Tag: Natural gas

The EU Gas Purchasing Mechanism: A Game-Changer or a Storm in a Teacup?

Posted on November 6, 2023 | Policy Brief

Image of the LNG tanker in the Baltic Sea representing EU gas purchasing mechanism

Marking a milestone in the tumultuous journey towards a unified energy policy, the European Union (EU) member states have initiated joint procurement of a portion of their gas consumption. This coordinated effort has been facilitated through a gas purchasing mechanism, the AggregateEU, as of May 2023. In this policy brief we discuss the challenges this mechanism faces, given its design characteristics and the altered dynamics of the gas market following the energy crisis.

The necessity for a coordinated approach to energy security within the EU has been recognized at least since 2009, when its legal base was explicitly introduced in Article 194 of the Treaty of Lisbon. However, the de facto implementation of the solidarity principle has been lagging for many years. In response to the 2022 surge in gas prices, the EU has at last taken the solidarity approach to common energy security seriously. One of the most prominent steps is the creation of the AggregateEU mechanism, launched at the end of 2022. This mechanism aggregates the demand of registered buyers from different member states and matches it with competitive bids from external gas suppliers. It aims at improving and diversifying the EU gas supply, avoiding unnecessary buyer competition within the EU and building up the buyer power of EU member states. Furthermore, the mechanism is meant to reduce uncertainty and mitigate price volatility by providing information about accessible energy supplies. The mechanism covers both pipeline natural gas and Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) and organizes tenders every two months. While  EU member states are required to submit demand bids for 15 percent of their 90 percent storage targets for the upcoming 2023-24 season through the mechanism, there is no obligation to sign any contracts based on the resulting match (more details can be found here and here).

The first three rounds of tendering via the mechanism, which took place May-October 2023, matched approximately 34 billion cubic meters of natural gas, exceeding the anticipated initial volumes. This outcome is currently perceived as a great achievement, enabling more vulnerable countries to benefit from coordinated purchases and resulting in increased bargaining power. Driven by this success, the European Commission (EC) has considered making demand aggregation via the mechanism a permanent feature of the EU’s gas market – and even extending it to hydrogen. However, while these agreed trades are a positive development, they may not reflect the mechanism’s overall success. Demand submission obligations may increase the number of demand calls which could project into more matches, but as they are not binding the subsequent agreements may not necessarily result in finalized contracts or lower prices.

In this brief, we argue that the mechanism’s benefits remain uncertain, primarily due to the current state of the EU’s gas market and the design flaws arising from efforts to address disparities in energy security among member states. These considerations call for a direct impact assessment, which however remains impossible due to the EC’s inability (or even reluctancy?) to collect and disclose the contracted outcomes resulting from the mechanism matches. This is especially problematic in light of the EC’s intentions to extend the mechanism’s coverage.

Limited Mechanism Benefits Under New Market Trends

Over the past two years, the EU has undertaken drastic efforts to address the energy security concerns within its gas market caused by the radical reduction in Russia’s natural gas exports to Europe. The EU has managed to sizably improve the diversification of its gas imports (see Figure 1), fill its storage facilities, and lower its gas demand (see McWilliams, Sgaravatti, and Zachmann (2021) and McWilliams and Zachmann (2023)).

Figure 1. Composition of EU natural gas imports.

Source: Authors’ calculations based on McWilliams, Sgaravatti and Zachmann (2021).

As a result, a certain balance of supply and demand has been achieved, and the gas prices in the EU market have fallen to pre-war price levels (though they are still somewhat higher than their earlier long-term trend), as depicted in Figure 2. The ease of market tensions in 2023 has led many to argue that market forces are sufficient to resolve potential problems in the EU gas market and that mechanism costs would not be justified (see, e.g., Eurogas or International Association of Oil and Gas Producers opinions).

However, in the coming years the EU gas market is expected to be relatively tight due to capacity constraints both in the LNG market and for pipeline gas producers (as noted by, e.g., Bloomberg and IEA). This tightness makes the market highly sensitive to shocks, and a twofold increase in exposure to LNG – with its global liquidity – only adds to the problem. A good illustration of this concern is the recent market reaction to the Israel-Palestine war:  the fear of supply disruptions lead to a whopping 55 percent increase in the European gas tariff TTF in the second week of October and to an EC initiative to prolong the emergency gas price cap, initially introduced in February 2023. This despite the EU’s gas storage nearing 98 percent of capacity and relatively low current prices.

Such a “seller market” situation implies that buyers’ ability to exercise buyer power and negotiate down prices may be highly limited when needed the most. Specifically, buyer power would be most effective when buyers have a credible outside option, e.g., the ability to claim that their gas demand needs can be facilitated elsewhere. The tighter the market, the more difficult it would be to find such volumes elsewhere, further limiting buyers’ ability to negotiate down prices. To put it differently: current market conditions may undermine the original purpose of the mechanism.

The current “shock-sensitivity” of the gas market may also give rise to additional concerns regarding the mechanism’s mere purpose – demand aggregation for vulnerable buyers. One of the by-products of demand aggregation is that (pooled) buyers are more likely to face correlated risks, e.g., by purchasing gas from the same producer. If markets are highly shock-sensitive – as they currently seem to be – such aggregation may further increase market volatility, implying that vulnerable buyers would be affected the most.

Figure 2. Natural gas prices in the EU, January 2021-October 2023 (prices in EUR).

Source: https://tradingeconomics.com/commodity/eu-natural-gas

Mechanism Design: Constraints vs. Efficiency

Some design elements of the purchasing mechanism may also challenge the mechanism’s ability to deliver an efficient outcome. First, quantity and price under the matching process are not binding, and buyers and sellers are expected to continue negotiations individually after the matching. This feature was introduced due to the concern that it would be challenging to offer a “one size fits all” binding contract to incorporate all participants of the pooled demand. This, as argued by Le Coq and Paltseva (2012; 2022), was one of the reasons for the previous failure to implement a mutual insurance and solidarity mechanism across the EU. However, the non-binding matching outcome will likely give rise to re-negotiations, price increases, and failure to exercise consolidated “buyer power”.

Moreover, a company can act on behalf of small or financially constrained buyers, purchase gas for them, and become an “Agent-on-behalf” and “Central Buyer”. In the process, companies will inevitably exchange sensitive information. This may limit competition and increase the market power of the “Central Buyer” company. In addition, firms may choose not to participate in the mechanism for at least two reasons. First, they may fear the threat of revealing valuable private information. Second, demand aggregation may discourage market participants with stronger buyer positions from participating, as being pooled with weaker participants would undermine their bargaining power. Both these cases would create a so-called adverse selection effect, where the more performant market participants would choose to avoid the joint purchasing mechanism. As a result, the joint buyer power may be strongly undermined, and the price-suppressing effect seems uncertain. This may explain why some firms, like several large German firms, have opted to sign long-term contracts with gas suppliers directly rather than via the mechanism

Several of these concerns arise not from the mechanism design per se but rather in combination with the inherent asymmetries between EU buyers, including variations in gas demand, risk exposure, etc. To put it differently: it is well justified that a “one size fits all” approach would fail in ensuring broad (and voluntary) mechanism participation; however, the choice of a more flexible solution, as implemented by the AggregateEU mechanism, creates commitment issues and adverse selection, and may undermine an effective use of buyer power.

Impact Assessment: Necessary but Currently Impossible

The new EU gas purchasing system is a significant step towards creating a unified energy policy. However, the design of such a procurement auction raises concerns about its contribution, especially under the new gas market dynamics. The current low gas prices make the immediate cost-benefit tradeoff of the mechanism nonobvious. More importantly, the tightness of the EU gas market in the next few years makes the “seller” power unlikely to be counteracted by the EU’s buyer power. Further, the absence of legal commitment between matched participants, and increased market volatility can lead to repeated ex-post renegotiations. These elements undermine the mechanism’s role and raise doubts about its benefits. Some of the mechanism’s inherent features, such as incentives for abuse of market power, also contribute to potential efficiency loss.

Hence, while the motivation behind this tool is clear, the implementation and potential design flaws may undermine the gains. It is therefore particularly important to understand whether the mechanism is effectively meeting its objectives, especially given the recent initiative to make it a permanent feature of the EU gas market and a key solution for the European Hydrogen Bank in the future. These considerations make a strong call for an impact assessment. An unbiased measure of AggregateEU’s impact would be necessary to assess the benefits of the mechanism (and to weigh them against the bureaucratic implementation costs). Currently, however, the EC has chosen not to collect, let alone disclose, the contractual outcomes resulting from matches. In a recent interview, Matthew Baldwin, deputy director-general at the EC’s energy directorate, said, “The reality is we’ve had relatively little feedback so far because companies are not required to give that to us in terms of the deals”. One may argue that many of the potential deficiencies of the mechanism design – e.g., non-binding matching and adverse selection – are justified by asymmetries across participants and other inherent market features. However, the absence of (appropriately desensitized) data about actual outcomes resulting from mechanism matches is more difficult to justify. The lack of data prevents us from evaluating the AggregateEU’s performance and raises additional concerns about its efficiency. Thus, gathering relevant information and conducting a comprehensive impact assessment based on sensible criteria are essential prerequisites for the future use, and expansion of the AggregateEU mechanism.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes. 

The EU Import Bill and Russian Energy Sanctions

Posted on April 28, 2022 | Policy Brief

20220428 Image of Gazprom office in Russia representing Russian Energy Sanctions

Since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war, the West has been contemplating sanctions on Russian oil and gas imports. For the EU, this plan poses a significant challenge due to the long-existing sizable dependency on Russian energy. In this brief, we outline the possible effects of banning Russian oil and gas on the energy import bill across the EU. While the effects of such a ban will go beyond a direct increase in the import costs of oil and gas, our estimates provide a useful reference point in discussing the impact of such sanctions on the EU. Our estimates suggest that the relative increase in the import costs in the case of an oil embargo would be more evenly spread across the Member States, than in the case of a natural gas ban. This parity makes an EU-wide Russian oil embargo a more straightforward sanction policy. In turn, a full replacement of Russian gas imports across the EU – due to either a gas embargo or retaliation from Russia in response to an oil ban – is likely to require some kind of solidarity mechanism.

Introduction

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the West has been discussing the idea of sanctioning the aggressor by banning Russian energy imports. The motivation is quite straightforward. In 2021, Russian oil and gas exports constituted 49% of Russian goods exports or 14 % of Russian GDP, and the Western world (in particular, the European Union) is the main recipient of these exports. Banning Russian oil and gas export would, thus, lead to heavy pressure on the Russian economy.

The discussion has been quite heated. The US actually implemented a ban on Russian oil and gas in early March 2022, but this gesture has been largely seen as relatively symbolic, as the US dependency on Russian energy imports is quite limited. EU politicians have voiced different opinions about the feasibility of Russian energy sanctions. While some advocate an immediate ban, others argue for a more gradual decrease in imports or even for continuing imports effectively in a business-as-usual fashion. While the EC has announced plans to cut down the consumption of Russian gas by two-thirds in 2022 and mentioned the implementation of “some form of oil embargo” as part of their 6th sanction package, there is still no consensus across the EU. Sanctions on Russian oil and gas imports have not been implemented in the EU by the time of writing this brief.

The main reason for this hesitation is the extent to which Russia remains the main energy supplier. In 2020, 39% of gas and 36% of oil and oil products in the EU were imported from Russia, and the feasibility and consequences of replacing these with alternative supplies are debatable. Since the beginning of the war academics, international organizations and consultancies have offered a variety of analytical materials on the feasibility and implications of such energy sanctions (see e.g., Bachmann et al. 2022. Chepeliev et al, 2022, Fulwood et al., 2022, Guriev and Itskhoki, 2022, Hilgenstock and Ribakova, 2022, IEA, 2022, RYSTAD 2002a,b, Stehn, 2022 to name just a few).

This brief contributes to these estimates by discussing how a Russian oil and gas ban could affect the energy import bill across individual EU countries. We start by providing details on the EU’s dependency on Russian oil and gas imports. We then proceed to access the scope of the costs that a ban on Russian energy could imply for the EU energy sector. We conclude with a discussion about the feasibility of political agreement on such sanctions.

Import Dependency and Dependency on Russian Energy Across the EU

The two primary channels through which a Russian energy ban would affect the vulnerability of an EU country are the dependency on Russian oil and gas, and the overall energy import dependency. The former matters since a ban would imply an immediate necessity to replace missing volumes of energy. This would lead to an increase in energy prices widely across markets, thereby signifying the importance of the latter channel, the overall import dependency.

Figures 1 and 2 depict the dependency on Russian oil and gas across the EU member states. In Figure 1, the dependency is measured as a ratio of Russian energy imports to the gross available energy for each energy type separately – crude oil, oil and oil products, and natural gas. However, this measure may not reflect the importance of the respective energy type in a country’s energy portfolio. For example, in Finland, Russian gas imports constitute 67% of gross available natural gas. However, natural gas is less than 7% of the country’s energy mix, thus the overall effect of Russian gas on the Finnish energy sector and economy is rather limited. To account for this, Figure 2 offers an overview of the contribution of Russian energy imports to the cumulative energy portfolio across the EU.

Both figures show that there is a large variation both in terms of the contribution of individual energy types and in terms of overall dependency on Russian fuels. For example, the latter is almost negligible for Cyprus and well over 50% for Lithuania (however, Figure 2 accounts for re-exports and, thus, overestimates the role of Russian energy imports for Lithuanian domestic available energy in 2020.

Figure 1. Share of Russian energy imports in gross available energy, by fuel, 2020.

