Location: Russia

Moldova’s EU Integration and the Special Case of Transnistria

Posted on October 14, 2024 | Policy Brief

Flags of Moldova and the European Union at a diplomatic meeting, symbolizing Moldova's EU integration efforts.

In the shadow of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, another East European country is actively working to secure its European future. After three years of negotiating cooperation agreements with the European Commission, Moldova finally obtained its EU candidate status and is now on track to join the EU as a member state. However, among many remaining obstacles on the path to full membership, one stands out as especially problematic: the region of Transnistria. The region, officially Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic, is an internationally unrecognized country and is rather seen as a region with which Russia has “special relations”, including a military presence in the region since 1992. This policy brief provides an overview of the current state of the Transnistrian economy and its relationships with Moldova, the EU, and Russia, arguing that Transnistria’s economy is de facto already integrated into the Moldovan and EU economies. It also points to the key challenges to resolve for a successful integration of Moldova into the EU.

Moldova’s EU Integration: The Moldovan Economy on its Path to EU Accession

On December 14th, 2023, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Moldova, recognizing Moldova’s substantial progress when it comes to anti-corruption and de-oligarchisation reforms. The first intergovernmental conference was held on the 25th of June 2024, officially launching accession negotiations (European Council, 2024). On October 20th, 2024, Moldova will hold a referendum on enshrining Moldova’s EU ambitions in the constitution. However, several issues remain to be solved, for Moldova to enter the EU.

With a small and declining population of only about 2.5 million people and a GDP of 16.54 billion US dollars (2023), Moldova remains among the poorest countries in Eastern Europe. In 2023 the GDP per capita was 6600 US dollars in exchange rate terms (substantially higher if using PPP-adjusted measures; World Bank, 2024a). In the last decade, the largest share of its GDP, about 60 percent, stemmed from activities in the services sector, and about 20 and 10 percent from the industrial and agricultural sectors, respectively (Statista, 2024). Despite substantial economic growth in the last decade (3.3 percent on average between 2016 and 2021) and recent reforms (largely under the presidency of Maia Sandu), Moldova remains highly dependent on financial assistance from abroad and remittances, the latter contributing to about 15 – 35 percent of Moldova’s GDP in the last two decades (World Bank, 2024b).

The COVID-19 pandemic and refugee flows caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have only intensified this dependence. Furthermore, these events excavated existing vulnerabilities in the Moldovan economy, such as high inflation and soaring energy and food prices, which depressed households’ disposable incomes and consumption, while war-related uncertainty contributed to weaker investment (World Bank, 2024c).

The Contested Region of Transnistria – Challenge for Moldova’s EU Integration

In addition to Moldova’s economic challenges, the country also faces a particular and unusual problem; it does not fully control its territory. The Transnistrian region in the North-West of the country (at the South-Western border of Ukraine) constitutes about 12 percent of Moldova’s territory. The region has a population of about 350 000 people, mostly Russian-speaking Moldovans, Russians, and Ukrainians.

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, a movement for self-determination for the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic resulted in a self-declaration of its independence on the 2nd of September 1990. More specifically, the alleged suppression of the Russian language and threats of unification between Moldova and Romania were the main stated reasons for the Transnistrian movement for self-determination, which in turn led to the civil armed conflict in 1992 and a following ceasefire agreement (Government of Republic of Moldova, 1992). The main points of the agreement concern the stationing of Russia’s 14th Army in Transnistria, the establishment of a demilitarized security zone, and the removal of restrictions on the movement of people, goods, and services between Moldova and Transnistria. As of 1992, Transnistria is de-facto an entity under “Russia’s effective control” (Roșa, 2021).

Over the years, the interpretations of the conflict have become more controversial, ranging from the local elite’s perspectives to assertions of an entirely artificial conflict fueled by malign Russian influence (Tofilat and Parlicov, 2020).

Notably, the Moldovan government has never officially recognized Transnistria as an occupied territory (see Article 11 of the Moldovan constitution stating “The Republic of Moldova – a Neutral State (1) The Republic of Moldova proclaims its permanent neutrality.  (2) The Republic of Moldova shall not allow the dispersal of foreign military troops on its territory” (Constitute, 2024)).

Furthermore, the European Council’s official recognition of Transnistria as an “occupied territory” on March 15, 2022, underscores the EU’s stance on the matter and highlights Russia’s pivotal role in providing political, economic, and military support to Transnistria (PACE, 2022).

The Transnistrian Economy: Main Indicators and Weaknesses

Despite Russia’s central role in Transnistria, the region’s economy is, in practice, substantially integrated into the Moldovan and EU economies. This fact should be considered at various levels of decision-making when discussing Moldova’s EU accession.

As depicted in Figure 1, economic activity in Transnistria has been quite “stable” in the last decade. GDP per capita has remained around 2000 US dollars, 2,5 times lower than Moldova’s GDP per capita in 2021.

Figure 1. Moldovan and Transnistrian GDP per capita, in thousand USD

Source: Data from World Bank, 2024; Pridnestrovian Republican Bank, 2024a. Note: since 2022 the Pridnestrovian Republican Bank has suspended publishing official statistics on macroeconomic indicators.

However, one must be careful when estimating and interpreting Transnistrian economic indicators in dollar terms. The local currency is the Transnistrian ruble which is not recognized anywhere in the world except in Russia. Its real value is thus highly uncertain as there is no market for this currency. Moreover, only Russian banks are authorized to open accounts and conduct transactions in the currency, demonstrating yet another significant weakness for Transnistria as a potential independent state, particularly given the current global ban on most Russian banks. As such, the official exchange rate for US dollars should be taken with a grain of salt. At the same time, there are no alternative statistics as the Pridnestrovian Republican Bank is the only source for relevant data on Transnistria.

Another distinctive feature of Transnistria is the substantial reliance on remittances from abroad (see Figure 2). In 2021, remittances amounted to 143.7 million US dollars, constituting 15.5 percent of GDP in 2021 (if relying on the official exchange rate for US dollars, as published by the Pridnestrovian Republican Bank).

Figure 2. Remittances to/from Transnistria, in million USD

Source: Data from the Pridnestrovian Republican Bank (2024b). Note: CIS denotes the Commonwealth of Independent States and all other countries.

Figure 2 illustrates a notable trend of increasing dependency on remittances in recent years, particularly on remittances originating from CIS countries, chiefly Russia and Ukraine.

In terms of reliance on Russia, this dependency is not a concern when it comes to Transnistria’s exports. Foreign trade data from recent years indicates that the Transnistrian economy no longer relies on exports to Russia. As seen in Figure 3, the share of exports to Russia has been constantly declining since 2014 and amounted to merely 9.2 percent in 2021. At the same time, exports to the EU, Moldova and Ukraine collectively accounted for about 80 percent in 2021. The primary commodities driving Transnistrian exports were metal products, amounting to 337.3 million US dollars in 2021, followed by electricity supplies at 130.1 million US dollars. Additionally, food products and raw materials contributed 87.6 million US dollars to Transnistrian exports in the same period.

