Tag: Development
Gender Equality and Economic Development: From Research to Action
It’s increasingly being acknowledged that gender inequality is not just a human rights issue, but of first order importance for economic development. It is also an issue of high priority for the Swedish government, with the feminist foreign policy gaining a lot of attention worldwide. This policy brief shortly summarizes presentations held during a full day conference at the Stockholm School of Economics on June 1, 2018. The event focused on how gender discrimination negatively impacts the productivity of low and middle income economies, but also how reforms and specific initiatives can better the situation. The perspective was both long term, how norms and laws governing women’s rights have evolved over time, and short term, illustrating the current challenges women and societies face, with a particular emphasis on the situation in Eastern Europe. This was the 7th installment of SITE Development Day – a yearly development policy conference organized with support from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
From Research: Causes, Costs and Remedies
Cross-country differences in gender equality are often explained by variation in formal institutions such as laws and policies, and informal institutions such as social norms, religion and culture. A recent literature has focused on understanding the underlying drivers behind the variation in gender norms, arguing that these norms themselves may be functions of predetermined fundamentals such as geography, language and external shocks such as wars, revolutions or the slave trade. An influential line of research has emphasized that certain agricultural conditions have given prominence to technologies that require more muscular strength (the plow), whereas in shifting agriculture, hand-held tools like the hoe and the digging stick, require less upper body strength, are more labor intensive and easier to combine with child care. The former conditions are therefore associated with a stricter gender division of labor that generated a norm that the natural place for women is in the home. That these differences still linger have been empirically shown looking at cross-country variation in outcomes such as female labor force participation, political representation, inheritance rules, polygamy, parental authority and women’s freedom of movement. The variation is also found among second generation immigrants, where the attitudes from the parents’ ancestry are reflected also among those born and raised in western societies with more equal gender norms.
There has been an increasing emphasis on trying to estimate how gender inequality inhibits economic development, and to put numbers on the foregone economic development and growth from continuing inequality. A key indicator of inequality in this respect is the gender gap in labor force participation. There has been progress globally in this respect, but we are still far from equality and outcomes vary dramatically across regions and countries. Traditional approaches to estimate the benefits of increased female labor force participation (flfp) has assumed perfect substitutability between men and women. New evidence suggests that this may not be true, that men and women are complementary, which implies that increased flfp increases production beyond just the fact that more people are put to work. This also means that more women in work increases the productivity of men, in other words a win-win situation. This complementarity effect can take place at the workplace (think of diversified company boards), but recent research suggests that this is particularly true at the macro level. This is likely because men and women tend to work in different sectors and occupations that are themselves complementary, yielding the additional benefit at the macro level. Estimates of welfare gains of eliminating barriers to female labor force participation to levels seen in the US, suggest improvements of on average 22 % in South Asia and 18 % in the Middle East and North Africa region.
One important policy tool to influence gender outcomes, and sometimes also gender norms, is tax and benefits policy. These sets of policies are almost never explicitly gender biased, but the impact of details of policies in areas such as inheritance law, parental leave, pensions and taxes all affect the incentives that men, women and couples face. It is also important to understand that these policies often operate in an environment that is far from being without a gender bias, suggesting that there may be motivation for government intervention to correct outcomes and also lead the way to slowly change norms. As models of household decision-making suggest that partners may not operate as a unitary actor maximizing joint welfare, and women typically have lower bargaining power within the household, policies that leave discretionary power to the couple may lead to highly unequal outcomes. Instead policies may need to be individualized, such as tax policy and parental leave policy.
The conference also contained a panel specifically focusing on Eastern Europe. The communist legacy meant that these countries, in some dimensions such as flfp, started from much more equal levels than other countries at comparable levels of income in the 1990s. The most immediate gender crisis in some ways was on behalf of men, whose life expectancy dropped dramatically. This crisis for men also created externalities in the form of domestic violence and orphaned children. Since 1990, there has therefore been some reversals in gender outcomes, and in some areas, such as political representation, the region on average performs quite poorly. Individual countries also face very different challenges. In Georgia the sex ratio at birth increased dramatically in the 1990’s as economic hardship and conflict coincided with the introduction of new technology to determine the sex of a child in utero. In Belarus inequality strikes both ways, with men having more than 10 years lower life expectancy, have higher retirement age and are drafted to military service. On the other hand women are under-represented in politics and largely responsible for unpaid homework, partly due to a very generous 3 year-long paid maternity leave policy. The tradition of bride kidnapping in parts of Central Asia (as high as 10-25 % of women in parts of rural Kyrgyzstan) was brought up, and research showing birthweight losses of children to kidnapped mothers equivalent to those measured elsewhere in conflict zones (100-200 g) suggest that this is indeed a real violation of these women.
To Action: Policies for gender equality
The SDG 2030 agenda and the concurrent finance for development process both emphasize the importance of having all sectors of society onboard in the quest of achieving the new development goals. The event therefore included representatives of both the private, public and civil societies, and featured a range of different initiatives across these sectors. A sector in which many women work for foreign companies in developing countries is textile. Here foreign companies can lead the way through initiatives beyond direct wage and employment policies that improve women’s welfare, such as information campaigns devoted to personal hygiene or policies that transfer salaries directly to the personal account of the employees (an approach that matters when there is unequal bargaining power within the household, as shown through research). Also initiatives to reduce harassment and support female careers can make a difference. A sector on the other side of the spectrum is the telecommunications sector, which is very male dominated. This bias typically start from an early age, and is reinforced by gender stereotypes. Active work in the community to early on reaching out with tech programs explicitly targeting girls can make a difference, and so can making people aware of unconscious biases.
Aid agencies and NGOs also play an important role in promoting gender equality in partner countries. Research shows that women in relative terms tend to spend resources in ways that benefit the family more, and discrimination can be counteracted through policies specifically targeting women and trying to strengthening their situation both outside and inside the household. Initiatives that give women access to credits, and foster collective action and political engagement have been tested on large scale in for instance India. Aid financed investment funds target female entrepreneurs, and engage in programs to integrate women into the investment process. Investors also have the leverage to stress the importance of partner companies investing in their female employees, for instance though education, safe transportation and separate changing rooms. A major player like Sida can engage in a dialogue also with partner governments to incentivize them to live up to commitments made in conventions and treaties, but also empower change agents that can put pressure on patriarchic structures. In the health sector, priority is given to sexual and reproductive rights, but beyond targeted interventions it is also important to mainstream a gender perspective into all types of projects and programs. It’s acknowledged that measuring impact is a challenge, and some partners are perceived as more receptive than others, but the perception is that attitudes are changing.
A Government Perspective
From the Swedish government’s side it was emphasized that gender equality is a goal in itself, as well as a prerequisite for economic development. The by now well-known feminist foreign policy is based on three R’s: that all women and girls should have access to rights, representation and resources. The policy is backed up by an action plan with clearly expressed goals in areas of peace and violence, political representation, economic empowerment and sexual and reproductive health rights. These goals will be evaluated for results (a fourth “R”) and, due to international demand, the foreign ministry is currently preparing a handbook for feminist foreign policy to document the process and the lessons learned. In the collaboration with Eastern Partnership countries, gender equality became part of the summit declaration in 2015. There’s an increasing willingness to talk about gender in the partnership countries, but many challenges remain, as also exemplified by recent experience from working in the government of Ukraine. Swedish initiatives are often a catalyst for change, though, with EU politicians and administrators slowly following pace. It was emphasized that to argue for the case of women and girls, data and research is crucial, so the FREE initiative to create a center of excellence in gender economics (FROGEE) was received with much appreciation.
To get more information about the presentations during the day and references to the data and literature discussed above, please visit this page.
Participants at the conference
- Ann Bernes, Ambassador for Gender Equality and Coordinator of Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy, Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- Raphael Espinoza, Senior Economist, IMF.
- Paola Giuliano, Associate Professor of Economics, UCLA, Anderson School of Management.
- Michal Myck, Director at CenEa, Poland.
- Anna-Karin Dahlberg, Corporate Sustainability Manager at Lindex.
- Richard Nordström, General Director at Hand in Hand.
- Karin Kronhöffer, Director Strategy and Communication at Swedfund.
- Anne Larilahti, VP Head of Sustainability Strategy at Telia.
- Jesper Roine, Deputy Director, SITE.
- Charles Becker, Research Professor of Economics, Duke University.
- Tamta Maridashvili, Researcher, ISET-PI, Georgia.
- Lev Lvovskiy, Research Fellow, BEROC.
- Elsa Håstad, Director at the Department for Europe and Latin America at Sida.
- Inna Sovsun, Vice President at Kyiv School of Economics (KSE), Ukraine.
- Anna Westerholm, Sweden’s Ambassador for the EU Eastern Partnership.
- Carin Jämtin, Director General at Sida.
- Torbjörn Becker, Director at SITE.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Remaining Challenges for Faster Growth in CESEE
Between 1995 and 2016, per capita GDP levels in Europe have converged, as countries that had lower income levels in 1995 on average have seen faster growth rates between 1995 and 2016 (Figure 1).
