Tag: Russo-Ukranian war
From Integration to Reconstruction: Standing with Ukraine by Supporting Ukrainians in Sweden
Sweden has strongly supported Ukraine through both public opinion and government actions, yet there has been little discussion about the needs of Ukrainian displaced people in Sweden. The ongoing war and the rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape have created uncertainty – geopolitical, institutional, and individual. Ukrainian displaced people in Sweden face an unclear future regarding their rights, long-term status, and opportunities, making future planning or investing in relevant skills difficult. This uncertainty also weakens the effectiveness of integration policies and limits the range of policy tools that can be deployed, which hinders participation in the labor market, affecting both displaced and employers. Addressing these challenges is essential, not only for the well-being of Ukrainians in Sweden, but also for Sweden’s broader role in supporting Ukraine. Helping displaced Ukrainians rebuild their lives also strengthens their ability to contribute both to Swedish society and to Ukraine’s future reconstruction and integration into Europe.
The Swedish Approach to Displaced Ukrainians
In response to the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Temporary Protection Directive (2001/55/EC) (commonly referred to as collective temporary protection) was activated in March 2022, granting Ukrainians seeking refuge temporary protection in EU countries, including Sweden. This directive provides residence permits, access to work, education, and limited social benefits without requiring individuals to go through the standard asylum process.
However, the practicalities of the Directive’s use differed significantly between countries. Sweden, despite its, until recent, reputation of being relatively liberal in its migration policies, has at times, lagged behind its Scandinavian neighbors in supporting Ukrainian displaced people. To illustrate this, it is useful to compare the Swedish approach to that of other Nordic states, as well as Poland.
Comparison to Other Nordic States
The Nordic countries have implemented the directive in different ways, adopting varying policies toward Ukrainians demonstrating different degrees of flexibility and support. Despite its generally restrictive immigration policy, Denmark introduced some housing and self-settlement policies for Ukrainians that were more liberal than its usual approach. Norway also initially introduced liberal measures but later tightened regulations, banning temporary visits to Ukraine and reducing financial benefits. Finland, meanwhile, has taken a relatively proactive stance, granting temporary protection to over 64,000 Ukrainians – one of the highest per capita rates in the region. Its strong intake reflects a more flexible and effective implementation of the directive, particularly from late 2022, when it surpassed Sweden and Denmark in number of arrivals.
In Sweden the so-called “massflyktsdirektivet“ grants Ukrainians temporary protection until at least March 2025. Its future beyond that, however, remains uncertain, adding to the challenges faced by refugees and policymakers alike. Sweden – considered liberal in migration policies (at least, up until 2016) – has been criticized for offering limited rights and financial support to displaced Ukrainians, making it one of the least attractive destinations among the Nordic countries (Hernes & Danielsen, 2024). Under “massflyktsdirektivet”, displaced Ukrainians were entitled to lower financial benefits and limited access to healthcare compared to refugees or residents with temporary permits. It was only in July 2023 that they became eligible for Swedish language training, and only in November 2024 could they apply for residence permits under Sweden’s regular migration laws – a pathway that can eventually lead to permanent residence.
Figure 1 illustrates significant fluctuations in the number of individuals granted collective temporary protection in the Nordic countries over the first two years following Russia’s full-scale invasion. As Hernes and Danielsen (2024) show in a recent report, all Nordic countries experienced a peak in arrivals in March-April 2022, followed by a decline in May-June. Sweden initially received the most, but aside from this early peak, inflows have remained relatively low despite its larger population (Table 1). Since August 2022, Finland and Norway have generally recorded higher arrivals than Denmark and Sweden. By August 2023, Norway’s share increased significantly, accounting for over 60 percent of total Nordic arrivals between September and November 2023.
Figure 1. Total number of individuals granted collective temporary protection in the Nordic countries
Source: Hernes & Danielsen, 2024, data from Eurostat.
Table 1. Total number of registered temporary protection permits and percent of population as of December 2023
Source: Hernes & Danielsen, 2024, data from Eurostat.
Comparison to Poland
Sweden’s policies and their outcomes compare rather poorly to those of Poland, one of the European countries that received the largest influx of Ukrainian migrants due to its geographic and cultural proximity. A key factor behind Poland’s relatively better performance is that pre-existing Ukrainian communities and linguistic similarities have facilitated a smoother integration. Ukrainians themselves played a crucial role in this regard, with many volunteering in Polish schools to support Ukrainian children. Sweden also had a community of Ukrainians who arrived to the country over time, partly fleeing the 2014 annexation of Donetsk and Crimea. Since these individuals were never eligible for refugee status or integration support, they had to rely on their own efforts to settle. In doing so, they built informal networks and accumulated valuable local knowledge. Nevertheless, after the full-scale invasion in 2022, they were not recognized as a resource for integrating newly arrived Ukrainian refugees – unlike in Poland.
However, Poland’s approach was shaped not only by these favorable preconditions but also by deliberate policy choices. As described in a recent brief (Myck, Król, & Oczkowska, 2025), a key factor was the immediate legal integration of displaced Ukrainians, granting them extensive residency rights and access to social services, along with a clearer pathway to permanent residence and eventual naturalization.
Barriers to Labor Market Integration
Despite a strong unanimous support for Ukraine across the political spectrum, there is less public debate and fewer policy processes in Sweden regarding displaced Ukrainians, most likely attributable to the general shift towards more restrictive immigration policies. The immigration policy debate in Sweden has increasingly emphasized a more “selective” migration, i.e. attracting migrants based on specific criteria, such as employability, skills, or economic self-sufficiency. This makes it puzzling that displaced Ukrainians, who largely meet these standards, have not been better accommodated. Before the full-scale invasion, Sweden was a particularly attractive destination among those who wanted to migrate permanently, especially for highly educated individuals and families (Elinder et al., 2023), indicating a positive self-selection process.
When large numbers of displaced Ukrainians arrived after the full-scale invasion, many had higher education and recent work experience, which distinguished them from previous refugee waves that Sweden had received from other countries. Despite a strong labor market in 2022, their integration was hindered by restrictions imposed under the Temporary Protection Directive, which limited access to social benefits and housing. At the same time, Sweden explicitly sought to reduce its attractiveness as a destination for migrants in general, contributing to a sharp decline in its popularity among Ukrainians after the war escalated.
In addition to the restrictiveness and numerous policy shifts over time, the temporary nature of the directive governing displaced Ukrainians – rather than the standard asylum process – creates significant policy uncertainty. This uncertainty makes it difficult for Ukrainians to decide whether to invest in Sweden-specific skills or prepare for a potential return to Ukraine, whether voluntary or forced, complicating their long-term planning. It also hinders labor market integration, increasing the risk of exploitation in the informal economy. Another key challenge is the unequal distribution of rights, as entitlements vary depending on registration timelines, further exacerbating the precarious situation many displaced Ukrainians face in Sweden.
A survey of 2,800 displaced Ukrainians conducted by the Ukrainian NGO in Sweden “Hej Ukraine!” in February 2025 provides key insights into their labor market integration (Hej Ukraine!, 2025). Survey results show that, currently, 40 percent of respondents are employed, with 42 percent of them holding permanent contracts while the rest work in temporary positions and 6 percent being engaged in formal studies. Employment is concentrated in low-skilled sectors, with 26 percent working in cleaning services, 14 percent in construction, and 12 percent in hospitality and restaurants. Other notable sectors include IT (11 percent), education (8 percent), warehousing (7 percent), elderly care (5 percent), forestry (3 percent), and healthcare (3 percent). The lack of stable permits, access to language courses (until September 2024), and financial incentives for hiring displaced persons have complicated their integration.
As mentioned above, the Swedish government has over time introduced several initiatives to facilitate the integration of displaced Ukrainians. However, assessing their effectiveness is crucial to identify persistent challenges and to formulate targeted policy solutions.
The Role of the Private Sector and Civil Society
The business sector, civil society and NGOs have also played a role in supporting displaced Ukrainians, filling gaps left by the public sector. This includes initiatives aimed at creating job opportunities that encourage voluntary return. However, broader systemic support, including simplified diploma recognition and targeted re-skilling programs, is needed to enhance labor market participation.
Moreover, there is a lack of information among displaced, potential employers and public institutions (municipality level) about the tools and programs available. For example, a community sponsorship program funded by UNHCR, which demonstrated positive effects on integration by offering mentorship and support networks, was only applied by five municipalities (UNHCR, 2025). Similar programs could be expanded to address structural barriers, particularly in the labor market. Another example is the Ukrainian Professional Support Center established to help displaced Ukrainians find jobs through building networks and matching job seekers with employers (UPSC, 2024). The center was funded by the European Social Fund, and staffed to 50 percent by Ukrainian nationals, either newcomers or previously established in Sweden, to facilitate communication. Experiences from this initiative, shared during a recent roundtable discussion – Integration and Inclusion of Ukrainian Displaced People in Sweden, highlighted that between 2022 and 2024, about 1,400 Ukrainians participated in the project, but only one-third of participants found jobs, mostly in entry-level positions in care, hospitality, and construction. Restrictions under the temporary protection directive, along with the absence of clear mechanisms for further integration, posed significant challenges; the lack of a personal ID, bank account, and access to housing were considered major obstacles. The uncertainty of their future in Sweden was also reported as a significant source of stress for participants.
Implications and Policy Recommendations
The lack of clarity surrounding the future of the EU Temporary Protection Directive, as well as its specific implementation in Sweden, leaves displaced Ukrainians in a precarious situation. Many do not know whether they will be allowed to stay or if they should prepare for a forced return. This uncertainty discourages long-term investment in skills, housing, and integration efforts.
Uncertainty also affects Swedish institutions, making it difficult to implement long-term policies that effectively integrate Ukrainians into society. To address these issues, the following policy recommendations are proposed.
- Extend Temporary Protection Status Beyond 2025: Clear guidelines on the duration of protection are necessary to provide stability for displaced Ukrainians
- Improve Labor Market Access: Introduce targeted programs for skill recognition, language training, and financial incentives for businesses hiring displaced Ukrainians
- Enhance Civil Society and Private Sector Collaboration: Support mentorship and community sponsorship programs that facilitate integration
- Acknowledge and Utilize displaced Ukrainians as a Resource: Recognizing displaced Ukrainians as potential assets in rebuilding Ukraine and strengthening European ties should be a priority.
- Increase Public and Policy Debate: There is a need for greater discussion on how to integrate Ukrainians in Sweden, as an important complement to the policy priority of providing aid to Ukraine.
By implementing these measures, Sweden can provide displaced Ukrainians with greater stability, enabling them to engage in the formal labour market rather than being pushed into informal or precarious employment. This not only benefits Ukrainians by ensuring fair wages and legal protection, but also strengthens Sweden’s economy through increased tax revenues and a more sustainable labour force.
As Sweden continues to support Ukraine in its fight for sovereignty, it should also recognize the value of displaced Ukrainians within its borders, fostering their contribution to both Swedish society and Ukraine’s eventual reconstruction.
References
- Hernes, V., & Danielsen, Å. Ø. (2024). Reception and integration policies for displaced persons from Ukraine in the Nordic countries – A comparative analysis. NIBR Policy Brief 2024:01. https://oda.oslom et.no/oda-xmlui/handle/11250/3125012
- Hej Ukraine! (2025). Telegram channel. https://t.me/hejukrainechat
- Elinder, M., Erixson, O., & Hammar, O. (2023). Where Would Ukrainian Refugees Go if They Could Go Anywhere? International Migration Review, 57(2), 587-602. https://doi.org/10.1177/01979183221131559
- EUROSTAT. Decisions granting temporary protection by citizenship, age and sex – monthly data. Dataset. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_asytpfm__custom_15634298/default/map?lang=en
- Myck, M., Król, A., & Oczkowska, M. (2025, February 21). Three years on – Ukrainians in Poland after Russia’s 2022 invasion. FREE Policy Brief. Centre for Economic Analysis (CenEA). https://freepolicybriefs.org/2025/02/21/ukrainians-in-poland/
- Ukrainian Professional Support Center (UPSC). (2024). https://professionalcenter.se/omoss/
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (2025). Community sponsorship. UNHCR Northern Europe. Retrieved [March 6, 2025] from https://www.unhcr.org/neu/list/our-work/community-sponsorship
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Human Capital Loss Among Belarusian and Ukrainian Migrants to the EU
This policy brief examines the underutilization of human capital among involuntary migrants from Ukraine and Belarus in Poland and Lithuania. Focusing on those who migrated after 2020 (Belarus) and 2022 (Ukraine), the brief investigates the factors influencing the conversion of their pre-migration skills into gainful employment in their host countries. Our findings show that despite many migrants possessing high levels of education and professional qualifications, structural barriers and low convertibility of their skills, hinder their full labor market integration. This skill underutilization not only limits migrants’ professional growth and earning potential but also deprives the host countries of valuable skills and potential economic gains.
Effective labor market integration substantially benefits both host and sending countries and migrants themselves. For host nations, successful integration can alleviate critical skill shortages, boost productivity, and drive economic growth (Boubtane, Dumont, & Rault, 2016; Boubtane, 2019; Engler, Giesing, & Kraehnert, 2023; Bernstein et al., 2022). Conversely, inadequate integration leads to underemployment, diminished potential, and economic inefficiency. Countries of origin can benefit from remittances, the return of migrants with enhanced skills, and strengthened international economic ties. However, poor integration risks an uncompensated “brain drain” (Reinhold & Thom, 2009; Barrett & O’Connell, 2001; Iara, 2006; Barrett & Goggin, 2010; Co, Gang, & Yun, 2000). For migrants, the ability to continue their careers means higher earnings and less stress from the acquisition of a new profession, while the non-utilization of existing skills results in their depreciation, potentially causing permanent wage reductions even upon return to the home country (Bowman & Myers, 1967).
Migrants can be broadly categorized into voluntary migrants or forced migrants. Voluntary migrants assess labor market prospects beforehand and often possess convertible human capital – one that can be used in a new labor market. This group often includes professionals like IT specialists and scientists and those in low-skilled but highly transferable professions. Forced migrants, on the contrary, may be utterly unprepared for changes in jurisdiction and possess skills of limited transferability. For example, even highly specialized professions requiring extensive training and substantial human capital, such as lawyers, officials, and teachers, often prove “non-convertible“ (Duleep & Regets, 1999). These individuals’ skills are frequently country specific.
Low convertibility of skills generates significant negative consequences. Highly educated professionals, for instance, may find themselves relegated to low-paying, unskilled jobs, unable to leverage their expertise. This hinders their professional development and deprives host countries of valuable skills and potential contributions to economic growth. Addressing these mismatches is crucial for maximizing the benefits of migration for stakeholders in both home and host countries.
Forced Migration from Belarus and Ukraine
The political crisis in Belarus, starting with the contested 2020 presidential elections, led to widespread repression and significant forced migration. Belarus’s role in supporting Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine exacerbated this situation, resulting in approximately 300,000 Belarusians seeking refuge in the European Union (Eurostat). This number accounts for a substantial proportion of the country’s 9 million population and its approximately 5 million-strong labor force (Belstat).
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine triggered the most significant wave of migration in Ukrainian history, with over 6 million of the pre-war 44 million population fleeing to the EU (UNHCR). About 90 percent of the initial refugees were women and children due to a mobilization law preventing most men aged 18 to 60 from leaving (UNHCR).
Online Survey and Migrant Differences
To better understand the situation of migrants, their integration into the EU labor market, and to develop data-driven recommendations for improving their conditions, the CIVITTA agency, in partnership with BEROC, conducted an online survey in the summer of 2024. This brief is based on the survey results. The survey includes responses from 616 Ukrainian nationals who migrated to Poland or Lithuania after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as well as 173 Belarusian migrants who left their home country after 2020. The research focuses on individuals aged 28 to 42, providing insights into their experiences and challenges in the labor market in their host countries. While we acknowledge the sample’s limitations in terms of representativeness, we believe the findings provide valuable insights into the specific challenges faced by involuntary migrants and their adaptation strategies in the new labor market.
Key differences characterize these migration waves. Ukrainian migration comprises of more women, while Belarusian migrants show a more balanced gender distribution, with 47 percent women in our sample versus 62 percent for Ukrainians. Family separation is also notable, as 91 percent of married Belarusians live with their spouses, compared to only 75 percent of Ukrainians (due to the mobilization law).
Survey respondents from both groups possess high levels of human capital with 60 percent of Ukrainians and 90 percent of Belarusians holding higher education degrees. Among Belarusians, 94 percent had over five years of work experience before migration, with and 79 percent of Ukrainians stating the same.
Ukrainian return intentions are split: 38 percent plan to return, 19 percent will not, and the rest are undecided. An end to the war and changes in Russian foreign policy would increase return rates to 70 percent. For Belarusians, 35 percent plan to return, 38 percent will not, and the rest are undecided. Education level is key, as less-educated Belarusians are more likely to stay abroad. An end to repression would increase the share of those Belarusians who want to return to 70 percent, and a regime change would increase this percentage to 82 percent.
