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Lessons From the FROGEE Conference “The Playing Field in Academia: Why Are Women Still Underrepresented?”

Posted on September 25, 2023 | FROGEE PROJECT

Image of dark university area with two men representing women underrepresented in academia

Despite an increase in women’s representation since the beginning of the 20^th century, women remain underrepresented in academia and other high-skilled professions. Academia has been prone to gender disparities both within and across fields as well as across academic ranks. In an endeavour to examine and address the underrepresentation of women in the academic profession, the Centre of Economic Analysis (CenEA), together with the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) and other partners of the Forum for Research on Gender Economics (FROGEE) at the FREE Network, organized the two-day conference “The playing field in academia: Why are women still underrepresented?”, in Warsaw June 21-22, 2023. This brief offers insights from the presentations and panel discussions held at the conference.

To date, there are few, if any, high-skilled professions exhibiting gender balance, and academia is no exception. Consequently, this imbalance has been subject to increased multidisciplinary research attention, exploring its origins and potential remedies. However, attaining a comprehensive understanding of gender disparities remains a challenge. For instance, much remains to be learnt about their long-run dynamics, a subject addressed by Carlo Schwarz, in one of the conference’s keynote lectures.

A Century of Progress

Carlo Schwarz (in joint work with Alessandro Iaria and Fabian Waldinger, 2022) trace the evolution of gender gaps in academia across a variety of domains at the global level throughout the 20^th Century. Facilitated by an unprecedentedly large database of nearly 500,000 academics, spanning 130 countries and supplemented by publication and citation data, the authors specifically examine gender imbalances in recruitment, publishing, citation patterns, and promotions.

They find that in 1900 women constituted roughly 1 percent of all hires in academia (226 women, with only 113 hired as full professors). By 1969 the share of female academics had risen to about 6.6 percent, and by the year 2000 it had grown to approximately 17 percent. These rates varied across disciplines, institutions, and countries. For instance, teaching-centric disciplines such as pedagogy and linguistics, exhibited higher representation relative to research-oriented ones.

The research subsequently reveals a hump-shaped evolution of the gender gap in academic output – starting small before peaking at 45 percentage points fewer publications by women in 1969, thereafter declining to 20 percentage points. These publication disparities were also found to share a U-shaped relationship with the share of women in academia, indicating the interconnectedness of gender gaps.

The authors also address gender gaps in citations, identified by the use of a novel machine learning approach, forecasting a paper’s citations had it been written by a man. The results indicate a progressive reduction in the citation gap during the 20^th century, decreasing from 27 percentage points (pre-WW1) to 14 percentage points (interwar) and eventually to 8 percentage points (post-WW2) fewer citations of papers by female relative to male academics. These gender gaps in academic output reiterated current evidence from Mexico, presented at the conference by Diana Terrazas-Santamaria, showing that women are associated with lower citation rates. Terrazas-Santamaria attribute the low rates to gender differences in both the number of publications and duration of academic careers.

The work by Iaria, Schwarz and Waldinger (2022) further showcase the gender disparities in career advancement in academia, which similarly decreased over the years. At the point of the greatest gender disparity, women required an approximately 6 percentage points better publication record to have the same promotion probabilities as their male counterparts.

The Leaky, Dry Pipeline

In the conference’s second keynote, Sarah Smith highlighted how academia, much like other professional occupations, exhibits a leaky pipeline. This is a phenomenon characterized by a declining representation of women as they ascend through the academic hierarchy. When examining specific fields, Smith’s results indicate that the gender disparities in economics much more closely align with those observed in STEM fields (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) than other social science disciplines. Furthermore, the economics’ field illustrate a significant lack of diversity among its new entrants. This phenomenon, referred to as the dry pipeline, generates future cohort implications, as they result in less demographically representative cohorts from which future professors can be recruited (see Stewart et al., 2009).

The cross-disciplinary comparison of the dry pipeline addressed in the keynote, contest the mathematical rigor of economics as a barrier to entry, as mathematics itself demonstrated higher women representation at A-level and undergraduate levels. In a following discussion panel, which focused on ensuring a fair start in academia (comprised of Yaroslava Babych, Alessandra Casarico, Federica Braccioli and Marta Gmurek, and moderated by Maria Perrotta Berlin), the panellists acknowledged that deeply engrained social expectations, gender trained behaviours and a lack of awareness constitute some of the persistent hindrances to the (early) involvement of women in specific fields, and the academic profession in general.

Additional factors influencing the gender balance in recruitment and promotion are gendered references, and the presence or absence of shared research interests between candidates and recruitment panels. These themes were extensively investigated in the work presented by Alessandra Casarico on the conference’s opening day. Specifically, results from collaborative work with Audinga Baltrunaite and Lucia Rizzica, highlight that grindstone words (e.g., “determined”, “hardworking”, etc.) are frequently used in recommendation letters to describe female candidates, while standout words (e.g., “excellent”, “strongest” etc.) typify male candidates’ references. Compared to their male counterparts, women are also shown to be more inclined to accentuate personality traits when serving as referees. This added to a broader literature demonstrating that female candidates’ recommendation letters frequently exhibit brevity, raise doubts, carry a weak tone, and emphasize candidates’ interpersonal skills and personality traits rather than their ability. Moreover, separate results from Casarico’s work (with Piera Bello and Debora Nozza) illustrate that research similarity between the recruiting committee and the candidate predict the likelihood of recruitment. The authors argue that the relationship is indicative of a bias against women if – as shown by the authors – women are less likely to be the candidates with the highest similarity.

In her presentation, Anne Sophie Lassen offered a different factor that may contribute to the attrition in the pipeline: the influence of parenthood on academic careers. Results from her work (with Ria Ivandić) indicate that while parenthood does not significantly influence graduation rates, it extends doctoral studies by an average of 7 months for women. Moreover, Lassen highlighted a declining trend of remaining in academia after becoming a parent, particularly pronounced among women.

More Areas of Imbalance

The remaining conference presentations and panel discussions explored additional domains of gender imbalances within academia. Iga Magda showcased evidence from her joint work with Jacek Bieliński, Marzena Feldy and Anna Knapińska of gender differences in remuneration during the early stages of an academic career, substantiating a gap within a year of graduation. These disparities endure throughout respondents’ careers and are contingent on the field of study – largest among engineering and technology graduates and lowest among those from the humanities and arts fields. Furthermore, it was observed that productivity plays a negligible role in the identified pay gaps, as its impact is similar for both genders.

The panel composed of Eleni Chatzichritou, Marta Łazarowicz-Kowalik, Jesper Roine and Joanna Wolszczak-Derlacz, and moderated by Michał Myck, deliberated on exposed disparities in the application for, and the success rates in attaining research funding in Poland and Europe – as seen in the National Science Centre (NCN) and the European Research Council research grants, respectively. The discussion highlighted how quantitative measures used in the allocation of research funding are riddled with subjective criteria that often benefit male academics. They also recognized how quests to allocate funds to the most successful candidate inadvertently penalize women with career breaks.

Another panel including Lev Lvovskiy, Carlo Schwarz, Sarah Smith, Marieke Bos and Joanna Tyrowicz, and moderated by Pamela Campa, lauded the growing objective data shedding light on gender inequalities in academia. The panellists discussed current challenges in identifying and quantifying aspects of gender disparities. For instance, currently used proxies do not allow to capture more subtle disparities, like microaggressions faced by female academics from students – emphasizing the need for more individual level survey data.

The panels were further enriched by personal anecdotes and filled with retrospective advice shared by both early career and established academics. To contextualize the above, a few cases from the FREE Network countries follow.

Evidence From Within the FREE Network

Yaroslava Babych shared insights concerning women in higher education in Georgia and other countries of the South Caucasus. Preliminary findings of her study confirm the presence of gender inequality in academia, evident in disparities in access to higher education as well as gender segregation across both fields and countries. Notably, women comprise a majority of the graduates in bachelor’s and master’s of art programs, whereas higher research-level programs such as doctors of science, and top echelons of the academic hierarchy remain predominantly male. Moreover, female academic output is found to be lower than that of male counterparts.

Lev Lvovskiy discussed the case of Belarus, highlighting the influence of the Soviet legacy. A significant factor linked to this legacy is exploiting university enrolment to circumvent compulsory conscription of men, allowing male university admissions to serve a secondary purpose beyond acquiring knowledge. This increases the perceived opportunity cost of enrolling a woman. Lvovskiy further documented the academic trajectories of Belarusians, revealing a majority of women at college and doctoral levels, but being underrepresented among doctoral graduates. The results further indicate significant cross-disciplinary gender disparities, with humanities having close to 80 percent women representation and engineering and information and technology (IT) fields having less than 30 percent women representation.

Monika Oczkowska provided evidence of gender disparities in Poland. Findings from the country reveal an overrepresentation of women graduates from bachelor through doctoral levels, and relative parity at post-doctoral level, but lower proportions at habilitation, associate professor, and professor levels. These general results confirm the higher detail findings presented by Karolina Goraus-Tanska on the first day of the conference. Results from Goraus-Tanska’s work (with Jacek Lewkowicz and Krzysztof Szczygielski) suggest that the drop-off among female academics from habilitation levels is not attributed to higher output expectations for women, but rather stems from the impact of parenthood.

