Tag: Ukraine

Humanitarian Demining and Ukraine’s Recovery: Lessons Yet to Learn

Posted on December 1, 2025 | Policy Brief

This policy brief examines how land mine action underpins Ukraine’s reconstruction and economic renewal. It outlines the current scale of contamination and the national humanitarian demining strategy. The brief also reviews international experience from countries around the world, discussing the economic recovery driven by demining and the economic efficiency of mine action. It documents significant variation in direct mine action costs across countries and contexts, complicating the assessment of these costs in the case of Ukraine. The brief also discusses the indirect costs arising from systemic inefficiencies in Ukraine’s demining effort, including fragmented governance, shortages of qualified personnel, outdated standards, and security constraints. It concludes that Ukraine’s success in transforming demining into a catalyst for recovery depends on effective coordination, data-driven planning, gender inclusion, and the adoption of best international practices.

Understanding the Scale and Current Need for Humanitarian Demining in Ukraine

As of mid-2025, approximately 137,000 km² of Ukrainian land remains potentially contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). While this is a reduction from 174,000 km² at the end of 2022, Ukraine remains one of the most mine-contaminated countries in the world (Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, 2023; UDA, 2025).

The problem of demining is multidimensional, encompassing both humanitarian and economic consequences. More than six million people currently live in at-risk areas, and the number of mine incidents has already exceeded one thousand. Without addressing the problem, the number of victims could rise to more than 9,000 by 2030 (Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, 2023). Contamination affects some of the world’s most fertile agricultural regions, as well as energy, transport, and residential zones.

The funding needs are substantial. According to UNDP (2024), Ukraine’s total demining bill could reach USD 34–35 billion, requiring tens of thousands of trained specialists. As of early 2025, Ukraine has more than 4,500 sappers and deminers, but this number remains far below national needs. Experts emphasize that the workforce must increase significantly to ensure the timely clearance of contaminated territories. At present, approximately 87 mine-action operators are active in Ukraine, encompassing government bodies, private companies, humanitarian organizations, and international partners (UN Women Ukraine, 2025).

At the same time, the potential economic benefits of demining are immense. According to the TBI (2024) estimates, Ukraine loses about USD 11.2 billion each year (compared to 2021) due to mine contamination. Frontline regions such as Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Sumy, and Chernihiv are particularly exposed, experiencing a reduction in exports of USD 8.9 billion and a loss of regional tax revenues of USD 1.1 billion annually.

In addressing the problem, the government has recently adopted a National Mine Action Strategy until 2033, which aims to clear about 80% of the de-occupied territories within 10 years (Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, 2024). However, this ambitious plan faces serious systemic challenges, including the dispersion of power among government agencies, insufficient and inconsistent funding, and delays in public procurement and tender processes (UDA, 2025). Thus, humanitarian demining stands at the crossroads of Ukraine’s security and economic recovery, affecting how quickly the country can restore farmland, rebuild infrastructure, and attract investment. Its success depends on efficient resource use, data-driven planning, and the adoption of proven international practices. The following sections examine global experience and economic efficiency in mine action, as well as the key challenges Ukraine must address to achieve tangible and sustainable recovery.

Evidence and Lessons from Global Experience

The problem of humanitarian demining is widespread globally, affecting dozens of post-conflict states across Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Many of these countries, such as Afghanistan, Mozambique, Eritrea, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia, have already undergone large-scale clearance operations and provide tangible evidence of how demining drives economic recovery and social stabilization.

In Afghanistan, humanitarian demining produced wide-ranging socio-economic benefits. It vastly improved mobility and access to resources and markets, served as a prerequisite for broader development initiatives, restored agricultural productivity and employment, and positively influenced mental health and community relations by reducing fear, enabling return, and rebuilding trust within affected populations (UNMAS, 2021).

In Mozambique, large-scale railway clearance reopened a key regional trade corridor, creating more than 400 jobs. The operation restored transport connectivity, enabled the renewal of coal exports, and stimulated agricultural and industrial recovery in the surrounding areas (Lundberg, 2006). In Eritrea, humanitarian demining enabled the return of more than 20,000 refugees within a year, which allowed about 29 villages to resume crop cultivation and schooling; casualty rates for both residents and livestock fell to zero, restoring local food security and rural incomes (Lundberg, 2006).

Sudan offers a contrasting case, where political and logistical barriers pushed costs to nearly USD 45 per m² (Bolton, 2008). Despite high costs, the reopened transport corridors and access to markets demonstrated substantial humanitarian and trade benefits, underscoring that elevated expenditure in complex terrains can still deliver strong socio-economic returns.

Post-war European experiences reinforce these findings. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, humanitarian demining has served as a foundation for sustainable socio-economic recovery, enabling the rebuilding of housing and infrastructure, reducing flood risks, restoring agricultural and forest productivity, improving access to water, and ensuring safe mobility essential for trade and community development (GICHD & UNDP, 2022). Similarly, mine clearance in Croatia has been pivotal to national recovery, restoring access to agricultural and forest land, enabling infrastructure and EU-funded development projects, and supporting tourism and investment in previously contaminated regions (Mine Action Review, 2021).

Collectively, these cases demonstrate that the economic dividends of demining are consistent across contexts. Clearing mines enables agricultural revival, facilitates transport and trade, lowers accident-related health costs, and strengthens confidence in governance. However, incomplete data and fragmented decision-making might delay land release and inflate costs.

For Ukraine, where contamination covers more than 137,000 km² of high-value farmland and industrial zones, these global lessons confirm that mine action must be integrated as a central pillar of the reconstruction process.

Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Humanitarian Demining: Indicators and Limitations

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, in its recent report, defines efficiency in demining as “a measure of how economically resources or inputs are converted to results” (GICHD, 2023, p. 6). In humanitarian demining, this means achieving the maximum area of land safely released or the largest number of explosive items cleared using the least possible resources, without compromising safety. Efficiency, however, differs from effectiveness which is defined in the report as “the extent to which the intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance” (GICHD, 2023, p.6).

Yet, the quantitative framework developed by GICHD primarily focuses on efficiency indicators, particularly cost-based metrics such as cost per square meter of land released, cost per square meter of land fully cleared, and cost per explosive item found. This narrow focus allows for financial comparison but risks overlooking effectiveness dimensions such as the humanitarian, developmental, and social outcomes of mine clearance.

To operationalize this concept, the GICHD study developed a framework of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) to measure economic efficiency across 17 mine-affected countries between 2015 and 2019 (GICHD, 2023, pp.14-17). Three indicators are identified as central for assessing the financial efficiency of mine action operations:

  1. Cost per square metre of land released – measuring the overall cost of returning territory to productive use, encompassing land cleared, reduced, and cancelled. A lower value indicates greater cost efficiency in land release and better-targeted survey and clearance operations.
  2. Cost per square metre of land cleared – reflecting the technical cost of full clearance, which is higher due to intensive labour, equipment, and safety requirements.
  3. Cost per explosive item found – linking financial inputs to tangible outputs, i.e., the average expenditure needed to locate and neutralize one explosive ordnance.

These metrics allow analysts and policymakers to assess how funds are transformed into measurable clearance outcomes. However, as GICHD (2023) stresses, they should be used for internal evaluation and planning, not for direct comparison between countries. Differences in contamination types, topography, labour costs, access, and national data systems make cross-country benchmarking misleading. The report explicitly cautions that “no country should be considered as having a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ performance in terms of operational efficiency purely on the basis of the KPI values” (GICHD, 2023, p.21). Even similar indicators can yield different implications depending on whether operations are clearance-driven (activity-based) or survey-driven (decision-based). To illustrate the scale and variation in demining costs globally, Table 1 presents key indicators of humanitarian demining costs as of 30 November 2022.

As shown in Table 1, costs per square meter of released territory range from USD 0.02/m² (Thailand) to USD 5.87/m² (Lebanon), i.e., a 293-fold difference. Similarly, the cost per explosive item ranged from USD 274 (Sri Lanka) to USD 13,450 (Croatia) (Rohozian, 2024). Such disparities illustrate that comparing “price per m²” without context or establishing the “benchmark” in the field is quite problematic.

Table 1. Key indicators of the cost of demining across countries, as of 30 Nov. 2022

State  Cost per square meter of territory released from the local socio-economic system, USD Cost per square meter of territory that has been cleared in the local socio-economic system, USD Cost of a single found explosive item in the local socio-economic system, USD
Angola 0,32 7,88 9042
Afghanistan 0,79 1,48 911
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0,36 19,06 6059
Vietnam 0,28 0,65 500
Western Sahara 0,41 0,51 2183
Zimbabwe 1,89 4,49 289
Iraq 0,81 1,32 4437
Cambodia 0,22 0,37 678
Laos 0,99 0,99 356
Lebanon 5,87 10,65 2204
South Sudan 0,49 4,07 5667
Serbia 1,07 1,96 9757
Sudan 2,89 5,78 457
Tajikistan 1,29 1,98 1721
Thailand 0,02 2,25 281
Croatia 1,03 1,23 13450
Sri Lanka 2,26 3,65 274

Source: Rohozian, 2024.

Moreover, the study acknowledges limitations in data standardisation and completeness. Variations in how organisations record and report costs affect comparability. Aggregated national averages can obscure contextual factors such as contamination density or security conditions. For these reasons, GICHD recommends interpreting efficiency metrics in conjunction with qualitative information, including terrain, contamination type, and labour structure, and always balancing cost-efficiency with safety and effectiveness.

However, drawing on global patterns and Ukraine’s official USD 34–35 billion cost estimate, we can expect Ukraine to fall within the middle range of international demining costs. It will likely be more expensive than low-cost cases in Asian contexts but substantially below the extreme-cost cases, such as Lebanon, due to its terrain, institutional capacity, and ability to scale mechanized clearance.

Challenges in Ukraine’s Humanitarian Demining

In addition to the substantial direct costs of humanitarian demining, it is essential to understand the indirect costs generated by systemic inefficiencies, i.e., costs that arise not from clearance itself, but from delays, duplication, weak coordination, and different shortages.

A review of Ukraine’s current mine-action landscape allows us to identify the main structural challenges that contribute to elevated indirect costs. These include fragmented governance, incomplete and inconsistent data, security-related access constraints, and a shortage of trained personnel.

One of the most pressing challenges is the fragmentation of coordination and governance. Responsibilities remain dispersed across numerous actors, including the Ministry of Defence, the State Emergency Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Economy, the National Mine Action Authority, and over 20 accredited NGOs and private contractors.

According to the UDA (2025), this overlap of mandates and inconsistent prioritisation frameworks frequently results in duplicated surveys and delayed task approvals, reducing efficiency and transparency. At the same time, the idea of consolidating all authority within a single centralised body would risk excessive concentration of power and reduced accountability. A more effective path forward would be to strengthen the existing Mine Action Center’s coordinating role while maintaining clear institutional separation between policymaking and operational implementation, ensuring transparency, competition, and sustained donor confidence.

A persistent shortage of qualified personnel represents one of the most critical challenges to scaling up humanitarian demining in Ukraine. According to UNDP (2025), the country currently employs around 4,500 trained deminers, while full national recovery will require at least 10,000 professionals over the next decade (TBI, 2024). The workforce is under pressure from wartime mobilization, which diverts potential recruits to defense roles, and from a shortage of experienced supervisors and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) specialists, limiting the number of teams that can safely operate simultaneously. The National Mine Action Strategy for the Period up to 2033 (Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, 2024) further acknowledges that Ukraine’s training system is inadequate for the sector’s needs.