Figure 3. Transnistrian exports by destination countries, in percent

Source: Data from the Pridnestrovian Republican Bank Bulletins (2024c).

These figures highlight the significant integration of the Transnistrian economy into the European market and, to some extent, indicate the strong potential to further align in this direction.

The increase in Transnistria’s exports to the EU in recent years can be largely attributed to the implementation of mandatory registration of Transnistrian enterprises in Moldova in 2006 as a prerequisite for engaging in foreign economic activities (EUBAM, 2017). Consequently, Moldova has exercised full control over Transnistrian exports and partial control over its imports since 2006.

However, Transnistria remains reliant on Russia for its imports, particularly in the energy sector. In contrast to the export structure, Russia’s share in Transnistrian imports was significantly larger in 2021. About 45 percent of the imports originated from Russia in 2021, and mostly constituted of fuel and energy goods (447.0 million US dollars) and metal imports (254.3 million US dollars), quite typical for a transition economy.

Figure 4. Transnistrian imports by origin countries, in percent

Source: Data from the Pridnestrovian Republican Bank Bulletins (2024c).

Transnistria’s Energy Dependence on Russia

The biggest challenge for Transnistria, as well as for Moldova, is the large fuel and energy dependence on Russia, mostly in the form of natural gas.

For many years, gas has been supplied to Transnistria effectively for free, often in the form of a so-called “gas subsidy” (Roșa, 2021).  This gas flows through Transnistria to Moldova, effectively accumulating a gas debt. Typically, Gazprom supplies gas to Moldovagaz, which in turn distributes gas to Moldovan consumers and to Tiraspol-Transgaz in Transnistria. Tiraspol-Transgaz then resell the gas at subsidized tariffs to local Transnistrian households and businesses. This included providing gas to the Moldovan State Regional Power Station, also known as MGRES – the largest power plant in Moldova. MGRES, in turn, exports electricity, further highlighting the interconnectedness of energy distribution between the Transnistrian region and the rest of Moldova.

Figure 5. Export/import of fuel and energy products from/to Transnistria, in million USD

Source: Data from the Pridnestrovian Republican Bank Bulletins (2024c). Note: Data for 2017 and 2018 unavailable.

The revenue generated from energy exports to Moldova has been deposited into a so-called special gas account and subsequently channeled directly into the Transnistrian budget in the form of loans from Tiraspol-Transgaz. In this way the Transnistrian government has covered more than 30 percent of their total budgetary expenditures over the last ten-year period. This further points to Transnistria’s’ fiscal inefficiencies and highlights its precarious dependency on gas from the Russian Federation.

In the last few years there have however been repeated disruptions in the gas supply and continuous disputes about prices and how much Moldovagaz owes Gazprom. De jure Tiraspol-Transgaz operates as a subsidiary of Moldovagaz, but de facto its assets were effectively nationalized by the separatist authorities in Transnistria (Tofilat and Parlicov, 2020). These unclarities has led to multiple conflicts over who owes the built-up gas debt. Given the ownership structure the debt is often seen as “Moldovan debt to Russia” (see e.g., Miller, 2023), albeit created by Transnistrian authorities. According to Gazprom, the outstanding amount owed by Moldovagaz to Gazprom stood at approximately 8 billion USD at the end of 2019 (Gazprom, 2024). This corresponds to about 7 times of Transnistria’s GDP. The Moldavian assessment of the debt is about two orders of magnitude lower  (Gotev, 2023).

The disagreement on the debt amount was the official reason for the gas supply to be drastically reduced in October 2022. From December 2022 to March 2023, Russia’s Gazprom supplied gas only to Transnistria and it was not until March 2023 that supplies to the rest of Moldova were resumed. Since then, there have been shifts back and forth with Moldova mainly buying gas from Moldovan state-owned Energocom, which imports gas from suppliers other than Gazprom (Całus, 2023; Tanas, 2023). Understanding all turns and events is at times challenging due to lack of transparency in dealings.

Currently, despite Gazprom’s debt claims, the entirety of Transnistria’s gas is still being provided by Russia. While this is a relatively “cheap” investment from the Russian perspective, its impact on Moldova is large, as highlighted by Tofilat and Parlicov (2020) “the bottomline costs for Russia with maintaining Transnistria as its main instrument of influence in Moldova was at most USD 1 billion—not too expensive for twenty-seven years of influence in a European country of 3 million people”.

Corruption in Transnistria – Who is the Real “Sheriff”?

Another obstacle hindering a resolution of the Transnistrian conflict is the near complete monopoly of political and economic power held by Transnistria’s former President Igor Smirnov (1991-2011), through his strong ties to the Sheriff corporation. The corporation, established in 1993 by two former members of Transnistria’s “special services” (Ilya Kazmaly and Victor Gushan), was enabled by Transnistria’s former president, Igor Smirnov. For instance, the Sheriff company was exempt from paying customs duties and was permitted to monopolize trade, oil, and telecommunications in Transnistria. In return, the company supported Smirnov’s party during his presidency. For more on the conflict between Transnistria’s power clans and their relationships with Russia, see Hedenskog and Roine (2009) and Wesolowsky (2021).

The Sheriff company encompasses supermarkets, gas stations, construction firms, hotels, a mobile phone network, bakeries, a distillery, and a mini media empire comprising radio and TV stations. Presently, the company is reported to exert control over approximately 60 percent of the region’s economy (Wesolowsky, 2021).

A straightforward illustration of Sheriff’s political influence is the establishment of the Sheriff football team. For the team, Victor Gushan constructed the Sheriff sports complex, the largest football stadium in Moldova, accommodating
12 746 spectators. This investment in sports infrastructure is notable, especially considering that the total population of Transnistria is only approximately 350 000, and that the region is fairy poor. A similar example concerns the allocation of a land plot of 6.4 hectares to the company “to expand the construction of sports complex for long-term use under a simplified privatization procedure” signed directly by the former president.

While these details may seem peripheral to broader problems, they illustrate how some vested interests in the Transnistrian region may not be keen to change towards a society based on the rule-of-law, increased transparency and a market-oriented economy.

Moldova’s Options for Resolving the Transnistrian Conflict in EU Integration

As Moldova grapples with both the consequences of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and the prolonged “frozen” conflict with Transnistria, its economy remains vulnerable. With the recent attainment of EU candidate status, it’s essential for the Moldovan government to map out ways to solve the conflict despite strong interest from powerful political and economic groups in preserving the status quo.

