Location: Russia
Record-Breaking Russian Budget Deficit as Oil Revenues Collapse and Economy Stalls
The record-breaking Russian budget deficit has become a central challenge for the country’s economy in 2025. Consequently, falling oil and gas revenues have collided with soaring government spending, pushing the fiscal gap to record levels. Moreover, analysts warn that this trend highlights the increasing strain on Moscow’s financial system and its ability to maintain stability. Therefore, the latest KSE Institute report stresses that these pressures will continue shaping Russia’s economic outlook in the months ahead.
A Record-Breaking Russian Budget Deficit
The Russian budget deficit reached 4.9 trillion rubles in January through July 2025, or 129% of the full-year target (KSE Institute, August 2025). Furthermore, this shortfall is 4.5 times larger than during the same period in 2024 and exceeds all recent records.
The growing Russian budget deficit highlights worsening fiscal stress, fueled by weak oil revenues and expanding government spending. As a result, Brent crude is projected to fall near 60 dollars per barrel by year-end, which will increase fiscal pressure. Consequently, Moscow will likely miss its 3.8 trillion ruble target.
Analysts warn that financing the gap will drain sovereign reserves and require more debt issuance. However, both approaches carry lasting economic risks. In addition, the imbalance raises concerns about economic stability under sanctions and falling global energy prices.
Oil and Gas Revenues Slump Despite Stable Exports
Russia’s oil export volumes remain steady. However, oil and gas revenues fell 19% year-on-year in the first seven months of 2025 (Bank of Russia). Although July saw a temporary boost from quarterly tax payments, this did not reverse the decline. Revenues were still 27% below July 2024.
Export earnings rose to 14.3 billion dollars in July, thanks to a brief oil price rise. Russian export prices averaged 60 dollars per barrel, the G7 price cap. Nevertheless, markets expect weaker global oil prices in late 2025 and early 2026. That trend would deepen the Russian budget deficit.
Debt Issuance Grows as Welfare Fund Shrinks
The Ministry of Finance issued 3.0 trillion rubles in OFZ bonds between January and July, a 114% increase from 2024 (MinFin). Moreover, yields remain low, which shows continued demand from domestic banks.
At the same time, the liquid portion of the National Welfare Fund fell to 4.0 trillion rubles, or 48 billion dollars, in July. The government also sold about 16% of its gold reserves (KSE Institute, August 2025). As a result, analysts caution that liquid NWF reserves could run out within a year. This would leave Russia more vulnerable to its growing budget deficit.
Inflation Moderates but Growth Falters
Inflation slowed to 8.8% in July, down from double-digit levels earlier in 2025 (Central Bank of Russia). Consequently, policymakers cut the key interest rate by 300 basis points to 18%. This marks the beginning of limited monetary easing.
However, the gains come at a cost. GDP growth fell to 1.1% year-on-year in the second quarter, down from 1.4% in the first. On a quarterly basis, growth stalled completely. In addition, severe limits on labor and capital remain. Forecasts from the IMF, OECD, and World Bank predict weaker growth in 2025 and 2026.
A Fragile Outlook for Russia’s Economy
The August 2025 Chartbook shows an economy under serious strain. Oil revenues are weak, expenditures are high, reserves are shrinking, and growth is slow.
With sanctions tightening and global oil prices falling, Moscow may depend heavily on domestic borrowing and possibly money creation. Both options aim to fund military spending and social programs. Ultimately, analysts conclude that the Russian budget deficit is unsustainable and threatens fiscal stability heading into 2026.
Record-Breaking Russian Budget Deficit: Insights, Experts, and Further Resources
Explore Other Editions of KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – August 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – July 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – June 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – May 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – April 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – March 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – February 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – January 2025
Meet the Researchers
- Benjamin Hilgenstock — KSE Institute.
- Yuliia Pavytska — KSE Institute.
- Matvii Talalaievskyi — KSE Institute.
Additional Reading
Explore other policy papers and reports on Ukraine’s economic transition and development on the KSE Institute’s website. Read more policy briefs on Eastern Europe and emerging economies on the FREE Network’s website.