Current state-level training for the profession of “Sapper (demining)” follows military-oriented standards that demand extensive time and resources but offer limited relevance to humanitarian operations. Only ten educational institutions are licensed to train deminers, and only a few conduct active courses. To close this capacity gap, the Strategy calls for expanding domestic training infrastructure, establishing accredited qualification centers, recognizing informal and partial training, and developing new professional standards tailored to humanitarian demining.

Another set of pressing challenges in Ukraine’s humanitarian demining effort concerns data deficits and security limitations. Incomplete and inconsistent mapping of hazardous areas continues to undermine planning and coordination. According to the Ministry of Economy (2023), Ukraine inherited multiple legacy databases using different coordinate systems and lacking harmonized metadata, resulting in duplication and delays in verifying “released” land. The absence of a unified digital mine-action information management system constrains both operational oversight and donor transparency. As Rohozian (2024) observes, such imperfect information leads to “erroneous management decisions” that increase total costs and prolong recovery.

In addition, large areas in the east and south remain off-limits due to ongoing hostilities, unexploded ordnance, and damaged infrastructure. Fluctuating front lines, dense contamination, and logistical barriers raise insurance and hazard-pay costs, shorten fieldwork periods, and cause rapid equipment deterioration.

Thus, addressing these interconnected challenges is essential to accelerate Ukraine’s reconstruction and ensure that mine action effectively supports the safe return of communities, the revival of agricultural production, and the broader recovery of the national economy.

The Role of Women in Humanitarian Demining

The role of women in Ukraine’s humanitarian demining sector deserves special attention, as they have become an integral part of the national workforce serving as deminers, team leaders, and technical-survey dog handlers. Their growing participation reflects both professional competence and the importance of gender-inclusive recovery efforts (UN Women Ukraine, 2025).

However, until 2017, Ukrainian legislation classified demining as a “dangerous profession,” barring women from formal employment in this field (Ministry of Health of Ukraine, 2017). Following sustained advocacy by international organizations, this restriction was lifted, granting women official access to mine-action professions. Since then, the number of women in operational and leadership roles has grown steadily.

Nevertheless, persistent stereotypes suggesting that demining is unsuitable for women have been disproved by practice, as reported by UN Women Ukraine, 2025. In practice, modern safety protocols and technologies such as drones and remotely operated vehicles allow women and men to perform tasks under equal safety conditions.

Following the lifting of the employment ban in 2017, which opened demining professions to women, mine-action organizations began reconsidering how to better meet women’s practical needs in the field. Recognizing that protective gear and uniforms had long been designed for men, many operators are now adapting equipment to fit women’s bodies, enhancing both comfort and operational efficiency.

These findings further demonstrate that gender-inclusive employment contributes to a reconstruction process that benefits all citizens and fosters social recovery based on principles of equity and shared responsibility.

Conclusions

In conclusion, humanitarian demining represents a strategic prerequisite for Ukraine’s reconstruction, food security, and long-term economic recovery. International experience demonstrates that mine clearance delivers substantial socio-economic dividends by restoring access to land, enabling trade, and rebuilding local livelihoods. However, the economic efficiency of mine action cannot be measured through simple cross-country comparisons. Costs per square meter or per explosive item differ widely depending on terrain, contamination density, labor costs, and institutional frameworks. Therefore, efficiency should be evaluated in context, i.e., by how well resources are transformed into measurable recovery outcomes without compromising safety or inclusiveness.

For Ukraine, transforming demining into a genuine driver of recovery requires addressing several domestic challenges. Fragmented governance and overlapping mandates continue to reduce coordination and transparency, while limited training capacity and workforce shortages constrain operational progress. Inconsistent data systems and incomplete mapping impede strategic planning, and security conditions still restrict access to large contaminated areas in the east and south of Ukraine. Overcoming these barriers will require strengthening the coordinating role of the National Mine Action Center and expanding professional education and certification programs.

Equally important, the growing participation of women in mine action deserves special recognition. Since the 2017 reform that lifted employment restrictions, women have become active as deminers, team leaders, and survey specialists, demonstrating both competence and leadership in this traditionally male-dominated field. Promoting gender-balanced participation will strengthen Ukraine’s mine action capacity and align reconstruction with broader principles of equality and social inclusion.

Thus, ensuring that clearance efforts are efficient, transparent, data-driven, and inclusive will determine how effectively Ukraine can restore productive land, rebuild infrastructure, and regain investor confidence.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Saving Lives During War: How to Make Evacuation Messages More Effective

Posted on November 26, 2025 | Policy Brief

When war threatens civilian populations, effective evacuation messages can mean the difference between life and death. Drawing on a controlled survey experiment conducted with 2,006 Ukrainians during the 2022 Russian invasion, we find that providing clear evacuation plans dramatically improves a message’s perceived effectiveness, while sophisticated message framing makes little difference. Our results indicate that people facing war are not naive about dangers—they need practical information on how to escape, not persuasion about why they should leave. This is especially true for those who do not have the means to evacuate autonomously. These findings offer guidance for authorities and humanitarian organizations: focus on providing concrete evacuation logistics rather than crafting perfect messaging.

The Life-or-Death Challenge of Wartime Evacuations

Each year, tens of thousands of civilians die in armed conflicts worldwide. Many of these deaths could be prevented through timely evacuations from danger zones. Yet despite imminent threats, many civilians hesitate to leave their homes. Understanding how to increase the effectiveness of evacuation messages has become a critical challenge for saving lives.

In July 2022, five months into Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we conducted the first experimental study testing the effectiveness of evacuation messages during an active war. Working with 2,006 Ukrainians from regions directly affected by combat, focusing on areas that experienced occupation, shelling, and ground fighting, we tested two fundamental approaches to improving evacuation messaging.

Figure 1. Surveyed regions with the relative share of respondents.

Source: Martinez et al. (2025)

 

Testing What Works: Plans vs. Persuasion

Our experiment compared two strategies:

Strategy 1: Persuasive Nudges

We tested different message framings inspired by behavioral economics, emphasizing either the gains from evacuating (saving lives) or losses from staying (risking death), and highlighting either deteriorating living conditions or benefits to military effectiveness. These techniques have proven effective in other contexts, from increasing vaccination rates to promoting energy conservation.

Strategy 2: Practical Evacuation Plans

We tested whether adding concrete evacuation instructions improved message effectiveness. Half of our messages included specific details: free buses available at designated locations, phone numbers for reserving seats, and clear departure times.

Participants evaluated how effective each message would be in convincing residents of their city to evacuate, using a scale from 0 (completely ineffective) to 10 (very effective).

Key Finding: People Need Logistics, Not Persuasion

Our results deliver a clear message for policymakers and humanitarian organizations:

Providing evacuation plans works

Messages that included concrete evacuation plans were rated approximately 5% more effective than those without. This improvement is both statistically significant and practically meaningful—in Donetsk oblast alone, where 350,000 civilians remained in Ukrainian-controlled areas during our study, a 5% increase in evacuation rates could mean 17,500 additional lives moved to safety.

Message framing makes little difference

Surprisingly, none of our carefully crafted persuasive messages performed better than a simple, standard evacuation notice. Whether we emphasized gains or losses, living conditions or military benefits, the framing made no significant difference to perceived effectiveness.

Different groups respond differently

The evacuation plan’s effect was strongest among those who had not previously evacuated, which is exactly the population authorities most need to reach. This particular segment of the population is characterized by lower financial means and, therefore, a lower likelihood of owning a car, which turned out to be a crucial factor when it comes to timely evacuations. Finally, women responded more strongly to evacuation plans than men.

Figure 2. Experimental Treatment Effects.

Source: Martinez et al. (2025)

Understanding the Psychology of War Zone Evacuations

Why do practical plans matter more than persuasive messaging? Our findings suggest that people experiencing war are far from naive about the dangers they face. Among our respondents:

  • 82% perceived real risk of death or injury from missile strikes
  • 40% had already evacuated at least once
  • 50% of those who stayed had considered evacuating

Which seems to suggest that the barrier is not understanding risk—it is knowing how to act on it. Our correlational analysis supports this interpretation: those offered transportation during the early invasion were 12-18 percentage points more likely to evacuate, while simply receiving evacuation information showed weaker effects.

Policy Recommendations

Based on our findings, we recommend that authorities and humanitarian organizations prioritize the following:

  1. Focus resources on logistics, not messaging

Instead of investing in sophisticated communication strategies, dedicate resources to organizing concrete evacuation support: transportation, clear meeting points, advance booking systems, and designated evacuation routes.

  1. Provide specific, actionable information

Every evacuation message should include: exact locations for transportation pickup, specific departure times, contact information for coordination, clear instructions for what evacuees can bring, and confirmation of free transportation.

  1. Target messages strategically

Prioritize delivering evacuation plans to those who have not previously evacuated, women who show higher responsiveness to organized evacuations, and areas where residents lack personal evacuation plans, that is most likely in the lower socio-economic status neighborhoods.

  1. Act on timing

Our research captured a relatively stable period in the conflict. During acute escalations, rapid deployment of evacuation logistics likely matters even more than message optimization.

Implications Beyond Ukraine

While our study focused on Ukraine, approximately 50 active conflicts worldwide threaten civilian populations. Our findings suggest a fundamental shift in how international organizations approach emergency evacuations: from persuasion to facilitation.

The lesson is sobering, but actionable. People facing mortal danger do not need convincing that threats are real. They need practical help escaping them. This insight should reshape how humanitarian organizations allocate resources, how militaries plan for civilian protection, and how governments prepare for crisis scenarios.

Conclusion

Effective evacuation during war is not about finding the perfect words; it is about providing clear paths to safety. Our research suggests that even simple additions of logistical information can meaningfully improve an evacuation message’s perceived effectiveness. In contexts where every percentage point of improved evacuation rates translates to lives saved, focusing on practical evacuation support over persuasive messaging represents both an evidence-based and morally imperative policy choice. For the millions of civilians who may face evacuation decisions in current and future conflicts, the message from our research is clear: authorities must move beyond telling people to leave and start showing them exactly how.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Mapping Ukrainian CSOs in the Nordic-Baltic Region: Areas of Advocacy and Common Challenges

Posted on September 29, 2025 | Policy Brief

Modern cityscape at dusk with illuminated glass tower in central Stockholm, symbolizing innovation and cooperation, related to mapping Ukrainian CSOs.

This policy brief maps Ukrainian civil society organizations (CSOs) active in the Nordic-Baltic region (NB8), based on a 2025 survey and discussions at the Nordic Ukraine Advocacy Summit. It highlights the diverse landscape of advocacy groups, ranging from long-established diaspora organizations to initiatives formed after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The analysis highlights key challenges, such as the lack of coordination mechanisms, uneven access to political platforms, and limited technical capacity. Closer cooperation with policymakers and donors would benefit both sides, utilizing CSOs’ expertise in facilitating better integration of displaced Ukrainians and improving inclusive policymaking. It is important to recognize the role of Ukrainian civil society not only as a facilitator in the immediate support efforts but also as a strategic partner in shaping Europe’s long-term peace architecture.

Introduction

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 caused a massive migration of Ukrainians settling across the EU, including the Nordic-Baltic region. This movement gave rise to a wide range of new initiatives, including advocacy, cultural diplomacy, support for integration, and humanitarian efforts. Alongside long-standing diaspora organisations, these newly formed groups quickly became vital actors mobilizing resources, amplifying Ukraine’s voice internationally, and contributing to host societies. In light of these dynamics, it is worthwhile to understand how these organizations operate and what challenges they face.