Factors Conditioning Human Capital Loss
As expected, due to the involuntary nature of migration of the two groups in focus, a large fraction of survey participants reported losing their profession after migration. As Figure one shows, 48 percent of Belarusians and 63 percent of Ukrainians in our sample reported full loss of their prior careers. The lower percentage of Ukrainians fully retaining their careers (23 percent) compared to Belarusians (44 percent) could be attributed to several factors, including the more recent and disruptive nature of the Russo-Ukrainian war leading to more significant displacement and challenges in finding comparable work. The higher percentage of Ukrainians starting their careers from scratch (49 percent compared to 29 percent among Belarusians) also supports this idea.
Figure 1. Preservation of careers in the EU
Source: Authors’ computations based on survey data.
To foster an evidence-based discussions on the smooth integration of migrants into the EU labor market and the prevention of human capital loss, it is crucial to examine the individual factors that influence career continuity for Belarusian and Ukrainian migrants. We therefore utilize a logistic regression model to identify key predictors that increase the likelihood of migrants remaining in their profession after relocating to Poland and Lithuania.
In our quantitative analysis, an outcome binary variable for staying in the profession is equal to 1 if an individual either “continued career started in a home country (in the same position)” or “remained in the same profession but started working in a position lower than the one held before emigration.” As predictors, we consider a set of sociodemographic variables reasonably related to the probability of staying in the profession and dummy variables for the most common spheres of employment (see Table 1).
Table 1. Overview of model variables
Who Maintains Their Career After Emigration?
Based on the regression coefficients in Table 2, we can identify characteristics related to losing career-specific human capital. In our regression, we control for both home and host country factors. One noteworthy finding is that, while Ukrainian migrants in our sample report significantly higher rates of career loss than Belarusian migrants, nationality itself does not emerge as a significant predictor of career loss once other characteristics are accounted for.
Our results also show that the probability of staying in a profession is higher among men, those with more extended work experience and higher income before emigration, and those who were invited to a host country by an employer. The same holds for entrepreneurs, those who do not plan to return, and those employed in the fields of Architecture & Engineering and Information and Communication Technologies.
Table 2. Results of regression analysis
Note: *** Significant at the .001 level. ** Significant at the .01 level. * Significant at the .05 level.
Conclusion
Several conclusions and policy advice can be derived from the survey results.
The higher likelihood of entrepreneurs staying in their profession suggests that supporting migrant entrepreneurship can be a valuable strategy to retain human capital. This can be done, for example, by:
- Providing access to resources, mentorship, and funding for migrant entrepreneurs.
- Streamlining the procedures for migrants to start and operate businesses.
- Facilitating access to capital for migrant-owned businesses.
The research highlights the disproportionate impact of human capital loss on women. Therefore, policies should include gender-specific programs that address women’s unique challenges in integrating into new labor markets. This could include:
- Skills retraining and certification programs: Designed to align women’s existing skills with the demands of the host country’s labor market, with consideration for childcare needs and other barriers women may face.
- Connecting women migrants with established professionals in their fields to facilitate knowledge transfer and career guidance.
- Language training programs: Tailored to the specific needs of women, potentially incorporating childcare support to enable participation.
The study highlights the positive role of international companies in supporting employee relocation. Respondents who were invited by an employer demonstrated the most successful integration into the new labor market. To enhance and strengthen these networks, policies may focus on:
- Encouraging corporations to hire and train migrant workers, potentially through tax breaks or other incentives. This could include partnerships with migrant-serving organizations to connect companies with qualified candidates.
- Developing digital platforms that connect migrants with diaspora networks, potential employers, and relevant resources.
In addition, policies should address the non-recognition of foreign qualifications, simplifying and expediting the procedures for recognizing foreign degrees and professional certifications. Initiatives to create targeted training programs could complement such policies and allow migrants to quickly acquire any missing skills or certifications required by the host country’s professional bodies. These policy measures would enhance the utilization of migrants’ human capital, benefiting both migrants and host countries while also supporting sending countries. This could be achieved by fostering a successful diaspora or facilitating productive reintegration in the case of return migration.
References
- Barrett, A., & Goggin, J. (2010). Returning to the question of a wage premium for returning migrants. National Institute Economic Review, 213, R43–R51. https://doi.org/10.1177/0027950110389752
- Barrett, A., & O’Connell, P. J. (2001). Does training generally work? The returns to in-company training. ILR Review, 54(3), 647–662. https://doi.org/10.1177/001979390105400403
- Bernstein, S., Diamond, R., McQuade, T. J., & Pousada, B. (2022). The contribution of high-skilled immigrants to innovation in the United States (No. w30797). National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w30797
- Boubtane, E. (2019). The economic effects of immigration for host countries. L’Economie politique, 84(4), 72–83. https://doi.org/10.3917/leco.084.0072
- Boubtane, E., Dumont, J.-C., & Rault, C. (2016). Immigration and economic growth in the OECD countries 1986–2006. Oxford Economic Papers, 68(2), 340–360. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpv024
- Bowman, M. J., & Myers, R. G. (1967). Schooling, experience, and gains and losses in human capital through migration. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 62(319), 875–898. https://doi.org/10.2307/2283723
- Co, C. Y., Gang, I. N., & Yun, M.-S. (2000). Returns to returning. Journal of Population Economics, 13, 57–79. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001480050121
- Duleep, H. O., & Regets, M. C. (1999). Immigrants and human-capital investment. American Economic Review, 89(2), 186–191. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.2.186
- Engler, P., Giesing, Y., & Kraehnert, K. (2023). The macroeconomic effects of large immigration waves. IAB-Discussion Paper. https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-239271
- Iara, A. (2006). Skill diffusion in temporary migration? Returns to Western European working experience in the EU accession countries (Development Studies Working Paper No. 210). Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=921492
- Reinhold, S., & Thom, K. (2009). Temporary migration and skill upgrading: Evidence from Mexican migrants. University of Mannheim, unpublished manuscript.
- UNHCR. (n.d.). Operational Data Portal. https://data.unhcr.org/
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Should the $60 Price Cap on Russian Oil Exports be Lowered?
Western governments have imposed a $60 price cap on Russian seaborne oil exports using Western services. To evade the policy, Russia has developed a “shadow fleet” which uses no such services. In this policy brief, we claim that the resulting segmentation of Russian oil exports dramatically modifies the conventional analysis of a price cap. Our research shows that lowering the cap would not hurt Russia as intended unless a robust expansion in non-Russian oil supply was to limit the induced increase in the world oil price. If this price increase is not limited, lowering the cap could even moderately increase Russian profits because shadow fleet sales would be more profitable. By contrast, policies that reduce some shadow fleet capacity would reduce Russian profits if undertaken while Russia still relies on some Western services.
In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU, the U.S., and other G7 countries (hereafter the West) ceased their imports of Russian oil, leading Russia to export more to India, Turkey, and China instead. In addition, the West imposed sanctions on oil exports from Russia, whose profits are instrumental in supporting its war.
Since more than 80 percent of Russia’s seaborne oil exports relied on the provision of Western services (CREA, 2023) (financial, operational, and commercial) the EU suggested banning the use of these Western services for all Russian seaborne exports. However, governments feared that this would cause a spike in the world oil price. As an alternative, the U.S. suggested a price cap, which the West ultimately imposed in December 2022, limiting Russian revenues from oil shipped using Western services to $60 per barrel.
Oil transported without Western services is exempt from the cap. Therefore, Russia has gradually assembled a “shadow fleet” that uses non-Western services in order to sell oil at prices above the cap.
The price cap on Russian oil is a new, insofar untested economic sanction, currently a subject of active public discussion, with experts recommending potential adjustments and application to more countries, and policymakers currently considering to tighten the price cap – see for example the January 2025 call by Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to lower the price cap below $60. The policy quickly piqued the interest of economists – see for example Spiro, Wachtmeister, and Gars’ (2024) comprehensive review of policy options to limit Russia’s ability to finance the war.
In their pioneering contribution to the literature, Johnson, Rachel, and Wolfram (2025) provide a rich analysis of the effects of the price cap, albeit under the assumption that the shadow fleet has a fixed capacity. In a recent working paper (Cardoso, Salant, and Daubanes, 2025), we present a new dynamic economic model that accounts for the expansion of the Russian shadow fleet. The model is calibrated to reproduce observed facts and used to simulate the effects of (1) various levels of the price cap, including the extreme case of a complete ban, (2) enforcement stringency, and (3) policies targeting the shadow fleet.
Perhaps surprisingly, our analysis shows that, in the absence of any increase in non-Russian oil supply, lowering the level of the price cap below $60 would benefit Russia. This includes lowering the cap to levels so low (below $34) that the policy amounts to a ban as Russia would prefer not to use Western services at all at these cap levels. More generally, the model reveals that a lower cap would have two opposite effects on Russia: On the one hand, it would reduce Russia’s profit (i.e., revenues net of production costs) from sales at the cap. On the other hand, since a lower cap would reduce Russia’s oil exports, it would increase the oil price and, therefore, Russia’s profit from sales through its shadow fleet. Our analysis yields a testable and intuitive condition under which the latter effect dominates the former, making a lower cap counterproductive. This condition depends on the shadow fleet capacity relative to Russian sales at the ceiling price.
Application of this condition shows that when sanctions were imposed, Russia’s shadow fleet capacity was already sufficiently high for Russia to benefit from a reduction in the price ceiling. Russia would even have benefited from a reduction in the cap if the West had prevented any expansion in Russia’s shadow fleet beyond its initial level. With no such limitation, Russia would continue to expand its fleet size regardless of the size of the cap reduction. This leads us to conclude that Russia would also benefit if an unanticipated reduction in the cap (or a complete ban) occurred subsequently.
It should be noted that in the absence of a non-Russian supply response, caps at different levels quantitatively impact Russian total profits in a similar way. For example, the $60 cap reduces Russian profits by about 25 percent compared to a scenario without sanctions, and a complete ban would have impacted Russia only slightly less.
The following figure shows a comparison of prices, shadow fleet capacity, and profits under a price cap sanction (solid lines), a service ban (dotted lines), and the absence of sanctions (grey dashed lines). The simulations assume no supply response from non-Russian producers (none occurred when the cap was first implemented). A lower cap cuts Russian exports and raises the global oil price, increasing Russian profits from its fleet sales. A non-Russian supply response would dampen this oil price spike and would, therefore, diminish the resulting revenue increase from Russian fleet sales.
Figure 1. Outcomes under different sanction scenarios
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Russia sometimes uses Western services to ship oil at a price above the cap, taking the risk that its shipments get sanctioned. Increasing the probability that cheating is punished lowers the price Russia expects to receive, with consequences identical to a reduction in the cap level.
By contrast, policies that reduce some capacity of the shadow fleet (“sidelining” some of its tankers) may harm Russia, even though they prompt Russia to rebuild its fleet rapidly. This happens, for example, if sidelining part of the fleet occurs while oil is also being sold at the ceiling, so that ceiling sales replace the lost fleet sales and there is no increase in the world oil price.
Conclusion
To conclude, we consider a variety of oil-market sanctions that have been have imposed on Russia to reduce the total export profits it uses to finance the war in Ukraine. As seen, tightening these sanctions is more effective if the induced increase in the world price can be significantly mitigated (if not entirely eliminated); otherwise, increased revenues from shadow fleet sales will weaken or undermine the intended effect of the tighter sanctions.
In one case we considered, no supplementary intervention is required for the sanction to be effective. Reducing Russia’s shadow fleet capacity when Russia is still selling at the ceiling price will induce an equal and offsetting increase in Russian sales at the ceiling, resulting in no increase in the world price.
However, other sanctions – lowering the ceiling, increasing its enforcement, or even reducing the shadow fleet capacity after Russian sales at the ceiling have ceased – will induce an increase in the world price sufficient to undermine the sanctions’ intended effect unless accompanied by a simultaneous expansion of non-Russian supply (presumably from the U.S. or OPEC) to dampen the increase in the world price. Supplemented in this way, the potency of each of these sanctions would be restored.
Overall, our results call attention to the need for complementary energy policies that would facilitate the response of non-Russian oil production to higher global prices.
References
- Cardoso, D. S., S. W. Salant, and J. Daubanes. (2025). The Dynamics of Evasion: The Price Cap on Russian Oil Exports and the Amassing of the Shadow Fleet. MIT CEEPR Working Paper 2025-05.
- Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air. (2023). December 2023 Monthly Analysis on Russian Fossil Fuel Exports and Sanctions.
- Johnson, S., L. Rachel, and C. Wolfram. (2025). A Theory of Price Caps on Non-Renewable Resources. NBER Working Paper No. 31347.
- Spiro, D., H. Wachtmeister, and J. Gars. (2024). Assessing the Impact of Oil Sanctions on Russia. SSRN Working Paper.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Exposure to Violence and Prosocial Attitudes
This policy brief examines the academic literature on the impact of conflict exposure on pro-social behavior, a crucial component of resilience and societal cohesion. It also explores potential implications for public opinion, particularly in relation to Ukraine’s prospective EU accession and foreign relations.
Introduction
Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, Russian forces have launched daily attacks with varying intensity. Living in a conflict zone profoundly affects individuals in multiple dimensions, including physical and mental health, as well as economic and social conditions. While reports often focus on the destruction of physical and human capital, social capital is equally affected by violence, influencing community resilience, cohesion, and cooperation. In conflict settings, identity can become more pronounced, particularly in distinguishing allies from adversaries.
This policy brief overviews the academic literature on this topic; the impact of conflict exposure on pro-social behavior broadly defined. This literature primarily examines post-conflict settings within the broader discourse on sustaining peace. It focuses on individuals directly engaged in combat or civilians directly affected by violence, particularly regarding the reintegration of former combatants and the rehabilitation of affected populations. As discussed below, results vary, depending on indicators used and the specific context. There is more consistent support for an impact on cooperation than on trust for instance. Another key finding in the literature is the differential behavior towards in-group members – those with whom individuals identify – versus out-group members, raising important questions about national identity and attitudes towards foreign allies. Based on this literature, the brief proceeds to discuss potential implications for public attitudes in Ukraine, focusing on Ukraine’s prospective EU accession.
Literature Overview
This review focuses on the empirical literature, though the theoretical basis spans psychology and the social sciences. Post-traumatic growth theory posits that adversity can foster positive change, whereas post-traumatic withdrawal theory suggests that violence exposure leads to distrust and social withdrawal. Economic arguments emphasize the need for rebuilding, enhanced safety concerns, or reduced time constraints for civic participation due to economic disruptions. Other perspectives highlight the detrimental effects of fragmented communities, given that trust and cooperation take time to develop, or suggest that individuals directly involved in violence may face social ostracization (see Fiedler 2023 for a detailed discussion).
Empirical studies on pro-social behavior employ diverse methodologies and data, including survey responses, indicators of political engagement, and controlled experiments measuring cooperation and trust. Methodology and research design vary, but most studies compare those with direct exposure to violence (treatment group) to those indirectly exposed (control group) within a post-conflict context. It is thus important to note that even the control group experiences some degree of conflict-related impact, meaning that studies specifically capture the effects of direct exposure.
Fiedler (2023), in a recent overview, categorizes the impact of violence into three main domains: personalized and political trust, cooperation, and political engagement. Most studies suggest a negative effect on trust, as seen in Kosovo (Kijewski & Freitag, 2018) and across Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia post-World War II (Grosjean, 2014). Bauer et al. (2016) conducted a meta-analysis of 16 early studies measuring the effects of war violence on social participation, cooperation, and trust. When it came to trust, no significant impact of exposure to violence was found. Cassar et al. (2013) found that Tajik civil war survivors exhibited lower trust in close neighbors but not distant villagers, suggesting that intra-community political divisions played a role. However, a small number of studies report positive effects, such as Hall & Werner (2022), who found that victimized Syrian and Iraqi refugees in Turkey exhibited higher generalized trust.
In terms of cooperation, early studies overwhelmingly support a positive effect, including the meta-analysis of Bauer et al. (2016). For example, Bauer et al. (2014) held experimental games in Sierra Leone and Georgia, demonstrating that those directly exposed to violence exhibited greater altruism and inequality aversion. More recent work has come to different conclusions, however. Hager et al. (2019) found that Uzbek victims of violence in Kyrgyzstan were less cooperative in experimental games with both in-group and out-group members. Similarly, Cecchi & Duchoslav (2018) found that violence-exposed caregivers in Uganda contributed less in public goods games.
When it comes to political engagement, most studies find a positive effect, including the meta-analysis by Bauer et al. (2016) looking at participation in social groups and political engagement. Early and influential studies by Bellows & Miguel (2006, 2009), found that individuals in Sierra Leone with direct war exposure were more likely to participate in community meetings, elections, and social or political groups. Interestingly, while Kijewski & Freitag (2018) found that violence reduced trust in Kosovo, Freitag et al. (2019) found increased political participation in the same setting. Grosjean (2014) also reported a negative effect on trust but found that conflict victims were more likely to engage in civic organizations and collective action. These findings suggest that broad measures of prosocial behavior may be overly simplistic.