Benjamin Hilgenstock on Trump’s New Sanctions Threat Over Russian Oil
In a recent Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty article, experts analyzed U.S. President Donald Trump’s call for NATO members to halt imports of Russian crude oil as a condition for Washington to impose tougher sanctions on Moscow. The proposal would primarily impact Turkey, Hungary, and Slovakia, the only NATO countries still purchasing Russian oil.
“Trump’s threats have so far been directed mostly at India and, to some extent, China. Turkey was never really part of that conversation, so this marks an interesting new development,” said Benjamin Hilgenstock, Senior Economist at the KSE Institute.
Turkey’s Crucial Role in Russian Oil Imports
The report underscores that Turkey is now the world’s third-largest importer of Russian crude, benefiting from steep price discounts and profitable refining operations that supply European markets. However, analysts warn that Ankara’s deep energy dependence on Moscow, coupled with its delicate political balancing act between Russia and the United States, could make compliance with Trump’s demands especially challenging.
Hilgenstock noted that cutting off Turkey’s imports would likely force Russia to offer even deeper discounts to attract alternative buyers, further straining its already fragile economy. Still, he emphasized that the political costs for NATO members to take such a step remain significant.
Further Reading
To explore Benjamin Hilgenstock’s full commentary and gain deeper insight into Trump’s evolving sanctions strategy against Russia, read the full article.
Energy exports remain central to Russia’s economy, serving as a key tool of geopolitical leverage. Sanctions on Russia’s energy sector aim to curb state revenues and reduce its influence over dependent nations. Discover the latest data and research on Russia sanctions and energy policy in the Sanctions Portal Evidence Base.
For more expert insights and economic analysis from KSE Institute, visit the KSE Institute homepage.
Torbjörn Becker on Russia’s Hidden Economic Troubles
As Western leaders consider new sanctions on Russia, The Guardian sheds light on Russia’s hidden economic troubles and growing doubts about Moscow’s ability to sustain its war-driven economy. The article examines President Donald Trump’s renewed threats of financial measures and the ongoing debate among U.S. and EU officials over coordinated sanctions.
Despite extensive restrictions since 2022, Russia’s economy continues to function. But experts warn that the reality may be far worse than official data suggest.
“Russia’s official economic data are questionable. The situation is worse than it appears. Inflation and deficits are understated, and GDP is overstated. Russia will struggle to maintain the war at its current level by mid-2026,” said Torbjörn Becker, Director of the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE).
The Guardian report also examines the limits of current sanctions, loopholes in the oil and gas trade, and the role of non-Western intermediaries that help Moscow circumvent restrictions. With Trump signaling openness to “major sanctions” if NATO allies align, analysts emphasize that political unity and global coordination will be critical to any future economic pressure on Russia.
Read the full article and Torbjörn Becker’s expert analysis in The Guardian / CNN Prima News.
Further Reading
Energy exports remain central to Russia’s economy, serving as a major source of geopolitical leverage. Sanctions targeting the Russian energy sector aim to reduce state revenues and curb Moscow’s global influence. Explore the latest research on sanctions, energy exports, and Russia’s economy in the Sanctions Portal Evidence Base.
For more economic insights and expert commentary, visit the SITE website.
Russia Budget Deficit Surges as Oil Revenues Fall
Russia’s public finances are under strain as oil and gas revenues slide. The budget deficit of Russia has ballooned in 2025, while spending keeps rising. Buffers like the National Welfare Fund are shrinking, and growth is stalling. These findings come from the KSE Institute’s August 2025 Russia Chartbook by Benjamin Hilgenstock, Yuliia Pavytska, and Matvii Talalaievskyi.
What’s Driving the Gap: Context Behind the Numbers
Russia’s oil export earnings rose to $14.3 billion in July, supported by slightly higher global oil prices that kept Russian export prices near $60 per barrel. Still, the global oil market outlook points to lower prices for Russian exports through the rest of this year and into the first half of 2026. As a result, budgetary pressures are expected to persist. While oil and gas revenues increased in July compared to June due to quarterly tax payments, they were more than 30% lower in May–July than during the same period last year. Extraction tax receipts remain very weak and are unlikely to recover soon.