While the perspectives of resolving the Transnistrian conflict obviously hinge on Russian troops withdrawing from the region, Moldova would also need to address a wide range of economic issues. The Transnistrian economy faces numerous critical structural challenges including a persistent negative foreign trade balance, an unsustainable banking system, and pervasive corruption. Notably, the dominant oligarchic entity, the Sheriff company, exercises monopolistic political and economic influence, striving to preserve the status quo for Transnistria. The obvious unviability of the local currency due to its artificial nature and a complete dependency on Russia’s banking system are additional challenges to be solved for Moldova to be able to integrate Transnistria properly into its economy. Therefore, introducing additional measures such as restricting access to remittances in Transnistria, and imposing personal sanctions on elite groups could help Moldova in establishing economic control over the region.

Furthermore, while the Transnistrian region de-facto has strong economic ties with the Moldovan and European markets in terms of exports, its heavy reliance on Russian gas imports remains a significant vulnerability.

When integrating Transnistria and severing its ties with Russia, Moldova would also need to resolve the issues arising from its reliance on the electricity produced at MGRES using subsidized Russian gas. Natural gas bought at market prices would make Moldovan electricity highly costly, presenting financial challenges to Moldova, and effectively destroying the competitive advantage and important source of revenue in the Transnistrian region. Moreover, alternative electricity routes to Moldova are yet to be completed (with an estimated cost of approximately 27 million EUR).

These and other issues need to be dealt with for a successful Moldovan transition into the EU. Although these challenges are highly important from a Moldovan point of view, and even more so from a Transnistrian perspective, it should be emphasized that these issues are, in economic terms, relatively small for the EU. Given that the EU has opened the way for Moldovan accession, it should be ready to step up financially to help Moldova solve these issues and stay on the membership path.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

The Russian Economy in the Fog of War | New Report

Posted on October 3, 2024 | News

A toy tank on crumpled Russian rubles, symbolizing the impact of war on the Russian economy.

A new report highlights the growing instability of the Russian economy as it grapples with the effects of war and sanctions. Official figures on inflation and GDP growth present an overly optimistic picture, according to the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE). The report reveals that Russia’s fiscal resources are under severe strain, threatening its economic future.

Economic Instability in the Russian War Economy

Russia’s war in Ukraine has caused unprecedented challenges for its economy. The report shows that Russia’s heavy reliance on oil exports remains a double-edged sword. International oil prices continue to dictate economic performance, but sanctions and declining demand have strained this vital revenue stream. This has deepened the instability in the Russian war economy.

Sanctions have blocked Russia from Western markets, forcing it to use costly and inefficient trade routes through China and other “friendly” nations. As a result, costs have surged and profits have shrunk, further destabilizing the economy.

Key Research Findings

  • Official statistics likely understate the real inflation rate and overestimate GDP growth.
  • Russia’s financial reserves, vital for war spending, may be depleted within a year, raising economic risks.
  • Fiscal policies are unsustainable, with rising public spending at odds with monetary tightening.
  • Sanctions are undermining long-term economic growth, especially in the energy sector.

Sanctions and Long-term Risks for the Russian War Economy

The report explains how international sanctions are driving the Russian economy toward long-term decline. Sanctions are not only limiting financial resources but also cutting off access to key technology and raising trade costs. This erosion of Russia’s industrial base, coupled with heavy war spending, has reduced investment in critical infrastructure and innovation. The future of the Russian war economy looks bleak, with the risks continuing to grow as the conflict drags on.

Read the Full Report “The Russian Economy in the Fog of War”

For a comprehensive understanding of Russia’s economic challenges in the context of war, read the full report by the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE). Access the complete report on the Institute’s website.

About SITE

SITE was set up as a research institute at the Stockholm School of Economics (SSE) in 1989 with the mandate of studying developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Today, SITE is a leading research-based policy institute on these issues. SITE has also built a network of research institutes in the region (FREE Network) that includes the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE). KSE not only provides a premier economics education to future leaders in Ukraine but is also involved in the analysis of the Ukrainian, as well as the Russian, economy, including analysis of the role of sanctions in limiting Russia’s destructive capacity. KSE has been an important contributor of the data and analysis that underlies this report. For more information, visit SITE’s homepage.

To read more policy briefs published by SITE’s experts, visit the Institute’s page on the FREE Network’s website.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in policy briefs, news posts, and other publications are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Russia in Africa: What the Literature Reveals and Why It Matters

Posted on September 23, 2024 | Policy Brief

Industrial oil factory in Africa symbolizing Russia’s influence on Africa's resources and economy.

Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has become increasingly isolated. In an attempt to counter Western powers’ efforts to suppress its economy and soft power impacts, Russia has tried to increase its influence in other parts of the world. In particular, Russia is increasingly active in Africa, having become a key partner to several African regimes, typically operating in areas with weak institutions and governments. Additionally, Russia’s approach has a different focus and objectives compared to other foreign actors, which may have both short and long term consequences for the continent’s development. Deepening our understanding of Russia’s distinct approach alongside those of other global actors, as well as the future implications of their involvement on the continent is, thus, of crucial importance.

Introduction

The new Foreign Policy Concept, adopted by the Russian government in March 2023, dedicates, for the first time, a separate section to Africa. The previous versions of the policy grouped North Africa with the Middle East and contained only a single paragraph, kept unchanged over time, about Sub-Saharan Africa. In the midst of its war against Ukraine, Russia is getting serious about Africa. What do we know about the reasons for and implications of this trend?

A relatively large literature in economics, political science, international relations, and other related fields has dealt with the Soviet Union’s engagement with African regimes (see overviews in Morris, 1973 and Ramani, 2023). However, the number of studies following the evolution of these relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union is significantly smaller, reflecting Russia’s strategic withdrawal from the region between 1990 and 2015. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s increased interest in and engagement on the African continent has been increasingly discussed by security analysts and think tanks (see for instance Siegel, 2021; Stanyard, Vircoulon and Rademeyer, 2023; Jones, et al., 2021). Primarily highlighted are Russia’s interest in mineral deposits, its large-scale arms’ exports to African regimes, its dominance on the nuclear energy market with resulting dependency on Russian nuclear fuels, and its ambition to undermine Western capacities by the spread of Russian propaganda and anti-Western sentiments (Lindén, 2023). Each of these dimensions carries potentially profound and far-reaching implications for the continent’s development, as underscored by various strands of literature. Research contributions on this specific new trend are however still very limited and predominantly of a qualitative and exploratory nature.

There is, however, substantial general knowledge about the various forms that foreign interests can take, including trade, investment, development aid, propaganda, election interference, and involvement in conflicts, and their potential consequences for development. This brief presents an overview of selected literature that most closely relates to foreign influence in Africa.

