Tag: EU

Towards European Union Membership: Poland’s EU Pre-accession Funds and Infrastructure Development

Posted on October 6, 2025 | Policy Brief, Policy Papers

European Union flag waving during a public demonstration, symbolizing support and integration efforts related to EU Pre-Accession Funds.

In advance of formal membership, candidate countries are offered three pillars of EU assistance: trade concessions, stabilization and association agreements and financial support. These instruments aim both to prepare candidates economically, politically and administratively, and to signal accession’s benefits to their populations. In this paper we describe the channels in which the third pillar – the EU pre-accession funds – affected Poland’s economic and institutional development ahead of its 2004 membership. The funds were designed to accelerate institutional transformation, modernize agriculture, strengthen rural communities, improve transport networks, and promote environmental protection. In Poland, between the mid-1990s and 2003, they supported extensive investments that produced unprecedented improvements in technical infrastructure. Poland’s accession referendum in 2003 turned decisively in favor of EU membership, despite strong regional variation in support. While no causal evidence is available, we argue that without the EU-funded infrastructural transformation, its outcome would have been less certain. For current EU candidate countries, Poland serves as an excellent example of how targeted external financial assistance can support structural transformation ahead of integration with the EU.

Introduction

Seven countries are currently eligible to receive financial support through the European Union’s Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III): Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Türkiye. The funding allocated within the program for the 2021–2027 period amounts to 14.162 billion EUR (in 2021 prices; European Commission, 2024). IPA III is the successor to the former two IPA editions, which have provided support exceeding 24 billion EUR since 2007 to countries in the then EU enlargement region. IPA aims to support countries that have entered a pathway to EU membership, expected in the foreseeable future, to facilitate progressive alignment with EU rules, values, and various standards and policies enforced in the European Union before they become full members. It constitutes one of the pillars of assistance offered by the EU to countries with a prospect of membership, with trade concessions and stabilization and association agreements (SAAs) serving as the other two.

Next in line to obtain financial help through the pre-accession funding are Moldova and Ukraine, both of which were granted candidate status by the European Council fairly recently. While they have already started their accession negotiations and may benefit from trade concessions and SAAs, they still need to fulfill certain requirements to be eligible for IPA. Though formally also a candidate since late 2023, the accession process of Georgia is currently suspended due to concerns about democratic backsliding, implementation of controversial laws and disputed parliamentary elections.

In this paper, we examine Poland’s experience in utilizing the funding available prior to the 2004 EU enlargement to undergo important structural and systemic changes. Given the goals of the funding, we discuss the evolution of a number of economic indicators which can serve as evidence of the socio-economic advancement that occurred in Poland in the years leading to its EU accession. These examples illustrate different dimensions of development that societies in countries embarking on the EU accession process could benefit from on their way towards full integration.

EU Pre-accession Funding Options in the 1990s

Together with nine other countries, mainly from the Eastern European region and the former communist bloc (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia), Poland joined the EU in 2004. It was the largest enlargement of the European community both in terms of the number of new countries and population-wise.

On the pathway to EU membership, these candidates benefited from a coordinated set of financial instruments designed to accelerate their political, economic, and institutional development. During the 1990s and early 2000s, three programs offered financial assistance: Phare, SAPARD, and ISPA. Each addressed a different strategic challenge that candidates faced during their accession period – many of which underwent the transition from centrally planned to free market economies.

From the pool of soon-to-be EU members, Hungary and Poland were the first among the post-communist Central and Eastern European countries to formally start the accession process as early as 1994 (Cyprus and Malta applied in 1990). These two countries also inaugurated the distribution of financial assistance among the EU applicants. They became the first beneficiaries of the Phare program, which concentrated on supporting public administration reform, improving institutional capacity, and preparing regions for effective absorption of EU structural funds. It also helped modernize local infrastructure and provided targeted assistance to sectors undergoing major restructuring. Phare was soon extended to cover all other candidate countries.

The second initiative – SAPARD, concentrated on the needs of the agricultural sector and rural communities. The goal was to raise the competitiveness of local farming and modernize food production.

The third program, ISPA, funded major environmental and transportation initiatives.

These three programs helped close the gap between the candidate countries and older EU member states by improving infrastructure and enhancing the functioning of their institutions. Formally, they also helped ensure that the new members met EU strict standards and legal directives and built the foundations for their long-term cohesion. More detailed descriptions of the objectives of each program, with a special focus on Poland, are included in Box 1.

Figure 1 presents the annual expenditures between 1990 and 2003 within each of the three analyzed instruments provided by the European Union to Poland (bars, left axis). With connected lines, we show the scope of each program in cumulative amounts over time (right axis). During the 1990s, the budget spent on Poland under the Phare program was kept under 200 million EUR annually (in the last year of the decade, it increased to almost 300 million EUR). However, after the program’s restructuring since the beginning of the 2000s, annual spending through this instrument doubled. Among the three, Phare was the major funding source for Poland, as the country received a total of 3.5 billion EUR until 2003 (equivalent to 1.9% of the Polish GDP in 2003) – almost five times more than under the SAPARD program. Poland also obtained the highest total amount of funding of all candidate countries at the time, corresponding to 30% of the overall provided financial assistance (Kawecka-Wyrzykowska & Ambroziak 2006).

Figure 1. Values of  EU pre-accession funds in Poland

Source: Own compilation based on Tables 3, 4, 6 from Kawecka-Wyrzykowska & Ambroziak (2006). Note: in 2003 prices.

In 2000, ISPA and SAPARD were introduced to further support specific areas identified during the 1990s as critical and requiring targeted funding – the agricultural sector, initiatives to enhance the transportation network, and environmental protection. Through SAPARD, projects related to farming and rural infrastructure received approximately 150 million EUR per year in Poland, accumulating to 700 million EUR over the four-year period until 2003. Since one of the prerequisites in SAPARD was national co-funding of ca. 25% of the public contribution in the investments, overall 1.1 bn EUR (0.6% of the 2003 GDP) of public money was committed to different projects in Poland through this instrument (ARiMR 2025; investments consisted in 50% of private resources).

Projects supported within ISPA on average obtained 300 million EUR annually in Poland, with total spending reaching 1.4 billion EUR until 2003 (0.8% of the 2003 GDP). Poland was still the major beneficiary of these two types of financial support, though the total share of the funding received within each of them was much lower than in the Phare program, respectively 32% in SAPARD and 34% in ISPA (Kawecka-Wyrzykowska & Ambroziak 2006).

 

Box 1. Financial instruments offered in the 1990s on the pathway to EU membership: Phare, SAPARD, ISPA

Originally known as Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring of the Economy, Phare was launched in 1989 at a pivotal moment in European history. Initially designed to support the two countries in their transition from communism to democracy and a market economy, Phare quickly expanded to cover other parts of Central and Eastern Europe. Its mission was not only to help rebuild economies, but also to support political democratization. At first, it operated through national programs, but as regional cooperation gained importance, Phare introduced international initiatives to foster cross-border collaboration. The evolving challenges faced by the transforming countries led to a significant change in the program’s operation in the late 1990s. Financial support was now focused on two main pillars: investment in essential infrastructure, which consumed about 70 per cent of resources, and institutional development, which received the remaining 30 per cent. Poland benefited from several specialized initiatives within Phare. Socio-Economic Cohesion focused on modernizing regional infrastructure and preparing Polish regions to efficiently absorb EU structural funds. Cross-Border Cooperation strengthened ties between Poland and its neighbors. Institutional Building contributed to more efficient and transparent public administration.

The Special Accession Program for Agriculture and Rural Development, SAPARD, was established in 1999 to help transform the agricultural sectors and rural economies of ten countries aspiring to join the EU at the time. The goal was to prepare farmers and food processors to meet strict EU sanitary and veterinary standards. In Poland, SAPARD played a major role given the country’s vast rural landscape and the important role of agriculture in the economy – accounting for 7% of the GDP in 1995 (CSO 2014). Around 75% of the total budget was allocated from EU funds, with the remainder covered by national co-financing. However, the rules required an own contribution from each beneficiary, thus around half of the total value of all investments realized through SAPARD was private capital (Supreme Audit Office, 2002). SAPARD in Poland focused on, on the one hand, the modernization of agriculture and, on the other, on rural development. A large part of the program went into modernizing agricultural holdings, supporting farmers in buying new machinery, improving farm buildings, and upgrading agricultural production to meet EU standards. Equally important was the modernization of food processing industries, like meat, dairy, fruits and vegetables. Another significant part of the program concentrated on infrastructure in rural communities — building roads, sewage systems, and improving basic services. To encourage economic diversification, assistance was provided to develop non-farming businesses and create new job opportunities outside of agriculture (EU Council, 1999a).

Created in 1999, the main goal of ISPA was to finance large-scale projects in two critical sectors: transportation and environmental protection. Projects selected for funding were typically expensive, exceeding 5 million EUR, and had a strategic, national or at least regional impact (EU Council, 1999b). From the society’s perspective, these initiatives improved living standards, protected public health and the natural environment and promoted sustainable development. In the environmental sector, ISPA focused mainly on critical areas, including improving the quality of drinking water, building modern sewage treatment plants, managing waste more efficiently, and reducing air pollution. Given the EU’s strict environmental directives, addressing these issues was a fundamental condition for accession. ISPA concentrated also on modernizing and expanding major roadways and railway lines, especially those which were signified as part of the Trans-European Transport Network. Improved transport connections facilitated trade, mobility, and regional development, essential for increasing economic competitiveness and tightening of physical linkage with the rest of Europe.

The total amount of received funding was only one of the factors that may have played a role in the scope and pace of overall socio-economic changes in Poland. Importantly, the spatial distribution of investments provided a unique opportunity to reduce the geographical inequalities deeply rooted in Polish history and related, in particular, to the partitions of Poland lasting from the late 1700s till the end of World War I (Becker et al. 2016; Grosfeld & Zhuravskaya 2015). The eastern regions of Poland were historically much less developed, with the agricultural sector maintaining a critical position in economic activity and employment.

To illustrate the differences in regional distribution of the funding, we use a number of indicators related to investments realized with the help of the SAPARD instrument – which was specifically targeted at supporting infrastructure in rural areas and advancements in the agricultural sector. In Figure 2, we present three measures of investment allocation – the total (public+private) value of investments completed in each region (a), total value of investments per capita (b), and per hectare of agricultural land (c). Depending on the analyzed indicator, we obtain a slightly different picture of the distribution of the investments in SAPARD throughout the country. It appears that the Western regions of Poland received the least funding from SAPARD, whereas the Eastern and most rural regions were less successful in securing the funding. In all three cases, though, the Wielkopolskie Voivodship – a region in the Central-Western part of Poland – stands out as the one that collected the highest funding not only overall, but also when calculated per inhabitant or, most crucially, per area of agricultural land.

Figure 2. Spatial distribution of the SAPARD investments in Poland, total amount (public+private) for the period 2000-2003

Source: Own compilation based on Table 7.2 from Rudnicki (2008). Note: Converted from PLN to EUR using 4PLN/EUR exchange rate; c) per hectare of agricultural land. As compared to Fig. 1 the amounts for SAPARD include private resources spent

The most likely reason behind the particular allocation of the funding is related to the application process. The total amount of the funding was granted to Poland with limited distributional guidelines, and the funds were allocated on the first-come, first-served basis (ARiMR 2003). The maps in Figure 2 suggest that farmers, agricultural producers and manufacturers, and rural municipalities in Wielkopolskie region were quick and efficient when it came to funding applications. The scale and scope of the investments, though – looking at the three different measures – shows the flow of substantial benefits to all central and eastern regions.

Infrastructural Metamorphosis of Poland in the 1990s

As described above, an exceptional stream of additional funds from the EU was directed to Poland from the early days of its transition. The funding programs evolved with time during the 1990s and became more specialized closer to EU accession to address the specific needs of the candidate countries. While causal evidence of the impact of EU pre-accession funds on evolving infrastructure remains scarce and is methodologically challenging (with just a few exceptions on more recent pre-accession funding schemes, like Denti 2013), a simple overview of a number of key indicators might serve as strong suggestive evidence that the funds actually made a significant difference. In this part of the paper, we take a closer look at some examples of Polish infrastructure that underwent enormous progress in the late 1990s and early 2000s. We stipulate that the EU funding played a crucial role in the acceleration of this development.

All three analyzed EU instruments – Phare, SAPARD and ISPA – shared some common objectives, for instance, increasing access to clean water in the population, reducing pollution in lakes, rivers, and the sea, and improving road conditions, especially the low-rank ones in remote, rural areas. In Figures 3-5, we present the scale of improvement observed in these three areas on the lowest level of regional disaggregation, namely, in Polish municipalities. We compare the three selected indicators over almost a decade, between 1995, the initial year of data availability, and 2004.

We begin with Figure 3, which depicts the expansion of the water pipe network measured in kilometers per 1,000 inhabitants in each municipality. As specified in the legend, the darker the green category, the higher the density of the water pipe network. The rapid expansion of the network between 1995 and 2004 is evident, especially in some parts of the country. Most often, the upgrade to the top category happened in regions that lagged well behind the rest of the country in 1995. Here, the notable examples are the central regions of Poland (Kujawsko-Pomorskie and Lodzkie Voivodships, including the northern part of the Mazowieckie Voivodship) and the north-eastern frontiers (Podlaskie and Warminsko-Mazurskie Voivodships).

Figure 3. Length of the water pipe system (in km) per 1000 inhabitants in Polish municipalities in 1995 and 2004

Source: Own compilation based on the statistics from the CSO Local Data Bank (BDL); Geodata: National Register of Boundaries (PRG). Note: The legend is based on 2004 data: the two top and bottom categories in the legend cover 10% of observations each, and the rest of the categories cover 20% of observations each. Municipality borders marked in white, voivodship borders in yellow. Poland underwent an important administrative reform in 1999, when 49 voivodships were aggregated into the current 16. For the year 1995, we use the post-reform voivodship division of the country. Between 1995 and 2004, only negligible administrative changes took place at the municipal level.

In Figure 4, we show the share of the population enjoying access to sewage treatment plant services. The progress over time in this respect was related, on the one hand, to the construction of new treatment facilities and, on the other, to the concurrent expansion of the sewage pipeline network, which resulted in a higher share of users for the existing wastewater treatment plants. The increase in the usage of the treatment plants over time is striking, especially given that at the starting point, in 1995, only a limited number of municipalities had a wastewater treatment plant in operation. These municipalities were mainly concentrated in the northwestern corner of Poland and in the southwestern region of Silesia.

In comparison to the water pipe system in Figure 3, the development of sewage treatment plant access was concentrated in regions that were already ahead of the rest of Poland in 1995 – specifically, the northwestern and southwestern ones. However, a substantial increase in access to sewage treatment services is also visible in central and eastern parts of Poland, where in 1995 plants offering these services were extremely rare. This particular type of development can also be viewed from the perspective of the extent of pollution reduction in Poland’s internal waters. The number of scientific reports documented a sharp decline in biochemical factors of industrial, agricultural and household origin, hazardous to both humans and the environment, commonly polluting Polish rivers and lakes in the 1990s (Gorski et al, 2017; Marszelewski & Piasecki, 2020).

Figure 4. Number of residents connected to sewage treatment plants per 1000 inhabitants in Polish municipalities in 1995 and 2004

Source: see Figure 3. Note: The legend is based on 2004 data: due to high prevalence of zeros the bottom category in the legend covers 30% of observations, the rest of categories cover 10% of observations each. Municipality borders marked in white, voivodship borders in yellow (see Notes in Figure 3 for details).

The third pair of maps (Figure 5) illustrates the development of the country’s road network. The Figure shows the expansion and modernization of the lower rank roads administered by municipalities, which seem particularly important from the point of view of day-to-day transportation and quality of life of local populations.

Figure 5. Length of the municipality road network (in km) per 1000 inhabitants in Polish municipalities in 1995 and 2004

Source and Note: see Figure 3.

The data in Figure 5 cover both paved or hard-surfaced roads and dirt roads. One point to keep in mind here is that with an overall development of a municipality and of the neighboring region, the status of the municipality’s small-scale road may be updated to a higher rank, administered by the county or even by the voivodship. Figure 5 does not account for such an update of rank (in the Figure of roads), so the numbers presented are likely to represent a lower bound of the actual advancement. The maps in Figure 5 compare the length of municipal roads per 1000 inhabitants in 1995 and 2004. While a significant improvement in the road system is visible almost all over the country, the central regions seem to have gained the most, at least when it comes to this particular type of roads.

Investments and Development vs. Public Perception

Overall, all three figures above demonstrate that during the decade before Poland integrated with the EU, significant progress was achieved in terms of improving the quality of life, increasing accessibility of public utilities, reducing environmental degradation and capturing sustainable urban development. Substantial investments in rural areas had an important impact on reducing regional disparities.

Another important observation when examining all three figures together is that, while advancement occurred throughout the country, the bulk of improvement in each of the considered aspects was concentrated in slightly different parts of it, and almost all Polish municipalities recorded an important inflow of investments related to the pre-accession funding. While again we cannot provide any causal evidence, below we confront the spatial distribution of infrastructural modernization from Figures 3-5 with public support for joining the EU expressed in the referendum organized in 2003, a year before accession.

Figure 6. Support for the EU accession in the referendum in 2003

Source: Own compilation based on the statistics from the National Electoral Commission; Geodata: National Register of Boundaries (PRG). Note: The bottom category in the legend covers municipalities that voted against EU integration (12.3% of observations), the rest of the categories cover 25% of the remaining observations each. Municipality borders marked in white, voivodship borders in yellow.

In Figure 6, we present the results of the vote on the municipal level, with darker blue shades indicating higher support for EU membership. The map clearly highlights high geographical variation in support for European integration, with much stronger proportions of votes in favor of EU membership in western and northern Poland. In contrast, the support in central and eastern Poland was substantially lower, reflecting a higher degree of skepticism towards the benefits of the EU. Clearly, many factors influenced people’s choices at the time of the referendum. They depended on their economic conditions, the degree of exposure to relations with Western European countries, the level of awareness of the potential gains from integration, as well as fears concerning the future of local economies and those related to cultural influences.