Challenging Outlook for Russian Oil and Gas Exports
Sanctions are increasingly squeezing Russia’s ability to move oil abroad. The number of sanctioned shadow tankers has climbed to 535, with 124 of them directly listed by the EU, UK, and US. This means that nearly two-thirds of the shadow fleet is now under sanctions, raising pressure on Moscow’s export routes.
Stronger enforcement will be key, as gaps still allow some shipments to move despite restrictions. In July, the shadow fleet’s share in Russian oil exports rose slightly, likely helped by higher global prices. This suggests that Russia is leaning even more on risky channels to keep its oil flowing, leaving its energy revenues vulnerable to tighter controls in the months ahead.
Russian Budget Deficit Deepens as Revenues Fall
Russia’s public finances came under heavy strain in July. The monthly budget deficit soared to 1.5 trillion rubles, driven by weak oil and gas revenues combined with surging expenditures.
This pushed the cumulative shortfall for January–July 2025 to 4.9 trillion rubles, a sharp increase from just 1.1 trillion during the same period in 2024. Alarmingly, the deficit has already reached 129% of the full-year target set after the most recent budget revision.
The rapid deterioration highlights how falling energy revenues and rising spending are creating mounting fiscal risks for Moscow.
Key Research Findings
- Oil and gas revenues fell 19% year over year, while expenditures jumped 21%, driving the Russian budget deficit wider.
- The liquid part of the National Welfare Fund is about 4.0 trillion rubles and could be used up within 6–12 months.
- Domestic debt issuance (OFZ) reached 3.0 trillion rubles in Jan–Jul, with falling yields showing strong bank demand.
- Growth slowed to 1.1% year over year in Q2, signaling a stalling economy; inflation eased to 8.8% while the policy rate stands at 18%.
What it Means: Risks and Next Steps
If oil prices drift toward $60 Brent into 2026, budget pressure will persist. The state may lean more on domestic borrowing and the National Welfare Fund, raising financial stability risks as buffers thin. With limited labor and capital, output has little room to grow, and policy goals clash: restrain prices or fund spending. Further monitoring of the Russian budget deficit and oil price trends is essential.
Meet The Researchers
- Benjamin Hilgenstock — KSE Institute.
- Yuliia Pavytska — KSE Institute.
- Matvii Talalaievskyi — KSE Institute.
Read The Full Report
Explore the full findings and detailed analysis by reading the complete report on the KSE Institute’s website. Additionally, you can view more policy briefs from the KSE Institute on the FREE Network’s website.
Explore Other Editions of KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – August 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – July 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – June 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – May 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – April 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – March 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – February 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – January 2025
Corporate Complicity: Global Firms Funded Russia with $20B in 2024
A new report by the KSE Institute and B4Ukraine reveals that many global corporations continued doing business in Russia throughout 2024. These companies paid $20 billion in taxes to the Russian government, indirectly helping fund the war. This corporate complicity has drawn widespread criticism for undermining sanctions and supporting aggression.
Global Business and War: A Dangerous Link
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the international response included economic sanctions and public pressure for firms to exit Russia. Yet as of mid-2025, only 12% of global firms had fully withdrawn. 1377 firms or 33% have officially declared that they are completely shutting down, or have announced they are temporarily reducing operations, but haven’t yet fully exited. A staggering 55% remain active in Russia, paying taxes, generating profit, and keeping operations running.
Many companies claim to have paused or scaled back operations. However, their tax contributions tell another story. In 2024 alone, foreign firms earned $201 billion in Russia and paid $20 billion in taxes—enough to fund more than one million soldiers based on Russia’s $18,400 recruitment bonus per soldier.
Why Companies Choose to Stay
Some firms chose profits over principles. The finance and consumer goods sectors led the way, with banks and brands like PepsiCo, Nestlé, and Mars topping revenue and tax lists. Despite early promises to leave, many companies either delayed their exit or quietly expanded. Others, like Mondelez and Coca-Cola, have been accused of masking their continued presence with rebranding or shifting operations to subsidiaries.