Figure 1
Income differentials between CESEE and Germany have narrowed significantly during this time. If we look at CESEE as a whole, in 1995 GDP per capita of CESEE was only a third of Germany. By 2016 it has increased to almost half. If we look at individual countries, all countries in CESEE have seen faster GDP growth than in Germany, but there have been important cross-country differences. For example, growth has been relatively rapid in the EU New Member States and very slow in Ukraine.
Nevertheless, CESEE is still much poorer than Germany. The richest country in CESEE – Slovenia – has the income level per capita Germany had in 1990 (Figure 2). Poland is as rich as Germany was in the late 1970s. And Ukraine, which in early transition had similar level of income to Poland, is now as rich as Germany was in the early 1950s.
Figure 2
CESEE is poorer both because labor productivity is lower and a smaller share of the population works. GDP per capita is the product of GDP per worker and the employment to population rate:
In 2015, labor productivity in CESEE was still well below that in Germany and the Netherlands (Figure 3, x-axis). Employment rates were also lower, but those differences were less pronounced (Figure 3, y-axis).
Figure 3
Differences in employment rates are, however, more pronounced if we take into account that in CESEE a higher share of the population is of working age. The employment to population rate is the product of the employment to working age population [1] rate:
The share of the working age population in CESEE is relatively high (Figure 4), although it is now declining. The employment to working age ratios in CESEE are well below those in Germany (Figure 5); only the Baltics come close.
Figure 4
Figure 5
It will be challenging to further increase the employment to total population rate, given the impact of aging and the already relatively low level of unemployment. The decline of the working age population will accelerate in the next decade (Figure 6) as the baby-boom generation is retiring; in a number of countries the working age population is set to decline by more than 1 percent annually. [2] If the share of the working age population that works remains constant, the share of the employment to total population rate will fall sharply. At the same time, the unemployment rate in many countries is already close to pre-crisis lows (Figure 7). It will therefore be key to increase labor force participation rates, which in most countries are still below those of Germany, particularly those of women (Figure 8).
Figure 6
Figure 7
Figure 8
A higher capital stock may be even more important than raising the employment rate. There is a strong correlation between the level of capital stock per capita and GDP per capita (Figure 9, left panel). The relationship between the employment rate and GDP per capita is much weaker (Figure 9, right panel). Further convergence of CESEE will thus require capital deepening. As of 2015, the capital stock per capita in CESEE region is on average only a quarter of that in Germany.
Figure 9
Figure 10
Figure 11
Figure 12
Unfortunately, the growth of the capital stock per capita has slowed (Figure 10), which reflects the decline in investment rates. Investment rates are low compared with other emerging market countries (Figure 11). Saving rates are low too (Figure 12), which suggests that a rebound of investment could lead to a re-emergence of high current account deficits, unless savings increases as well. Yet it may be challenging to boost saving. With labor markets tightening, wages shares are likely to increase, which is likely to reduce corporate profits. Indeed, in a number of countries this is already happening (Figure 13). Household savings are difficult to influence. Boosting public savings would help, yet even though unemployment rates are falling, few countries plan a meaningful fiscal tightening (Figure 14).
Figure 13
Figure 14
TFP growth has slowed as well. TFP growth has recovered somewhat in recent years, but it is still much slower than in the pre-crisis years (Figure 15). The TFP slowdown might be a result of both the decrease of productivity in main trading partners and unfinished post-crisis adjustment.
The IMF’s CESEE Regional Economic Issues have identified several factors that might restrain productivity and investment. The May 2016 and November 2016 IMF CESEE Regional Economic Issues [3] analyzed several areas where reforms are needed in CESEE, and recommended to improve institutions to boost productivity. The May 2016 REI suggested the largest efficiency gains might come from increasing protection of property rights, upgrading legal systems and other government services. In this context, the November 2016 REI discussed the need to improve public investment management and tax administration. Given the large gaps in infrastructure and capital stock to Western Europe, improving the efficiency of public investment by improving its allocation and the implementation of frameworks and procedures could boost potential growth significantly. Regarding tax administration, reducing compliance gaps, would help improve tax collection, which could generate more fiscal revenues and allow for higher public investment.
Figure 15
In short, further catch-up is possible but challenging. Labor force participation could be further increased, which would also help to offset declining share of working age population. A slowdown or even reversal of net emigration would also contribute. The capital stock is relatively low, and higher investment is needed especially in infrastructure, but raising the saving rate will be a challenge. Since the crisis the TFP has slowed considerably, and re-igniting TFP growth will be crucial for boosting growth. For all this, improving the quality of institutions and legal frameworks will help.
Bas Bakker is the IMF’s Senior Resident Representative for Central and Eastern Europe; Marta Korczak and Krzysztof Krogulski are economists in the IMF’s regional office for Central and Eastern Europe in Warsaw. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Comments by [Jorg Decressin] on an earlier version are gratefully acknowledged.
[1] The working age population is the population ages between 15 and 64.
[2] In many countries, demographics pressures have been exacerbated by the net emigration. A reduction in emigration, or even reversal, would also help. See IMF Staff Discussion Note “Emigration and Its Economic Impact on Eastern Europe” available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1607.pdf
[3] In many countries, demographics pressures have been exacerbated by the net emigration. A reduction in emigration, or even reversal, would also help. See IMF Staff Discussion Note “Emigration and Its Economic Impact on Eastern Europe” available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1607.pdf
Cross-Country Differences in Convergence in CESEE
Since 1989, there have been large differences in the convergence of the income levels of the former communist countries in CESEE with those in the US. Most Central European countries have seen a sharp rise in relative incomes, but many countries in former Yugoslavia and the CIS have not—indeed, some countries, including Moldova and Serbia, are now poorer than they were in 1989 (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Transition outcomes
Source: Total Economy Database and IMF staff calculations.
Figure 2. GDP level in Poland and Ukraine
Source: Total Economy Database and IMF staff calculations.
The difference between Ukraine and Poland is particularly stark. In 1989, both had similar income levels, but Poland is now more than three times as rich (Figure 2). As a result, cross-country income differences in CESEE remain large. In 1989, the Czech Republic, Russia, Slovenia and Croatia had the highest income per capita in 1989, about 4 times as high as in Albania and Moldova, the poorest in the group. Twenty-six years later, the differences are even larger. GDP per capita in Slovenia is 6 times as high as in Moldova (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Cross-country income differences
Source: Total Economy Database and IMF staff calculations.
What Explains Convergence Differences?
These differences in convergence do not seem to reflect data problems. True, GDP statistics in 1989 were not very good. It is hard to measure value added when prices are not quite right. Moreover, GDP at that time was probably not a good indicator or of consumer welfare. Much of what was produced was not wanted by consumers (e.g. military expenditures) and/or of low quality. Nevertheless, these issues apply to all post-communist countries in the regions—it is not clear that some countries suffered from data problems more than others.
Indeed, more direct measures of economic activity also suggest large initial output falls and large cross-country differences. Between 1990 and 1995 electricity consumption per capita fell by almost 40 percent in Ukraine and Moldova. By then electricity consumption in Poland had nearly recovered to the 1990 level (Figure 4).
Figure 4. An alternative measure of decline in economic activity
Source: IFA Statistics and IMF staff calculations.
Instead, several factors seem to have a played a role:
- The speed of transition to a market economy
- War and conflicts
- Boom-busts
- EU Membership
- Whether transition has been completed
Countries that reformed early had a shorter and shallower post-transition recession. The lower the EBRD transition index in 1995 (i.e., the less the economy was reformed), the sharper the output decline between the beginning of the transition and 1995 (Figure 5).
Figure 5. Market reforms and post-transition recession
Source: Total Economy Database and IMF staff calculations.
Why was this? In late 1989, a fierce debate broke out over what came to be called gradualism versus shock therapy. Many gradualists argued that the structural flaws of the economy would frustrate attempts at liberalization, and therefore that reforms should be implemented in a gradual, sequenced way. But for others—including key figures such as Leszek Balcerowicz in Poland—understanding the nature of the problem meant the opposite: reform was a seamless web that could only succeed if all the changes happened together, because liberal prices, improved governance, and a stable economic and financial environment were needed to reinforce one another; little could be achieved with a partial reform. The evidence from the past 25 years has vindicated the seamless web theory of transition. There is no doubt that some reforms took much longer than anticipated, including privatization, both of banks and companies. But it seems clear that the countries that made sweeping changes, and that kept at reform and stabilization have done well.[2] Countries that followed a more gradual path suffered from the decline of the old industries and did not get the boost from the growth of new firms. And in some countries bouts of macroeconomic instability repeatedly undermined reforms and sapped political momentum.
Weaker growth in the early transition years was not compensated by faster growth later. Countries, where output declines were deeper in early 1990s, did not see more rapid growth in subsequent years (Figure 6).