Just by looking at the map of support, it is impossible to say much about the degree to which the EU pre-accession funds affected the outcome of the referendum. For that, we would need to know more about the dynamics of support across regions. Yet, while the share of votes in favor of integration in many eastern municipalities was below 50%, people in a substantial majority of localities expressed overwhelming support for joining the EU. The result of the referendum was 77,45% in favor. Although no causal analysis linked the results to EU pre-accession funds, the scale of investment and its visibility, as well as its tangible effects – the direct translation of EU funds into daily quality of life all across Poland, are very likely to have turned many people’s votes in the EU’s favor.

Conclusion

Since the early 1990s, on the path to EU membership in 2004, Poland, like other candidate countries, received generous European pre-accession financial assistance. The combination of three financial instruments in operation at the time – Phare, SAPARD, and ISPA – enabled Poland to make substantial investments in key economic sectors, including public administration, agriculture, environmental protection, and physical infrastructure. The early launch of the Phare program prepared Poland to follow various EU standards and prerequisites, and contributed to the implementation of the cohesion policy. Initiation of assistance within SAPARD and ISPA instruments since 2000 strengthened the rural economy and competitiveness of Polish agriculture, and allowed for modernization of the transportation and environmental infrastructure. In pre-accession assistance, Poland received a total of 5.5 billion euro (over 3% of the 2003 GDP), by far the highest support provided to the candidate countries at the time.

Substantial investments made during the 1990s and early 2000s, largely covered by pre-accession financial aid, had a remarkable impact on the quality of existing infrastructure in Poland. Kilometers of roads were built and renovated in Polish municipalities, thousands of households acquired a connection with the water pipe network, and hundreds of wastewater treatment plants were constructed. This is only a small subset of selected advancements that can be demonstrated using quantitative data collected in a comparable way over time. Numerous other types of infrastructure received substantial investments to support development, modernization or enhancement. On top of that, all these improvements have likely contributed to further spill-over effects through higher levels of regional growth, a boost in the labor market with the creation of new jobs, a reduction of unemployment, or enhanced labor productivity. All these changes, taken together, played a key role in determining the overall quality of life for the Polish population, reducing regional economic inequalities, and improving the quality of the local natural environment, etc.

The distribution of support for Poland’s accession to the EU, as reflected in the 2003 referendum results, differed significantly by region. Enthusiasm for the EU was significantly lower in the eastern parts of the country, while residents of many western municipalities voted overwhelmingly in favor of membership. Yet, even at a very fine geographical distribution, we see only a relatively small group of municipalities – 12.3% – where less than 50% of residents voted in favor of EU membership, and the overall outcome across the country was a decisive “YES”. Thus, although the substantial advancement in infrastructural development all across the country did not convince the majority of residents in each and every locality, the number and geographical scope of those voting in favor was very decisive. It is impossible to say how high/low the support would have been without the received support. Yet, given the scale of the resulting changes in various basic dimensions of quality of life, it seems safe to say that, thanks to the funds, many voters looked at the future integration with a higher degree of appreciation. Naturally, other factors played a role in determining people’s decisions in the referendum, with economic conditions and prospects for socio-economic development being just one factor, albeit a likely important one.

Pre-accession funds in the current candidate countries, how they are used, distributed, and how they change people’s daily lives, will again prove important in showcasing the benefits of integration. At the same time, to secure the kind of support that the Polish population expressed in the 2003 referendum, it will be important to also highlight the broader benefits of integration and address fears and concerns of various population groups.

The experience of Poland and other member countries from Central and Eastern Europe can serve not only as an example of the benefits of pre-accession funds, which we studied in this policy paper. The countries’ socio-economic success and the changes in the quality of life, both before and after accession, should be seen as a clear case of fundamental changes, which would have been highly unlikely had the countries decided to stay out of the European Union.

Acknowledgement

The authors acknowledge the support from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida. We are grateful to Patryk Markowski for his assistance in preparing this analysis and detailed background research.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Liberal Values in Ukraine Days Before the 2022 Invasion

Posted on September 22, 2025 | Policy Brief

Monument in Kyiv at sunrise symbolizing Ukraine liberal values of freedom, democracy, and resilience.

Just weeks before Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, the European Social Survey completed the 10th round of data collection on public attitudes and beliefs in Ukraine. This policy brief examines regional variation in liberal values such as attitudes toward democracy and the EU, based on that data. While respondents in Eastern Ukraine were more skeptical of democracy and EU integration, they did not consistently reject liberal social values to a greater extent than respondents in other parts of the country. The most striking divide however, lies in institutional trust, which was significantly lower in Eastern Ukraine. This suggests that trust in institutions, which may have been further negatively impacted by prolonged exposure to violence since 2014, underlie the observed regional differences in attitudes towards democracy and the EU. Understanding these differences is vital for policymakers navigating Ukraine’s reform and EU accession process.

Introduction

It has been well documented that values in post-communist countries in Eastern Europe on average, tend to be more authoritarian, more nationalistic, more in favor of state intervention in the economy, and more skeptical towards sexual and ethnic minorities and foreigners than in Western Europe (e.g., Roland 2012). Behind the averages, however, there is substantial variation in values across subgroups of populations. Even before the onset of the full-scale Russian invasion, a discussion on regional Ukrainian differences in relation to democratic values, the wish for EU integration, and similar liberal attitudes existed, both in and outside of the country.

The path towards a closer relationship with Europe and the EU started already in 2014, but since February 2022, Ukraine has politically positioned itself even closer to the EU, and an EU accession process is now underway. However, for a successful reform process in Ukraine, how public opinion is shaped and whether attitudes and values converge towards those of the EU will be important (Olofsgård et al. 2024).

With this in mind, this policy brief provides a descriptive account of public liberal values in Ukraine by analyzing data from the 10th round of the European Social Survey (ESS) conducted just weeks before the full-scale invasion on the 22nd of February 2022. Some of the differences we observe are likely long-standing and related to differences in language preferences and cultural and informational exposure from Russia and the EU, respectively. Yet, given the exposure to instability and conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine since 2014, we also discuss the role that exposure to conflict may have played in explaining several attitudinal dimensions, including satisfaction with democracy, support for liberal social values, attitudes toward Europe and EU integration, as well as levels of trust.

Data

The ESS round 10 data was collected through face-to-face interviews in Ukraine between January 18th, 2022, and February 8th, 2022. The nationally representative survey focuses on public attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors and includes questions on opinions on democracy, the EU, and similar topics commonly considered to capture liberal views.

ESS Sample Characteristics

The sample consisted of more women than men (about 59 percent and 41 percent, respectively). While the Ukrainian population is well-educated, most still find it difficult (41 percent) or very difficult (32 percent) to live comfortably on their income. 11.5 percent of the sample was unemployed, while 31 percent were retired. Broken down by location, most average outcomes are similar, albeit with the East displaying somewhat lower levels of education and greater income difficulties (see Figure 1 for an illustration of what oblasts (regions) are included in each geographical unit). Unemployment was, however, substantially higher in the West (about 15 percent), while the share of retirees was lower (26 percent).

Some heterogeneity exists when it comes to belonging to a religious denomination. In the Central and South, around 63 percent state they belong to a church/mosque/synagogue, etc. The East is roughly at par with the national average (70 and 69.5 percent, respectively), while this figure is 82 percent in the Western part of the country. Similarly, there are major differences in the language one most often speaks at home. In the country as a whole, 13.4 percent stated they speak both Ukrainian and Russian at home. In the East, this figure was as high as 27.1 percent, displaying the duality in mother tongue in this part of Ukraine. The corresponding figure for the West was 3.3 percent. On the contrary, 92.4 percent marked that they most often speak only Ukrainian at home in the West, whereas this figure was only 5.2 percent in the East.

Figure 1. Geographical Classification of Ukraine’s Oblasts

Note: The map depicts the ESS coverage at the time of data collection, excluding Crimea and Sevastopol – illegally annexed by Russia since 2014.

Key Variables of Interest

To understand the views on liberal values, ESS responses to questions in the following areas have been considered:

  • I. Merits of democracy: satisfaction with the way democracy works; importance of living in a democratic country.
  • II. Liberal democratic values: agreement with statements such as “gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own lives as they wish”; attitudes towards the merits of obedience, respect for authority, and loyalty towards leaders; attitudes towards immigrants.
  • III. Opinions about Europe and the EU: support for further EU integration; emotional attachment to Europe; vote intention in a hypothetical EU referendum.

Regional Differences

There are some clear regional divides in attitudes toward democracy, liberal values, and EU integration across Ukraine in the weeks leading up to the full-scale Russian invasion. These differences are particularly pronounced between Eastern Ukraine and the Center, South, and West – though not uniformly in the same direction.

Figure 2. Attitudes toward democracy, liberal values, and EU integration across Ukraine

Source: Authors’ creation from ESS.

On democratic commitment, only 37 percent of respondents in the East considered it “extremely important” to live in a democratically governed country. This was about 16 percentage points lower than the national average. When categories were grouped into low, medium, and high importance, the East still trailed the national average by about 10 percentage points (about 67.5 and 75 percent, respectively). Similarly, satisfaction with democracy is the lowest among respondents from the East (about 6 percent compared to a national average, including the East, of 11 percent). Geographical differences are also evident in the responses to the question on whether it is acceptable for a country to have a strong leader above the law. A smaller share rejected this in the East (about 30 percent compared to the national average of 37 percent).

However, the East stood out in the other direction on some core liberal values, as depicted in Figure 2. It had the lowest share disagreeing with LGBT rights (31 percent vs. 40 percent nationally), the weakest support for teaching children obedience (17 percent), and the highest rejection of it (41 percent). Further, only 12 percent in the East agreed that “the country needs most loyalty towards its leaders,” compared to 26 percent nationally. This question could reflect one’s view on the current leadership, warranting some caution in the interpretation. On immigration, however, the East was less liberal: only 19 percent saw immigrants as having a positive impact, versus about 30 percent nationally.

The sharpest regional divide between the East and other regions concerns attitudes toward Europe and EU membership. In a hypothetical referendum, 73 percent of respondents in the East said they would vote to remain outside of the EU, compared to 47 percent in the South, 23 percent in the Central, and just 11 percent in the West. Support for further European unification was also substantially lower in the East, with only about 17 percent in favor of further unification, as compared to the almost 50 percent national average. Similarly, emotional attachment to Europe is substantially lower among respondents from the East, with nearly all respondents stating low or medium attachment only – figures that nearly invert those of respondents from the West of Ukraine.

The Role of Trust

Turning to the measures of trust, the East clearly stands out. Trust in the parliament, the police, political parties, politicians, and the legal system was substantially lower among respondents from the East (in the ranges of 5 to 15 percentage points more respondents answered they had a low level of trust in said institutions than the national average). When asked about trust in the United Nations, the East also stood out with more than 50 percent stating low trust compared to the national average of about 37. The same pattern holds also when asked about the European Parliament – 73 percent compared to the national average of about 44 percent – stated low trust. Respondents from the South also displayed lower levels of trust across all measures, but the deviations from the average are about half as big as the East.

When asked whether people can generally be trusted, or one can’t be too careful, the East did not stand out in this way, underpinning how distrust is strongly directed toward institutions, both national and international.

Conflict Exposure

Figure 3 details the conflict intensity in the last two years leading up to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As can be seen, incidents of violence are concentrated in the Donbass area, including the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. While not marked by similar levels of active conflict, Kharkiv oblast – also part of the East classification – borders areas with high levels of conflict intensity in the Donbass, as well as Russia in the east.

Figure 3. Conflict intensity in Ukraine, by raion

2020

 

2021

Source: Authors’ creation from Armed Conflict and Location Data.

It should be noted that the map also depicts strategic deployments and political unrest, such as demonstrations, explaining the prevalence of “conflict” also in a few other places in Ukraine prior to February 2022. The occurrences of such incidents are, however, far less than those in Luhansk oblast and Donetsk oblast at the time. An important piece of information is that the intensity pattern holds for the time Armed Conflict and Location Data for Ukraine has been available (2018), i.e. individuals situated in the East have been exposed to incidences of violence over a prolonged period of time.

This raises the question whether this exposure to violence may have contributed to increased differences in trust in institutions and support for democracy and the EU beyond what was already there before 2014. The most immediate effect probably comes from selective migration, i.e., that individuals who remain in the eastern regions in early 2022 despite the violence since 2014 may be those who, on average, are more skeptical of the Ukrainian government and its tilt away from the authoritarian Russia and towards the EU. But previous literature and recent studies on Ukraine suggest that there may also be a direct effect coming from exposure to violence on an individual’s attitudes. This relationship has recently been mapped by Obrizan (2025). A key finding is that military solutions are preferred in the segment of the population that has experienced hardship and personal losses since the full-scale invasion in 2022.

More generally, any kind of trust – including the interpersonal one – can be affected by exposure to conflict. The relationship is complicated, and in some instances, violence can cause more pro-social attitudes and behavior. An important distinction, however, is that exposure to violence amplifies the distinctions in attitudes and behavior towards members of in- and out-groups (Olofsgård, 2025). This suggests that conflict may have further increased the differences between the East of Ukraine and the rest of the country, if many residents in the former perceive national and western institutions as being dominated by groups they do not feel strong attachments to.

Further, terror management theory (e.g., Landau et al. 2004) suggests that fear induces support for charismatic and strong leadership. In a context where liberal democracy is not everywhere well enough entrenched, this may tilt over into support for more authoritarian leadership in response to attacks triggering stronger emotions of fear. Furthermore, work by Feldman and Stenner (1997) shows that the impact of perceived societal threat on triggering stronger authoritarian preferences can depend on authoritarian predispositions. The latter is measured by, e.g., looking at attitudes towards child rearing and emphasis on obedience. In the context of the finding above, this would imply that the impact of violence on authoritarian preferences would be weaker in the eastern parts of Ukraine, compared to the rest of the country, a potentially interesting avenue for future research.

Conclusions

The findings in this policy brief nuance simple narratives about regional divides in Ukraine. While dissatisfaction with democracy and skepticism toward the EU are more common in the East, this does not necessarily correspond to a general rejection of liberal social values. In some cases — such as attitudes toward child-rearing, authority, and LGBT rights — respondents from the East even express more liberal views than elsewhere.

Not explicitly discussed in the brief is the topic of mother tongue. The data shows that Russian speakers are less emotionally attached to Europe and less supportive of EU integration. Yet, there is no consistent evidence that Russian speakers are less committed to liberal democratic values overall. The effect of language is difficult to disentangle from geography, particularly given the concentration of Russian speakers in Eastern Ukraine.

What does stand out more clearly is that trust and the general view on institutions are substantially lower and more negative in the East. Respondents from the East consistently report lower trust in national and international political institutions. Interestingly, this pattern does not extend to generalized social trust — the East does not differ markedly from the rest of the country. This contrast suggests a more focused skepticism directed at formal institutions, rather than widespread social distrust. One possible explanation, as discussed in Olofsgård (2025), is that when exposed to conflict and violence, interpersonal trust may reflect confidence in one’s in-group, while institutional trust hinges on feeling represented within the broader political system. If respondents from the East perceive themselves as excluded from the national or European in-group, this could explain their lower levels of trust in both domestic and international institutions, and exposure to violence may have further amplified this. While signs of such alienation appear in the data, one should refrain from drawing too strong conclusions from this alone. Another possible explanation is that prolonged exposure to violence has eroded confidence in the government’s ability to protect citizens, and in the effectiveness of EU support, which would turn support away from the EU option preferred by the current government.  Future research on the effects of war exposure should more carefully disentangle the various aspects and forms of trust and how they relate to liberal values in Ukraine. Rebuilding institutional trust remains a key challenge. In this context, instilling peace and decentralizing political power may be essential for increasing trust in the Eastern part of the country, if that helps residents in the East to identify with public institutions. As Ukraine advances on its path toward EU membership, fostering a shared sense of national belonging will be critical in overcoming the narrative of an East–West divide when rebuilding the country.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

A Potential Broadening of the Excise Tax on Food Products High in Sugar and Salt: The Case of Latvia

Posted on June 9, 2025 | Policy Brief

Woman holding a burger with fried chicken, donuts, and sugary foods – concept image for excise tax on sugar and salt.

Overweight and obesity are significant public health issues, contributing to various chronic diseases such as cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, and certain cancers. Latvia’s second-highest share of overweight adults in the EU is a compelling reason for public health measures. These should aim to discourage excessive consumption of high-calorie foods and beverages. Excise tax is one of the tools in a complex approach to encourage a balanced diet and promote positive health outcomes. Motivated by evidence from Hungary, currently the only country in Europe imposing a tax on pre-packaged food products high in sugar and salt, we simulate the short-term impact of the introduction of a differentiated broad-based tax on food products in Latvia. We conclude that to influence consumer behaviour, price increases should be at least 10 percent, which implies introducing tax rates that are at least 1.5 times higher than those in Hungary.

Extremely High Overweight and Obesity Rates in Latvia

Overweight and obesity are serious public health challenges across Europe. Together with an unbalanced diet and low physical activity they contribute to many non-communicable diseases (NCDs), including heart diseases, diabetes and certain cancers (WHO, 2022). For many individuals, being overweight is also linked to psychological problems.

Overweight and obesity rates are extremely high in all EU countries. In 2022, more than half of all adults in the EU (51.3 percent) were overweight (including pre-obese and obese). Latvia has the 2nd highest rate of overweight adults in the EU (60.4 percent). This puts significant pressure on Latvia’s health care system and social resources.

Recognizing that overweight and obesity has multifactorial causes, a comprehensive approach is required to effectively tackle this problem, involving experts from various fields and addressing the issue from multiple angles.

One potential tool in a complex approach is an excise tax on foods and drinks high in sugar and salt since excessive consumption of such foods and drinks represents a major risk factor for NCDs (WHO, 2015a). Such a tax could help to reduce excessive consumption, encourage healthier eating, and improve public health outcomes.

The Intake of Added Sugars

According to data from the EFSA Panel on Nutrition, Novel Foods and Food Alergens (EFSA, 2022), the main source of added sugar intake in almost all European countries is sugar and confectionery. The numbers for adults (18–64 years) range from 20 percent in Austria to 57 percent in Italy (48 percent in Latvia). For children aged 1–18 years, sugar and confectionary contribute to 36 – 44 percent of added sugar intake in Latvia.

In Latvia, other key sources of added sugar are fine bakery wares, processed fruits, and vegetables. The contribution of sweetened soft and fruit drinks to total added sugar intake is only 8 percent for adults (18–64 years) and 3–7 percent for children (1–18 years).