Oczkowska further demonstrated that female academics in Poland are characterized by fewer international collaborations and lower levels of international output. Polish female academics were also showcased to engage in more international mobility during their doctoral studies relative to men, with the converse holding true after obtaining a doctoral degree. A potential explanation for this mobility decline among female academics, could be the increased burden of familial responsibilities at the post-doctoral and higher levels. Moreover, fewer women were reported to have applied for NCN grants and were underrepresented among the beneficiaries of these calls. Lastly, female academics in Poland record significantly lower total project costs relative to their male counterparts.

‘Plugging’ the Leak

In light of the aforementioned, what measures can be taken to address the gender imbalances in academia? As summarized by Sarah Smith, early initiatives have involved tracking women representation (e.g., in admissions, progression, hiring, etc.) within departments and/or institutions to identify where in the pipeline their progress is impeded. Attempted initiatives include formulation of seminar guidelines to overcome unfair experiences, as well as using gender-blind recruiting and objective hiring criteria to equalize hiring opportunities. Some other efforts, such as diverse recruitment panels have been unsuccessfully adopted, as they seem to embolden hostile male recruiters and load female panellists with unrewarded administration tasks. Conversely, mentoring has helped women build networks, publish more, and advance professionally. Awareness raising campaigns have reduced disparities in teaching evaluations and remain vital in addressing the dry pipeline and both transparent workload allocation and rewarding of administrative tasks have been shown to reduce promotion gaps in academia. In addition to the above, initiatives such as fostering gender-neutral networking opportunities, collaborations and a more diverse faculty were also deliberated during the conference.

Concluding Remarks

The conference advanced dialogue on societal and structural constraints to gender equality in academia and provided a platform to exchange ideas on how the shared objective of a more inclusive and equitable academic environment can be achieved. While the challenges remain abundant, and the costs associated not always negligible, it remains crucial to assess achievements, such as those resulting from mentoring and awareness intervention initiatives and recognize that further opportunities to enhance equity within the profession exist.

Additional Material

Seminar Programme 21.06.2023

Seminar Participants – short bios

Conference Programme 22.06.2023

Conference Participants – short bios

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Potential Climate Change Impacts on Women’s Vulnerability in Georgia

Posted on May 8, 2023 | Policy Brief

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Climate change can increase the vulnerability of women to various risks, including natural disasters, food insecurity, water scarcity, and health problems. Women may also face unique challenges in accessing resources and services, which can limit their ability to adapt to a changing climate. Developing countries, with their more traditional gender roles, are even more likely to experience disproportionate impacts of climate change on women, and Georgia is no exception. Thus, the country needs to address this problem through a comprehensive approach which accounts for the social, economic, and environmental factors that contribute to gender inequality.

Introduction

According to Georgia’s fourth national communication report to the United Nation’s Framework Convention on Climate Change, the negative impacts of climate change on ecosystems and the economy can hinder Georgia’s path toward sustainable development. Therefore, a key focus for the country should be to develop climate-resilient practices and reduce the vulnerability of communities exposed to these impacts.

The climate scenarios in the communication report present a worrying picture of warming trends in the country, mainly due to increased temperatures in the last summer and autumn seasons, as depicted in Figure 1 (MEPA, 2021). Such alterations in weather patterns often lead to glacier retreat, water scarcity, coastal erosion, and biodiversity loss in different regions of Georgia (ibid).

Figure 1. Average summer and winter temperatures in Georgia, 1900-2021.

Source: Climate Change Knowledge Portal (World Bank, 2021).

An increasing body of international research has demonstrated that climate change can have adverse effects on agricultural production, food security, water management, and public health. Furthermore, research has revealed that these effects are not gender-neutral, with women and children being among the most affected groups (World Bank Group, 2021).

Climate Change Impacts on Women – A Georgian Perspective

Women in developing countries like Georgia experience various impacts of climate change, which affect them differently than men. The effects might vary according to region or community, but some common signs can be identified. The main channels through which women are disproportionally affected by climate change are discussed in the following sub-sections.

Health Impacts

Climate change has a significant effect on human health, with women being more vulnerable due to various cultural, social, and economic factors (Sbiroli et al., 2022). In particular, women appear to be more susceptible to infectious diseases and undernutrition, especially in middle and low-income countries (ibid).

Springmann et al. (2016) found that, by 2050, Georgia could experience about 32.36 climate-related deaths per million due to malnutrition caused by a lack of fruits and vegetables in people’s diets and due to increased health complications associated with undernutrition. In Georgia, malnutrition is a significant gender equality concern. According to the Global Nutrition Report, women in Georgia disproportionally experience exposure to undernutrition translated into underweight. Similarly, women represent the majority of Georgians with obesity (26.8 percent, compared to 22.2 percent among men). Both these issues may be further exacerbated by climate change in the future.

Furthermore, in Georgia, women are more likely to care for sick family members. According to Geostat, 31 percent of women who have sick or dependent family members are involved in providing them care, compared to only 15 percent of the men. This puts women at greater risk of exposure to climate change-induced infectious diseases, given that research has demonstrated an increased risk of such diseases worldwide, including in areas in Europe that have climate profiles similar to Georgia (Mora et al., 2022; Gray et al., 2009).

Figure 2. Prevalence of underweight among adults (>18) in Georgia, 2000-2016.

Source: Global Nutrition Report (2023).

Water and Food Scarcity

Climate change is also known to affect food and water supply through changes in agricultural conditions, droughts, and floods. In developing countries as women are often responsible for food and water supply, they are disproportionally affected by water shortages resulting from climate change (Figueiredo & Perkins, 2013). Women in poor rural households in Georgia are likely to face similar challenges.

Women in Georgia also play a crucial role in agriculture (according to Geostat, 47 percent of workers in agricultural holdings were women in 2021). Fluctuations in temperature and precipitation patterns can reduce crop yields, leading to lower income and food insecurity. This may disproportionately affect female farmers, as access to agricultural technologies, land ownership and lack of necessary knowledge and skills are some of the significant barriers for women involved in agriculture in Georgia (Gamisonia, 2015).

Economic Impacts and Access to Resources

One of the main reasons to why women are disproportionally affected by climate change is that their underlying economic conditions are less favourable than men’s (Yadav & Lal, 2018). In 2021, the majority of people outside the labor force were women (65 percent), while men constituted 35 percent (Geostat). It is important to mention that in the same year, only 33 percent of women were employed in Georgia, compared to 49 percent of men. Additionally, the average salary for women was 1056 GEL (813 GEL in the agricultural sector), while men earned an average of 1538 GEL (1006 GEL in the agricultural sector). Finally, although poverty rates among women in Georgia are slightly lower than among men, 17.1 vs. 17.9 percent respectively (absolute poverty rates in 2021), the poverty data does not account for the gender-biased distribution of household resources. Women face larger barriers in obtaining financial resources (collaterals, loans, etc.) than men because they own less property. For different types of property, only 44 percent are owned by at least one woman, according to the National Agency of Public Registry of Georgia. The corresponding number for men is 56 percent. Geostat data further indicates that households headed by men make up 63 percent of the total number of households, whereas households headed by women account for only 37 percent. These unfavorable conditions hinder women’s access to vital information and resources required for climate change adaptation and mitigation.

The discussed impacts may be especially prominent for women in poor rural households. Climate change-induced natural disasters are typically more detrimental for households dependent on agriculture (Dagdeviren et al., 2021), especially subsistence farmers and poor agricultural workers (in particular those without access to technology or resources). In Georgia, women are in majority in both these categories.

Natural Disasters and Displacement

Climate-driven disasters are over 14 times more likely to cause fatalities among women and children than men, according to UNHCR (2022). Additionally, women in agrarian societies impacted by climate change are less likely to use adaptive measures, putting them at higher risk of displacement (Palacios, Sexsmith, Matheu & Gonzalez, 2023). Such risks are also likely to pertain to the rural areas of Georgia.

Georgia’s International Obligations and Policies

In previous decades Georgia has made significant progress when it comes to incorporating gender equality and climate change into the policy agenda. In particular, Georgia follows numerous international legislative initiatives regarding sustainable development, gender equality, and climate change.

Georgia is a party to the Paris Agreement and the Beijing platform (a comprehensive roadmap for women’s rights and empowerment, which lists the problems associated with gender inequality and different strategies to overcome them, signed by Georgia in 1995). It is also a signatory of the Gender Action Plan (GAP), adopted a year after the Paris Agreement to integrate gender into targets and increase effectiveness, fairness, and sustainability.

The updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) of Georgia includes a dedicated section on gender and climate change. This section aims to promote gender mainstreaming, encourage equal participation, empower women, build capacity, and develop climate policies that are responsive to gender considerations. Furthermore, the Long-term Low-emission Development Strategies for Paris Agreement parties (including Georgia) has a communication and awareness-raising strategy that seeks to address gender, youth, and people with disabilities in its outreach efforts (United Nations, 2022).

Despite these commitments, Georgia is lagging when it comes to tackling the issues of climate change and gender in coordination. For example, even though Georgia has adopted a Gender Equality Law and Action Plan, it does not address climate change issues. Therefore, municipalities are not required to consider gender aspects of climate change impacts.

Identified Gaps and Policy Recommendations

Despite the number of policies and measures undertaken, unsolved problems hinder the country’s ambition to adhere to gender-mainstreamed climate change-addressed policymaking.

For example, there is a lack of gender-disaggregated data on the impacts of climate change in Georgia, which prevents policymakers from developing targeted strategies to address women’s needs. Therefore, collecting and analyzing disaggregated data with gender-specific impacts in mind is recommended. Additionally, involving women in decision-making and ensuring their participation in climate change efforts is crucial as their unique experiences and perspectives can inform more effective and equitable responses to climate change impacts.