Figure 6. Permanent output losses in the early transition
Source: Total Economy Database and IMF staff calculations.
Wars and conflicts also played an important role. It is striking that the five countries with the lowest growth all had a war or serious conflict between 1990 and 2015 (Figure 7).
Figure 7. Wars and conflicts impact on long-term growth
Source: Total Economy Database and IMF staff calculations.
Avoiding boom-busts helped boost longer-term growth. Steady growth rates seem to be more conducive to higher long term growth than booms followed by busts. Between 2002 and 2008, Romania had capital inflows fueled boom and grew much faster than Poland, but thereafter it suffered a deep bust, and between 2002 and 2015, Poland has grown faster (Figure 8).
Figure 8. The hare and the tortoise
Source: Total Economy Database and IMF staff calculations.
EU accession was a powerful catalyst for reforms and upgrading of institutional frameworks. CESEE countries that joined the EU were required to bring their regulations and institutions up to Western European standards. There is a striking difference in the level of EBRD transition indicators between EU countries and non-EU countries (Figure 9).
Figure 9. EU accession as a reform catalyst
Source: EBRD and IMF staff calculations.
Thus, prospects of EU Membership have led to more reforms and, as a consequence, to stronger growth (Figure 10).
Figure 10. Market reforms and changes in income levels
Source: EBRD, Total Economy Database and IMF staff calculations.
Countries that upgraded their institutions to EU standards saw a decline in cross-country income differences. Countries that joined the EU in 2000s show clear pattern of convergence. The difference between Bulgaria and Slovenia has narrowed by 15 percent of Slovenia’s GDP since the former begun EU accession negotiations in 2000 (Figure 11, right panel). Similarly, a group of candidate and potential candidate countries, including Croatia (which joined the EU only in 2013) have converged as well (Figure 11, left panel).
Figure 11. Convergence within CESEE regions
Source: Total Economy Database and IMF staff calculations. Note: The EU has recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina as potential EU candidate countries.
By contrast, there was no convergence among the European CIS-countries. Russia, the richest of CIS countries grew by only 0.6 percent annually since 1989, while output per capita declined in Moldova and Ukraine. Only Belarus achieved growth rates comparable to non-CIS countries, but its largely unreformed economy may have approached the limits of the current extensive growth model (Figure 12).
Figure 12. Convergence in the European CIS region
Source: Total Economy Database and IMF staff calculations.
Countries that have a more completed transition are richer. There is a strong correlation between progress in market reforms and a country’s income level (Figure 13).
Figure 13. Market reforms and income level
Source: EBRD, Total Economy Database and IMF staff calculations.
Similarly, richer countries have a more vibrant private sector (Figure 14).
Figure 14. Market reforms and private sector share in the economy
Source: EBRD, Total Economy Database and IMF staff calculations.
Correlation does of course not mean causality but is it telling that there is no highly reformed poor country.
Convergence Post-2009 Crisis
Post-2009, catch-up has slowed down. Pre-crisis, convergence was rapid and widespread. In some countries, the GDP per capita gap to the US narrowed by more than 12 percentage points in 2003-08. Since 2010 only two-thirds of countries in the region have continued to catch-up with the US, while Ukraine and Slovenia saw a widening of income differences (Figure 15). And if we include the 2009 crisis, which was deeper in CESEE than in Western Europe, convergence has been even less.
Figure 15. Convergence pace pre- and post-crisis
Source: WEO database and IMF staff calculations.
More recently, there have also been large differences across regions: while the CIS was in recession, the non-CIS countries doing much better.
- The CIS countries suffered from falling commodity prices, and from the impact of sanction on Russia.
- By contrast, the non-CIS countries saw a gradual acceleration of GDP growth, on the back of a pick-up of domestic demand in the euro area. Labor markets in many EU New Member States (NMS) are tightening rapidly, and unemployment is quickly approaching pre-crisis lows, though GDP growth rates are well below those in the pre-crisis years.
How can we boost Convergence going forward?[3]
GDP per capita is the product of GDP per worker (labor productivity) and the share of the population that works (the employment rate):
Low GDP per capita can thus be the result of both low labor productivity and a low employment rate. In CESEE, both factors play a role:
- In most CESEE countries, the employment rate is below that in Western Europe (Figure 18). Low employment rates are a particular problem in SEE and some CIS countries.
- The labor productivity gap with Western Europe is still large, even though it has declined in the past twenty years.
Figure 16. Big differences in growth among regions
Source: WEO database and IMF staff calculations.
Figure 17. Labor markets in EU new member states
Source: Eurostat.
Figure 18. Labor utilization and productivity
Source: Total Economy Database, UN population statistics and IMF staff calculations.
To raise labor productivity more investment is needed. The capital stock per worker in a typical CESEE economy is only about a third of that in advanced Europe. Domestic saving rare are too low in most the region; policies should, therefore, focus on institutional reforms that reduce inefficiencies and increase returns on private investment and savings.
Boosting total factor productivity (TFP) is important as well. CESEE countries have to address structural and institutional obstacles that prevent efficient use of available technologies or lead to an inefficient allocation of resources. The recent IMF CESEE report suggests the largest efficiency gains are likely to come from improving the quality of institutions (protection of property rights, legal systems, and healthcare); increasing the affordability of financial services (especially for small but productive firms), and improving government efficiency.
Conclusion
Since the fall of communism, there have been large differences in the convergence of income levels with the US among CESEE countries. Much of these differences reflect differences in policies. Countries that reformed more and earlier saw faster growth than countries that reformed less or later. Macro-stability also helped, and countries that avoided boom-busts tended to grow faster.
Continued convergence will require a higher investment, higher TFP, and higher employment rates. The capital stock per worker is still below that in Western Europe. Higher investment rates will require higher saving rates, lest large current account deficits emerge anew. Addressing structural and institutional obstacles would also help convergence, as it will support higher labor force participation and allow for a more efficient allocation of resources.
Notes and References
- [1] Bas B. Bakker is the Senior Resident Representative and Krzysztof Krogulski an economist in the IMF’s Regional Office for Central and Eastern Europe in Warsaw. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.
- [2]This is not to say that the rapid and seamless approach was without problems, notably large losses of output and high unemployment in the short run. Thus, reform will always have to worry about the social safety net and, under some circumstances, may benefit from external assistance, which is where the IMF and others can come in.
- [3]The IMF addressed this question in depth in the spring 2016 issue of “CESEE Regional Economic Issues.”
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy papers and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Financing for Development: Two Years after Addis
At the Third International Conference on Development Finance in Addis Ababa on July 13—16, 2015, the world committed itself to an action agenda to raise resources to realize the 2030 sustainable development goals. The question is how much progress the world has achieved two years down the road, when the initial enthusiasm and commitments are no longer in the immediate spotlight. This policy brief reports on the discussion from a conference on this topic, Development Day 2017, held in Stockholm on May 31.
The year 2015 has been lauded as a landmark year for sustainable development. As many as three major global agreements were negotiated and signed: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; the Paris Agreement on Climate Change; and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) on Financing for Development. The latter may be less known, but is essential to the ambition to achieve the first since it concerns how to finance the necessary investments to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). The AAAA identified seven action areas spanning both the public and the private sectors, and involving both domestic revenues and international transfers (domestic public resources, domestic and international private business and finance, development cooperation, trade, debt and debt sustainability, systemic issues and science, technology and innovation). This event focused primarily on international commercial private capital flows, and indirectly on development cooperation as a facilitator and catalyst for such private transfers.
Combining good business and good development
A major theme of the conference was combining good business with good development. Should private companies also take responsibility for environmental and social sustainability, or is the “only business of business to do business”? If firms do engage in sustainability investments, does it eat into profits or does it rather create a competitive edge? Reading business journals, it is easy to get the impression that there is a win-win situation. This picture is, however, based on rather limited information and the relationship is fraught with methodological challenges as both profitability and sustainability investments may be driven by other factors (such as competent leadership), and firms performing well may have the capacity and feel the obligation to invest part of their surplus into corporate social responsibility (CSR). Hence, there may be a question of reverse causality.
At the conference, new research was presented using data on investments in low and middle-income countries from the International Finance Corporation that includes both measures of financial rates of returns and subjective ratings of environment, social and governance (ESG) performance. Simple correlations suggested a significant positive relationship, or a win-win situation. However, once care was taken to identify a causal effect from ESG on profits, the results became insignificant. That is, the causal effect of ESG investments on profits seemed neither positive nor negative. However, when looking at broader measures of private sector development, the results suggest that both profits and ESG investments have a positive impact on sector development. This implies that there are good reasons for the public sector to encourage ESG activities even beyond the direct sustainability benefits through for instance public-private partnerships but also regulations that encourage good behavior.
How should results like these be interpreted? The presentation spurred an interesting debate on what are reasonable expectations and whether “the glass is half full or half empty”. It was emphasized that systematically beating the market should not really be expected from any group of investments, so a half-full interpretation seems more plausible.