Excise Tax on Soft Drinks

As of 2024, 14 European countries have implemented taxes on sugar-sweetened soft drinks. In Latvia, the tax was introduced in 1999 and was mainly motivated by the financial needs of the state budget.

The evidence from international case studies (WHO, 2023) shows that taxes on sugar-sweetened soft drinks can be effective in reducing consumption in the short term, particularly when the tax leads to significant price increases that reduce affordability. However, the overall evidence on whether these taxes successfully reduce sugar intake is inconclusive. In a review by the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (NZIER, 2017), the authors conclude that methodologically robust studies  show only small reductions in sugar intake, too small to produce significant health benefits, and easily offset if consumers switch to other high-calorie products. On the other hand, studies reporting a meaningful change in sugar intake often assume no compensatory substitution. At the same time, experience from Hungary suggests that a sugar tax imposed on a wide range of products is effective in reducing the overall consumption of products subject to the tax, and in encouraging healthier consumption habits. The impact assessment conducted 3 years after the introduction of the tax in Hungary showed that consumers of unhealthy food products responded to the tax by choosing a cheaper, often healthier product (7–16 percent of those surveyed), consuming less of the unhealthy product (5–16 percent), switching to another brand of the product (5–11 percent), or substituting it with another food item – often a healthier alternative (WHO, 2015b).

The Short-term Effect of a Broad-Based Excise Tax in Latvia

Approach

Motivated by the evidence from Hungary, we simulate the short-term impact of the introduction of a similar differentiated broad-based tax on food products high in sugar and salt using the approach applied in Pļuta et. al (2020). First, we use AC Nielsen monthly data from 2019 to 2023 on sales volume and prices of pre-packaged food products of selected categories in the modern trade retail market to estimate the price elasticity of demand for these products. The selected product categories included:

  • Pre-packaged sweetened products (e.g., breakfast cereals, cacao, chocolate bars, soft and hard candies, sweet biscuits, etc.)
  • Sweetened dairy products (e.g., ice cream, yoghurt, condensed milk, curd countlines, etc.)
  • Salted snacks (salted nuts, salted biscuits, etc.)
  • Ready-to-eat and instant foods (e.g., pizza cooled and frozen, frozen dumplings, vegetables and canned beans, etc.)
  • Condiments (e.g., dehydrated instant and cooking culinary, dehydrated sauces and seasonings, dressings, ketchup, mayonnaise, etc.)

Second, we simulate different scenarios to assess the increase in price, reduction in sales and budgetary effect using the estimated elasticities and assuming different degrees of tax pass-through rate to retail prices (100 and 50 percent, respectively). Our results represent a short-term or direct fiscal effect, meaning we do not account for any second-round effects that may arise due to changes in domestic production and employment, which could in turn generate additional tax revenues.

The Tax Object and Rates

In defining the scenarios to be considered when modelling the potential broadening of the tax base, we use the Hungarian Public Health Product Tax (PHPT) as a practice example. As a basis, we use the list of product categories under taxation by the PHPT, the two-tier tax system and the PHPT rates as of 2024. In addition, we are also looking at other product categories (such as sugar sweetened dairy products, sweetened cereals and vegetables and beans containered), expanding the tax base even more. In total, we simulated four scenarios for taxing the food products high in sugar and salt. The scenarios consider a two-tier tax system, meaning products with lower sugar or salt content are taxed at a lower rate, while those with higher content face a higher tax. For condiments, only a high rate is applied due to the, usually high, salt content. A differentiated tax rate is expected to stimulate the industry to drive down sugar and salt content in their products, i.e., offering sugar and salt-reduced options. The scenarios differ from each other in the applicable rates.

  • Scenario 1: Uses the same tax rates as Latvia’s excise tax on non-alcoholic beverages (as of March 2024) – EUR 7.40 per 100 kg (low rate) and EUR 17.50 per 100 kg (high rate).
  • Scenario 2: Uses Hungary’s PHPT rates – in the general case, the low rate is EUR 17 per 100 kg, and the high rate is EUR 54 per 100 kg.
  • Scenario 3: Sets rates 1.5 times higher than Hungary’s rates.
  • Scenario 4: Doubles Hungary’s rates.

Assumptions

Unfortunately, the retail price and sales time series used in the analysis are not disaggregated into groups according to the sugar and salt content in the product. As a result, we apply assumptions to estimate the potential range of tax impacts.

To calculate the lower bound of the expected impact, we assume that 100 percent of sales in each product category are subject to the new sugar and salt tax, but all products have low sugar and salt content and therefore qualify for the lower tax rate.

To calculate the upper bound, we assume that 25 percent of the sales volume is taxed at the lower rate (due to low sugar and salt content), while the remaining 75 percent of sales are taxed at the higher rate, reflecting higher sugar and salt levels in those products.

Results

According to our estimations, the application of an excise tax on food products high in sugar and salt could lead to a price increase and sales decrease of taxed food products. The magnitude would depend on the type of food product (i.e., average retail price in the country) and scenario assumed (i.e., tax rates). Within each single scenario, the largest impact is expected for condiments. This is because we simulate only the high tax rate applied to them (not a two-tier system), as is the case in Hungary. The tax makes up a larger share of their price, and due to high price sensitivity, the decrease in sales is also greater.

Based on previous research, we conclude that price increases need to reach at least 10 percent to meaningfully influence consumer behaviour. This level of change is achieved in Scenario 3, which assumes tax rates 1.5 times higher than those used in Hungary.

Below we present the obtained estimations under Scenario 3.  The estimates for Scenarios 1 and 2 are not included here because the price increase caused by the tax does not reach 10 percent for several product categories. Under Scenario 4 the price changes could exceed 10 percent but this scenario may also provide stronger incentives for manufacturers to reformulate their products (and in this case, the average price increase within a given product category will be lower). The results for Scenario 4 are available in a recent BICEPS report (Pļuta et al., 2024).

Under Scenario 3, with full tax pass-through (100 percent), the estimated reduction in sales volume is:

  • 3.0–8.1 percent for pre-packaged sweetened products;
  • 3.6–17.1 percent for sweetened dairy products;
  • 0.9–4.7 percent for salted snacks;
  • 10.4–54.1 percent for ready-to-eat and instant foods;
  • 11.0–11.8 percent for condiments.

If only 50 percent of the tax is passed through to retail prices, the sales reductions would be approximately half as big.

The estimated revenue from the excise tax in this scenario would range between EUR 15.0 million and EUR 54.9 million. The resulting change in VAT revenue would range from a loss of EUR 0.7 million to a gain of EUR 1.1 million.

Conclusion

Although overweight and obesity rates are extremely high in all EU countries, Latvia, in 2022, had the second highest rate in the EU. In this brief, we explore the use of the excise tax as one of the tools in a complex approach to discourage excessive consumption of foods and beverages high in sugar and salt and encourage a balanced diet and promote positive health outcomes. Based on findings from previous studies, a price increase of at least 10 percent is needed to influence consumer behaviour. In Latvia, this would require tax rates approximately 1.5 times higher than those applied in Hungary, i.e. in the general case equal to EUR 25.5 (low rate) and EUR 81 (high rate) per 100 kg of product. Under such a scenario, the estimated revenue from the tax could range from EUR 15.0 to 54.9 million. For comparison, in 2024, Latvia’s excise tax on soft drinks generated EUR 15.6 million. To remain effective, tax rates should be adjusted over time in line with growth in disposable income.

Acknowledgement

This brief is based on a study Taxation of the non-alcoholic beverages with excise tax in the Baltic countries. Potential broadening of the tax base to food products high in sugar and salt completed by BICEPS researchers in 2024 (Pļuta et al., 2024). The study was commissioned by VA Government. It was developed independently and reflects only the views of the authors.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

From Integration to Reconstruction: Standing with Ukraine by Supporting Ukrainians in Sweden

Posted on April 7, 2025 | Policy Brief

People gathered in Sweden showing solidarity and supporting Ukrainians with national flags.

Sweden has strongly supported Ukraine through both public opinion and government actions, yet there has been little discussion about the needs of Ukrainian displaced people in Sweden. The ongoing war and the rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape have created uncertainty – geopolitical, institutional, and individual. Ukrainian displaced people in Sweden face an unclear future regarding their rights, long-term status, and opportunities, making future planning or investing in relevant skills difficult. This uncertainty also weakens the effectiveness of integration policies and limits the range of policy tools that can be deployed, which hinders participation in the labor market, affecting both displaced and employers. Addressing these challenges is essential, not only for the well-being of Ukrainians in Sweden, but also for Sweden’s broader role in supporting Ukraine. Helping displaced Ukrainians rebuild their lives also strengthens their ability to contribute both to Swedish society and to Ukraine’s future reconstruction and integration into Europe.

The Swedish Approach to Displaced Ukrainians

In response to the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Temporary Protection Directive (2001/55/EC) (commonly referred to as collective temporary protection) was activated in March 2022, granting Ukrainians seeking refuge temporary protection in EU countries, including Sweden. This directive provides residence permits, access to work, education, and limited social benefits without requiring individuals to go through the standard asylum process.

However, the practicalities of the Directive’s use differed significantly between countries. Sweden, despite its, until recent, reputation of being relatively liberal in its migration policies, has at times, lagged behind its Scandinavian neighbors in supporting Ukrainian displaced people. To illustrate this, it is useful to compare the Swedish approach to that of other Nordic states, as well as Poland.

Comparison to Other Nordic States

The Nordic countries have implemented the directive in different ways, adopting varying policies toward Ukrainians demonstrating different degrees of flexibility and support. Despite its generally restrictive immigration policy, Denmark introduced some housing and self-settlement policies for Ukrainians that were more liberal than its usual approach. Norway also initially introduced liberal measures but later tightened regulations, banning temporary visits to Ukraine and reducing financial benefits. Finland, meanwhile, has taken a relatively proactive stance, granting temporary protection to over 64,000 Ukrainians – one of the highest per capita rates in the region. Its strong intake reflects a more flexible and effective implementation of the directive, particularly from late 2022, when it surpassed Sweden and Denmark in number of arrivals.

In Sweden the so-called “massflyktsdirektivet“ grants Ukrainians temporary protection until at least March 2025. Its future beyond that, however, remains uncertain, adding to the challenges faced by refugees and policymakers alike. Sweden – considered liberal in migration policies (at least, up until 2016) – has been criticized for offering limited rights and financial support to displaced Ukrainians, making it one of the least attractive destinations among the Nordic countries (Hernes & Danielsen, 2024). Under “massflyktsdirektivet”, displaced Ukrainians were entitled to lower financial benefits and limited access to healthcare compared to refugees or residents with temporary permits. It was only in July 2023 that they became eligible for Swedish language training, and only in November 2024 could they apply for residence permits under Sweden’s regular migration laws – a pathway that can eventually lead to permanent residence.

Figure 1 illustrates significant fluctuations in the number of individuals granted collective temporary protection in the Nordic countries over the first two years following Russia’s full-scale invasion. As Hernes and Danielsen (2024) show in a recent report, all Nordic countries experienced a peak in arrivals in March-April 2022, followed by a decline in May-June. Sweden initially received the most, but aside from this early peak, inflows have remained relatively low despite its larger population (Table 1). Since August 2022, Finland and Norway have generally recorded higher arrivals than Denmark and Sweden. By August 2023, Norway’s share increased significantly, accounting for over 60 percent of total Nordic arrivals between September and November 2023.

Figure 1. Total number of individuals granted collective temporary protection in the Nordic countries

Source: Hernes & Danielsen, 2024, data from Eurostat.

Table 1. Total number of registered temporary protection permits and percent of population as of December 2023

Source: Hernes & Danielsen, 2024, data from Eurostat.

Comparison to Poland

Sweden’s policies and their outcomes compare rather poorly to those of Poland, one of the European countries that received the largest influx of Ukrainian migrants due to its geographic and cultural proximity. A key factor behind Poland’s relatively better performance is that pre-existing Ukrainian communities and linguistic similarities have facilitated a smoother integration. Ukrainians themselves played a crucial role in this regard, with many volunteering in Polish schools to support Ukrainian children. Sweden also had a community of Ukrainians who arrived to the country over time, partly fleeing the 2014 annexation of Donetsk and Crimea. Since these individuals were never eligible for refugee status or integration support, they had to rely on their own efforts to settle. In doing so, they built informal networks and accumulated valuable local knowledge. Nevertheless, after the full-scale invasion in 2022, they were not recognized as a resource for integrating newly arrived Ukrainian refugees – unlike in Poland.

However, Poland’s approach was shaped not only by these favorable preconditions but also by deliberate policy choices. As described in a recent brief (Myck, Król, & Oczkowska, 2025), a key factor was the immediate legal integration of displaced Ukrainians, granting them extensive residency rights and access to social services, along with a clearer pathway to permanent residence and eventual naturalization.

Barriers to Labor Market Integration

Despite a strong unanimous support for Ukraine across the political spectrum, there is less public debate and fewer policy processes in Sweden regarding displaced Ukrainians, most likely attributable to the general shift towards more restrictive immigration policies. The immigration policy debate in Sweden has increasingly emphasized a more “selective” migration, i.e. attracting migrants based on specific criteria, such as employability, skills, or economic self-sufficiency. This makes it puzzling that displaced Ukrainians, who largely meet these standards, have not been better accommodated. Before the full-scale invasion, Sweden was a particularly attractive destination among those who wanted to migrate permanently, especially for highly educated individuals and families (Elinder et al., 2023), indicating a positive self-selection process.

When large numbers of displaced Ukrainians arrived after the full-scale invasion, many had higher education and recent work experience, which distinguished them from previous refugee waves that Sweden had received from other countries. Despite a strong labor market in 2022, their integration was hindered by restrictions imposed under the Temporary Protection Directive, which limited access to social benefits and housing. At the same time, Sweden explicitly sought to reduce its attractiveness as a destination for migrants in general, contributing to a sharp decline in its popularity among Ukrainians after the war escalated.

In addition to the restrictiveness and numerous policy shifts over time, the temporary nature of the directive governing displaced Ukrainians – rather than the standard asylum process – creates significant policy uncertainty. This uncertainty makes it difficult for Ukrainians to decide whether to invest in Sweden-specific skills or prepare for a potential return to Ukraine, whether voluntary or forced, complicating their long-term planning. It also hinders labor market integration, increasing the risk of exploitation in the informal economy. Another key challenge is the unequal distribution of rights, as entitlements vary depending on registration timelines, further exacerbating the precarious situation many displaced Ukrainians face in Sweden.

A survey of 2,800 displaced Ukrainians conducted by the Ukrainian NGO in Sweden “Hej Ukraine!” in February 2025 provides key insights into their labor market integration (Hej Ukraine!, 2025). Survey results show that, currently, 40 percent of respondents are employed, with 42 percent of them holding permanent contracts while the rest work in temporary positions and 6 percent being engaged in formal studies. Employment is concentrated in low-skilled sectors, with 26 percent working in cleaning services, 14 percent in construction, and 12 percent in hospitality and restaurants. Other notable sectors include IT (11 percent), education (8 percent), warehousing (7 percent), elderly care (5 percent), forestry (3 percent), and healthcare (3 percent). The lack of stable permits, access to language courses (until September 2024), and financial incentives for hiring displaced persons have complicated their integration.

As mentioned above, the Swedish government has over time introduced several initiatives to facilitate the integration of displaced Ukrainians. However, assessing their effectiveness is crucial to identify persistent challenges and to formulate targeted policy solutions.

The Role of the Private Sector and Civil Society

The business sector, civil society and NGOs have also played a role in supporting displaced Ukrainians, filling gaps left by the public sector. This includes initiatives aimed at creating job opportunities that encourage voluntary return. However, broader systemic support, including simplified diploma recognition and targeted re-skilling programs, is needed to enhance labor market participation.

Moreover, there is a lack of information among displaced, potential employers and public institutions (municipality level) about the tools and programs available. For example, a community sponsorship program funded by UNHCR, which demonstrated positive effects on integration by offering mentorship and support networks, was only applied by five municipalities (UNHCR, 2025). Similar programs could be expanded to address structural barriers, particularly in the labor market. Another example is the Ukrainian Professional Support Center established to help displaced Ukrainians find jobs through building networks and matching job seekers with employers (UPSC, 2024). The center was funded by the European Social Fund, and staffed to 50 percent by Ukrainian nationals, either newcomers or previously established in Sweden, to facilitate communication. Experiences from this initiative, shared during a recent roundtable discussion –  Integration and Inclusion of Ukrainian Displaced People in Sweden, highlighted that between 2022 and 2024, about 1,400 Ukrainians participated in the project, but only one-third of participants found jobs, mostly in entry-level positions in care, hospitality, and construction.  Restrictions under the temporary protection directive, along with the absence of clear mechanisms for further integration, posed significant challenges; the lack of a personal ID, bank account, and access to housing were considered major obstacles. The uncertainty of their future in Sweden was also reported as a significant source of stress for participants.

Implications and Policy Recommendations

The lack of clarity surrounding the future of the EU Temporary Protection Directive, as well as its specific implementation in Sweden, leaves displaced Ukrainians in a precarious situation. Many do not know whether they will be allowed to stay or if they should prepare for a forced return. This uncertainty discourages long-term investment in skills, housing, and integration efforts.

Uncertainty also affects Swedish institutions, making it difficult to implement long-term policies that effectively integrate Ukrainians into society. To address these issues, the following policy recommendations are proposed.

  • Extend Temporary Protection Status Beyond 2025: Clear guidelines on the duration of protection are necessary to provide stability for displaced Ukrainians
  • Improve Labor Market Access: Introduce targeted programs for skill recognition, language training, and financial incentives for businesses hiring displaced Ukrainians
  • Enhance Civil Society and Private Sector Collaboration: Support mentorship and community sponsorship programs that facilitate integration
  • Acknowledge and Utilize displaced Ukrainians as a Resource: Recognizing displaced Ukrainians as potential assets in rebuilding Ukraine and strengthening European ties should be a priority.
  • Increase Public and Policy Debate: There is a need for greater discussion on how to integrate Ukrainians in Sweden, as an important complement to the policy priority of providing aid to Ukraine.

By implementing these measures, Sweden can provide displaced Ukrainians with greater stability, enabling them to engage in the formal labour market rather than being pushed into informal or precarious employment. This not only benefits Ukrainians by ensuring fair wages and legal protection, but also strengthens Sweden’s economy through increased tax revenues and a more sustainable labour force.