Note: Gross available energy indicates the overall available energy supply on the territory of the country. It is defined as Gross available energy = Primary production + Recovered and recycled products + Imports – Exports + Change in stock. . In several EU member states natural gas transit may be included in the imports. As a result, the high share of Russian energy may reflect not only imports for consumption but also for transit, as well as fuels for refinement and further export (e.g. oil products in Estonia (cut at Figure 1, 285%), Lithuania (cut at Figure 1, 201%), Slovakia and Finland). Austrian data on natural gas imports from Russia are confidential and not represented in the diagram. Denmark and Croatia did not report Russian gas imports data for 2020 to Eurostat. Source: Eurostat

Figure 2. Share of Russian energy imports in total gross available energy, 2020. Source: Eurostat

Note: See Figure 1. Source: Eurostat

While the above data summarizes the EU dependency on Russian energy imports in volume terms, it is also useful to have a sense of the costs of this dependency. As we are not aware of any source that has accurate data on the value of imports across the EU states, we construct a back-of-the-envelope assessment of the costs of Russian energy imports to the EU in 2021 using the available trade data for 2021 and the allocation of imports across the EU Member States for 2020 (see Appendix 1 for more details). Admittedly, these estimates only account for the differences in prices of energy imports from Russia vs. other suppliers; it does not capture e.g., the difference in prices of Russian gas across the Member States. Still, they offer useful insight into the scope of these expenses, in levels (Figure 3) and the share of GDP (Figure 4).

The results suggest that, while the expenses are quite sizable – e.g., the total value of Russian fossil energy imports to the EU in 2021 exceeds 110 bln EUR, – they correspond to around 0.7% of European GDP. Again, there is variation across the Member States, but in most cases – effectively all cases that do not account for re-export – the share of Russian energy imports is below 2% of GDP.

Figure 3. Value of Russian fossil energy imports, bln EUR, 2021.

Source: Eurostat, GazpromExport, Central Bank of Russia, author’s own calculations, see Appendix 1.

Figure 4. Share of oil, oil products and gas imports in GDP, 2021.

Source: Eurostat, GazpromExport, Central Bank of Russia, author’s own calculations, see Appendix 1.

Figure 4 also touches upon the second source of vulnerability towards a ban on Russian energy, mentioned at the beginning of this section. It depicts not only the value of Russian oil and gas imports as a percent of GDP but the overall dependency on imports of oil and gas as a share of GDP. The larger this dependency is, the bigger is the impact of an increase in energy prices for a country. Figure 4 not only confirms the abovementioned variation across the Member States but also shows that some countries with little-to-moderate direct dependency on Russian oil and gas – e.g., Portugal or Spain, – are still likely to experience a sizable negative shock to their energy expenses due to the market price increase.

Importantly, these figures give only a very rough representation of the potential damage that a ban on Russian energy imports may cause to the EU economies. Two EU Member States with a comparable dependency could react to the shortage of Russian gas in very different ways, depending on a variety of other factors – the extent and scalability of domestic production, diversification of their remaining energy portfolio in terms of energy suppliers and types of oil the economy relies on (e.g., light vs. heavy), energy infrastructure (e.g., LNG regasification facilities or storage), consumption structure, etc. Le Coq and Paltseva (2009, 2012) discuss in detail some of these factors, and the possibilities to account for them. However, for the sake of simplicity, in this brief we focus on the (volume- and value-based) measures of dependency.

Potential Costs of Russian Energy Import Ban

In this section, we discuss the potential implications of banning imports of Russian oil and gas on the costs of fossil energy imports in the EU. We offer a few historical parallels in order to assess the potential scope of the price reaction to such a ban. Furthermore, we proceed to provide estimates of the costs of oil and gas imports across the EU Member States, would such sanctions be implemented.

Oil Imports Ban

We start with a potential ban on Russian oil and oil product imports. To put things in perspective, it might be useful to present some numbers. According to the IEA, Russia recently surpassed Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest oil and oil products exporter. In December 2021, global Russian crude and oil product exports constituted 7.8 million barrels per day (mb/d), with exports of crude oil and condensate at 5 mb/d. Out of the total 7.8 mb/d, exports to OECD countries constituted 5.6 mb/d, with crude oil exports amounting to 3.9 mb/d. Assuming that the size of the global oil market in 2021 returns to its pre-pandemic 2019 level (the actual data for 2021 global oil consumption is not available yet), Russian crude oil exports to the OECD constitute 8.6% of global crude exports. The corresponding figure for oil products is 6.8% (BP, 2021).

So, what would happen if the developed world – which for the purpose of this analysis we proxy by OECD – bans Russian oil exports? In the recent public discussion, many voices have compared this potential development to the 1973 oil crisis. This crisis was initiated by OAPEC’s – the Arab members of OPEC, – oil embargo on the US in response to their support of Israel during the Yom Kippur War. The OAPEC, the biggest group of oil exporters at the time, completely banned oil exports to the US (and a number of other western countries), and also introduced production restraints that affected the global oil market. The (WTI) oil price during this episode went up by a factor of three (see, e.g, Baumeister and Kilian, 2016).

However, a few important features are likely to differ between the oil crisis of 1973 and the potential impact of the Russian imports ban. First, the net loss of oil supplies during the Arab embargo was around 4.4 mb/d, which at that point constituted around 14% of traded oil (Yergin, 1992). Recall that Russian supplies to OECD are around half of this share. Moreover, it is likely that the ban would not lead to a complete withdrawal of these amounts from the market, but rather to a partial rerouting of Russian oil to Asia and, consequently, a readjustment of world oil trade flows. Second, Yergin (1992) points out that, at the time of the 1973 oil crisis, oil consumption was growing at 7.5% per year, which exacerbated the impact of the embargo. In contrast, the current assessments of oil demand growth are at around 2% per year (IEA, 2022). Third, the energy portfolios are much more diversified now than in 1973, with gas and renewables playing a more substantial role. In the case of an isolated oil imports ban (not extending to gas imports), this would argue in favor of a more moderate price impact. Finally, the oil embargo of 1973 was a never-seen-before episode in the history of the oil market. The uncertainty about future developments has likely contributed to the oil price increase. While there is substantial uncertainty associated with the impact of a Russian oil imports ban, it is arguably lower than in 1973. Based on these considerations, a three-fold oil price increase in the case of a Russian oil export ban seems highly unlikely.

As a possible lower bound of the price impact, one can consider a much more recent price shock brought about by drone attacks on the oil processing facilities Abqaiq and Khurais in Saudi Arabia in 2019. In the initial assessment of the damage, Saudi Arabian authorities stated that the attack decreased the national oil production by 5.7 mb/d – which is more than the total of Russian oil exports to OECD. As a reaction, the intraday oil price went up by 20 %, and the daily oil price by 12%. In two weeks, production and export capacity was almost back to normal and the price returned to pre-shock levels.

Notice that the scale of the daily shortage in this episode exceeds the likely shortage under the Russian imports ban. However, a moderate price reaction, in this case, was clearly driven by expectations for the temporary nature of the shortage, as the damage was to be repaired in a matter of a few weeks, if not days. In comparison, the Russian oil ban is likely to last much longer. In this way, a price increase of 12%, or even 20%, would be an underestimation of the effect of a Russian oil imports ban.

While the above discussion suggests some bounds for the possible price effects of a Russian oil ban, the uncertainty around such price developments is very high.  Figure 5 shows the cost estimates of oil and oil products imports to the EU for two potential price levels – $120/b, and $180/b. Each price would roughly correspond to an increase of 33%, and 100%, respectively, relative to the pre-invasion price of $90/b. In the estimation, we simplistically assume that the price of oil products increases by the same amount as the price of crude oil. We also assume that the missing Russian oil can be replaced by alternatives, such that oil consumption does not change compared to the 2021 level for the lower price scenario and that it decreases by 2% for the high-cost scenario due to the demand adjustments.

Figure 5. Estimated effect of Russian oil ban on oil and gas imports in 2022: value of oil and oil products imports, EUR bln (left axis), and oil import expenses relative to 2021 level (right axis).

Source: Eurostat, GazpromExport, Central Bank of Russia, author’s own calculations, see Footnote 1.

The estimates suggest that the total oil and oil products import costs for the EU would be just above EUR 640 bln for the $120/b price level and EUR 940 bln for the $180/b price level. Furthermore, the costs across the EU Member States would vary greatly depending on the size of the economy and its exposure to oil imports.

This shows that – provided that the Russian oil will be fully replaced but at a higher price – the expected cost of this is in the range of 1.7-1.9 times the 2021 expenses at 120$/b, and 2.5-2.8 times that if the price would be 180$/b. While there is some variation across Member States, mostly driven by the removal of the somewhat cheaper Russian oil from the consumption basket, it is rather limited. Figure 5 also demonstrates that the ban on Russian oil imports is going to affect not only countries that directly depend on Russian oil but also countries with large oil and oil products imports due to the market price effects.

Gas Imports Ban

Now we proceed to discuss the costs of banning Russian gas imports into the EU. While LNG has increased the fungibility of the natural gas market, it remains sizably segmented. Therefore, we concentrate on the effect on the European market.

Russian gas constituted around 39% of the EU gas consumption volumes in 2020, and just below 30% in 2021 due to restricted supply during the second half of the year (McWilliams, Sgaravatti and Zachmann, 2021). It is currently a common understanding that fully substituting 155 Bcm of Russian gas imports in 2021 with imports from other pipeline suppliers, LNG, storage, and increasing domestic production is not feasible in 2022. Different sources have given different estimates on the extent of the resulting shortage, see e.g. Table 1.

Table 1. Alternatives to replace EU imports of Russian natural gas

Source: Rystad Energy (2022a, 2022b), Fulwood et.al (2022), IEA (2022).

As shown in Table 1, the net missing gas consumption ranges between 12% and 22% across different scenarios. As there are no historical episodes in the gas market to which such a development can be compared, it is difficult to assess the potential price reaction. One rough comparison can be made based on the oil market situation during the Arab oil embargo of 1973 discussed above. Then, the net loss of oil constituted about 9% of the oil consumption in “the free world” (Yergin, 1982), even lower than the most optimistic prognosis in Table 1. However, 33 Mcb of Russian gas (or 6% of 2021 the EU’s gas consumption) has already been imported to the EU since the beginning of 2022, making the potential gas shortage quite comparable to the oil shortage of 1973. Subject to all differences between the two shocks, one can, perhaps, still argue that the gas price increase following a ban on Russian gas imports should not exceed three-fold from before the invasion.

It is important to stress here that the EU gas market situation in the case of the Russian gas embargo would be principally different from the oil market one. Due to supply shortage not coverable by the alternative gas sources, a gas embargo would lead not only to a stronger price increase than in the case of oil, but also to significant downward demand adjustments, rationing and, perhaps, even price controls. (This, again, parallels the developments during the 1973 oil crisis). The negative effect of such rationing is not accounted for by the import bill. On the contrary, a shortage of supply would imply lower gas import volumes, biasing the impact on the gas import bill downward. In this way, an import bill reaction to sanctions in the case of natural gas may more strongly underestimate the overall impact on the economy than in the case of oil.

While the above argument suggests a higher price increase in the case of a gas embargo in comparison to an oil ban, there is still a lot of uncertainty in forecasting the gas price. Figure 6 depicts the estimates for the natural gas cost across the EU for two potential price levels – EUR 160/Mwh, and EUR 240/Mwh, a two- and three-fold increase relative to the pre-invasion price level of EUR 80/Mwh. Both estimates assume a (moderate) 8% decrease in the demand reflecting the abovementioned supply shortage and demand adjustments. We assume that the shortage is affecting both the importers of Russian gas and those who use other suppliers due to the common gas market in the EU and the use of reverse flow technology – as was the case for Poland which was denied Russian gas on April 27th, 2022 due to not paying for it in Rubles (see Appendix 1 for a discussion of implications of this assumption).

Not surprisingly, the gas import costs increase drastically in comparison to 2021. The total figures for the EU would be just below EUR 680 bln in the two-fold price increase scenario, and exceed 1 trn EUR in the case of a three-fold increase, in contrast to EUR 185 bln in 2021. Again, the largest economies bear the highest costs in absolute value.

When it comes to the relative increase in gas import value, two further observations follow from Figure 6. First, there is a huge variation in the increase in the value of gas imports across the Member States, from no effect in Cyprus which does not import natural gas, to 7.7 times in the case of a price doubling and 11.5 times in the case of a price tripling. Again, this variation originates from the necessity to replace cheaper Russian gas with more expensive gas sources, and the effect is much stronger than for oil. However, just like in the oil case, the states not directly importing Russian gas will still experience a huge negative shock from such a price hike. (Recall also, that the variation of the impact across the Member States is likely underestimated here, as the gas bill does not account for potential rationing which may differentially impact the importers of Russian gas).

Second, the increase in the value of gas imports exceeds the scale of the price increase even for the least affected Member States (excluding Cyprus). This is due to the unprecedented gas price increase during the EU gas crisis that took place between late 2021 and the beginning of 2022. Due to this increase, the pre-invasion gas price in February 2022 was 60% higher than the average gas price in 2021.

Figure 6. Estimated effect of Russian natural gas ban on gas imports in 2022: value of gas imports, EUR bln (left axis), and gas import expenses relative to 2021 level (right axis).

Source: Eurostat, GazpromExport, Central Bank of Russia, author’s own calculations, see Footnote 1.

Conclusions

The above estimates suggest that a ban on Russian oil and gas imports is going to be costly for the EU. While uncertainty is very high concerning the possible energy price increase following such a ban, historical parallels together with the market characteristics suggest that both the price increase and the rise in the value of imports are going to be stronger for natural gas. The resulting increase in the EU-wide import values relative to 2021 ranges from 1.8 to 2.6 times for the considered oil scenarios, and from 3.7 to 5.5 times for the natural gas scenarios.

Unsurprisingly, the most sizable import costs will be faced by the larger EU Member States, as well as those most dependent on oil and gas imports. However, all EU countries are going to be affected due to the market price increase. While the relative rise in the import costs of oil and oil products will be fairly uniformly met across the EU states, the increase in the costs of gas exports will vary greatly, with the largest relative losses faced by the EU states that are currently more exposed to Russian gas imports.