A common, and important, finding in much of the literature is with regards to differential behavior towards in-groups and out-groups. Bauer et al. (2014) found that exposure to violence increased altruism and inequality aversion only when interactions occurred within the in-group. Similar findings emerge in studies on soccer players in Sierra Leone (Cecchi et al., 2016) and trust experiments in Colombia (Francesco et al., 2023). Calvo et al. (2019) found that in conflict-affected areas of Mali, participation increased in kinship-based groups while it decreased in more inclusive organizations. Similarly, Mironova & Whitt (2016) found that Kosovars exhibited greater altruism and cooperation when interacting with in-group members. These findings align with research on parochial altruism in general, where cooperation and altruistic behavior are evolutionarily linked to in-group solidarity in response to external threats (e.g. Bernhard et al., 2006, Tajfel et al., 1979). There is thus a risk that social identity becomes more based on a narrow in-group (defined by ethnicity, religion, or language) potentially exacerbating societal divisions.
Implications for Ukraine
What do these insights imply for Ukraine? Given the context-dependent nature of the literature, definitive conclusions are challenging. Two studies on conflict exposure in eastern Ukraine offer preliminary insights. Mironova & Whitt (2021) examined fairness preferences among young Ukrainian men in Donbas, finding that, while no bias against ethnic Russians existed at the onset of violence in 2014, such bias increased after a year of conflict – particularly among non-combatants, contradicting typical patterns in the literature. Coupe & Obrizan (2016) used survey data from November 2014, showing that direct exposure to violence affected political behavior: physical damage reduced voter turnout, while property damage increased support for Western-leaning parties and stronger opposition to Russian aggression.
The strong effect on non-combatants in Mironova & Whitt (2021) highlights a key limitation in the literature – findings on direct exposure may not generalize to entire populations under invasion. Comparing directly and indirectly exposed individuals does not capture the broader societal impact, potentially leading to an overly optimistic view of conflict-induced prosocial behavior. If everyone is negatively affected, those with direct exposure to violence may simply be impacted a little less.
Of particular interest is how the war shapes national identity, in-group perceptions, and political preferences. These dynamics matter for domestic cohesion, interethnic relations, and Ukraine’s foreign policy trajectory. Focusing on the latter, the EU and the U.S. have provided substantial support during the full-scale invasion but delays and insufficiencies in aid may influence perceptions of these allies. EU accession presents economic benefits but entails lengthy and costly reforms with uncertain outcomes. Additionally, shifting U.S. policies and emerging geopolitical alignments may alter Ukrainian attitudes toward Western institutions.
Terror management theory (Landau et al., 2004) suggests that fear strengthens support for charismatic leadership, which, in fragile democratic settings, may favor more authoritarian tendencies. If Western democratic institutions lose appeal, this could negatively impact Ukraine’s political engagement, trust in allies, and willingness to align with European values, which are crucial for successful EU integration.
Conclusions
This review examined the literature on exposure to violence and prosocial behavior, discussing implications for Ukraine’s societal resilience and international alignment. The findings suggest no universal relationship between conflict exposure and prosociality; instead, effects vary depending on the recipient of trust, cooperation, and engagement. Generally, prosocial behavior increases within in-groups, while attitudes toward out-groups may remain unchanged or worsen. In the Ukrainian context, this has ramifications for internal cohesion and external diplomatic relations, particularly regarding the country’s path toward EU membership.
References
- Bauer, M., Blattman, C., Chytilová, J., Henrich, J., Miguel, E., & Mitts, T. (2016). Can War Foster Cooperation? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30(3), 249–274.
- Bauer, M., Cassar, A., Chytilová, J., & Henrich, J. (2014). War’s Enduring Effects on the Development of Egalitarian Motivations and In-Group Biases. Psychological Science, 25(1), 47–57.
- Bellows, J., & Miguel, E. (2006). War and Institutions: New Evidence from Sierra Leone. American Economic Review, 96(2), 394–99.
- Bellows, J., & Miguel, E. (2009). War and Local Collective Action in Sierra Leone. Journal of Public Economics, 93(11–12), 1144–57.
- Bernhard, H., Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2006). Group Affiliation and Altruistic Norm Enforcement. American Economic Review, 96(2), 217–221.
- Calvo, T., Lavallée, E., Razafindrakoto, M., & Roubaud, F. (2019). Fear Not for Man? Armed Conflict and Social Capital in Mali. Journal of Comparative Economics, 48(2), 251–76.
- Cassar, A., Grosjean, P. A., Khan, F. J., & Lambert, M. (2022). Mothers, Fathers and Others: Competition and Cooperation in the Aftermath of Conflict. UNSW Business School Research Paper.
- Cecchi, F., Duchoslav, J. (2018). The Effect of Prenatal Stress on Cooperation: Evidence from Violent Conflict in Uganda. European Economic Review, 101, 35–56.
- Cecchi, F., Leuveld, K., & Voors, M. (2016). Conflict Exposure and Competitiveness: Experimental Evidence from the Football Field in Sierra Leone. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 64(3), 405-435.
- Coupé, T., & Obrizan, M. (2016). Violence and political outcomes in Ukraine—Evidence from Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Journal of Comparative Economics, 44(1), 201-212.
- Fiedler, C. (2023). What Do We Know about How Armed Conflict Affects Social Cohesion? A Review of the Empirical Literature. International Studies Review.
- Francesco, B., Gómez, C., & Grimalda, G. (2023). Crime-related exposure to violence and prosocial behavior: Experimental evidence from Colombia. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 104.
- Freitag, M., Kijewski, S., & Oppold, M. (2019). War Experiences, Economic Grievances, and Political Participation in Postwar Societies: an Empirical Analysis of Kosovo. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 36(4), 405–24.
- Grosjean, P. (2014). Conflict and Social and Political Preferences: Evidence from World War II and Civil Conflict in 35 European Countries. Comparative Economic Studies, 56(3), 424–51.
- Hager, A., Krakowski, K., & Schaub, M. A. X. (2019). Ethnic Riots and Prosocial Behavior: Evidence from Kyrgyzstan. American Political Science Review, 113(4), 1029–44.
- Hall, J., & Werner, K. (2022). Trauma and Trust: How War Exposure Shapes Social and Institutional Trust among Refugees. Frontiers in Psychology, 13, 786838.
- Kijewski, S., & Freitag, M. (2018). Civil War and the Formation of Social Trust in Kosovo: Post-traumatic Growth or War-Related Distress? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 62(4), 717–42.
- Landau, M. J., Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., Cohen, F., Pyszczynski, T., Arndt, J., Miller, C. H., Ogilvie, D. M., & Cook, A. (2004). Deliver us from Evil: The Effects of Mortality Salience and Reminders of 9/11 on Support for President George W. Bush. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(9), 1136–1150.
- Mironova, V., & Whitt, S. (2016). Social Norms after Conflict Exposure and Victimization by Violence: Experimental Evidence from Kosovo. British Journal of Political Science, 48(3), 749–65.
- Mironova, V., & Whitt, S. (2021). Conflict and parochialism among combatants and civilians: Evidence from Ukraine. Journal of Economic Psychology, 86.
- Tajfel, H., Turner, J. C., Austin, W. G., & Worchel, S. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. Organizational Identity: A Reader, 56-65.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Ukraine’s Fight Is Our Fight: The Need for Sustained International Commitment
We are at a critical juncture in the defense of Ukraine and the liberal world order. The war against Ukraine is not only a test of Europe’s resilience but also a critical moment for democratic nations to reaffirm their values through concrete action. This brief examines Western support to Ukraine in the broader context of international efforts, putting the order of magnitudes in perspective, and emphasizing the west’s superior capacity if the political will is there. Supporting Ukraine to victory is not just the morally right thing to do, but economically rational from a European perspective.
As the U.S. support to the long-term survival of Ukraine is becoming increasingly uncertain, European countries need to step up. This is a moral obligation, to help save lives in a democratic neighbor under attack from an autocratic regime. But it is also in the self-interest of European countries as the Russian regime is threatening the whole European security order. A Russian victory will embolden the Russian regime to push further, forcing European countries to dramatically increase defense spending, cause disruptions to global trade flows, and generate another wave of mass-migration. This brief builds on a recent report (Becker et al., 2025) in which we analyze current spending to support Ukraine, put that support in perspective to other recent political initiatives, and discuss alternative scenarios for the war outcome and their fiscal consequences. We argue that making sure that Ukraine wins the war is not only the morally right thing to do, but also the economically rational alternative.
The International Support to Ukraine
The total support provided to Ukraine by its coalition of Western democratic allies since the start of the full-scale invasion exceeded by October 2024 €200 billion. This assistance, that includes both financial, humanitarian and military support, can be categorized in various ways, and its development over time can be analyzed using data compiled by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. A summary table of their estimates of aggregate support is provided below.
A particularly relevant aspect in light of recent news is that approximately one-third of total disbursed aid has come from the United States. The U.S. has primarily contributed military assistance, accounting for roughly half of all military aid provided to Ukraine. In contrast, the European Union—comprising both EU institutions and bilateral contributions from member states—stands as the largest provider of financial support. This financial assistance is crucial for sustaining Ukraine’s societal functions and maintaining the state budget.
Table 1. International support to Ukraine, Feb 2022 – Oct 2024
Source: Trebesch et al. (2024).
Moreover, the EU has signaled a long-term commitment to provide, in the coming years, an amount comparable to what has already been given. This EU strategy ensures greater long-term stability and predictability, guaranteeing that Ukraine has reliable financial resources to sustain state operations in the years ahead. Consequently, while a potential shift in U.S. policy regarding future support could pose challenges, it would not necessarily be insurmountable.
What is crucial is that Ukraine’s allies remain adaptable, and that the broader coalition demonstrates the ability to adjust its commitments, as this will be essential for sustaining the necessary level of assistance moving forward.
Putting the Support in Perspective
To assess whether the support provided to Ukraine is truly substantial, it is essential to place it in context through meaningful comparisons. One approach is to examine it in historical terms, particularly in relation to past instances of large-scale military and financial assistance. A key historical benchmark is the Second World War, when military aid among the Allied powers played a decisive role in shaping the outcome of the conflict. Extensive resources were allocated to major military operations spanning multiple continents, with the United States and the United Kingdom, in particular, dedicating a significant share of their GDP to support their allies, including the Soviet Union, France, and other nations. As seen in Figure 1, by comparison, the current level of aid to Ukraine, while substantial and essential to its defense, remains considerably smaller in relation to GDP.
Figure 1. Historical comparisons
Source: Trebesch et al. (2024).
Another way to assess the scale of support to Ukraine is by comparing it to other major financial commitments made by governments in response to crises. While the aid allocated to Ukraine is significant in absolute terms, it remains relatively modest when measured against the scale of other programs, see Figure 2.
A recent example is the extensive subsidies provided to households and businesses to mitigate the impact of surging energy prices since 2022. Sgaravatti et al. (2021) concludes that most European countries implemented energy support measures amounting to between 3 and 6 percent of GDP. Specifically, Germany allocated €157 billion, France and Italy each committed €92 billion, the UK spent approximately €103 billion. These figures represent 5 to 10 times the amount of aid given to Ukraine so far, with some countries, such as Italy, allocating even greater relative sums. On average, EU countries have spent about five times more on energy subsidies than on Ukraine aid. Only the Nordic countries and Estonia have directed more resources toward Ukraine than toward energy-related support. Although not all allocated funds have been fully disbursed, the scale of these commitments underscores a clear political and financial willingness to address crises perceived as directly impacting domestic economies.
Figure 2. EU response to other shocks (billions of €)
Source: Trebesch et al. (2024).
Another relevant comparison is the Pandemic Recovery Fund, also known as Next Generation EU. With a commitment of over €800 billion, this fund represents the EU’s comprehensive response to the economic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. Again, the support to Ukraine appears comparatively small, about one seventh of the Pandemic Recovery Fund.
The support to Ukraine is also much smaller in comparison to the so-called “Eurozone bailout”, the financial assistance programs provided to several Eurozone member states (Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal) during the sovereign debt crisis between 2010 and 2012. The programs were designed to stabilize the economies hit hard by the crisis and to prevent the potential spread of instability throughout the Eurozone.
Overall, the scale of these commitments underscores a clear political and financial willingness and ability to address crises perceived as directly impacting domestic citizens. This raises the question of whether the relatively modest support for Ukraine reflects a lack of concern among European voters. However, this does not appear to be the case. In survey data from six countries – Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland – fielded in June 2024, most respondents express satisfaction with current aid levels, and a narrow majority in most countries even supports increasing aid (Eck and Michel, 2024).
A further illustration comes from the Eurobarometer survey conducted in the spring of 2024 which asked: “Which of the following [crises] has had the greatest influence on how you see the future?”. Respondents could choose between different crises, including those mentioned above, and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Figure 3 illustrates the total commitments made by EU countries for Ukraine up until October 31, 2024, compared to other previously discussed support measures, represented by the blue bars. The yellow bars, on the other hand, show a counterfactual allocation of these funds, based on public priorities as indicated in the Eurobarometer survey. Longer yellow bars indicate that a higher proportion of respondents perceived this crisis as having a greater negative impact on their outlook for the future. By comparing the actual commitments (blue bars) with this hypothetical allocation (yellow bars)—which reflects how resources might have been distributed if they aligned with the population’s stated priorities—it becomes evident that there is substantial public backing for maintaining a high level of support for Ukraine. The results show that the population prioritizes the situation in Ukraine above several other economic issues, including those that directly affect their own personal finances.
Figure 3. Support to Ukraine compared to other EU initiatives – what do voters think?
Source: Trebesch et al. (2024); Niinistö (2024); authors’ calculations.
The Costs of Not Supporting Ukraine
When discussing the costs of support to Ukraine it is important to understand what the correct counterfactual is. The Russian aggression causes costs for Europe irrespective of what actions we take. Those costs are most immediately felt in Ukraine, with devastating human suffering, the loss of lives, and a dramatic deterioration in all areas of human wellbeing. Also in the rest of Europe, though, the aggression has immediate costs, in the economic sphere primarily in the form of dramatically increased needs for defense spending, migration flows, and disruptions to global trade relationships. These costs are difficult to determine exactly, but they are likely to be substantially higher in the case of a Russian victory. Binder and Schularik (2024) estimate increased costs for defense, increased refugee reception and lost investment opportunities for the German industry at between 1-2 percent of GDP in the coming years. As they put it, the costs of ending aid to Ukraine are 10-20 times greater than continuing aid at Germany’s current level.
Any scenario involving continued Russian aggression would demand substantial and sustained economic investments in defense and deterrence across Europe. Clear historical parallels can be drawn looking at the difference in countries’ military spending during different periods of threat intensity. Average military spending in a number of Western countries during the Cold War (1949-1990) was about 4.1 percent of GDP, much higher in the U.S. but also in Germany, France and the UK. In the period after 1989-1991 (the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Soviet Union), the amounts fell significantly. The average for the same group of countries in this period is about 2 percent of GDP and only 1.75 percent if the U.S. is excluded.
Also after 1991 there is evidence of how perceived threats affect military spending. Figure 4 plots the change in military spending over GDP between 2014-2024 against the distance between capital cities and Moscow. The change varies between 0 (Cyprus) and around 2.25 (Poland) and shows a very clear positive correlation between increases in spending and proximity to Moscow. There has also in general been a substantial increase in military spending after 2022 in several European countries, but in a scenario where Russia wins the war, these will certainly have to be increased further and maintained at a high level for longer. An increase in annual military expenditure in relation to GDP in the order of one to two percentage points would mean EUR 200-400 billion per year for the EU, while the total EU support to Ukraine from 2022 to today is just over €100 billion.
Figure 4. Increase in military expenditures in relation to distance to Moscow
Source: SIPRI data, authors’ calculations.
A Russian victory would also have profound consequences for migration flows, with the most severe effects likely in the event of Ukraine’s surrender. The Kiel Institute estimates the cost of hosting Ukrainian refugees at €26.5 billion (4.2 percent of GDP) for Poland, one of the countries that received the largest flows. Beyond migration, a Russian victory would also reshape the global geopolitical order. Putin has framed the war as a broader conflict with the U.S. and its democratic allies, while an emerging alliance of Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China is positioning itself as an alternative to the Western-led system. A Ukrainian defeat would weaken the authority of the U.S., NATO, and the rules-based international order, potentially driving more nations in the Global South toward authoritarian powers for military and economic support. This shift could disrupt global trade, affect access to food, metals, and energy. Estimating the full economic impact of such a shift is difficult, but comparisons can be drawn with other global shocks. The European Union’s GDP experienced a significant contraction due to the Covid-19 pandemic, 5.9 percent contraction in real GDP according to Eurostat, 6.6 percent according to the European Central Bank. While the economy rebounded relatively quickly from the pandemic, a permanent geopolitical realignment caused by a Russian victory would likely have far more severe and lasting economic consequences.
Given that Ukraine is at the forefront of Russia’s aggression, its resilience serves as a critical test of Europe’s ability to withstand potential future threats. Thus, strengthening our own security and economic stability in the long term is inseparable from strengthening Ukraine’s resilience now. The fundamental difference lies in the long-term trajectory of these investments. In a scenario where Ukraine is victorious, military and financial aid during the war would eventually transition into reconstruction efforts and preparations for the country’s integration into the EU. This outcome is undeniably more favorable—both economically and in humanitarian terms—not only for Ukraine but for Europe as a whole. Therefore, an even more relevant question is whether the level of support is enough for Ukraine to win the war.