Key Research Findings on Corporate Complicity
- In 2024, foreign companies earned $201 billion and paid $20 billion in taxes to Russia.
- Only 12% of firms fully exited the Russian market; 55% stayed.
- U.S. and EU firms paid more than $3.8 billion in profit taxes combined.
- The finance and consumer sectors were the top contributors to the Russian war economy.
Western Values Undermined by Business-as-Usual
The report argues that continued business in Russia by Western firms directly undermines their governments’ aid to Ukraine. Companies headquartered in the U.S., Germany, and France are among the largest contributors to Russia’s tax base.
The report highlights that increasing numbers of foreign firms have stopped publishing their financial reports, a trend particularly noticeable among large corporations. Of the 100 largest foreign companies operating in Russia in 2021, 86 disclosed their financials in 2023. This number has halved in 2024 to just 43. The decision not to disclose financial statements may reflect an effort by companies to avoid further reputational damage linked to the scale of their economic support for the war effort.
Read the Full Report
Explore the full findings and detailed analysis by reading the complete report on the Kyiv School of Economics website. Additionally, you can view more policy briefs from the KSE Institute on the FREE Network’s website.
Learn More About the Russian War Economy and Sanctions
To learn more about Western sanctions and Russia’s countermeasures, visit the Sanctions Timeline. And for details on sanctions imposed on Russia and their effects, see the Evidence Base section of the sanctions portal. Explore more policy briefs on sanctioning Russia here.
Russian War Economy Faces Slowdown Despite Resilience
Since 2022, the Russian economy has surprised many with its resilience under Western sanctions. Growth was fueled by wartime spending and high energy revenues. Now, signs suggest this “war bump” is fading. In a recent Financial Times interview, Elina Ribakova explains why the Russian war economy faces serious challenges ahead. Elina Ribakova is vice-president for foreign policy at the Kyiv School of Economics. She spoke with Sam Fleming, economics editor at the Financial Times.
Sanctions and Short-Term Resilience
When Western nations imposed sanctions on Russia, many expected a collapse. Instead, wartime spending and high oil revenues propped up growth. Ribakova notes that Russia’s ability to redirect resources into military production created a temporary boom. But this resilience came at the cost of long-term growth in the Russian war economy.
Why the Russian War Economy Is Slowing
Russia is now hitting hard limits. Labor shortages, soaring inflation, and overstretched industrial capacity are beginning to bite. Ribakova points out that unemployment has fallen to unsustainably low levels, while non-military sectors are stagnating. Even the defense industry, once booming, is showing signs of strain across the Russian war economy.
China’s Critical Role
One reason Russia has endured sanctions is its growing reliance on China. Ribakova highlights how Chinese exports—from consumer goods to vital military components—have allowed Moscow to sustain its war economy. Yet this partnership is highly lopsided: for China, Russia is a marginal partner; for Russia, China is a lifeline.
The Postwar Challenge
Looking ahead, Ribakova warns that ending the war will not mean an easy recovery. Russia faces deep demographic challenges, heavy reliance on military production, and decades of failed economic diversification. Rebuilding a sustainable postwar economy may prove “devastatingly hard” for the Russian war economy.
Listen to the Original Interview
The slowdown of the Russian war economy is more than an economic story; it shapes global energy markets, security, and geopolitics. To hear the full conversation and Ribakova’s detailed analysis, listen to the original Financial Times interview here.
Learn More About the Russian War Economy and Sanctions
To learn more about Western sanctions and Russia’s countermeasures, visit the Sanctions Timeline. And for details on sanctions imposed on Russia and their effects, see the Evidence Base section of the sanctions portal. Explore more policy briefs on sanctioning Russia here.
Are the Sanctions on Russia Finally Working?
Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine is now in its fourth year. In recent weeks, President Donald Trump has held several high-level meetings to explore ways to end the conflict. How serious are these efforts, and what would it take to ensure Ukraine’s long-term security?
When Russian forces invaded in February 2022, many expected Western sanctions to cripple Moscow’s economy and limit its ability to fight. Yet, Russia’s economy has remained surprisingly strong. What explains this resilience? And what could the international community have done differently?