The above figures provide a rough assessment of the potential costs of a Russian fossil fuels ban. The approach does not take into account substitutability between different fuels and resulting cross-effects on prices, which implies that the costs could be both under- and overestimated. It has a very limited and simplistic take on the demand reaction to a price increase, which again may lead to either over- or underestimation of the effect. Neither does it account for the consequences of such price increases on the costs of electricity and implications for the non-energy sector within the economies. The latter may, again, be differentially affected depending on the industrial composition and their relative energy intensity. Another factor to consider is the interconnectivity between the EU economies – for example, an increase in Germany’s energy bill is likely to have a large impact on the entire EU. Moreover, the use of the import bill as a proxy for the overall effect on the economy may have further limitations in the case of supply shortage and rationing. To provide a more precise estimate of the impact of such a ban on the entire economy, for instance on GDP, one would require an extensive and sophisticated model along the lines of the CGE approach, relying on large amounts of data (Bachmann et al. (2022) provide an excellent example of such a study of the effect on Germany). This, however, is beyond the scope of the current assessment.

Still, even this relatively simplistic assessment of import costs of a Russian energy ban offers sufficient food for thought for the discussion of the scale of damage across the EU Member States and the feasibility of oil and gas sanctions. For example, the assessment suggests that an oil ban is likely to yield relative parity across the Member States in terms of the increase in the 2022 oil import bill as compared to the 2021 level. This would imply that, were the EU to decide on a gradual sanctioning of Russian oil and gas, it would be easier to reach an EU-wide agreement on oil sanctions. In turn, moving away from Russian gas – due to either the decision to ban gas imports or retaliation from Russia in response to oil sanctions, -implies very uneven import cost exposure. Thus, to face the challenge of replacing Russian gas imports, the EU would likely need to implement some kind of energy solidarity mechanism.

References

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  • Le Coq, C. & E. Paltseva. (2012). “Assessing Gas Transit Risks: Russia vs. the EU”, Energy Policy, 4: 642-650.
  • McWilliams, B., Sgaravatti G., Tagliapietra S., & Zachmann G. (2022). “Can Europe Survive Painlessly without Russian Gas?”, Bruegel, 27 February.
  • McWilliams, B., Sgaravatti G.,  & Zachmann G. (2021). “European Natural Gas Imports”, Bruegel Datasets
  • Rystad Energy. (2022a). “Energy Impact Report, Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, public version”, March 2
  • Rystad Energy. (2022b). “Energy Impact Report, Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, public version”, March 21
  • Stehn, S. J., Ball, S., Durre, A., Radde, S., Schnittker, C., Taddei, F. & Quadr, I. (2022). “The Impact of Gas Shortages on the European Economy”, Goldman Sachs, March
  • Y. Daniel. (1992). The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

What does the Gas Crisis Reveal About European Energy Security?

Posted on January 24, 2022 | Policy Brief

20220124 Gas Crisis European Energy Image 01

The recent record-high gas prices have triggered legitimate concerns regarding the EU’s energy security, especially with dependence on natural gas from Russia. This brief discusses the historical and current risks associated with Russian gas imports. We argue that decreasing the reliance on Russian gas may not be feasible in the short-to-mid-run, especially with the EU’s goals of green transition and the electrification of the economy. To ensure the security of natural gas supply from Russia, the EU has to adopt the (long-proclaimed) coordinated energy policy strategy.

In the last six months, Europe has been hit by a natural gas crisis with a severe surge in prices. Politicians, industry representatives, and end-energy users voiced their discontent after a more than seven-fold price increase between May and December 2021 (see Figure 1). Even if gas prices somewhat stabilized this month (partly due to unusually warm weather), today, gas is four times as expensive as it was a year ago. This has already translated into an increase in electricity prices, and as a result, is also likely to have dramatic consequences for the cost and price of manufacturing goods.

Figure 1. Evolution of EU gas prices since Oct 2020.

Source:  https://tradingeconomics.com/commodity/eu-natural-gas.

These ever-high gas prices have triggered legitimate concerns regarding the security of gas supply to Europe, specifically, driven by the dependency on Russian gas imports. Around 90% of EU natural gas is imported from outside the EU, and Russia is the largest supplier. In 2020, Russia provided nearly 44% of all EU gas imports, more than twice the second-largest supplier, Norway (19.9%, see Eurostat). The concern about Russian gas dependency was exacerbated by the new underwater gas route project connecting Russia and the EU – Nord Stream 2. The opponents to this new route argued that it will not only increase the EU’s gas dependency but also Russia’s political influence in the EU and its bargaining power against Ukraine (see, e.g., FT). Former President of the European Council Donald Tusk stated that “from the perspective of EU interests, Nord Stream 2 is a bad project.”.

However, neither dependency nor controversial gas route projects are a new phenomenon, and the EU has implemented some measures to tackle these issues in the past. This brief looks at the current security of Russian gas supply through the lens of these historical developments. We provide a snapshot of the risks associated with Russian gas imports faced by the EU a decade ago. We then discuss whether different factors affecting the EU gas supply security have changed since (and to which extent it may have contributed to the current situation) and if decreasing dependence on Russian gas is feasible and cost-effective. We conclude by addressing the policy implications.

Security of Russian Gas Supply to the EU, an Old Problem Difficult to Tackle

Russia has been the main gas provider to the EU for a few decades, and for a while, this dependency has triggered concerns about gas supply security (see, e.g., Stern, 2002 or Lewis, New York Times, 1982). However, the problem with the security of Russian gas supplies was extending beyond the dependency on Russian gas per se. It was driven by a range of risk factors such as insufficient diversification of gas suppliers, low fungibility of natural gas supplies with a prevalence of pipeline gas delivery, or use of gas exports/transit as means to solve geopolitical problems.

This last point became especially prominent in the mid-to-late-2000s, during the “gas wars” between Russia and the gas transit countries Ukraine and Belarus. These wars led to shortages and even a complete halt of Russian gas delivery to some EU countries, showing how weak the security of the Russian gas supply to the EU was at that time.

Reacting to these “gas wars”, the EU attempted to tackle the issue with a revival of the “common energy policy” based on the “solidarity” and “speaking in one voice” principles. The EU wanted to adopt a “coherent approach in the energy relations with third countries and an internal coordination so that the EU and its Member States act together” (see, e.g., EC, 2011). However, this idea turned out to be challenging to implement, primarily because of one crucial contributor to the problem with the security of Russian gas supply – the sizable disbalance in Russian gas supply risk among the individual EU Member States.

Indeed, EU Member States had a different share of natural gas in their total energy consumption, highly uneven diversification of gas suppliers, and varying exposure to Russian gas. Several Eastern-European EU states (such as Bulgaria, Estonia, or Czech Republic) were importing their gas almost entirely from Russia; other EU Member States (such as Germany, Italy, or Belgium) had a diversified gas import portfolio; and a few EU states (e.g., Spain or Portugal) were not consuming any Russian gas at all. Russian natural gas was delivered via several routes (see Figure 2), and member states were using different transit routes and facing different transit-associated risks. These differences naturally led to misalignment of energy policy preferences across EU states, creating policy tensions and making it difficult to implement a common energy policy with “speaking in one voice” (see more on this issue in Le Coq and Paltseva, 2009 and 2012).

Figure 2. Gas pipeline in Europe.

Source: S&G Platt. https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/blogs/natural-gas/010720-so-close-nord-stream-2-gas-link-completion-trips-at-last-hurdle

The introduction of Nord Stream 1 in 2011 is an excellent example of the problem’s complexity. This new gas transit route from Russia increased the reliability of Russian gas supply for EU countries connected to this route (like Germany or France), as they were able to better diversify the transit of their imports from Russia and be less exposed to transit risks. The “Nord Stream” countries (i.e., countries connected to this route) were then willing to push politically and economically for this new project. Le Coq and Paltseva (2012) show, however, that countries unconnected to this new route while simultaneously sharing existing, “older” routes with “Nord Stream” countries would experience a decrease in their gas supply security. The reason for this is that the “directly connected” countries would now be less interested in exerting “common” political pressure to secure gas supplies along the “old” routes.

This is not to say that the EU did not learn from the above lessons. While the “speaking in one voice” energy policy initiative was not entirely successful, the EU has implemented a range of actions to cope with the risks of the security of gas supply from Russia. The next section explains how the situation is has changed since, outlining both the progress made by the EU and the newly arising risk factors.

Security of Russian Gas Supply to the EU, a Current Problem Partially Addressed

Since the end of the 2000s, the EU implemented a few changes that have positively affected the security of gas supply from Russia.

First, the EU put a significant effort into developing the internal gas market, altering both the physical infrastructure and the gas market organization. The EU updated and extended the internal gas network and introduced the wide-scale possibility of utilizing reverse flow, effectively allowing gas pipelines to be bi- rather than uni-directional. These actions improved the gas interconnections between the EU states (and other countries), thereby making potential disruptions along a particular gas transit route less damaging and diminishing the asymmetry of exposure to route-specific gas transit risks among the EU members. Ukraine’s gas import situation is a good illustration of the effect of reverse flow. Ukraine does not directly import Russian gas since 2016, mainly from Slovakia (64%), Hungary (26%), and Poland (10%) (see https://www.enerdata.net/publications/daily-energy-news/ukraine-launches-virtual-gas-reverse-flow-slovakia.html). The transformation of the gas market organization brought about the implementation of a natural gas hub in Europe and change in the mechanism of gas price formation. It is now possible to buy and sell natural gas via long-term contracts and on the spot market. With the gas market becoming more liquid, it became easier to prevent the gas supply disruption threat.

Second, Europe has made certain progress in diversifying its gas exports. According to Komlev (2021), the concentration of EU gas imports from outside of the EU (excluding Norway), as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, has decreased by around 25% between 2016 and 2020. While the imports are still highly concentrated, with the HHI equal to 3120 in 2020, this is a significant achievement. A large part of this diversification effort is the dramatic increase in the share of liquified natural gas (i.e., LNG) in its gas imports – in 2020, a fair quarter of the EU gas imports came in the form of LNG. An expanded capacity for LNG liquefaction and better fungibility of LNG would facilitate backup opportunities in the case of Russian gas supply risks and improve the diversification of the EU gas imports, thereby increasing the security of natural gas supply.

However, the above developments also have certain disadvantages, which became especially prominent during the ongoing gas crisis. For example, the fungibility of LNG has a reverse side: LNG supplies respond to variations in gas market prices across the world. This change has intensified the competition on the demand side – Europe and Asia might now compete for the same LNG. This is likely to make a secure supply of LNG – e.g., as a backup in the case of a gas supply default or as a diversification device – a costly option.

In turn, new mechanisms of gas price formation in Europe included decoupling the oil and gas prices and changing the format of long-term gas contracts. The percentage of oil-linked contracts in gas imports to the EU dropped from 47% in 2016 to 26% in 2020. In particular, 87% of Gazprom’s long-term contracts in 2020 were linked to spot and forward gas prices and only around 13% to oil prices (Komlev, 2021). This gas-on-gas linking may have contributed to the current gas crisis: Indeed, it undermined the economic incentives of Gazprom to supply more gas to the EU spot market in the current high-price market. Shipping more gas would lower spot prices and prices of hub-linked longer-term contracts for Gazprom. In that sense, the ongoing decline in Russian gas supplies to the EU may reflect not (only) geopolitical considerations but economic optimization.

Similarly, this new mechanism also finds reflection in the ongoing situation with the EU gas storage. The current EU storage capacity is 117 bcm, or almost 20% of its yearly consumption, and thus, can in principle be effective in managing the short-term volume and price shocks. However, the current gas crisis has shown that this option might be far from sufficient in the case of a gas shortage (see, e.g., Zachmann et al., 2021).  One of the reasons for this insufficiency can be Gazprom controlling a sizable share of this storage capacity (see https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2021-004781_EN.html). For example, Gazprom owns (directly and indirectly) almost one-third of all gas storage in Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands.  Combining this storage market position with a long-term gas contract structure may also lead to strategic behavior for economic (on top of potential political) purposes.

Last but not least, the EU gas market is likely to be characterized by increased demand due to the green transition agenda (see Olofsgård and Strömberg, 2022). Being the least carbon-intensive fossil fuel, natural gas has an important role in facilitating green transition and increasing the electrification of the economy. For example, Le Coq et al. (2018) argues that gas capacity should be around 3 to 4 times the current capacity by 2050 for full electrification of transport and heating in France, Germany, or the Netherlands. In such circumstances, the EU is not likely to have the luxury to diminish reliance on Russian gas.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

Keeping the above discussion in mind, should the EU try to diminish its dependence on Russian gas to improve its energy security? This may be true in theory, but in practice, this might be too costly, at least in the short-to-medium run.

The current situation on the EU gas market suggests that simply cutting gas imports from Russia is likely to lead to high prices both in the energy sector and, later, in other sectors of the economy due to spillovers. Substituting gas imports from Russia with gas from other sources, such as LNG, is likely to be very costly and not necessarily very reliable. Alternative measures, e.g., improving interconnections between the EU Member States or controlling transit issues via the use of reverse flow technology, are effective but have limited impact. Simply cutting down gas demand is not a viable strategy. Indeed, with the EU pushing for a green transition and the electrification of the economy, the EU’s gas imports may have to increase. Russian gas may play an important role in this process.

As a result, we believe that the solution to keep the security issue of Russian gas supply at bay lies in the area of common energy policy. It is essential that the EU implements and effectively manages a coordinated approach in dealing with Russian gas supplies. The EU is the largest buyer of Russian gas, and given Russian dependency on hydrocarbon exports, such a synchronized approach would give the EU the possibility to exploit its “large buyer” power. While the asymmetry in exposure to Russian gas supply risks among the EU Member States is still sizable, the improvements in the functioning of the internal gas market and gas transportation within the EU make their preferences more aligned, and a common policy vector more feasible. Furthermore, recent EU initiatives on creating “strategic gas reserves” by making the Member States share their gas storage with one another would further facilitate such coordination. Implementing the “speaking in one voice” gas import policy will allow the EU to fully utilize its bargaining power vis-à-vis Gazprom and spread the benefits of new gas routes from Russia – such as Nord Stream 2 – across its Member States.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Covid-19: News for Europe’s Energy Security

Posted on May 7, 2020 | Policy Brief

Black and white image of natural gas processing plant representing Energy security Europe

While there has been a lot of attention on the effect of Covid-19-related developments in the oil market, the effect on the natural gas market has almost evaded media attention. For the EU, however, the gas market and especially the impact of the pandemic on the gas relationship with its largest gas supplier, Russia, is of high relevance. This brief discusses the potential implications of Covid-19 on this relationship both under the pandemic and during the expected slow economic recovery. We argue that, while in the short run the security of Russian gas supply is likely to improve, this is unlikely to be the case in the aftermath of the pandemic. To ensure gas supply security in post-pandemic markets, the EU may need to finally implement the long-awaited “speaking with one-voice” energy policy.