As previously mentioned, climate change in Georgia is expected to exacerbate water and food scarcity, which can disproportionately affect women. Therefore, implementing climate-resilient water management strategies and increasing access to climate-resilient agricultural practices, such as crop diversification and improved irrigation systems, can help increase farm productivity and reduce the adverse impacts of climate change on women.

Furthermore, there is a need to provide women with access to financial resources and services and to address gender-based inequalities that may limit women’s ability to access information and resources necessary for climate change adaptation and mitigation.

Finally, addressing the impacts of climate change on women in Georgia will require a coordinated and sustained effort from a range of stakeholders, including governments, civil society organizations, and local communities, so that women are not left behind in the global effort to address the impacts of climate change.

Conclusion

To effectively address the impacts of climate change on women in Georgia, it is essential to recognize that various social, economic, and cultural factors shape women’s experiences. For example, women in rural areas may face different challenges than women in urban areas; women with few economic means may be disproportionately affected by climate change. Therefore, policies should not only integrate gender-mainstreaming, but also account for these heterogeneities, to ensure that different parties of the society are adequately addressed within the climate change policy agenda.

References

Dagdeviren, H., Elangovan, A., & Parimalavalli, R. (2021). Climate change, monsoon failures and inequality of impacts in South India. Journal of Environmental Management.
Figueiredo, P., & Perkins, P. E. (2013). Women and water management in times of climate change: participatory and inclusive processes. Journal of Cleaner Production, 188-194.
Gamisonia, N. (2015). Climate Change and Women. Heinrich Böll Stiftung.
Global Nutrition Report. (2023). Global Nutrition Report. https://globalnutritionreport.org/resources/nutrition-profiles/asia/western-asia/georgia/
Geostat. https://www.geostat.ge/en
Gray, J. S., Dautel, H., Estrada-Peña, A., Kahl, O., & Lindgren, E. (2009). Effects of Climate Change on Ticks and Tick-Borne Diseases in Europe. National Library of Medicine.
MEPA. (2021). Fourth National Communication of Georgia to the UNFCCC. Tbilisi: UNDP.
Mora, C., McKenzie, T., Gaw, I. M., Dean, J. M., Hammerstein, H. v., Knudson, T. A., Franklin, E. C. (2022). Over half of known human pathogenic diseases can be aggravated by climate change. Nature Climate Change.
National Agency of Public Registry of Georgia. https://www.napr.gov.ge/
Palacios, H. V., Sexsmith, K., Matheu, M., & Gonzalez, A. R. (2023). Gendered adaptations to climate change in the Honduran coffee sector. Women’s Studies International Forum.
Sbiroli, E., Geynisman-Tan, J., Sood, N., Maines, B. A., Junn, J. H.-J., & Sorensen, C. (2022). Climate change and women’s health in the United States: Impacts and opportunities. The Journal of Climate Change and Health.
Springmann, M., Mason-D’Croz, D., Robinson, S., Garnett, T., Godfray, H. C., Gollin, D., Scarborough, P. (2016). Global and regional health effects of future food production under climate change: a modelling study. National Library of Medicine.
UNHCR. (2022). Gender, Displacement and Climate Change. Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research.
United Nations. (2022). Long-term Low-emission Development Strategies. United Nations.
World Bank Group. (2021). Climate Risk Country Profile: Georgia. World Bank Group.
World Bank. (2021). Climate Change Knowledge Portal. https://climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org/country/georgia
Yadav, S. S., & Lal, R. (2018). Vulnerability of women to climate change in arid and semi-arid regions: The case of India and South Asia. Journal of Arid Environments, 4-17.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

FROGEE Training Workshop: Data Sources and Methods for Research and Policy Analysis

Posted on May 3, 2023 |

20230602 FROGEE Training Workshop Image 01

On 2 June 2023 CenEA will host an academic seminar day as part of a training workshop on “Data Sources and Methods for Research and Policy Analysis” organised in Szczecin.

The speakers include:

Daniel Hamermesh (University of Texas at Austin and IZA Bonn)
Arieda Muço (Central European University)
Michał Myck (Centre for Economic Analysis, CenEA)
Maria Perrotta Berlin (Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics)

The detailed programme of the Seminar day can be found here.

Registration

The seminar day is open to the public (the number of places is limited). If you would like to join please register by sending an e-mail to: Artur Król at: akról@cenea.org.pl.

If you would like to join via Zoom please register via Zoom registration page: (click here)

European Democracy Through the Lens of Party Manifestos

Posted on May 1, 2023 | Policy Brief

A group of flags representing European countries, displayed on flagpoles with a clear blue sky in the background representing European democracy

The subjects of political discourse are important but hard to quantify. This brief uses data from 30 years of party manifestos to study how the dominant topics in politics have evolved across Europe. Transition countries have seen the most significant shift in the content of political discourse. In the early 1990s, party manifestos in Eastern Europe focused on a distinct set of topics related to transition; by recent elections they had converged to those in Western Europe, with a heavy emphasis on the welfare state, education, infrastructure and technology. Political discourse can change rapidly in times of crisis as shown by the example of Ukraine.

“It’s the economy, stupid!”

James Carville, Bill Clinton’s strategist for the 1992 election.

The dominant topics in politics are not always as apparent as when Bill Clinton was elected US president in the midst of a recession. While it is easy to track winners across election cycles, it is much harder to know what got them elected and what they will do (or at least, promise to do) once in power. The key issues and topics that political parties and candidates talk about form as important a part in our democracies as vote shares.

In this brief, we use data collected by the Manifesto Project (Lehmann et al., 2022) to describe the development of political discourse across Europe, with a particular focus on the differences and similarities between western European countries and transition economies in Eastern Europe.

Political Manifestos as Data

In most countries, voters mainly participate in the democratic process by voting for candidates put forward by political parties. Political parties advertise themselves to voters and distinguish themselves from each other by issuing party programmes or party manifestos where they lay down their ideological and policy positions.

The Manifesto Project provides a publicly available dataset on parties’ policy platforms. The data are based on the manifestos of parties that have won at least one (Western Europe) or two seats (transition countries) in a national election. Coders manually analyse the content of the manifestos and provide the percentage of each party’s manifesto that falls into one of 56 content categories. These content categories summarise a party’s policy position on given issues, for instance, whether they favour environmental protection or an expansion of the welfare state or oppose protectionism or multiculturalism.

The Manifesto Project is an example of “text as data“. Quantitative analysis based on text is becoming increasingly important across the social sciences (Gentzkow et al., 2019) but it is particularly useful in political economy and political science given that “language is the medium of politics“ and objective numerical data are often limited (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013). Unlike many recent approaches which process data using automated text analysis tools, the Manifesto Project relies on the judgement of coders from over 50 countries who read the original text. The resultant dataset has limitations: the subjective choices made by individual coders, the to-some-extent arbitrary determination of content categories to summarise the most relevant issues across different contexts and time periods and the difficulty of imposing consistent classifications for texts written in over 40 languages. Despite these caveats, it is a unique resource for analysing the evolution of countries’ political discourse over time and across countries.

Key Issues in Political Discourse

Figure 1 summarises, through content categories, the policy positions of parliaments in Western Europe and transition countries at two points in time: the early 1990s (around the time of the first democratic elections in most transition countries) and after the latest election. We measure the importance of a policy position in a country’s parliament by weighting the importance of the relevant content category in each party’s manifesto by that party’s vote share. Over time, our measure of a policy position’s importance in political discourse may increase or decline for two reasons. First, parties may change the extent to which they emphasise a given position in their manifestos. For example, parties across the political spectrum are likely to have increased references to healthcare in their manifestos during election campaigns held during the Covid-19 pandemic. Second, as voters’ preferences shift, parties that gain support will see their issues receive greater weight in the aggregate measure relative to parties that lose vote shares. For example, if the pandemic shifted voters’ preferences towards a more comprehensive welfare system, voters could respond by voting for parties which discuss the expansion of the welfare state in their manifestos.

Figure 1. Policy positions of parties in parliament.

Source: The Manifesto Project and authors’ calculations.
Notes: This chart shows word clouds of the main topics that feature in the manifestos of political parties in parliament, weighted by each party’s vote share and averaged across countries within a region. Panels a and b are based on the first election after 1990 (and before 1995) and Panels c and d are based on the latest election (after 2015) in the sample. Western Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Transition economies include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. Not all countries are represented in both periods.

Some striking patterns emerge. While the policy priorities of Western European parliaments remain relatively stable over the past 30 years, those of transition countries have changed markedly. During the transition period, many parties focused on the political and economic aspects of transition. Support for democracy, freedom and human rights, as well as the free market economy, featured heavily in the manifestos of parties that formed the first democratic parliaments. Over time, policy priorities in transition countries have become more similar to those of their western neighbours, and issues such as the expansion of the welfare state, the provision of education, and the importance of technology and infrastructure, have come to the fore in all countries.

Nevertheless, some differences still remain. For instance, environmental protection is one of the most important topics in western European parliaments, though its importance has declined over time. In transition countries, the environment is slowly becoming more important, but even in the latest elections it ranked at only number 16 out of 56 issues. In contrast, support for the “national way of life” was and continues to be a prominent part of the political discourse in transition economies and it is also becoming more mainstream in the Western European countries.