Today, signs of economic slowdown are becoming clear in Russia. Could this downturn finally start to weaken the Kremlin’s war machine? What effect might a recession have on the battlefield? And how can Ukraine’s allies keep supporting the country while preparing for reconstruction and future EU membership?
These questions were discussed by:
- Cecilia Malmström, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
- Torbjörn Becker, Director of the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics at the Stockholm School of Economics,
- Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, Nonresident Senior Fellow at PIIE.
For more information about the event, visit the Peterson Institute for International Economics.
To learn more about sanctions on Russia and Russian economic retaliation, explore the SITE Sanctions Project — a hub that collects, organizes, and shares insights, data, and analysis on the evolving landscape of sanctions against Russia.
EU Adopts 18th Sanctions Package Against Russia to Cut War Funding
The European Union has adopted its 18th sanctions package against Russia, marking one of the toughest measures since the start of the war in Ukraine. The new package targets Russia’s oil revenues, banking system, and trade routes that have been used to bypass earlier restrictions. Slovakia had initially blocked the move but lifted its veto after negotiations. The authors of the package described it as crucial to closing loopholes and weakening Russia’s wartime economy.
Why the EU Tightened Sanctions?
Russia has repeatedly adapted to previous sanctions by finding new trade partners and exploiting loopholes. As a result, the EU introduced the 18th sanctions package against Russia to strengthen enforcement rather than create entirely new bans. Sanctions are part of a constant economic battle, with the EU closing gaps as Russia discovers new ways to evade them.
What are the Main Goals of the New Package?
The 18th sanctions package focuses on reducing Russia’s energy income and financial resources. It aims to block the shadow fleet of tankers, target Russian banks, and restrict access to military technology.
What are the New Measures of the 18th Sanctions Package?
- The oil price cap has been lowered to about $47.6 per barrel, with dynamic adjustments.
- Imports of refined oil made from Russian crude in third countries are now banned.
- Twenty-two more Russian banks face transaction bans, including those linked to Nord Stream projects.
- Over 105 new vessels were blacklisted, bringing the “shadow fleet” count to more than 400.
- Export restrictions on military-use technology have been tightened.
- Sanctions now extend to third-country actors helping Russia evade restrictions.
- New limits on liquefied natural gas (LNG) aim to reduce Russia’s long-term energy revenues.
Why These Measures Matter?
The 18th sanctions package against Russia is not just about new bans; it is about ensuring old rules work. Energy is still Russia’s biggest source of money, and cutting this income weakens its ability to fund the war. However, Russia has proven resilient by redirecting oil exports to Asia, relying on smuggling networks, and depleting its National Wealth Fund to cover deficits.
To learn more about the 18th sanctions package, how Russia is adapting, what tools the EU has left, how well the EU is responding to Russian countermeasures, and how long Russia can hold out, visit the Sanctions Hub—a website that collects data and insights on sanctions against Russia and its economic retaliation (read more).
To learn more about Western sanctions and Russia’s countermeasures, visit the Sanctions Timeline. And for details on sanctions imposed on Russia and their effects, see the Evidence Base section of the sanctions portal.
Russia Budget Deficit Nears Full-Year Target in Just Six Months
Russia’s budget deficit has surged to alarming levels, hitting 97% of its full-year target by mid-2025. Falling oil and gas revenues, combined with a sharp rise in government spending, are putting unprecedented strain on the country’s finances. The Russia budget deficit is now the largest for the first half of any year since the war began. The findings come from a new report by Benjamin Hilgenstock, Yuliia Pavytska, and Matvii Talalaievskyi of the KSE Institute.
Economic Strains Push Russia’s Finances to the Brink
In early 2025, low global oil prices dealt a major blow to Russia’s revenue streams. Although prices briefly spiked in June due to Middle East tensions, they soon fell back to $50–55 per barrel. This sustained drop cut oil and gas income by 17% year-on-year, leaving the government struggling to meet budget plans and worsening the Russia budget deficit.