Introduction

The ongoing coronavirus pandemic will not only affect human lives, but also bring new economic and political challenges. The energy sector, and in particular the dramatic decrease of oil prices, has been in the news since the beginning of the Covid-19 crisis. But discussions have so far rarely touched the natural gas market, despite the pandemic taking its toll also on this market. As for oil, the demand and price have been negatively affected by the economic slowdown. While not as drastic as for oil, the price of natural gas in the EU has declined by approximately 40% since the beginning of 2020 (World Bank, 2020). However, the impact of the pandemic is likely to be quite different in oil and gas markets. There are multiple reasons for that; for example, oil and oil products are predominantly consumed by the transport sector while natural gas is mostly used in the power sector, the industry and households, and these sectors were differently affected by the Covid-19 pandemic.

Understanding the impact of the pandemic on the gas market is especially interesting from the European point of view, given that natural gas accounts for 25% of total energy consumption and two thirds of this gas is imported. The imports are also very concentrated, with the main supplier Russia providing around 40% of the gas, compared to 25% of the crude oil. This dependency, as well as a long history of tensions with third parties (Ukraine and Belarus) on the Russian gas transit routes, has made the EU’s concerns about the security of Russian gas supply much more pronounced than for oil (see Le Coq and Paltseva, 2012). The combination of these factors – i.e. the importance of natural gas for the EU and the long-standing concern about gas supply security warrant an analysis of the short and mid-term effect of the Covid-19 pandemic on the gas market, and, specifically, on the EU-Russia gas relationship. This brief discusses how the pandemic-driven decline in gas demand, and the potential shift in the balance of power between the parties may affect both the dependency on, and the transit of, Russian gas.

EU Dependency on Russian Gas Under the Covid-19 Pandemic

As is well known, Covid-19 and the associated lockdowns imposed by many EU Member States, have caused a slowdown in most economies and a decline in energy demand. However, for natural gas, the effect is likely to be significantly smaller than for oil. While we do not yet have statistics for the EU’s gas demand in recent months, the Norwegian energy consultancy Rystad Energy has predicted the decline of gas demand to be around 4% for March and April 2020. This forecast was given quite early in the course of the pandemic, and is very likely an underestimation; still, it is very different from the one for oil, with the demand drop estimated to be a whopping 34% in April.

One reason why we do not observe a sizable decrease in gas demand is that the natural gas is used in electricity generation, especially as a base-load fuel to compensate for the intermittency of green energy sources, such as sun and wind. With the reduced electricity demand, renewable power generation has become relatively more important in the electricity supply in many countries. Since mid-March 2020, the share of renewable power generation across the EU is 46%, nine percent higher than during the same period last year (Energy Transition Lab, 2020). Interestingly, in France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, the absolute volume of electricity generation by renewable sources even increased relative to the same period in 2019, despite declining energy demand. One potential channel, anecdotally recorded for Germany could be higher solar generation due to cleaner skies resulting from the decline in emissions because of lower fossil energy consumption. A higher volume of a renewable generation often requires more back-up power to maintain grid stability. While natural gas is not the only back-up source, this need might still limit the decline in gas demand (or even increase it like e.g. in the Czech Republic). Of course, cheaper gas prices may also play a role: for example, Slovakia and Romania experienced an increase in gas-based generation, but a drop in the renewable generation since mid-March 2020 relative to the same period in 2019. Finally, another reason for the moderate gas demand decline is its residential use – which is likely to be sustained due to the lockdown regime introduced by many countries.

When it comes to Russian gas imports, the official statistics since mid-March – roughly the beginning of lockdown policies across the EU – are not available yet. However, we can with some reservation look at the evolution of the volume of gas sales to the EU disclosed by Gazprom (2020). There was a very sizable decrease in Russian gas imports by the EU – of more than 21% – as compared to the same period last year but it started before the lockdown: January 2020 recorded a drop of 34% and February of 20%). This suggests that the current decrease in Russian gas imports is only marginally related to the pandemic, and more related to the overall gas market situation (such as relatively full gas storage in the EU in 2020, a warm winter, an increase in LNG imports, etc.).

It is, however, likely that the negative effect of the pandemic on Russian gas imports by the EU will be noticeably higher than it currently appears in the Gazprom data, thereby further decreasing the EU’s dependency on Russian gas. Moreover, since demand and prices decrease, substituting for Russian gas, were there a supply interruption, should be relatively easy and cheap with the current excess capacity of the natural gas market and the substantial storage in the EU.

Another reason for the improvement in the security of Russian gas supply to the EU is the observation that Russia’s dependency on oil and gas exports in combination with pandemic-associated factors may lead to a substantial economic downturn in Russia (Becker, 2020). In these dire circumstances, Russia is unlikely to further risk its gas export revenues by pursuing geopolitical goals through the means of gas supply and gas transit. For all these reasons, one may expect the security of Russian gas supply to the EU to improve during the pandemic.

However, the EU dependency on Russian gas may still be a concern due to medium-run effects of Covid-19. First of all, while the gas prices have been in decline for roughly a year now, the recent decrease in natural gas prices has accelerated the negative impact on the unconventional natural gas industry. For example, the US natural gas rig count has declined by 20% since mid-March 2020, which accounts for more than a third of the 54% year-to-year decline (Ycharts.com, 2020). Similarly, nearly 42% of Australian gas resources could be uneconomic under the current gas prices, according to Rystad Energy. While gas prices are unlikely to stay low forever, the industry will need time to recover even if/when the natural gas demand rises again. Moreover, the East-Asian markets are likely to be served first, as they are expected to recover from the pandemic shock before Europe. This dynamic, coupled with historically higher LNG prices in Asia may delay the LNG flows to Europe. A shortage of LNG in Europe, in turn, is likely to hinder any diversification strategy from Russian gas, weakening the EU’s bargaining power. The new Russia-China gas pipeline, “Power of Siberia”, operational since the end of 2019, will also be used to satisfy the post-Covid-19 Chinese gas demand which is likely to recover before demand picks up in the EU. Its use will then allow Russia to be less reliant on exporting gas to the EU, further contributing to the EU’s gas security concerns.

Transit of Russian Gas to the EU: Covid-19 Effect

The EU’s energy security also depends on the reliability of Russian gas transit to the EU. There are currently 5 transit routes connecting Russia to the EU (plus the routes that are serving the Baltic states and Finland without further transit), see Figure 1. Three onshore routes connect Russia to the EU via Ukraine and Belarus. There has been a history of gas transit disputes associated with these routes, at times threatening the Russian gas supply to the EU. Two newer offshore pipelines, Nord Stream 1 (in operation since 2011) and TurkStream (in operation since 2020) connect Russia directly to Germany, and to the South-East of Europe via Turkey. Further, one more offshore route to Germany, Nord Stream 2, is currently underway, with the operations announced to start in the first quarter of 2021. All three offshore projects are expected to not suffer from geopolitical transit issues.

In relation to the Covid-19 pandemic, there are likely to be two major effects on Russian gas transit. First, the inauguration of Nord Stream 2 is likely to be further delayed. Nord Stream 2 is 50% financed by Gazprom, and this financing scheme may be difficult to sustain after the fall in oil and gas prices and a significant decrease of Gazprom’s export revenues. Indeed, while the statistics for March and April 2020 are not yet available, the Russian customs statistics suggests that the USD value of gas exports from Russia in January-February 2020 has decreased by 45% relative to the same period last year. Because Nord Stream 2 could facilitate gas delivery to the EU in case of a transit conflicts, its expected delay may negatively impact the EU’s gas security.

Additionally, the Covid-19 related demand drop may impact the utilization of Russia-EU gas routes, driven by the current agreements between Russia and the transit countries. Russia and Ukraine have just signed a transit agreement for the next 5 years. This agreement was widely perceived as a diplomatic success of the EU (that facilitated the deal), given the historically difficult geopolitical relation between Ukraine and Russia. One of the new features of this agreement is of particular interest within the Covid-19 context. Unlike for previous deals, Russia agreed to prepay a fixed volume of gas transit, 178.1 mcm/day for 2020, and 110 mcm/day units for 2021-24 (Pirani et al., 2020). So, underutilization of this route is costly for Russia.

Figure 1. Gas supply Routes to the EU.

Source: Ukrainian Liaison Office in Brussels

With decreased demand due to Covid-19, warmer weather in the coming months and almost full gas storages in the EU, this contractual feature may affect how Russia allocates its gas exports across the routes. At least, in the short term, it may undermine Russian gas transit via the Belarus-Poland route. The concern about the utilization of this route in relation to the new Russia-Ukraine transit agreement has already been raised by Pirani et al. (2020). The Covid-19-associated decrease in gas demand is likely to make this concern much more real. Russia may use the Belarus-Poland pipeline sporadically, e.g. to adjust for the seasonal spikes in demand, without long-term capacity booking. Recent gas tensions between Russia and Poland (e.g. Poland winning in the arbitration court against Gazprom (RFE/RL, 2020), and Poland repeatedly expressing opinions and exercising legislative effort restricting the usage of Nord Stream 1 and construction of Nord Stream 2) may further exacerbate the issue.

In the medium term, however, when the EU gas demand has recovered but Nord Stream 2 is not yet in place, the Belarus-Poland route is likely to prove useful for Russia, at least starting from 2021 (when prepaid volumes of Russian gas transit via Ukraine will decline according to their agreement).

The transit contract between Russia and Poland is to be renewed in mid-May 2020, and as of now, it is unclear if, and how it will be written and whether the Belarus-Poland transit route will be used to a substantial degree or only marginally. If transit through the Belarus-Poland route is limited, it will imply poorer route diversification for a major part of European consumers of Russian gas, thereby lowering their security of Russian gas supply.   This may also put another strain on the bargaining power allocation within the EU and the EU’s intended common energy policy of “speaking with one voice” with external energy suppliers like Russia.

Conclusion

Summing up, the decrease in demand of natural gas, as well as other factors associated with the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, such as economic recession and turbulence in stock markets, are likely to have noticeable implications for the security of Russian gas supplies to the EU in the short term. On the one hand, even if the current pandemic-associated decrease in demand of gas from Russia seems rather moderate, the ultimate negative effect on Russian gas imports by the EU is likely to be larger. Lower imports from Russia are likely to improve the security of supply, both through lower import dependency of the EU, and through improved market opportunities due to the current market’s overcapacity. On the other hand, in the medium run, lower demand also negatively affects the non-conventional gas industry, undermining the diversification opportunities to LNG, and, consequently, natural gas energy security. Further, a fall in the gas demand by the EU coupled with the newly signed transit agreement between Russia and Ukraine may potentially cause underusage of the Belarus-Poland transit route, thereby putting a strain on the diversification of Russian gas import routes to the EU and on the power balance within the EU.

Energy security might be even more of a concern in the post coronavirus period when the economy is slowly recovering, and cheap and guaranteed energy supply is crucial. To ensure this supply, national efforts combined with an EU-wide policy coordination would be required. The long-discussed “speaking with one voice” common energy policy may finally need to materialize in order to facilitate reliable access to natural gas.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Indexation Formula for Natural Gas Procurement in Ukraine

Posted on February 10, 2020 | Policy Brief

Natural Gas power plant

Due to the high volatility of natural gas market prices, it is almost impossible to adequately plan the purchases for the year ahead, so contract prices need to be regularly updated. This fact creates uncertainty for the contracting authorities, as well as room for unfair competition and corruption. We offer an indexation formula which uses the European gas prices as a benchmark for procurement prices and calculate the potential economic effect of this formula on the Ukrainian gas procurement market.

Problems with the Public Procurement of Natural Gas

Natural gas procurement poses a number of challenges for the contracting authorities (CAs), suppliers and controllers. Due to price volatility it is almost impossible to adequately plan the purchases for the year ahead, so prices need to be regularly adjusted. After the heating season starts, CAs find themselves in a weak position in price negotiations since they almost never have storage for accumulating stocks, and if the contract is cancelled the new procurement would take at least one month due to the existing public procurement regulations. The new version of the Law on Public Procurement, which was recently adopted by the Ukrainian parliament, addresses this problem by allowing CAs to have a new contract fast in case the previous contact was cancelled because of the supplier.

CAs often lack reliable data on market dynamics. There are cases when unreliable price references are provided by specialized agencies to support higher price claims of suppliers. As a result, CAs bear administrative responsibility if they do not have proper justification for changing contract prices when controlling agencies initiate an audit.

Natural gas suppliers may also find themselves in a situation of unfair competition. Since it is possible to win an open auction (i.e. by quoting a considerably lower than market price) and later raise the price to the market level with an additional contract, honest businesses might feel demotivated to participate in the procurement process. They cannot be sure if the contract price can be changed later because there is no proper legal mechanism to assess the need of such an adjustment.

Previous research shows that every third contract of natural gas purchase was amended with an additional contract at least once, usually raising the price for the customer (Shapoval, Memetova, 2017). Additional contracts are indeed used 1) as a tool for price overstatement by the supplier, 2) as a loophole for corruption, and 3) as a way to get a market price for a supplier who used dumping to win the auction (Gribanovsky, Memetova, 2017).