To this end, the Nordic Ukraine Forum, with the support of the Swedish Institute, conducted a Survey of Nordic-Baltic Ukrainian Civil Society Organisations 2025: Mapping Areas of Advocacy, Structures, and Common Challenges between March and May 2025 (Zubkovych et al., 2025). This study examined Ukrainian CSOs active in both the Nordic-Baltic region (NB8) and Ukraine, based on a structured survey of 17 organizations (from an initial pool of 42). Notably, the survey focused exclusively on organizations with advocacy for Ukraine as a main activity, excluding smaller initiatives dedicated primarily to humanitarian relief, such as collecting clothes or food. Additionally, the output of the survey has been supplemented by the discussions and outcomes from the Nordic Ukraine Advocacy Summit (NUAS), held in Oslo in June 2025, with 30 participating CSOs. Together, these sources provide a unique empirical overview of the role and activities of Ukrainian advocacy CSOs in the Nordic-Baltic region.

Survey Results

Areas of Advocacy

The survey covers Ukrainian advocacy organisations based in the Nordic-Baltic region, where Sweden-based organisations or initiatives made up over half of the total respondents. The survey represents both long-established diaspora organizations and newer initiatives formed in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. About one-fourth of CSOs were established before 2014 (the earliest in 1997), while the majority were founded after 2022, reflecting the urgent mobilization of diaspora communities during the war.

Surveyed CSOs represent a broad mix of leadership roles, gender, professions, languages, membership sizes, and funding models. Most remain volunteer-driven and rely on short-term or project-based funding. More detailed demographic and organizational profiles can be found in the report by Zubkovych et al., 2025. Survey results show that Ukrainian CSOs in the NB8 focus on a wide range of areas. The most common activities include advocacy for Ukraine’s military support, cultural diplomacy and education, as well as support for displaced Ukrainians and their integration (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Focus areas of Ukrainian CSOs in the Nordic-Baltic region

Source: Zubkovych et al., 2025.

Many organizations also prioritize working with media, countering disinformation, humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and advocacy for Ukraine’s EU integration, followed by legal aid, human rights, and gender issues.

Figure 2 presents the main types of activity through which Ukrainian CSOs pursue their objectives. As shown, Ukrainian CSOs perform their tasks by raising social media awareness (82%) and organizing events in support of Ukraine (82%). Other key activities include demonstrations, media outreach, and direct engagement with policymakers. These findings suggest the need to examine more closely which social media platforms are being used, especially given the increasing risks of disinformation and propaganda.

Figure 2. Types of activities of Ukrainian CSOs in the Nordic-Baltic region

Source: Zubkovych et al., 2025.

Main Challenges

At the same time, the survey reveals the main challenges that Ukrainian CSOs in the Nordic-Baltic region have been facing (Figure 3). In particular, the respondents mentioned the absence of structured coordination mechanisms, which leads to duplication of efforts and uneven visibility.

For instance, while several groups in Sweden and Norway focus on humanitarian aid, their activities often run parallel rather than in partnership. The lack of common platforms or umbrella networks reduces their collective influence and makes it more challenging to articulate shared priorities to governments and donors. Without stronger horizontal coordination, CSOs risk competing rather than complementing one another in their advocacy and support work.

Figure 3. Main challenges for Ukrainian CSOs

Source: Zubkovych et al., 2025.

Funding emerged as one of the most pressing issues in the survey. Most organizations reported reliance on short-term, project-based grants or donations. Many CSOs lack multi-year funding, which makes strategic planning and staff retention almost impossible. This precarious situation often leads to volunteer burnout and creates uncertainty about the future of their programs. Donor practices have unintentionally exacerbated this vulnerability by neglecting the long-term capacity-building needs of diaspora CSOs.

The survey further highlights significant disparities in institutional access. Larger CSOs, particularly those based in capital cities such as Stockholm, Oslo, and Helsinki, enjoy greater visibility and are more likely to receive invitations to political consultations. By contrast, smaller groups in regions often remain excluded from policy-making processes, despite being closer to affected communities. This imbalance risks creating unequal representation, where only a handful of well-resourced organizations shape public debate, while others remain invisible. Respondents from Baltic states also pointed out that while they are engaged in cultural diplomacy and integration activities, they struggle to gain recognition from national ministries or international donors. The result is a fragmented advocacy landscape, where not all voices are equally heard.

Many organizations reported gaps in technical capacity, particularly a lack of specific skills in fundraising, project management, digital communication, lobbying, and public outreach. Additionally, the survey highlighted the dual role that Ukrainian CSOs currently play outside Ukraine. On one hand, they act as advocates for Ukraine internationally, lobbying for sanctions, military aid, and continued political support. On the other hand, they provide practical integration services for displaced Ukrainians, including legal counselling, language courses, housing support, and employment assistance. While both roles are crucial, this dual identity can create tensions. For instance, CSOs in Sweden and Finland reported that resources devoted to advocacy sometimes limited their ability to address integration needs, while groups in Estonia and Latvia noted that local integration demands risk overshadowing their transnational advocacy. Without clearer strategies or additional resources, CSOs may struggle to balance these functions effectively.

Conclusion

The survey of Ukrainian CSOs in the Nordic-Baltic region, combined with insights from NUAS 2025, highlights both their urgent needs and strategic opportunities.

For CSOs, strengthening coordination mechanisms is critical to reduce duplication and amplify their collective influence. Creating cross-border advocacy platforms and thematic working groups would help CSOs to better coordinate their activities, learn from others’ experience, and articulate common priorities. In particular, smaller CSOs would benefit from learning how to adopt effective communication strategies, diversify outreach through multiple platforms, and enhance engagement with local communities and institutional stakeholders.

At the same time, CSOs should invest in internal capacity: skills training in project management, advocacy, and digital communication can improve efficiency and increase funding opportunities. Finally, CSOs should balance their dual roles, such as supporting displaced Ukrainians locally while advocating for Ukraine internationally, by dividing responsibilities and tailoring strategies to avoid role conflict.

In turn, policymakers and donors may benefit from closer cooperation with Ukrainian CSOs. As documented by Anisimova et al.  (2025), Ukrainian CSOs and civil society actors have already stepped in to fill gaps left by the public sector in the Nordic-Baltic countries. They have been facilitating labor market integration by offering mentorship, language support, and professional networks; improving access to information and bridging communication barriers between displaced people, employers, and municipalities. By recognizing and making use of Ukrainian CSOs’ experience, NB8 governments can develop more efficient mechanisms for integrating displaced populations. Furthermore, wider interaction with CSOs – including small local ones, currently underrepresented in the policy dialogue – may help coordinate with local communities and ensure inclusive policy-making processes.

Ultimately, it is important to recognize the role of Ukrainian civil society not only as a facilitator in the immediate support efforts but also as a strategic partner in shaping Europe’s long-term peace architecture.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Liberal Values in Ukraine Days Before the 2022 Invasion

Posted on September 22, 2025 | Policy Brief

Monument in Kyiv at sunrise symbolizing Ukraine liberal values of freedom, democracy, and resilience.

Just weeks before Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, the European Social Survey completed the 10th round of data collection on public attitudes and beliefs in Ukraine. This policy brief examines regional variation in liberal values such as attitudes toward democracy and the EU, based on that data. While respondents in Eastern Ukraine were more skeptical of democracy and EU integration, they did not consistently reject liberal social values to a greater extent than respondents in other parts of the country. The most striking divide however, lies in institutional trust, which was significantly lower in Eastern Ukraine. This suggests that trust in institutions, which may have been further negatively impacted by prolonged exposure to violence since 2014, underlie the observed regional differences in attitudes towards democracy and the EU. Understanding these differences is vital for policymakers navigating Ukraine’s reform and EU accession process.

Introduction

It has been well documented that values in post-communist countries in Eastern Europe on average, tend to be more authoritarian, more nationalistic, more in favor of state intervention in the economy, and more skeptical towards sexual and ethnic minorities and foreigners than in Western Europe (e.g., Roland 2012). Behind the averages, however, there is substantial variation in values across subgroups of populations. Even before the onset of the full-scale Russian invasion, a discussion on regional Ukrainian differences in relation to democratic values, the wish for EU integration, and similar liberal attitudes existed, both in and outside of the country.

The path towards a closer relationship with Europe and the EU started already in 2014, but since February 2022, Ukraine has politically positioned itself even closer to the EU, and an EU accession process is now underway. However, for a successful reform process in Ukraine, how public opinion is shaped and whether attitudes and values converge towards those of the EU will be important (Olofsgård et al. 2024).

With this in mind, this policy brief provides a descriptive account of public liberal values in Ukraine by analyzing data from the 10th round of the European Social Survey (ESS) conducted just weeks before the full-scale invasion on the 22nd of February 2022. Some of the differences we observe are likely long-standing and related to differences in language preferences and cultural and informational exposure from Russia and the EU, respectively. Yet, given the exposure to instability and conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine since 2014, we also discuss the role that exposure to conflict may have played in explaining several attitudinal dimensions, including satisfaction with democracy, support for liberal social values, attitudes toward Europe and EU integration, as well as levels of trust.

Data

The ESS round 10 data was collected through face-to-face interviews in Ukraine between January 18th, 2022, and February 8th, 2022. The nationally representative survey focuses on public attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors and includes questions on opinions on democracy, the EU, and similar topics commonly considered to capture liberal views.

ESS Sample Characteristics

The sample consisted of more women than men (about 59 percent and 41 percent, respectively). While the Ukrainian population is well-educated, most still find it difficult (41 percent) or very difficult (32 percent) to live comfortably on their income. 11.5 percent of the sample was unemployed, while 31 percent were retired. Broken down by location, most average outcomes are similar, albeit with the East displaying somewhat lower levels of education and greater income difficulties (see Figure 1 for an illustration of what oblasts (regions) are included in each geographical unit). Unemployment was, however, substantially higher in the West (about 15 percent), while the share of retirees was lower (26 percent).

Some heterogeneity exists when it comes to belonging to a religious denomination. In the Central and South, around 63 percent state they belong to a church/mosque/synagogue, etc. The East is roughly at par with the national average (70 and 69.5 percent, respectively), while this figure is 82 percent in the Western part of the country. Similarly, there are major differences in the language one most often speaks at home. In the country as a whole, 13.4 percent stated they speak both Ukrainian and Russian at home. In the East, this figure was as high as 27.1 percent, displaying the duality in mother tongue in this part of Ukraine. The corresponding figure for the West was 3.3 percent. On the contrary, 92.4 percent marked that they most often speak only Ukrainian at home in the West, whereas this figure was only 5.2 percent in the East.

Figure 1. Geographical Classification of Ukraine’s Oblasts

Note: The map depicts the ESS coverage at the time of data collection, excluding Crimea and Sevastopol – illegally annexed by Russia since 2014.

Key Variables of Interest

To understand the views on liberal values, ESS responses to questions in the following areas have been considered:

  • I. Merits of democracy: satisfaction with the way democracy works; importance of living in a democratic country.
  • II. Liberal democratic values: agreement with statements such as “gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own lives as they wish”; attitudes towards the merits of obedience, respect for authority, and loyalty towards leaders; attitudes towards immigrants.
  • III. Opinions about Europe and the EU: support for further EU integration; emotional attachment to Europe; vote intention in a hypothetical EU referendum.

Regional Differences

There are some clear regional divides in attitudes toward democracy, liberal values, and EU integration across Ukraine in the weeks leading up to the full-scale Russian invasion. These differences are particularly pronounced between Eastern Ukraine and the Center, South, and West – though not uniformly in the same direction.

Figure 2. Attitudes toward democracy, liberal values, and EU integration across Ukraine

Source: Authors’ creation from ESS.