As Sweden continues to support Ukraine in its fight for sovereignty, it should also recognize the value of displaced Ukrainians within its borders, fostering their contribution to both Swedish society and Ukraine’s eventual reconstruction.

References

  • Hernes, V., & Danielsen, Å. Ø. (2024). Reception and integration policies for displaced persons from Ukraine in the Nordic countries – A comparative analysis. NIBR Policy Brief 2024:01. https://oda.oslom et.no/oda-xmlui/handle/11250/3125012
  • Hej Ukraine! (2025). Telegram channel. https://t.me/hejukrainechat
  • Elinder, M., Erixson, O., & Hammar, O. (2023). Where Would Ukrainian Refugees Go if They Could Go Anywhere? International Migration Review, 57(2), 587-602. https://doi.org/10.1177/01979183221131559
  • EUROSTAT. Decisions granting temporary protection by citizenship, age and sex – monthly data. Dataset. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_asytpfm__custom_15634298/default/map?lang=en
  • Myck, M., Król, A., & Oczkowska, M. (2025, February 21). Three years on – Ukrainians in Poland after Russia’s 2022 invasion. FREE Policy Brief. Centre for Economic Analysis (CenEA). https://freepolicybriefs.org/2025/02/21/ukrainians-in-poland/
  • Ukrainian Professional Support Center (UPSC). (2024). https://professionalcenter.se/omoss/
  • United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (2025). Community sponsorship. UNHCR Northern Europe. Retrieved [March 6, 2025] from https://www.unhcr.org/neu/list/our-work/community-sponsorship

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Human Capital Loss Among Belarusian and Ukrainian Migrants to the EU

Posted on March 31, 2025 | Policy Brief

Silhouettes of construction workers on scaffolding at sunset, symbolizing underemployment among human capital migrants in the EU.

This policy brief examines the underutilization of human capital among involuntary migrants from Ukraine and Belarus in Poland and Lithuania. Focusing on those who migrated after 2020 (Belarus) and 2022 (Ukraine), the brief investigates the factors influencing the conversion of their pre-migration skills into gainful employment in their host countries. Our findings show that despite many migrants possessing high levels of education and professional qualifications, structural barriers and low convertibility of their skills, hinder their full labor market integration. This skill underutilization not only limits migrants’ professional growth and earning potential but also deprives the host countries of valuable skills and potential economic gains.

Effective labor market integration substantially benefits both host and sending countries and migrants themselves. For host nations, successful integration can alleviate critical skill shortages, boost productivity, and drive economic growth (Boubtane, Dumont, & Rault, 2016; Boubtane, 2019; Engler, Giesing, & Kraehnert, 2023; Bernstein et al., 2022). Conversely, inadequate integration leads to underemployment, diminished potential, and economic inefficiency. Countries of origin can benefit from remittances, the return of migrants with enhanced skills, and strengthened international economic ties. However, poor integration risks an uncompensated “brain drain” (Reinhold & Thom, 2009; Barrett & O’Connell, 2001; Iara, 2006; Barrett & Goggin, 2010; Co, Gang, & Yun, 2000). For migrants, the ability to continue their careers means higher earnings and less stress from the acquisition of a new profession, while the non-utilization of existing skills results in their depreciation, potentially causing permanent wage reductions even upon return to the home country (Bowman & Myers, 1967).

Migrants can be broadly categorized into voluntary migrants or forced migrants. Voluntary migrants assess labor market prospects beforehand and often possess convertible human capital – one that can be used in a new labor market. This group often includes professionals like IT specialists and scientists and those in low-skilled but highly transferable professions. Forced migrants, on the contrary, may be utterly unprepared for changes in jurisdiction and possess skills of limited transferability. For example, even highly specialized professions requiring extensive training and substantial human capital, such as lawyers, officials, and teachers, often prove “non-convertible“ (Duleep & Regets, 1999). These individuals’ skills are frequently country specific.

Low convertibility of skills generates significant negative consequences. Highly educated professionals, for instance, may find themselves relegated to low-paying, unskilled jobs, unable to leverage their expertise. This hinders their professional development and deprives host countries of valuable skills and potential contributions to economic growth. Addressing these mismatches is crucial for maximizing the benefits of migration for stakeholders in both home and host countries.

Forced Migration from Belarus and Ukraine

The political crisis in Belarus, starting with the contested 2020 presidential elections, led to widespread repression and significant forced migration. Belarus’s role in supporting Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine exacerbated this situation, resulting in approximately 300,000 Belarusians seeking refuge in the European Union (Eurostat). This number accounts for a substantial proportion of the country’s 9 million population and its approximately 5 million-strong labor force (Belstat).

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine triggered the most significant wave of migration in Ukrainian history, with over 6 million of the pre-war 44 million population fleeing to the EU (UNHCR). About 90 percent of the initial refugees were women and children due to a mobilization law preventing most men aged 18 to 60 from leaving (UNHCR).

Online Survey and Migrant Differences

To better understand the situation of migrants, their integration into the EU labor market, and to develop data-driven recommendations for improving their conditions, the CIVITTA agency, in partnership with BEROC, conducted an online survey in the summer of 2024. This brief is based on the survey results. The survey includes responses from 616 Ukrainian nationals who migrated to Poland or Lithuania after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as well as 173 Belarusian migrants who left their home country after 2020. The research focuses on individuals aged 28 to 42, providing insights into their experiences and challenges in the labor market in their host countries. While we acknowledge the sample’s limitations in terms of representativeness, we believe the findings provide valuable insights into the specific challenges faced by involuntary migrants and their adaptation strategies in the new labor market.

Key differences characterize these migration waves. Ukrainian migration comprises of more women, while Belarusian migrants show a more balanced gender distribution, with 47 percent women in our sample versus 62 percent for Ukrainians. Family separation is also notable, as 91 percent of married Belarusians live with their spouses, compared to only 75 percent of Ukrainians (due to the mobilization law).

Survey respondents from both groups possess high levels of human capital with 60 percent of Ukrainians and 90 percent of Belarusians holding higher education degrees. Among Belarusians, 94 percent had over five years of work experience before migration, with and 79 percent of Ukrainians stating the same.

Ukrainian return intentions are split: 38 percent plan to return, 19 percent will not, and the rest are undecided. An end to the war and changes in Russian foreign policy would increase return rates to 70 percent. For Belarusians, 35 percent plan to return, 38 percent will not, and the rest are undecided. Education level is key, as less-educated Belarusians are more likely to stay abroad. An end to repression would increase the share of those Belarusians who want to return to 70 percent, and a regime change would increase this percentage to 82 percent.

Factors Conditioning Human Capital Loss

As expected, due to the involuntary nature of migration of the two groups in focus, a large fraction of survey participants reported losing their profession after migration. As Figure one shows, 48 percent of Belarusians and 63 percent of Ukrainians in our sample reported full loss of their prior careers. The lower percentage of Ukrainians fully retaining their careers (23 percent) compared to Belarusians (44 percent) could be attributed to several factors, including the more recent and disruptive nature of the Russo-Ukrainian war leading to more significant displacement and challenges in finding comparable work. The higher percentage of Ukrainians starting their careers from scratch (49 percent compared to 29 percent among Belarusians) also supports this idea.

Figure 1. Preservation of careers in the EU

Source: Authors’ computations based on survey data.

To foster an evidence-based discussions on the smooth integration of migrants into the EU labor market and the prevention of human capital loss, it is crucial to examine the individual factors that influence career continuity for Belarusian and Ukrainian migrants. We therefore utilize a logistic regression model to identify key predictors that increase the likelihood of migrants remaining in their profession after relocating to Poland and Lithuania.

In our quantitative analysis, an outcome binary variable for staying in the profession is equal to 1 if an individual either “continued career started in a home country (in the same position)” or “remained in the same profession but started working in a position lower than the one held before emigration.” As predictors, we consider a set of sociodemographic variables reasonably related to the probability of staying in the profession and dummy variables for the most common spheres of employment (see Table 1).

Table 1. Overview of model variables

Who Maintains Their Career After Emigration?

Based on the regression coefficients in Table 2, we can identify characteristics related to losing career-specific human capital. In our regression, we control for both home and host country factors. One noteworthy finding is that, while Ukrainian migrants in our sample report significantly higher rates of career loss than Belarusian migrants, nationality itself does not emerge as a significant predictor of career loss once other characteristics are accounted for.

Our results also show that the probability of staying in a profession is higher among men, those with more extended work experience and higher income before emigration, and those who were invited to a host country by an employer. The same holds for entrepreneurs, those who do not plan to return, and those employed in the fields of Architecture & Engineering and Information and Communication Technologies.

Table 2. Results of regression analysis

Note: *** Significant at the .001 level. ** Significant at the .01 level. * Significant at the .05 level.

Conclusion

Several conclusions and policy advice can be derived from the survey results.

The higher likelihood of entrepreneurs staying in their profession suggests that supporting migrant entrepreneurship can be a valuable strategy to retain human capital. This can be done, for example, by:

  • Providing access to resources, mentorship, and funding for migrant entrepreneurs.
  • Streamlining the procedures for migrants to start and operate businesses.
  • Facilitating access to capital for migrant-owned businesses.

The research highlights the disproportionate impact of human capital loss on women.  Therefore, policies should include gender-specific programs that address women’s unique challenges in integrating into new labor markets. This could include:

  • Skills retraining and certification programs: Designed to align women’s existing skills with the demands of the host country’s labor market, with consideration for childcare needs and other barriers women may face.
  • Connecting women migrants with established professionals in their fields to facilitate knowledge transfer and career guidance.
  • Language training programs: Tailored to the specific needs of women, potentially incorporating childcare support to enable participation.

The study highlights the positive role of international companies in supporting employee relocation. Respondents who were invited by an employer demonstrated the most successful integration into the new labor market. To enhance and strengthen these networks, policies may focus on:

  • Encouraging corporations to hire and train migrant workers, potentially through tax breaks or other incentives. This could include partnerships with migrant-serving organizations to connect companies with qualified candidates.
  • Developing digital platforms that connect migrants with diaspora networks, potential employers, and relevant resources.

In addition, policies should address the non-recognition of foreign qualifications, simplifying and expediting the procedures for recognizing foreign degrees and professional certifications. Initiatives to create targeted training programs could complement such policies and allow migrants to quickly acquire any missing skills or certifications required by the host country’s professional bodies. These policy measures would enhance the utilization of migrants’ human capital, benefiting both migrants and host countries while also supporting sending countries. This could be achieved by fostering a successful diaspora or facilitating productive reintegration in the case of return migration.

References

  • Barrett, A., & Goggin, J. (2010). Returning to the question of a wage premium for returning migrants. National Institute Economic Review, 213, R43–R51. https://doi.org/10.1177/0027950110389752
  • Barrett, A., & O’Connell, P. J. (2001). Does training generally work? The returns to in-company training. ILR Review, 54(3), 647–662. https://doi.org/10.1177/001979390105400403
  • Bernstein, S., Diamond, R., McQuade, T. J., & Pousada, B. (2022). The contribution of high-skilled immigrants to innovation in the United States (No. w30797). National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w30797
  • Boubtane, E. (2019). The economic effects of immigration for host countries. L’Economie politique, 84(4), 72–83. https://doi.org/10.3917/leco.084.0072
  • Boubtane, E., Dumont, J.-C., & Rault, C. (2016). Immigration and economic growth in the OECD countries 1986–2006. Oxford Economic Papers, 68(2), 340–360. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpv024
  • Bowman, M. J., & Myers, R. G. (1967). Schooling, experience, and gains and losses in human capital through migration. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 62(319), 875–898. https://doi.org/10.2307/2283723
  • Co, C. Y., Gang, I. N., & Yun, M.-S. (2000). Returns to returning. Journal of Population Economics, 13, 57–79. https://doi.org/10.1007/s001480050121
  • Duleep, H. O., & Regets, M. C. (1999). Immigrants and human-capital investment. American Economic Review, 89(2), 186–191. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.2.186
  • Engler, P., Giesing, Y., & Kraehnert, K. (2023). The macroeconomic effects of large immigration waves. IAB-Discussion Paper. https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-239271
  • Iara, A. (2006). Skill diffusion in temporary migration? Returns to Western European working experience in the EU accession countries (Development Studies Working Paper No. 210). Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=921492
  • Reinhold, S., & Thom, K. (2009). Temporary migration and skill upgrading: Evidence from Mexican migrants. University of Mannheim, unpublished manuscript.
  • UNHCR. (n.d.). Operational Data Portal. https://data.unhcr.org/

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Agricultural Subsidies: The Case of Georgia

Posted on March 17, 2025 | Policy Brief

Fresh apples, pears, and grapes at a local market benefiting from agricultural subsidies in Georgia.

This brief explores the role of government subsidy programs in Georgia’s agricultural sector, with a focus on grapes, apples, and hazelnuts. These subsidies play a significant role in providing social assistance to the sector and in supporting farmers; however, their long-term impact on industry growth remains a subject of discussion. Key challenges include ensuring product quality, enhancing productivity, and expanding market opportunities, particularly regarding export market concentration and infrastructure constraints.

Introduction

Governments have historically intervened in agricultural markets under the pretext of promoting food security. At first, interventions aimed to provide affordable food for rapidly growing urban populations, afterwards more emphasis was put on enhancing agricultural productivity. Nowadays, agriculture remains a priority for policymakers due to its role in promoting inclusive growth and reducing poverty. Additionally, renewed concerns about food security have further driven these policy efforts (Gautam, 2015).

One of the key instruments of these interventions are subsidies in different forms – such as various input subsidies, price supports, and trade interventions. While their use has been widespread, the economic effectiveness of subsidies continues to be heavily debated. Economic theory suggests that subsidies are useful in resolving market failures; however, even in this case, the actual effect of subsidies is highly dependent on the specific implementation. Further, in many other cases, subsidies have led to distortions and have been detrimental to countries’ own economic interests (Gautam, 2015).

Another important concern arises from the political economy of subsidies use. Widening rural-urban income disparities create political pressure to implement measures that support the livelihoods of the large agricultural population. Subsidies, due to their visibility, are a convenient instrument to increase political support from this population group. Further, subsidies offer immediate or near-immediate gains to recipients, whereas public capital investments take longer to deliver results, therefore subsidies are often used as a political instrument. Since political decision-making is typically driven by short-term considerations, often aligned with electoral cycles, long-term investments do not always align with political incentives (Gautam, 2015).

Box 1. Subsidies

Subsidies are financial assistance provided by governments to support or promote specific sectors, industries, or activities within the economy. They can take various forms, including direct cash payments, tax relief, low-interest loans, and in-kind support, such as the provision of goods and services at below-market prices. Subsidies play a significant role as a tool in government expenditure policy. They influence resource allocation decisions, income distribution, and expenditure efficiency (Schwartz & Clements, 1999).

In the case of Georgia, subsidies are the main instrument for support to the agricultural sector, with direct subsidies accounting on average 45 percent of total government expenditure in the sector (2014-2024). The government provides subsidies for most of the country’s main crops, including wheat, grapes, hazelnut, tangerines and apples.

Given the scope of this policy brief, only subsidies for major perennial crops – grapes, hazelnuts and apples – are discussed. This as as the wheat sector involves additional food security considerations and due to lack of data for tangerines. Among perennial crops grapes have the highest share of total production (46 percent, including both white and red grapes), followed by tangerines at 14 percent, apples at 10 percent, and hazelnuts at 8 percent (2023, Geostat).

This policy brief firstly explains the Georgian context in more detail, followed by sub-sections discussing each major perennial crop sector, ending with conclusions and policy recommendations.

The Georgian Context

Agriculture plays a crucial role in Georgia’s economy. As of 2024, 39 percent of the population resides in rural areas (Geostat, 2024), where agriculture serves as the primary source of income. The sector employs the largest share of the country’s workforce—17 percent (Geostat, 2023)—yet it contributes to only 7 percent of Georgia’s GDP (Geostat, 2023).  At the same time, the disparity in income, and other major socio-economic indicators between the rural (agricultural) and urban population is large. For example, in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, the average monthly nominal earnings are 78 percent higher than the average for the rest of Georgia. Additionally, Tbilisi accounts for 70 percent of the total value added generated in the country (Geostat, 2023).

In recent year, the country has undertaken significant efforts to modernize and improve the agricultural sector, yet significant challenges remain. Georgian agriculture is largely characterized by small, fragmented family farms focused on subsistence farming with restricted market access. They are highly vulnerable to weather conditions, yet there is little awareness of or adoption of insurance and risk mitigation measures (State Audit Office of Georgia, 2023). Traditional farming methods remain dominant, with limited use of modern technology. Additionally, most farmers operate on a small scale and lack cooperation and coordination, further hindering efficiency and competitiveness. As a result, they often struggle with low productivity and have difficulty producing high-quality products in stable quantities. Lastly, a high dependency on the Russian market for most agricultural products poses significant risks, as Russia is not a stable trade partner.

Given this context, agricultural subsidies are a highly important topic in Georgia. The Georgian government implements various subsidy programs to support agricultural sectors such as fruit production, viticulture, hazelnut farming, and wheat production. These initiatives aim to promote the sales of grapes, non-standard apples, and tangerines, enhance hazelnut production, and ensure food security by subsidizing essential staples like wheat, particularly during the Covid-19 pandemic.

Starting from 2014 to 2024 (Figure 1), the share of subsidies in total agricultural expenditure has followed an increasing trend, ranging from 21.4 percent in 2014 to peaking at 67.5 percent in 2021. In 2024 the respective share is 54.1 percent.  A decline occurred in 2022–2023, following the stabilization of the Covid-19 pandemic. Apart from this, the share of subsidies within agricultural expenditures has been increasing over the last ten years.

Figure 1. Total and subsidy expenditures on agriculture, million GEL (2014-2024)

Graph showing total expenditures and agricultural subsidies in Georgia from 2014 to 2024.

Source: Geostat, 2025.

While these programs are designed to assist farmers and increase sales, how these subsidies support in addressing the mentioned structural challenges – therefore advancing the effectiveness of the sector – is under question.

The Grape Subsidy Programs

The grape subsidy programs in Georgia are primarily aimed at supporting viticulture in key wine-producing regions, such as Kakheti, Racha-Lechkhumi, and Kvemo Svaneti. These subsidies were designed to stabilize farmers’ incomes and ensure smooth harvests, to guarantee that even lower-quality grapes will be sold, particularly for grape varieties used in wine production. In general, the government uses two types of subsidies: direct and indirect. Direct subsidies involve paying farmers a certain amount of money per kilogram of grapes. Indirect subsidies are implemented through state-owned companies that are responsible for purchasing grapes from farmers.