International Drivers of Gas Prices in Ukraine

Since 2016, the EU has been the only official exporter of natural gas to Ukraine. According to PwC, Ukraine imported 14.1 billion m3 in 2017, which is 44% of total gas consumption – the remaining 56% are extracted locally. In Ukraine, the prices for industrial consumers are not regulated, while the household prices are set by the government. Today, the average price on the unregulated gas market is in line with the prices in neighbouring countries – the Baltic states, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary (PricewaterhouseCoopers Advisory LLC, 2018).

European prices are formed on the large marketplaces. The two biggest hubs, Dutch TTF and British NBP, by far outweigh their competitors (ACER Market Monitoring Report, 2017). However, the third-biggest hub, German NCG, is the closest to the Ukrainian border, so its prices often become the benchmark for private traders. In some cases, NCG is the official benchmark for gas price – for instance, the purchase parity import price in Ukraine in 2017-2018 was based on this hub’s index.

In order to assess the impact of the European natural gas prices on procurement prices in Ukraine, we used the Month+1 futures hub prices from TTF, NCG and Austrian VTP CEGH. Procurement prices were extracted from the analytical module of ProZorro (the Ukrainian e-procurement system which CAs are obliged to use at all levels). We excluded irrelevant procurements and selected the contracts which had information on the volume procured. We calculated the average daily prices weighted by volume. Our dataset covers the time period from January 1, 2017 to December 31, 2018.

Figure 1: Natural gas prices at ProZorro and European hubs

Source: ProZorro data, hubs data

As one can see in Figure 1, hubs prices are highly correlated, so they cannot be used as independent variables within a single model. Thus, we decided to take the NCG Month+1 price as a benchmark for explaining the relation between internal procurement prices and international market prices.

NCG Impact on Procurement Prices in ProZorro

In the period of low business activity on natural gas markets, especially in summer, few contracts are awarded. One might have noticed from Figure 1 that this leads to higher variance in daily prices caused by random factors. Therefore, in our model we decided to use the weighted average of weekly prices instead.

Figure 2: Weekly gas price fluctuations in ProZorro and NCG

Source: ProZorro data, Pegas (https://www.powernext.com/futures-market-data)

Our econometric estimation shows that the NCG Month+1 price influences procurement prices with a lag of 7 weeks. In other words, the price at the German hub becomes relevant for the Ukrainian procurement market after almost 2 months on average.

Figure 3: Correlations between procurement prices and NCG Month+1 with different lags

According to the model, the weighted average gas price in ProZorro is more dependent on the NCG Month+1 gas price than on the reservation price in ProZorro. Thus, a UAH 1 increase in the reservation price adds UAH 0.41 to the final price, while each additional hryvnia of the NCG price leads raises the final price by UAH 0.63 in 7 weeks if the price growth trend is not taken into account.

Potential Cost-Saving Using the Price Indexation Formula

The Price Indexation Formula

As European gas prices strongly influence prices on the internal Ukrainian market, it is obvious that they should be included into the indexation formula, as well as exchange rate fluctuations. After consultations with stakeholders, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine (MEDT) decided to adjust the initial formula proposed by the KSE and included price fluctuations on the Ukrainian Energy Exchange (UEEx) with a small weight into the formula in order to stimulate UEEx development.

The final formula was officially published in December 2018. This formula is not compulsory for any contract authorities, though it is recommended for use by the smaller public entities who do not have the in-house analytical capacity to make a realistic price assessment during negotiations with the suppliers.

where:

  • CP – new price in UAH for 1000 m3 of natural gas (including value-added tax, VAT)
  • PCP – current price in UAH for 1000 m3 of natural gas (including VAT) before adjustment
  • K(cur) – average National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) UAH/EUR exchange rate for 5 days before the price change
  • K(base) – average NBU UAH/EUR exchange rate on the day of the previous price adjustment (contract signed)
  • NCG(avg) – average of daily NCG Month+1 index during 20 previous trading days before the day of price amendment, EUR per MW-hour
  • NCG(base) – NCG Month+1 index on the day of the previous price amendment (contract signed), EUR per MW-hour
  • VAT – rate of value-added tax, which is currently 20% in Ukraine
  • CV – heating value of natural gas in MW-hour/1000 m3 on the date of the price adjustment
  • UEEx(avg) – weighted monthly average natural gas price of UEEx (including VAT) on the day of price amendment
  • UEEx(base) – weighted monthly average natural gas price on the UEEx (including VAT) on the day of the previous price amendment (contract was signed)

Thus, the formula includes current gas price, exchange rate changes, changes in NCG index and UEEx index.

Estimation of Potential Cost-Saving for Contract Authorities

The simplest yet time-efficient way to empirically verify the hypothesis of potential cost-saving after the introduction of the price indexation formula in the gas market is a retrospective analysis of the contracts which had already been signed.

The basic principle of estimation is comparing actual prices with the potential prices calculated based on the price indexation formula. For this, we collected a dataset of natural gas procurement contracts covering the time period from August 2017 to the end of August 2018. This period includes both short-term contracts signed for the heating season or its part (usually signed in August-September, sometimes in January-February) and middle-term contracts which are active for at least one year (usually signed in December-March). We took into account all the additional contracts to these contracts signed before January 1, 2019.

Supply schedules and prices of additional contracts are not readily available in a machine-readable format, so we kept only contracts with the total value higher than UAH 1 million. These are 27.5% of all contracts but they cover 79.3% of the total value of natural gas procurement in Ukraine. The final dataset contains prices of additional contracts and monthly supply schedules.

Our earlier analysis of all the contracts on the shorter time scale showed no correlation between prices and volumes in gas procurement contracts (Shapoval, Memetova et al., 2017), therefore our results can be extrapolated to all the gas contracts.

The biggest gap between actual and indexation prices would be in November 2017, averaging UAH 623. However, until the end of the year the gap reduced threefold to UAH 170.

Figure 4: Monthly increase of gas procurement prices

Source: bipro.ProZorro, ProZorro API

We combined the supply schedules with the prices found in the additional contracts in order to estimate potential savings. Obviously, the highest savings were observed during the heating season. However, in September they were negative (see Figure 6). Thus, while the market prices of natural gas started rising in August, actual procurement prices lagged behind until the end of September-October.

Figure 5: Monthly cost savings in case of applying price indexation formula

Source: bipro.ProZorro, ProZorro API

In total, for contracts of over UAH 1 million, potential cost savings from applying the price indexation formula would have been equal to UAH 120.25 million. If these estimations are extrapolated to all the contracts, this figure would reach UAH151.6 million. This is a rather modest sum in relative terms – only 2.7% of the total contract value. However, using the formula is expected to assist smaller CAs who often lack the knowledge of market dynamics to negotiate the optimal price more effectively and limit their dependence on the suppliers’ estimates.

Besides, the parties concluded the contracts without taking into account the opportunity of using the indexation formula. Therefore, actual cost savings might be lower, first of all because the suppliers’ auction strategy would be different. In particular, the dumping strategy with subsequent price increase through additional contracts would become useless. If the formula is used, a lower starting price would mean a lower increase in absolute terms (UAH per 1000 m3), because the formula calculates the change in relative terms (in per cent). For example, if the market price grows by 15% during the indexation period, the starting price can also be raised by only 15%.

Conclusion

The application of the price indexation formula for natural gas procurement may have a positive impact on the public procurement market. We recommend taking into account the prices of the European hubs adjusted by exchange rate fluctuations.

Had the price indexation formula been used for additional contracts in gas procurement in 2017-2018, the average price would have declined by UAH 623, potentially allowing CAs to save UAH 151.6 million.

Formula pricing would raise the negotiation power of customers (CAs) before the start of the heating season. This is especially true for the smaller ones which are not able to professionalize procurement processes. Natural gas price indexation within clearly defined boundaries will create more favourable conditions for fair competition by eliminating the stimuli for dumping at the auction stage.

References

Data Sources

Resource Discoveries, FDI Bonanzas and Local Multipliers: Evidence from Mozambique

Posted on November 5, 2018 | Policy Brief

20181105 Resource Discoveries Image 01

Giant oil and gas discoveries in developing countries trigger FDI bonanzas. Across countries, it is shown that in the 2 years following a discovery, the creation of FDI jobs increases by 54% through the establishment of new projects in non-resource sectors such as manufacturing, retail, business services and construction. Using Mozambique’s gas driven FDI bonanza as a case study we show that the local job multiplier of FDI projects in Mozambique is large and results in 4.4 to 6.5 additional jobs, half of which are informal.

Natural Resources, FDI Job Multiplier and Economic Development

Large resource wealth has for several decades been associated with a curse, slowing economic growth in resource-rich developing countries (Venables, 2016). More recently, this wisdom has been questioned by several studies. Arezki et al. (2017) point out that giant discoveries trigger short-run economic booms before windfalls from resources start pouring in. And Smith (2017) provides evidence for a positive relationship between resource discoveries and GDP per capita across countries, which persists in the long term.

In a new paper (Toews and Vézina, 2018) we contribute to this research by showing that giant oil and gas discoveries in developing countries trigger foreign direct investment (FDI) bonanzas in non-extraction sectors. FDI has long been considered a key part of economic development since it is associated with transfers of technology, skills, higher wages, and with backward and forward linkages with local firms (Hirschman, 1957; Javorcik, 2015). Using Mozambique, where a giant offshore gas discovery has been made in 2009, as a case study,  we estimate the local multiplier of FDI projects. We find that the FDI job multiplier in Mozambique is large, highlighting the job creation potential of FDI in developing countries.

Resource Discoveries and FDI Bonanzas

In our study we focus on jobs created by FDI bonanzas triggered by resource discoveries. Multinationals might invest in countries being blessed by giant discoveries for a variety of reasons before production starts. First, they might expect to benefit from the decisions of oil and gas companies to increase investment in local infrastructure and to increase demand for local services provided by law firms and environmental consultancies. Second, multinationals may also expect governments and consumers to bring forward expenditure and investment by borrowing. Finally, multinationals might invest since particularly large discoveries have the potential to operate as a signal leading to a coordinated investment by a large number of multinationals from a variety of industries and countries.

Using data from fDi Markets we show that, indeed, FDI flows into non-extraction sectors following a discovery. FDI increases across sectors and by doing so creates jobs in industries such as manufacturing, retail, business services and construction. Using Mozambique as a case study we show that following the gas discovery, multinationals decided to invest in Mozambique triggering job creation in non-extraction FDI to skyrocket (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. FDI Bonanza in Mozambique

Source: Author’s calculations using fDiMarkets data.

FDI Job Multiplier

Using the FDI bonanza in Mozambique as a natural experiment, we proceed by estimating the FDI job multiplier for Mozambique. The concept of the local job multiplier boils down to the idea that every time a job is created by attracting a new business, additional jobs are created in the same locality. In our case, FDI jobs are expected to have a multiplier effect due to two distinct channels. Newly created and well paid FDI jobs are likely to increase local income and in turn the demand for local goods and services (Moretti, 2010). Additionally, backward and forward linkages between multinationals and local firms increase the demand for local goods and services (Javorcik, 2004).

Using concurrent waves of household surveys and firm censuses we estimate the local FDI multiplier for Mozambique to be large. In particular, we find that every additional FDI job results in 4.4 to 6.5 additional local jobs. Due to the combined use of household survey and the firm census we are also able to conclude that only half of these jobs are created in the formal sector, while the other half of the jobs are created informally.

Conclusion

Our results suggest that giant oil and gas discoveries in developing countries lead to simultaneous foreign direct investment in various sectors including manufacturing. Our results also highlight the job creation potential of FDI projects in developing countries. Jointly, our results imply that giant discoveries do have the potential to trigger extraordinary employment booms and, thus, provide a window of opportunity for a growth takeoff in developing countries.

References

  • Arezki, R., V. A. Ramey, and L. Sheng (2017): “News Shocks in Open Economies: Evidence from Giant Oil Discoveries,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132, 103.
  • Hirschman, A. O. (1957): “Investment Policies and “Dualism” in Underdeveloped Countries,” The American Economic Review, 47, 550 – 570.
  • Javorcik, B. S. (2004): “Does Foreign Direct Investment Increase the Productivity of Domestic Firms? In Search of Spillovers Through Backward Linkages,” American Economic Review, 94, 605 – 627.
  • Javorcik, B. S. (2015): “Does FDI Bring Good Jobs to Host Countries?” World Bank Research Observer, 30, 74 – 94.
  • Moretti, E. (2010): “Local Multipliers,” American Economic Review, 100, 373 – 377.
  • Smith, Brock. “The resource curse exorcised: Evidence from a panel of countries.” Journal of Development Economics: 116 (2015): 57-73.
  • Toews and Vézina, (2018): “Resource discoveries, FDI bonanzas and local multipliers: An illustration from Mozambique” Working Paper.
  • Venables, A. J. (2016): “Using Natural Resources for Development: Why Has It Proven So Difficult?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30, 161 – 84.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Is Cutting Russian Gas Imports Too Costly For The EU?

Posted on June 9, 2014 | Policy Brief

20140608 FREE Network Policy Brief

This brief addresses the economic costs of a potential Russian gas sanction considered by the EU. We discuss different replacement alternatives for Russian gas, and argue that complete banning is currently unrealistic. In turn, a partial reduction of Russian gas imports may lead to a loss of the EU bargaining power vis-à-vis Russia. We conclude that instead of cutting Russian gas imports, the EU should put an increasing effort towards building a unified EU-wide energy policy.

Soon after Russia stepped in Crimea, the question of whether and how the European Union could react to this event has been in the focus of political discussions. So far, the EU has mostly implemented sanctions on selected Russian and Ukrainian politicians, freezing their European assets and prohibiting their entry into the EU, but broader economic sanctions are intensively debated.

One such sanction high on the political agenda is an EU-wide ban on imports of Russian gas. Such a ban is often seen as one of the potentially most effective economic sanctions. Indeed the EU buys more than half of total Russian gas exports (BP 2013), and gas export revenues constitute around one fifth of the Russian federal budget (RossBusinessConsulting,2012 and our calculations). Thus, by banning Russian gas the EU may indeed be able to exert strong economics pressure on Russia.