On democratic commitment, only 37 percent of respondents in the East considered it “extremely important” to live in a democratically governed country. This was about 16 percentage points lower than the national average. When categories were grouped into low, medium, and high importance, the East still trailed the national average by about 10 percentage points (about 67.5 and 75 percent, respectively). Similarly, satisfaction with democracy is the lowest among respondents from the East (about 6 percent compared to a national average, including the East, of 11 percent). Geographical differences are also evident in the responses to the question on whether it is acceptable for a country to have a strong leader above the law. A smaller share rejected this in the East (about 30 percent compared to the national average of 37 percent).

However, the East stood out in the other direction on some core liberal values, as depicted in Figure 2. It had the lowest share disagreeing with LGBT rights (31 percent vs. 40 percent nationally), the weakest support for teaching children obedience (17 percent), and the highest rejection of it (41 percent). Further, only 12 percent in the East agreed that “the country needs most loyalty towards its leaders,” compared to 26 percent nationally. This question could reflect one’s view on the current leadership, warranting some caution in the interpretation. On immigration, however, the East was less liberal: only 19 percent saw immigrants as having a positive impact, versus about 30 percent nationally.

The sharpest regional divide between the East and other regions concerns attitudes toward Europe and EU membership. In a hypothetical referendum, 73 percent of respondents in the East said they would vote to remain outside of the EU, compared to 47 percent in the South, 23 percent in the Central, and just 11 percent in the West. Support for further European unification was also substantially lower in the East, with only about 17 percent in favor of further unification, as compared to the almost 50 percent national average. Similarly, emotional attachment to Europe is substantially lower among respondents from the East, with nearly all respondents stating low or medium attachment only – figures that nearly invert those of respondents from the West of Ukraine.

The Role of Trust

Turning to the measures of trust, the East clearly stands out. Trust in the parliament, the police, political parties, politicians, and the legal system was substantially lower among respondents from the East (in the ranges of 5 to 15 percentage points more respondents answered they had a low level of trust in said institutions than the national average). When asked about trust in the United Nations, the East also stood out with more than 50 percent stating low trust compared to the national average of about 37. The same pattern holds also when asked about the European Parliament – 73 percent compared to the national average of about 44 percent – stated low trust. Respondents from the South also displayed lower levels of trust across all measures, but the deviations from the average are about half as big as the East.

When asked whether people can generally be trusted, or one can’t be too careful, the East did not stand out in this way, underpinning how distrust is strongly directed toward institutions, both national and international.

Conflict Exposure

Figure 3 details the conflict intensity in the last two years leading up to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As can be seen, incidents of violence are concentrated in the Donbass area, including the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. While not marked by similar levels of active conflict, Kharkiv oblast – also part of the East classification – borders areas with high levels of conflict intensity in the Donbass, as well as Russia in the east.

Figure 3. Conflict intensity in Ukraine, by raion

2020

 

2021

Source: Authors’ creation from Armed Conflict and Location Data.

It should be noted that the map also depicts strategic deployments and political unrest, such as demonstrations, explaining the prevalence of “conflict” also in a few other places in Ukraine prior to February 2022. The occurrences of such incidents are, however, far less than those in Luhansk oblast and Donetsk oblast at the time. An important piece of information is that the intensity pattern holds for the time Armed Conflict and Location Data for Ukraine has been available (2018), i.e. individuals situated in the East have been exposed to incidences of violence over a prolonged period of time.

This raises the question whether this exposure to violence may have contributed to increased differences in trust in institutions and support for democracy and the EU beyond what was already there before 2014. The most immediate effect probably comes from selective migration, i.e., that individuals who remain in the eastern regions in early 2022 despite the violence since 2014 may be those who, on average, are more skeptical of the Ukrainian government and its tilt away from the authoritarian Russia and towards the EU. But previous literature and recent studies on Ukraine suggest that there may also be a direct effect coming from exposure to violence on an individual’s attitudes. This relationship has recently been mapped by Obrizan (2025). A key finding is that military solutions are preferred in the segment of the population that has experienced hardship and personal losses since the full-scale invasion in 2022.

More generally, any kind of trust – including the interpersonal one – can be affected by exposure to conflict. The relationship is complicated, and in some instances, violence can cause more pro-social attitudes and behavior. An important distinction, however, is that exposure to violence amplifies the distinctions in attitudes and behavior towards members of in- and out-groups (Olofsgård, 2025). This suggests that conflict may have further increased the differences between the East of Ukraine and the rest of the country, if many residents in the former perceive national and western institutions as being dominated by groups they do not feel strong attachments to.

Further, terror management theory (e.g., Landau et al. 2004) suggests that fear induces support for charismatic and strong leadership. In a context where liberal democracy is not everywhere well enough entrenched, this may tilt over into support for more authoritarian leadership in response to attacks triggering stronger emotions of fear. Furthermore, work by Feldman and Stenner (1997) shows that the impact of perceived societal threat on triggering stronger authoritarian preferences can depend on authoritarian predispositions. The latter is measured by, e.g., looking at attitudes towards child rearing and emphasis on obedience. In the context of the finding above, this would imply that the impact of violence on authoritarian preferences would be weaker in the eastern parts of Ukraine, compared to the rest of the country, a potentially interesting avenue for future research.

Conclusions

The findings in this policy brief nuance simple narratives about regional divides in Ukraine. While dissatisfaction with democracy and skepticism toward the EU are more common in the East, this does not necessarily correspond to a general rejection of liberal social values. In some cases — such as attitudes toward child-rearing, authority, and LGBT rights — respondents from the East even express more liberal views than elsewhere.

Not explicitly discussed in the brief is the topic of mother tongue. The data shows that Russian speakers are less emotionally attached to Europe and less supportive of EU integration. Yet, there is no consistent evidence that Russian speakers are less committed to liberal democratic values overall. The effect of language is difficult to disentangle from geography, particularly given the concentration of Russian speakers in Eastern Ukraine.

What does stand out more clearly is that trust and the general view on institutions are substantially lower and more negative in the East. Respondents from the East consistently report lower trust in national and international political institutions. Interestingly, this pattern does not extend to generalized social trust — the East does not differ markedly from the rest of the country. This contrast suggests a more focused skepticism directed at formal institutions, rather than widespread social distrust. One possible explanation, as discussed in Olofsgård (2025), is that when exposed to conflict and violence, interpersonal trust may reflect confidence in one’s in-group, while institutional trust hinges on feeling represented within the broader political system. If respondents from the East perceive themselves as excluded from the national or European in-group, this could explain their lower levels of trust in both domestic and international institutions, and exposure to violence may have further amplified this. While signs of such alienation appear in the data, one should refrain from drawing too strong conclusions from this alone. Another possible explanation is that prolonged exposure to violence has eroded confidence in the government’s ability to protect citizens, and in the effectiveness of EU support, which would turn support away from the EU option preferred by the current government.  Future research on the effects of war exposure should more carefully disentangle the various aspects and forms of trust and how they relate to liberal values in Ukraine. Rebuilding institutional trust remains a key challenge. In this context, instilling peace and decentralizing political power may be essential for increasing trust in the Eastern part of the country, if that helps residents in the East to identify with public institutions. As Ukraine advances on its path toward EU membership, fostering a shared sense of national belonging will be critical in overcoming the narrative of an East–West divide when rebuilding the country.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

The Case for Seizing Russian State Assets

Posted on June 18, 2025 | Policy Brief

Facade of the Central Bank of Russia with Russian flag, symbolizing the debate around seizing Russian state assets to support Ukraine.

This brief examines the legal and economic arguments in the ongoing debate over whether to confiscate Russian state assets frozen in Western democracies and redirect them toward supporting Ukraine’s resilience and reconstruction. It also outlines concrete proposals for how such a measure could be undertaken in compliance with international law and with manageable economic consequences.

At the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, substantial Russian state assets held in Western countries were frozen. While not all countries have disclosed precise figures, estimates place the total between $290–330 billion, most of it held within European jurisdictions. These numbers can be put in perspective to the total global support to Ukraine so far, €267 billion according to the Kiel Institute’s Ukraine Support Tracker. A lively discussion has emerged around the legal, economic, and political feasibility of seizing these assets to support Ukraine. As evident, this would constitute a very substantial addition to the support for the country. Thus far, agreement has only been reached on utilizing the returns on the assets to service a $50 billion loan to Ukraine under the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) mechanism. It has been argued that $50 billion should be enough, but Western contributions to the defence of Ukraine have been around €80 billion per year. The ERA is thus only a partial and very short-term financial solution for Ukraine, while a €300 billion fund based on the seizure of the assets would last perhaps 3-5 years. In short, the size of the fund matter and the principal amount is significantly larger than the fund that has been set up based solely on taxing the returns of the frozen assets.

This brief survey’s the main areas of contention and proposes viable pathways forward. It focuses on the legal and economic dimensions, setting aside moral arguments—which are broadly accepted given Russia’s unprovoked aggression and the destruction it has caused. Ultimately, the question is a political one: whether the legal justification and economic trade-offs favour asset seizure over other financing methods.

The Legal Arguments

Opposition to seizure often cites the principle of sovereign immunity. Yet, international law permits exceptions through countermeasures—acts that would otherwise be unlawful but are allowed in response to grave violations by another state. Additionally, asset confiscation may be lawful when enforcing international judgments (other possible legal avenues are for instance explored in Webb (2024), though in the end deemed as less likely to gain traction and legal approval). In both cases, the goal is to induce compliance with international obligations and secure reparations. A further legal basis lies in the doctrine of collective self-defense, which permits states not directly attacked to aid those that are, in response to unlawful aggression (Vlasyuk, 2024).

Critics often note that countermeasures should be temporary and reversible. However, as Vlasyuk (2024) points out, international law qualifies reversibility as being required only “as far as possible.” This implies that in cases of severe violations—where reversible countermeasures have failed—non-reversible actions may be justified. One proposed mechanism ties the frozen assets to future war reparations, allowing permanent transfers only if Russia refuses to comply with a future reparations ruling. Since reparation should go to the victim of Russia’s aggression, it also means that it is Ukraine that has the ultimate claim on the frozen Russian assets. This implies that any decision of confiscation and governance structure for transferring funds to Ukraine should be made with the consent of Ukraine. Put differently; even if the money is in Western financial institutions, there are good reasons to make sure the resources are used according to Ukrainian preferences.

The Economic Arguments

The principal economic concerns surrounding asset seizure are its potential impact on confidence in European capital markets, including risks of capital flight, increased interest rates, and diminished credibility of the euro. There are also fears of reciprocal actions by Russia against remaining Western investments.

These concerns, however, are increasingly overstated. The major shock to financial markets occurred when the assets were first frozen; any anticipated impact should now be fully priced in. Moreover, a viable reserve currency must be supported by convertibility, sound economic governance, and rule of law—features absent in countries like China, Gulf states, or most other emerging economies. The yen and Swiss franc lack either scale or stability. Despite previous sanctions and the 2022 asset freeze, the dollar and euro still account for around 80 percent of global foreign exchange reserves (The International Working Group on Russian Sanctions, 2023). Given the current crisis of confidence in U.S. fiscal governance, the euro remains especially robust.

The extraordinary nature of the situation also diminishes fears of setting a destabilizing precedent. Investors alarmed by this measure may not be long-term assets to Western markets but rather criminal states or individuals that should not be protected by the West’s financial and legal systems. More broadly, it signals to authoritarian regimes that aggressive actions will carry financial consequences. Western firms still operating in Russia have had ample time to disinvest, and those that remain should not constrain public policy.