Background: Theories of Foreign Policy

Two contrasting approaches are used to describe the way countries engage with the international community. The first one is the so-called realist perspective, which emphasizes the role of power, national interests, and security in shaping foreign policy (Mearsheimer, 1995). In this model, countries act in their self-interest, and often in competition or even conflict with other countries. Strategic alliances and a willingness to use force to advance one’s interests are contemplated under this perspective. The second approach is the idealist perspective, in which foreign policy is used to promote democratic values, human rights, and international cooperation, prioritizing tools such as diplomacy, international law, and multilateral institutions (Lancaster, 2008). For countries at the receiving end of major powers’ foreign policy agendas, and particularly for developing countries, the implications from the contrasting approaches will be widely different. While even a realist foreign policy may ostensibly incorporate concerns about the welfare and development of its allies, these are often not more than a thin disguise for the ultimate objective of buying political support and commercial advantages. A genuine interest in the welfare and development of receiving partners only finds a place under the idealist perspective, although even idealism is at times claimed to “greenwash” state actors’ own interests (Delmas and Burbano, 2011). While this claim has some substance to it, such accusations can also stem from the anti-western rhetoric typically pursued by Russia and aimed at undermining the credibility of actors with good intentions.

In practice, most countries’ foreign policies incorporate elements of both realism and idealism, although the balance between the two may vary. Some countries may have a predominantly realist approach, while others may prioritize idealist goals. Additionally, the same country may shift its approach over time, depending on changing circumstances and priorities. Idealism may be more prominent during periods of stability and prosperity, when countries have the resources and political will to pursue more ambitious foreign policy goals. Realism tends to become more prominent in times of crisis, when countries face serious threats to their national security or economic well-being. Historical examples of the latter are the aftermath of World War II, the Cold War, and even the 2008 global financial crisis (Roberts, 2020).

Comparative Analysis of Foreign Influence

A few studies, recent enough to encompass Russia’s renewed interest in Africa post-2015 but not enough to cover the current day resurgence, explicitly compare the strategy of different actors and their long-term influence. Trunkos (2021) develops a new soft power measure for the time-period 1995–2015, to test the commonly accepted claim in the political science literature that American soft power use has been declining while Russian and Chinese soft power use has been increasing. In the author’s own words, “the findings indicate that surprisingly the US is still using more soft power than Russia and China. The data analysis also reveals that the US is leading in economic soft power actions over China and in military soft power actions over Russia as well.”

Castaneda Dower et al. (2021) take a longer-term perspective and categorize African countries into two blocs one Western-leaning and one pro-Soviet, based on a game-theoretical model of alliances. This categorization aligns well with UN voting patterns during the Cold War, but it does not predict alignment as effectively in the post-Cold War period. The study finds no significant difference in average GDP growth between the two blocs for the period from 1990 to 2016. However, the bloc with Western-like characteristics shows higher levels of inequality and greater reliance on the market economy – as opposed to the planned one. It also has higher human capital, more gender parity (in education), and better democracy scores, but lower infrastructure capital compared to the other bloc.

Another strand of literature has looked into the deep changes that have occurred over time within the global development architecture, highlighting changes in donor and partner motivations after the end of the Cold War (Boschini and Olofsgård, 2007; Frot, Olofsgård and Perrotta Berlin, 2014), through the Arab Spring (Challand, 2014), and more recently under the emergence of new actors, chiefly China (Blair, Marty and Roessler, 2021). Studies in this area aim to highlight what implications the varying ideologies and motivation for cooperation in the donor countries have for countries at the receiving end. Competing aid regimes generate soft power through public diplomacy, often in the form of branding (for instance through putting origin “flags” on aid projects or investments). This type of positive association has been shown to generate ‘positive affect’ toward donors (Andrabi and Das, 2010), and to strengthen recipients’ perceptions of the models of governance and development that such donors promote – liberal democracy, for example, or free market capitalism (Blair, Marty and Roessler, 2021).

Emerging Players on the African Stage

An extensive literature has examined the various facets of established power actors’ presence on the continent, spanning foreign aid, diplomatic relations, and military involvement, revealing significant impacts on local economic development through multiple channels. The United States, along with other former colonial powers and major Western donors, plays a particularly prominent role in this context. Against this background, recent research has increasingly focused on the rise of new actors, and in particular China’s expanding role as a donor and investor in Africa (Bluhm, 2018; Brautigam, 2008; Brazys, Elkink and Kelly, 2017; Dreher et al. 2018). While the consensus is still unclear on whether China’s approach to aid attracts support among African citizens (Lekorwe et al. 2016; Blair, Marty, and Roessler, 2021), recent research also shows that Chinese aid exacerbates corruption and undermines collective bargaining in recipient countries (Isaksson and Kotsadam 2018a; 2018b).

As mentioned, there are as yet very few recent articles concerned with the reasons for Russia’s renewed interest in Africa (see Marten, 2019; Akinlolu and Ogunnubi, 2021; Ramani, 2023), and even fewer analyzing the potential impacts from it. One working paper, not citable due to the authors’ wishes, has quantitatively mapped and explicitly analyzed the impact of Russian military presence (in particular, of the Wagner Group) in Africa. The study found that the infamous paramilitary group faces fewer repercussions for human rights violations and commits more lethal actions than the state actors that employ them. In another recent study on the Central African Republic (CAR), Gang et al. (2023) found not only mortality levels in CAR to be four times higher than what estimated by the UN but also that Wagner mercenaries have contributed to “increased difficulties of survival” for the population in affected areas. Pardyak, M. (2022) explores the communication strategies employed by the key actors in the war, specifically focusing on how these strategies are received in African societies. Based on the analysis of over 140 media articles published in several African countries up to 15 October 2022, complemented by street surveys in Cairo, and in-depth interviews with Egyptians and Sudanese migrants, the study concludes that Russia’s multipolar perspective on the international order is more widely supported in Africa than Western strategies.

When viewed in a historical context, however, Russia’s actions reflect a longstanding adherence to a realist approach in its foreign policy endeavors. Throughout its trajectory, Russia has consistently prioritized national security and economic interests, frequently leveraging military and economic means to safeguard these interests (Tsygankov and Tsygankov, 2010). Presently, amid mounting pressures from the Western democratic world following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia finds itself increasingly reliant on a realist approach. While the Chinese engagement in Africa is also characterized by realist principles, it’s important to emphasize that the Russian approach diverges from that of China. China is focused on a long-term presence, infrastructure building and investments. It has no interest in democracy and human rights, is efficient and cheap though not always loved (Isaksson and Kotsadam, 2018b). Russia’s interest is more short term and opportunistic, seeking out countries rich in natural resources with unstable governments and weak institutions, such as Libya, Sudan, Mozambique, the Central African Republic, Mali, Burkina Faso and Madagascar. Russia typically targets undemocratic elites or military juntas, offering political support, military equipment sales, and security cooperation (in particular through the Wagner Group) in exchange for access to natural resources, concession rights and influence. State of the art research on a previous period (Berman et al., 2017, spanning 1997 to 2010), although not exclusively focused on Russia, finds that rents from mineral contracts, captured by swings in global mineral prices for a causal interpretation, lead to a higher likelihood of local conflicts, and furthermore that the control of mining areas by rebel groups can escalate violence beyond the local level.