However, the feasibility of such sanction is questionable. Indeed, in 2012 Russia supplied around 110 bcm of natural gas to EU-28 (Eurostat), which constitutes 22.5% of total EU gas consumption. There are a number of alternatives to replace Russian gas, such as an increase in domestic production by investing in shale gas, or switching to other energy sources, such as nuclear, coal or renewables. However, many of the above alternatives, e.g. shale gas or nuclear power, involve large and time-consuming investments, and thus cannot be used in the short run (say, within a year). Others, such as wind energy, are subject to intermittency problem, which again requires investments into a backup technology. The list of alternatives implementable within a short horizon is effectively down to replacing Russian gas by gas from other sources and/or switching to coal for electricity generation. Below, we argue that even if such a replacement is feasible, it is likely to be very costly for the EU, both economically and environmentally.

Notice that any replacement option will be automatically associated with a significant increase in economic costs. This is due to the fact that a substantial part of Russian gas exports to Europe (e.g., according to Financial Times, 2014 – up to 75%) are done under long-term “take-or-pay” contracts. These contracts assume that the customer shall pay for the gas even if it does not consume it. In other words, by switching away from Russian gas, the EU would not only incur the costs of replacing it, but also incur high financial or legal (or both) costs of terminating the existing contracts with Russia, with the latter estimated to be around USD 50 billion (Chazan and Crooks, Financial Times, 2014).

Due to this contract clause, own costs of replacement alternatives become of crucial importance. The coal alternative is currently relatively cheap. However, a massive use of coal for power generation is associated with a strong environmental damage and is definitely not in line with the EU green policy.

What about the cost of reverting to alternative sources of gas? First, in utilizing this option, the EU is bound to rely on external and potentially new gas suppliers. Indeed, the estimates of potential contribution within the EU – by its largest gas producer, the Netherlands – are in the range of additional 20 bcm (here and below see Zachmann 2014 and Economist 2014). Another 15-25 bcm can be supplied by current external gas suppliers: some 10-20 bcm from Norway, and 5 bcm from Algeria and Libya. This volume is not sufficient for replacement, and is not likely to be cheaper than Russian gas.

This implies that the majority of the missing gas would need to be replaced through purchases of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) on the world market, in particular, from the US. This option may first look very appealing. Indeed, the current gas price at Henry Hub, the main US natural gas distribution hub, is 4.68 USD/mmBTU (IMF Commodity Statistics, 2014). Even with the costs of liquefaction, transport and gasification – which are estimated to be around 4.7 USD/mmBTU (Henderson 2012) – this is way lower than the current price of Russian gas at the German border (10.79 USD/mmBTU, IMF).

However, this option is not going to be cheap. A substantial increase in the demand for LNG is likely to lead to an LNG price hike. Notice that, at the abovementioned prices, US LNG starts losing its competitive edge in Europe already at a 15% price increase. Just for a very rough comparison, the 2011 Fukushima disaster lead to 18% LNG price increase in Japan in one month after disaster. Some experts are expecting the price of LNG in Europe to rise as much as two times in these circumstances (Shiryaevskaya and Strzelecki, Bloomberg, 2014).

Moreover, it is not very likely that there will be sufficient supply of LNG, even at increased prices. For example, in the US, which is the main ”hope” provider of LNG replacement for Russian gas, only one out of more than 20 liquefaction projects currently has full regulatory approval for imports to the EU. This project, Cheniere Energy’s Sabine Pass LNG terminal, is planned to start export operations no earlier than in the 4th quarter of 2015 with a capacity of just above 12bcma (World LNG Report, 2013). Of course, there are other US and Canada gas liquefaction projects currently undergoing regulatory approval process, but none of them is going to be exporting in the next year or two. Another potential complication is that two thirds of the world LNG trade is covered by long-term oil-linked contracts (World LNG Report, 2014), which significantly restricts the flexibility of short-term supply reaction, contributing to a price increase. All in all, LNG is unlikely to be a magical solution for Russian gas replacement.

All of the above discussion suggests that it may be prohibitively expensive for the EU to do completely without Russian gas. Maybe the adequate solution is partial? That is, shall the EU cut down on its imports of natural gas from Russia, by, say, a half, instead of completely eliminating it?

On one hand, this may indeed lower the costs outlined above, such as part of take-or-pay contract fines, or costs associated with an LNG price increase. On the other hand, cutting down on Russian gas imports may lead to an important additional problem, loss of buyer power by the EU.

Indeed, the dependence on the gas deal is currently mutual – as outlined above, not only Russian gas is important for the EU energy portfolio; the EU also represents the largest (external) consumer of Russian gas, with its 55% share of the total Russian gas exports. In other words, the EU as a whole possesses a substantial market power in gas trade between Russia and the EU, and this buyer power could be and should be exercised to achieve certain concessions, such as advantageous terms of trade from the seller etc.

However, the ability to have buyer power and to exercise it depends crucially on whether the EU acts as a whole to exercise a credible pressure on Russia. That is, the EU Member States may be much better off by coordinating their energy policies rather than diluting the EU buyer power by diversifying gas supply away from Russia. This coordination may be a challenge given the Member States’ different energy profiles and environmental concerns. Also, such coordination requires a stronger internal energy market that will allow for better flow of the gas between the Member States. While demanding any of these measures would be double beneficial: they will improve the internal gas market’s efficiency, and at the same time reinforce the EU’s buyer power vis-à-vis Russia.

To sum up, the EU completely banning Russian gas imports does not seem a feasible option in the short run. In turn, half-measures are not necessarily better due to the loss of the EU’s buyer power. Thereby, the best short-term reaction by the EU may be to put the effort into working up a strong unified energy policy, and to place “gas at the very back end of the sanctions list” for Russia as suggested by the EU energy chief Gunther Oettinger (quoted by Shiryaevskaya and Almeida, Bloomberg, 2014).

 

References

The European Commission against Gazprom: Should Gas Contracting Arrangement Be Changed?

Posted on June 4, 2013 | Policy Brief

20140526 More Commitment is Needed Image 01

This policy brief discusses EC’s claim that Gazprom abuses its dominant position. I argue that parts of the claim, like denying Third Party Access, are warranted but others related to the contracts offered by Gazprom to different Member States need not be. In fact, major market players in Europe offer similar contracting forms. In this case, the literature on the competitive effect of long-term supply contracts have stressed that such effect depends on the exact contract arrangement. For example, offering multi-years contract may indeed increase the competition on one part of the market. Having a gas supply contract with a price fully linked to the price of a gas hub may on the other hand reduce the competition among big gas suppliers. Hence, the assessment of Gazprom’s abuse of dominant position should be based on a careful analysis of the many contracting forms that have been agreed between Gazprom and customers in the Member States.

On the 4th of September 2012, the European Commission (EC) opened a proceeding against Gazprom, investigating whether Gazprom has abused its dominant market position in Central and Eastern Europe’s gas supply (see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-937_en.htm?locale=en). The allegation relies on two different points. First, Gazprom has been accused of denying access to its network pipeline when requested by competing gas supplier. Second, the contractual arrangement offered by Gazprom itself has been under scrutiny. A Gazprom contract usually includes a “destination clause”, that forbids any gas reselling by the buyer. Moreover, the typical Gazprom contract usually specifies a fixed quantity (with a take or pay clause) at a price indexed to the oil price (see Sartori, 2013 for a more extensive description of the EC’s proceeding.)

The objective of this policy brief is to discuss the EC’s claim of Gazprom’s abuse of dominant position. I argue that while the denial of Third Party Access appears as an obvious case of abuse of dominant position, the contractual arrangements offered by Gazprom need not be.

Characterization of Gazprom’s Abuse of Dominant Position

Denying access to Gazprom’s pipelines limits competition and thereby benefits Gazprom as controlling a pipeline constitutes a natural monopoly. This fact has been recognized for a long time with the requirement for a third party access to gas networks in the EU Gas Directive (Directive 2009/73/EC). The first part of the proceeding thus seems to be justified.

The EC proceeding also found that the contractual arrangements offered by Gazprom reflected an abuse of dominant position. The claim is that Gazprom locked in its customers. When signing a contract with Gazprom, buyers agreed on a fixed quantity irrespective of their “real” consumption (“take or pay” clause) and are not allowed to resale ex post excess quantity on the market (“destination clause”). Given that gas contracts usually are signed for many years, the lock-in period can be long. Moreover, the price of the gas contract is usually pegged to the oil price so that it reflects current supply and demand conditions for oil rather than for gas. One implication is that the contracted gas prices did not reflect the severe drop in the gas market price in 2008 (BP report, 2012).

The EC’s allegation that Gazprom has abused its dominant position is thus based not only on the fact that Gazprom is denying third party access to its pipelines but also on the long term contracts with a fixed quantity and an oil indexed price.

Next, I argue that the second part of the claim is questionable. Forcing Gazprom to propose contracts with flexible quantities, shorter contract lengths and no indexation to the oil price may not limit the abuse of Gazprom’s dominance. Depending on the exact contract arrangement (quantity, duration, and indexation), the abuse of dominant position could be more or less severe.

Contract Arrangement and Market Competition

It is important to stress that the major gas suppliers of Europe, like Sonatrach or Statoil, offer similar contract arrangements. So, are long-term supply contract arrangements pro or anticompetitive given that all major competitors use such contracts? The answer to this question typically depends on the contractual details. In what follows, I discuss briefly when contracts provided by major market players could alleviate the abuse of dominant position.

It has been shown that firms may have less incentive to exercise market power, if they have large contract positions (e.g. Allaz and Vila, 1993). Intuitively, a firm obtains a leadership position by selling contracts before going on the spot market. Motivated by this opportunity, all players participate in the contract market and as a consequence compete more aggressively overall. Offering long-term supply contracts may therefore enhance competition among gas suppliers.

The competitive effect of long-term supply contract may not always be present when suppliers and buyers repeatedly sign contracts. In a dynamic setup, it has been shown that allowing contracting for major players may reduce competition. Contracting could be used to reduce demand elasticity by increasing spot market exposure (e.g. Mahenc and Salanié, 2004). Contracting could also increase the likelihood and severity of collusion (Ferreira, 2003; Le Coq, 2004; Liski and Montero, 2006). The reason is that a collusive agreement is easier to sustain in a dynamic setup if firms offer contracts. A collusive strategy is sustainable provided that firms have no incentives to cheat, i.e. the repeated collusive profits exceed the immediate profit from the deviation and the price war following defection. The short run gains from cheating are reduced if all firms have signed contracts as the defecting firm will not capture the demand already covered by competitors’ contract sales. Compared to the case with no contracts, this reduces the gains from defection without changing the punishment path, and therefore makes collusion easier to sustain. In a dynamic setup, offering contracts may therefore increase the likelihood of collusion.

Green and Le Coq (2010) have shown, however, that the anti-competitive effect of contracts depends on their duration. The longer the contracts last, the more difficult it is to sustain collusion. Intuitively, a deviation from the collusive agreement will trigger punishments, which depend on the contract duration. The longer the contract lasts, the smaller would be the punishment profit, which would increase the incentive to deviate.

The contract price’s format also matters when estimating the anti-competitive effect of any contract arrangement. The stronger the degree of indexation to the spot price the easier it is to sustain collusion (Le Coq, 2013). In particular, if a contract price would be fully indexed on a gas spot (hub) price, irrespective of the contract’s duration, it is always easier to collude. The intuition underlying this result is two-fold.

First, given that the contracted quantities are not traded in the spot market, contracts reduce the size of the market that a deviator can serve when undercutting the rival’s price. Second, given that the contract’s price equals the spot price, the contract does not affect profit levels in the punishment phase. Consequently, profits in the punishment phase can be driven down to zero just as in the case when there is no contract market. Moreover, contracts with others forms of indexation have the same qualitative effects, provided that the indexation to the spot price is sufficiently strong. Interestingly, with full indexation, the anti-competitive effect of supply contract holds even if contracted quantities are flexible (can be renegotiated).

To conclude, changing the contract arrangement between Gazprom and European customers may not alleviate the abuse of Gazprom’s dominant position. A detailed analysis of the (many) contract arrangements offered by Gazprom needs to be conduct first to be able to make such claim.

▪

References

  • Allaz, B., Vila, J.-L., 1993. Cournot competition, forward markets and efficiency. Journal of Economic Theory 59 (1), 1–16.
  • BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2012
  • Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC, OJ L 211.
  • Ferreira, J.L., 2003. Strategic interaction between futures and spot markets. Journal of Economic Theory 108 (1), 141–151.
  • Liski, M., Montero, J.-P., 2006. Forward trading and collusion in oligopoly. Journal of Economic Theory 131 (1), 212–230.
  • Le Coq, C., 2004. Long-term supply contracts and collusion in the electricity market. Stockholm, SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 552.
  • Le Coq, C., 2013 Supply Contracts and Competition on the Spot: How indexation and duration matter? Mimeo.
  • Le Coq, C., R. Green, 2010 The Length of Contracts and Collusion International Journal of Industrial Organization 28(1), 21-29, 2010.
  • Mahenc, P., Salanié, F., 2004. Softening competition through forward trading. Journal of Economic Theory 116 (2), 282–293.
  • Sartori N., 2013. The European Commission vs. Gazprom: An Issue of Fair Competition or a Foreign Policy Quarrel? IAI working paper 13103

Buyer Power as a Tool for EU Energy Security

Posted on June 7, 2012 | Policy Brief

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In this policy brief we address the recently revived idea of a common energy policy for the EU – an idea of the EU acting as a whole when dealing with energy security issues. We focus on a particular mechanism for such a common policy – the substantial “buyer power” of the EU in the natural gas market. We start by relating the “buyer power” mechanism to the current context of the EU energy markets. We then discuss the substitutability between “buyer power” and alternative energy security tools available to the EU.  In particular, we argue that two main energy security tools – the diversification of the gas sources and the liberalization of the internal gas market – may counteract such buyer power, either by decreasing the leverage over the gas supplier(s) or by undermining coordination. Thereby, investing both into diversification, market liberalization and energy policy coordination may be inefficiently costly. These trade-offs are often overlooked in the discussion of EU energy policy.