Importantly, the costs of inaction must be considered. Financing Ukraine through increased public borrowing could raise interest rates across the eurozone and widen yield spreads between fiscally stronger and weaker member states. Seizing Russian assets, by contrast, may be economically safer, more equitable, and legally sound (International Working Group on Russian Sanctions, 2023).

Suggested Approaches

Several proposals aim to facilitate asset transfer in ways consistent with international law and economic stability.

Zelikow (2025) proposes the establishment of a trust fund to lawfully assume custody of frozen assets. This fund—grounded in the legal doctrine of countermeasures—would not represent outright confiscation but a conditional hold. Assets would remain Russia’s property until disbursed to victims of its aggression. A board of trustees would oversee disbursements—for example, servicing ERA loans or financing reconstruction. In this proposal, the fund would broadly define “victims” to include Ukraine and neighbouring states that have borne costs, such as accommodating refugees. This can perhaps help build political support among Western countries for the trust fund, but it has the obvious drawback that it may imply less support to Ukraine. Zelikow (2025) argues that institutions like the Bank of England or World Bank could manage the fund, given past experience with similar arrangements, potentially issuing bonds backed by the assets to accelerate support.

Vlasyuk (2024) proposes a multilateral treaty among coalition states recognizing Russia’s grave breaches of international law. This would provide a unified legal basis for transferring central bank assets to Ukraine via a compensation fund. National legislation would follow—similar to the U.S. REPO Act—tailored narrowly to address such violations. These laws should include safeguards, such as provisions to suspend asset seizure if hostilities end and reparations are paid.

Dixon et al. (2024) propose a “reparation loan” backed by Ukraine’s reparations claims. The EU or G7 would lend to Ukraine, using these claims as collateral. If Russia fails to pay after a ruling by a UN-backed claims commission, the frozen assets could be seized. This approach aligns well with the requirement for reversibility in countermeasures and may also reassure financial markets.

Conclusions

In summary, compelling legal arguments support the transfer or confiscation of Russian state assets under international law. Meanwhile, fears of damaging economic consequences appear increasingly unfounded. Any meaningful support for Ukraine—whether through asset seizure or public borrowing—will carry financial implications. However, using Russian rather than Western taxpayer resources is both morally and politically compelling.

What is now needed is coordinated political will and a practical, legally sound mechanism to operationalize asset transfers. With sound governance, such a step would not only finance Ukraine’s recovery but reinforce the international legal order and deter future aggression. An arrangement that makes sure all resources go to Ukraine—and not toward covering losses incurred by supporting Western countries—should be prioritized.

References

  • Dixon, H., Buchheit, L. C., & Singh, D. (2024). Ukrainian reparation loan: How it would work. The International Working Group on Russian Sanctions.
  • The International Working Group on Russian Sanctions. (2023). Working Group paper #15. Stanford University.
  • Vlasyuk, A. (2024). Legal report on confiscation of Russian state assets for the reconstruction of Ukraine. KSE Institute.
  • Webb, P. (2024). Legal options for confiscation of Russian state assets to support the reconstruction of Ukraine. European Parliament.
  • Zelikow, P. (2025). A fresh look at the Russian assets: A proposal for international resolution of sanctioned accounts (Hoover Institution Essay). Hoover Institution Press.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Beyond North Africa: Ukraine’s Agricultural Engagements with Sub-Saharan Partners

Posted on June 12, 2025 | Policy Brief

Farmworkers harvesting leafy vegetables in a lush green field with mountains in the background, illustrating hands-on labor central to Ukraine's agricultural engagements.

In recent years, the global agricultural landscape has shifted dramatically, shaped by the intersecting crises of climate change, food insecurity, geopolitical tensions, and technological disruption. Against this backdrop, Ukraine and Sub-Saharan Africa have emerged as two regions uniquely positioned to build a complementary partnership in the agri-food sector – one that not only addresses immediate humanitarian and trade challenges but also lays the groundwork for long-term sustainable development. As Ukraine looks to diversify its agricultural partnerships beyond traditional European and Asian markets, Ukraine’s agricultural engagements with Africa offer both a growing consumer base and an investment frontier where Ukraine’s expertise and surplus production capacity can meet critical demand. This policy brief explores how Ukraine’s agricultural engagements with certain African countries can deepen cooperation across the agricultural value chain. Drawing on in-depth regional analyses conducted by the Kyiv School of Economics Agrocenter (Martyshev, Stolnikovych & Piddubnyi, 2024a–d), the discussion considers strategic sectors, regional particularities, and policy innovations essential for a robust and mutually beneficial partnership.

Ukraine Agricultural Engagements with Africa: Opportunities for Growth and Partnership

Ukraine is one of the world’s most productive agricultural exporters, supplying significant volumes of wheat, corn, sunflower oil, and other essential staples. Africa, by contrast, is grappling with an array of food production and security challenges. In many regions, agricultural productivity remains stubbornly low, constrained by underinvestment, poor infrastructure, limited irrigation, climate volatility, and outdated farming techniques. Yet, Africa’s demographic trends suggest a rapidly growing demand for food. Urbanization is accelerating, dietary preferences are shifting, and consumers are increasingly looking beyond subsistence crops toward diversified and processed foods. These dynamics set the stage for Ukraine to serve not just as a food exporter, but also as a strategic partner in Africa’s agricultural transformation.

In a series of recent regional reports by the Kyiv School of Economics Agrocenter, all titled Cooperation Between Ukraine and African Countries in Agriculture, (Martyshev, Stolnikovych & Piddubnyi, 2024a,b,c,d), the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE) explored the mutually beneficial opportunities for collaboration between Ukraine and Africa in the agricultural sector. The full reports covering Central, East, Southern, and West Africa are available at https://agrocenter.kse.ua. This brief summarizes the key findings and insights drawn from those reports.

Data and Methods

A standardized analytical framework across four African regions, Central, East, Southern, and West Africa, focusing on three major countries in each region, was applied. The objective was to, through data-drive insights, assess the potential for agricultural cooperation with Ukraine in food security, trade, production systems, and policy environments.

  • Food security analysis relies on indicators from FAOSTAT and the World Bank, including prevalence of undernourishment, dietary energy adequacy, and trends in malnutrition from 2000 to 2022.
  • Trade analysis uses data from UN Comtrade, ITC Trade Map, Ukrainian customs, and national sources to evaluate import-export flows, Ukraine’s market share, and commodity dependencies, particularly in cereals and vegetable oils.
  • Agricultural sector profiling includes employment, GDP contribution, key crop and livestock outputs, and irrigation coverage. Data are drawn from FAOSTAT, national agricultural statistics, and World Development Indicators.
  • Infrastructure and technology assessments are based on literature reviews and secondary sources evaluating the state of storage, logistics, irrigation, and mechanization. Attention is given to adoption of modern tools like drones and ICT platforms.
  • Policy and institutional reviews focus on national agricultural strategies, trade policies, food security programs, and land tenure systems, using official government documents and donor evaluations.
  • For East and West Africa, findings were also informed by stakeholder input from KSE Agrocenter webinars held in 2024, involving local policymakers, researchers, and trade representatives.

This mixed-methods approach enabled a comparative, region-specific understanding of agri-food challenges and opportunities relevant to Ukraine’s engagement in Africa.

Empirical Findings and Policy Recommendations

Trade: A Nascent but Promising Relationship

The trade relationship between Ukraine and Africa, while still developing, shows considerable potential. Based on empirical trade flow data, Ukraine’s primary exports to Africa include cereals like wheat and corn, along with vegetable oils. Imports from Africa, however, are minimal, revealing the one-sided nature of current trade. This asymmetry is due to limited diversification, logistical barriers, and underdeveloped bilateral trade frameworks. Trade activity is concentrated in North and West Africa, while countries in Central, Eastern and Southern Africa receive fewer Ukrainian goods. Engagement with regional trade blocs such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the East African Community (EAC) presents both regulatory hurdles and strategic entry points.

Based on observed trade gaps, the policy recommendation is to expand Ukraine’s access to African markets by negotiating preferential trade agreements and eliminating non-tariff barriers. Appointing agrarian attachés in African capitals can facilitate market entry, monitor regional regulations, and promote Ukrainian products in regional fairs and business forums.

Joint Investment Opportunities

Based on field-level evidence and investment data, agriculture in Central and East Africa is constrained by severe infrastructure deficits. Post-harvest losses, driven by the absence of proper storage, cold chains, and road networks, are estimated to cost billions in lost output annually. The strategic proposal is for Ukraine to co-invest in building post-harvest systems, leveraging its expertise in grain storage and export logistics. Ukrainian firms could collaborate with African partners on silos, warehouses, and cold storage tailored to tropical climates.

Food processing also represents a high-potential area. Many East African countries impose protective tariffs on processed food imports to stimulate local industry. Based on these findings, the policy recommendation is for Ukraine to establish agro-processing joint ventures that align with local industrial policies. These ventures would stimulate employment, reduce food imports, and strengthen Ukraine’s position in value-added agriculture abroad.

Technology Transfer Potential

Empirical assessments reveal that low mechanization, climate volatility, and limited access to agri-tech remain persistent barriers to productivity in much of sub-Saharan Africa. Ukraine, with its advanced capabilities in precision agriculture, can provide high-impact technologies such as satellite-based soil monitoring, drones for crop surveillance, and automated irrigation systems. For example, in parts of Southern Africa like Zambia and Namibia, where rainfall is unpredictable, these technologies can help stabilize crop yields and reduce risk for smallholder farmers.

The strategic proposal is for Ukrainian firms to develop demonstration farms and pilot projects that showcase these innovations. Based on successful models from Eastern Europe, these pilots could serve as training grounds for local agronomists and as proof-of-concept for scalable investment.

Regional Variability and Context-Specific Cooperation

Central Africa (e.g., the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Angola, Cameroon)

Based on food security metrics, Central Africa faces some of the highest levels of undernourishment on the continent. In DRC for example, more than one-third of the population is chronically underfed. Political instability and unclear land rights further hinder agricultural investment.

The strategic recommendation is to continue and scale humanitarian programs like “Grain from Ukraine,” while also offering technical support in veterinary services for cattle and poultry sectors, particularly in Angola and Cameroon. Ukrainian expertise in land reform and extension services could also help unlock investment in rural farming.

East Africa (e.g., Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania)

Agricultural productivity is improving in East Africa, but gaps remain. Based on infrastructure and yield data, the region struggles with limited access to farm machinery, irrigation systems, and post-harvest technology. The policy recommendation is to focus on joint research, agricultural education, and training programs that address these specific bottlenecks. Ukrainian institutions could work with African universities to design curricula on crop science, data-driven farming, and agri-business entrepreneurship. Mobile extension services and remote learning platforms could further boost rural outreach.

Southern Africa (e.g., South Africa, Botswana, Namibia)

This region has a more developed agricultural sector with export orientation and mechanization. However, environmental and political factors, such as energy shortages and water scarcity, threaten sustainability. Based on these empirical conditions, the strategic proposal is for Ukraine to engage through agri-consulting and technology partnerships. High-value inputs like hybrid seeds and automated irrigation systems can address local constraints, while cooperation on renewable energy solutions for farming could provide long-term stability.

