is supported by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).

References

The Sanctions on Russia, and Their Impact on the Region

Posted on March 1, 2022 |

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As fighting across Ukraine escalates and the international community reacts, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) and the FREE Network invite you to join the webinar “The sanctions on Russia, and their impact on the region” on 3 March, 17:00 – 18:00 CET Stockholm.

The Sanctions on Russia, and Their Impact on the Region

Torbjörn Becker, Director of SITE will be joined by Larry Samuelson, Professor at Yale and Cowles Foundation, Lev Lvovsky, BEROC Research Fellow, Nataliia Shapoval, Chairman of KSE Institute and Yaroslava V. Babych, Academic Director of ISET Policy Institute and other experts with extensive policy experience for a live discussion about the economic effects of sanctions in Russia and the region.

Registration

Everyone is invited to join the webinar. Please use the Zoom registration platform to register (click here). After registration, you will receive a confirmation email which includes the Zoom link and passcode. Please also check the spam folder, not to miss the registration access details.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed during events, seminars and conferences are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

A War No One Wants? The Political Economy of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Posted on February 11, 2022 |

Russian soldiers in military truck convoy representing conflict between Russia and Ukraine

The Forum for Research on Eastern Europe and Emerging Economies (FREE Network) with two of its members, the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE) and the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), will host an online seminar and discussion on the risk of war between Russia and Ukraine and potential consequences of military confrontation.

The Risk of War Between Russia and Ukraine

How can so many think that there will be a war between Russia and Ukraine when it is so hard to see any winner in such a war. Can the political gains for Russia’s leaders really outweigh the loss of a good neighbour, significant economic sanctions that will undermine growth for years to come and the failure of a new gas connection to Europe? What is the logic of the President of Russia and how does Russian public opinion perceive the war? What will be the response to further aggression in Ukraine as well as in the rest of Europe and the US? There are many questions but few hard answers, but the event will provide some thinking on these and other issues.

Seminar Speakers

Registration

The seminar will take place on 17 February 2022, from 17.00-18.30, CET (Stockholm time). The seminar will be organised via the Zoom platform and will be open to the public through digital channels. However, registration is required. Please register via the Eventbrite registration platform (click here). The Zoom link and passcode will be sent to your registered email account a few hours before the start of the online seminar.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed during events, seminars and conferences are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.