Is Sufficient Support Feasible?
Is it even reasonable to think that we in the West could be able to support Ukraine in such a way that they can militarily defeat Russia? Russia is spending more on its war industry than it has since the Cold War. In 2023, it spent about $110 billion (about 6 percent of GDP). By 2024, this figure is expected to have increased to about $140 billion (about 7 percent of GDP). These amounts are huge and represent a significant part of Russia’s state budget, but they are not sustainable as long as sanctions against Russia remain in place (SITE, 2024). For the EU, on the other hand, the sacrifices needed to match this expenditure would not be as great. The EU’s GDP is about ten times larger than Russia’s, which means that in absolute terms the equivalent amount is only 0.6-0.7 percent of the EU’s GDP. If the U.S. continues to contribute, the share falls to below 0.3 percent of GDP.
Despite the economic advantage of Ukraine’s allies over Russia, several factors could still shift the balance of power in Russia’s favor. One key issue is military production capacity—Russia has consistently outproduced Ukraine’s allies in ammunition and equipment. While Western economies have the resources to manufacture superior weaponry, actual production remains insufficient, requiring both increased capacity and political will. Another challenge is cost efficiency. Military purchasing power parity estimates suggest that Russia can produce approximately 2.5 times more military equipment per dollar than the EU, giving it a cost advantage in volume production. However, this does not fully compensate for its overall economic disadvantage, particularly when factoring in quality differences.
Manpower is also a critical factor. Russia’s larger population allows for sustained mobilization, but at a steep financial cost. Soldiers are recruited at a minimum monthly salary of $2,500, with additional bonuses bringing the first-year cost per recruit to three times the average Russian annual salary. Compensation for injured and fallen soldiers further strains state finances, with estimated payouts reaching 1.5 percent of Russia’s GDP between mid-2023 and mid-2024. Over time, these costs limit Russia’s ability to fund its war effort, making mass mobilization financially unsustainable.
Overall, advanced Western weaponry and superior economic capacity can match Russia’s advantage in manpower if the political will is there. Additionally, Russia’s already fragile demographic situation is deteriorating due to battlefield losses and wartime emigration. Any measure that weakens Russia’s economic capacity—particularly through sanctions and embargoes—diminishes the strategic advantage of its larger population and serves as a crucial complement to military and financial support for Ukraine.
Conclusion
Ukraine’s western allies have provided the country with substantial military and financial support since the onset of the full-scale invasion. Yet, relative to the gravity of the risks involved, previous responses to economic shocks, and citizens’ concerns about the situation, the support is insufficient. The costs of a Russian victory will be higher for Europe, even disregarding the human suffering involved. With U.S. support potentially waning, EU needs to pick up leadership.
References
- Becker, Torbjörn; and Anders Olofsgård; and Maria Perrotta Berlin; and Jesper Roine. (2025). “Svenskt Ukrainastöd i en internationell kontext: Offentligfinansiella effekter och framtidsscenarier”, Commissioned by the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council.
- Binder, J. & Schularick, M. (2024). “Was kostet es, die Ukraine nicht zu unterstützen?” Kiel Policy Brief No. 179.
- Eck, B & Michel, E. (2024). “Breaking the Stalemate: Europeans’ Preferences to Expand, Cut, or Sustain Support to Ukraine”, OSF Preprints, Center for Open Science.
- Niinistö, S. (2024) .“Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness” European Commission Report.
- Sgaravatti, G., S. Tagliapietra, C. Trasi and Zachmann, G. (2021). “National policies to shield consumers from rising energy prices”, Bruegel Datasets, first published 4 November 2021.
- SITE. (2024). “The Russian Economy in the Fog of War”. Commissioned by the Swedish Government.
- Trebesch, C., Antezza, A., Bushnell, K., Bomprezzi, P., Dyussimbinov, Y., Chambino, C., Ferrari, C., Frank, A., Frank, P., Franz, L., Gerland, C., Irto, G., Kharitonov, I., Kumar, B., Nishikawa, T., Rebinskaya, E., Schade, C., Schramm, S., & Weiser, L. (2024). “The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how?” Kiel Working Paper No. 2218. Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Three Years On – Ukrainians in Poland after Russia’s 2022 Invasion
The wave of Ukrainian refugees which followed the full-scale Russian invasion on February 24th, 2022, was in Poland met with unprecedented levels of support and solidarity. According to data from the Polish Household Budget Survey, 70 percent of households offered some help, and over 10 percent (1.3 million households) provided direct personal assistance. Overall, by early 2025, 1.9 million refugees had registered in the dedicated social security registry (PESEL-UKR system) and 1 million continue to be registered as residing in Poland. Drawing on other data sources we argue in this policy paper that the latter figure is highly overstated, giving rise to unjustified criticisms of low school enrolment among Ukrainian children, and low rates of labour market activity among adult refugees. We highlight the risks that these critical voices may become prominent in the ongoing campaign ahead of the Polish presidential elections. During the crucial months of prospective peace negotiations, when presidential candidates are appealing for voters’ support, we argue that the public debate in Poland concerning Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees, ought to be grounded in reliable evidence.
Introduction
The dramatic events of late February 2022 shook the populations across Ukraine, Europe and the world. The objective of the massive, full-scale Russian aggression was clear – to rapidly take over Kyiv, force Ukraine to surrender and take over full control of the country thus subjugating it into Kremlin’s rule. Three years later, while thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians have lost their lives, and while Russia has imposed a massive economic and social burden on Ukraine, its key objective has badly failed and remains far from being realised. This thanks to the commitment of the Ukrainian government, the country’s army and the mobilisation of the Ukrainian population. In turn, the country’s resistance would not have been possible without substantial support from the outside, primarily from countries in the European Union and the U.S. International aid from governments to Ukraine between February 2022 and October 2024 amounted to over €230 billion (bn) with the largest part contributed by the US (€88 bn), the European Commission and European Council (€45 bn) and Germany (€16 bn). Proportional to 2021 GDP levels, the highest support came from Estonia (2.20 percent), Denmark (2.02 percent) and Lithuania (1.68 percent) (Kiel Institute, 2024). Support for Ukraine has come in many forms – military, material, financial, political and diplomatic. The international community has also imposed substantial economic and political sanctions against Russia, and has excluded it from many international forums, marginalising its voice in international discussions and meetings.
On top of that, Ukraine’s neighbours and many Western countries opened their borders and welcomed a massive wave of refugees escaping the immediate military invasion in the east and north of Ukraine, seeking safety from continued bomb and drone attacks on the entire country, and running away from the risk of a complete Russian take-over. It is estimated that up to 8 million Ukrainians left the country in the first months after the full-scale war started, initially moving mainly to Poland, Romania and Slovakia (Polish Economic Institute, 2022; UNCHR, 2022). At the same time the Russian aggression resulted in internal displacement of more than 3.6 million Ukrainians (IOM UN Migration, 2024). While many of the international and internal refugees have since returned, over 6.8 million Ukrainians still reside outside of Ukraine’s borders (UNCHR, 2025).
The wake of the war was met with an unprecedented wave of support among the Polish population (Duszczyk and Kaczmarczyk, 2022). We use data from one of the largest representative Polish surveys – the Household Budget Survey 2022 and 2023 – to show the degree of involvement among Polish households in direct and indirect support to Ukrainian refugees. We also show that declarative general sympathy towards Ukrainians reached over 50 percent in 2023 – twice as high compared to 16 years earlier. This support has by now fallen close to the levels from just before the full-scale war (40 percent). As the immediate need for help has become less urgent, and the refugees have organised their lives in Poland, the involvement of Polish households in supporting the Ukrainian population has also declined. At its peak at the beginning of the war the proportion of Polish households that were actively involved in helping the Ukrainian population reached nearly 70 percent, with over 10 percent (i.e. more than 1.3 million) of the households providing direct assistance to the refugees.
In this policy paper we call into question some of the official data on the number of Ukrainian refugees who continue to reside in Poland (almost 1 million) (EUROSTAT, 2025). We argue that inconsistency across different sources with regard to precise numbers – such as likely inflated refugee count in the official social security register – may be used to build unfavourable claims against the refugees and the Ukrainian cause overall, as arguments and narratives develop based on marginal anecdotal evidence and incorrect statistics. As the new U.S. administration tries – in its own way – to bring an end to the war, Ukraine will need continued strong support from all Western allies to end the war on favourable terms for Ukraine and to get significant additional help to rebuild the country. Ukraine’s safety and economic security will depend on Western military guarantees and closer integration with the EU. All of this requires the support of populations in these countries, which gets increasingly undermined by internal disputes and external political interferences.
As negotiations to end the war begin to take shape, Poland enters a crucial electoral campaign ahead of its May 2025 presidential elections. This combination is likely to place the Ukrainian question among the top issues on the local agenda. At the same time, there is a risk that the extent of support towards Ukraine and Ukrainian residents in Poland will be used in the battle for electoral votes. We argue that any debate around this topic should draw on reliable, up to date data sources. In this regard, the government should provide more information to clarify data inconsistencies, to shed more light on the situation among Ukrainian citizens currently residing in Poland, and to ensure that any doubtful narratives raised in the public debate are quickly addressed.
Ukrainian sovereignty, its peaceful development and prosperity are very much in the interest of both Poland and the rest of Europe. Therefore, the Polish government must provide arguments to reinvigorate the support for Ukraine among its population. This will be fundamental to ensure Ukraine’s military success and stability, to guarantee the mutual benefits of integration of the Ukrainian population in Poland, and for the future economic cooperation with Ukraine in the prospective enlarged European Union.
The Outbreak of the Full-Scale War: Ukrainians in Poland
In the first couple of months after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24th 2022, over 2 million refugees fled to Poland through the common land border, with as many as 1.3 million people crossing the border during the first two weeks of the war (Figure 1a). The exact number of refugees who arrived in Poland is difficult to gauge as some people left Ukraine via the border with Romania or Slovakia and could have entered Poland across the uncontrolled borders of the Schengen area.
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BOX 1. Ukrainian citizens in Poland before the war in 2022 Before February 24, 2022, the migration of Ukrainian citizens to Poland was regulated by existing legal mechanisms concerning all foreigners coming from non-EU countries (European Parliament, 2010). Migrants could apply for a temporary residence permit for a maximum of three years, most often in connection with prearranged employment or education (Sejm RP, 2013). Since 2017 Ukrainian citizens with biometric passports could travel to Poland and other EU countries without a visa, but their stay was limited to 90 days (European Parliament, 2017). Access to the Polish social transfer system for migrants and their families was strictly regulated and limited. Labor migrants and temporary visitors under the visa-free regime had no right to public benefits or healthcare (Sejm RP, 2003). |
At the time, application for refugee status was possible, but required undergoing a lengthy and burdensome asylum procedure. Those with refugee status granted had access to public transfers and healthcare (Sejm RP, 2003).
In accordance with the European regulations of Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001, the Polish government responded to the refugee crisis by establishing a special residence status for those fleeing the war. The regulations were introduced as early as March 12, 2022, and as a result, all Ukrainian refugees who arrived in Poland since 24 February could register themselves (and their family members) in a special social security registry, the so-called PESEL-UKR (Sejm RP, 2022). This registration immediately provided the refugees with an official status of temporary protection and legalized their stay in Poland until a specified date, which – as the war continued – has been regularly extended. In comparison to other, non-EU migrants, the PESEL-UKR status grants the refugees simplified access to the Polish labour market and gives them access to public healthcare and social transfers – including general support available to all legal residents, as well as special financial and non-monetary aid targeted specifically at refugees (Duszczyk and Kaczmarczyk, 2022). The registration process was streamlined and widely accessible in all municipality offices throughout Poland and resulted in rapid registration of the majority that had arrived to Poland since February 24, 2022. By the end of June 2022, 1.2 million individuals had registered for the PESEL-UKR status. The number grew to 1.4 million by October 2022 and continued to grow to 1.9 million registrations by January 2025. As evident from Figure 1b not all of those who crossed the Polish border (or arrived in Poland having left Ukraine through a different country) stayed in the country. Some continued their journey to other EU countries and beyond, while some decided to return to Ukraine. It is worth noting though that of all the registrations carried out by the end of 2024, nearly half happened in the first 8 weeks following the invasion.
Figure 1. Number of Ukrainian citizens crossing the border between Poland and Ukraine and registering for PESEL-UKR, 2021-2024
Note: Weekly data on crossings via all land borders with Ukraine.
Source: Open Data Portal (2025a, 2025b).
A notable and important legal change was introduced in October 2022, whereby individuals are automatically withdrawn from the PESEL-UKR registry after a period of 30 days when they (1) leave Poland, (2) apply for a residence permit, or (3) apply for international protection status (Sejm RP, 2022). This change is the reason for the substantial drop in the number of registered refugees at the end of 2022, with over 400 000 individual withdrawals (Figure 1b). This change in legislation was aimed at estimating more precisely the number of Ukrainian refugees currently residing in Poland. However, since withdrawals from the system require that departures from the territory of Poland are officially recorded at the border, or follow a parallel registration in another EU country, or are recorded as departures from the Schengen area through another country, the numbers in the system may still be far from the actual number of refugees currently residing in Poland.
Since late 2022 the number of registered Ukrainian refugees in Poland has been fairly stable at slightly below 1 million. Similarly, the shares of different age cohorts have not changed. In Figure 2 we show the split of those in the PESEL-UKR registry by age. Children under the age of 18 account for about 40 percent of all refugees, of which 30 percent are in schooling age (7-17). 7 percent of the refugees are aged 62 years or older. Among those aged 18-61 years old, 70 percent are women. It is worth noting that out of about half a million children recorded in the first 7 months, almost 400 000 are still registered in the PESEL-UKR registry, a number that has been stable since the end of 2022. As we show below, these values are significantly higher compared to the number of refugee children reported by two other administrative sources. This in turn casts doubt on the reliability of the estimates of the total number of Ukrainian refugees in Poland.
Figure 2. Ukrainian citizens registered with PESEL-UKR, by age group
Note: Based on registered year of birth, age as of 2025.
Source: Open Data Portal (2025b).
Where Are All the Registered Children?
To check the reliability of the PESEL-UKR registry data, we match the information from the registry with information from school registers provided by the Ministry of National Education, and the number of children benefitting from social transfers provided by the Social Insurance Institution (ZUS). As evident in Figure 3, the number of registered school-age children in the PESEL-UKR registry and the number of those who are officially registered in Polish schools significantly differ, and the difference seems stable over time. According to school records, most of the Ukrainian parents promptly enrolled their children in schools right after their arrival in Poland – about 120 000 pupils joined Polish schools as early as March 2022. The numbers grew in September 2024, which followed the introduction of obligatory schooling for all Ukrainian children aged between 7 and 17 (Sejm RP, 2024), with online classes in Ukraine permitted only for those in their final year. When we compare data for late 2024 and early 2025, we see that while about 270 000 children aged 7-17 were registered in the PESEL-UKR database, only 152 000 attended Polish schools – resulting in a very low enrolment rate of about 56 percent – raising legitimate concerns over the children’s academic and social development (see for example CEO, 2024).
Figure 3. Number of school-age children among Ukrainian refugees
Note: School registrations: all school types except preschool education, post-secondary schools, schools for adults and grades in which children are at least 18 years old. Ukrainian refugees only. Child benefit data points as reported in June, October and December.
Source: Open Data Portal (2025b, 2025c); information on 800+ benefit recipients: unpublished data from the Social Insurance Institution (ZUS).
As evident from Figure 3 though, from late 2023 all the way until early 2025, the ‘800+ benefit’ (which is a universal child benefit paid to all children aged 0-17) was paid to around 150 000 Ukrainian refugee children aged 7-17. Given the ease of claiming the benefit, and the relatively high value of the transfers (about 23 percent of net minimum wage per child per month), it seems very unlikely that so many families would opt out of the support. Looking at the close match between the numbers from ZUS and from the Ministry of Education, the more likely interpretation of the figures is not that children stay away from school and fail to claim social transfers, but rather that far fewer children continue to reside in Poland.
An additional argument supporting the inaccuracy of the PESEL-UKR data comes from a report published by the Narodowy Bank Polski (the Polish Central Bank) (NBP, 2024). Using information from a large survey conducted among Ukrainians living in Poland the report shows that 83 percent of school-age children in refugee families were enrolled in either a Polish or a Ukrainian school physically based in Poland. This is very far from the 56 percent rate calculated with reference to administrative data, again suggesting that the PESEL-UKR numbers of school-age children are highly inflated. If that is the case, not only the number of refugee children but the overall PESEL-UKR numbers (992 000 by January 2025) should be called into question.
How Many of the Registered Adults Are Active on the Labor Market?
The accuracy of the overall number of refugees is important because it is one of the key references for policy discussions. While international regulations specify that victims of war and conflict are granted the same basic rights and privileges as other legal residents, including access to the labour market, healthcare and other public services (Duszczyk et al., 2023), negative sentiments towards Ukrainian citizens have recently grown in Poland. Further, various restrictions on access to public support for Ukrainian refugees have already been publicly discussed and proposed in Parliament. These sentiments feed on the claims of fraudulent behaviour, unwillingness to engage in official employment and crowding out of public services for Polish nationals. Such claims about Ukrainians are spread more easily if not met by accurate numbers.