The security of energy supply has been part of the European political agenda for more than half a century – at least, since the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. However, the Community’s view on the energy security policy and its desirable tools has been changing over time. In the early decades of European integration energy security issues were predominantly seen as belonging to the national competence level. Due to substantial variation in the energy portfolios and energy needs among the Member States, attempts to create a common energy policy were largely unsuccessful. The first large move towards a common energy policy came in the mid-1980s with the idea of developing a common internal energy market. The focus was on liberalization, privatization and integration of the internal markets, with an objective of achieving more competitive prices, improving infrastructure, and facilitating cooperation in case of energy supply shocks. In particular, the internal market was seen as a tool to (partially) overcome the disparity in the energy risk exposure among the Member States.  A considerable effort was put in this direction and a certain progress was accomplished.

The second half of 2000s has been characterized by a number of gas crises between one of the largest EU gas suppliers, Russia and the transit countries  – Ukraine (in 2006, 2007 and 2009) and Belarus (in 2004 and 2010).  These crises repeatedly caused reduction, and sometimes even complete halts, of Russian gas flows to the EU. As a result, the focus of the EU energy policy shifted towards measures ensuring the security of external energy supply. The policy debate has been stressing the dependency of the EU on large fuel suppliers, such as Russia in case of gas, and the need to lower this dependency. Suggested remedies included diversification of gas sources (in particular, away from Russian gas – such as construction of Nabucco pipeline or introduction of new LNG terminals), strengthening of the internal market, and more efficient energy use. The debate was further heated by the construction (and late 2011 launch) of the Nord Stream pipeline, which, according to popular opinion, would further increase the EU dependence on Russia.

In what follows, we address this external energy policy debate. We argue that the dependence per se is not necessarily dangerous for the EU and can be counteracted with due coordination between the Member States. Further, we argue that in dealing with large gas suppliers, there is certain substitutability between such coordination and other proposed energy policy measures, such as diversification of the energy routes or further market liberalization. Thereby, the EU would be better off by carefully choosing an appropriate mix of energy policy tools, rather than by getting all of them at once.

Indeed, the dependency of the EU on Russian natural gas is large. The share of Russian gas in the total EU gas consumption is around 20%,1 and for the group of EU Member States importing gas from Russia this share constitutes around one third.1  Furthermore, in a number of EU Member States – such as Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania and Slovakia – the share of Russian gas in total consumption is above 80%.3

However, it is important to remember that the dependency is mutual. The current share of gas exports to the EU of total Russian gas exports is around 55%,1 and these gas exports constitute around one fifth7 of Russian federal budget revenues. These observations suggests that the EU as a whole would also possess a substantial market power in the gas trade between Russia and the EU, and this market power can be exercised to achieve certain concessions.

More precisely, this situation could be viewed through a prism of what the economic literature refers to as “buyer power”. Inderst and Shaffer (2008) identify buyer power as “the ability of buyers (i.e., downstream firms) to obtain advantageous terms of trade from their suppliers (i.e., upstream firms)”.5 The notion of buyer power is typically used in the context of vertical trade relationship between a small number of large sellers and a few large buyers. As there are only a few agents, each with considerable market power, the outcome of such trade would typically be determined through some kind of bargaining procedure, rather than via a market mechanism. In such bargaining, the extent of buyer power depends on the seller’s outside option, or, in other words, on the ease for the seller to cope with a loss of a large part of its market.

Consider for example a single seller serving a few buyers. Intuitively, were there a disagreement between the seller and a small buyer, it should be relatively easy for the seller to reallocate the freed-up capacity to the remaining buyers, making each of them consume just a little bit more of a product. However, the larger is the freed-up capacity of the seller in case of a disagreement, the more difficult it is for the seller to reallocate this capacity to the rest of the market. Moreover, allocating this relatively large capacity to the remaining buyers is likely to suppress the price and lower the monopoly profits of the seller. Inderst and Wey (2007) show that, under some relatively standard modeling requirements, “the supplier’s loss from a disagreement increases more than proportionally with the size of the respective buyer”.6 In other words, an increase in the size of the buyer undermines the seller’s outside option, thereby weakening the seller’s bargaining position and allowing the buyer to negotiate a preferential treatment.

It is relatively straight-forward to see the parallels between this argument and the gas trade relation between the EU and Russia. In a sense, the buyer power theory provides an economic (rather than political) rational for the September 2011 European Commission proposal to coordinate the external energy policy in order to “exercise the combined weight of the EU in external energy relations”.2 At the same time, the large buyer mechanism also allows us to see more clearly, why such a coordination policy may come into conflict with the other proposed energy policy tools.

In particular, consider the diversification of the gas supplies across producers. The argument for the diversification is that it decreases the dependency on each particular supplier, thereby lowering the exposure to the idiosyncratic risks of these suppliers. However, lower volumes of gas imports from such suppliers imply a loss of the EU’s buyer power vis-a-vis these suppliers. This would worsen the terms of the respective gas trade deals or undermine the stability of the supply. Of course, this argument suggests by no means that a diversification strategy is useless or harmful for the EU energy security; however, one would need to account for the relative importance of lower dependency vs. lower buyer power in making the diversification decisions. In other words, the EU can achieve the same level of gas supply stability by investing either into further diversification of gas supply or into better coordination among the members. Trying to achieve both objectives at the same time may result in efficiency loss, at least from the gas supply security perspective. Importantly, this tradeoff has been largely overlooked in the discussion of the EU energy policy.

Another energy policy objective pursued by the EU in the last decades is the creation of an integrated and deregulated internal gas market. Again, the relationship between this energy policy objective and the buyer power is two-fold. On one hand, better integration of internal gas markets would help to even out the disparities in the gas supply risk exposure across the Member States, thereby facilitating cooperation and lessening the tensions between the energy security interests on the national vs. community-wide level. On the other hand, gas market liberalization and a push towards more competitive gas trade environment within the EU may come into conflict with the supranational coordination of buyer power. Once large state-run gas purchasing actors are dissolved and replaced by multiple private, not necessarily domestic, and possibly small market participants, it might be much more difficult, if at all possible, to achieve coordination in bargaining with the gas supplying side. As Finon and Locatelli (2007) argue, “if the major gas buyers are weakened in the name of the principles of short-term competition, their bargaining power and their financial capacity to handle large import operations would be reduced”.4 Moreover, there is a clear conceptual contradiction between coordination among gas buyers and the competitiveness principles of the European gas market. Again, this tradeoff needs to be taken into account in the common energy policy design.

Finally, it is important to mention that the “large buyer” argument is less relevant for the EU markets for other fuels, such as oil, liquefied natural gas, or coal. The key difference comes from the inherent structure of the gas market, as compared to the one of oil, coal, etc. Indeed, the EU imports most of its natural gas via pipelines, which makes it difficult for both sides of the deal to switch to an alternative partner. In other words, the natural gas market serving the EU is effectively a local market. Instead, fuels like oil, liquefied natural gas, or coal are traded more globally, and are much more fungible (that is, it is much easier to find an alternative supplier or a consumer). Global markets imply smaller market shares of the EU (indeed, the EU consumes only about 16 %1 of the world oil). This, coupled with better fungibility of oil, LNG, etc. undermines the power of the large buyer argument for other fuels.

To sum up, the EU has a noticeable potential for improving its position in the gas trade deals and enhancing the stability of its gas supplies. This potential comes from the large buyer power possessed by the EU in the gas market, and is in line with the long considered and recently revived idea of “one voice” common energy policy. At the same time, the extent to which the buyer power can be used as an energy policy tool may be limited by the other policy instruments, such as diversification of gas supplies, a shift towards LNG or alternative fuels, or internal market liberalization. This has to be taken into account in choosing the optimal energy security policy mix.

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References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Multidimensional Approach to the Energy Security Analysis of Belarus – Part 2: Economic and Geopolitical Trends

Posted on October 17, 2011 | Policy Brief

20181016 SITE Energy Talks Image 01

Author: Mykhaylo Salnykov, BEROC

Energy security is a complex phenomenon incorporating a variety of economic, social and environmental aspects of a country’s life. Building on a previous FREE policy brief, published on September 5, which dealt mainly with the situation up until today, this text deals more with the future. It takes a detailed look at existing trends and discusses potential positive effects and challenges to energy security in Belarus. It also provides potential measures for addressing adverse effects of these trends on the country’s energy security.

When evaluating energy security consequences of external and internal factors, a decision maker is advised to view energy security as a complex phenomenon. The main components of Belarusian energy security identified in the first part of this paper published in the FREE Policy Brief Series September 5, 2011, include (i) primary energy source distribution (diversification of energy sources, especially away from natural gas as well as reducing the economy’s energy intensity), (ii) international trade considerations, (iii) the geopolitical context (with a special focus on diversification of energy suppliers and an optimal use of the country’s gas- and oil- transporting systems), and (iv) environmental considerations of the energy use (related to both actual and the perceived impact of the energy production and consumption on the environment).

Other dimensions of energy security also include the social impact of energy production and consumption, as well as the sustainability of energy use.

Below, I provide a detailed look at these and other existing trends. Potential positive effects and challenges in the context of energy security of Belarus will also be discussed. Finally, potential measures of addressing adverse effects of these trends on the country’s energy security will be suggested.

Main Energy Security Challenges for Belarus in 2011-2020

The following components of the energy security of Belarus are considered to be of primary importance:

  • Reducing energy intensity of the economy;
  • Diversification of energy sources used in heat and power generation, especially diversification away from natural gas consumption;
  • Diversification away from Russian fuel imports;
  • Securing stable operation of gas and oil pipeline systems close to full capacity;
  • Reducing impact of energy production and consumption on the environment.

The main trends in Belarusian and regional policy and economy, as well as their impacts on the aforementioned components of energy security are the following:

  • Natural shale gas and liquefied natural gas revolution in Europe;
  • Launch of the Nord Stream gas pipeline system in 2011-2012;
  • Construction of nuclear power plant station in Astravets;
  • New suppliers of hydrocarbons to Belarus.

I will purposefully not discuss important topics as carbon-free technologies development in Belarus, participation in the international carbon-reduction dialog, etc., since these trends are unlikely to become anything close to significant determinants of the Belarusian energy security puzzle within the next decade.

Natural Shale Gas and LNG Revolution in Europe

Recent developments in the technology of natural shale gas extraction in Europe and elsewhere, bring a lucrative prospect of boosting the world’s natural gas supply. Several of the European countries, including Austria, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Sweden, Ukraine and United Kingdom have announced plans to study fields with shale gas extraction potential. This could secure European gas supplies, drive gas prices in Europe down, and diversify European imports away from Russian natural gas. The natural shale gas extraction development factor will be further reinforced by the increased volumes of the LNG imports to Europe from the Americas and Northern Africa.

Contraction of gas prices in the European market will positively affect Belarusian economy as natural gas imports from Russia will become less expensive even if no active steps by the Belarusian government are undertaken. Nevertheless, the natural shale gas and LNG revolution will also widen the body of potential importers of natural gas via pipelines from Poland and Ukraine and by sea freight from seaports in the Baltic States. Specifically, in the summer of 2010, the Belarusian government announced having plans of negotiating a possible construction of a Belarusian LNG terminal in Lithuanian Klaipeda. This terminal is projected to have an annual capacity of five to eight billion cubic meters of natural gas which would be transported to Belarus via the pipeline system.

The shortcoming of the lower prices for natural gas and diversified body of importers in Europe is a reduced demand for Belarusian natural gas transit capacity as Russian exports to Europe contract. Moreover, potential transportation of shale gas from Poland via the pipeline system (see Figure 1) is likely to conflict with the Russian gas transit going into the opposite direction. From an economic perspective, it is very likely that benefits for Belarus obtained from lower gas prices will overweight potential losses from the reduced transit of Russian natural gas to Europe.

Figure 1. Natural gas and oil pipeline systems in Eastern Europe.


Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Russia/images/fsu_energymap.pdf

From a political perspective, Belarus losing its role as a transit country would substantially weaken its position in foreign relations with both Russia and Europe.

A possible side effect of the lower prices for natural gas is reduced incentives for the Belarusian government to reform power and heat generating sector and contract the energy intensity of the economy. While the former outcome may be economically justified by lower gas prices and diversified sources of natural gas in the new economic environment, the latter raises serious concerns over the pace of economic modernization in the country.

On the other hand, the environmental impact is mixed. While lower incentive to modernize the economy could result in a slower progress of lowering the pollution intensity in energy use, increased incentives to use natural gas, one of the environmentally friendliest hydrocarbons, would play a positive role in ensuring that the intensity of pollution reduces.

Launch of the Nord Stream Pipeline System

Dubbed by the Belarusian President, Aliaksandr Lukashenka “the silliest Russian project ever”, the Nord Stream pipeline system will allow Russia to redirect 55 billion cubic meters of natural gas (nearly 33% of the current Russian gas exports) via this more direct route to the final consumers. Thus, if European demand for Russian gas stays unchanged, the gas transit through Belarus and Ukraine will drop to nearly 100 billion cubic meters from the current 158 billion cubic meters. The 100 billion cubic meters figure is close to the capacity of the Ukrainian gas pipeline system alone. Therefore, one may hypothesize that in the worst case scenario Belarus may suffer a complete loss of its gas transit revenues.

In fact, even optimistic scenarios of the distribution of the residual transit demand between Ukrainian and Belarusian pipeline systems, imply both a substantial reduction of volumes transferred via Belarusian pipeline system, and a decline in transit tariffs triggered by strong price competition between Belarus and Ukraine. As a result, profits from the gas pipeline system in Belarus are likely to diminish.