Russia is pursuing a range of strategic goals that include diplomatic legitimization, media influence, military presence, elite influence, arms export, and shaping voting patterns in international organizations (Lindén, 2023). Like China, Russia is uninterested in democracy or human rights. Moreover, what Russia stands for is in stark contrast to the Western model. Russia embodies autocracy and backward revisionist values (for instance in areas such as attitudes to gender equality and the sustainability agenda) while the West generally promotes democracy and progressive inclusive solutions (Lindén, 2023). What also especially characterizes Russia is the particular attraction towards the presence of anti-West sentiment, which it fuels through populistic anti-colonial disinformation and propaganda. This approach has been criticized for potentially weakening democratic norms and sidelining African agency (Akinlolu and Ogunnubi, 2021). Additionally, Russia’s disregard for the socio-political realities in Africa, typically associated with a self-interested realist approach, can lead to ineffective engagement and unintended negative consequences, undermining the long-term sustainability of both social and economic developments in the region.

Conclusion

Many African countries find themselves in a delicate balancing act, as they cannot afford to push away Russia nor displease their historical Western partners. This attempt to balance between actors poses several risks and potentially detrimental consequences, including reduced development cooperation, slower democratization, limited progress on human rights, and increased conflicts. Additionally, Russia’s growing presence in Africa can have implications for the interests and policies of the European Union (EU) and its member states as well as global actors, including impacts on migration, terrorism, the energy sector as well as on trade and aid flows.

In light of the diverse strategies foreign powers use in their relations with African countries and the significant impact these strategies have, it is crucial to deepen our understanding of foreign engagements in Africa. By examining Russia’s distinct approach alongside those of other global actors, we can gain valuable insights into the complex dynamics shaping the continent’s political, economic, and social landscape, both now and in the future. Expanding research in this area is not only desirable but essential for informing policy and development strategies.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Russia’s Shadow Fleet: Sanctions Needed on Core Tankers, KSE Institute Urges

Posted on August 13, 2024 | News

Rusty oil tanker fleet drifting in foggy ocean at dusk, illustrating the shadow fleet of Russia evading sanctions.

A new analysis by the KSE Institute reveals details about Russia’s shadow fleet and urges immediate action. The report, titled “The Core of Russia’s Shadow Fleet: Identifying Targets for Future Tanker Designations,” uncovers 86 tankers evading sanctions. These tankers allow Russia to continue oil exports despite the G7 price cap.

Key Insights into Russia’s Core Shadow Fleet

From January 2023 to June 2024, 307 shadow tankers in the Russia shadow fleet carried Russian crude oil. During the same period, 432 tankers from the fleet transported Russian oil products across various regions. Of these, 45 crude oil tankers and 41 oil product tankers are core parts of the fleet. However, only eight core vessels from the Russia shadow fleet have been sanctioned by the US, EU, or UK. As a result, many critical Russian tankers still operate undetected, evading current sanctions. Although 64 shadow fleet vessels were sanctioned since the fall of 2023, much of the fleet remains active.

UAE and Turkey Fuel Shadow Fleet Growth

The report highlights how UAE and Turkish companies are central to Russia’s shadow fleet operations. UAE-based Stream Ship Management Fzco manages 28 of the 45 core crude oil tankers. Turkish firms oversee a large share of the core oil product fleet. Frequent changes in vessel management after sanctions make enforcement more difficult, allowing operations to continue under new entities.

Strengthening Sanctions on Core Vessels

The KSE Institute urges governments to apply more pressure by targeting additional shadow fleet vessels. Sanctioning the remaining 45 crude oil and 41 oil product tankers from the core fleet would severely impact Russia’s ability to export oil. This would force reliance on mainstream tankers that are subject to the price cap, tightening existing sanctions.

Conclusion: Immediate Action Needed

Russia’s shadow fleet continues to grow, supported by entities in the UAE and Turkey. Current sanctions are weakening, and the KSE Institute calls for the urgent designation of the core vessels identified in its report. This would strengthen sanctions and reduce Russia’s capacity to fund its war in Ukraine.

Additional Resources

We invite you to view the full KSE Institute report, now available on the KSE Institute website. Additionally, if you wish to explore more policy briefs published by the KSE Institute, you can do so by visiting the Institute’s page on the FREE Network’s website.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in policy briefs, news posts, and other publications are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Navigating Market Exits: Companies’ Responses to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Posted on May 20, 2024 | Policy Brief

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Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 led to widespread international condemnation. As governments imposed sanctions on Russian businesses and individuals tied to the war, international companies doing business in Russia came under increasing pressure to withdraw from Russia voluntarily. In the first part of this policy brief, we show what kind of companies decided to leave the Russian market using data collected by the LeaveRussia project. In the second part, we focus on prominent Swedish businesses which announced a withdrawal from Russia, but whose products were later found available in the country by investigative journalists from Dagens Nyheter (DN). We collect the stock prices for these companies when available and show how investors respond to these news.

Business Withdrawal from Russia

The global economy is highly interconnected, and Russia forms an important part. Prior to the invasion, Russia ranked 13th in the world in terms of global goods exports value and 22nd in terms of imports (Schwarzenberg, 2023). In the months following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s imports dropped sharply (about 50 percent according to Sonnenfeld et al., 2022). Before February 24th, Russia’s main trading partners were China, the European Union (in particular, Germany and the Netherlands) and Belarus (as illustrated in Figure 1). While there is some evidence of Russia shifting away from Western countries and towards China following the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the resulting sanctions, Western democracies still made up about 60 percent of Russia’s trade  in 2020 (Schwarzenberg, 2023). In the same year, Sweden’s exports to Russia accounted for 1.4 percent of Sweden’s total goods exports, of which 59 percent were in the machinery, transportation and telecommunications sectors. 1.3 percent of Swedish imports were from Russia (Stockholms Handelskammare, 2022).

Figure 1. Changes in trade with Russia, 2013-2020.

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, data until 2020. From Lehne (2022).

In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2024, Western governments imposed strict trade and financial sanctions on Russian businesses and individuals involved in the war (see S&P Global, 2024). These sanctions are designed to hamper Russia’s war effort by reducing its ability to fight and finance the war. The sanctions make it illegal for, e.g., European companies to sell certain products to Russia as well as to import select Russian goods (Council of the European Union, 2024). Even though sanctions do not cover all trade with Russia, many foreign businesses have been pressured to pull out of Russia in an act of solidarity. The decision by these businesses to leave is voluntary and could reflect their concerns over possible consumer backlash. It is not uncommon for consumers to put pressure on businesses in times of geopolitical conflict. For instance, Pandya and Venkatesan (2016) find that U.S. consumers were less likely to buy French-sounding products when the relationship between both countries deteriorated.