Political corruption and governmental and administrative efficiency have become relatively more important issues in the parliaments of transition countries, both over time and relative to their western neighbours. Meanwhile, parties in Western Europe are devoting more of their manifesto to calls for equality and social justice.

A Closer Look at Ukraine

A country’s parliament’s policy platform can change suddenly in response to shocks. Figure 2 shows the big topic groups in the manifestos of political parties in the Ukrainian parliament from 1998 to 2019. The parliamentary election in October 2014 closely followed the Euromaidan Revolution, the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the start of the Donbas war. Compared to the previous elections, external relations became a major issue in the Ukrainian parliament, driven in particular by increased mentions of the military and the relationship with the EU. Party manifestos heavily featured appeals to Ukrainian nationhood, national solidarity, and unity (as evidenced by the increasing importance of the content category “Fabric of Society”). The trend of increasing attention to freedom and democracy also continued in this election cycle. In contrast, the previously most important issues in elections (welfare and quality of life) received much less attention in parliament at times of political upheaval and military conflict.

Figure 2. Topics in Ukrainian elections.

Source: The Manifesto Project and authors’ calculations.
Notes: This chart shows the percentage of mentions of topic groups in the manifestos of political parties in the Ukrainian parliament from 1998 to 2019, weighted by each party’s vote share.

Distribution of Political Ideology

While the previous section discussed the main policy issues in parliament, we now turn our focus to the ideology of individual political parties that make up a country’s parliament. A commonly used summary measure of political ideology is a left-right scale (RILE), where left positions favour peace, state intervention in the economy and the expansion of the welfare state and right positions support security, traditional values and the free market economy. The Manifesto Project provides a RILE value for each party at each election (based on Laver and Budge, 1992), which is calculated by subtracting the share of a party’s manifesto devoted to left-leaning policy issues, for instance support for the welfare state, from right-leaning content, such as support for the free market economy. Condensing the complexity of party programmes into a one-dimensional measure based on fixed definitions has advantages and drawbacks. The RILE makes it possible to compare diverse political parties that campaign on different issues (for instance ecological parties compared to nationalist parties) and measure how the same party’s policy stance may have shifted over time. As the definition of left- and right-leaning issues were based on influential political theories around the 1900s, some scholars argue that this measure has become less appropriate to empirically differentiate between modern political parties, particularly in transition countries (see, e.g., Mölder, 2016). In particular, Tavits and Letki (2009) show that during the transition process many leftist parties in Eastern Europe pursued economically right-wing policies and Vachudova (2008) argues that right-wing parties in the region often appealed to a nationalist discourse.

With these caveats in mind, Figure 3 shows the distribution of all parties in parliament in the Manifesto Project database on the RILE scale, weighted by their respective vote shares. In Western Europe in the 1990s, the chart shows the prominence of both centre-left and centre-right parties, as well as smaller parties both on the more extreme left and right. In contrast, the parties in parliament in transition economies at the time were more concentrated in the centre (and slightly towards the right). Fast forward 30 years and the distribution of political ideology has changed in both the east and the west. In Western Europe, the majority of parliamentarians are now situated slightly right of centre with little mass in the more extreme tails. In contrast, in the former transition countries, there is evidence of political polarisation with party representation moving both to the left and the right on the ideological spectrum and relatively few parliamentarians occupying the centre.

Figure 3. Left-right position of parties in parliament.

Source: The Manifesto Project and authors’ calculations.
Notes: This chart shows the density of parties in parliament on the left-right policy scale (RILE), weighted by each party’s vote share within their country. The dashed lines are based on the first election after 1990 (and before 1995) and the solid lines are based on the latest election (after 2015) in the sample. Western Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Transition economies include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. Not all countries are represented in both periods.

Conclusion

What are the main topics of political discourse? Are they different across countries? Do they change over time? While there is no perfect way to quantify and track political discourse over time, this brief uses data from parties’ manifestos provided by the Manifesto Project to illustrate some broad trends across Europe over the past 30 years.

We document two kinds of changes in the subject matter of party manifestos. First, there are gradual shifts in content that reflect underlying developments in society. As democracies have matured in Eastern Europe, the content of their parties’ manifestos has evolved away from the immediate concerns of economic and political transition and converged to those of Western European parties. Second, more abrupt shifts can arise when countries experience crises or institutional upheaval. Over the past decade Ukrainians have lived through a revolution, the Donbas war, and the ongoing Russian invasion. Most of the parties that represent them in parliament are new, and the issues that feature prominently in their manifestos are now markedly different from those before the Euromaidan revolution.

Manifestos are not just about substance but also about ideology. Using the Manifesto Project’s classification of parties on a left-right scale, we show how the distribution of parties has evolved in Western Europe and transition countries. By this measure, political polarisation has been increasing in transition countries where centrist positions are less well represented than in Western European parliaments.

References

Gentzkow, Matthew, Bryan Kelly, and Matt Taddy. (2019). “Text as data”, Journal of Economic Literature 57, no. 3: 535-74.
Grimmer, J., and Stewart, B. (2013). “Text as data: The promise and pitfalls of automatic content analysis methods for political texts”. Political analysis 21, no. 3: 267-297.
Lehmann, P., Burst, T., Matthieß, T., Regel, S., Volkens, A., Weßels, B. and Zehnter, L. (2022) The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG / CMP / MARPOR). Version 2022a. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB). https://doi.org/10.25522/manifesto.mpds.2022a
Laver, M. and Budge, I. (eds.). (1992). Party Policy and Government Coalitions, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: The MacMillan Press.
Mölder, M. (2016). The validity of the RILE left–right index as a measure of party policy. Party Politics, 22(1), 37–48. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068813509525
Tavits, M. and Letki, N. (2009). When Left Is Right: Party Ideology and Policy in Post-Communist Europe. American Political Science Review, 103(4), 555-569. doi:10.1017/S0003055409990220
Vachudova, M. A. (2008). Centre—Right Parties and Political Outcomes in East Central Europe. Party Politics, 14(4), 387–405. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068808090252

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Spillover Effects from the Nordic Model of Prostitution Legislation

Posted on April 24, 2023 | Policy Brief

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In recent years several European countries alongside Canada and Israel have adopted the so-called Nordic model of prostitution legislation to try and reduce the risk of sexual exploitation. While the reforms directly affect the regulation of the domestic sex market, their effects may also spill over to other outcomes in nearby areas and internationally – for example affecting sex tourism flows. Making use of data on tourism flows and Google searches, a new study examines the causal effect from the implementation of the reform in four different countries on sex tourism in popular destinations. The findings indicate that domestic reforms increase sex tourism, calling for the design of policies to account also for these adverse effects.

Introduction

Since 1999, when Sweden introduced the so-called Nordic model of prostitution legislation, similar legislation has been introduced in Canada, Iceland, Ireland, France, Norway, and most recently Israel. While the legislation design differs between countries (for an overview see Perrotta Berlin and Spagnolo, 2019), the common foundation is to effectively criminalize the purchase but not the selling of sexual services. The introduction of such reforms aims at battling human trafficking and reducing the risk of exploitation. While the effect from the asymmetric prostitution legislation has been found to increase rape incidence in Sweden (Ciacci, 2018), when it comes to the sex market the Nordic model is mainly thought to affect it in two contrasting ways. Firstly, it may suppress domestic supply, which could result in people travelling to destinations where prostitution is not criminalized. Secondly, it might affect the general view on prostitution (Kotsadam and Jakobsson, 2011), thus reducing domestic demand as well as international sex tourism.

Sex tourism is associated with human trafficking, child exploitation and increased spread of sexually transmitted diseases (Herold and Van Kerkwijk, 1992; Brooks and Heaslip, 2019; Newman et al. 2011). Despite this, few studies have explored the impact of prostitution laws on the practice – in part due to measurement difficulties.

This brief presents evidence from a forthcoming paper by Perrotta Berlin and Latour on sex tourism patterns following the implementation of the reform in four different countries.

Quantifying Sex Tourism

Perrotta Berlin and Latour use tourism patterns and Google searches to quantify sex tourism flows, in order to evaluate the effect from changes in prostitution legislation in Canada, France, Ireland and Norway. Specifically, they use data on the number of monthly tourist arrivals to Thailand and The Philippines, and weekly Google searches originating from the above-mentioned reform countries for popular sex-tourism and other tourism destinations, including attractions within cities. German tourism data and Google searches originating from France as well as Google searches originating in the US are used to estimate the effect on sex tourism to bordering countries (France to Germany and US to Canada, respectively). To evaluate the respective effects, they identify treated and control groups for each considered setting, and proceed to compare data between these groups before and after the reform (in line with the so-called difference-in-differences specification, as pioneered by Card and Krueger, 1994). In the following sections, each of these specifications and the subsequent results are discussed.

Evident Spillover Effects

Thailand and The Philippines

For Thailand and The Philippines, monthly data was available on tourist arrivals differentiated by country of origin from 2013 to 2020 and from 2008 to 2020, respectively. The underlying assumption is that, absent a prostitution legislation reform in the four considered countries (Canada, Ireland, France and Norway), the tourism flows from the country in question to Thailand and The Philippines would have remained the same over time. Thus, the change in the number of tourist inflow (out of which an unknown number are sex tourists) from the country in question – when compared to the number of tourists from other countries used as the control group – can be interpreted as a causal effect from the legislative reform on sex tourism.