Georgia’s grape subsidy program (direct subsidies) was introduced in 2008 and has been implemented every year except for in 2018 and 2019. Starting from 2014, the government provided substantial direct financial support to grape producers. However, starting in 2017, direct subsidies began to decline sharply, and by 2018–2019, the government announced that it would no longer directly subsidize the grape harvest. However, during this period, the state’s grape purchasing program remained in place, purchasing any surplus grapes left on the market after private acquisitions.

The Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 prompted a renewed surge in subsidies, with financial support reaching its highest levels in years. This elevated support continued until 2022 but was significantly reduced again in 2023 (by 63 percent), following a decline in production (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Grape production, subsidies and wine exports (2014-2023)

Source: Geostat, 2025.

Grape production has generally followed an upward trend, with record harvests in 2019 and 2020. Given the absence of direct subsidies in 2017 and 2018, the effect of subsidies on production levels is questionable. In more recent years, production has become more volatile, displaying a noticeable decline by 2023.

Wine exports, a crucial part of Georgia’s economy, have grown steadily, with volumes peaking in 2022, and persisting at high levels ever since. Export revenues have also increased consistently, reaching an all-time high in 2024, according to preliminary data.

The main destination for the Georgian wine sector is CIS countries. Russia accounts for the largest share among the CIS, with an average of 75.4 percent, between 2014-2024. Russia’s share has been increasing in recent years, reaching 85.8 percent in 2024 (among CIS countries). The average share of exports to the EU of total exports is 10 percent (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Wine exports by country groups (2014-2024)

Source: Geostat, 2025.

Although subsidies played a key role in revitalizing Georgia’s wine industry following the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially as grape production and processing have increased over the years, their long-term impact have been problematic (Ghvanidze, Bitsch, Hanf, & Svanidze, 2020). Since subsidies were introduced in 2008, Georgia’s grape market has become heavily distorted, with prices shaped by government support rather than supply and demand dynamics.

Even though a significant portion of government funding for the sector is allocated to subsidies, the way in which subsidies affect grape production levels is not obvious. Other sector insufficiencies, such as quality issues and exporting market diversification are inadequately addressed. Grape quality remains a key issue, as farmers lack incentives to improve production practices, knowing that the government will purchase their yield regardless. Additionally, Georgia’s heavy reliance on its main export partner, Russia, poses significant risks, and the share of exports to EU countries has not seen substantial growth. Overall, since the subsidies aim to stabilize producers’ income rather than to address structural issues in the sector, they may be considered social support.

The Apple Subsidy Program

The apple subsidy program in Georgia was introduced in 2014 to support the sale of non-standard apples after market prices dropped to a record low 0.02 GEL. Non-standard apples are damaged fruits that fall from trees due to wind, hail, or other natural factors. Typically unfit for direct consumption, these lower-quality apples are primarily used by factories to produce apple concentrate. The program aimed to stabilize prices and provide financial relief to farmers. Processing companies received financial support for each kilogram of non-standard apples purchased.

The program was discontinued between 2015 and 2019, before it resumed in 2020. The number of companies involved in purchasing non-standard apples for further processing ranges from 12 to15 over the years.

As for apple production levels, although there were significant production surges in 2016, 2018, and 2020, these increases have been volatile and unstable.

Figure 4. Apple production, subsidies and exports (2014-2023)

Source: Geostat, 2025.

In terms of exports, the volume increased sharply between 2018 and 2019, reaching its peak in 2021 before gradually declining. Most apple exports are directed to CIS countries, with Russia accounting for an average of 94 percent between 2018 and 2024. In contrast, the EU’s share remains minimal, averaging less than 1 percent, with no exports recorded to the EU in half of the considered years.

Figure 5. Apple exports by country group (2014-2024)

Source: Geostat, 2025.

While apple production is highly vulnerable to weather conditions, the adoption of insurance remains low. The provided subsidy program supports farmers in producing lower-quality non-standard apples, thus limiting the incentives to enhance product quality, productivity, or production practices, as farmers rely on the government to purchase their produce regardless. Similar to the grape industry, government support in the apple market functions more as a social assistance rather than a tool for industry advancement.

The Hazelnut Subsidy Program

Georgia introduced the Hazelnut Production Support Program in 2022 to enhance competitiveness, assist farmers, and improve disease management. The program registered hazelnut orchards in a national cadaster, enabling better monitoring and targeted support, to subsidize the purchase of pesticides and agrochemicals essential for hazelnut care and cultivation. The program has continued in 2023 and 2024, with subsidies amounting 22 and 22.6 million GEL, respectively.

Hazelnut production in Georgia has been highly volatile in the past decade. The sector experienced its most severe crisis in 2017-2018 when fungal diseases and an Asian stink bug (Pharosana) invasion devastated yields. Consequently, both the quantity and quality of hazelnut production declined. In 2019, the production began to recover, peaking in 2021. However, unfavorable weather conditions resulted in a decline in 2022, with only a partial rebound in 2023.

Figure 6. Hazelnut production and exports (2014-2023)

Source: Geostat, 2025.

Hazelnut is mainly exported to EU countries, with an average share of 65.3 percent, between 2014 and 2024. The share of CIS countries in this period is 20.2 percent. However, the share exported to EU countries has been declining 2023 and 2024, to 52.4 and 56.7 percent, respectively.

Figure 7. Hazelnut exports by country group (2014-2024)

Source: Geostat, 2025.

The subsidy scheme in the hazelnut sector seems to be more targeted at the issues the sector is facing, compared to the other discussed programs. The effects are however yet to be explored as the program began in 2022. However, several challenges remain, such as insufficient technical facilities for drying and storing goods essential for ensuring the quality of products (Gelashvili, Deisadze & Seturidze, 2023).

Conclusion and Recommendations

Although the government of Georgia provides substantial support for the agricultural sector, it still suffers from various challenges. Product quality, high vulnerability to weather events and export dependency on unstable partners are major issues for the grape and apple sectors. Further, the effectiveness of the direct financial support and the corresponding incentives within these sectors can be questioned.

For these crops, the subsidy programs seem to function more as social assistance rather than tools for industry development. In the grape sector, guaranteed government purchases reduce incentives for farmers to improve grape quality. Similarly, the apple subsidy program encourages the cultivation of non-standard apples, as farmers rely on state-backed purchases rather than market-driven quality improvements. Apple production has also shown significant volatility over the years, further highlighting the sector’s instability.

Additionally, heavy dependence on Russia as a primary export market for these crops presents economic risks. Diversification, particularly to the EU, has remained limited.

As for the hazelnut sector, the subsidy program aims to address some of the structural challenges, while this sector also relies less on the Russian market. However, some issues with infrastructural equipment remain unresolved.

Overall, the share of subsidies in agriculture is very high; further, the design of the programs mainly prioritizes short-term income stability for farmers rather than long-term market competitiveness and sectoral development. To address the discussed systemic challenges, it is essential to develop targeted policies tailored to the specific needs of each sector. While the priorities may differ across each crop, several key areas require focused attention:

  • Quality of Products – Enhancing product quality through ensuring food safety standards, improved farming and manufacturing practices, and better regulatory frameworks can help increase competitiveness in both domestic and international markets.
  • Market Diversification – Strengthening ties with new international partners and improving branding strategies can help industries access new markets and reduce risks associated with economic or political fluctuations in dominant trade partners.
  • Infrastructure Development – Poor infrastructure remains a challenge for the sector. Investments in post-harvest drying and storage facilities, as well as modern machinery and equipment, will enhance efficiency, reduce losses, and improve product quality.
  • Adoption of innovative farming practices– Adopting innovative farming practices boosts productivity, lowers costs, and enhances sustainability. It helps farmers adapt to changing weather conditions, making agriculture more efficient, environmentally friendly, and resilient.

By addressing these fundamental issues, policies can play a role in contributing to the long-term stability and growth of the agricultural sector, ultimately strengthening the economy and increasing global competitiveness.

References

  • Gautam, M. (2015). Agricultural Subsidies: Resurging Interest in a Perennial Debate. Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics.
  • Gelashvili, S., Deisadze, S., & Seturidze, E. (2022). An Overview of the Georgian Wine Sector.
  • Gelashvili, S., Deisadze, S., & Seturidze, E. (2023). Overview of the hazelnut sector in Georgia: past trends and the way forward. Tbilisi: ISET Policy Institute.
  • Ghvanidze, S., Bitsch, L., Hanf, J. H., & Svanidze, M. (2020). “The Cradle of Wine Civilization” – Current Developments in the Wine Industry of the Caucasus. Caucasus Analytical Digest, 117, 9-15.
  • Jayne, T., & Rashid, S. (2013). Input Subsidy Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Synthesis of Recent Evidence. Agricultural Economics, 44, 547-562.
  • Schwartz, G., & Clements, B. (1999). Government subsidies. Journal of Economic Surveys, 13(2), 119-148. doi:10.1111/1467-6419.00079
  • State Audit Office of Georgia. (2023). Audit Report on the Development and Management of the State Agricultural Insurance Program.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Ukraine’s Fight Is Our Fight: The Need for Sustained International Commitment

Posted on February 24, 2025 | Policy Brief

A large Ukrainian flag being carried by a crowd of demonstrators in Lithuania, symbolizing Ukraine International Commitment and global solidarity against aggression.

We are at a critical juncture in the defense of Ukraine and the liberal world order. The war against Ukraine is not only a test of Europe’s resilience but also a critical moment for democratic nations to reaffirm their values through concrete action. This brief examines Western support to Ukraine in the broader context of international efforts, putting the order of magnitudes in perspective, and emphasizing the west’s superior capacity if the political will is there. Supporting Ukraine to victory is not just the morally right thing to do, but economically rational from a European perspective.

As the U.S. support to the long-term survival of Ukraine is becoming increasingly uncertain, European countries need to step up. This is a moral obligation, to help save lives in a democratic neighbor under attack from an autocratic regime. But it is also in the self-interest of European countries as the Russian regime is threatening the whole European security order. A Russian victory will embolden the Russian regime to push further, forcing European countries to dramatically increase defense spending, cause disruptions to global trade flows, and generate another wave of mass-migration. This brief builds on a recent report (Becker et al., 2025) in which we analyze current spending to support Ukraine, put that support in perspective to other recent political initiatives, and discuss alternative scenarios for the war outcome and their fiscal consequences. We argue that making sure that Ukraine wins the war is not only the morally right thing to do, but also the economically rational alternative.

The International Support to Ukraine

The total support provided to Ukraine by its coalition of Western democratic allies since the start of the full-scale invasion exceeded by October 2024 €200 billion. This assistance, which includes both financial, humanitarian, and military support, can be categorized in various ways, and its development over time can be analyzed using data compiled by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. A summary table of their estimates of aggregate support is provided below.

A particularly relevant aspect in light of recent news is that approximately one-third of total disbursed aid has come from the United States. The U.S. has primarily contributed military assistance, accounting for roughly half of all military aid provided to Ukraine. In contrast, the European Union—comprising both EU institutions and bilateral contributions from member states—stands as the largest provider of financial support. This financial assistance is crucial for sustaining Ukraine’s societal functions and maintaining the state budget.

Table 1. International support to Ukraine, Feb 2022 – Oct 2024

Source: Trebesch et al. (2024).

Moreover, the EU has signaled a long-term commitment to provide, in the coming years, an amount comparable to what has already been given. This EU strategy ensures greater long-term stability and predictability, guaranteeing that Ukraine has reliable financial resources to sustain state operations in the years ahead. Consequently, while a potential shift in U.S. policy regarding future support could pose challenges, it would not necessarily be insurmountable.

What is crucial is that Ukraine’s allies remain adaptable, and that the broader coalition demonstrates the ability to adjust its commitments, as this will be essential for sustaining the necessary level of assistance moving forward.

Putting the Support in Perspective

To assess whether the support provided to Ukraine is truly substantial, it is essential to place it in context through meaningful comparisons. One approach is to examine it in historical terms, particularly in relation to past instances of large-scale military and financial assistance. A key historical benchmark is the Second World War, when military aid among the Allied powers played a decisive role in shaping the outcome of the conflict. Extensive resources were allocated to major military operations spanning multiple continents, with the United States and the United Kingdom, in particular, dedicating a significant share of their GDP to support their allies, including the Soviet Union, France, and other nations.  As seen in Figure 1, by comparison, the current level of aid to Ukraine, while substantial and essential to its defense, remains considerably smaller in relation to GDP.

Figure 1. Historical comparisons

Source: Trebesch et al. (2024).

Another way to assess the scale of support to Ukraine is by comparing it to other major financial commitments made by governments in response to crises. While the aid allocated to Ukraine is significant in absolute terms, it remains relatively modest when measured against the scale of other programs, see Figure 2.

A recent example is the extensive subsidies provided to households and businesses to mitigate the impact of surging energy prices since 2022.  Sgaravatti et al. (2021) concludes that most European countries implemented energy support measures amounting to between 3 and 6 percent of GDP. Specifically, Germany allocated €157 billion, France and Italy each committed €92 billion, the UK spent approximately €103 billion. These figures represent 5 to 10 times the amount of aid given to Ukraine so far, with some countries, such as Italy, allocating even greater relative sums. On average, EU countries have spent about five times more on energy subsidies than on Ukraine aid. Only the Nordic countries and Estonia have directed more resources toward Ukraine than toward energy-related support. Although not all allocated funds have been fully disbursed, the scale of these commitments underscores a clear political and financial willingness to address crises perceived as directly impacting domestic economies.

Figure 2. EU response to other shocks (billions of €)

Source: Trebesch et al. (2024).

Another relevant comparison is the Pandemic Recovery Fund, also known as Next Generation EU. With a commitment of over €800 billion, this fund represents the EU’s comprehensive response to the economic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. Again, the support to Ukraine appears comparatively small, about one seventh of the Pandemic Recovery Fund.

The support to Ukraine is also much smaller in comparison to the so-called “Eurozone bailout”, the financial assistance programs provided to several Eurozone member states (Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal) during the sovereign debt crisis between 2010 and 2012. The programs were designed to stabilize the economies hit hard by the crisis and to prevent the potential spread of instability throughout the Eurozone.

Overall, the scale of these commitments underscores a clear political and financial willingness and ability to address crises perceived as directly impacting domestic citizens. This raises the question of whether the relatively modest support for Ukraine reflects a lack of concern among European voters. However, this does not appear to be the case. In survey data from six countries – Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland – fielded in June 2024, most respondents express satisfaction with current aid levels, and a narrow majority in most countries even supports increasing aid (Eck and Michel, 2024).

A further illustration comes from the Eurobarometer survey conducted in the spring of 2024 which asked: “Which of the following [crises] has had the greatest influence on how you see the future?”. Respondents could choose between different crises, including those mentioned above, and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Figure 3 illustrates the total commitments made by EU countries for Ukraine up until October 31, 2024, compared to other previously discussed support measures, represented by the blue bars. The yellow bars, on the other hand, show a counterfactual allocation of these funds, based on public priorities as indicated in the Eurobarometer survey. Longer yellow bars indicate that a higher proportion of respondents perceived this crisis as having a greater negative impact on their outlook for the future. By comparing the actual commitments (blue bars) with this hypothetical allocation (yellow bars)—which reflects how resources might have been distributed if they aligned with the population’s stated priorities—it becomes evident that there is substantial public backing for maintaining a high level of support for Ukraine. The results show that the population prioritizes the situation in Ukraine above several other economic issues, including those that directly affect their own personal finances.

Figure 3. Support to Ukraine compared to other EU initiatives – what do voters think?

Source: Trebesch et al. (2024); Niinistö (2024); authors’ calculations.

The Costs of Not Supporting Ukraine

When discussing the costs of support to Ukraine it is important to understand what the correct counterfactual is. The Russian aggression causes costs for Europe irrespective of what actions we take. Those costs are most immediately felt in Ukraine, with devastating human suffering, the loss of lives, and a dramatic deterioration in all areas of human wellbeing. Also in the rest of Europe, though, the aggression has immediate costs, in the economic sphere primarily in the form of dramatically increased needs for defense spending, migration flows, and disruptions to global trade relationships. These costs are difficult to determine exactly, but they are likely to be substantially higher in the case of a Russian victory. Binder and Schularik (2024) estimate increased costs for defense, increased refugee reception and lost investment opportunities for the German industry at between 1-2 percent of GDP in the coming years. As they put it, the costs of ending aid to Ukraine are 10-20 times greater than continuing aid at Germany’s current level.

Any scenario involving continued Russian aggression would demand substantial and sustained economic investments in defense and deterrence across Europe. Clear historical parallels can be drawn looking at the difference in countries’ military spending during different periods of threat intensity. Average military spending in a number of Western countries during the Cold War (1949-1990) was about 4.1 percent of GDP, much higher in the U.S. but also in Germany, France and the UK. In the period after 1989-1991 (the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Soviet Union), the amounts fell significantly. The average for the same group of countries in this period is about 2 percent of GDP and only 1.75 percent if the U.S. is excluded.

Also after 1991 there is evidence of how perceived threats affect military spending. Figure 4 plots the change in military spending over GDP between 2014-2024 against the distance between capital cities and Moscow. The change varies between 0 (Cyprus) and around 2.25 (Poland) and shows a very clear positive correlation between increases in spending and proximity to Moscow.  There has also in general been a substantial increase in military spending after 2022 in several European countries, but in a scenario where Russia wins the war, these will certainly have to be increased further and maintained at a high level for longer.  An increase in annual military expenditure in relation to GDP in the order of one to two percentage points would mean EUR 200-400 billion per year for the EU, while the total EU support to Ukraine from 2022 to today is just over €100 billion.

Figure 4. Increase in military expenditures in relation to distance to Moscow

Source: SIPRI data, authors’ calculations.