This debate also came up in a panel discussion on institutional investments in developing countries, and where the growing success of green bonds was presented. Though still small in absolute size (1-2% of the bonds coming to the market are green bonds), there has been an impressive growth in the last 3-4 years. Currently, the Swedish bank SEB is cooperating with the German government in developing a green-bond market in emerging markets. Some of the lessons emphasized from the green-bond market were the importance of being clear towards investors about the motivation and the value proposition, to package the information in a credible way emphasizing independent verification, and to continuously monitor and give feedback to investors.
From the institutional investor side, it was mentioned how important it is to tell investors a compelling story. This may be easier with regards to environmental sustainability relative to social sustainability, both in terms of conveying the urgency and in developing indicators that can be monitored and communicated. It was also argued that even though there are initiatives out there, emphasizing how sustainable investments can be competitive in terms of profitability (such as green bonds), it would also help to change the relative price on the other end of the spectrum, i.e. through regulations, taxes or other instruments that can make investments with particularly negative externalities less profitable.
Finally, an overarching theme of the discussion was the challenge to have institutional investments reach the places with the most needs, i.e. the fragile and least developed countries. If this is to happen, pension funds and insurance companies have to be allowed to take on more risks, and it would be essential to reduce the corporate risk in public-private partnerships (more on this below).
In a second panel discussion, different Swedish corporate initiatives, emphasizing sustainability, were showcased. For example, the Swedish steel producers’ association, Jernkontoret, showcased the Swedish steel industry’s vision 2050 with the target of domestically based steel production using hydrogen and with zero CO2 emissions. Another example is the Sweden Textile Water Initiative, launched in 2010 by major Swedish textile and leather brands together with the Stockholm International Water Institute, has created the first guidelines for sustainable water and wastewater management in supply chains. Currently working with 277 suppliers in 5 countries, the initiative features clear win-win situations and is now self-sustaining and in the process of going private.
Skandia, a major Swedish insurance company, emphasized the business costs of socially unsustainable situations with examples from the costs in Sweden of sick leave, and the costs for protection and security for Swedish retailers and mall developers. Positive preventive work focusing on rehabilitation and the development of blossoming and inclusive neighborhoods were featured. These examples showcased how the SDGs are feeding into the thinking and planning of the private sector in Sweden, and how important it is to identify the business cases for thinking about sustainability in order for this to become mainstream.
However, the case for private capital to be the panacea for reaching the SDGs is by no means obvious. The non-governmental organization Diakonia pointed out that for every dollar flowing into a developing country, more than two dollars are lost. The biggest loss is coming from illicit financial flows, and within this category, tax evasion is the biggest problem. While the private sector is key to development, the main contributions this sector can do for development is to pay taxes where they are due, abide by international standards, and be transparent and accountable to the citizens and governments in the countries where they operate.
Swedwatch, used two examples from Borneo and what is now South Sudan, to illustrate how investors at times turn a blind eye towards human rights and environmental abuses by private multi-national companies. Transparency, due diligence in evaluating human rights risks prior to investment decisions, and a readiness to push for compensation and remedy if abuse is still unearthed were pointed out as key components to avoid this type of malpractice.
Development cooperation as facilitator for private flows
The second main theme of the day dealt with the ability to use development cooperation as a catalyst for private investments.
Swedfund, the Swedish government’s development financier, emphasized the need to move fast and find a business model in which one dollar spent becomes ten dollars on the ground. Based on a business model around three pillars (societal impact, sustainability and financial viability) Swedfund focus on areas with relatively high risk and where private capital are in short supply, with the hope to foster job creation, inclusive growth and poverty reduction.
Sida, the Swedish main aid agency, showcased their guarantee instruments. Through partnerships with bigger actors such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank group as well as local banks in developing countries, Sida can shoulder part of the default risks involved when trying to reach more high-risk investors (such as small and medium sized enterprises) with great potential development impact. In this way, one dollar from the public aid budget can lure a multiple of dollars in private capital towards sustainable development.
The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) emphasized that governments generally lack a policy for how to deliver official development assistance (ODA) in a sustainable way and a strategy for how to enable capital flows from the private sector. A DAC initiative to better track all financial flows going towards development, beyond just ODA, was presented.
From the Center for Global Development, the case for using public resources to facilitate private sector insurance mechanisms against human disasters was presented (concessional insurance). Benefits emphasized from explicit insurance contracts included faster and better-coordinated payouts, more certainty that compensation will come, incentives to invest in disaster prevention (to reduce premiums) and involvement of commercial insurance professionals.
Importantly, though, it was emphasized that it is crucial that aid money are truly complementary in the sense that they crowd in private investments that otherwise would not have taken place (and not end up subsidizing private investors in donor countries). It was also emphasized that donors must not forget about the focus on the poorest and people in fragile states.
In some environments donors must shoulder 100% of the risk to lure private capital. In those cases alternatives must be considered. Sida emphasized the importance to match financial instruments with the appropriate context, i.e. there is a need to identify where different instruments should be used. For instance, big institutional investors need investments that are manageable, predictable, and of a reasonable size. Aid agencies can help through subsidized risk management, but also by helping build strong institutions in partner countries that can work as counterparts, and encourage public-private collaborations to package investment deals and reduce information asymmetries.
Where are we now?
Turns out that this is not a simple question to answer. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs presented the Swedish government’s priority areas – strengthening the implementation of SDG 5, 8, 14 and 16 (all goals can be found here: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300) – and reported from a recent follow-up meeting at the UN.
In principle the Addis Agenda identifies action areas and connects areas and actors, which makes it possible for systematic follow-ups, and an inter-agency task force produces an annual report of the general state of the implementation of the Addis Agenda. The Swedish government has produced a report on the implementation of the AAAA covering all seven action-areas with examples of progress. This initiative was commended at the UN meetings, and together with the private sector engagement, as showcased during the 2017 Development Day, it paints a rather positive picture of progress and engagement in Sweden.
However, globally, there are many uncertainties and challenges. The Center for Global Development reported on the budget proposal of the US president, which among other things includes a 32% cut to topline funding for the Department of State and Foreign Operations. There are also plans to eliminate the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and to zero out US food assistance. On the other hand, in this fiscal year, the US Congress (controlled by the Republicans) increased the amount going into foreign aid compared to what previous president Obama suggested. What will eventually come out of the current president’s budget proposal for the coming fiscal year is thus highly unclear.
Participants at the conference
- Rami AbdelRahman, Sweden Textile Water Initiative
- Frida Arounsavath, Swedwatch
- Owen Barder, Center for Global Development
- Eva Blixt, Jernkontoret
- Magnus Cedergren, Sida
- Penny Davies, Diakonia
- Raj Desai, Georgetown University and the Brookings Institution
- Ulf Erlandsson, Fourth Swedish National Pension Fund (AP4)
- Måns Fellesson, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- Charlotte Petri Gornitzka, OECD-DAC
- Anna Hammargren, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
- John Hurley, Center for Global Development
- Lena Hök, Skandia
- Måns Nilsson, Stockholm Environmental Institute
- Mats Olausson, SEB
- Anders Olofsgård, SITE
- Anna Ryott, Swedfund
- Elina Scheja, Sida
Strategic Aid Financing
Donor countries often face a Samaritan’s dilemma when trying to implement political conditionality in bilateral aid. Giving through multinational organizations can mitigate this problem: Recipient nations are de-facto competing for funds, which restores their incentives to comply even with non-enforceable conditions. Donor nations might therefore find it useful to set up multinational aid funds, rather than to disseminate aid bilaterally, even if they have to give up control over where the money is spent.
In the last decade, global challenges like climate change or the fight against epidemics have become the focus of aid projects. In order to make progress on these large-scale issues, donor nations increasingly recognize that simply giving money to a developing region does not ensure success. Instead, the impact of aid spending depends crucially on efforts undertaken in the partner countries. Reforms of the local economic and judicial system, fighting corruption and general good governance are just a few of the demands on donor countries’ wish lists.
However, many of the conditions set by donating governments are hard to enforce, especially since they nowadays often fall in the category of “political conditionality,” aiming at broader political improvements rather than simple, measurable economic indicators (see for example Molenaers et.al., 2015). The crucial question for aid giving countries therefore remains how to strategically structure aid, so that recipient governments can be incentivized to cooperate also on intangible or non-enforceable conditions.
The Samaritan’s Dilemma
Indeed, the theoretical literature on aid conditionality finds that optimal contracts should be self-enforcing, i.e. the threat of aid sanctions should be large enough to ensure that the recipient government has an interest in fulfilling the conditions (see for example Scholl, 2009). That, however, might be easier said than done: Svensson (2000) argues that the threat of cutting aid in case conditions are violated is hard to credibly sustain, at least for individual donor countries. They often face political constraints to spend a certain amount of money on aid. This opens the possibility for a classic hold-up problem: If the donor country cannot commit to giving aid only conditional on reform efforts, the recipient country, knowing it will receive assistance in any case, has no incentive to implement costly reforms. From the donor’s perspective, this is also known as the Samaritan’s dilemma.