The results show that, when compared to tourists arriving from other countries, the number of tourists arriving from one of the countries having recently implemented the Nordic model increased by 0.312 and 0.158 standard deviation points for The Philippines and Thailand respectively. Figure 1 below illustrates the results from an event study specification, in which the reform dates in the four different countries are aligned at 0, depicting how the increase is spread over the two years following the reform.

Figure 1. Number of tourists before and after the reform, The Philippines to the left and Thailand to the right.

Notes: The horizontal axis is the time variable. Time is normalized such that 0 is the month when the reform came into force. On the left panel the vertical axis is the number of tourist arrivals to The Philippines from reform countries in deviation from control countries. On the right panel the vertical axis is the number of tourist arrivals to Thailand from reform countries in deviation from control countries.

France-Germany Border

In Germany, the legislative status of prostitution is determined at the level of municipality. For the analysis, German municipalities where prostitution is to some extent legal were considered to form the treatment group and municipalities where it is illegal constituted the control group. The outcomes of interest were i) tourists travelling to German municipalities of interest, and ii) Google searches from France for the same municipalities.

The analysis shows an increase in foreign tourism to the treatment municipalities following the implementation of the Nordic model of prostitution legislation in France. At the same time, no changes in domestic tourism was detected. The conclusion that the increase in foreign tourism is driven by an increase in French tourists, by which one could then argue the implemented reform to increase cross-border sex tourism, was validated by the analysis of French Google searches. In these data it can be seen that distant German municipalities where prostitution is legal become relatively more interesting in French Google searches after the reform compared to municipalities where prostitution is illegal.

Figure 2. Searches of German municipalities originated in France relative their distance from the French border.

Notes: The vertical axis is the weekly index of Google Trends for searches for municipalities in Germany originated in France. The horizontal axis is distance from the French border. The red line shows that the slope decreased, i.e. distance became more salient for municipalities with illegal prostitution after the reform.

Canada-US Border

Data on Google searches for Canadian municipalities from one year before to one year after the reform in Canada were considered for the analysis. Searches originate in different US states, which also differ in the extent to which purchase of sexual services is legally punishable. The length of imprisonment in each US state determines whether a state was considered treated – when the length of imprisonment equals or exceeds that in Canada following the reform – or control. Results show that after the introduction of the Canadian reform, Google searches for Canadian municipalities dropped, in particular, in US states with high punishments for purchase of sexual services – most likely those where sex tourism to Canada used to originate before the reform. The results from the event study is depicted in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3. Number of searches of Canadian cities before and after the reform, deseasoned.

Notes: The horizontal axis is the time variable. Time is normalized such that 0 is the month when the reform came into force. The vertical axis is the number of searches from US states with high punishments in deviation from control states.

Sex Tourism Destinations

Finally, Google Searches for sex tourism destinations were considered as the outcome variable with the underlying idea being that – in the absence of a legislative change in the four considered countries – the difference in number of searches for sex tourism vs tourism destinations would have been the same over time. Sex tourism destinations were defined in two alternative ways: first, a list of popular destinations was selected within countries where prostitution is legal; second, this list was augmented with information from websites that list popular destinations for sex tourism, regardless of the legal status of prostitution in that country.

The results from this analysis are less clear, varying with the definition of sex tourism destinations and with the country of origin. But by and large they showed, if anything, that the interest in sex tourism destination countries decreased after the reform. This might indicate a change in attitudes towards lower acceptance of sex trade in general in the countries where the reform was implemented.

Conclusion

Prostitution legislation reforms affect the domestic sex market and have potential cross-border and international spillover effects. One such impact from criminalizing the purchase of sexual services domestically is increased levels of sex tourism, which might in turn impose adverse effects on the destination countries.

Filling a research gap by studying the effect from introducing asymmetric prostitution laws on sex tourism, Perrotta Berlin and Latour find evidence suggesting that harsher domestic regulation, while potentially changing attitudes in the general population (as indicated by Google Searches) also, in specific cases, increases, the outflow of tourists to destinations with less stringent laws.

After the introduction of the Nordic model, Norway has imposed legislation prohibiting their citizens to purchase sexual services even in countries where it is legal and implemented awareness campaigns on the detrimental effects of sex tourism on local populations. Given that sex tourism is associated with human trafficking, child exploitation and increased spread of sexually transmitted diseases, the results call for other countries to follow suit with domestic prostitution legislation taking on a more global approach to achieve greater effectiveness.

References

Brooks, A. and Heaslip, V. (2019). Sex trafficking and sex tourism in a globalised world. Tourism Review, 74(5): 1104-1115. https://doi.org/10.1108/TR-02-2017-0017
Card, D. and Krueger, A. (1994). Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. American Economic Review, 84(4): 772–793, September https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v84y1994i4p772-93.html
Ciacci, R. (2018). Banning the purchase of prostitution increases rape: evidence from Sweden. https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/100393.html
Herold, E. S. and Van Kerkwijk, C. (1992). Aids and sex tourism. AIDS society, 4(1):1/8.
Kotsadam, A. and Jakobsson, N. (2011). Do laws affect attitudes? an assessment of the norwegian prostitution law using longitudinal data. International Review of Law and Economics, 31(2):103–115. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818811000196
Newman, W., Holt, B., Rabun, J., Phillips, G. and Scott, C. (2011). Child sex tourism: Extending the borders of sexual offender legislation. International journal of law and psychiatry, 34:116–21. doi: 10.1016/j.ijlp.2011.02.005
Perrotta Berlin, M. and Spagnolo, G. (2019). The Nordic Model of Prostitution Legislation: Health, Violence and Spillover Effects. FREE Policy Brief. https://freepolicybriefs.org/2019/04/21/the-nordic-model-of-prostitution-legislation-health-violence-and-spillover-effects
Perrotta Berlin, M. and Latour, C. (2023). Cross-Country Impacts of Prostitution Legislation: Evidence from Reforms in five Countries. Unpublished manuscript.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Democratic Backsliding and Electoral Autocracies

Posted on April 21, 2023 | News

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The Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) and the Forum for Research on Media and Democracy in Eastern Europe (FROMDEE) invite paper submissions to a one-day conference on “Democratic backsliding and electoral autocracies” with a keynote lecture by Arturas Rozenas (New York University).

Conference

The UN’s Secretary-General António Guterres recently observed that “across the world, democracy is backsliding”. This trend encompasses new democracies that have drifted towards electoral autocracy and established democracies where political polarization threatens institutional norms. Research can shed light on where and when democratic institutions are fragile and what can help make them resilient.

The Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) and the Forum for Research on Media and Democracy in Eastern Europe (FROMDEE) is organising a one-day conference on “Democratic backsliding and electoral autocracies” with a keynote lecture by Arturas Rozenas (New York University). The conference will take place on 13 October 2023 in Stockholm, Sweden.

Call for Papers

We would like to invite paper and extended abstract submissions, as well as expressions of interest in attending the conference by 15 June 2023 at the link below. We welcome submissions from economics and political science on threats to liberal democratic institutions, as well as other topics in political economy. We would especially like to encourage researchers working on or based in Eastern Europe to apply.

There is no conference registration fee and meals will be provided for all participants. Some funding is available for travel and accommodation, with preference given to presenters and participants from Eastern Europe.

Submission form: Click here

Download the call for paper in pdf-file: “Democratic backsliding and electoral autocracies”

Important dates:

15 June 2023 – Submission deadline (full papers or extended abstracts >10 pages)
July 2023 – Notification of acceptance
13 October 2023 – SITE Academic Conference on “Democratic Backsliding and Electoral Autocracies”

The conference is organised as part of the FROMDEE initiative – the Forum for Research on Media and Democracy in Eastern Europe supported by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).

In case of technical difficulties, please send your submission to: site.free.conferences@gmail.com

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed during events and conferences are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Energy Infrastructure Resilience and Sustainable Future

Posted on April 18, 2023 |

The Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) and the Forum for Research on Eastern Europe: Climate and Environment (FREECE) would like to invite you to its 2023 SITE Energy Talk. This year it will focus on the opportunities and challenges that the energy infrastructure will face in the near future.

As we move towards sustainable, low-carbon energy systems, it is essential to guarantee the energy infrastructure’s resilience against various challenges, such as supply chain disruptions, network congestion, rising energy costs, and other potential threats. Valuable insights have been gained from recent shocks such as the Covid-19 pandemic, the energy crisis, and the ongoing Ukrainian war concerning the energy infrastructure’s resilience.

The next SITE Energy event will focus on the opportunities and challenges that the energy infrastructure will face in the near future.

Speakers

Ewa Lazarczyk Carlson

Associate Professor at Reykjavik University and also affiliated to Luleå University of Technology

Lazarczyk Carlson will focus on the Baltic Sea region’s energy security and the network dependency on Russia as an electricity power supplier.

Yuliya Markuts

Ph.D., Head of the Center of Public Finance and Governance at the Kyiv School of Economics, Associate Professor of Finance at the State University of Trade and Economics

Markuts will address the energy of Ukraine during the Russia full-scale invasion: resilience and future prospects for transformation.

Igor Piddubnyi

Analyst on Energy sector Damages and Losses, Researcher at the Center for Food and Land Use Research at Kyiv School of Economics

Piddbunyi addresses the question of Ukrainian energy infrastructure, its current status, and damage evaluations.

Mikael Toll

Senior Advisor at Ramboll Management Consulting

Toll will discuss how well-prepared the Nordic energy infrastructure is for the green transition from a security of energy supply perspective, in the light of recent and current energy crises.