West Africa (e.g., Nigeria, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire)

According to population and consumption data, West Africa faces mounting pressure on food systems. Despite improving domestic output, infrastructure deficits and policy inconsistency limit food availability. Based on these findings, the strategic recommendation is to invest in logistics infrastructure, such as road and rail links to key ports and warehouses, as well as to diversify the region’s agricultural base. Ukrainian seed companies could introduce crops like barley and legumes, adapted to regional climates, to reduce dependence on cocoa and palm oil.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the partnership between Ukraine and Sub-Saharan Africa in the agricultural sector is not merely a matter of commerce; it is a strategic opportunity with tangible benefits for both sides. Ukraine, as a breadbasket with advanced agri-tech capabilities, can play a pivotal role in enhancing food systems in parts of Africa where food insecurity remains acute, particularly in regions such as the Horn of Africa (e.g., Somalia and Ethiopia), the Sahel (e.g., Niger and Mali) and Central Africa (e.g., the Democratic Republic of the Congo). At the same time, many African nations offer Ukraine access to growing consumer markets, underutilized arable land, and increasing geopolitical relevance in a rapidly evolving global landscape.

To realize this vision, both sides must commit to a comprehensive, long-term strategy built on trust, transparency, and mutual benefit. The road ahead is complex but filled with promise. With smart investments, targeted diplomacy, and collaborative innovation, Ukraine and Africa can co-author a new chapter in global agriculture, one defined not by scarcity and dependency, but by resilience, growth, and shared prosperity.

References

Central Africa

  • Martyshev, P., Stolnikovych, H., Piddubnyi, I. (2024a). Cooperation between Ukraine and African countries in agriculture: Central Africa. Center for Food and Land Use Research at Kyiv School of Economics.
  • Abia, W. A., Shum, C. E., Fomboh, R. N., Ntungwe, E., & Ageh, M. T. (2016). Agriculture in Cameroon: Proposed Strategies to Sustain Productivity. International Journal for Research in Agricultural Research, 2(2), 1–14.
  • Africa24. (2024, January 25). Cameroon reduces state fees for agricultural enterprises by 92%.
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  • African Development Bank. (2023). Angola – Agriculture Sector Reform Program (ASRP).
  • African Development Bank. (2024). African Economic Outlook 2024: Driving Africa’s Transformation.
  • Arsene, M. B., & Mwine Fyama, J. N. (2021). Potential threats to agricultural food production and farmers’ coping strategies in the marshlands of Kabare in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Cogent Food & Agriculture, 7(1), 1933747.
  • Binswanger-Mkhize, H. P. (2008). Empowering Rural People for Their Own Development. FAO.
  • Boko, M. I., Niang, A., Nyong, C., et al. (2007). Africa Climate Change: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. IPCC, Fourth Assessment Report.
  • CAADP. (2013). Agriculture Investment Opportunities Brief: CAADP Investment Facilitation Programme – DRC.

East Africa

  • Martyshev, P., Stolnikovych, H., Piddubnyi, I. (2024b). Cooperation between Ukraine and African countries in agriculture: East Africa. Center for Food and Land Use Research at Kyiv School of Economics.
  • Achandi, E., Mujawamariya, G., Agboh-Noameshie, A., et al. (2018). Women’s access to agricultural technologies in rice production and processing hubs: A comparative analysis. Journal of Rural Studies, 60, 188–198.
  • African Development Bank. (2024). African Economic Outlook 2024.
  • Ayenew, M., & Arquitt, S. (2018). Kenya Agricultural Performance and Targets. CCGA Policy Brief No. 2.
  • Bekabil, U. T. (2014). Review of challenges in Ethiopia. Journal of Natural Sciences Research, 4(18), 70–77.
  • Casaburi, L., Kremer, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2016). Contract farming and agricultural productivity in Western Kenya. In S. Edwards et al. (Eds.), African Successes, Vol IV. University of Chicago Press.
  • Charles, G., Jeppesen, S., Kamau, P., & Kragelund, P. (2016). Food-processing sector study. Forum for Development Studies, 44(1), 109–131.
  • FAO. (2015–2016). AQUASTAT Country Profiles – Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania.
  • Government of Kenya. (2007). Kenya Vision 2030.
  • Government of Tanzania. (2015). Agricultural Sector Development Strategy II (ASDS II).
  • Kashindi, G. (2020). Local agricultural production in Kenya. KAS African Law Study Library, 7.
  • Laichena, J., Kiptoo, E., et al. (2022). Kenya agricultural policy profile. IWMI/CGIAR.

Southern Africa

  • Martyshev, P., Stolnikovych, H., Piddubnyi, I. (2024c). Cooperation between Ukraine and African countries in agriculture: South Africa. Center for Food and Land Use Research at Kyiv School of Economics.
  • Acquah, B. K. (2004). In Shaping the Future of African Agriculture for Development. AAAE.
  • AgriSA. (2024). Key Issues for South African Agriculture.
  • Bank of Namibia. (2017). Feeding Namibia: Agricultural Productivity and Industrialisation.
  • Commission on Restitution of Land Rights. (2021). Strategic Plan 2021–2024.
  • Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development. (2022, 2024). Agriculture and Agro-Processing Master Plan; State Land Lease and Disposal Policy.
  • Department of Rural Development and Land Reform. (2013). NARYSEC Booklet.
  • Financial and Fiscal Commission. (2021). Strategic Plan 2020–2025.
  • Fortunato, A., & Enciso, S. (2023). Food for Growth: Namibia’s Agriculture Sector. Harvard Growth Lab.
  • Giesel, C. (2023). Agriculture Challenges in South Africa. Bizcommunity.
  • GIZ. (2020). Sector Brief: Namibia Agriculture.
  • Government of Namibia. (2004–2017). Vision 2030, Agriculture Policy, Development Plans, and Cooperative Policy.
  • Namibia Statistics Agency & UNICEF. (2021). Multidimensional Poverty Index Report.

West Africa

  • Martyshev, P., Stolnikovych, H., Piddubnyi, I. (2024d). Cooperation between Ukraine and African countries in agriculture: West Africa. Center for Food and Land Use Research at Kyiv School of Economics, https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/COOPERATION-BETWEEN-UKRAINE-AND-AFRICAN-COUNTRIES-IN-AGRICULTURE-WEST-AFRICA-.pdf
  • Banson, K., Nguyen, N., & Bosch, O. (2014, 2015). Systems Research and Behavioral Science.
  • Diallo, S., Fofana, I., & Diallo, M. (2020). AGRODEP Working Paper 0041. IFPRI.
  • FAO. (2005–2016). AQUASTAT Country Profiles – Ghana, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire.
  • FAOSTAT. (2023). Food, Beverages and Tobacco Data.
  • FMARD. (2022). National Rice Development Strategy II (2020–2030).
  • Ghana Business News. (2009). The Challenge of Agriculture in Ghana.
  • Jalloh, A., Nelson, G., Thomas, T., et al. (2013). West African Agriculture and Climate Change. IFPRI Monograph.
  • JICA. (2023). Côte d’Ivoire Country Analysis Paper (JCAP).
  • King, C. (2008). Community resilience in agri-ecological systems. Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 25(1), 111.
  • Kouassi, J-L., Gyau, A., et al. (2021). Land, 10(4), 429.
  • NEPAD. (2003). Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security.
  • Nitag Consults Ltd. (2009). Agricultural Development Review.
  • Olukunle, O. (2013). Challenges and Prospects of Agriculture in Nigeria. Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development, 4(16).
  • USDA. (2023). Nigeria Grain and Feed Update (GAIN Report NI2023-0008).

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

From Integration to Reconstruction: Standing with Ukraine by Supporting Ukrainians in Sweden

Posted on April 7, 2025 | Policy Brief

People gathered in Sweden showing solidarity and supporting Ukrainians with national flags.

Sweden has strongly supported Ukraine through both public opinion and government actions, yet there has been little discussion about the needs of Ukrainian displaced people in Sweden. The ongoing war and the rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape have created uncertainty – geopolitical, institutional, and individual. Ukrainian displaced people in Sweden face an unclear future regarding their rights, long-term status, and opportunities, making future planning or investing in relevant skills difficult. This uncertainty also weakens the effectiveness of integration policies and limits the range of policy tools that can be deployed, which hinders participation in the labor market, affecting both displaced and employers. Addressing these challenges is essential, not only for the well-being of Ukrainians in Sweden, but also for Sweden’s broader role in supporting Ukraine. Helping displaced Ukrainians rebuild their lives also strengthens their ability to contribute both to Swedish society and to Ukraine’s future reconstruction and integration into Europe.

The Swedish Approach to Displaced Ukrainians

In response to the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Temporary Protection Directive (2001/55/EC) (commonly referred to as collective temporary protection) was activated in March 2022, granting Ukrainians seeking refuge temporary protection in EU countries, including Sweden. This directive provides residence permits, access to work, education, and limited social benefits without requiring individuals to go through the standard asylum process.

However, the practicalities of the Directive’s use differed significantly between countries. Sweden, despite its, until recent, reputation of being relatively liberal in its migration policies, has at times, lagged behind its Scandinavian neighbors in supporting Ukrainian displaced people. To illustrate this, it is useful to compare the Swedish approach to that of other Nordic states, as well as Poland.

Comparison to Other Nordic States

The Nordic countries have implemented the directive in different ways, adopting varying policies toward Ukrainians demonstrating different degrees of flexibility and support. Despite its generally restrictive immigration policy, Denmark introduced some housing and self-settlement policies for Ukrainians that were more liberal than its usual approach. Norway also initially introduced liberal measures but later tightened regulations, banning temporary visits to Ukraine and reducing financial benefits. Finland, meanwhile, has taken a relatively proactive stance, granting temporary protection to over 64,000 Ukrainians – one of the highest per capita rates in the region. Its strong intake reflects a more flexible and effective implementation of the directive, particularly from late 2022, when it surpassed Sweden and Denmark in number of arrivals.

In Sweden the so-called “massflyktsdirektivet“ grants Ukrainians temporary protection until at least March 2025. Its future beyond that, however, remains uncertain, adding to the challenges faced by refugees and policymakers alike. Sweden – considered liberal in migration policies (at least, up until 2016) – has been criticized for offering limited rights and financial support to displaced Ukrainians, making it one of the least attractive destinations among the Nordic countries (Hernes & Danielsen, 2024). Under “massflyktsdirektivet”, displaced Ukrainians were entitled to lower financial benefits and limited access to healthcare compared to refugees or residents with temporary permits. It was only in July 2023 that they became eligible for Swedish language training, and only in November 2024 could they apply for residence permits under Sweden’s regular migration laws – a pathway that can eventually lead to permanent residence.

Figure 1 illustrates significant fluctuations in the number of individuals granted collective temporary protection in the Nordic countries over the first two years following Russia’s full-scale invasion. As Hernes and Danielsen (2024) show in a recent report, all Nordic countries experienced a peak in arrivals in March-April 2022, followed by a decline in May-June. Sweden initially received the most, but aside from this early peak, inflows have remained relatively low despite its larger population (Table 1). Since August 2022, Finland and Norway have generally recorded higher arrivals than Denmark and Sweden. By August 2023, Norway’s share increased significantly, accounting for over 60 percent of total Nordic arrivals between September and November 2023.

Figure 1. Total number of individuals granted collective temporary protection in the Nordic countries

Source: Hernes & Danielsen, 2024, data from Eurostat.

Table 1. Total number of registered temporary protection permits and percent of population as of December 2023

Source: Hernes & Danielsen, 2024, data from Eurostat.

Comparison to Poland

Sweden’s policies and their outcomes compare rather poorly to those of Poland, one of the European countries that received the largest influx of Ukrainian migrants due to its geographic and cultural proximity. A key factor behind Poland’s relatively better performance is that pre-existing Ukrainian communities and linguistic similarities have facilitated a smoother integration. Ukrainians themselves played a crucial role in this regard, with many volunteering in Polish schools to support Ukrainian children. Sweden also had a community of Ukrainians who arrived to the country over time, partly fleeing the 2014 annexation of Donetsk and Crimea. Since these individuals were never eligible for refugee status or integration support, they had to rely on their own efforts to settle. In doing so, they built informal networks and accumulated valuable local knowledge. Nevertheless, after the full-scale invasion in 2022, they were not recognized as a resource for integrating newly arrived Ukrainian refugees – unlike in Poland.