Multinational Funds Can Help
Svensson goes on to argue that transferring the responsibility of allocating aid to a multilateral organization might solve the Samaritan’s dilemma outlined above. He notes that if donors are lacking a commitment technology (that helps them to actually implement aid sanctions in case a recipient government shirks on the agreed aid conditions), “delegation of part of the aid budget to an (international) agency with less aversion to poverty will improve welfare of the poor.” Such organizations will have less of a commitment problem and should therefore better be able to enforce aid conditionality.
Competition Restores Incentives
There is, however, no a priori reason to think that multilateral organizations have a different objective than individual donor countries in terms of eliminating poverty and achieving growth and prosperity for developing countries. After all, these organizations’ founding principles are set by the donor countries that fund them. An international organization’s objective, as represented by how it actually allocates funds across causes and recipient countries, should reflect an aggregation of the individual preferences of donor nations.
In a new study, Simon and Valasek (2016) argue that precisely this stage of preference aggregation enables multilateral organizations to better implement aid conditionality. How non-earmarked funds given to multilateral organizations are allocated is determined in a bargaining process between representatives of the different donating nations. Individual preferences might differ; the bargaining outcome thus has to reflect a compromise between them. The bargaining position of each donor will in part depend on intrinsic values, but importantly also on the reform efforts and willingness to cooperate of the potential recipient nations. Intuitively, the better the government of an aid receiving country behaves, the better the bargaining position of donor countries lobbying on its behalf.
This constitutes a new strategic reason for pooling resources in large aid funds rather than implementing aid bilaterally: When resources are pooled, recipient nations have to compete for their share of aid. It is precisely the heterogeneity of donor country preferences that induces (or enhances) such competition. Bilateral aid relations thus cannot replicate the effect to the same extend. This competition restores incentives to invest in costly reforms and circumvents the hold-up problem.
Conclusion
Donor nations should consider pooling their resources in multinational funds when they fear that their partner governments are reluctant to implement political reforms. This is especially relevant for aid aimed at common global issues like climate change or disease control.
Simon and Valasek show that the payoff from joining an aid fund is especially high when donor nations represented in the fund have relatively homogenous goals for their foreign aid programs, but differ in terms of where in the world they would like to send their aid money. Then the disadvantage from losing the direct say over which recipient nations get the most funds is far outweighed by the gain from inducing investment and reform incentives in the aid receiving nations.
References
- Molenaers et al. (2015): “Political Conditionality and Foreign Aid,” World Development Vol. 75.
- Scholl (2009), “Aid Effectiveness and Limited Enforceable Conditionality,” Review of Economic Dynamics 12(2).
- Simon & J.M. Valasek (2016), “The Political Economy of International Aid Funds,” Working Paper.
- Svensson (2000): “When is Foreign Aid Policy Credible? Aid Dependence and Conditionality,”, Journal of Development Economics Vol. 61.
Urban Land Misallocation and Markets in Russian Cities
Authors: Paul Castañeda Dower, CEFIR and William Pyle, Middlebury College.
Former socialist countries inherited factory-dominated cityscapes since planners made industrial location decisions in relative ignorance of land’s opportunity costs. Drawing on unique survey evidence and policy variation across territorial units within Russia, this brief discusses the relationship between land tenure reforms and land reallocation. The evidence points to land privatization as an important factor in the reallocation of land in Russian cities.
Gender and Development: the Role of Female Leadership
This policy brief reports on a discussion of the role of female leadership in development held during a full day conference at the Stockholm School of Economics on June 16, 2014. The event was organized jointly by the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) and the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and was the fourth installment of Development Day – a yearly development policy conference. It is well known that women fall behind men on many markers of welfare and life opportunities, both in developed and developing countries. For most indicators, though, such as education and labor force participation, both the absolute and relative position of women tend to improve with economic development. However, in some areas the beneficiary effect of raising incomes is less clear. Access to leadership positions and decision-making roles are examples of such areas. To discuss this question, the conference brought together a distinguished and experienced group of policy oriented scholars and practitioners from government agencies, international organizations, civil society and the business community.
Development Policy After the Millennium Development Goals: Where Do We Go From Here?
This policy brief reports on a discussion of the Post-2015 Development Agenda held during a full day conference at the Stockholm School of Economics on August 23, 2013. The event was organized jointly by the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) and the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and was the third installment of Development Day, a yearly development policy conference. The Millennium Development Goals established in year 2000 has been an essential concept for global and national efforts to promote economic, social and human development. Highlighting income poverty, health, education, gender equality and environmental sustainability, the targets have focused global efforts on a set of quantifiable and comparable measures of progress. The question for the development community as these goals reach their endpoint is how to build a successful agenda for the future beyond year 2015. To discuss this challenging question, the conference brought together a distinguished and experienced group of policy oriented scholars and practitioners from governments, International Financial Institutions, the business community as well as NGOs.
In September 2000, world leaders adopted the United Nations Millennium Declaration, committing their nations to a global partnership to reduce extreme poverty. The declaration defined eight time-bound targets expiring in 2015, the so-called Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). These goals specify areas of focus; eradicate extreme poverty and hunger, achieve universal primary education, promote gender equality and empower women, reduce child mortality rates, improve maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, ensure environmental sustainability, and develop a global partnership for development. They also set explicit targets such as halving the number of people living on less than US$ 1.25 a day and reducing maternal mortality by three quarters from 1990 to 2015. Some commendable success has indeed been realized; already in 2010 the worldwide goal to reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than US$ 1.25 a day was achieved. However, much less progress has been seen in some other areas, including maternal health, and there are countries for which none of the goals are expected to be achieved by 2015. Nevertheless, the use of quantifiable, comparable and time-bound targets to create awareness and direct political resources is generally regarded as a success. The question for the development community as 2015 quickly approaches is thus how to build a successful post-2015 development agenda that builds on what has worked but also incorporates areas identified as missing.
The process to establish a new agenda of course raises many questions and reveals some of the trade-offs involved. There seems to be a consensus that the Millennium Declaration and the MDG framework should serve as a starting point, but there are many details to pin down. For instance, there are important challenges not directly mentioned in the original eight goals such as political conflict, rising inequality and youth unemployment. Many also argue that environmental sustainability, though included, may deserve a more prominent role in the future agenda. On the other hand, loading the Agenda with more and more goals may also dilute the global effort across too many areas, and some scholars argue that the whole idea with specific goals is counterproductive based on an organic view of development ill-suited for social engineering from above. To protect credibility, it is also important to get a sense of what is realistic to aim for, and what responsibility to ascribe to the already developed world. Moreover, even if a consensus can be reached with regards to the goals, opinions on how to best reach those goals will most definitely vary widely.
To get the process towards a new agenda started, the UN Secretary General has launched several initiatives including task teams, special advisors and consultations, but also a High-level Panel of Eminent Persons co-chaired by the Presidents of Indonesia and Liberia, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom; also including as its member Gunilla Carlsson, Swedish Minister for Development Cooperation. The panel, led by executive secretary and lead author Homi Kharas, submitted a report to the Secretary General on May 31. The program of Development Day 2013 started with a presentation of the report by Dr. Kharas, and remarks from Minister Carlsson. This was followed by an academic session corroborating projections of the report and outlining its limitations, and two panel discussions on sustainable development and Sweden’s potential as a leader in this process. Below follows a short representation of the main arguments and debates of the day.
A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies through Sustainable Development
Homi Kharas, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director at the Brookings Institution, presented the main messages contained in the report in the first session. An analysis of the situation since year 2000 shows many positive signs such as high global economic growth; increased international connectedness; a reduction in global inequality; and a substantial drop in absolute poverty rates. However, there are also many challenges ahead; rapid population growth, political conflicts, and the fact that the majority of the extremely poor live in conflict zones, increasing urbanization, a deteriorating environment and dwindling aid flows. This, in turn, leads Dr. Kharas to conclude that ‘business as usual’ is no longer feasible, and a new framework replacing the MDGs is needed.
The report seeks to address these issues and is conceived to serve as a set of guidelines, new goals and targets for the UN Secretary General and for the UN member states for the post-2015 period. At the core of the report is a bold aspiration to eradicate absolute poverty by 2030 through a unified framework of sustainable economic growth, increased social equality and environmental sustainability, and a new global partnership paradigm. This universal agenda, in turn, is proposed to be reached via five paradigm shifts to the status quo, (i) universal inclusion and equality, (ii) environmentally sustainable development, (iii) a transformation of national economies for sustainable growth, (iv) peace and effective, transparent public institutions, and (v) a new and more inclusive global partnership. In the report these broad and major shifts are further delineated across 12 illustrative targets, which, if met, will directly affect more than two billion people across the world and would require about $30 trillion spent by the governments worldwide.