Moderators

The seminar will be moderated by Chloé Le Coq, Professor of Economics at the University Paris-Panthéon-Assas (CRED) and Research Fellow at SITE, and Elena Paltseva, Associate Professor at SITE.

Registration

The event will take place in Terrasrummet at Holländargatan 32, 113 59 Stockholm (near the main building of SSE) and the registration opens at 11.45 near the entrance of Holländargatan.

The event will also be streamed online via Zoom for those who cannot join the event in person. Please register via the Trippus platform:

In-person participation (here)
Online participation (here)

NOTE: A light lunch will be provided for those who will participate the event in person.

Please contact site@hhs.se if you have any questions regarding the event.

Russia’s Data Warfare

Posted on April 18, 2023 | Policy Brief

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, a broad spectrum of previously publicly available statistics on economic indicators has been removed from the public eye. This reduced transparency affects any analysis of the state of the Russian economy and assessments of the effects of sanctions. The strategy is also part of a larger disinformation campaign that has become an integral part of Russia’s war on Ukraine. In this brief we provide a short overview of the main indicators on economic activity that have been masked in various forms by Russia’s data producing institutions. We also touch upon some alternative strategies, employed to gain a better understanding of the actual state of the Russian economy while official data is unavailable or unreliable.

Following Russia’s war on Ukraine, Russia has ceased to publish large amounts of previously publicly available statistics on economic indicators. This reduced transparency affects any attempts to analyze the Russian economy with regular data and models, and is an integral part of the information war that has followed Russia’s aggression. In particular, it aims to reduce or obscure the analysis of the effects of sanctions that have been imposed on Russia by Ukraine’s partners. The reduced precision of this analysis is then used in various propaganda channels to claim that sanctions are useless and that they are, instead of hurting Russia, harming the EU, the US and other sanctions implementing countries.

In this brief we present a short overview of some of the most important statistics on Russia’s economic performance no longer publicly available (with a detailed list to be found in the Online Appendix). We also discuss some alternative measures to track the Russian economy which can be used to provide more accurate assessments of the effect of sanctions and thus reduce the impact of Russia’s data warfare.

What Data is Being Masked?

Russia’s cessation of statistical publications has occurred across several dimensions including foreign trade, budget, and finance. Most notably, data has been masked by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (CBR), the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation (Ministry of Finance), the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) and the Federal Customs Service of Russia.

Budget Data

Data on federal and consolidated budgets in Russia was previously easily accessible on the Ministry of Finance’s and Rosstat’s webpages.

The Ministry of Finance has however, as of January 2022, ceased publishing data on budget expenditures. This includes monthly data for a wide range of budget expenditure categories such as spending for public administration, national defense and law enforcement, environmental protection, education, healthcare, social politics, mass media and culture. This data is no longer available despite the webpage for budget expenditures being updated as late as March 17^th 2023.

Data on certain budget indicators is also missing on Rosstat’s webpage. While statistics on taxes, fees and other mandatory payments are available for 2022, budget expenditures are available only for 2021. This is however not surprising given that Rosstat receives its figures on the financial sector, including figures on public finances partly from the Ministry of Finance.

Foreign Trade Data

Foreign trade statistics is normally published by the Federal Customs Service of Russia, CBR and Rosstat.

Since the invasion, the Federal Customs Service of Russia has however stopped publishing statistics on foreign trade and commodity structure. The latest available monthly data on Russian foreign trade with its main partners (the EU, Commonwealth of Independent States countries and others), and the commodity structure of exports and imports – including processed goods and oil and gas – is from January 2022 (as of April 3^rd 2023).

Foreign trade data from CBR has been withheld throughout 2022. CBR has however recently resumed parts of their publications and, as of April 3^rd 2023, monthly data on total export and import is available for all of 2022 as well as for January 2023. Still, these figures display total exports and imports only and are not broken down by trade partner or commodity.

Similar to CBR’s publishing pattern, figures on export and import as part of GDP by use were unavailable on Rosstat’s webpage from February 2022 and throughout the year. As of April 7^th 2023, quarterly aggregated data is however available for all of 2022. Monthly data on export and import by country is nonetheless still available only for 2021, despite the webpage being updated in November 2022.

Financial Data

To provide information on the national finance system and its dynamics is a main tasks of any country’s central bank, with Russia being no exception. Despite this there are about 40 financial indicators that, since the beginning of 2022, are no longer available on CBR’s webpage (as of April 3^rd 2023). This contravenes CBR’s calendar, which states that statistics are supposed to be published in the next reporting period, i.e. the next quarter/month for quarterly and monthly data respectively.

The most deferred data (more than 20 indicators) can be found, or rather can’t be found, in the so-called External Sector Statistics category. For example, monthly data on balance of payments, remittances and financial transactions in the private sector, and international investment position of the banking sector is missing as of January 2022. Similarly, quarterly data on foreign investments, foreign assets and liabilities in the banking sector has been unavailable since January 2022. The same goes for data on external debt of the corporate sector of the Russian Federation in the form of loans, credits and deposits raised as a result of non-resident placement of Eurobonds and other debt securities.

In the so-called Banking Sector Statistics category, data on indicators such as assets, risks, operational data, international reserves and volume of FX operations is no longer available. Furthermore, figures on turnover of the interbank spot and forward markets have also been unavailable since February 2022.

Two comments are due considering the ease of access to above mentioned data/data sources. Firstly, in order to access the CBR’s and the Federal Customs Service of Russia’s webpages, one at times needs make use of a Virtual Private Network (VPN). Secondly, there are, for all sources mentioned, large discrepancies between the Russian language and the English language webpages, with the latter being severely patchier in its information.

Hiding Data: Reasons and Implications

What drives the authorities to mask seemingly relevant figures? Alexandra Prokopenko, an expert on Russian economic policy, argues that Russian authorities mask certain numbers related to the sanctions to impede evaluations of the effect of sanctions (Prokopenko 2023). Making the data less transparent and accessible in order to hide sanctions’ effect across various sectors to try and paint a better picture of the economic activity has also been a Russian policy goals. The head of the Federal Customs Services, Vladimir Bulavin, in April 2022 announced trade statistics were masked partly to “avoid […] speculation and discrepancies in import deliveries” (Uvarchev, 2022).

In this context, it is worth mentioning that Russia is obliged to report to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on several of the previously discussed indicators since the country is subscribing to the Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS) as of 2005. SDDS aims at providing transparent economic and financial data to the public and according to the IMF “Serious and persistent nonobservance of the SDDS, therefore, will be cause for action” (IMF, 2023). If Russia does not publish data according to the SDSS commitments, it could be excluded from the list of countries that subscribe to the SDSS. This affects how the country is viewed by investors and others and will further increase the risk premia that is applied to dealing with Russia.

Further, in its efforts to restrict insight into how the Russian economy is faring following the sanctions, the authorities have however created a large uncertainty also for Russian domestic markets, adding to the sanction’s effects. For instance, Elvira Nabiullina, Russia’s Central Bank Governor, has been arguing to revoke the decision to classify large amounts of data saying that investors, analysts and researchers simply need the data to do their work properly (CBR News, 2023).

Alternative Ways of Understanding the Real State of the Russian Economy

How can we learn about the state of affairs in Russia without the previously discussed data? While deducing Russia’s budget expenditures and many financial indicators may be cumbersome, more can be done when it comes to trade data. Specifically, a BOFIT Policy Brief by Simola (2022) proxied Russia’s imports and exports by tracking the imports of Russia’s main trading partners (17 economies) between March and June 2022. Similar proxying efforts have been made by Darvas, Martins and McCaffrey (2023), who tracked Russia’s foreign trade by considering detailed trade data from China, the United States, South Korea, Japan, India, the United Kingdom, Turkey and the EU, putting together publicly available datasets which span from January 2019 to January 2023.

Proxying trade data by considering trade partner’s statistics is emphasized by Sonnenfeld et al. (2022), who not only considers such data but rather a wide variety of available and reliable data sources – emphasizing the need to also crosscheck data from official Russian statical sources with more reliable ones (for a full overview of the methodologies used, the estimated indicators on the Russian economy and the implications from this, see Sonnenfeld et al. 2022).

Other efforts to map out Russia’s economic activity consider more creative methods such as using satellite data and/or ship location (AIS) data. Examples of such efforts include a recent Bruegel dataset which tracks Russian crude oil trade (Heusaff et al., 2023) and CREA’s “Russia Fossil Tracker”. For both examples, the authors utilize the location data for individual crude oil tankers, and (for Heusaff et al. 2023) combine it with data from OPEC, BP and Eurostat, to assess monthly crude oil exports from Russia to a set of major destinations (mainly the EU, China and CIS countries).

Similarly, satellite data has been previously used to estimate carbon emissions from flaring (Böttcher et al., 2021). While there is an ongoing debate on whether flaring can be trusted to give insight into gas and oil production (World Bank, 2023), one could potentially make use of such data to get a better view of the productivity within the Russian oil and gas sector following the imposed price cap mechanism and sanctions.

The struggle of creating reliable estimates for an economy polishing or masking information did not arise with the withdrawal of certain Russian statistics. The actual status of the North Korean economy remains much of a mystery to analysts (see The Economist) as the country, in 2017, was yet to publish a Statistical Yearbook. While Russia is far from North Korea in several aspects, the reality is that the alternative measures used to estimate North Korea’s economic activity (such as making use of Chinese trade data etc.) are partly the ones now being undertaken by analysts looking beyond the figures from Kremlin.