However, Poland’s approach was shaped not only by these favorable preconditions but also by deliberate policy choices. As described in a recent brief (Myck, Król, & Oczkowska, 2025), a key factor was the immediate legal integration of displaced Ukrainians, granting them extensive residency rights and access to social services, along with a clearer pathway to permanent residence and eventual naturalization.

Barriers to Labor Market Integration

Despite a strong unanimous support for Ukraine across the political spectrum, there is less public debate and fewer policy processes in Sweden regarding displaced Ukrainians, most likely attributable to the general shift towards more restrictive immigration policies. The immigration policy debate in Sweden has increasingly emphasized a more “selective” migration, i.e. attracting migrants based on specific criteria, such as employability, skills, or economic self-sufficiency. This makes it puzzling that displaced Ukrainians, who largely meet these standards, have not been better accommodated. Before the full-scale invasion, Sweden was a particularly attractive destination among those who wanted to migrate permanently, especially for highly educated individuals and families (Elinder et al., 2023), indicating a positive self-selection process.

When large numbers of displaced Ukrainians arrived after the full-scale invasion, many had higher education and recent work experience, which distinguished them from previous refugee waves that Sweden had received from other countries. Despite a strong labor market in 2022, their integration was hindered by restrictions imposed under the Temporary Protection Directive, which limited access to social benefits and housing. At the same time, Sweden explicitly sought to reduce its attractiveness as a destination for migrants in general, contributing to a sharp decline in its popularity among Ukrainians after the war escalated.

In addition to the restrictiveness and numerous policy shifts over time, the temporary nature of the directive governing displaced Ukrainians – rather than the standard asylum process – creates significant policy uncertainty. This uncertainty makes it difficult for Ukrainians to decide whether to invest in Sweden-specific skills or prepare for a potential return to Ukraine, whether voluntary or forced, complicating their long-term planning. It also hinders labor market integration, increasing the risk of exploitation in the informal economy. Another key challenge is the unequal distribution of rights, as entitlements vary depending on registration timelines, further exacerbating the precarious situation many displaced Ukrainians face in Sweden.

A survey of 2,800 displaced Ukrainians conducted by the Ukrainian NGO in Sweden “Hej Ukraine!” in February 2025 provides key insights into their labor market integration (Hej Ukraine!, 2025). Survey results show that, currently, 40 percent of respondents are employed, with 42 percent of them holding permanent contracts while the rest work in temporary positions and 6 percent being engaged in formal studies. Employment is concentrated in low-skilled sectors, with 26 percent working in cleaning services, 14 percent in construction, and 12 percent in hospitality and restaurants. Other notable sectors include IT (11 percent), education (8 percent), warehousing (7 percent), elderly care (5 percent), forestry (3 percent), and healthcare (3 percent). The lack of stable permits, access to language courses (until September 2024), and financial incentives for hiring displaced persons have complicated their integration.

As mentioned above, the Swedish government has over time introduced several initiatives to facilitate the integration of displaced Ukrainians. However, assessing their effectiveness is crucial to identify persistent challenges and to formulate targeted policy solutions.

The Role of the Private Sector and Civil Society

The business sector, civil society and NGOs have also played a role in supporting displaced Ukrainians, filling gaps left by the public sector. This includes initiatives aimed at creating job opportunities that encourage voluntary return. However, broader systemic support, including simplified diploma recognition and targeted re-skilling programs, is needed to enhance labor market participation.

Moreover, there is a lack of information among displaced, potential employers and public institutions (municipality level) about the tools and programs available. For example, a community sponsorship program funded by UNHCR, which demonstrated positive effects on integration by offering mentorship and support networks, was only applied by five municipalities (UNHCR, 2025). Similar programs could be expanded to address structural barriers, particularly in the labor market. Another example is the Ukrainian Professional Support Center established to help displaced Ukrainians find jobs through building networks and matching job seekers with employers (UPSC, 2024). The center was funded by the European Social Fund, and staffed to 50 percent by Ukrainian nationals, either newcomers or previously established in Sweden, to facilitate communication. Experiences from this initiative, shared during a recent roundtable discussion –  Integration and Inclusion of Ukrainian Displaced People in Sweden, highlighted that between 2022 and 2024, about 1,400 Ukrainians participated in the project, but only one-third of participants found jobs, mostly in entry-level positions in care, hospitality, and construction.  Restrictions under the temporary protection directive, along with the absence of clear mechanisms for further integration, posed significant challenges; the lack of a personal ID, bank account, and access to housing were considered major obstacles. The uncertainty of their future in Sweden was also reported as a significant source of stress for participants.

Implications and Policy Recommendations

The lack of clarity surrounding the future of the EU Temporary Protection Directive, as well as its specific implementation in Sweden, leaves displaced Ukrainians in a precarious situation. Many do not know whether they will be allowed to stay or if they should prepare for a forced return. This uncertainty discourages long-term investment in skills, housing, and integration efforts.

Uncertainty also affects Swedish institutions, making it difficult to implement long-term policies that effectively integrate Ukrainians into society. To address these issues, the following policy recommendations are proposed.

  • Extend Temporary Protection Status Beyond 2025: Clear guidelines on the duration of protection are necessary to provide stability for displaced Ukrainians
  • Improve Labor Market Access: Introduce targeted programs for skill recognition, language training, and financial incentives for businesses hiring displaced Ukrainians
  • Enhance Civil Society and Private Sector Collaboration: Support mentorship and community sponsorship programs that facilitate integration
  • Acknowledge and Utilize displaced Ukrainians as a Resource: Recognizing displaced Ukrainians as potential assets in rebuilding Ukraine and strengthening European ties should be a priority.
  • Increase Public and Policy Debate: There is a need for greater discussion on how to integrate Ukrainians in Sweden, as an important complement to the policy priority of providing aid to Ukraine.

By implementing these measures, Sweden can provide displaced Ukrainians with greater stability, enabling them to engage in the formal labour market rather than being pushed into informal or precarious employment. This not only benefits Ukrainians by ensuring fair wages and legal protection, but also strengthens Sweden’s economy through increased tax revenues and a more sustainable labour force.

As Sweden continues to support Ukraine in its fight for sovereignty, it should also recognize the value of displaced Ukrainians within its borders, fostering their contribution to both Swedish society and Ukraine’s eventual reconstruction.

References

  • Hernes, V., & Danielsen, Å. Ø. (2024). Reception and integration policies for displaced persons from Ukraine in the Nordic countries – A comparative analysis. NIBR Policy Brief 2024:01. https://oda.oslom et.no/oda-xmlui/handle/11250/3125012
  • Hej Ukraine! (2025). Telegram channel. https://t.me/hejukrainechat
  • Elinder, M., Erixson, O., & Hammar, O. (2023). Where Would Ukrainian Refugees Go if They Could Go Anywhere? International Migration Review, 57(2), 587-602. https://doi.org/10.1177/01979183221131559
  • EUROSTAT. Decisions granting temporary protection by citizenship, age and sex – monthly data. Dataset. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_asytpfm__custom_15634298/default/map?lang=en
  • Myck, M., Król, A., & Oczkowska, M. (2025, February 21). Three years on – Ukrainians in Poland after Russia’s 2022 invasion. FREE Policy Brief. Centre for Economic Analysis (CenEA). https://freepolicybriefs.org/2025/02/21/ukrainians-in-poland/
  • Ukrainian Professional Support Center (UPSC). (2024). https://professionalcenter.se/omoss/
  • United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (2025). Community sponsorship. UNHCR Northern Europe. Retrieved [March 6, 2025] from https://www.unhcr.org/neu/list/our-work/community-sponsorship

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Exposure to Violence and Prosocial Attitudes

Posted on March 10, 2025 | Policy Brief

A Ukrainian soldier walks past an overturned car on a war-torn street, illustrating the effects of exposure to violence in conflict zones.

This policy brief examines the academic literature on the impact of conflict exposure on pro-social behavior, a crucial component of resilience and societal cohesion. It also explores potential implications for public opinion, particularly in relation to Ukraine’s prospective EU accession and foreign relations.

Introduction

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, Russian forces have launched daily attacks with varying intensity. Living in a conflict zone profoundly affects individuals in multiple dimensions, including physical and mental health, as well as economic and social conditions. While reports often focus on the destruction of physical and human capital, social capital is equally affected by violence, influencing community resilience, cohesion, and cooperation. In conflict settings, identity can become more pronounced, particularly in distinguishing allies from adversaries.

This policy brief overviews the academic literature on this topic; the impact of conflict exposure on pro-social behavior broadly defined. This literature primarily examines post-conflict settings within the broader discourse on sustaining peace. It focuses on individuals directly engaged in combat or civilians directly affected by violence, particularly regarding the reintegration of former combatants and the rehabilitation of affected populations. As discussed below, results vary, depending on indicators used and the specific context. There is more consistent support for an impact on cooperation than on trust for instance. Another key finding in the literature is the differential behavior towards in-group members – those with whom individuals identify – versus out-group members, raising important questions about national identity and attitudes towards foreign allies. Based on this literature, the brief proceeds to discuss potential implications for public attitudes in Ukraine, focusing on Ukraine’s prospective EU accession.

Literature Overview

This review focuses on the empirical literature, though the theoretical basis spans psychology and the social sciences. Post-traumatic growth theory posits that adversity can foster positive change, whereas post-traumatic withdrawal theory suggests that violence exposure leads to distrust and social withdrawal. Economic arguments emphasize the need for rebuilding, enhanced safety concerns, or reduced time constraints for civic participation due to economic disruptions. Other perspectives highlight the detrimental effects of fragmented communities, given that trust and cooperation take time to develop, or suggest that individuals directly involved in violence may face social ostracization (see Fiedler 2023 for a detailed discussion).

Empirical studies on pro-social behavior employ diverse methodologies and data, including survey responses, indicators of political engagement, and controlled experiments measuring cooperation and trust. Methodology and research design vary, but most studies compare those with direct exposure to violence (treatment group) to those indirectly exposed (control group) within a post-conflict context. It is thus important to note that even the control group experiences some degree of conflict-related impact, meaning that studies specifically capture the effects of direct exposure.

Fiedler (2023), in a recent overview, categorizes the impact of violence into three main domains: personalized and political trust, cooperation, and political engagement. Most studies suggest a negative effect on trust, as seen in Kosovo (Kijewski & Freitag, 2018) and across Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia post-World War II (Grosjean, 2014). Bauer et al. (2016) conducted a meta-analysis of 16 early studies measuring the effects of war violence on social participation, cooperation, and trust. When it came to trust, no significant impact of exposure to violence was found. Cassar et al. (2013) found that Tajik civil war survivors exhibited lower trust in close neighbors but not distant villagers, suggesting that intra-community political divisions played a role. However, a small number of studies report positive effects, such as Hall & Werner (2022), who found that victimized Syrian and Iraqi refugees in Turkey exhibited higher generalized trust.

In terms of cooperation, early studies overwhelmingly support a positive effect, including the meta-analysis of Bauer et al. (2016). For example, Bauer et al. (2014) held experimental games in Sierra Leone and Georgia, demonstrating that those directly exposed to violence exhibited greater altruism and inequality aversion. More recent work has come to different conclusions, however. Hager et al. (2019) found that Uzbek victims of violence in Kyrgyzstan were less cooperative in experimental games with both in-group and out-group members. Similarly, Cecchi & Duchoslav (2018) found that violence-exposed caregivers in Uganda contributed less in public goods games.