Dr, Kharas emphasized that the report was prepared in cooperation with 5000 civil organizations, 250 large international corporations, and thematic, regional and country consultations all over the world, with another one million people taking part in an online questionnaire. He stressed that this kind of broad cooperation and consultation is needed to implement the goals set by the report and especially to operationalize these goals at the level of each of the member states.
Gunilla Carlsson, Swedish Minister for International Development Cooperation and a member of the UN High-Level Panel, continued the discussion and commended the members of the Panel on the impressive amount of work put in the report. She also emphasized the universal character of the agenda presented in the report, largely applicable both to developing and developed countries.
Carlsson stressed what she identified as the core values of the report; eradication of extreme poverty, prevention of violence and conflict, and inclusive peace. She further underlined the importance of local and global partnerships across governments, business communities and civil society. Broader public-private partnerships are essential both for fostering innovation in development work and to guarantee sufficient amounts of financing. The exact design of such a framework, however, is still an open question, but she hopes Sweden can serve as a leading example.
Both Homi Kharas and Gunilla Carlsson also showed great optimism when asked about the potential to implement the substantive initiatives by 2030. They stressed that not only does the world at present have more resources and more aid flows than it ever have, but the international community, including both public and private actors, is also showing more willingness to help the developing countries integrate successful development models than ever before.
Comments and Reflections
Martin Ravallion, Edmond D. Villani Professor of Economics at Georgetown University, started the commentary and reflection session. He showed how there is a strong current trend of between-country convergence of inequality rates (more equal countries becoming more unequal, while more unequal countries are becoming more equal) and declining poverty rate. The latter decline is to a considerable extent driven by Chinese economic growth, but this is far from the only source. He also underlined that the rate of poverty reduction has increased since the adoption of the MDGs in the 2000s, but said it was too early to judge the success or failure of the MDGs on these grounds.
Based on current trends, Ravallion also presented some estimates of the possibility to achieve the core objective of the report, eradication of absolute poverty by 2030. From a broad range of alternatives, the best case scenario, based on 3% annual growth rates of the world economy, absence of major economic crises and at least not decreasing participation of the poor in the benefits of growth, estimated a fall in absolute poverty rates from about 19% at present to 3% by 2030. In a less optimistic scenario, but historically not unlikely, levels of inequality and poverty would fall at a much slower rate, causing 12% to 14% of the world population to live below the absolute poverty line by 2030. Thus, the conclusion is that total eradication of absolute poverty by 2030 is hardly achievable, but substantial progress can be made, and it depends critically on continued high levels of world economic growth.
Professor Ravallion also stressed that these projections were made possible through a recent revolution in data availability, something the High Level Panel was asking for. To a large extent, this is attributed to a massive data collection effort by the World Bank, which not only provided better coverage of countries around the world, but also allowed for deeper insights into the nature of extreme poverty, including re-calculations and harmonization of cross-country comparable Purchasing Power Parity consumption baskets. This revolution provided more reliable inputs for his prediction models and improved the precision of estimates considerably.
Owen Barder, Senior Fellow and Director for Europe at the Center for Global Development, further emphasized this importance of credible statistics. Barder was somewhat skeptical to the report’s claim to be bold and offering a new approach, arguing that it largely reiterated the goals (jobs for young people, partnership with the private sector, reform of the financial system, etc.) already in the Millennium Declaration from year 2000. He also argued that the claim of success for the MDGs is almost entirely made on the basis of paragraph 19 of the Declaration; the objective to reduce by half the number of people living in absolute poverty. Much less progress has been made on the other explicit objectives, and all other aspects emphasized in the Millennium Declaration but which were not necessarily a part of the MDGs.
Barder suggested that there is too little effort to consistently measure whether rich countries are playing their part in the global partnership. Against that background he presented some preliminary results on the last round of the Center for Global Development’s Commitment to Development Index, calculated on the basis of OECD counties’ participation in aid, trade, investments, migration, environment, security and technology transfers. Over the last 10 years, OECD countries demonstrated on average a modest increase from four to five points on a ten-point scale, with Sweden ranked third from the top with a score of 7.2 for 2011 and 6.8 for 2012. Interestingly enough, this deterioration in the index for Sweden is mainly due to deterioration in the security component of the index, in turn resulting from larger sales of arms to undemocratic regimes, and from decreasing aid and immigration. There is obviously variation across countries, but on average there is scant improvements during the 13 years since the Millennium Declaration. This led Barder to question whether the developed countries have contributed their share to the objective of ending poverty, or if too much of the heavy lifting is left for the developing countries.
Barder concluded the presentation by pointing out the difference in language used in the report, namely the imperative used in the parts of the report describing recommendations for the developing countries, and the subjunctive used for recommendations for the developed countries. Again, to him this difference signaled the need to re-emphasize the importance of political commitment and operational goals also for the already developed countries in the Post-2015 Agenda.
Johan Rockström, Executive Director at the Stockholm Resilience Centre, started out noting that the population of the world is estimated to increase to eight billion people by 2030 and to nine billion by 2050. This, in combination with the currently prevailing development paradigm that emphasizes short-term economic growth over long run sustainability, causing degradation of biodiversity and climate change, means that we are hitting the planetary ceiling of eco-capacity. This suggests that ‘business as usual’ is no longer an option, and a new development paradigm is needed.
To address this issue, Rockström formulated a set of goals for human development balancing the needs of the environment, the needs of society and the needs of the people, all within the Earth’s life-support system. He proposed a broader framework for thinking about these issues, the so-called Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs rather than MDGs), which rebalances the relative weight on environmental, human and economic development with relatively more emphasis on the first two. This approach unifies the MDGs with planetary necessities (material use, clean air, nutrient and hydrological cycles, biodiversity, and climate stability), and sustainable development goals (sustainable food and water security, universal clean energy, governance for sustainable societies, etc.).
Discussion Panels
The first panel of the day focused on issues of sustainable development and was started by Klas Waldenström, Senior Advisor on the Post-2015 Development Agenda at Sida. He argued that the main challenge to the new partnership paradigm discussed earlier, will be the creation of trust both across nations and across the private and public sectors. Referring to the experience of Sida, he cited the successful creation of a network of 25 private Swedish companies focusing on models of sustainable development. An important role of official foreign aid in these partnerships, he argued, was to blend direct financial transfers with a combination of political support and business sector outreach, thereby potentially leveraging the financial flows with alternative sources of capital.
David Fergusson, Deputy Director at the Office of Science and Technology at USAID, called for more and better data in order to be able to operationalize and evaluate the new strategies that hopefully will come out of the report. He also reiterated the importance of transformative solutions for sustainable development and the need to understand that ‘business as usual’ is no longer an option. He also referred to the successful cooperation between Sida and USAID as an example of international collaboration of a new kind, more of which will be needed in the future to overcome the status quo and achieve the goals put forward by the report.
Garry Conille, Special Advisor to President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia and UNDP, discussed his experience of working with the MDGs and stressed that possibly the most challenging part was the negotiation between different stakeholders to reach a set of issues well-defined and contained enough to be operational. From his point of view, the major challenge is the operationalization of the rather opaque and broadly defined MDGs and how to find a proper allocation of resources across the many commendable ambitions. He therefore called for an effort to make the post-2015 agenda more practical.
The issue of operationalization was discussed further by Stefano Prato, Managing Director at the Society for International Development. He argued that with such large shifts proposed by the post-2015 agenda, it is perhaps difficult to understand how to work with the vision put forward by the panel. His suggestion for the Panel was to dig deeper into the challenging areas of the report but also to develop more applied recommendations for the member states and especially so for the private institutions desired as part of the new partnerships.
This need for operationalization was supported by Jakob Granit, Centre Director at the Stockholm Environment Institute. In his opinion, the broad vision as presented in the report is indeed difficult to work with, but he also suggested that progress on parts of the agenda can be instructive for how to go further also with the more challenging parts. He also emphasized the importance of a regional approach, building on existing networks of regional partnerships, and again stressed the importance of public-private partnerships to solve common international issues.
The second panel was devoted to the role Sweden can play in global sustainable development and the post-2015 agenda. The discussion was started by Ulla Holm, Global Director at Tetra Laval Food for Development Office. She presented some of Tetra Laval’s experiences of sustainable development work in Bangladesh, an example of a successful public-private partnership. In her view, one of the main pillars of sustainability is to prevent unnecessary food loss, and this can be achieved by building an integrated value chain that supports rural development in the long run. The crucial challenge on this path is the need for concurrent public and private investments, and how to overcome coordination problems and lacking trust across stakeholders. She therefore stressed the need to construct successful public-private partnerships on a large scale and in different areas, but also to make sure to document and scale up the existing models in order to replicate success in the most cost efficient way.
Erik Lysen, Director for International Affairs at the Church of Sweden, stressed the challenges in changing existing institutions and briefly discussed the main motives that could make such changes to occur. He also argued that some of the strongest motives that would actually provide the necessary motivation for change, namely fear, could not be desirable in the long run, but still viable in a context of post-2015 agenda if complemented with better social protection, institutes of civil society and a broader public discussion. Here, NGOs could act as watchdogs and catalysts, strengthening the desire for building new institutions and providing material and human support for their construction at the same time.