Figure 4. Number of Ukrainian men and women contributing to pension insurance in Poland
Note: ‘Other countries’ refers to other registered foreigners.
Source: Social Insurance Institution ZUS (2024).
Looking at labour market activity, the number of Ukrainians who were officially active on the Polish labour market (as employees, self-employed or receiving unemployment benefit) and who thus paid pension contributions to social security in December 2023 stood at 759 000 (see Figure 4). Of those 396 000 were men and 363 000 were women. While ZUS, the Social Insurance Institution, does not distinguish between migrants (those with the right to stay before February 24th, 2022) and refugees (with PESEL-UKR status) it seems safe to assume that those who registered in the ZUS database in 2022 and 2023 belong to the latter group. The difference between the number of Ukrainians contributing to social security in December 2021 and December 2023 is 132 000 and, as seen in Figure 4, the additional numbers of those registered differ only for Ukrainian women. New Ukrainian male refugees certainly also appear in the database in 2022 and 2023, but their number is difficult to estimate as some earlier migrants returned to Ukraine after the outbreak of the war, and as a result the net effect of men between 2021 and 2023 is essentially zero. Focusing on women, we can compare the number of new registrations in the ZUS database to the total number of women aged 18-59 (excluding students) in the PESEL-UKR database (about 335 000 in December 2023). Such a ratio would suggest that only about 40 percent of female Ukrainian refugees are formally contracted on the Polish labour market (on contracts paying social security contributions). This is much lower than the values presented in the NBP report (2024), suggesting that in July 2024, around 70 percent of the adult war refugees were working and further 19 percent were looking for a job. This comparison once again suggests that the PESEL-UKR numbers are significantly inflated.
Addressing the public concerns with regard to school enrolment and labour market activity with correct figures could help counter the growing negative sentiments towards Ukrainians in Poland as well as towards the overall support for the process of securing peace in Ukraine and integrating it closer with Poland and the EU. In the next section we show that when the full-scale war started in February 2022, not only the sentiments were strongly in favour of supporting Ukraine. Additionally, the level of engagement of the Polish population in actively assisting Ukrainian refugees was truly unprecedented.
Individual Support in Response to the Outbreak of the War
In the first few weeks after the full-scale Russian invasion the Polish society almost uniformly united in providing help and assistance to Ukrainians affected by the war. The Polish Economic Institute estimated that during the first 3 months the financial, humanitarian and material help provided by the Polish society alone reached 9-10 billion PLN, which corresponded to 0.34-0.38 percent of Poland’s GDP (Baszczak et al. 2022). Polish private businesses were also quick to join the assistance efforts, donating money, food, medical and other specialized equipment, and providing services such as transportation, insurance, and education free of charge (WEI 2023). Until May 2022, 53 percent of Polish enterprises engaged in different kinds of relief or support.
The assistance to refugees has been documented in numerous anecdotes, formal reports and extensive media coverage. The scale of support is also reflected in the Polish Household Budget Survey, a regular household survey conducted by the Central Statistical Office. Already in the first quarter of 2022 the survey included several questions related to the assistance given by the interviewed households to Ukrainian refugees. These questions were then included in the survey throughout 2022 and 2023. As shown in Figure 5, when the inflow of refugees from Ukraine started in late February 2022, nearly 70 percent of Polish households offered some form of assistance. Most of this help took the form of gifts and money transfers, but 10.4 percent, i.e. over 1.3 million Polish households, offered direct help such as transport, providing an overnight stay, delivering goods to accommodation venues, etc. The fraction of those offering assistance stayed very high through the first half of 2022, and 23 percent of Polish households still provided some form of assistance in the last quarter of 2022 (Figure 5). As the war stalled, and the Ukrainian population settled and became more independent, and the Polish government took official responsibility of assisting those still in need, the level of direct support from households fell. However, in late 2023 9 percent of Polish households still continued to provide some form of assistance. What is really special about the initial wave of support is that the positive attitudes towards the refugees and the Ukrainian cause were nearly universal. As seen in Figure 6, assistance was offered by high and low educated households (79 and 59 percent), those living in large cities and in rural areas (73 and 68 percent), the young and the old (66 and 63 percent). Households who declared good material conditions were more likely to offer help (75 percent), but even among those who declared difficulties with their financial status 41 percent came forward to offer some assistance.
Figure 5. Polish households engaged in assisting Ukrainian refugees, 2022-2023 (by quarter)
Note: Help covers support and transfers to individuals and institutions in Ukraine as well as to Ukrainian refugees in Poland. “Personal assistance” – direct help to refugees (with job search, doctor’s visits, public matters, language lessons, translation, etc.), “Other help” – help at the border, in reception points, temporary accommodation points, gift collection points, transportation, hosting or subletting own housing free of charge, blood donation.
Source: own compilation based on the Polish Household Budget Surveys 2022-2023.
Figure 6. Polish households engaged in assisting Ukrainian refugees (any help) in the first quarter of 2022, by household characteristics
Notes: Urban status – A: rural area, B: city below 100 000 inhabitants, C: city over 100 000 inhabitants. Material situation (self-assessed) – D: bad or rather bad material situation, E: average material situation, F: good or rather good material situation. Age of head of household – G: 18-29, H: 30-59, I: 60 and older. Education of head of household – J: lower than secondary, K: secondary or postsecondary, L: tertiary. Source: own compilation based on the Polish Household Budget Survey 2022.
It is worth noting also that by the time the full-scale war broke out in February 2022 the sentiments among the Polish population towards Ukrainians had improved compared to attitudes in the 1990s and early 2000s. These sentiments have been regularly surveyed by the Public Opinion Research Center CBOS, and we summarize them in Figure 7. As evident, in the early 1990s the proportion of Poles declaring positive sentiments towards Ukrainians was very low. It steadily increased until about 2017 and then grew rapidly from 2018 till 2020. In 2022 the sentiments towards Ukrainians reached their peak, with over 50 percent of Poles declaring fondness towards them – on par with nations such as Lithuania and Slovakia. At the same time positive attitudes towards Russians reached an all-time low of 6 percent. Positive sentiments towards Ukrainians declined in 2024 – the last year for which the data is available – but even after the drop they are still high when compared with attitudes before 2023.
While the general positive sentiments towards Ukrainians in Poland has improved over the years, 2022 was truly unique when it comes to attitudes toward Ukrainian refugees (see Figure 8). Between 2015 and 2018, i.e. after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, around 50-60 percent of Poles declared that refugees from the conflict areas in Ukraine should be welcomed in Poland. When the same question was asked again in March 2022, 95 percent agreed that Ukrainian refugees should be welcomed in Poland and nearly 60 percent declared that they ‘definitely’ agreed with such a policy. However, the proportion of Poles in support of welcoming Ukrainian refugees has decreased. In late 2024 the share was more or less back at the level prior to the full-scale war, i.e. at over 50 percent.
Figure 7. Share of survey participants declaring fondness towards foreigners of different origin
Source: The Public Opinion Research Center CBOS (2024a).
Figure 8. Opinion survey: If Poland should accept Ukrainian refugees coming from the conflict territories
Note: The surveys were discontinued between 2018 and 2022.
Source: Public Opinion Research Center CBOS (2024b).
Why Have Sentiments Shifted?
At the crucial time of a possible long-awaited end to the Russian invasion, when coordinated support of Western governments will be essential to secure a just and long-lasting solution, the willingness of these governments to firmly stand behind Ukraine will, to a large extent, depend on the sentiments among their voters. Thus, the wavering enthusiasm for the Ukrainian cause in countries such as Poland can be seen as a worrying sign, in particular given how high the level of support was in the early days of the invasion. This support will be particularly important over the next few months, given the likely period of intensive international negotiations and the battle for votes in the upcoming Polish presidential elections.
It is not unusual to try to put the blame for various unfortunate developments on external forces, including global trends, external conflicts and all things ‘foreign’. Thus, the fact that many people in various countries, including Poland, blame their perceived worsened economic conditions on the consequences of the war and the related influx of Ukrainian refugees is far from surprising. While some politicians might want to explain the complex broad context, others will take advantage of these sentiments and continue to fuel the negative discourse. With that in mind, three main topics have been particularly visible in the public debate in Poland:
- access to social transfers, in particular to the ‘800+’ child benefit for Ukrainian refugees
- Ukrainian refugees’ participation in the Polish labour market and tax contributions to the local budget
- risks to particular groups of interest, most prominently reflected in Poland by the crisis surrounding imported Ukrainian grain (see Box 2)
The first two issues are strongly related to the general approach to immigration and integration of migrants in the Polish society. The popular media discourse – in traditional and social media – tends to focus on instances of abuse of social support and public services, and to build up negative sentiments along the lines of supposed unwillingness to engage in legal economic activity among those who have settled in Poland. While one can certainly identify anecdotes which selectively confirm all sorts of misbehaviour, the overall evidence would clearly reject such claims. As discussed, the surveys conducted by the NBP show that a significant majority of migrants and refugees from Ukraine find legal employment in Poland. Further research based on administrative data demonstrates that many Ukrainians establish and successfully run their businesses in Poland (Polish Economic Institute, 2024). Between January 2022 and June 2024 Ukrainian migrants and refugees established almost 60 000 enterprises in Poland, and as Vézina et al. (2025) argue, these firms did not crowd out Polish businesses, meaning they represent a true value added to the national and local economies.
Recent public discussions, however, have focused on the combination of employment and benefit claims. The debate started with two parliamentary initiatives by the right wing Konfederacja and Prawo i Sprawiedliwość opposition parties and was then picked up by the leading government party’s presidential candidate, Rafał Trzaskowski (money.pl, 2025). The proposed legislative changes are broadly similar, suggesting that access to the main child benefits – the ‘800+ benefit’ – should be limited to those refugee families where at least one of the parents is formally employed. Such conditionality does not apply to Polish families, and according to current legislation, to no other families legally residing in Poland (Konfederacja, 2025; Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, 2025). The supposed aim of the changes would be to, first of all, limit fraudulent claims among those who no longer reside in Poland, and secondly, to restrict access to the benefits to those who contribute with their taxes to the public budget only. On both counts the policy seems badly misconceived. As shown above, the ‘800+’ claims closely match the numbers of children officially registered in Polish schools, far below the numbers registered in the PESEL-UKR database. Moreover, such a policy is unlikely to lead to much higher employment among refugee parents. The benefit is universal and received by all families regardless of employment status or income; previous research has shown a similar benefit to have negligible effects on employment (see for example: Myck and Trzcinski, 2019). Therefore, the most likely reason for some refugee parents to not take up work is not unwillingness, but rather other constraints – constraints which will not change as a result of the proposed restrictions. Most Ukrainian families who fled the war are mothers whose partners could not join them due to military restrictions on the mobility of Ukrainian men. While many women settled and found jobs, family obligations may significantly limit some refugee’s options for regular employment. For these families, withdrawing the eligibility for the ‘800+ benefit’ would be a significant loss of income with potentially dire consequences for their children. It is thus difficult to understand the initiatives as anything other than attempts to address the growing critical sentiments towards the refugees to gain support among voters who are convinced by the anecdotal narrative. As argued above – with the exception of anecdotes – there is very little evidence in support of such legislative changes. Even from the point of view of potential budgetary gains, the proposed limitations on benefit claims would impose heavy administrative costs which would likely exceed any resulting savings. The politicians coming forward with such proposals would be well advised to consider data from various sources and avoid raising issues which have a clear potential to fuel negative sentiments towards refugees and migrants.
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BOX 2. The dispute over the Ukrainian grain In February 2022, Russia’s full-scale invasion destabilized the Ukrainian market, in particular the agricultural sector, due to blocked exports through the Black Sea. To enable exports, so-called Solidarity Lanes were established, including corridors crossing Poland (European Commission 2022). However, Poland was not prepared to handle and re-export large volumes of Ukrainian agricultural products, due to insufficient capacity of Polish sea ports (farmer.pl, 2023; for such quantities experts argue that road transport is unprofitable; Kupczak, 2023). This led to a surplus of grain in multiple storehouses throughout the country, especially in Southeastern Poland. Overall, Polish grain stocks increased by over 250 percent, from 3.8 to almost 10 million tones (Supreme Audit Office, 2023). The drastic surplus of grain, together with much lower prices for Ukrainian crops, led to a dramatic price drop—one could buy mixed Polish-Ukrainian grain for half the price it cost the previous year (rp.pl, 2023). Apart from its impact on quantity and price, Ukrainian grain drew public attention also due to concerns regarding its quality (money.pl, 2023). Imported agricultural and food articles must undergo rigorous quality controls at the border, depending on their purpose – human consumption, animal fodder or cultivation, conducted by the respective state inspection office. Random controls held in 2022 by the Food Articles Inspection revealed that 2.4 percent of the grain samples were banned from entering the market (rp.pl, 2023). According to a report by the Supreme Audit Office (2023), controls run by the Veterinarian Inspection were drastically limited as of May 2022 which allowed poor quality fodder grain to enter the Polish market (Supreme Audit Office 2023). Since technical grain – used in the production of biofuels, insulating materials or oils – is exempt from border quality controls, its imports and sale as consumable grain could be particularly profitable. Several incidents of such forgery were subject to investigation confirming that large quantities of technical grain originating from Ukraine were sold as consumable to Polish companies (gov.pl, 2024). The tightened border controls that followed, resulted in multiday delays in the transportation of food products from Ukraine. To mitigate these constraints an agreement was reached, and, as of March 8, 2023, grain transit through Poland to other final destinations (within EU or to a third country via Polish ports) is exempt from border controls at the Polish-Ukrainian border and sealed by the National Revenue Administration. These seals can be removed only at the final destination (gov.pl, 2023a). Throughout this period Polish farmers held demonstrations opposing the influx of Ukrainian grain. The border crossings with Ukraine were temporarily blocked by protests aimed at disrupting the flow of goods. The symbolic dumping of Ukrainian grain on the ground at the Medyka border crossing resulted in a famously cited statement by the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that this event may be seen as evidence of the “erosion of solidarity” with Ukraine (BBC, 2024). After the EU-level temporary embargo on four types of grains and oil seeds from Ukraine was lifted in mid-September 2023 (which was in effect since May 2023), Ukraine agreed to introduce export measures to avoid grain surges (European Commission, 2023). Nevertheless, Poland administered a unilateral ban on selected products and their derivatives (gov.pl, 2023b), which led Ukraine to file a complaint with the World Trade Organization (WTO, 2023). While the ban still applies (gov.pl, 2025), the Polish government has on multiple occasions actively sought to convince the EU to include wheat (and other grains) among the crops covered by the quotas under the EU-level 2022 regulation on temporary trade liberalization with Ukraine (the Autonomous Trade Measures Regulation; OKOpress, 2024; European Commission, 2024). |
Conclusions
Considering the current approach by the U.S. administration under President Donald Trump, Ukraine’s position in the prospective negotiations will strongly depend on the support it can gather from its European allies. This in turn is likely to reflect the sentiments towards the Ukrainian cause among European voters. In Poland, where critically important presidential elections are scheduled for May 2025, the importance of these sentiments might be particularly salient. On the one hand, the candidates are likely to voice support for Ukraine to secure peace and stability in the region. On the other hand, they may appeal for support among voters who are critical of the generous approach of Polish public institutions towards Ukrainian refugees.
As shown in this policy paper, the critical voices highlighting instances of abuse of privileges granted to refugees are largely unfounded, and much of the critical discourse is linked to – in our view – highly inaccurate numbers of officially registered refugees with the PESEL-UKR status system. The government would do a service to the quality of the debate about Ukrainian refugees in Poland, and at the same time defuse some of the critical claims, by verifying the PESEL-UKR database.
Using administrative data on school enrolment and benefit claims we show that these match almost perfectly, with around 150 000 children aged 7-17 in both registries in late 2024. This is far less than the 270 000 children in this age group registered in the PESEL-UKR database and assumed to be residing in Poland. Similarly, survey data suggests that about 70 percent of Ukrainian refugees are active on the Polish labour market. This proportion is much lower when official data based on social security contributions is compared to the total number of adult refugees in the PESEL-UKR registry. The comparison once again suggests that the figures in the latter database are significantly overstated. It is thus very unlikely that the number of Ukrainian refugees in Poland is as high as the numbers officially reported in the registry (992 000 in January 2025).
The accuracy of the numbers is important for several reasons, and the ability to address various critical claims in the public debate is only one of them. At the time of an electoral campaign ahead of a highly significant presidential election, this reason, however, may prove fundamental to avoid further polarization of the debate about continued support for Ukrainian refugees in Poland. It is also crucial for securing strong support for Ukraine by the Polish government in the coming challenging months of peace negotiations. While it is likely impossible to restore the level of positive attitudes toward Ukrainian citizens seen in Poland in February and March 2022, that degree of solidarity should serve as a foundation for a deepened relationship between the two countries.