A Russian victory would also have profound consequences for migration flows, with the most severe effects likely in the event of Ukraine’s surrender. The Kiel Institute estimates the cost of hosting Ukrainian refugees at €26.5 billion (4.2 percent of GDP) for Poland, one of the countries that received the largest flows. Beyond migration, a Russian victory would also reshape the global geopolitical order. Putin has framed the war as a broader conflict with the U.S. and its democratic allies, while an emerging alliance of Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China is positioning itself as an alternative to the Western-led system. A Ukrainian defeat would weaken the authority of the U.S., NATO, and the rules-based international order, potentially driving more nations in the Global South toward authoritarian powers for military and economic support. This shift could disrupt global trade, affect access to food, metals, and energy. Estimating the full economic impact of such a shift is difficult, but comparisons can be drawn with other global shocks. The European Union’s GDP experienced a significant contraction due to the Covid-19 pandemic, 5.9 percent contraction in real GDP according to Eurostat, 6.6 percent according to the European Central Bank. While the economy rebounded relatively quickly from the pandemic, a permanent geopolitical realignment caused by a Russian victory would likely have far more severe and lasting economic consequences.

Given that Ukraine is at the forefront of Russia’s aggression, its resilience serves as a critical test of Europe’s ability to withstand potential future threats. Thus, strengthening our own security and economic stability in the long term is inseparable from strengthening Ukraine’s resilience now. The fundamental difference lies in the long-term trajectory of these investments. In a scenario where Ukraine is victorious, military and financial aid during the war would eventually transition into reconstruction efforts and preparations for the country’s integration into the EU. This outcome is undeniably more favorable—both economically and in humanitarian terms—not only for Ukraine but for Europe as a whole. Therefore, an even more relevant question is whether the level of support is enough for Ukraine to win the war.

Is Sufficient Support Feasible?

Is it even reasonable to think that we in the West could be able to support Ukraine in such a way that they can militarily defeat Russia? Russia is spending more on its war industry than it has since the Cold War. In 2023, it spent about $110 billion (about 6 percent of GDP). By 2024, this figure is expected to have increased to about $140 billion (about 7 percent of GDP). These amounts are huge and represent a significant part of Russia’s state budget, but they are not sustainable as long as sanctions against Russia remain in place (SITE, 2024). For the EU, on the other hand, the sacrifices needed to match this expenditure would not be as great. The EU’s GDP is about ten times larger than Russia’s, which means that in absolute terms the equivalent amount is only 0.6-0.7 percent of the EU’s GDP. If the U.S. continues to contribute, the share falls to below 0.3 percent of GDP.

Despite the economic advantage of Ukraine’s allies over Russia, several factors could still shift the balance of power in Russia’s favor. One key issue is military production capacity—Russia has consistently outproduced Ukraine’s allies in ammunition and equipment. While Western economies have the resources to manufacture superior weaponry, actual production remains insufficient, requiring both increased capacity and political will. Another challenge is cost efficiency. Military purchasing power parity estimates suggest that Russia can produce approximately 2.5 times more military equipment per dollar than the EU, giving it a cost advantage in volume production. However, this does not fully compensate for its overall economic disadvantage, particularly when factoring in quality differences.

Manpower is also a critical factor. Russia’s larger population allows for sustained mobilization, but at a steep financial cost. Soldiers are recruited at a minimum monthly salary of $2,500, with additional bonuses bringing the first-year cost per recruit to three times the average Russian annual salary. Compensation for injured and fallen soldiers further strains state finances, with estimated payouts reaching 1.5 percent of Russia’s GDP between mid-2023 and mid-2024. Over time, these costs limit Russia’s ability to fund its war effort, making mass mobilization financially unsustainable.

Overall, advanced Western weaponry and superior economic capacity can match Russia’s advantage in manpower if the political will is there. Additionally, Russia’s already fragile demographic situation is deteriorating due to battlefield losses and wartime emigration. Any measure that weakens Russia’s economic capacity—particularly through sanctions and embargoes—diminishes the strategic advantage of its larger population and serves as a crucial complement to military and financial support for Ukraine.

Conclusion

Ukraine’s western allies have provided the country with substantial military and financial support since the onset of the full-scale invasion. Yet, relative to the gravity of the risks involved, previous responses to economic shocks, and citizens’ concerns about the situation, the support is insufficient. The costs of a Russian victory will be higher for Europe, even disregarding the human suffering involved. With U.S. support potentially waning, EU needs to pick up leadership.

References

  • Becker, Torbjörn; and Anders Olofsgård; and Maria Perrotta Berlin; and Jesper Roine. (2025). “Svenskt Ukrainastöd i en internationell kontext: Offentligfinansiella effekter och framtidsscenarier”, Commissioned by the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council.
  • Binder, J. & Schularick, M. (2024). “Was kostet es, die Ukraine nicht zu unterstützen?” Kiel Policy Brief No. 179.
  • Eck, B & Michel, E. (2024). “Breaking the Stalemate: Europeans’ Preferences to Expand, Cut, or Sustain Support to Ukraine”, OSF Preprints, Center for Open Science.
  • Niinistö, S. (2024) .“Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness” European Commission Report.
  • Sgaravatti, G., S. Tagliapietra, C. Trasi and Zachmann, G. (2021). “National policies to shield consumers from rising energy prices”, Bruegel Datasets, first published 4 November 2021.
  • SITE. (2024). “The Russian Economy in the Fog of War”. Commissioned by the Swedish Government.
  • Trebesch, C., Antezza, A., Bushnell, K., Bomprezzi, P., Dyussimbinov, Y., Chambino, C., Ferrari, C., Frank, A., Frank, P., Franz, L., Gerland, C., Irto, G., Kharitonov, I., Kumar, B., Nishikawa, T., Rebinskaya, E., Schade, C., Schramm, S., & Weiser, L. (2024). “The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how?” Kiel Working Paper No. 2218. Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Three Years On – Ukrainians in Poland after Russia’s 2022 Invasion

Posted on February 21, 2025 | Policy Papers

Ukrainians in Poland rallying in Kraków, waving Ukrainian and Polish flags.

The wave of Ukrainian refugees that followed the full-scale Russian invasion on February 24th, 2022, was met in Poland with unprecedented levels of support and solidarity. According to data from the Polish Household Budget Survey, 70 percent of households offered some help to Ukrainians in Poland, and over 10 percent (1.3 million households) provided direct personal assistance. Overall, by early 2025, 1.9 million refugees had registered in the dedicated social security registry (PESEL-UKR system), and 1 million continue to be registered as residing in Poland. Drawing on other data sources, we argue in this policy paper that the latter figure is highly overstated, giving rise to unjustified criticisms of low school enrolment among Ukrainian children and low rates of labour market activity among adult refugees. We highlight the risks that these critical voices may become prominent in the ongoing campaign ahead of the Polish presidential elections. During the crucial months of prospective peace negotiations, when presidential candidates are appealing for voters’ support, we argue that the public debate in Poland concerning Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees ought to be grounded in reliable evidence.

Polish Support for Ukraine: Shifts in Public Attitudes, and Policy Challenges Amid War and Elections

The dramatic events of late February 2022 shook the populations across Ukraine, Europe and the world. The objective of the massive, full-scale Russian aggression was clear – to rapidly take over Kyiv, force Ukraine to surrender and take over full control of the country thus subjugating it into Kremlin’s rule. Three years later, while thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians have lost their lives, and while Russia has imposed a massive economic and social burden on Ukraine, its key objective has badly failed and remains far from being realised. This thanks to the commitment of the Ukrainian government, the country’s army and the mobilisation of the Ukrainian population. In turn, the country’s resistance would not have been possible without substantial support from the outside, primarily from countries in the European Union and the U.S. International aid from governments to Ukraine between February 2022 and October 2024 amounted to over €230 billion (bn) with the largest part contributed by the US (€88 bn), the European Commission and European Council (€45 bn) and Germany (€16 bn). Proportional to 2021 GDP levels, the highest support came from Estonia (2.20 percent), Denmark (2.02 percent) and Lithuania (1.68 percent) (Kiel Institute, 2024). Support for Ukraine has come in many forms – military, material, financial, political and diplomatic. The international community has also imposed substantial economic and political sanctions against Russia, and has excluded it from many international forums, marginalising its voice in international discussions and meetings.

On top of that, Ukraine’s neighbours and many Western countries opened their borders and welcomed a massive wave of refugees escaping the immediate military invasion in the east and north of Ukraine, seeking safety from continued bomb and drone attacks on the entire country, and running away from the risk of a complete Russian take-over. It is estimated that up to 8 million Ukrainians left the country in the first months after the full-scale war started, initially moving mainly to Poland, Romania and Slovakia (Polish Economic Institute, 2022; UNCHR, 2022). At the same time the Russian aggression resulted in internal displacement of more than 3.6 million Ukrainians (IOM UN Migration, 2024). While many of the international and internal refugees have since returned, over 6.8 million Ukrainians still reside outside of Ukraine’s borders (UNCHR, 2025).

The wake of the war was met with an unprecedented wave of support among the Polish population (Duszczyk and Kaczmarczyk, 2022). We use data from one of the largest representative Polish surveys – the Household Budget Survey 2022 and 2023 – to show the degree of involvement among Polish households in direct and indirect support to Ukrainian refugees. We also show that declarative general sympathy towards Ukrainians reached over 50 percent in 2023 –  twice as high compared to 16 years earlier. This support has by now fallen close to the levels from just before the full-scale war (40 percent). As the immediate need for help has become less urgent, and the refugees have organised their lives in Poland, the involvement of Polish households in supporting the Ukrainian population has also declined. At its peak at the beginning of the war the proportion of Polish households that were actively involved in helping the Ukrainian population reached nearly 70 percent, with over 10 percent (i.e. more than 1.3 million) of the households providing direct assistance to the refugees.

In this policy paper we call into question some of the official data on the number of Ukrainian refugees who continue to reside in Poland (almost 1 million) (EUROSTAT, 2025). We argue that inconsistency across different sources with regard to precise numbers – such as likely inflated refugee count in the official social security register – may be used  to build unfavourable claims against the refugees and the Ukrainian cause overall, as arguments and narratives develop based on marginal anecdotal evidence and incorrect statistics. As the new U.S. administration tries – in its own way – to bring an end to the war, Ukraine will need continued strong support from all Western allies to end the war on favourable terms for Ukraine and to get significant additional help to rebuild the country. Ukraine’s safety and economic security will depend on Western military guarantees and closer integration with the EU. All of this requires the support of populations in these countries, which gets increasingly undermined by internal disputes and external political interferences.

As negotiations to end the war begin to take shape, Poland enters a crucial electoral campaign ahead of its May 2025 presidential elections. This combination is likely to place the Ukrainian question among the top issues on the local agenda. At the same time, there is a risk  that the extent of support towards Ukraine and Ukrainian residents in Poland will be used in the battle for electoral votes. We argue that any debate around this topic should draw on reliable, up to date data sources. In this regard, the  government should provide more information to clarify data inconsistencies, to shed more light on the situation among Ukrainian citizens currently residing in Poland, and to ensure that any doubtful narratives raised in the public debate are quickly addressed.

Ukrainian sovereignty, its peaceful development and prosperity are very much in the interest of both Poland and the rest of Europe. Therefore, the Polish government must provide arguments to reinvigorate the support for Ukraine among its population. This will be fundamental to ensure Ukraine’s military success and stability, to guarantee the mutual benefits of integration of the Ukrainian population in Poland, and for the future economic cooperation with Ukraine in the prospective enlarged European Union.

The Outbreak of the Full-Scale War: Ukrainians in Poland

In the first couple of months after the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24th  2022, over 2 million refugees fled to Poland through the common land border, with as many as 1.3 million people crossing the border during the first two weeks of the war (Figure 1a). The exact number of refugees who arrived in Poland is difficult to gauge as some people left Ukraine via the border with Romania or Slovakia and could have entered Poland across the uncontrolled borders of the Schengen area.

BOX 1. Ukrainian citizens in Poland before the war in 2022

Before February 24, 2022, the migration of Ukrainian citizens to Poland was regulated by existing legal mechanisms concerning all foreigners coming from non-EU countries (European Parliament, 2010). Migrants could apply for a temporary residence permit for a maximum of three years, most often in connection with prearranged employment or education (Sejm RP, 2013). Since 2017 Ukrainian citizens with biometric passports could travel to Poland and other EU countries without a visa, but their stay was limited to 90 days (European Parliament, 2017). Access to the Polish social transfer system for migrants and their families was strictly regulated and limited. Labor migrants and temporary visitors under the visa-free regime had no right to public benefits or healthcare (Sejm RP, 2003).

At the time, application for refugee status was possible, but required undergoing a lengthy and burdensome asylum procedure. Those with refugee status granted had access to public transfers and healthcare (Sejm RP, 2003).

In accordance with the European regulations of Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001, the Polish government responded to the refugee crisis by establishing a special residence status for those fleeing the war. The regulations were introduced as early as  March 12, 2022, and as a result, all Ukrainian refugees who arrived in Poland since 24 February could register themselves (and their family members) in a special social security registry, the so-called PESEL-UKR (Sejm RP, 2022). This registration immediately provided the refugees with an official status of temporary protection and legalized their stay in Poland until a specified date, which – as the war continued – has been regularly extended. In comparison to other, non-EU migrants, the PESEL-UKR status grants the refugees simplified access to the Polish labour market and gives them access to public healthcare and social transfers – including general support available to all legal residents, as well as special financial and non-monetary aid targeted specifically at refugees (Duszczyk and Kaczmarczyk, 2022). The registration process was streamlined and widely accessible in all municipality offices throughout Poland and resulted in rapid registration of the majority that had arrived to Poland since February 24, 2022. By the end of June 2022, 1.2 million individuals had registered for the PESEL-UKR status. The number grew to 1.4 million by October 2022 and continued to grow to 1.9 million registrations by January 2025. As evident from Figure 1b not all of those who crossed the Polish border (or arrived in Poland having left Ukraine through a different country) stayed in the country. Some continued their journey to other EU countries and beyond, while some decided to return to Ukraine. It is worth noting though that of all the registrations carried out by the end of 2024, nearly half happened in the first 8 weeks following the invasion.

Figure 1. Number of Ukrainian citizens crossing the border between Poland and Ukraine and registering for PESEL-UKR, 2021-2024

Note: Weekly data on crossings via all land borders with Ukraine.
Source: Open Data Portal (2025a, 2025b).

A notable and important legal change was introduced in October 2022, whereby individuals are automatically withdrawn from the PESEL-UKR registry after a period of 30 days when they (1) leave Poland, (2) apply for a residence permit, or (3) apply for international protection status (Sejm RP, 2022). This change is the reason for the substantial drop in the number of registered refugees at the end of 2022, with over 400 000 individual withdrawals (Figure 1b). This change in legislation was aimed at estimating more precisely the number of Ukrainian refugees currently residing in Poland. However, since withdrawals from the system require that departures from the territory of Poland are officially recorded at the border, or follow a parallel registration in another EU country, or are recorded as departures from the Schengen area through another country, the numbers in the system may still be far from the actual number of refugees currently residing in Poland.

Since late 2022 the number of registered Ukrainian refugees in Poland has been fairly stable at slightly below 1 million. Similarly, the shares of different age cohorts have not changed. In Figure 2 we show the split of those in the PESEL-UKR registry by age. Children under the age of 18 account for about 40 percent of all refugees, of which 30 percent are in schooling age (7-17). 7 percent of the refugees are aged 62 years or older. Among those aged 18-61 years old, 70 percent are women. It is worth noting that out of about half a million children recorded in the first 7 months, almost 400 000 are still registered in the PESEL-UKR registry, a number that has been stable since the end of 2022. As we show below, these values are significantly higher compared to the number of refugee children reported by two other administrative sources. This in turn casts doubt on the reliability of the estimates of the total number of Ukrainian refugees in Poland.

Figure 2. Ukrainian citizens registered with PESEL-UKR, by age group

Note: Based on registered year of birth, age as of 2025.
Source: Open Data Portal (2025b).

Where Are All the Registered Children?

To check the reliability of the PESEL-UKR registry data, we match the information from the registry with information from school registers provided by the Ministry of National Education, and the number of children benefitting from social transfers provided by the Social Insurance Institution (ZUS). As evident in Figure 3, the number of registered school-age children in the PESEL-UKR registry and the number of those who are officially registered in Polish schools significantly differ, and the difference seems stable over time. According to school records, most of the Ukrainian parents promptly enrolled their children in schools right after their arrival in Poland – about 120 000 pupils joined Polish schools as early as March 2022. The numbers grew in September 2024, which followed the introduction of obligatory schooling for all Ukrainian children aged between 7 and 17  (Sejm RP, 2024), with online classes in Ukraine permitted only for those in their final year. When we compare data for late 2024 and early 2025, we see that while about 270 000 children aged 7-17 were registered in the PESEL-UKR database, only 152 000 attended Polish schools – resulting in a very low enrolment rate of about 56 percent – raising legitimate concerns over the children’s academic and social development (see for example CEO, 2024).

Figure 3. Number of school-age children among Ukrainian refugees

Note: School registrations: all school types except preschool education, post-secondary schools, schools for adults and grades in which children are at least 18 years old. Ukrainian refugees only. Child benefit data points as reported in June, October and December.
Source: Open Data Portal (2025b, 2025c); information on 800+ benefit recipients: unpublished data from the Social Insurance Institution (ZUS).

As evident from Figure 3 though, from late 2023 all the way until early 2025, the ‘800+ benefit’ (which is a universal child benefit paid to all children aged 0-17) was paid to around 150 000 Ukrainian refugee children aged 7-17. Given the ease of claiming the benefit, and the relatively high value of the transfers (about 23 percent of net minimum wage per child per month), it seems very unlikely that so many families would opt out of the support. Looking at the close match between the numbers from ZUS and from the Ministry of Education, the more likely interpretation of the figures is not that children stay away from school and fail to claim social transfers, but rather that far fewer children continue to reside in Poland.

An additional argument supporting the inaccuracy of the PESEL-UKR data comes from a report published by the Narodowy Bank Polski (the Polish Central Bank) (NBP, 2024). Using information from a large survey conducted among Ukrainians living in Poland the report shows that 83 percent of school-age children in refugee families were enrolled in either a Polish or a Ukrainian school physically based in Poland. This is very far from the 56 percent rate calculated with reference to administrative data, again suggesting that the PESEL-UKR numbers of school-age children are highly inflated. If that is the case, not only the number of refugee children but the overall PESEL-UKR numbers (992 000 by January 2025) should be called into question.

How Many of the Registered Adults Are Active on the Labor Market?