Conclusion

Russia’s decision to stop publishing regular economic data is part of the disinformation and propaganda efforts that are integral parts of its war on Ukraine, with the purpose being to complicate any analysis of what is going on in the Russian economy. While being partially successful in this regard, the data withholding likely creates further negative implications for Russia’s external economic relations and undermines the functioning of its domestic markets.

Given the lack of data following Russia’s disinformation efforts it is essential that any analyst concerned with mapping the Russian economy not only considers alternative but also multiple sources and consult experts with a plethora of competencies. Already today, new creative ways of getting hold of relevant data is providing increasing insight into the state of the Russian economy. With continued efforts, these measures will progress over time, improving our understanding of how sanctions affect the Russian economy.

Online Appendix

An overview of all indicators discussed in this brief can be found in the Online Appendix. The information in the Appendix is valid as of April 7^th 2023.

References

Böttcher, K., & Paunu, V-V., Kupiainen, K., Zhizhin, M., Matveev, A., Savolahti, M., Klimont, Z., Väätäinen, S., Lamberg, H., Karvosenoja, N. (2021). Black carbon emissions from flaring in Russia in the period 2012-2017. Atmospheric Environment. 254. 118390. 10.1016/j.atmosenv.2021.118390.
CBR News. (2023, March 17). Statement by Governor of the Bank of Russia Elvira Nabiullina following the meeting of the Board of Directors of the Bank of Russia on March 17, 2023. https://www.cbr.ru/press/event/?id=14629
The Central Bank of the Russian Federation. (2023). https://www.cbr.ru/
CREA. https://www.russiafossiltracker.com
Darvas, Martins and McCaffrey (2023, March 23). Russian foreign trade tracker. Bruegel datasets. https://www.bruegel.org/dataset/russian-foreign-trade-tracker
The Economist. (2017, February 9). How to measure North Koreas economy. https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2017/02/09/how-to-measure-north-koreas-economy?
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_campaign=a.22brand_pmax&utm_content=conversion.direct-response.anonymous&gclidh
The Federal Customs Service of Russia. (2023). https://customs.gov.ru/
The Federal State Statistics Service. (2023). https://rosstat.gov.ru/
Heusaff, Guetta-Jeanrenaud, McWilliams and Zachmann. (2023). Russian crude oil tracker. Bruegel datasets. https://www.bruegel.org/dataset/russian-crude-oil-tracker
International Monetary Fund. (2023). Special Data Dissemination Standard. https://dsbb.imf.org/
The Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation. (2023). https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/
Prokopenko, A. (2023, January 20). How can you analyze the Russian economy amid data censorship? A guide. The Bell. https://thebell.io/en/your-guide-to-the-russian-economy/
Simola, H. (2022). Russian foreign trade after four months of war in Ukraine. BOFIT Policy Paper No.5. BOFIT.
Sonnenfeld, J., Tian, S., Sokolowski, F., Wyrebkowski, M. and Kasprowicz, M. (2022). Business Retreats and Sanctions Are Crippling the Russian Economy. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4167193
Uvarchev, L. (2022, April 21). FCS suspends publication of export and import statistics. Kommersant. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5318414
The World Bank. (2023). Global Gas Flaring Tracker Report. https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/5d5c5c8b0f451b472e858ceb97624a18-0400072023/original/2023-Global-Gas-Flaring-Tracker-Report.pdf

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

The Playing Field in Academia: Why Are Women Still Underrepresented?

Posted on March 24, 2023 |

The Forum for Research on Gender Economics (FROGEE) together with the Centre for Economic Analysis (CenEA) and the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE) invites academic papers to a conference held in Warsaw, entitled: “The playing field in academia: Why are women still underrepresented?”

Conference

Women continue to be underrepresented in every stage of their academic career in many fields and they do not advance professionally at the same rate as men. A growing body of research in economics points towards social and institutional causes behind these inequalities and offers policy suggestions to address them. To discuss and disseminate recent developments in this area FROGEE together with CenEA and SITE invites academic papers to a conference held in Warsaw on 21-22 June 2023.

The conference is organised as part of the FREE Network initiative FROGEE, supported by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). It will combine contributed sessions, invited lectures and policy discussions.

Invited Lectures:

prof. Carlo Schwarz (Bocconi University)
prof. Sarah Smith (University of Bristol)

Call for Papers

We invite either full papers (early versions are welcome) or extended abstracts. Authors will have approximately 30 minutes for their presentations. There is no conference fee but participants are expected to cover their own travel and accommodation costs.

Submission Deadline

Online submission is open via site@hhs.se, please in the subject box type: “Submission: The playing field in academia”.

The deadline for submissions is 17 April 2023. Notifications are expected by 30 April 2023.

Save the date

21-22 June, 2023. More information about the conference can be found here.

Exploring the Impact from the Russian Gas Squeeze on the EU’s Greenhouse Gas Reduction Efforts

Posted on March 14, 2023 | Policy Brief

Throughout 2022, the reduction in Russian gas imports to the EU and the resilience of European energy markets have been subject of significant public discourse and policy-making. Of particular concern has been the EU’s ability to maintain its environmental goals, as substitution from Russian pipeline gas to liquified natural gas and other fuels such as coal, could result in increased emissions. This brief aims to reevaluate the consequences from the loss of Russian gas and the EU’s response to it on greenhouse gas emissions in the region. Our analysis suggests that the energy crisis did not result in a rise in emissions in 2022. While some of the factors that contributed to this outcome – such as a mild winter – may have been coincidental, the adjustments caused by the 2022 gas squeeze are likely to support rather than jeopardize the EU’s green transition.

Energy markets in Europe experienced a tumultuous 2022, with the Russian squeeze on natural gas exported to the region bringing a major shock to its energy supply. Much attention has been devoted to the effects of the succeeding spiking and highly fluctuating energy prices on households’ budget and on the production sector, with numerous policy initiatives aimed at mitigating these effects (see, e.g., Reuters or Sgaravatti et al., 2021). Another widely discussed concern has revolved the consequences of the gas crisis – such as switching to coal – on the EU’s climate policy objectives (see e.g. Bloomberg or Financial Times). In this brief, we analyze and discuss to what extent this concern turned out to be valid, now that 2022 has come to an end.

We consider greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions stemming from the main strategies that allowed the EU to weather the gas crisis throughout 2022 – namely the substitution from Russian gas to other energy sources. These strategies include increased imports of liquified natural gas (LNG), a lower gas demand, and an increased reliance on coal, oil, and other energy sources. We also discuss the implications of the crisis for climate mitigation in the EU and try to draw lessons for the future.

Substitution to LNG and Pipeline Gas from Other Suppliers

Prior to 2022, Russian natural gas largely reached Europe by pipeline (92.4 percent in 2021 according to Eurostat). More than half of these pipeline imports, 86 billion cubic meters (bcm), were lost during the 2022 Russian gas supply squeeze, predominantly through the shut-down of both the Yamal and the Nordstream pipelines. 57 percent of this “missing” supply was met through an increase in LNG imports from several countries, the largest contributor being the U.S. Another 27 percent of the “missing Russian gas” was substituted by an increase in pipeline gas imports from other suppliers, with the UK (20 percent) and Norway (7 percent) taking the lead. A substantial part of the replaced gas was stored, rather than combusted. With this in mind, here we concentrate on the upstream emissions associated with this change – i.e., emissions that occurred during the extraction, processing, and transportation. The change in the combustion emissions is postponed to the next section.

There is an ongoing debate in the literature on whether the greenhouse gas pollution intensity of LNG is higher or lower than that of gas delivered through pipelines – prior to final use. In comparison to pipeline gas, LNG is associated with emissions resulting from energy-intensive liquefaction and regassification processes in upstream operations as well as with fuel combustion from transportation on ocean tankers. For both LNG and pipeline gas it is also crucial to consider fugitive methane emissions, as methane has up to 87 times greater global warming potential than carbon dioxide in the first 20 years after emission, and up to 36 times greater in the first 100 years. One source of methane emissions is leaks from the natural gas industry (both “intentional” and accidental) since methane is the primary component of natural gas. Both LNG and pipeline gas infrastructure are subject to such leaks, and the size and frequency of these leaks during transportation varies greatly depending on the technologies used, age of infrastructure, etc. Further, the risk of these leaks may also be different depending on the technology of gas extraction.

Currently there is limited knowledge about the size of greenhouse gas emissions, including methane emissions resulting from leaks, from specific gas projects. Until recently, most estimates were based partially on self-reported data and partially on “emission factors” data. Modern and more reliable methods, for instance satellite-based measures for methane emissions, suggest that the resulting figures are greatly underestimated (see, e.g., Stern, 2022; IEA; ESA) but the coverage of these new estimates is currently limited.

As a result, there is considerable disagreement in the literature on the emissions arising from Russian pipeline gas imports vs. LNG imports to the EU. For example, Rystad (2022) argues that the average LNG imports to Europe have a CO2 emission intensity that is more than 2.5 times higher than that from pipeline gas from Russia (although they do not explicitly state whether these figures include fugitive methane emissions). On the contrary, Roman-White et al. (2019) suggest that the life-cycle GHG emission intensity of EU LNG imports (from New Orleans) is lower than EU gas imports from Russia (via the Yamal pipeline).