Acknowledgement
The authors acknowledge the support from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida. We are grateful to Patryk Markowski for helpful research assistance. The Polish Household Budget Survey data (2022, 2023) used in the analysis was provided by Statistics Poland (Główny Urząd Statystyczny). We are grateful to the Social Insurance Institution ZUS (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych) for providing us with unpublished data on child benefit recipients.
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Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Development Day 2024: Integrating Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia into the European Union
For Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, integration into the European Union (EU) is a pathway to modernization, economic development, and increased resilience against authoritarianism. At this year’s Development Day Conference, hosted by the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), policymakers, researchers, and experts convened to discuss the shared challenges, opportunities, and reforms required for these countries’ successful EU accession.
This policy brief draws on the insights from the conference, briefly outlining the discussions across panels and presentations on governance reforms, hybrid threats, economic transformation, and security challenges.
The Geopolitical Context for Enlargement
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has intensified the European Union’s strategic focus on enlargement. Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia find themselves at a crossroads, where integration into the EU is not merely aspirational but essential for safeguarding sovereignty and ensuring economic and political stability. The urgency of this enlargement stems from the need to counteract Russian aggression and bolster the EU’s geopolitical standing.
At the opening sessions of the Development Day Conference, three special guests offered their respective countries’ perspectives. Yevhen Perebyinis, Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, underscored how Ukraine’s integration process aligns with its defense of European values against Russia’s aggression. Cristina Gherasimov, Moldova’s Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration, highlighted Moldova’s efforts to advance reforms while countering persistent Russian hybrid threats, including systematic election interference. Christian Danielsson, Sweden’s State Secretary to the Minister for EU Affairs, accentuated the necessity of ensuring that the EU is ready for enlargement, something political leaders now see as an imperative in the shadow of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Similarly, discussions emphasized Georgia’s historical and policy-oriented commitment to Europe, despite recent democratic backsliding and a recent pivot toward Russia.
Challenges on the Pathway to EU Accession
The integration paths of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia face numerous challenges. Critical areas for alignment with EU standards include governance reforms, anti-corruption efforts, and institutional capacity building. Moldova has made strides in public administration reform and jumped significantly on the Corruption Perceptions Index from 120th place in 2019 to 76th in 2023. However, persistent gaps in judicial independence and public procurement transparency remain hurdles. Similarly, Ukraine has enacted sweeping reforms under extraordinary wartime circumstances, reflecting a persistent and widespread commitment to European values. Yet, continued progress in judicial and financial oversight is essential, with the administrative framework in these areas needing improvement in both countries.
Russia’s hybrid warfare poses a persistent and evolving threat to democratic resilience across the region. Moldova’s elections in 2024 showcased large-scale, sophisticated interference by Russian actors. This interference began well before election day and continues in the form of disinformation campaigns and energy blackmailing in the Transnistria region. In Georgia, Russian influence compounds the challenges of domestic political unrest, particularly as the ruling party engaged in substantial electoral fraud and manipulation to secure its position in the 2024 October elections. These challenges highlight the need for robust countermeasures, including enhanced cybersecurity and strengthened democratic institutions across the candidate countries. It also points to the need for support from the international community, especially in the case of Georgia, where protesters are currently taking to the streets to challenge the widely recognized electoral fraud.
Economic transformation and alignment also remain a critical challenge. Ukraine’s economy, suffering wartime devastation, requires extensive reconstruction, with the cost of infrastructural damage alone nearing its annual GDP. Ukraine’s vast agricultural sector, a major player in global markets, will require careful integration into the EU to address compliance costs and alignment with the Common Agricultural Policy while maintaining its competitive edge. Moldova faces significant challenges in effectively communicating the benefits of EU integration to its population, a critical issue in countering Russian influence and maintaining public support for reforms. Despite clear economic progress, such as the increase in Moldovan exports to the EU, many Moldovans remain skeptical about the long-term benefits of EU alignment. This skepticism is particularly pronounced in regions like Gagauzia, where pro-Russian sentiment is strong and local populations are vulnerable to disinformation and propaganda.
As emphasized by multiple panelists, targeted communication strategies are vital to ensuring that the benefits of EU integration are understood across populations. Concrete examples—such as enhanced economic opportunities, improved infrastructure, and access to EU funding—must be clearly communicated to counteract Russian narratives and build broad-based support for EU accession.
In this regard, pre-accession funding offers a potentially transformative tool. The successful use of pre-accession funding in Poland in the 1990s and early 2000s demonstrates the potential for such resources to modernize infrastructure, connect markets, and build institutional capacity, a capacity that has later proved pivotal to overcoming democratic backsliding. Poland serves as a reminder that alignment and integration may take time, but also clearly showcases the economic and social benefits it can yield.
During the conference, security concerns were at the core of the enlargement discussion, with several panelists emphasizing NATO’s historical role as a critical security complement for EU member states. However, Ukraine’s potential EU accession may advance without parallel NATO membership. This raises significant challenges, as the absence of NATO guarantees leaves Ukraine vulnerable to further Russian aggression. Panelists highlighted the urgent need for the EU to adopt concrete security measures, such as strengthened hybrid defense capabilities, cybersecurity frameworks, and coordinated responses to disinformation—threats already witnessed in Moldova and Georgia. Additionally, ensuring Ukraine’s security would require increased military and financial support from EU member states to safeguard territorial integrity and maintain resilience against Russia, argued a necessity by several panelists.
The Opportunities of Enlargement
The integration of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia into the European Union offers profound opportunities for these states. It represents access to the single market, pre- and post-accession funding, and vital structural support that can accelerate modernization efforts. Overall, this can reduce the countries’ infrastructure gaps and cause an increase in foreign direct investment. Beyond economic gains, EU support drives crucial institutional reforms, enhances public administration capacity, and provides a framework for addressing corruption and strengthening the rule of law—key challenges across all three countries.
For the EU, enlargement would entail strategic benefits aligned with its new geopolitical focus and long-term economic goals. Ukraine’s reserves of critical raw materials, including lithium and titanium, are essential for Europe’s green transition. Furthermore, Ukraine and its defense industry offers strategic benefits to Europe by bolstering collective security. Its agricultural capacity remains pivotal not only for the EU but for global food security, and its IT sector provides additional growth potential. Moldova and Georgia, on the other hand, offer untapped market potential and workforce integration opportunities, which could strengthen the EU’s competitive edge. Enlargement also represents a critical opportunity to counter the threat from Russia, manifesting the Union as a geopolitical leader committed to stability, democracy, and shared values.
However, as voiced throughout the conference, the EU must prioritize clear communication of these benefits. Concerns about increased competition in existing member states need to be met with transparency while communicating the long-term economic and security advantages of enlargement. Involving the business perspective in the enlargement process and ensuring that both candidate countries and current EU citizens and businesses see tangible benefits early in the process will be key to sustaining both momentum and public support. Such messaging could include the fact that the EU is originally a peace project and that the counterfactual scenario to the current enlargement ambitions is Russia and its wars creeping even closer to the Union’s border. In regard to the business sector, it could be emphasized that enlargement associated risks can be met with risk sharing instruments and credit guarantees.
As emphasized by several speakers, the EU also needs to ensure that it is ready for enlargement in terms of capacity. As the EU was not initially built to be this large, a further expansion requires the Union to critically reflect on how to ensure it will stand up for the rule of law and all member states’ adhesion to EU principles in the years to come.
Concluding Remarks
How to facilitate the accession of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia into the European Union was the topic for discussion at the 2024 Development Day. The discussions highlighted the substantial early progress and rapid reforms undertaken by Ukraine while being a country at war. Moldova’s steady progress toward its ambitious 2030 accession target underscores its commitment to reform, though challenges remain in securing public trust and countering Russian interference. Georgia, meanwhile, serves as a warning of how quickly democratic gains can erode, with political turmoil and Russian influence threatening its European path. These examples underscore the need for sustained support and clear communication of the benefits of EU integration. Panelists and participants also underscored that integrating these nations is not merely about expanding the EU—it is a vital response to ongoing geopolitical threats, in particular from Russia, and an affirmation of the EU’s foundational values.
Ultimately, the enlargement of the EU to include Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine holds significant potential, both for the aspiring members and the EU itself. However, as the discussions at Development Day 2024 showcased, such enlargement requires robust partnerships, unwavering and early support, and a recognition that integration strengthens the EU as a whole, ultimately positioning the EU as a much-needed major democratic geopolitical actor.
List of Participants
- Tinatin Akhvlediani, Research Fellow in the EU Foreign Policy Unit at CEPS
- Katarina Areskoug, The High-Level Advisory Group of the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8) on Ukraine’s accession to the EU
- Torbjörn Becker, Director of SITE
- Christian Danielsson, State Secretary to the Minister for EU Affairs
- Cristina Gherasimov, Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration of Moldova
- Liliana Gutan, Moldova’s Ambassador to the Nordic Countries
- Fredrik Löjdquist, Director of the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies
- Stas Madan, Program Director Expert Group Moldova
- Michal Myck, Director CenEA Poland
- Tymofiy Mylovanov, President of Kyiv School of Economics
- Oleg Nivievskyi, Professor Kyiv School of Economics and Freie Universität Berlin
- Anders Olofsgård, Deputy Director Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE)
- Yevhen Perebyinis, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine
- Fredrik Sjögren, Director EU Affairs The Confederation of Swedish Enterprise
- Tamar Sulukhia, Director ISET and ISET Policy Institute Georgia
- Dumitru Țîra, CEO and Founder of Realitatea Media Group
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Breaking the Link: Costs and Benefits of Shutting Down Europe’s Last Gas Pipeline from Russia
Ukraine’s decision to halt Russian gas transit from January 1st, 2025, marks the end of decades of direct gas links between Europe and Russia. The EU is unlikely to face significant short-to-mid-term impacts, as Russian pipeline gas imports have already dropped sixfold since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, uneven exposure to this shock has already created internal tensions within the EU. Further, increased reliance on liquefied natural gas may also slow the green transition. In the region, Moldova faces severe supply challenges and Ukraine will lose transit revenues. Targeted support and stronger cooperation within the EU and with neighboring countries, especially EU candidates, will be essential. In turn, the halt will make Russia face not only financial but also geopolitical losses.
On January 1st, 2025, Ukraine halted the transit of Russian gas to Europe following the expiration of a five-year agreement between Russian Gazprom and Ukrainian Naftogaz, marking a major shift in Europe’s energy landscape. This decision ended decades of reliance on Ukrainian pipelines for Russian gas (see Figure 1). Despite Ukraine announcing its intent not to renew the agreement well in advance (Corbeau, 2023), uncertainty lingered until the contract’s final days. Similarly, the broader implications remain uncertain. This policy brief explores the short-, mid-, and long-term effects of this change on the region.
Figure 1. Russian pipeline network to Europe, 2022-2025
Source: Euromaidan Press
A “Political” Pipeline
The Ukrainian transit route has long been a key corridor for direct gas deliveries to Europe, playing a crucial role in shaping the EU energy security policy. However, this route has also been the site of major disruptions, particularly during the 2006 and 2009 gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine. These incidents exposed Europe’s reliance on transit routes and its vulnerability to geopolitical conflicts, prompting political responses despite the relatively localized impact. To address these vulnerabilities, the EU introduced measures aimed at diversifying energy sources and strengthening internal energy markets (see, e.g., Le Coq and Paltseva, 2012). Early efforts focused primarily on improving the internal energy market’s efficiency while diversification advanced slowly. This changed drastically during the gas crisis that began in mid-2021 and escalated with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. These events forced the EU to alter its gas import strategy, driving further investments in liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure and new pipelines, such as the Southern Gas Corridor enabling gas imports from Azerbaijan (see e.g., Regulation (EU) 2022/1032 and Regulation (EU) 2024/1789).
As a result, despite the significant burden of soaring energy prices and investment costs, the EU has made remarkable progress in reducing its reliance on Russian piped gas. Indeed, the share of Russian natural gas (both pipeline and LNG) in total EU gas imports, which increased 35 percent in 2015 to 41 percent in 2020, dropped to just 9 percent by 2023. However, the progress was non-uniform among member states (see Figure 2). In turn, by 2024, Russian gas via Ukraine accounted for just 5 percent of EU’s gas supply, with significant reliance limited to Austria, Hungary, and Slovakia (where it still made up between 65 percent and 78 percent of imports, and, between 12 percent and 22 percent of total energy consumption).
Figure 2. Share of Russian pipeline and LNG gas in total gas imports across the EU
Source: Eurostat, 2024. The gas imports include data for both pipeline and LNG imports. The 2024 gas imports data was unavailable at the time of writing this brief. However, several EU member states further decreased their consumption of Russian gas in 2024. For example, while Sweden and Finland were importing Russian LNG both in 2020 and 2023, possibly for re-export, as shown in Figure 1, they both stopped this practice from June 2024.
Further, Austrian data on imports from Russia is not available from Eurostat, and is, instead, compiled from Eurogas, IMF, and Austrian government data.
The Immediate Impact of the Transit Stop
The EU’s reduced reliance on Russian gas has significantly softened the immediate impact of the transit halt. Gas prices showed only a slight reaction, with no clear evidence linking the transit stop to price changes. Even if one would attribute the cumulative gas price increase over 2024 to the expectations of the pipeline shutdown only, the effect was much smaller than during the 2021 gas crisis or the sharp price spikes of 2022, as illustrated in Figure 3. Ample storage levels – 71.8% as of January 01.2025, well within acceptable levels for this time of the year – have further limited the immediate impact.
Figure 3. EU gas prices, 2021-2025
Effectively, the only part of the region facing an immediate and significant impact due to the termination of the gas transit deal has been Moldova. The pro-Russian separatist region of Transnistria, previously fully reliant on subsidized Russian gas via Ukraine and representing 70 percent of Moldovan gas consumption, has been cut off since January 1, 2025, due to the lack of alternative routes. This has also significantly affected the right-bank-of-Dniester Moldova as 80 percent of its electricity supply was previously provided by the Russian gas-based MGRES plant in Transnistria (Anisimova, 2024). In response, Chisinau declared a state of emergency in the energy sector, introducing energy-saving measures and rationing. In turn, Transnistria halted most industrial production and faced widespread blackouts (Kieff, 2025).
The Mid-Term Costs and Benefits for Involved Parties
In the mid-term, the impact will likely broaden and take various forms. Moldova, Ukraine, and Europe are expected to face primarily financial consequences, while Russia will also bear significant geopolitical costs.
Moldova will continue to be the most affected country. Russia could attempt to reroute gas to Transnistria via Turkstream and reversed flow on the Trans-Balkan pipeline. However, since this route briefly passes through Ukraine before reaching Moldova, it would require a transit agreement, an unlikely scenario under current conditions.
Alternatively, the Trans-Balkan route could be used to import gas from Azerbaijan or LNG from Turkey and Greece (Halser and Skaug, 2024). However, this would require political will from both Moldova and Transnistria, and involve substantial costs, likely unaffordable singlehandedly for Moldova or Transnistria, especially as the latter has long received Russian gas for free. Financial, as well as infrastructural support from the EU could help address these challenges.
Ukraine faces an annual loss of transit fees due to the halted agreement amounting to approximately $450 million/year. Formally, the loss should have been around $1.2 billion annually but Russia payed only for 15 bcm/a of gas transit since 2022, instead of 40 bcm/a under the ship-or-pay transit agreement, citing Ukraine’s refusal to transit gas via the Russia-occupied Sokhranivka entry point. This dispute is in international arbitration but is unlikely to be resolved before the war ends (see Reley, 2025). The absence of a transit gas flow could also undermine the competitiveness of Ukraine’s gas storage services for the EU (Ukraine’s Naftogaz has Europe’s largest underground facilities with a capacity of 30.9bcm, 10bcm of which is available to foreign traders.)
At the same time, the option of renewing the transit agreement could boost Ukraine’s leverage in future talks with Russia. However, this leverage weakens with the EU’s ability to cope with its remaining reliance on Russian gas – greater diversification in EU imports would reduce the importance of Russian pipelines and, consequently, Ukraine’s bargaining position.
Europe’s mid-term impact from the transit halt will be non-uniform, with Austria, Slovakia, and Hungary facing the highest energy bill increases. However, the effect is expected to be limited due to its well-connected internal energy market, which can absorb shocks and distribute shortages across member states. The shortage is likely to be compensated by increased LNG purchases, which would somewhat increase gas prices due to the current LNG market rigidity. However, with LNG supply capacity increasing already in 2025 and projected to grow by 40 percent by 2028 without a matching rise in demand (IEEFA, 2024), the price increase is not going to last long.
However, the EU may also face a political cost. Expectations of price increases and Slovakia’s loss of transit fees could strain the EU unity, as differing energy dependencies risk deepening intra-EU tensions and complicating policy coordination (see, e.g., here and here). This underscores the importance of Europe’s “one voice” energy policy, which has gained momentum in recent years.
Russia faces significant financial and geopolitical losses from the transit halt. Financially, it risks losing approximately $6.5 billion annually in revenue at current prices (Keliauskaitė and Zachmann, 2024) unless flows are redirected. While temporary price increases – for the sales of Russian gas via Turkstream, and Russian LNG exports to Europe, could offset some of these losses – these are not going to last.