Mounting Pressure on State Finances
By June, the budget deficit had climbed to 3.7 trillion rubles—over five times higher than in the same period of 2024. Government spending rose 20%, while non-oil revenues increased by just 13%. The Russia budget deficit has already nearly equaled the planned total for the year, making it almost certain the target will be missed.
Key Research Findings
- The Russian budget deficit reached 97% of the annual target in just six months.
- Oil and gas revenues dropped 17% year-on-year, while government spending rose 20%.
- Domestic debt issuance in H1 2025 was 90% higher than in the same period last year.
- The National Welfare Fund’s liquid assets exceed the mid-year deficit by only 12%.
Outlook: Risks and Financing Challenges
If oil prices remain low, the Russia budget deficit will likely surpass forecasts by a significant margin. This could force the government to draw heavily on the National Welfare Fund and increase domestic debt issuance. While demand for bonds from Russian banks remains strong, the long-term sustainability of financing is questionable without a rebound in export revenues.
Meet the Researchers
- Benjamin Hilgenstock: Head of Macroeconomic Research and Strategy, KSE Institute
- Yuliia Pavytska: Manager of the Sanctions Programme, KSE Institute
- Matvii Talalaievskyi: Analyst, KSE Institute
Read the Full Report
Explore the full findings and detailed analysis by reading the complete report on the KSE Institute website. You can also explore more policy briefs covering sanctions against Russia and Russian counter-sanctions in the FREE Network’s policy briefs section.
Explore Other Editions of KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – August 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – July 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – June 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – May 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – April 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – March 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – February 2025
- KSE Institute’s Russia Chartbook – January 2025
Russian Oil Revenues Dip to $12.6 Billion as Sanctions Bite
In May 2025, Russian oil export revenues fell by $0.4 billion to $12.6 billion due to lower prices and export volumes. Seaborne oil shipments declined, with oil products dropping sharply. The shadow fleet’s role in exports grew, raising environmental and enforcement concerns. The findings come from the latest Russian Oil Tracker by the KSE Institute, authored by Borys Dodonov, Benjamin Hilgenstock, Anatolii Kravtsev, Yuliia Pavytska, and Nataliia Shapoval.
Falling Oil Exports Amid Sanctions Pressure
Global oil prices remained weak in May, keeping all Russian crude grades within the G7/EU price cap. Export volumes slipped, with overall seaborne shipments down 3.1% month-on-month. Reliance on Western-insured tankers dropped to 42%, while older, uninsured “shadow fleet” tankers carried most crude exports. India remained Russia’s largest crude buyer, taking 51% of shipments, while Turkey led in oil product imports.
Tracking Sanctions Evasion and Enforcement
KSE Institute data shows that 165 Russian-affiliated tankers operated in May without international insurance, 89% of them over 15 years old. Many had previously been sanctioned, yet enforcement gaps persist. Between March and May, 135 sanctioned vessels were still loaded at Russian ports. The US and EU maintain stricter compliance, while UK and Canadian enforcement remains weaker.
Key Research Findings
- Russian oil revenues fell to $12.6 billion in May 2025, the second-lowest since the invasion.
- Oil product exports dropped 7% month-on-month, with Pacific ports seeing a 21.9% collapse.
- Shadow fleet tankers carried 82% of crude exports, most over 15 years old.
- In a strict sanctions scenario, annual revenues could drop to $111 billion in 2025.
Economic and Policy Implications
If sanctions enforcement remains weak, Russia could still earn $163 billion from oil in 2025. Stronger enforcement and tighter price caps could sharply cut revenues, limiting war financing. The growing shadow fleet also raises environmental risks due to poor maintenance and flag evasion. Future monitoring will focus on how sanctions coalitions adapt to these tactics.
Meet the Researchers
- Borys Dodonov: KSE Institute
- Benjamin Hilgenstock: KSE Institute
- Anatolii Kravtsev: KSE Institute
- Yuliia Pavytska: KSE Institute
- Nataliia Shapoval: KSE Institute
Read the Full Report
Explore the complete findings and detailed charts in the Russian Oil Tracker on the KSE Institute’s website.