The LeaveRussia Project

The LeaveRussia project, from the Kyiv School of Economics Institute (KSE Institute), systematically tracks foreign companies’ responses to the Russian invasion. The database covers a selection of companies that have either made statements regarding their operations in Russia, and/or are a large global player (“major companies and world-famous brands”), and/or have been mentioned in relation to leaving/waiting/withdrawing from Russia in major media outlets such as Reuters, Bloomberg, Financial times etc. (LeaveRussia, 2024). As of April 5th, 2024, the list contains 3342 firms, the companies’ decision to leave, exit or remain in the Russian market, the date of their announced action, and company details such as revenue, industry etc. The following chart uses publicly available data from the LeaveRussia project to illustrate patterns in business withdrawals from Russia following the invasion of Ukraine.

Figure 2a shows the number of foreign companies in Russia in the LeaveRussia dataset by their country of headquarters. Figure 2b shows the share of these companies that have announced a withdrawal from Russia by April 2024, by their country of headquarters.

Figure 2a. Total number of companies by country.

Figure 2b. Share of withdrawals, by country.

Source: Authors’ compilation based on data from the LeaveRussia project and global administrative zone boundaries from Runfola et al. (2020).

Some countries (e.g. Canada, the US and the UK) that had a large presence in Russia prior to the war have also seen a large number of withdrawals following the invasion. Other European countries, however, have seen only a modest share of withdrawals (for instance, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands and Slovakia). Companies headquartered in countries that have not imposed any sanctions on Russia following the invasion, such as Belarus, China, India, Iran etc., show no signs of withdrawing from the Russian market. In fact, the share of companies considered by the KSE to be “digging in” (i.e., companies that either declared they’d remain in Russia or who did not announce a withdrawal or downscaling as of 31st of March 2024) is 75 percent for more than 25 countries, including not only the aforementioned, but also countries such as Argentina, Moldova, Serbia and Turkey.

Withdrawal Determinants

The decision for companies to exit the market may range from consumer pressure to act in solidarity with Ukraine, to companies’ perceived risk from operating on the Russian market (Kiesel and Kolaric, 2023). Out of the 3342 companies in the LeaveRussia project’s database, about 42 percent have, as of April 5th, 2024, exited or stated an intention to exit the Russian market. This number increases only slightly to 49 percent when considering only companies headquartered in democratic (an Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index score of 7 or higher) countries within the EU. Figure 3 shows the number of companies that announced their exit from the Russian market, by month. A clear majority of companies announce their withdrawal in the first 6 months following the invasion.

Figure 3. Number of foreign companies announcing an exit from the Russian market, 2022-2024.

Source: Authors’ compilation based on data from the LeaveRussia project.

Similarly to the location of companies’ headquarters, the decision to exit the Russian market varies by industry. Figure 4 a depicts the top 15 industries with the highest share of announced withdrawals from the Russian market among industries with at least 10 companies. Most companies with high levels of withdrawals are found in consumer-sensitive industries such as the entertainment sector, tourism and hospitality, advertising etc.

Figure 4a. Top 15 industries in terms of withdrawal shares.

Figure 4b. Bottom 15 industries in terms of withdrawal shares.

Source: Authors’ compilation based on data from the LeaveRussia project.

In contrast, Figure 4b details the industries with the lowest share of companies opting to withdraw from the Russian market. Only around 10 percent of firms in the “Defense” and “Marine Transportation” industries chose to withdraw. Two-thirds of firms within the “Energy, oil and gas” and “Metals and Mining” sectors have chosen to remain in business in Russia following the war in Ukraine.

Several sectors have been identified as crucial in supplying the Russian military with necessary components to sustain their military aggression against Ukraine, mainly electronics, communications, automotives and related categories. We find that many of these sectors are among those with the lowest share of companies withdrawing from Russia. Companies for which Russia constitute a large market share have more to lose from exiting than others. Another reason for not exiting the market relates to the current legal hurdles of corporate withdrawal from Russia (Doherty, 2023). Others may simply not have made public announcements or operate within an industry dominated by smaller companies that are not on the radar of the LeaveRussia project. Nonetheless, Bilousova et al. (2024) detail that products from companies within the sanction’s coalition continue to be found in Russian military equipment destroyed in Ukraine. This is due to insufficient due diligence by companies as well as loopholes in the sanctions regime such as re-exporting via neighboring countries, tampering with declaration forms or challenges in jurisdictional enforcement due to lengthy supply chains, among others. (Olofsgård and Smitt Meyer, 2023).

And Those Who Didn’t Leave After All

The data from the LeaveRussia project details if and when foreign businesses announce that they will leave Russia. However, products from companies that have announced a departure from the Russian market continue to be found in the country, including in military components (Bilousova, 2024). In autumn 2023, investigative journalists from the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter exposed 14 Swedish companies whose goods were found entering Russia, in most cases contrary to the companies’ public claims (Dagens Nyheter, 2023; Tidningen Näringslivet, 2023). For this series of articles, the journalists used data from Russian customs and verified it with information from numerous Swedish companies, covering the time period up until December 2022. This entailed reviewing thousands of export records from Swedish companies either directly to Russia or via neighboring countries such as Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. All transactions mentioned in the article series have been confirmed with the respective companies, who were also contacted by DN prior to publication (Dagens Nyheter, 2023b). DNs journalists also acted as businessmen, interacting with intermediaries in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, exposing re-routing of Swedish goods from a company stated to have cut all exports to Russia in the wake of the invasion (Dagens Nyheter, 2023d).

For Sweden headquartered companies exposed in DN and that are traded on the Swedish Stock Exchange, we collect their stock prices and trading volume. Our data includes information on each stock’s average price, turnover, number of trades by date from around the date of the DN publications as well as the date of each company’s prior public announcement of exiting Russia. Table 1 details the companies who were exposed of doing direct or indirect business with Russia by DN and who had announced an exit from the Russian market previously. In their article series, DN also shows that goods from the following companies entered Russia; AriVislanda, Assa Abloy, Atlas Copco, Getinge, Scania, Securitas Tetra Pak, and Väderstad. Most of the companies exposed by DN operate within industries displaying low withdrawal shares.

Table 1. Select Swedish companies’, time of exit announcement and exposure in Dagens Nyheter and stock names.


Source: The LeaveRussia project, 2023; Dagens Nyheter, 2023b, 2023c, 2023d. Note: The exit statements have been verified through companies’ press statements and/or reports when available. For Epiroc, the claim has been verified via a previous Dagens Nyheter article (Dagens Nyheter, 2023a).

In Figure 5, we show the average stock price and trades-weighted average stock price of the Swedish companies in Table 1 around the time when the companies announced that they are leaving Russia.

Figure 5. Average stock price of companies in Table 1 around Russian exit announcements.

Source: Author’s compilation based on data from Nasdaq Nordic.

There appears to be an immediate increase in stock prices after firms announced their exit from the Russian market. Stock prices, however, reverse their gains over the next couple of days. In general, stock prices are volatile, and we also see similar-sized movements immediately before the announcement. Due to this volatility and the fact that we cannot rule out other shocks impacting these stock prices at the same time, it is difficult to attribute any movements in the stock prices to the firms’ decisions to leave Russia.