For the purposes of this exercise, we choose to rely on middle-ground estimates by DBI and Sphera, which assess GHG emission intensity along different Russian gas import routes (DBI, 2016) and across different LNG suppliers to the EU (Thinkstep – Sphera, 2020). This allows us to account for substantial heterogeneity across routes.

We also account for the change in upstream emissions associated with the switch from imports of pipeline Russian gas to pipeline gas imports from Norway and the UK. For this, we approximate the GHG emission intensity of the new flows using the estimate suggested by Thinkstep – Sphera (2017).

The results of our assessment are presented in the top three rows of Table 1. They suggest that a substitution from Russian gas imports to LNG imports and pipeline imports from other sources resulted in an increase in upstream GHG emissions by approximately 14 million tons (Mt) of CO2eq. Details on calculations and assumptions are found in the online Appendix.

Table 1. Change in EU GHG emissions resulting from Russian gas squeeze.

Source: Authors’ own calculations based on DBI (2016), McWilliams et al. (2023), Sphera (2017; 2020), and IEA (2022). See the online Appendix for more details on assumptions, calculations, and sources. Note: Billion cubic meters (bcm) and terawatt-hours (TWh).

The Decline in Gas Demand and the Switch to Other Fuels

A decrease in gas use in the EU constituted another response to the Russian gas squeeze. Gas demand in the EU is estimated to have declined by 10 percent (50 bcm or 500 TWh) in 2022 with respect to 2021 (IEA, 2022). Part of this decline was facilitated by switching from gas to other polluting fuels, such as oil and coal. The extent to which switching occurred however differed across the three main uses of gas; power generation, industrial production, and residential and commercial use. Below we discuss them separately.

Power Generation

At the onset of the 2022 energy crisis, a prevalent expectation was that there would be significant gas-to-coal switching in power generation. However, gas demand for power generation, which accounts for 31.4 percent of the gas demand from EU countries (European Council), increased by only 0.8 percent in 2022 (EMBER, 2022, p.29), implying that there was no direct substitution from gas-fired to coal-fired generation.

One of the reasons to why there was no major switching to coal in spite of the increase in gas prices is that CO2 emissions are priced in the Emissions Trading System (ETS) program, and the average carbon price has been growing recently, reaching an average of around €80/ton in 2022. Given that coal has a higher emission intensity than gas, the carbon price increases the relative cost of coal versus gas for power generators.

Instead, the decline in demand came from industry, residential and commercial use, which together account for nearly 57 percent of the EU’s gas demand (European Council).

Industry Use

For the industry, IEA calculations (2022) suggest a demand drop of 25 bcm, which would correspond to approximately 50 Mt CO2eq. However, half of the industrial gas reduction came from gas to oil switching. Based on our estimates, this switch implies an additional 41 Mt CO2eq emissions, considering both upstream emissions and emissions from use in furnaces (assuming this to be the prevalent use of the oil that substituted gas, see McWilliams et al., 2023). The remaining half of the industrial demand decline resulted from energy-efficiency improvements, lower output, and import of gas-intensive inputs where possible (ibid.). These changes are either neutral in terms of life-cycle emission impact (import increases) or emission-reducing (efficiency improvements and lower output).

Residential and Commercial Use

Residential and commercial use represented the remaining part of the 500 TWh gas demand decline. In this case, lower gas demand is unlikely to imply massive fuel switching to other fossil fuels, simply because of the lack of short-term alternatives. For example, European households use gas mostly for space heating and cooking, and albeit both higher use of coal for home-heating (BBC) and a surge in installations of heat pumps (Bruegel, 2023 and EMBER, 2023) have been reported, the net change in emissions resulting from these two opposite developments is likely relatively minor as compared to other considered sizeable changes.

The Rise of Coal

As observed, there was no direct switch from gas to coal in European power generation. However, coal generation in the EU did increase by 6 percent in 2023 (IEA, 2022), to help close the gap in electricity supply created by the temporary shut-down of nuclear plants in France and the reduced performance of hydro. In our calculations we assume that in a counterfactual world with no Russian gas squeeze, gas-fired electricity would have covered most of the gap that was instead covered by coal. Therefore, we estimate that, as an indirect result of the Russian gas squeeze in 2022, CO2eq emissions increased by 27 Mt, specifically because of the ramp-up in coal generation (see the second section in Table 1).

Gas Shortage and the EU’s Climate Objectives

In recent years, the EU has made substantial progress in climate change mitigation. Despite widely expressed concerns, it achieved its 2020 targets – reducing emission by 20 percent by 2020, from the 1990 level. However, its current target of a 55 percent net GHG emission reduction by 2030, requires average yearly cuts of 134 Mt CO2eq, from the 2021 level. This is an ambitious target: while the emission cut between 2018 and 2019 exceeded this level, the average yearly cut between 2018 and 2021 however fell short (Eurostat).

The question is if the Russian gas squeeze can significantly undermine the EU’s ability to achieve these climate goals?

First, based on our assessment above, the changes prompted by the Russian squeeze – namely a move from pipeline-gas to LNG, a decline in gas demand and an increase in coal and oil use – made 2022 emissions decline by 18 Mt CO2eq. This suggests that the energy shock prompted overall emission-reducing adjustments in the short run. One important question that arises from this is therefore how permanent these adjustments are.

The increased reliance on LNG (and other gas suppliers) is likely to be permanent as a return to imports from Russia is hardly imaginable and as the 2022 surge in LNG imports entailed significant investments and contractual obligations. According to our estimates, overall, this shift is going to cause a relatively modest increase in yearly CO2eq emissions, approximately 10 percent of the needed emission reduction outlined above. Moreover, this is accounting for emissions throughout the EU’s entire supply chain – which is increasingly advocated for, but not currently applied in the typical emission accounting. It is, of course, important to make sure that ongoing LNG investments do not result in “carbon lock-ins”, postponing the green transition.

The decline in gas demand is a welcome development for climate mitigation if it is permanent. Part of the decline, from improved energy efficiency or installation of heat pumps, is indeed permanent. However, European households also responded temporarily (to warmer than usual winter and high gas prices (for instance by reducing their thermostats). Their behavior in the near future will therefore depend on the development of both these variables.

Overall, our assessment is that the Russian gas squeeze did force some adjustments in demand that might translate into a permanent decline in greenhouse gas emissions.

The question however remains of how the shortage of gas can be met in a scenario with higher gas demand due to, for instance, colder winters. In terms of climate objectives, it is of paramount importance that coal-powered generation does not increase (which would happen if, for instance, the price of gas continues to raise due to shortages). In this sense some lessons can be learned from the response to the shortage in electricity supply following the exceptional under-performance of nuclear and hydro in 2022. Wind and solar, which provide the lowest-cost source of new electricity production, in combination with declines in electricity demand, were able to cover 5/6 of the 2022 shortage created by the nuclear and hydro shock (EMBER, 2023), thus relegating coal to a residual contribution. We expect this pattern to emerge also in the future in the presence of other crises. However, we also caution that the lower production of electricity was at least partially caused by the dramatic heatwaves and droughts experienced throughout the summer in Europe. These events are likely to happen more often in the face of climate change. European policy-makers should therefore carefully assess the capacity of the EU energy system to address potentially multiple and frequent shocks with minimal to no-reliance on coal, in a scenario where also reliance on gas needs to be in constant decline given the Russian gas squeeze and unreliability.

Finally, the dramatic circumstances of 2022 led the EU to adopt the REPowerEU plan, which outlines financial and legal measures to, among other things, speed up the development of renewable energy projects and induce energy-saving behavior.

The outlined observations lead us to conclude that the Russian gas squeeze is ultimately unlikely to sizably reduce the chances of the EU reaching its climate goals, suggesting that the 2022 concerns in this regard were somewhat exaggerated. Nonetheless, learning from the costly lessons of the 2022 energy crisis is crucial for efficient policy making in the future.

References

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Bloomberg. (2022, July 22). Putin’s War Threatens Europe’s Ambitious Climate Goals. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-07-07/ukraine-invasion-threatens-europe-s-climate-change-goals#xj4y7vzkg
DBI. (2016). Critical Evaluation of Default Values for the GHG Emissions of the Natural Gas Supply Chain. https://www.dbi-gut.de/emissions.html?file=files/PDFs/Emissionen/Report_english.pdf&cid=5808
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McWilliams, B., Tagliapietra, S., Zachmann, G. and Deschuyteneer. T. (2023). Preparing for the next winter: Europe’s gas outlook for 2023. Policy Brief 01/2023, Bruegel. https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/european-union-gas-survival-plan-2023
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Roman-White, S., Rai, S., Littlefield, J., Cooney, G. and Skone, T. J. (2019). Life cycle greenhouse gas perspective on exporting liquefied natural gas from the United States: 2019 update. DOE/NETL-2019/2041. National Energy Technology Laboratory. https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2019/09/f66/2019%20NETL%20LCA-GHG%20Report.pdf
Rystad. (2022). LNG import boom could drive up European emissions by 35 million tonnes. Rystad Energy.
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Thinkstep – Sphera. (2017). Greenhouse Gas Intensity of Natural Gas. http://gasnam.es/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/NGVA-thinkstep_GHG_Intensity_of_NG_Final_Report_v1.0.pdf
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Stern, J. P. (2022). Measurement, Reporting, and Verification of Methane Emissions from Natural Gas and LNG trade: Creating transparent and credible frameworks, OIES Paper: ET, No. 06, ISBN 978-1-78467-191-4, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford.

Online Appendix

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.