The accuracy of the overall number of refugees is important because it is one of the key references for policy discussions. While international regulations specify that victims of war and conflict are granted the same basic rights and privileges as other legal residents, including access to the labour market, healthcare and other public services (Duszczyk et al., 2023), negative sentiments towards Ukrainian citizens have recently grown in Poland. Further, various restrictions on access to public support for Ukrainian refugees have already been publicly discussed and proposed in Parliament. These sentiments feed on the claims of fraudulent behaviour, unwillingness to engage in official employment and crowding out of public services for Polish nationals. Such claims about Ukrainians are spread more easily if not met by accurate numbers.

Figure 4. Number of Ukrainian men and women contributing to pension insurance in Poland

Note: ‘Other countries’ refers to other registered foreigners.
Source: Social Insurance Institution ZUS (2024).

Looking at labour market activity, the number of Ukrainians who were officially active on the Polish labour market (as employees, self-employed or receiving unemployment benefit) and who thus paid pension contributions to social security in December 2023 stood at 759 000 (see Figure 4). Of those 396 000 were men and 363 000 were women. While ZUS, the Social Insurance Institution, does not distinguish between migrants (those with the right to stay before February 24th, 2022) and refugees (with PESEL-UKR status) it seems safe to assume that those who registered in the ZUS database in 2022 and 2023 belong to the latter group. The difference between the number of Ukrainians contributing to social security in December 2021 and December 2023 is 132 000 and, as seen in Figure 4, the additional numbers of those registered differ only for Ukrainian women. New Ukrainian male refugees certainly also appear in the database in 2022 and 2023, but their number is difficult to estimate as some earlier migrants returned to Ukraine after the outbreak of the war, and as a result the net effect of men between 2021 and 2023 is essentially zero. Focusing on women, we can compare the number of new registrations in the ZUS database to the total number of women aged 18-59 (excluding students) in the PESEL-UKR database (about 335 000 in December 2023). Such a ratio would suggest that only about 40 percent of female Ukrainian refugees are formally contracted on the Polish labour market (on contracts paying social security contributions). This is much lower than the values presented in the NBP report (2024), suggesting that in July 2024, around 70 percent of the adult war refugees were working and further 19 percent were looking for a job. This comparison once again suggests that the PESEL-UKR numbers are significantly inflated.

Addressing the public concerns with regard to school enrolment and labour market activity with correct figures could help counter the growing negative sentiments towards Ukrainians in Poland as well as towards the overall support for the process of securing peace in Ukraine and integrating it closer with Poland and the EU. In the next section we show that when the full-scale war started in February 2022, not only the sentiments were strongly in favour of supporting Ukraine. Additionally, the level of engagement of the Polish population in actively assisting Ukrainian refugees was truly unprecedented.

Individual Support in Response to the Outbreak of the War

In the first few weeks after the full-scale Russian invasion the Polish society almost uniformly united in providing help and assistance to Ukrainians affected by the war. The Polish Economic Institute estimated that during the first 3 months the financial, humanitarian and material help provided by the Polish society alone reached 9-10 billion PLN, which corresponded to 0.34-0.38 percent of Poland’s GDP (Baszczak et al. 2022). Polish private businesses were also quick to join the assistance efforts, donating money, food, medical and other specialized equipment, and providing services such as transportation, insurance, and education free of charge (WEI 2023). Until May 2022, 53 percent of Polish enterprises engaged in different kinds of relief or support.

The assistance to refugees has been documented in numerous anecdotes, formal reports and extensive media coverage. The scale of support is also reflected in the Polish Household Budget Survey, a regular household survey conducted by the Central Statistical Office. Already in the first quarter of 2022 the survey included several questions related to the assistance given by the interviewed households to Ukrainian refugees. These questions were then included in the survey throughout 2022 and 2023. As shown in Figure 5, when the inflow of refugees from Ukraine started in late February 2022, nearly 70 percent of Polish households offered some form of assistance. Most of this help took the form of gifts and money transfers, but 10.4 percent, i.e. over 1.3 million Polish households, offered direct help such as transport, providing an overnight stay, delivering goods to accommodation venues, etc. The fraction of those offering assistance stayed very high through the first half of 2022, and 23 percent of Polish households still provided some form of assistance in the last quarter of 2022 (Figure 5). As the war stalled, and the Ukrainian population settled and became more independent, and the Polish government took official responsibility of assisting those still in need, the level of direct support from households fell. However, in late 2023 9 percent of Polish households still continued to provide some form of assistance. What is really special about the initial wave of support is that the positive attitudes towards the refugees and the Ukrainian cause were nearly universal. As seen in Figure 6, assistance was offered by high and low educated households (79 and 59 percent), those living in large cities and in rural areas (73 and 68 percent), the young and the old (66 and 63 percent). Households who declared good material conditions were more likely to offer help (75 percent), but even among those who declared difficulties with their financial status 41 percent came forward to offer some assistance.

Figure 5. Polish households engaged in assisting Ukrainian refugees, 2022-2023 (by quarter)

Note: Help covers support and transfers to individuals and institutions in Ukraine as well as to Ukrainian refugees in Poland. “Personal assistance” – direct help to refugees (with job search, doctor’s visits, public matters, language lessons, translation, etc.), “Other help” – help at the border, in reception points, temporary accommodation points, gift collection points, transportation, hosting or subletting own housing free of charge, blood donation.
Source: own compilation based on the Polish Household Budget Surveys 2022-2023.

Figure 6. Polish households engaged in assisting Ukrainian refugees (any help) in the first quarter of 2022, by household characteristics

Notes: Urban status – A: rural area, B: city below 100 000 inhabitants, C: city over 100 000 inhabitants. Material situation (self-assessed) – D: bad or rather bad material situation, E: average material situation, F: good or rather good material situation. Age of head of household – G: 18-29, H: 30-59, I: 60 and older. Education of head of household – J: lower than secondary, K: secondary or postsecondary, L: tertiary. Source: own compilation based on the Polish Household Budget Survey 2022.

It is worth noting also that by the time the full-scale war broke out in February 2022 the sentiments among the Polish population towards Ukrainians had improved compared to attitudes in the 1990s and early 2000s. These sentiments have been regularly surveyed by the Public Opinion Research Center CBOS, and we summarize them in Figure 7. As evident, in the early 1990s the proportion of Poles declaring positive sentiments towards Ukrainians was very low. It steadily increased until  about 2017 and then grew rapidly from 2018 till 2020. In 2022 the sentiments towards Ukrainians reached their peak, with over 50 percent of Poles declaring fondness towards them – on par with nations such as Lithuania and Slovakia. At the same time positive attitudes towards Russians reached an all-time low of 6 percent. Positive sentiments towards Ukrainians declined in 2024 – the last year for which the data is available – but even after the drop they are still high when compared with attitudes before 2023.

While the general positive sentiments towards Ukrainians in Poland has improved over the years, 2022 was truly unique when it comes to attitudes toward Ukrainian refugees (see Figure 8). Between 2015 and 2018, i.e. after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, around 50-60 percent of Poles declared that refugees from the conflict areas in Ukraine should be welcomed in Poland. When the same question was asked again in March 2022, 95 percent agreed that Ukrainian refugees should be welcomed in Poland and nearly 60 percent declared that they ‘definitely’ agreed with such a policy. However, the proportion of Poles in support of welcoming Ukrainian refugees has decreased. In late 2024 the share was more or less back at the level prior to the full-scale war, i.e. at over 50 percent.

Figure 7. Share of survey participants declaring fondness towards foreigners of different origin

Source: The Public Opinion Research Center CBOS (2024a).

Figure 8. Opinion survey: If Poland should accept Ukrainian refugees coming from the conflict territories

Note: The surveys were discontinued between 2018 and 2022.
Source: Public Opinion Research Center CBOS (2024b).

Why Have Sentiments Shifted?

At the crucial time of a possible long-awaited end to the Russian invasion, when coordinated support of Western governments will be essential to secure a just and long-lasting solution, the willingness of these governments to firmly stand behind Ukraine will, to a large extent, depend on the sentiments among their voters. Thus, the wavering enthusiasm for the Ukrainian cause in countries such as Poland can be seen as a worrying sign, in particular given how high the level of support was in the early days of the invasion. This support will be particularly important over the next few months, given the likely period of intensive international negotiations and the battle for votes in the upcoming Polish presidential elections.

It is not unusual to try to put the blame for various unfortunate developments on external forces, including global trends, external conflicts and all things ‘foreign’. Thus, the fact that many people in various countries, including Poland, blame their perceived worsened economic conditions on the consequences of the war and the related influx of Ukrainian refugees is far from surprising. While some politicians might want to explain the complex broad context, others will take advantage of these sentiments and continue to fuel the negative discourse. With that in mind, three main topics have been particularly visible in the public debate in Poland:

  • access to social transfers, in particular to the ‘800+’ child benefit for Ukrainian refugees
  • Ukrainian refugees’ participation in the Polish labour market and tax contributions to the local budget
  • risks to particular groups of interest, most prominently reflected in Poland by the crisis surrounding imported Ukrainian grain (see Box 2)

The first two issues are strongly related to the general approach to immigration and integration of migrants in the Polish society. The popular media discourse – in traditional and social media – tends to focus on instances of abuse of social support and public services, and to build up negative sentiments along the lines of supposed unwillingness to engage in legal economic activity among those who have settled in Poland. While one can certainly identify anecdotes which selectively confirm all sorts of misbehaviour, the overall evidence would clearly reject such claims. As discussed, the surveys conducted by the NBP show that a significant majority of migrants and refugees from Ukraine find legal employment in Poland. Further research based on administrative data demonstrates that many Ukrainians establish and successfully run their businesses in Poland (Polish Economic Institute, 2024). Between January 2022 and June 2024 Ukrainian migrants and refugees established almost 60 000 enterprises in Poland, and as Vézina et al. (2025) argue, these firms did not crowd out Polish businesses, meaning they represent a true value added to the national and local economies.

Recent public discussions, however, have focused on the combination of employment and benefit claims. The debate started with two parliamentary initiatives by the right wing Konfederacja and Prawo i Sprawiedliwość opposition parties and was then picked up by the leading government party’s presidential candidate, Rafał Trzaskowski (money.pl, 2025). The proposed legislative changes are broadly similar, suggesting that access to the main child benefits – the ‘800+ benefit’ – should be limited to those refugee families where at least one of the parents is formally employed. Such conditionality does not apply to Polish families, and according to current legislation, to no other families legally residing in Poland (Konfederacja, 2025; Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, 2025). The supposed aim of the changes would be to, first of all, limit fraudulent claims among those who no longer reside in Poland, and secondly, to restrict access to the benefits to those who contribute with their taxes to the public budget only. On both counts the policy seems badly misconceived. As shown above, the ‘800+’ claims closely match the numbers of children officially registered in Polish schools, far below the numbers registered in the PESEL-UKR database. Moreover, such a policy is unlikely to lead to much higher employment among refugee parents. The benefit is universal and received by all families regardless of employment status or income; previous research has shown a similar benefit to have negligible effects on employment (see for example: Myck and Trzcinski, 2019). Therefore, the most likely reason for some refugee parents to not take up work is not unwillingness, but rather other constraints – constraints which will not change as a result of the proposed restrictions. Most Ukrainian families who fled the war are mothers whose partners could not join them due to military restrictions on the mobility of Ukrainian men. While many women settled and found jobs, family obligations may significantly limit some refugee’s options for regular employment. For these families, withdrawing the eligibility for the ‘800+ benefit’ would be a significant loss of income with potentially dire consequences for their children. It is thus difficult to understand the initiatives as anything other than attempts to address the growing critical sentiments towards the refugees to gain support among voters who are convinced by the anecdotal narrative. As argued above – with the exception of anecdotes – there is very little evidence in support of such legislative changes. Even from the point of view of potential budgetary gains, the proposed limitations on benefit claims would impose heavy administrative costs which would likely exceed any resulting savings. The politicians coming forward with such proposals would be well advised to consider data from various sources and avoid raising issues which have a clear potential to fuel negative sentiments towards refugees and migrants.

BOX 2. The dispute over the Ukrainian grain

In February 2022, Russia’s full-scale invasion destabilized the Ukrainian market, in particular the agricultural sector, due to blocked exports through the Black Sea. To enable exports, so-called Solidarity Lanes were established, including corridors crossing Poland (European Commission 2022). However, Poland was not prepared to handle and re-export large volumes of Ukrainian agricultural products, due to insufficient capacity of Polish sea ports (farmer.pl, 2023; for such quantities experts argue that road transport is unprofitable; Kupczak, 2023). This led to a surplus of grain in multiple storehouses throughout the country, especially in Southeastern Poland. Overall, Polish grain stocks increased by over 250 percent, from 3.8 to almost 10 million tones (Supreme Audit Office, 2023).

The drastic surplus of grain, together with much lower prices for Ukrainian crops, led to a dramatic price drop—one could buy mixed Polish-Ukrainian grain for half the price it cost the previous year (rp.pl, 2023). Apart from its impact on quantity and price, Ukrainian grain drew public attention also due to concerns regarding its quality (money.pl, 2023). Imported agricultural and food articles must undergo rigorous quality controls at the border, depending on their purpose – human consumption, animal fodder or cultivation, conducted by the respective state inspection office. Random controls held in 2022 by the Food Articles Inspection revealed that 2.4 percent of the grain samples were banned from entering the market (rp.pl, 2023).

According to a report by the Supreme Audit Office (2023), controls run by the Veterinarian Inspection were drastically limited as of May 2022 which allowed poor quality fodder grain to enter the Polish market (Supreme Audit Office 2023). Since technical grain – used in the production of biofuels, insulating materials or oils – is exempt from border quality controls, its imports and sale as consumable grain could be particularly profitable. Several incidents of such forgery were subject to investigation confirming that large quantities of technical grain originating from Ukraine were sold as consumable to Polish companies (gov.pl, 2024).

The tightened border controls that followed, resulted in multiday delays in the transportation of food products from Ukraine. To mitigate these constraints an agreement was reached, and, as of March 8, 2023, grain transit through Poland to other final destinations (within EU or to a third country via Polish ports) is exempt from border controls at the Polish-Ukrainian border and sealed by the National Revenue Administration. These seals can be removed only at the final destination (gov.pl, 2023a).

Throughout this period Polish farmers held demonstrations opposing the influx of Ukrainian grain. The border crossings with Ukraine were temporarily blocked by protests aimed at disrupting the flow of goods. The symbolic dumping of Ukrainian grain on the ground at the Medyka border crossing resulted in a famously cited statement by the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that this event may be seen as evidence of the “erosion of solidarity” with Ukraine (BBC, 2024).

After the EU-level temporary embargo on four types of grains and oil seeds from Ukraine was lifted in mid-September 2023 (which was in effect since May 2023), Ukraine agreed to introduce export measures to avoid grain surges (European Commission, 2023). Nevertheless, Poland administered a unilateral ban on selected products and their derivatives (gov.pl, 2023b), which led Ukraine to file a complaint with the World Trade Organization (WTO, 2023). While the ban still applies (gov.pl, 2025), the Polish government has on multiple occasions actively sought to convince the EU to include wheat (and other grains) among the crops covered by the quotas under the EU-level 2022 regulation on temporary trade liberalization with Ukraine (the Autonomous Trade Measures Regulation; OKOpress, 2024; European Commission, 2024).

Conclusions

Considering the current approach by the U.S. administration under President Donald Trump, Ukraine’s position in the prospective negotiations will strongly depend on the support it can gather from its European allies. This in turn is likely to reflect the sentiments towards the Ukrainian cause among European voters. In Poland, where critically important presidential elections are scheduled for May 2025, the importance of these sentiments might be particularly salient. On the one hand, the candidates are likely to voice support for Ukraine to secure peace and stability in the region. On the other hand, they may appeal for support among voters who are critical of the generous approach of Polish public institutions towards Ukrainian refugees.

As shown in this policy paper, the critical voices highlighting instances of abuse of privileges granted to refugees are largely unfounded, and much of the critical discourse is linked to – in our view – highly inaccurate numbers of officially registered refugees with the PESEL-UKR status system. The government would do a service to the quality of the debate about Ukrainian refugees in Poland, and at the same time defuse some of the critical claims, by verifying the PESEL-UKR database.

Using administrative data on school enrolment and benefit claims we show that these match almost perfectly, with around 150 000 children aged 7-17 in both registries in late 2024. This is far less than the 270 000 children in this age group registered in the PESEL-UKR database and assumed to be residing in Poland. Similarly, survey data suggests that about 70 percent of Ukrainian refugees are active on the Polish labour market. This proportion is much lower when official data based on social security contributions is compared to the total number of adult refugees in the PESEL-UKR registry. The comparison once again suggests that the figures in the latter database are significantly overstated. It is thus very unlikely that the number of Ukrainian refugees in Poland is as high as the numbers officially reported in the registry (992 000 in January 2025).

The accuracy of the numbers is important for several reasons, and the ability to address various critical claims in the public debate is only one of them. At the time of an electoral campaign ahead of a highly significant presidential election, this reason, however, may prove fundamental to avoid further polarization of the debate about continued support for Ukrainian refugees in Poland. It is also crucial for securing strong support for Ukraine by the Polish government in the coming challenging months of peace negotiations. While it is likely impossible to restore the level of positive attitudes toward Ukrainian citizens seen in Poland in February and March 2022, that degree of solidarity should serve as a foundation for a deepened relationship between the two countries.

Acknowledgement

The authors acknowledge the support from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida. We are grateful to Patryk Markowski for helpful research assistance. The Polish Household Budget Survey data (2022, 2023) used in the analysis was provided by Statistics Poland (Główny Urząd Statystyczny). We are grateful to the Social Insurance Institution ZUS (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych) for providing us with unpublished data on child benefit recipients.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Development Day 2024: Integrating Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia into the European Union

Posted on January 20, 2025 | Policy Brief

Flags of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia alongside EU flags in a conference setting.

For Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, integration into the European Union (EU) is a pathway to modernization, economic development, and increased resilience against authoritarianism. At this year’s Development Day Conference, hosted by the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), policymakers, researchers, and experts convened to discuss the shared challenges, opportunities, and reforms required for these countries’ successful EU accession.

This policy brief draws on the insights from the conference, briefly outlining the discussions across panels and presentations on governance reforms, hybrid threats, economic transformation, and security challenges.

The Geopolitical Context for Enlargement

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has intensified the European Union’s strategic focus on enlargement. Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia find themselves at a crossroads, where integration into the EU is not merely aspirational but essential for safeguarding sovereignty and ensuring economic and political stability. The urgency of this enlargement stems from the need to counteract Russian aggression and bolster the EU’s geopolitical standing.