The academic evidence on investors’ reactions to firms divesting from Russia is mixed. Using a sample of less than 300 high-profile firms with operations in Russia compiled by researchers at the Yale Chief Executive Leadership Institute, Glambosky and Peterburgsky (2022) find that firms that divest within 10 days after the invasion experience negative returns, but then recover within a two-week period. Companies announcing divesting at a later stage do not experience initial stock price declines. In contrast, Kiesel and Kolaric (2023) use data from the LeaveRussia project to find positive stock price returns to firms’ announcements of leaving Russia, while there appears to be no significant investor reaction to firms’ decisions to stay in Russia.

When considering the effect from DN’s publications, the picture is almost mirrored, with the simple and trades-weighted average stock prices dipping in the days following the negative media exposure before not only recovering, but actually increasing. Similar caveats apply to the interpretation of this chart. In addition, the DN publication occurred shortly after the Hamas attacks on Israel on October 7 and Israel’s subsequent war on Gaza. While conflict and uncertainty typically dampen the stock market, the events in the Middle East initially caused little reaction on the stock market (Sharma, 2023).

Figure 6. Average stock price for companies listed in Table 1 around the time of DN exposure.

Source: Author’s compilation based on data from Nasdaq Nordic.

Discussion

As discussed in Becker et al. (2024), creating incentives and ensuring companies follow suit with the current sanctions’ regime should be a priority if we want to end Russia’s war on Ukraine and undermine its wider geopolitical ambitions. Nevertheless, Bilousova et al. (2024), and Olofsgård and Smitt Meyer (2023), highlight that there is ample evidence of sanctions evasions, including for products that are directly contributing to Russia’s military capacity. Even in countries that have a strong political commitment to the sanctions’ regime, enforcement is weak. For instance, in Sweden, it is not illegal to try and evade sanctions according to the Swedish Chamber of Commerce (2024). There is little coordination between the numerous law enforcement agencies that are responsible for sanction enforcement and there have been very few investigations into sanctions violations.

Absent effective sanctions enforcement and for the many industries not covered by sanctions, can we rely on businesses to put profits second and voluntarily withdraw from Russia? Immediately after the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as news stories about the brutality of the war proliferated, many international companies did announce that they will be leaving Russia. However, a more systematic look at data collected by the LeaveRussia project and KSE Institute reveals that more than two years into the war, less than half of companies based in Western democracies intend to distance themselves from the Russian market. A closer look at companies who are continuing operations in Russia reveals that they tend to be in sectors that are crucial for the Russian economy and war effort, such as energy, mining, electronics and industrial equipment. Many of these companies are probably seeing the war as a business opportunity and are reluctant to put human lives before their bottom line (Sonnenfeld and Tian, 2022).

Whether companies who announce that they are leaving Russia actually do leave is difficult to independently verify. A series of articles published in a prominent Swedish newspaper (Dagens Nyheter) last autumn revealed that goods from 14 major Swedish firms continue to be available in Russia, despite most of these firms publicly announcing their withdrawal from the country. The companies’ reactions to the exposé were mixed. A few companies, such as Scania and SSAB, have decided to cut all exports to the intermediaries exposed by the undercover journalists (for instance, in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan). Other companies stated that they are currently investigating DN’s claims or that the exports exposed in the DN articles were final or delayed orders that were accepted before the company decided to withdraw from Russia. Another company, Trelleborg – a leading company within polymer solutions for a variety of industry purposes – reacted to the DN exposure by backtracking from its earlier commitment to exit the Russian market (Dagens Nyheter 2023b, 2023d). Wider reaction to these revelations was muted. Looking at changes in stock prices for the exposed companies, we find little evidence that investors are punishing companies for not honoring their public commitment to withdraw from Russia.

In an environment, where businesses themselves withdraw at low rates and investors do not shy away from companies contradicting their own claims, the need for stronger enforcement of sanctions seems more pressing than ever.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Using the Financial System to Enforce Export Controls

Posted on May 7, 2024 | News

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A new Bruegel working paper shows how Russia’s export controls could work better if banks and firms play a larger role. Despite sweeping sanctions, Russia’s imports of “battlefield goods” bounced back close to pre-invasion levels in 2023. To close loopholes, the authors suggest bank-style due diligence for lenders and manufacturers. This approach could choke off illicit tech flows more effectively.

Why Export Controls Matter Now

Russia still gets critical microelectronics and navigation gear through complex routes. In 2023, it imported $12.5 billion of high-priority items, just 2% below pre-war levels. Import patterns shifted. Mainland China accounted for 56.3% and Hong Kong for 19.3%. Meanwhile, Turkey rose to 5.7% and the UAE to 4.2%.

In addition, 40% of these goods are produced for companies headquartered in sanctioning countries. Even more striking, 95% of identifiable foreign parts in Russian weapons still come from Western producers. These figures show why tighter export controls remain urgent.

What the Study Set Out to Do

The authors asked why current export controls underperform. As a solution, they outline a practical plan. First, banks should identify and block suspicious trade payments. Second, non-financial firms should adopt “know your customer” checks across their distributor networks. Together, these steps would help reduce illicit flows.

Key Research Findings

  • Russia’s battlefield goods imports rebounded quickly after spring 2022 and are again near pre-invasion levels.
  • Third-country hubs, especially China and Hong Kong, now dominate shipment routes, as shown in the report’s charts.
  • Western technology remains embedded. Forty percent of the import value is tied to coalition producers. Moreover, 95% of foreign parts in Russian weapons are Western.
  • Leveraging banks’ AML/CFT systems and tightening disclosure, such as item descriptions and HS codes, would make export controls stronger.

What This Means

In practice, turning banks into frontline enforcers could flag risky payments before goods move. For example, trade finance documents often reveal items and counterparties. Furthermore, extending similar diligence to manufacturers, backed by penalties for negligence, would close loopholes. As a result, sensitive parts would find it harder to reach Russia. Finally, stronger guidance and wider data sharing are essential to make export controls credible.

Read the Full Report

Learn more about the role of export controls, the challenges of implementation, and the financial system’s contribution in the latest working paper from KSE Institute and Bruegel.

Meet the Researchers

  • Benjamin Hilgenstock: KSE Institute. 
  • Elina Ribakova: Bruegel. 
  • Anna Vlasyuk: KSE Institute. 
  • Guntram Wolff: Bruegel.

Russian Central Bank Assets and EU’s Next Steps

Posted on May 3, 2024 |

The image shows a close-up of several Russian 5000-ruble banknotes encased in ice representing Russian Central Bank assets.

On May 8th, the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) and the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS) will co-host a roundtable discussion on “Russian Central Bank Assets and the EU’s Next Steps.” The event will feature invited guest speaker Nigel Gould-Davis from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

Discussion Theme

During the Swedish EU Presidency, seizing Russian assets held in Europe was a priority. This work has yielded some results, but the issue is moving forward internationally, with US, Canada and the UK taking a forward-leaning approach. In view of the upcoming G7 meeting in June, it is imperative for the EU to unite in thinking creatively about the 300 billion currently held in the EU. To support Ukraine, what are the next steps for the EU in making use of Russian Central Bank assets?