The greater impact lies in Russia’s diminished geopolitical leverage. Historically, Russia has used gas as a political tool, leveraging its dominant position and access to multiple pipeline routes to exert influence over transit countries and dependent nations. This influence would now be lost. Further, with the loss of a Ukrainian transit, Russia’s pipeline connection to EU gas markets now relies solely on Turkey, increasing its dependency on Turkey and potentially altering its alliance dynamics due to higher transit costs. Additionally, as Azerbaijani gas emerges as a viable alternative for Europe, Russia’s bargaining power in its geopolitical relations with Azerbaijan is likely to weaken further. This erosion of influence marks a significant shift in Russia’s regional energy strategy.
Long-Term Effects: Increased Dependence on LNG and the Green Transition
The halt of the Russian gas transit is facilitating the implementation of the RePowerEU goal of fully eliminating EU Russian fossil fuels dependency by 2027. However, its long-term effects, particularly on the timing and success of the green transition, warrant attention. Natural gas is widely considered a transitional fuel, essential for maintaining energy reliability in an energy system relying heavily on intermittent renewables. For the green transition to succeed, it is critical to avoid infrastructure lock-ins, displacement of low-carbon technologies, and the creation of stranded assets.
The shift from Russian gas to the LNG market will likely require substantial infrastructure investments in the EU and LNG-producing countries, increasing the risk of long-term dependency. Geopolitical dynamics add further complexity – e.g., the U.S., which supplied 50 percent of Europe’s LNG in 2023, has advocated for long-term purchasing agreements that could delay green technology adoption and extend the EU’s reliance on fossil fuels. This is already a reality as some EU member states having signed long-term gas contracts with Qatar, lasting beyond 2050, which may hinder efforts to accelerate the green transition.
Conclusion
The impact of the gas transit halt varies depending on whether it is seen from a short-, medium-, or long-term perspective. While all parties involved face losses, the impact of the halt on the EU is drastically different from what it could have been a few years ago due to the dramatic efforts undertaken in the last few years. Further, there are also potential benefits to consider. Notably, the EU has the opportunity to play a crucial role in reducing the economic and political burdens on neighboring countries, particularly those seeking EU membership. By offering targeted financial support and promoting deeper cooperation, the EU can help these nations manage the challenges posed by the halt. In turn, the halt will imply not only financial but also geopolitical losses for Russia.
References
- Anisimova, A. (2024). Moldova’s EU integration and the special case of Transnistria. FREE Policy Brief. Retrieved January 11, 2025, from https://freepolicybriefs.org/2024/10/14/moldovas-eu-integration/
- Corbeau, A. (2024). Swapping Azeri gas for Russian supplies: No easy fix for Europe. Center on Global Energy Policy. Retrieved January 11, 2025, from https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/swapping-azeri-gas-for-russian-supplies-no-easy-fix-for-europe/
- Halser, P., & Skaug, B. (2024). Supply shift: End of Ukraine gas transit sets the stage for LNG and pipeline diversions. Rystad Energy. Retrieved January 11, 2025, from https://www.rystadenergy.com/news/end-of-ukraine-gas-transit-lng-and-pipeline
- Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA). (2024). Global LNG outlook 2024–2028. Retrieved January 11, 2025, from https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2024-06/067.%20IEEFA%2C%20Global%20LNG%20Outlook%202024-2028.pdf
- Keliauskaitė, D., & Zachmann, G. (2024). The end of Russian gas transit via Ukraine and options for the EU. Bruegel. Retrieved January 11, 2025, from https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/end-russian-gas-transit-ukraine-and-options-eu
- Kieff, T. (2025). An energy crisis provides opportunity in Moldova. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Retrieved January 11, 2025, from https://www.csis.org/analysis/energy-crisis-provides-opportunity-moldova
- Le Coq, C., & Paltseva, E. (2012). Buyer power as a tool for EU energy security. FREE Policy Brief. Retrieved January 11, 2025, from https://freepolicybriefs.org/2012/06/07/buyer-power-as-a-tool-for-eu-energy-security/
- Reley, M. (2025). The end of the affair? The transit of Russian gas across Ukraine. International Center for Defense and Security. Retrieved January 11, 2025, from https://icds.ee/en/the-end-of-the-affair-the-transit-of-russian-gas-across-ukraine/
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
What decision did Ukraine make regarding Russian pipeline gas transit? How has the EU’s reliance on Russian pipeline gas changed since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? What are the potential consequences of the EU’s increased reliance on liquefied natural gas (LNG) following the decline in Russian pipeline gas imports? Read the policy brief “Breaking the Link: Costs and Benefits of Halting Russian Pipeline Gas to Europe” to explore the impact of halting Russian pipeline gas transit on Europe, Ukraine, and energy security.
Belarus’s Progressing Economic Dependence on Russia and Its Implications
This policy brief examines the complexities surrounding Belarus’s economy as it deepens its economic dependence on Russia. Recent growth, driven by increased domestic demand and a resurgence in exports to Russia, has surpassed expectations. This trajectory is largely due to Belarus’s mounting dependence on Russia across trade, energy, finance, logistics, and other domains, a dependency that poses significant long-term risks and uncertainties. The Belarusian regime has begun to see this relationship not only as a lifeline but also as a potential source of economic enhancement. However, this approach may blur the lines between sustainable growth and short-term gains, fostering uncertainties about the true nature of this economic uptick. Hence, questions on whether this growth is viable or merely cyclical persist. The uncertainty and progressing dependence on Russia, in turn, imply numerous challenges for the political domain.
New Issues on the Belarusian Economic Agenda
The Belarusian economy continues to surprise, displaying output growth substantially higher than previous forecasts (see e.g. BEROC, 2024). In 2024, the economy is projected to grow by around 4.0 percent. The growth is being driven by domestic demand, fueled by rising real wages and labor shortages. However, an underlying factor is the recent resurgence of exports to Russia. The unexpectedly high growth has allowed for the Belarusian economy to surpass pre-war output levels, at the moment defying earlier predictions of stagnation or decline.
Although the growth period has now extended beyond what could be considered a mere “recovery”, the overall picture – as suggested in Kruk (2024) – still appears relevant. Despite the upturn, the economy remains significantly behind the counterfactual ‘no sanctions, no war’ scenario (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. The Dynamics of Output (seasonally adjusted, index, 2018=100): Actual vs. Counterfactual
Source: Own estimations based on Belstat data. Note: The counterfactual scenario assumes that the Belarusian economy continued to grow uniformly from Q2 2021 to the present, at a sluggish growth rate of 1 percent per annum (a conservative estimate of the potential growth rate before the sanctions were implemented (Kruk & Lvovskiy, 2022)).
Moreover, all the risks to long-term growth associated with total dependence on Russia, potential contagion effects from Russia, etc. are still relevant (KAS, 2024; Bornukova, 2023).
At the same time, a prolonged period of growth gives grounds to think about recent trends also from the perspective of ongoing structural changes in the Belarusian economy. Can these changes, besides implying numerous risks, enhance Belarus’s growth potential and degree of sustainability? If so, to what extent, for how long, and under which conditions? With these questions in mind, it is important to gain a better understanding of what aspects of the Belarusian economy are being transformed due to the increased coupling with Russia and which effects, besides increased dependency and corresponding risks, this coupling generates. Are there any growth-enhancing effects? If so, how sustainable are they?
Belarus’s Growing Economic Dependence on Russia
Belarus’s economic dependence on Russia is reaching unprecedented levels, spanning various critical sectors, with new dimensions of reliance emerging in recent years. This dependence is deeply embedded in the trade, energy, financial, and technological sectors of the Belarusian economy, and recent geopolitical shifts have further intensified these connections.
One of the most evident signs of Belarus’s economic reliance on Russia is reflected in its foreign trade. Russian imports make up around 55-60 percent of all imports to Belarus, with a staggering 80 percent consisting of intermediate goods crucial for industrial production. Energy products, including crude oil and natural gas, form the largest part of these imports, with almost all of Belarus’s energy needs being met by Russia. Exports have also become increasingly concentrated to the Russian market. In 2022-2023 there were several periods when about 70 percent of Belarusian exports were directed to Russia, an increase from about 35-40 percent prior to 2022. This surge was driven by new opportunities for Belarusian firms on the Russian market following Western companies withdrawals. Although competition in the Russian market has since intensified, Russia still accounts for around 60-65 percent of Belarus’s total exports (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. The Evolution of Physical Volume of Exports (2018=100) and the Share of Exports to Russia (in percent)
Source: Own estimations based on data from the National Bank of Belarus.
A major new development since 2022 is Belarus’s reliance on Russia for transportation and logistics. Sanctions and the war in Ukraine have forced Belarus to abandon its traditional export routes through European ports, leaving Russian seaports as the only viable option for further exports. In 2023, Belarus secured around 14 million tons of port capacity in Russia, primarily for potash fertilizers and oil products exports. Although it is still below the needed volumes, this logistics dependency significantly exacerbates Belarus’s external trade dependency. Taking into account direct exports and imports to and from Russia, as well as mechanisms of logistics and transport control, Russia essentially “controls” up to 90 percent of Belarusian exports and about 80 percent of its imports.
Energy dependency is another critical factor to consider. Belarus imports over 80 percent of its energy resources from Russia, making it vulnerable to any shifts in Russian energy policy. In fact, Russian energy subsidies have played a crucial role in keeping Belarusian industries competitive. In 2022, when global energy prices spiked, the low and fixed price that Belarus paid for Russian gas and the steep discount on oil supplies translated into record-high energy subsidies. These amounted to billions of US dollars and shielded Belarus from the economic fallout other countries experienced due to rising energy prices. Although the value of these subsidies has somewhat decreased in 2023-2024, they remain significant and vital for Belarus.
Belarus’s fiscal situation has also become increasingly tied to Russia. After years of running budget deficits, Belarus achieved a budget surplus in 2023, largely due to Russian financial assistance. For instance, the budgetary item ‘gratuitous revenues’, which mainly includes reverse excise tax and other transfers from Russia, reached a historical high in 2023, securing revenues of around 3.0 percent of GDP. Without this external support, Belarus would likely face a severe fiscal deficit, forcing cuts in social spending and other areas. The scale of Russian financial aid has become a key factor in maintaining budgetary stability, imposing a serious risk for Belarus. Were Russia to restrict such financing, Belarus would almost instantly lose its fiscal stability.
In the monetary sphere, Belarus’s dependence on Russia manifests through the informal peg of the Belarusian ruble to the Russian ruble. Given the deep trade ties and shared currency use in bilateral transactions, Belarusian monetary policy is effectively constrained by Russian economic conditions. The Belarusian National Bank has little room for maneuver, as any nominal devaluation or appreciation of the ruble tends to self-correct through inflation or price adjustments tied to Russian trade. This linkage limits Belarus’s monetary sovereignty and aligns its inflation trajectory closely with Russia’s.
Belarus’s debt structure underscores this dependency further. Of the country’s roughly 17.0 billion US dollars in external debt, about 65 percent is owed directly to Russia or Russia-controlled entities like the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development. In 2022-2023, Russia granted Belarus a six-year deferment on debt repayments, providing crucial breathing room for the regime. This deferment, along with Belarus’s limited access to other international financial sources due to sanctions, has cemented Russia’s role as the primary creditor and financial lifeline for Belarus.
New dimensions of dependence have also emerged within infrastructure, technology, and cyberspace. As Belarus is cut off from Western technologies and financial systems, it increasingly relies on Russian alternatives. Belarus has adopted Russian software for critical functions such as tax administration, giving Moscow access to sensitive financial data. Similarly, with several Belarusian banks disconnected from SWIFT, the country has integrated into Russia’s financial messaging system, further entrenching its reliance on Russian infrastructure. Belarusian companies, particularly in sectors like accounting and logistics, have also shifted to using Russian business software, while consumers increasingly rely on Russian digital platforms for social networks, payments, and entertainment.
An Attempt to Spur Growth Through Coupling with Russia
From the perspective of macroeconomic stability and the traditional view on strengthening growth potential, Belarus’s progressing dependence on Russia is obviously an evil (Kruk, 2023; Kruk, 2024). However, the Belarusian regime sees it as a necessary trade-off, or a “lesser evil”. In 2021-2023, the coupling was done in exchange for economic survival. Firstly, production coupling allowed to counterweight the losses in output associated with sanctions (as niches were freed up in the Russian market) (Kruk & Lvovskiy, 2022). Secondly, the coupling was driven by pressure from Russia and a desire from Belarusian authorities to rapidly obtain some compensations if accepting Russia’s demands. For example, in 2022-2023, Belarusian enterprises were granted a credit line of 105 billion rubles within so-called import-substitution projects.
However, in 2024, coupling with Russia is beginning to look more like a purposeful strategy by the Belarusian economic authorities rather than just a survival strategy. The regime seems willing to sacrifice sustainability considerations in favor of strengthening the growth potential by ‘directive production coupling’, i.e. artificially shaping value-added chains between producers in Belarus (mainly state-owned enterprises) and Russia. For instance, the regime accepted the co-called Union programs for 2024-2026 (Turarbekova, 2024), which encompass numerous activities by the governments of Belarus and Russia aimed at securing ‘production coupling’ in sectors such as machine building, agricultural and automotive engineering, aviation industry, and elevator manufacturing. In some cases, the Belarusian party solely initiates such kind of sectoral activities. It seems that the authorities either accepted the dependency due to the lack of outside options, or they became more optimistic regarding the possibility to spur economic growth through coupling with Russia based on the experiences from the last couple of years. And to some extent, this logic might hold true.
As in the previous two years, the coupling with Russia may, in the short to medium term, more than compensate for certain institutional weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the Belarusian economy. The positive effects may even extend beyond mere cyclical impacts and, under certain conditions, contribute to a semblance of stability for a period of time. For example, economic growth in Belarus could reach some degree of stability under the following conditions:
- (a) if the war in Ukraine becomes protracted and military demand from Russia remains steady;
- (b) if the Russian economy continues to grow (albeit modestly) in an environment with limited competition in Russian commodity markets;
- (c) if specific tools and forms of support for the Belarusian economy remain in place.
Growth driven by a combination of these preconditions could be sufficiently stable as long as they persist. However, the existence of such a status quo is not inherently sustainable and could vanish at any moment. Each of these preconditions is highly unreliable and comes with its own set of determining factors. Thus, one cannot count on the preservation of the entire “package” of preconditions in the long term.
Conclusions
Belarus and its economic prospects are currently in a highly complex situation. The Belarusian economy has been steadily increasing its degree of coupling with Russia, with the ties strengthening both in the range of economic sectors involved and the depth of their integration.
From a long-term growth perspective, the unprecedented level of dependence on Russia is undoubtedly detrimental. In this regard, Kruk’s (2024) conclusion about the economic and political deadlocks remains entirely relevant.
However, as the past two years have shown, this situation can achieve a certain semblance of stability in the medium term. The Belarusian regime is increasingly viewing its coupling with Russia not only as a mechanism for economic survival but also as a means to enhance economic potential. In this way, the growing dependence on Russia, which brings substantial macroeconomic risks, is seen as an unavoidable cost entailed to the only available mechanism to sustain economic growth in Belarus.
How then, should we interpret the related fluctuations in Belarus’s economy? As an increase in economic potential (equilibrium growth rate) or as cyclical acceleration? Traditional economic logic encounters a contradiction here, as the line between equilibrium growth and cyclical fluctuations becomes blurred. An increase in economic potential should inherently be sustainable, whereas cyclical acceleration is inherently transient. Yet, how should we treat a mechanism that might be somewhat sustainable under certain conditions?
This contradiction creates numerous uncertainties, both strictly within the economic domain and beyond it. Economically, it diminishes the effectiveness of conventional macro forecasting tools, making them more dependent on ad-hoc assumptions. For example, if there is indeed an increase in potential, then macroeconomic projections generated without accounting for this channel (e.g. BEROC, 2024) would likely underestimate output growth while overestimating the risks of overheating and destabilization. Conversely, if the model assumes higher equilibrium growth but it proves unsustainable, the forecast could significantly overestimate growth while underestimating macroeconomic imbalances. In other words, the seemingly favorable situation could ultimately be a harbinger of a macroeconomic storm.
These uncertainties are even more pronounced in the political domain. Up to what threshold can an increasing economic dependency on Russia yield macroeconomic gains for the regime? What political consequences can arise if the strategy of coupling with Russia for growth enhancement fails? Can the progressing dependency on Russia undermine the regime politically? If political barriers for democratization are eliminated, what should and can be done to get rid of the dependence on Russia? Are the estimations and prescriptions in Hartwell et al. (2022) – which considers the perspectives of economic reconstruction for a democratic Belarus and the costs of eliminating the dependency on Russia in pre-war reality – still relevant today?
Answering such questions meaningfully using formal research tools ex-ante is nearly impossible. The dependence of macroeconomic sustainability on non-economic factors and motivations leaves little room for an accurate ex-ante diagnosis of the current state of affairs. Only ex-post will we likely be able to reliably assess which diagnosis is closer to the truth. This, in turn, means that we must accept an additional degree of uncertainty in today’s forecasts and projections. Similar challenges are faced by decision-makers in Belarus. As a result, the likelihood of incorrect economic and political decisions due to misdiagnosing the current situation is relatively high, even in the (more optimistic) scenario where the authorities recognize and account for these uncertainties. Such decisions, if made, could not only be costly but might even trigger rapid and drastic economic and political changes.