At the opening sessions of the Development Day Conference, three special guests offered their respective countries’ perspectives. Yevhen Perebyinis, Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, underscored how Ukraine’s integration process aligns with its defense of European values against Russia’s aggression. Cristina Gherasimov, Moldova’s Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration, highlighted Moldova’s efforts to advance reforms while countering persistent Russian hybrid threats, including systematic election interference. Christian Danielsson, Sweden’s State Secretary to the Minister for EU Affairs, accentuated the necessity of ensuring that the EU is ready for enlargement, something political leaders now see as an imperative in the shadow of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Similarly, discussions emphasized Georgia’s historical and policy-oriented commitment to Europe, despite recent democratic backsliding and a recent pivot toward Russia.

Challenges on the Pathway to EU Accession

The integration paths of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia face numerous challenges. Critical areas for alignment with EU standards include governance reforms, anti-corruption efforts, and institutional capacity building. Moldova has made strides in public administration reform and jumped significantly on the Corruption Perceptions Index from 120th place in 2019 to 76th in 2023. However, persistent gaps in judicial independence and public procurement transparency remain hurdles. Similarly, Ukraine has enacted sweeping reforms under extraordinary wartime circumstances, reflecting a persistent and widespread commitment to European values. Yet, continued progress in judicial and financial oversight is essential, with the administrative framework in these areas needing improvement in both countries.

Russia’s hybrid warfare poses a persistent and evolving threat to democratic resilience across the region. Moldova’s elections in 2024 showcased large-scale, sophisticated interference by Russian actors. This interference began well before election day and continues in the form of disinformation campaigns and energy blackmailing in the Transnistria region. In Georgia, Russian influence compounds the challenges of domestic political unrest, particularly as the ruling party engaged in substantial electoral fraud and manipulation to secure its position in the 2024 October elections. These challenges highlight the need for robust countermeasures, including enhanced cybersecurity and strengthened democratic institutions across the candidate countries. It also points to the need for support from the international community, especially in the case of Georgia, where protesters are currently taking to the streets to challenge the widely recognized electoral fraud.

Economic transformation and alignment also remain a critical challenge. Ukraine’s economy, suffering wartime devastation, requires extensive reconstruction, with the cost of infrastructural damage alone nearing its annual GDP. Ukraine’s vast agricultural sector, a major player in global markets, will require careful integration into the EU to address compliance costs and alignment with the Common Agricultural Policy while maintaining its competitive edge. Moldova faces significant challenges in effectively communicating the benefits of EU integration to its population, a critical issue in countering Russian influence and maintaining public support for reforms. Despite clear economic progress, such as the increase in Moldovan exports to the EU, many Moldovans remain skeptical about the long-term benefits of EU alignment. This skepticism is particularly pronounced in regions like Gagauzia, where pro-Russian sentiment is strong and local populations are vulnerable to disinformation and propaganda.

As emphasized by multiple panelists, targeted communication strategies are vital to ensuring that the benefits of EU integration are understood across populations. Concrete examples—such as enhanced economic opportunities, improved infrastructure, and access to EU funding—must be clearly communicated to counteract Russian narratives and build broad-based support for EU accession.

In this regard, pre-accession funding offers a potentially transformative tool. The successful use of pre-accession funding in Poland in the 1990s and early 2000s demonstrates the potential for such resources to modernize infrastructure, connect markets, and build institutional capacity, a capacity that has later proved pivotal to overcoming democratic backsliding. Poland serves as a reminder that alignment and integration may take time, but also clearly showcases the economic and social benefits it can yield.

During the conference, security concerns were at the core of the enlargement discussion, with several panelists emphasizing NATO’s historical role as a critical security complement for EU member states. However, Ukraine’s potential EU accession may advance without parallel NATO membership. This raises significant challenges, as the absence of NATO guarantees leaves Ukraine vulnerable to further Russian aggression. Panelists highlighted the urgent need for the EU to adopt concrete security measures, such as strengthened hybrid defense capabilities, cybersecurity frameworks, and coordinated responses to disinformation—threats already witnessed in Moldova and Georgia. Additionally, ensuring Ukraine’s security would require increased military and financial support from EU member states to safeguard territorial integrity and maintain resilience against Russia, argued a necessity by several panelists.

The Opportunities of Enlargement

The integration of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia into the European Union offers profound opportunities for these states. It represents access to the single market, pre- and post-accession funding, and vital structural support that can accelerate modernization efforts. Overall, this can reduce the countries’ infrastructure gaps and cause an increase in foreign direct investment. Beyond economic gains, EU support drives crucial institutional reforms, enhances public administration capacity, and provides a framework for addressing corruption and strengthening the rule of law—key challenges across all three countries.

For the EU, enlargement would entail strategic benefits aligned with its new geopolitical focus and long-term economic goals. Ukraine’s reserves of critical raw materials, including lithium and titanium, are essential for Europe’s green transition. Furthermore, Ukraine and its defense industry offers strategic benefits to Europe by bolstering collective security. Its agricultural capacity remains pivotal not only for the EU but for global food security, and its IT sector provides additional growth potential. Moldova and Georgia, on the other hand, offer untapped market potential and workforce integration opportunities, which could strengthen the EU’s competitive edge. Enlargement also represents a critical opportunity to counter the threat from Russia, manifesting the Union as a geopolitical leader committed to stability, democracy, and shared values.

However, as voiced throughout the conference, the EU must prioritize clear communication of these benefits. Concerns about increased competition in existing member states need to be met with transparency while communicating the long-term economic and security advantages of enlargement. Involving the business perspective in the enlargement process and ensuring that both candidate countries and current EU citizens and businesses see tangible benefits early in the process will be key to sustaining both momentum and public support. Such messaging could include the fact that the EU is originally a peace project and that the counterfactual scenario to the current enlargement ambitions is Russia and its wars creeping even closer to the Union’s border. In regard to the business sector, it could be emphasized that enlargement associated risks can be met with risk sharing instruments and credit guarantees.

As emphasized by several speakers, the EU also needs to ensure that it is ready for enlargement in terms of capacity. As the EU was not initially built to be this large, a further expansion requires the Union to critically reflect on how to ensure it will stand up for the rule of law and all member states’ adhesion to EU principles in the years to come.

Concluding Remarks

How to facilitate the accession of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia into the European Union was the topic for discussion at the 2024 Development Day. The discussions highlighted the substantial early progress and rapid reforms undertaken by Ukraine while being a country at war. Moldova’s steady progress toward its ambitious 2030 accession target underscores its commitment to reform, though challenges remain in securing public trust and countering Russian interference. Georgia, meanwhile, serves as a warning of how quickly democratic gains can erode, with political turmoil and Russian influence threatening its European path. These examples underscore the need for sustained support and clear communication of the benefits of EU integration. Panelists and participants also underscored that integrating these nations is not merely about expanding the EU—it is a vital response to ongoing geopolitical threats, in particular from Russia, and an affirmation of the EU’s foundational values.

Ultimately, the enlargement of the EU to include Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine holds significant potential, both for the aspiring members and the EU itself. However, as the discussions at Development Day 2024 showcased, such enlargement requires robust partnerships, unwavering and early support, and a recognition that integration strengthens the EU as a whole, ultimately positioning the EU as a much-needed major democratic geopolitical actor.

List of Participants

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Breaking the Link: Costs and Benefits of Shutting Down Europe’s Last Gas Pipeline from Russia

Posted on January 13, 2025 | Policy Brief

A pressure gauge showing zero pressure in a Russian pipeline gas system, symbolizing the halt of gas transit to Europe.

Ukraine’s decision to halt Russian gas transit from January 1st, 2025, marks the end of decades of direct gas links between Europe and Russia. The EU is unlikely to face significant short-to-mid-term impacts, as Russian pipeline gas imports have already dropped sixfold since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, uneven exposure to this shock has already created internal tensions within the EU. Further, increased reliance on liquefied natural gas may also slow the green transition. In the region, Moldova faces severe supply challenges and Ukraine will lose transit revenues. Targeted support and stronger cooperation within the EU and with neighboring countries, especially EU candidates, will be essential. In turn, the halt will make Russia face not only financial but also geopolitical losses.

On January 1st, 2025, Ukraine halted the transit of Russian gas to Europe following the expiration of a five-year agreement between Russian Gazprom and Ukrainian Naftogaz, marking a major shift in Europe’s energy landscape. This decision ended decades of reliance on Ukrainian pipelines for Russian gas (see Figure 1). Despite Ukraine announcing its intent not to renew the agreement well in advance (Corbeau, 2023), uncertainty lingered until the contract’s final days. Similarly, the broader implications remain uncertain. This policy brief explores the short-, mid-, and long-term effects of this change on the region.

Figure 1. Russian pipeline network to Europe, 2022-2025

Map showing the Russian pipeline gas network to Europe between 2022 and 2025, highlighting disruptions, shutdown points, and operational routes that impact Russian gas to Europe and energy security in Europe amid pipeline sanctions on Russia.

Source: Euromaidan Press

A “Political” Pipeline

The Ukrainian transit route has long been a key corridor for direct gas deliveries to Europe, playing a crucial role in shaping the EU energy security policy. However, this route has also been the site of major disruptions, particularly during the 2006 and 2009 gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine. These incidents exposed Europe’s reliance on transit routes and its vulnerability to geopolitical conflicts, prompting political responses despite the relatively localized impact. To address these vulnerabilities, the EU introduced measures aimed at diversifying energy sources and strengthening internal energy markets (see, e.g., Le Coq and Paltseva, 2012). Early efforts focused primarily on improving the internal energy market’s efficiency while diversification advanced slowly. This changed drastically during the gas crisis that began in mid-2021 and escalated with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. These events forced the EU to alter its gas import strategy, driving further investments in liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure and new pipelines, such as the Southern Gas Corridor enabling gas imports from Azerbaijan (see e.g., Regulation (EU) 2022/1032 and Regulation (EU) 2024/1789).

As a result, despite the significant burden of soaring energy prices and investment costs, the EU has made remarkable progress in reducing its reliance on Russian piped gas. Indeed, the share of Russian natural gas (both pipeline and LNG) in total EU gas imports, which increased 35 percent in 2015 to 41 percent in 2020, dropped to just 9 percent by 2023. However, the progress was non-uniform among member states (see Figure 2). In turn, by 2024, Russian gas via Ukraine accounted for just 5 percent of EU’s gas supply, with significant reliance limited to Austria, Hungary, and Slovakia (where it still made up between 65 percent and 78 percent of imports, and, between 12 percent and 22 percent of total energy consumption).

Figure 2. Share of Russian pipeline and LNG gas in total gas imports across the EU

Map showing the decline in Russian pipeline gas and LNG imports across the EU from 2015 to 2023, highlighting changes in Russian gas to Europe and their impact on energy security in Europe.

Source: Eurostat, 2024. The gas imports include data for both pipeline and LNG imports. The 2024 gas imports data was unavailable at the time of writing this brief. However, several EU member states further decreased their consumption of Russian gas in 2024. For example, while Sweden and Finland were importing Russian LNG both in 2020 and 2023, possibly for re-export, as shown in Figure 1, they both stopped this practice from June 2024.

The Immediate Impact of the Transit Stop

The EU’s reduced reliance on Russian gas has significantly softened the immediate impact of the transit halt. Gas prices showed only a slight reaction, with no clear evidence linking the transit stop to price changes. Even if one would attribute the cumulative gas price increase over 2024 to the expectations of the pipeline shutdown only, the effect was much smaller than during the 2021 gas crisis or the sharp price spikes of 2022, as illustrated in Figure 3. Ample storage levels – 71.8% as of January 01.2025, well within acceptable levels for this time of the year – have further limited the immediate impact.

Figure 3. EU gas prices, 2021-2025

Line chart showing EU natural gas prices from 2021 to 2025, highlighting price spikes after reduced Russian pipeline gas supply and the effect of pipeline sanctions on Russia’s gas exports to Europe.

Source: https://tradingeconomics.com/commodity/eu-natural-gas

Effectively, the only part of the region facing an immediate and significant impact due to the termination of the gas transit deal has been Moldova. The pro-Russian separatist region of Transnistria, previously fully reliant on subsidized Russian gas via Ukraine and representing 70 percent of Moldovan gas consumption, has been cut off since January 1, 2025, due to the lack of alternative routes. This has also significantly affected the right-bank-of-Dniester Moldova as 80 percent of its electricity supply was previously provided by the Russian gas-based MGRES plant in Transnistria (Anisimova, 2024). In response, Chisinau declared a state of emergency in the energy sector, introducing energy-saving measures and rationing. In turn, Transnistria halted most industrial production and faced widespread blackouts (Kieff, 2025).

The Mid-Term Costs and Benefits for Involved Parties

In the mid-term, the impact will likely broaden and take various forms. Moldova, Ukraine, and Europe are expected to face primarily financial consequences, while Russia will also bear significant geopolitical costs.

Moldova will continue to be the most affected country. Russia could attempt to reroute gas to Transnistria via Turkstream and reversed flow on the Trans-Balkan pipeline. However, since this route briefly passes through Ukraine before reaching Moldova, it would require a transit agreement, an unlikely scenario under current conditions.

Alternatively, the Trans-Balkan route could be used to import gas from Azerbaijan or LNG from Turkey and Greece (Halser and Skaug, 2024). However, this would require political will from both Moldova and Transnistria, and involve substantial costs, likely unaffordable singlehandedly for Moldova or Transnistria, especially as the latter has long received Russian gas for free. Financial, as well as infrastructural support from the EU could help address these challenges.

Ukraine faces an annual loss of transit fees due to the halted agreement amounting to approximately $450 million/year. Formally, the loss should have been around $1.2 billion annually but Russia payed only for 15 bcm/a of gas transit since 2022, instead of 40 bcm/a under the ship-or-pay transit agreement, citing Ukraine’s refusal to transit gas via the Russia-occupied Sokhranivka entry point. This dispute is in international arbitration but is unlikely to be resolved before the war ends (see  Reley, 2025). The absence of a transit gas flow could also undermine the competitiveness of Ukraine’s gas storage services for the EU (Ukraine’s Naftogaz has Europe’s largest underground facilities with a capacity of 30.9bcm, 10bcm of which is available to foreign traders.)

At the same time, the option of renewing the transit agreement could boost Ukraine’s leverage in future talks with Russia. However, this leverage weakens with the EU’s ability to cope with its remaining reliance on Russian gas – greater diversification in EU imports would reduce the importance of Russian pipelines and, consequently, Ukraine’s bargaining position.

Europe’s mid-term impact from the transit halt will be non-uniform, with Austria, Slovakia, and Hungary facing the highest energy bill increases. However, the effect is expected to be limited due to its well-connected internal energy market, which can absorb shocks and distribute shortages across member states. The shortage is likely to be compensated by increased LNG purchases, which would somewhat increase gas prices due to the current LNG market rigidity. However, with LNG supply capacity increasing already in 2025 and projected to grow by 40 percent by 2028 without a matching rise in demand (IEEFA, 2024), the price increase is not going to last long.

However, the EU may also face a political cost. Expectations of price increases and Slovakia’s loss of transit fees could strain the EU unity, as differing energy dependencies risk deepening intra-EU tensions and complicating policy coordination (see, e.g., here and here). This underscores the importance of Europe’s “one voice” energy policy, which has gained momentum in recent years.

Russia faces significant financial and geopolitical losses from the transit halt. Financially, it risks losing approximately $6.5 billion annually in revenue at current prices (Keliauskaitė and Zachmann, 2024) unless flows are redirected. While temporary price increases – for the sales of Russian gas via Turkstream, and Russian LNG exports to Europe, could offset some of these losses – these are not going to last.

The greater impact lies in Russia’s diminished geopolitical leverage. Historically, Russia has used gas as a political tool, leveraging its dominant position and access to multiple pipeline routes to exert influence over transit countries and dependent nations. This influence would now be lost. Further, with the loss of a Ukrainian transit, Russia’s pipeline connection to EU gas markets now relies solely on Turkey, increasing its dependency on Turkey and potentially altering its alliance dynamics due to higher transit costs. Additionally, as Azerbaijani gas emerges as a viable alternative for Europe, Russia’s bargaining power in its geopolitical relations with Azerbaijan is likely to weaken further. This erosion of influence marks a significant shift in Russia’s regional energy strategy.

Long-Term Effects: Increased Dependence on LNG and the Green Transition

The halt of the Russian gas transit is facilitating the implementation of the RePowerEU goal of fully eliminating EU Russian fossil fuels dependency by 2027. However, its long-term effects, particularly on the timing and success of the green transition, warrant attention. Natural gas is widely considered a transitional fuel, essential for maintaining energy reliability in an energy system relying heavily on intermittent renewables. For the green transition to succeed, it is critical to avoid infrastructure lock-ins, displacement of low-carbon technologies, and the creation of stranded assets.

The shift from Russian gas to the LNG market will likely require substantial infrastructure investments in the EU and LNG-producing countries, increasing the risk of long-term dependency. Geopolitical dynamics add further complexity – e.g., the U.S., which supplied 50 percent of Europe’s LNG in 2023, has advocated for long-term purchasing agreements that could delay green technology adoption and extend the EU’s reliance on fossil fuels. This is already a reality as some EU member states having signed long-term gas contracts with Qatar, lasting beyond 2050, which may hinder efforts to accelerate the green transition.

Conclusion

The impact of the gas transit halt varies depending on whether it is seen from a short-, medium-, or long-term perspective. While all parties involved face losses, the impact of the halt on the EU is drastically different from what it could have been a few years ago due to the dramatic efforts undertaken in the last few years. Further, there are also potential benefits to consider. Notably, the EU has the opportunity to play a crucial role in reducing the economic and political burdens on neighboring countries, particularly those seeking EU membership. By offering targeted financial support and promoting deeper cooperation, the EU can help these nations manage the challenges posed by the halt. In turn, the halt will imply not only financial but also geopolitical losses for Russia.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

What decision did Ukraine make regarding Russian pipeline gas transit? How has the EU’s reliance on Russian pipeline gas changed since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? What are the potential consequences of the EU’s increased reliance on liquefied natural gas (LNG) following the decline in Russian pipeline gas imports? Read the policy brief “Breaking the Link: Costs and Benefits of Halting Russian Pipeline Gas to Europe” to explore the impact of halting Russian pipeline gas transit on Europe, Ukraine, and energy security.