Speaker

Nigel Gould-Davis is a Senior Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and forefront figure in the field of EU managing frozen Russian assets.

The roundtable will be moderated by Torbjörn Becker, Director of SITE.

Registration by Invitation

Admission to the round table discussion at the Stockholm School of Economics (SSE) is by invitation only. Please contact site@hhs.se if you have any questions regarding the event.

This event is organized by the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) and the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS).

KSE Institute: Further Weakening of Russian Macroeconomic Stability Will Require Additional Measures

Posted on March 21, 2024 | News

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The KSE Institute has recently released its March Russia Chartbook titled “Further Weakening of Russian Macroeconomic Stability Will Require Additional Measures.” The chartbook examines Russia’s current economic landscape, highlighting key trends and challenges. Notably, Russia’s foreign trade has stabilized at a new post-sanctions baseline, characterized by reduced exports and a notable recovery in imports. Meanwhile, on the fiscal front, escalating expenditures are contributing to an uptick in the budget deficit.

Why the Russian Economy Matters Now

Since 2022, Russia’s trade has settled into a smaller “new normal.” Exports hover near $100 billion per quarter while imports sit around $75 billion. As a result, the current account surplus in 2023 tumbled to $50 billion, down 79% from 2022. This weaker external backdrop keeps pressure on the ruble and forces tighter policy.

What the Study Set Out to Explain

The chartbook tracks how sanctions, oil-market enforcement, and wartime budgets are reshaping the Russian economy. It asks whether today’s growth is durable and what steps could further limit Russia’s ability to finance the war.

Key Research Findings

  • The current account surplus shrank to $50 billion in 2023, from a record $238 billion in 2022.
  • Oil sanctions bite unevenly: discounts widened again, and OFAC tanker designations sidelined much of the shadow fleet.
  • The federal deficit reached 1.5 trillion rubles in January–February 2024, already 92% of the full-year plan; tax hikes worth ~4 trillion rubles are on the table.
  • Half of the National Welfare Fund’s liquid assets are gone; hard-currency NWF assets have been depleted, leaving mainly yuan and gold.

Read the Full Report

To read the whole of KSE Institute’s latest Russia Chartbook, visit the presentation by Benjamin Hilgenstock, Senior Economist, Yuliia Pavytska, Manager of the Sanctions Programme, and Vira Ivanchuk, Research Analyst.

Meet the Researchers

How Has the War in Ukraine Affected Sentiments in Russia?

Posted on March 21, 2024 |

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On the 26th of March, Professor Olle Hammar from Linnaeus University will deliver a presentation on his working paper titled “How Has the War in Ukraine Affected Sentiments in Russia?” at SSE, with the option to attend online via Zoom.

Working Paper: How Has the War in Ukraine Affected Sentiments in Russia?

The researchers investigate how the war in Ukraine has impacted opinions and sentiments in Russia. Utilizing survey data from Gallup World Poll and the Levada Center, they scrutinize the effects on political support for Putin, attitudes towards the West, subjective well-being, optimism about the future, and migration aspirations. Their primary focus lies on assessing the repercussions of the full-scale invasion in February 2022 and the military mobilization of young men in September 2022. Additionally, they incorporate data on Russian casualties to explore potential regional heterogeneity within Russia.

About the Speaker

Olle Hammar is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Economics and Statistics at Linnaeus University and a Researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm. He is also affiliated with IZA, IFN, UCFS, UCLS, and UIL. Previously, he worked as a postdoctoral researcher at IFN and as a visiting scholar at UC Berkeley and Columbia University. He holds a Ph.D. in economics from Uppsala University.

Join the Seminar

If you wish to participate in the SITE Seminar at SSE or join online via Zoom, access to the seminar will be granted exclusively through invitation. To express your interest in attending, kindly reach out to site@hhs.se. Please adhere to the following instructions:

  1. In the subject line, type “SITE Seminar: [INSERT SEMINAR TITLE]”
  2. Specify your affiliation and field of interest.
  3. Additionally, indicate your preference for attending either in person or online.

For confirmed participants, a Zoom link will be shared via email prior to the event, along with comprehensive instructions.

Social Mobility in Times of Revolutions and Regime Changes

Posted on March 15, 2024 |

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On the 22nd of March, Professor Andrei Markevich from the University of Helsinki will deliver a presentation on his working paper titled “Social Mobility in Times of Revolutions and Regime Changes: Persistence of Elites in 20th Century Russia” at SSE.

Working Paper: Social Mobility in Times of Revolutions and Regime Changes: Persistence of Elites in 20th-Century Russia

How much do radical changes of social order affect the persistence of elites? To address this question, we analyze the impact of the 1917 Russian Revolution, measuring the spread of Tsarist elite surnames among Soviet and modern Russian elites. We document a quicker decline of elite representation at the start of the Soviet era, but mostly for political and military outcomes during Stalin’s reign. Over the longer haul (1914-2022) we find that, despite a series of post-revolutionary shocks during the 20th century, elite persistence was substantial and very similar for elites from different backgrounds. However, the persistence rate of 0.5 is smaller than the multi-generational estimates Gregory Clark finds for other countries (0.7-0.8). We provide suggestive evidence that family traits and within-elite social capital generated persistence. We also document a substantial contribution of Soviet anti-elite repressive policies to the loss of social status before WWII.

About the Speaker

Andrei Markevich is a university lecturer at the University of Helsinki (Finland) and a professor (on leave) at the New Economic School (Moscow, Russia). He studies the economic history of Russia, Eastern Europe, and North Eurasia. The development of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union in the 18th–20th centuries is at the center of his research. He focuses on the interconnections between institutions and economic growth, the political economy of state socialism, and the long-run consequences of history.

He has published in international refereed journals, including the American Economic Review, Review of Economics and Statistics, European Economic Review, Journal of Economic Literature, Journal of Economic History, Journal of Development Economics, and Journal of Public Economics. The paper on Russian national income in 1913-1928 was awarded the Russian National Prize in Applied Economics in 2011. He was a Marie Curie Research Fellow at the University of Warwick from 2005 to 2007 and a national research fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford from 2014 to 2015.

Join the Seminar

If you wish to participate in the SITE Seminar at SSE or join online via Zoom, access to the seminar will be granted exclusively through invitation. To express your interest in attending, kindly reach out to site@hhs.se. Please adhere to the following instructions:

  1. In the subject line, type “SITE Seminar: [INSERT SEMINAR TITLE]”
  2. Specify your affiliation and field of interest.
  3. Additionally, indicate your preference for attending either in person or online.

For confirmed participants, a Zoom link will be shared via email prior to the event, along with comprehensive instructions.