References
- BEROC. (2024). Macroeconomic Forecast for Belarus. 2024-2025 (in Russian). BEROC. https://beroc.org/publications/view/makroprognoz-dlya-belarusi-2024-2025/
- Bornukova, K. (2023). The Economic Dimension of the Russian Policy toward Belarus. In A. Moshes & R. Nizhnikau (Eds.), Russian Policy toward Belarus after 2020: At a Turning Point? (pp. 29–46). Lexington Books.
- Hartwell, C., Bornukova, K., Kruk, D., & Zoller-Rydzek, B. (2022). The Economic Reconstruction of Belarus: Next Steps after a Democratic Transition (EP/EXPO/AFET/FWC/2019-01/Lot1/R/03). European Parliament. Directorate General for External Policies. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_STU(2022)653663
- Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. (2024). EU Sanctions against the regime in Minsk (in Russian). https://www.kas.de/documents/285805/31503540/sanctions-6.pdf/4b6d787d-60fa-ba9a-9ff3-a546946dae31?version=1.0&t=1721109230965
- Kruk, D. (2024). Cognitive Dissonance on Belarus: Recovery and Adaptation or Stalemate? (Policy Brief Series). FREE Network. https://freepolicybriefs.org/2024/01/08/belarusian-economy-outlook/
- Kruk, D. (2023). What is Needed to Reinforce Macroeconomic Stability in Belarus? (In Russian) (85; BEROC Working Paper Series, p. 52). BEROC. https://beroc.org/publications/working_papers/chto-nuzhno-dlya-ukrepleniya-makroekonomicheskoy-stabilnosti-v-belarusi/
- Kruk, D., & Lvovskiy, L. (2022). Belarus Under War Sanctions (Policy Brief Series). FREE Network. https://freepolicybriefs.org/2022/10/17/belarus-under-sanctions/
- Turarbekova, R. (2024). The Union State: Belarus’ Increasing Dependence on Russia and the Risk of Sovereignty Erosion, 2020-2023 [SCEEUS Guest Commentary]. https://sceeus.se/en/publications/the-union-state-belarus-increasing-dependence-on-russia-and-the-risk-of-sovereignty-erosion-2020-2023/
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Navigating Market Exits: Companies’ Responses to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 led to widespread international condemnation. As governments imposed sanctions on Russian businesses and individuals tied to the war, international companies doing business in Russia came under increasing pressure to withdraw from Russia voluntarily. In the first part of this policy brief, we show what kind of companies decided to leave the Russian market using data collected by the LeaveRussia project. In the second part, we focus on prominent Swedish businesses which announced a withdrawal from Russia, but whose products were later found available in the country by investigative journalists from Dagens Nyheter (DN). We collect the stock prices for these companies when available and show how investors respond to these news.
Business Withdrawal from Russia
The global economy is highly interconnected, and Russia forms an important part. Prior to the invasion, Russia ranked 13th in the world in terms of global goods exports value and 22nd in terms of imports (Schwarzenberg, 2023). In the months following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s imports dropped sharply (about 50 percent according to Sonnenfeld et al., 2022). Before February 24th, Russia’s main trading partners were China, the European Union (in particular, Germany and the Netherlands) and Belarus (as illustrated in Figure 1). While there is some evidence of Russia shifting away from Western countries and towards China following the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the resulting sanctions, Western democracies still made up about 60 percent of Russia’s trade in 2020 (Schwarzenberg, 2023). In the same year, Sweden’s exports to Russia accounted for 1.4 percent of Sweden’s total goods exports, of which 59 percent were in the machinery, transportation and telecommunications sectors. 1.3 percent of Swedish imports were from Russia (Stockholms Handelskammare, 2022).
Figure 1. Changes in trade with Russia, 2013-2020.
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, data until 2020. From Lehne (2022).
In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2024, Western governments imposed strict trade and financial sanctions on Russian businesses and individuals involved in the war (see S&P Global, 2024). These sanctions are designed to hamper Russia’s war effort by reducing its ability to fight and finance the war. The sanctions make it illegal for, e.g., European companies to sell certain products to Russia as well as to import select Russian goods (Council of the European Union, 2024). Even though sanctions do not cover all trade with Russia, many foreign businesses have been pressured to pull out of Russia in an act of solidarity. The decision by these businesses to leave is voluntary and could reflect their concerns over possible consumer backlash. It is not uncommon for consumers to put pressure on businesses in times of geopolitical conflict. For instance, Pandya and Venkatesan (2016) find that U.S. consumers were less likely to buy French-sounding products when the relationship between both countries deteriorated.
The LeaveRussia Project
The LeaveRussia project, from the Kyiv School of Economics Institute (KSE Institute), systematically tracks foreign companies’ responses to the Russian invasion. The database covers a selection of companies that have either made statements regarding their operations in Russia, and/or are a large global player (“major companies and world-famous brands”), and/or have been mentioned in relation to leaving/waiting/withdrawing from Russia in major media outlets such as Reuters, Bloomberg, Financial times etc. (LeaveRussia, 2024). As of April 5th, 2024, the list contains 3342 firms, the companies’ decision to leave, exit or remain in the Russian market, the date of their announced action, and company details such as revenue, industry etc. The following chart uses publicly available data from the LeaveRussia project to illustrate patterns in business withdrawals from Russia following the invasion of Ukraine.
Figure 2a shows the number of foreign companies in Russia in the LeaveRussia dataset by their country of headquarters. Figure 2b shows the share of these companies that have announced a withdrawal from Russia by April 2024, by their country of headquarters.
Figure 2a. Total number of companies by country.
Figure 2b. Share of withdrawals, by country.
Source: Authors’ compilation based on data from the LeaveRussia project and global administrative zone boundaries from Runfola et al. (2020).
Some countries (e.g. Canada, the US and the UK) that had a large presence in Russia prior to the war have also seen a large number of withdrawals following the invasion. Other European countries, however, have seen only a modest share of withdrawals (for instance, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands and Slovakia). Companies headquartered in countries that have not imposed any sanctions on Russia following the invasion, such as Belarus, China, India, Iran etc., show no signs of withdrawing from the Russian market. In fact, the share of companies considered by the KSE to be “digging in” (i.e., companies that either declared they’d remain in Russia or who did not announce a withdrawal or downscaling as of 31st of March 2024) is 75 percent for more than 25 countries, including not only the aforementioned, but also countries such as Argentina, Moldova, Serbia and Turkey.
Withdrawal Determinants
The decision for companies to exit the market may range from consumer pressure to act in solidarity with Ukraine, to companies’ perceived risk from operating on the Russian market (Kiesel and Kolaric, 2023). Out of the 3342 companies in the LeaveRussia project’s database, about 42 percent have, as of April 5th, 2024, exited or stated an intention to exit the Russian market. This number increases only slightly to 49 percent when considering only companies headquartered in democratic (an Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index score of 7 or higher) countries within the EU. Figure 3 shows the number of companies that announced their exit from the Russian market, by month. A clear majority of companies announce their withdrawal in the first 6 months following the invasion.
Figure 3. Number of foreign companies announcing an exit from the Russian market, 2022-2024.
Source: Authors’ compilation based on data from the LeaveRussia project.
Similarly to the location of companies’ headquarters, the decision to exit the Russian market varies by industry. Figure 4 a depicts the top 15 industries with the highest share of announced withdrawals from the Russian market among industries with at least 10 companies. Most companies with high levels of withdrawals are found in consumer-sensitive industries such as the entertainment sector, tourism and hospitality, advertising etc.
Figure 4a. Top 15 industries in terms of withdrawal shares.
Figure 4b. Bottom 15 industries in terms of withdrawal shares.
Source: Authors’ compilation based on data from the LeaveRussia project.
In contrast, Figure 4b details the industries with the lowest share of companies opting to withdraw from the Russian market. Only around 10 percent of firms in the “Defense” and “Marine Transportation” industries chose to withdraw. Two-thirds of firms within the “Energy, oil and gas” and “Metals and Mining” sectors have chosen to remain in business in Russia following the war in Ukraine.
Several sectors have been identified as crucial in supplying the Russian military with necessary components to sustain their military aggression against Ukraine, mainly electronics, communications, automotives and related categories. We find that many of these sectors are among those with the lowest share of companies withdrawing from Russia. Companies for which Russia constitute a large market share have more to lose from exiting than others. Another reason for not exiting the market relates to the current legal hurdles of corporate withdrawal from Russia (Doherty, 2023). Others may simply not have made public announcements or operate within an industry dominated by smaller companies that are not on the radar of the LeaveRussia project. Nonetheless, Bilousova et al. (2024) detail that products from companies within the sanction’s coalition continue to be found in Russian military equipment destroyed in Ukraine. This is due to insufficient due diligence by companies as well as loopholes in the sanctions regime such as re-exporting via neighboring countries, tampering with declaration forms or challenges in jurisdictional enforcement due to lengthy supply chains, among others. (Olofsgård and Smitt Meyer, 2023).
And Those Who Didn’t Leave After All
The data from the LeaveRussia project details if and when foreign businesses announce that they will leave Russia. However, products from companies that have announced a departure from the Russian market continue to be found in the country, including in military components (Bilousova, 2024). In autumn 2023, investigative journalists from the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter exposed 14 Swedish companies whose goods were found entering Russia, in most cases contrary to the companies’ public claims (Dagens Nyheter, 2023; Tidningen Näringslivet, 2023). For this series of articles, the journalists used data from Russian customs and verified it with information from numerous Swedish companies, covering the time period up until December 2022. This entailed reviewing thousands of export records from Swedish companies either directly to Russia or via neighboring countries such as Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. All transactions mentioned in the article series have been confirmed with the respective companies, who were also contacted by DN prior to publication (Dagens Nyheter, 2023b). DNs journalists also acted as businessmen, interacting with intermediaries in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, exposing re-routing of Swedish goods from a company stated to have cut all exports to Russia in the wake of the invasion (Dagens Nyheter, 2023d).
For Sweden headquartered companies exposed in DN and that are traded on the Swedish Stock Exchange, we collect their stock prices and trading volume. Our data includes information on each stock’s average price, turnover, number of trades by date from around the date of the DN publications as well as the date of each company’s prior public announcement of exiting Russia. Table 1 details the companies who were exposed of doing direct or indirect business with Russia by DN and who had announced an exit from the Russian market previously. In their article series, DN also shows that goods from the following companies entered Russia; AriVislanda, Assa Abloy, Atlas Copco, Getinge, Scania, Securitas Tetra Pak, and Väderstad. Most of the companies exposed by DN operate within industries displaying low withdrawal shares.
Table 1. Select Swedish companies’, time of exit announcement and exposure in Dagens Nyheter and stock names.
Source: The LeaveRussia project, 2023; Dagens Nyheter, 2023b, 2023c, 2023d. Note: The exit statements have been verified through companies’ press statements and/or reports when available. For Epiroc, the claim has been verified via a previous Dagens Nyheter article (Dagens Nyheter, 2023a).
In Figure 5, we show the average stock price and trades-weighted average stock price of the Swedish companies in Table 1 around the time when the companies announced that they are leaving Russia.
Figure 5. Average stock price of companies in Table 1 around Russian exit announcements.
Source: Author’s compilation based on data from Nasdaq Nordic.
There appears to be an immediate increase in stock prices after firms announced their exit from the Russian market. Stock prices, however, reverse their gains over the next couple of days. In general, stock prices are volatile, and we also see similar-sized movements immediately before the announcement. Due to this volatility and the fact that we cannot rule out other shocks impacting these stock prices at the same time, it is difficult to attribute any movements in the stock prices to the firms’ decisions to leave Russia.
The academic evidence on investors’ reactions to firms divesting from Russia is mixed. Using a sample of less than 300 high-profile firms with operations in Russia compiled by researchers at the Yale Chief Executive Leadership Institute, Glambosky and Peterburgsky (2022) find that firms that divest within 10 days after the invasion experience negative returns, but then recover within a two-week period. Companies announcing divesting at a later stage do not experience initial stock price declines. In contrast, Kiesel and Kolaric (2023) use data from the LeaveRussia project to find positive stock price returns to firms’ announcements of leaving Russia, while there appears to be no significant investor reaction to firms’ decisions to stay in Russia.
When considering the effect from DN’s publications, the picture is almost mirrored, with the simple and trades-weighted average stock prices dipping in the days following the negative media exposure before not only recovering, but actually increasing. Similar caveats apply to the interpretation of this chart. In addition, the DN publication occurred shortly after the Hamas attacks on Israel on October 7 and Israel’s subsequent war on Gaza. While conflict and uncertainty typically dampen the stock market, the events in the Middle East initially caused little reaction on the stock market (Sharma, 2023).
Figure 6. Average stock price for companies listed in Table 1 around the time of DN exposure.
Source: Author’s compilation based on data from Nasdaq Nordic.
Discussion
As discussed in Becker et al. (2024), creating incentives and ensuring companies follow suit with the current sanctions’ regime should be a priority if we want to end Russia’s war on Ukraine and undermine its wider geopolitical ambitions. Nevertheless, Bilousova et al. (2024), and Olofsgård and Smitt Meyer (2023), highlight that there is ample evidence of sanctions evasions, including for products that are directly contributing to Russia’s military capacity. Even in countries that have a strong political commitment to the sanctions’ regime, enforcement is weak. For instance, in Sweden, it is not illegal to try and evade sanctions according to the Swedish Chamber of Commerce (2024). There is little coordination between the numerous law enforcement agencies that are responsible for sanction enforcement and there have been very few investigations into sanctions violations.
Absent effective sanctions enforcement and for the many industries not covered by sanctions, can we rely on businesses to put profits second and voluntarily withdraw from Russia? Immediately after the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as news stories about the brutality of the war proliferated, many international companies did announce that they will be leaving Russia. However, a more systematic look at data collected by the LeaveRussia project and KSE Institute reveals that more than two years into the war, less than half of companies based in Western democracies intend to distance themselves from the Russian market. A closer look at companies who are continuing operations in Russia reveals that they tend to be in sectors that are crucial for the Russian economy and war effort, such as energy, mining, electronics and industrial equipment. Many of these companies are probably seeing the war as a business opportunity and are reluctant to put human lives before their bottom line (Sonnenfeld and Tian, 2022).
Whether companies who announce that they are leaving Russia actually do leave is difficult to independently verify. A series of articles published in a prominent Swedish newspaper (Dagens Nyheter) last autumn revealed that goods from 14 major Swedish firms continue to be available in Russia, despite most of these firms publicly announcing their withdrawal from the country. The companies’ reactions to the exposé were mixed. A few companies, such as Scania and SSAB, have decided to cut all exports to the intermediaries exposed by the undercover journalists (for instance, in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan). Other companies stated that they are currently investigating DN’s claims or that the exports exposed in the DN articles were final or delayed orders that were accepted before the company decided to withdraw from Russia. Another company, Trelleborg – a leading company within polymer solutions for a variety of industry purposes – reacted to the DN exposure by backtracking from its earlier commitment to exit the Russian market (Dagens Nyheter 2023b, 2023d). Wider reaction to these revelations was muted. Looking at changes in stock prices for the exposed companies, we find little evidence that investors are punishing companies for not honoring their public commitment to withdraw from Russia.
In an environment, where businesses themselves withdraw at low rates and investors do not shy away from companies contradicting their own claims, the need for stronger enforcement of sanctions seems more pressing than ever.
References
- Becker, T., Fredheim, K., Gars, J., Hilgenstock, B., Katinas, P., Le Coq, C., Mylovanov, T., Olofsgård, A., Perrotta Berlin, M., Pavytska, Y., Ribakova, E., Shapoval, N., Spiro, D. and Wachtmeister, H. (2024). Sanctions on Russia: Getting the Facts Right. FREE Policy Brief. https://freepolicybriefs.org/2024/03/14/sanctions-russia-war-ukraine/
- Bilousova, O., Hilgenstock, B., Ribakova, E., Shapoval, N., Vlasyuk, A. and Vlasiuk, V. (2024). CHALLENGES OF EXPORT CONTROLS ENFORCEMENT HOW RUSSIA CONTINUES TO IMPORT COMPONENTS FOR ITS MILITARY PRODUCTION. Yermak-McFaul International Working Group on Russian Sanctions & KSE Institute. https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Challenges-of-Export-Controls-Enforcement.pdf
- Council of the European Union. (2023). Sanctions against Russia explained. European Council. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia/sanctions-against-russia-explained/#services
- Dagens Nyheter. (2023a). DN avslöjar: Wallenbergs gruvjätte gjorde affärer med ryskgrundat bolag – efter krigsutbrottet.
- Dagens Nyheter. (2023b). DN avslöjar: Svenska storbolagen i affärer med Rvssland – trots löftena.
- Dagens Nyheter. (2023c). Svenska miljardbolaget svek löftet – sålde till ryska hamnprojekt.
- Dagens Nyheter (2023d). Mellanhanden avslöjar: Så levereras stålet från SSAB till Ryssland.
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