Stefan Isaksson, Head of Policy Analysis at the Department for Aid Management at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, continued the discussion on the challenges of changing existing institutions. He described current efforts to remodel the Swedish aid management system in order to become a more effective bureaucracy. In his view, the major shift in thinking is that of understanding aid less as simply giving money away and more as an investment for a common future. This is needed to improve the selection process of aid projects and also to motivate better the need to make projects and their results measurable and accountable. To achieve this, broader collaboration and consultations across stakeholders is needed. He also mentioned that perhaps at present many aid projects are too conservative, that the failure rate is too low because it reflects an aversion to risk that partly defeats the purpose of official foreign aid. The private sector will always be reluctant to venture into areas with high risk even if the potential social rate of return is high, so for official aid to serve as a more effective complement to private flows, more risk tolerance may be needed.
The issue of understanding aid as investment was discussed in detail by Jonas Ahlen, Investment Manager at the Storebrand Kapitalförvaltning. He described current efforts in the area of sustainable investments, mainly centered in microfinance and agricultural loans. In his opinion, broader involvement in such practices from the private sector would facilitate a transition to sustainable practices, but would at the same time require changing existing regulations in home countries to incentivize and alleviate the risks. He also stressed the need for broader public-private partnerships in these areas and briefly described the new consultative practices established by the Ministry of Finance in Sweden to catalyze private capital participation in for instance infrastructure projects in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Finally, Homi Kharas added to the Sweden-centered discussion by stressing that there exists no systematic assessment of what public-private partnerships can do. In his opinion, possibly the most important role for Sweden is to create conditions that would facilitate public-private partnerships in development and aid. By developing and experimenting with forms of public-private partnerships, as well as with new ways of measuring and monitoring of performance of such partnerships, Sweden could create a case for broader involvement of private funding and thus accomplish perhaps the most difficult part of bridging the post-2015 with the experience and skills of the private sector.
Conclusions
In sum, the discussion at the Development Day 2013 clearly highlighted the importance of sustaining some of the positive trends seen lately for economic and human development but also highlighted how crucial it is to take environmental sustainability into account. There is a growing consensus that long run human development necessitates an understanding of the planetary boundaries, even though exactly what trade-offs this involves and where to put the relative weight on more short run economic development is still debatable. There was also a wide consensus around the importance to get all different parts of society involved and working in tandem. Foreign aid cannot be expected to pull the heavy load by itself. The challenges are far too wide and important. Instead, much hope was attributed to public-private partnerships, but there is a lot of work that remains to make sure these vehicles generate the hoped for solutions. The capital, experience and skills of the private sector are needed. On the other hand, getting the incentives right is not a trivial challenge. Finding models of partnerships that work and can be scaled up may be an area in which Sweden can set an example and lead the way for other nations striving to contribute to long run sustainable development.
What Do Recent Insights From Development Economics Tell Us About Foreign Aid Policy?
The short answer is: quite a lot, but different parts of the literature offer different recommendations. The problem is that these different recommendations are partly in conflict, and that political and bureaucratic incentives may reinforce these frictions when putting aid policy into practice. It follows that reforms aiming at improving aid effectiveness have to find a way to deal with this conflict and also balance the tendency of institutional sclerosis within bureaucratic agencies against short sighted incentives of politicians.
The currently predominant field of development economics focuses on impact evaluation of different economic and social interventions. These studies are all micro-oriented, looking at the impact on the level of the individual or household, rather than at the nation as a whole. One example is evaluations of the effects of different interventions on school participation, such as conditional cash transfers, free school meals, provision of uniforms and textbooks, and de-worming. Other well-known studies have looked at educational output, moral hazard versus adverse selection on financial markets, how to best allocate bed-nets to prevent malaria, and the role of information in public goods provision and health outcomes.
What has sparked the academic interest in these types of impact evaluations is the application of a methodology well known from clinical trials and first introduced in the field of economics by labor economists, randomized field experiments. The purpose of impact evaluation is to establish the causal effect of the program at hand. Strictly speaking this requires an answer to the counterfactual question; what difference does it make for the average individual if he is part of the program or not. Since an individual cannot be both part of, and not part of, the program at the same time, an exact answer to that question cannot be reached. Instead evaluators must rely on a comparison between individuals participating in the program and those that do not, or a before and after comparison of program participants. The challenge when doing this is to avoid getting the comparison contaminated by unobservable confounding factors and selection issues. For instance, maybe only the most school motivated households are willing to sign up for conditional cash transfer programs, so a positive correlation between program involvement and school participation may all be due to a selection bias (these households would have sent their children to school anyway). In this case participation is what economists refer to as “endogenous”, individual characteristics that may impact the outcome variable may also drive participation in the program.
To get around this problem, the evaluator would want strictly “exogenous” variation in the participation in the program, i.e. individuals should not get an opportunity to self-select into participation or not. The solution to this problem is to select a group of similar individuals/households/villages and then randomize participation across these units. This creates a group of participants in the program (the “treated”, using the language of clinical studies) and a group of non-participants (the “control group”) who are not only similar in all observable aspects thought to possibly affect the outcome, but who are also not given the opportunity to self-select into the program based on unobservable characteristics. Based on this methodology, the evaluator can then estimate the causal effect of the program. Exactly how that is done varies, but in the cleanest cases simply by comparing the average outcome in the group of treated with that in the group of controls.
So what has this got to do with aid policy? A significant part of aid financing goes of course to projects to increase school participation, give the poor access to financial markets, eradicate infectious diseases, etc. Both the programs evaluated by randomization, and the randomization evaluations themselves, are often financed by aid money. The promise of the randomization literature is thus that it offers a more precise instrument to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of aid financed projects, and also helps aid agencies in their choice of new projects by creating a more accurate knowledge bank of what constitutes current best practices. This can be particularly helpful since aid agencies often are under fire for not being able to show what results their often generous expenditures generate. Anyone who has followed the recent aid debate in Sweden is familiar with this critique, and the methodology of randomization is often brought forward as a useful tool to help estimate and make public the impact of aid financed development projects.
Limits to Randomization
Taken to the extreme, the “randomization revolution” suggests that to maximize aid effectiveness all aid should be allocated to clearly defined projects, and only to those projects that have been shown through randomization to have had a cost-effective causal effect on some outcome included in the aid donors objective (such as the millennium development goals). Yet, most aid practitioners would be reluctant to ascribe to such a statement. Why is that? Well, as is typically the case there are many potential answers. The cynic would argue that proponents of aid are worried that a true revelation of its dismal effects would decrease its political support, and that aid agencies want to keep their relative independence to favor their own pet projects. Better evaluation techniques makes it easier for politicians and tax payers to hold aid agencies accountable to their actions, and principal-agency theory suggests that governments then should put more pressure on agencies to produce verifiable results.
There are other more benevolent reasons to be skeptical to this approach, though, and these reasons find support in the more macro oriented part of the literature. In recent papers studying cross national differences in economic growth and development almost all focus is on the role of economic and political institutions. The term “institutions” has become a bit of a catch-phrase, and it sometimes means quite different things in different papers. Typically, though, the focus lies on formal institutions or societal norms that support a competitive and open market economy and a political system with limited corruption, predictability and public legitimacy. Critical components include protection of property rights, democracy, honest and competent courts, and competition policy, but the list can be made much longer. Also this time the recent academic interest has been spurred by methodological developments that have permitted researchers to better establish a causal effect from institutions to economic development. Estimating cleanly the effect of institutions on the level or growth rate of GDP is complicated since causality is likely to run in both directions, and other variables, such as education, may cause both. What scholars have done is to identify historical data that correlates strongly with historic institutions and then correlated the variation in current institutions that can be explained by these historical data with current day income levels. If cross national variation in current institutions maps closely to cross national variation in historical institutions (“institutional stickiness”) and if current day income levels, or education rates, do not cause historical institutions (which seems reasonable) then the historical data can be used as a so called “instrument” to produce a cleaner estimate of the causal effect of institutions.
Note that randomization and instrumentation are trying to solve the same empirical challenge. When randomization is possible it will be superior if implemented correctly (because perfect instruments only exist in theory), but there is of course a fairly limited range of questions for which randomized experiments are possible to design. In other cases scholars will have to do with instrumentation, or other alternatives such as matching, regression discontinuity or difference-in-difference estimations to better estimate a causal effect.
A second insight from this literature is that what constitutes successful institutions is context specific. Certain economic principles may be universal; incentives work, competition fosters efficiency and property rights are crucial for investments. However, as the example of China shows, what institutions are most likely to guarantee property rights, competition and the right incentives may vary depending on norms and historical experiences among other things. Successful institutional reforms therefore require a certain degree of experimentation for policy makers to find out what works in the context at hand. To just implement blueprints of institutions that have worked elsewhere typically doesn’t work. In other words, institutions must be legitimate in the society at hand to have the desired effect on individual behavior.