This negative outcome is reinforced by the above mentioned trends of increased extraction of natural shale gas in Europe as well as prospective development of the LNG trading routes with Northern Africa and Americas. A conservative estimation of the reduction of European demand for Russian natural gas indicates that it can be reduced by 28 billion cubic meters (17% of the current Russian imports). Coupled with the launch of the Nord Stream, the decline of transit volumes through Belarus and Ukraine can be nearly 75 billion cubic meters annually, which is more than a 50% reduction from current levels.

Notably, these 28 billion cubic meters is an equivalent of the natural gas consumption by Poland and Hungary alone, the European countries currently most dependent on Russian gas imports.

Thus, the launch of the Nord Stream presents a substantial threat to the stable operation of the Belarusian gas pipeline system and requires careful policy steps (which will be discussed further ahead).

The fact that Belarus loses an important lever of its transit capacity may lead to lower negotiation power in fuel prices dialog with Russia, thus, leading to the smaller subsidies for the Russian oil and gas imports. However, a reduction of the world gas prices due to the growing European production of natural gas and LNG trade is likely to at least partly offset this effect.

Reduced profits received from the natural gas transit is likely to lead to a decrease of budget funds available for technological modernization of the Belarusian economy, which, in turn, may lead to an inadequate pace of changes in energy efficiency and pollution intensity of energy use as well as slower modernization of the power and heat generating sector and diversification away from the natural gas use.

On the other hand, the launch of the Nord Stream and reduced negotiation power towards Russia could increase incentives for Belarus to diversify away from Russian fuel imports as subsidies for the Russian oil and gas imports will contract.

Construction of Astravets Nuclear Power Plant

Although the launch of the Astravets nuclear power plant is unlikely to happen before 2017-2018, debates around this controversial project and its rationale requires a discussion of its energy security implications long before the plant is constructed.

The projected two-reactor nuclear power plant has an operating capacity of 2.4 GW. Unadjusted for load fluctuations in demand, this figure is an equivalent of 63.5% of the electricity consumption in Belarus. A rough seasonally unadjusted estimate of the Astravets nuclear power plant electricity production is a 35-40% of the daily peak load electricity consumption in the country – a usual figure for the baseload demand figure. Therefore, it is expected that once in full operation, Astravets plant could provide for the entire baseload demand on electricity in Belarus.

Some opponents of the Astravets plant construction note that the plant’s capacity may be excessive as several other nuclear power plants are being constructed in the region, including a plant in Lithuania and Russia’s Kaliningrad oblast. It is suggested that it may be optimal for Belarus to purchase electricity from these plants rather than constructing its own. This view, however, does not take into consideration two important issues. Firstly, it is highly unlikely that anything but the excess baseload electricity production will be traded (i.e. limited volumes of energy at night for approximately 5 to 6 hours per day); at all other time Belarus would need to rely entirely on its thermal power plants to generate electricity. Secondly, shifting from the dependence on hydrocarbon imports to the dependence on electricity imports will not cause a substantial improvement of the country’s energy security.

Current production of electricity by fossil fuel operated power plants in Belarus is an equivalent of 18 TWh, 55% of the total electricity consumption in the country. A launch of the Astravets nuclear power plant would allow reducing fossil fuel operated power plants’ utilization to virtually zero level. In addition, nearly 15% of the combined heat and power plants may operate as heat plants only.

Yet, it is unlikely to lead to the substantial changes in the usage of the existing heat plants: while nuclear power plants can provide heat, Astravets is located far from densely populated regions of Belarus, which makes heat delivery to the final consumer close to impossible because of the high losses in transfer.

As a result of decreased utilization of power plants and CHP plants, demand for natural gas from the heat and power generating sector will be reduced by 38%. Thus, the share of natural gas in the sector’s consumption balance will shrink to nearly 50% from the current 91% figure. The Astravets plant launch will also lead to nearly 25% reduction of the sector’s demand for petroleum products.

Therefore, the economy-wide TPES of natural gas is likely to contract by 28.5% and TPES of crude oil and petroleum products by nearly 2% once the Astravets plant is in full operation. The estimated annual benefit from the reduced imports of hydrocarbons is likely to reach USD 1 billion at current fuel prices.

Overall, Astravets power plant launch is expected to have strongly positive effect on diversification of energy sources in heat and power generating sector as nuclear power will gain the second largest share among the energy sources used in the sector and the natural share will reduce to nearly 50% of the total consumption by the sector. The plant construction is also likely to have a positive effect on the energy intensity by reducing losses from the power generating sectors and by closure of obsolete plants.

Moreover, the effect on diversifying fuel imports away from Russia is two-fold. Although Belarus will be able to reduce its Russian gas imports by almost a third of its current level, nuclear fuel for the Astravets station is likely to be imported from Russia. Nevertheless, given positive shifts in Belarusian regime’s relations with the West, it is highly likely that by the time of the power plant launch, the current suspicion of the Belarusian government by the international community will have vanished and alternative importers of uranium would then become an option.

Overall, the Astravets plant will have very limited impact on Belarus’ role as a transit corridor for Russian hydrocarbons.

Environmental consideration is probably the most controversial issue with respect to the projected plant. The issue becomes even more uncertain when one takes into account not only objective environmental costs and benefits, but also subjective factors, such as suspicion of Belarusians to nuclear power – a legacy of the Chernobyl accident.

A nuclear power plant will undoubtedly lead to a reduction of pollution intensity in the Belarusian economy. Yet, there are a number of factors that may offset the seeming gains. Firstly, a low probability of technological disaster at the power plant, mean that most Belarusians consider the plant as an environmentally but dangerous project for the country. Secondly, Lithuanian environmentalists have expressed their concerns over the proximity of the projected plant to the Lithuanian capital, Vilnius (only 40 km), especially as the Neris (Viliya) river that flows through Vilnius will be the main water source for the Astravets plant. Thirdly, international environmental experts rarely consider nuclear power plants considerably greener than their fossil fuel operated counterparts as uranium extraction and enriching produces substantial amounts of polluting substances at their fuel producing facilities. Finally, spent nuclear fuel treatment still remains one of the issues without a sustainable technological solution. Belarus is likely to export its nuclear waste to either Russia or Ukraine that have spent nuclear fuel storage facilities.

Therefore, from an environmental perspective, while Belarus will enjoy most of the benefits of the cleaner power generation, it is likely to create substantial trans-boundary environmental risks mostly for Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine.

New suppliers of hydrocarbons

Belarus currently attempts to diversify its oil supply by shipping Venezuelan crude to Black Sea and Baltic Sea ports. In addition, there exists a sound potential of diversifying Belarusian natural gas imports by gaining access to Ukrainian and Polish natural shale gas deposits as well as through constructing an LNG terminal at the Baltic Sea.

While the perspectives of these recent international advancements are not certain, in the case of sustainable progress they are likely to have important implications for the energy security of Belarus, which are closely interrelated to the implications of the shale gas and LNG revolution.

Emergence of new suppliers of hydrocarbons will have a positive impact on diversifying away from Russian fuel imports, but will also reduce incentives for the energy intensity and pollution intensity reduction as well as the modernization of the heat and power generating sector as economic stimuli for technological modernization fade away.

Diversification of hydrocarbon suppliers presents risks for the usage of Belarusian gas and oil pipeline systems. If oil would be transported from either Black Sea or Baltic Sea ports, this oil would compete with the Russian oil transport routes headed into the opposite direction to either Ukrainian Odesa seaport or Baltic refineries (see Figure 1). Pipeline transportation of shale gas from Poland would compete with Russian natural gas going in the opposite direction. At the same time, reduced revenues from transit of Russian hydrocarbons may be overweighed by benefits incurred from lower prices for hydrocarbons from the alternative sources.

Table 1 provides a summary of the reviewed trends and their impact on the energy security challenges faced by Belarus.

Table 1. Summary of the existing trends and their impact on energy security of Belarus

Policy recommendations

Table 1 suggests that the most of the vital energy security components will experience both positive and negative shocks in the nearest future. Nevertheless, it is possible to undertake a number of policy measures to enhance positive effects and secure against risks.

Reducing energy intensity of economy

All possible negative effects on the energy intensity reduction will be a result of either lowering incentives to modernize the existing technologies due to lower hydrocarbons prices or a reduced capacity to modernize due to drop in budget revenues. Yet, as discussed above, improving energy efficiency may become an important driver of economic growth in the foreseeable future.

Besides already existing Energy Efficiency Department of the Committee for Standardization and construction of the Astravets power plant having a positive impact on the energy intensity of the economy, the Belarusian government may also consider the following options:

  • Establishing a Research and Development (R&D) program on energy efficiency;
  • Creating a special energy efficiency fund to be used for the modernization and energy intensity reduction measures;
  • Imposing standards of energy use, especially in energy intensive sectors;
  • Introducing taxation schemes on energy use with industry-specific energy intensity reference values in order to provide additional incentives for businesses to undertake modernization and reduce energy intensity;
  • Issuing a mandate requiring gradual replacement and rehabilitation of obsolete equipment, especially in heat and power generating and energy intensive industrial sectors.

Heat and power generating sector diversification away from gas

Similarly, to the energy intensity challenge, the HPG sector diversification away from gas will be negatively affected by the reduced incentives to modernize and the lack of budget funds to impose these modernizations. Hence, the following measures may be considered:

  • Ensuring adequate progress of the Astravets power plant construction;
  • Imposing standards and taxation schemes of energy use by the sector;
  • Study options for electricity imports, especially in off-peak hours;
  • Gradually replace and rehabilitate obsolete equipment.

A number of steps to encourage use of specific fuel sources can be undertaken:

  • Study possibilities of expanding production and/or imports of coal;
  • Transfer some smaller-scale heat plants to coal and/or wood as environmental conditions permit;
  • Integrate production of fuel wood into conventional forestry and industrial timber procurement;
  • Assure quality standards and efficient use for forest chips.

While not being directly related to the sector’s diversification away from natural gas, the following measures will allow improving financial performance of the sector and, thus, providing additional resources to undertake modernizations in the sector:

  • Separate commercial operation of the sector’s state-owned companies from the government’s conflicting position as an owner, policy setter and regulator;
  • Imposing reporting standards, such as IFRS standards, in the sector in order to improve financial management of the companies and attract possible financiers;
  • Adopt and implement OECD 2005 Guidelines on corporate governance of state-owned enterprises. While a number of the guidelines are not applicable to the Belarusian noncorporatized companies such as Belenergo and Beltopgas, general principle allow for more effective management of the companies.

I purposefully omit an option of the ownership change of the heat and power generating sector’s companies in our policy recommendations, since this option is not consistent with the existing economic and political environment in Belarus.

Diversification away from Russian fuel imports

While all of the trends analyzed will have positive effect on diversification away from Russian fuel imports, this seeming progress is largely due to the fact that up until recently Belarus has been totally dependent on Russia’s fuel imports. Yet, a number of steps can be undertaken to further augment the diversification progress:

  • Ensuring adequate progress of the projects enhancing the diversification away from Russian fuel supply, namely LNG terminal in Kaunas, Astravets power plant and search of alternative suppliers of hydrocarbons;
  • Exploring possibility to access and explore Polish and Ukrainian shale gas fields with a possibility to operate some of the extraction facilities;
  • Studying an option to create a coal-bed methane extracting consortium with Ukraine to develop technology and extract coal-bed methane in coal-rich Eastern Donbas region;
  • Researching and developing biomass as a source of energy to replace a share of oil and gas usage.

Usage of pipeline system up to full capacity

It is next to certain that the configuration of the hydrocarbon routes in Eastern Europe is about to go through fundamental changes in the nearest future due to both reduced demand for Russian hydrocarbons from Europe and the launch of the Nord Stream pipeline system. Still, there exist a number of steps to ensure that Belarusian pipeline system is in operation and is enhancing the country’s energy security:

  • Creating a gas-transporting consortium with Ukraine to gain an additional market power to ensure adequate transit tariffs and share of volumes of the residual Russian gas exports to Europe after Nord Stream is launched;
  • If Russian hydrocarbons transit volumes fall below critical level, transfer to the reverse direction to make the best use of the Polish shale gas and Baltic seaports’ ability to receive oil for Belarus. By doing so, Belarus will ensure both hydrocarbons imports diversification and adequate operation of its pipeline systems;
  • Continuing search for alternative suppliers of oil and natural gas (including LNG) in order to assure adequate usage of the pipeline systems in the reverse direction.

Environmental effect

Similarly to energy intensity considerations, most of the negative effects of the current trends on the environment are related to either reduced incentives to modernize or reduced funds available for modernization projects. The following measures are intended to reduce pollution intensity of energy use:

  • Establishing a Research and Development (R&D) program on environmental effects of energy use;
  • Imposing environmental standards and taxes on energy use, especially in energy intensive sectors and bringing these policies closer to international standards;
  • Issuing a mandate requiring gradual replacement and rehabilitation of obsolete equipment, especially in heat and power generating and pollution intensive industrial sectors;
  • Establishing emission trade relations with the Kyoto Protocol Annex B countries to collect funds for the environmental modernization of equipment.

The following steps should be undertaken to minimize both actual and perceived environmental risks of the Astravets nuclear power station:

  • Working with the general public to educate them about modern technologies that guarantee nuclear power safety as well as inform them of virtually accident-free record of civil nuclear power besides Chernobyl disaster;
  • Establishing relations with the stakeholders that might be affected by the environmental impact of the projected power station, especially, local communities along Neris river;
  • On early stages, study the possibilities for the spent nuclear fuel treatment and reach the preliminary international agreements over the potential nuclear waste storage if needed;
  • Ensure compliance with the international standards of the power plant construction and operation and advertise this compliance strategy to the stakeholders.

Concluding remarks

Currently Belarus enters a completely new stage of its development as the old economic growth factors vanish, the political situation both within and outside the country transforms, and the geopolitical context changes. This new stage of the country’s development presents new challenges and new opportunities for Belarusian energy security, the key for any country’s independence. Careful consideration of the most critical energy security challenges coupled with professional and effective policy measures to tackle them is a vital task for securing Belarus’ economic growth, political sovereignty and quality of life improvement.

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