Coming back to aid policy, the lesson from this part of the literature is that for aid to contribute to economic and social development, focus should be on helping partner country governments and civic society to develop strong economic and political institutions. And since blueprints don’t work, it is crucial that this process involves domestic involvement and leadership in order to guarantee that the institutions put in place are adapted to the context of the partner country at hand, and has legitimacy in the eyes of both citizens and decision makers. Indeed, institution building is also a central part of aid policy. This sometimes takes an explicit form such as in financing western consultants with expertise in say central banking reform or how to set up a well-functioning court system. But many times it is also implicit in the way the money is disbursed, through program support rather than project support (where the former is more open for the partner country to use at their own priorities), through the partner country’s financial management systems and recorded in the recipient country budget. Also in the implementation of projects there is an element of institution building. By establishing projects within partner government agencies and actively involving its employees, learning and experience will contribute to institutional development.
Actual aid policy often falls short of these ambitions, though. Nancy Birdsall has referred to the impatience with institution building as one of the donors’ “seven deadly sins”. The impatience to produce results leads to insufficient resources towards the challenging and long term work of creating institutions in weak states, and the search for success leads to the creation of development management structures (project implementation units) outside partner country agencies. The latter not only generates no positive spill-overs of knowledge within government agencies, but can often have the opposite effect when donors eager to succeed lure over scarce talent from government agencies. The aid community is aware of these problems and has committed to improve its practices in the Paris declaration and the Accra Agenda, but so far progress has been deemed as slow.
Micro or Macro?
So, I started out saying that there is a risk that these two lessons from the literature may be in conflict if put into practice for actual aid policy. Why is that? At a trivial level, there is of course a conflict over the allocation of aid resources if we interpret the lessons as though the sole focus should be on either institutional development or best practice social projects respectively. However, most people would probably agree that there is a merit to both. In theory it is possible to conceive of an optimal allocation of aid across institutional support and social project support, in which the share of resources going to project support is allocated across projects based on best practices learned from randomized impact evaluations. In practice, however, it’s important to consider why these lessons from the literature haven’t been implemented to a greater extent already. After all, these are not completely new insights. Political economy and the logic of large bureaucratic organizations may be part of the answer. Once these factors are considered, a less trivial conflict becomes apparent, showing the need to think carefully about how to best proceed with improving the practices of aid agencies.
As mentioned above, one line of criticism against aid agencies is that they have had such a hard time to show results from their activities. This is partly due to the complicated nature of aid in itself, but critics also argue that it is greatly driven by current practices of aid agencies. First of all there is a lack of transparency; information about what decisions are made (and why), and where the money is going is often insufficient. This problem sometimes becomes acute, when corruption scandals reveal the lack of proper oversight. Secondly, money is often spent on projects/programs for which objectives are unclear, targets unspecified, and where the final impact of the intervention on the identified beneficiaries simply can’t be quantified. This of course limits the ability to hold agencies accountable to their actions, so focus instead tends to fall on output targets (have all the money been disbursed, have all the schools been built) rather than the actual effects of the spending. So why is this? According to critics, a reason for this lack of transparency and accountability is that it yields the agencies more discretion in how to spend the money. Agencies are accused of institutional inertia, programs and projects keep getting financed despite doubts about their effectiveness because agency staff and aid contractors are financially and emotionally attached.
In this context, more focus on long run, hard to evaluate institutional development may be taken as an excuse for continuing business as usual. Patience, a long run perspective and partner country ownership is necessary, but it cannot be taken as an excuse for not clearly specifying verifiable objectives and targets, and to engage in impact evaluation. It is also important that a long term commitment doesn’t have to imply an unwillingness to abandon a program if it doesn’t generate the anticipated results. It is of course typically much harder to design randomized experiments to evaluate institutional development than the effect of say free distribution of bed-nets. But it doesn’t follow that it is always impossible, and, more importantly, it doesn’t preclude other well founded methods of impact evaluation. The concern here is thus that too much emphasis on the role of institutional development is used as an excuse for not incorporating the main lesson from the “randomization revolution”, the importance of the best possible impact evaluation, because actual randomization is not feasible.
The concern discussed above is based on the implicit argument that aid agencies due to the logic of incentives and interests within bureaucratic institutions may not always do what is in their power to promote development, and that this is made possible through lack of transparency and accountability. The solution would in that case seem to be to increase accountability of aid agencies towards their politicians, the representatives of the tax payers financing the aid budget. That is, greater political control of aid policy would improve the situation.
Unfortunately, things aren’t quite that easy, which brings us to the concern with letting the ability to evaluate projects with randomized experiments being a prerequisite for aid financing. We have already touched upon the problem that programs for institutional development are hard to design as randomized experiments. It follows that important programs may not be implemented at all, and that aid allocation becomes driven by what is feasible to evaluate rather than by what is important for long run development. But there is also an additional concern that has to do with the political incentives of aid. The impatience with institution building is often blamed on political incentives to generate verifiable success stories. This is driven by the need to motivate aid, and the government policies more generally, in the eyes of the voters. It follows that politicians in power often have a rather short time horizon, that doesn’t square well with the tedious and long run process of institution building. Putting aid agencies under tighter control of elected politicians may therefore possibly solve the problem outlined above, but it may also introduce, or reinforce, another problem, the impatience with institution building.
Unfortunately, the perception that randomization makes it possible to more exactly define what works and what doesn’t, may have further unintended consequences if politicians care more about short term success than long term development. We know from principal-agent theory that the optimal contract gives the agent stronger incentives to take actions that contribute to a project if it becomes easier to evaluate whether the project has been successful or not. Think now of the government as the principal and the aid agency as the agent, and consider the case when the government has a bias towards generating short run success stories. In this case the introduction of a new technology that makes it easier to evaluate social projects (i.e. randomization) will make the government put stronger incentives on the aid agency to redirect resources towards social projects and away from institutional development. This would not be a problem if the government had development as its only objective, because then the negative consequences on effort at institution building would be internalized in the incentive structure. But in a second best world where politics trump policy, the improved technology may have perverse and unintended consequences. Greater political control will lead to less focus on institutional development than what is desired from a development perspective. A very benevolent (naïve?) interpretation of the motivation behind aid agencies’ tendencies to design social projects such that their effects are hard to quantify could thus be that it decreases the political pressure to ignore institutional development.
Concluding Remarks
The challenge to heed the two lessons from the literature thus goes beyond the mere conflict of whether to allocate the resources to institutional development or to best practice social projects once political economy and bureaucratic incentives are considered. Improved agency accountability may be necessary to avoid “institutional sclerosis” in the name of institution building and make sure that best practices are followed, but too much political meddling may lead to short sightedness and a hunt for marketable success stories. It is even possible, that the “randomization revolution” may make matters worse, if it becomes an excuse for neglecting the tedious and long term process of institution building and reinforces the political pressure for short term verifiable results.
What is then the best hope for avoiding this conflict of interest? That is far from a trivial question, but maybe the best way to make sure that agency accountability towards their political principals doesn’t lead to impatience with institution building is to form a broad-based political consensus around the objectives, means and expectations of development aid. The pedagogical challenge to convince tax payers that aid helps and that they need to be patient remains, but at least the political temptation to accuse political opponents of squandering tax payers money without proven effects and to pretend to have the final solution for how to make aid work, should be mitigated. But until then the best bet is probably to stay skeptical to anyone claiming to have the final cure for aid inefficiency, and to allow some trust in the ability of experienced practitioners to do the right thing.
Recommended Further Reading
- Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson and J.A. Robinson (2001) “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation“, American Economic Review 91(5), 1369-1401.
- Banerjee, A. (Ed.) (2007), “Making Aid Work”, MIT Press.
- Bannerjee, A. and E. Duflo (2008), “The Experimental Approach to Development Economics”, NBER Working Paper 14467.
- Birdsall, N. (2005), “Seven Deadly Sins: Reflections on Donor Failings”, CGD Working Paper 50.
- Birdsall, N. and H. Kharas (2010), “Quality of Official Development Assistance Assessment”, Working Paper, Brookings and CGD.
- Duflo, E., R. Glennerster and M. Kremer (2007), “Using Randomization in Development Economics Research: A Toolkit”, CEPR Discussion Paper 6059.
- Easterly, W. (2002), “The Cartel of Good Intentions: The problem of Bureaucracy in Foreign Aid”, Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 5, 223-50.
- Easterly, W. and T. Pfutze (2008), “Where Does the Money Go? Best and Worst Practices in Foreign Aid”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22, 29-52.
- Knack, S. and A. Rahman (2007), “Donor fragmentation and bureaucratic quality in aid recipients”, Journal of Development Economics, 83(1), 176-97.
- Rodrik, D. (2008), “The New Development Economics: We Shall Experiment, but how Shall We Learn?”, JFK School of Government Working Paper 55.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.