When it comes to political engagement, most studies find a positive effect, including the meta-analysis by Bauer et al. (2016) looking at participation in social groups and political engagement. Early and influential studies by Bellows & Miguel (2006, 2009), found that individuals in Sierra Leone with direct war exposure were more likely to participate in community meetings, elections, and social or political groups. Interestingly, while Kijewski & Freitag (2018) found that violence reduced trust in Kosovo, Freitag et al. (2019) found increased political participation in the same setting. Grosjean (2014) also reported a negative effect on trust but found that conflict victims were more likely to engage in civic organizations and collective action. These findings suggest that broad measures of prosocial behavior may be overly simplistic.

A common, and important, finding in much of the literature is with regards to differential behavior towards in-groups and out-groups. Bauer et al. (2014) found that exposure to violence increased altruism and inequality aversion only when interactions occurred within the in-group. Similar findings emerge in studies on soccer players in Sierra Leone (Cecchi et al., 2016) and trust experiments in Colombia (Francesco et al., 2023). Calvo et al. (2019) found that in conflict-affected areas of Mali, participation increased in kinship-based groups while it decreased in more inclusive organizations. Similarly, Mironova & Whitt (2016) found that Kosovars exhibited greater altruism and cooperation when interacting with in-group members. These findings align with research on parochial altruism in general, where cooperation and altruistic behavior are evolutionarily linked to in-group solidarity in response to external threats (e.g. Bernhard et al., 2006, Tajfel et al., 1979). There is thus a risk that social identity becomes more based on a narrow in-group (defined by ethnicity, religion, or language) potentially exacerbating societal divisions.

Implications for Ukraine

What do these insights imply for Ukraine? Given the context-dependent nature of the literature, definitive conclusions are challenging. Two studies on conflict exposure in eastern Ukraine offer preliminary insights. Mironova & Whitt (2021) examined fairness preferences among young Ukrainian men in Donbas, finding that, while no bias against ethnic Russians existed at the onset of violence in 2014, such bias increased after a year of conflict – particularly among non-combatants, contradicting typical patterns in the literature. Coupe & Obrizan (2016) used survey data from November 2014, showing that direct exposure to violence affected political behavior: physical damage reduced voter turnout, while property damage increased support for Western-leaning parties and stronger opposition to Russian aggression.

The strong effect on non-combatants in Mironova & Whitt (2021) highlights a key limitation in the literature – findings on direct exposure may not generalize to entire populations under invasion. Comparing directly and indirectly exposed individuals does not capture the broader societal impact, potentially leading to an overly optimistic view of conflict-induced prosocial behavior. If everyone is negatively affected, those with direct exposure to violence may simply be impacted a little less.

Of particular interest is how the war shapes national identity, in-group perceptions, and political preferences. These dynamics matter for domestic cohesion, interethnic relations, and Ukraine’s foreign policy trajectory. Focusing on the latter, the EU and the U.S. have provided substantial support during the full-scale invasion but delays and insufficiencies in aid may influence perceptions of these allies. EU accession presents economic benefits but entails lengthy and costly reforms with uncertain outcomes. Additionally, shifting U.S. policies and emerging geopolitical alignments may alter Ukrainian attitudes toward Western institutions.

Terror management theory (Landau et al., 2004) suggests that fear strengthens support for charismatic leadership, which, in fragile democratic settings, may favor more authoritarian tendencies. If Western democratic institutions lose appeal, this could negatively impact Ukraine’s political engagement, trust in allies, and willingness to align with European values, which are crucial for successful EU integration.

Conclusions

This review examined the literature on exposure to violence and prosocial behavior, discussing implications for Ukraine’s societal resilience and international alignment. The findings suggest no universal relationship between conflict exposure and prosociality; instead, effects vary depending on the recipient of trust, cooperation, and engagement. Generally, prosocial behavior increases within in-groups, while attitudes toward out-groups may remain unchanged or worsen. In the Ukrainian context, this has ramifications for internal cohesion and external diplomatic relations, particularly regarding the country’s path toward EU membership.

References

  • Bauer, M., Blattman, C., Chytilová, J., Henrich, J., Miguel, E., & Mitts, T. (2016). Can War Foster Cooperation? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30(3), 249–274.
  • Bauer, M., Cassar, A., Chytilová, J., & Henrich, J. (2014). War’s Enduring Effects on the Development of Egalitarian Motivations and In-Group Biases. Psychological Science, 25(1), 47–57.
  • Bellows, J., & Miguel, E. (2006). War and Institutions: New Evidence from Sierra Leone. American Economic Review, 96(2), 394–99.
  • Bellows, J., & Miguel, E. (2009). War and Local Collective Action in Sierra Leone. Journal of Public Economics, 93(11–12), 1144–57.
  • Bernhard, H., Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2006). Group Affiliation and Altruistic Norm Enforcement. American Economic Review, 96(2), 217–221.
  • Calvo, T., Lavallée, E., Razafindrakoto, M., & Roubaud, F. (2019). Fear Not for Man? Armed Conflict and Social Capital in Mali. Journal of Comparative Economics, 48(2), 251–76.
  • Cassar, A., Grosjean, P. A., Khan, F. J., & Lambert, M. (2022). Mothers, Fathers and Others: Competition and Cooperation in the Aftermath of Conflict. UNSW Business School Research Paper.
  • Cecchi, F., Duchoslav, J. (2018). The Effect of Prenatal Stress on Cooperation: Evidence from Violent Conflict in Uganda. European Economic Review, 101, 35–56.
  • Cecchi, F., Leuveld, K., & Voors, M. (2016). Conflict Exposure and Competitiveness: Experimental Evidence from the Football Field in Sierra Leone. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 64(3), 405-435.
  • Coupé, T., & Obrizan, M. (2016). Violence and political outcomes in Ukraine—Evidence from Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Journal of Comparative Economics, 44(1), 201-212.
  • Fiedler, C. (2023). What Do We Know about How Armed Conflict Affects Social Cohesion? A Review of the Empirical Literature. International Studies Review.
  • Francesco, B., Gómez, C., & Grimalda, G. (2023). Crime-related exposure to violence and prosocial behavior: Experimental evidence from Colombia. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 104.
  • Freitag, M., Kijewski, S., & Oppold, M. (2019). War Experiences, Economic Grievances, and Political Participation in Postwar Societies: an Empirical Analysis of Kosovo. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 36(4), 405–24.
  • Grosjean, P. (2014). Conflict and Social and Political Preferences: Evidence from World War II and Civil Conflict in 35 European Countries. Comparative Economic Studies, 56(3), 424–51.
  • Hager, A., Krakowski, K., & Schaub, M. A. X. (2019). Ethnic Riots and Prosocial Behavior: Evidence from Kyrgyzstan. American Political Science Review, 113(4), 1029–44.
  • Hall, J., & Werner, K. (2022). Trauma and Trust: How War Exposure Shapes Social and Institutional Trust among Refugees. Frontiers in Psychology, 13, 786838.
  • Kijewski, S., & Freitag, M. (2018). Civil War and the Formation of Social Trust in Kosovo: Post-traumatic Growth or War-Related Distress? Journal of Conflict Resolution, 62(4), 717–42.
  • Landau, M. J., Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., Cohen, F., Pyszczynski, T., Arndt, J., Miller, C. H., Ogilvie, D. M., & Cook, A. (2004). Deliver us from Evil: The Effects of Mortality Salience and Reminders of 9/11 on Support for President George W. Bush. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(9), 1136–1150.
  • Mironova, V., & Whitt, S. (2016). Social Norms after Conflict Exposure and Victimization by Violence: Experimental Evidence from Kosovo. British Journal of Political Science, 48(3), 749–65.
  • Mironova, V., & Whitt, S. (2021). Conflict and parochialism among combatants and civilians: Evidence from Ukraine. Journal of Economic Psychology, 86.
  • Tajfel, H., Turner, J. C., Austin, W. G., & Worchel, S. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. Organizational Identity: A Reader, 56-65.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Energy Security at a Cost: The Ripple Effects of the Baltics’ Desynchronization from the BRELL Network

Posted on March 3, 2025 | Policy Brief

High-voltage power lines in a foggy landscape representing the desynchronization of the BRELL network.

The Baltic States’ desynchronization from the BRELL network on February 7, 2025, cut ties with Russia and Belarus, ending electricity trade. Though the transition was smooth with no outages, recent underwater cable disruptions have highlighted vulnerabilities, raising energy security concerns. These events underscore the importance of both diversifying and decentralizing power systems, drawing lessons from Ukraine’s electricity market, which has remained operational despite sustained Russian attacks.

The Baltics’ power system was part of a large Russian-operated synchronous electricity system known as BRELL, which connected the electricity transmission systems of Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (Figure 1). The desynchronization from BRELL and the integration into the European grid have been discussed since 2007, when the Prime Ministers of the Baltic States declared desynchronization as the region’s strategic priority. In 2018, a decision was made to join the Continental European Synchronous Area through a connection with Poland, leading to significant investments – financially supported by the European Commission – to ensure adequate infrastructure. Fully committing to their priority, the Baltic’s desynchronized completely from BRELL on February 7th, 2025.

Figure 1. The BRELL power ring

Source: Karčiauskas (2023)

A Successful Physical (De)synchronization

The desynchronization process proceeded smoothly, with no blackouts. This success was anticipated, given the project’s meticulous planning over several years. A comparable example is Ukraine, which disconnected from the Russian and Belarusian power systems less than a month after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. Ukraine then synchronized with the Continental European power grid ENTSO-E, an event that had been in preparation since 2017.

After the desynchronization, the Baltic states temporarily operated in island mode, relying entirely on domestic generation for all grid operations. To maintain system stability, the commercial capacity of interconnectors with the Nordics (whose regional group is not part of the Continental European Synchronous Area) was reduced, ensuring they could serve as reserves in case of major generator outages. The NordBalt cable is one such connector linking Sweden’s SE4 region and Lithuania.

However, conditions are gradually returning to normal. As of February 17, 2025, 700 MW is now available for commercial trading, as shown in Figure 2. Despite this progress, the commercial trading capacity of the interconnector with Poland (the LitPol line) remains heavily restricted and is primarily used to maintain system stability.

Figure 2. Day-ahead commercial transfer capacities on the Nordic interconnectors around the desynchronization

Source: Nord Pool

The Baltic region’s synchronization with the European grid is currently achieved through a 400 kV overhead power line connecting Lithuania and Poland. A second link, the Harmony Link, an underground cable, is planned to become operational by 2030. This makes the existing interconnection an essential part of regional infrastructure and a potential security risk, particularly given the recent sabotage of cables in the Baltic Sea. In response to these threats, Lithuania has increased surveillance of the NordBalt cable. The country’s prime minister has estimated the cost of securing the Baltic cables at €32-34 million,  seeking EU support for its funding. The government has also strengthened the protection measures. Initially, security was outsourced to a private security company, but plans are in place for the country’s Public Security Service (Viešojo saugumo tarnyba) to take over in spring 2025. Further, in preparation for the Baltics’ full desynchronization, the Polish Transmission System Operator deployed helicopters to patrol the interconnection, to enhance the security of the infrastructure.

From Trade Interruption to Infrastructure Sabotage

The most significant short-term impact of the desynchronization from the BRELL is the limitation of electricity trade for the Baltic states. The desynchronization has affected reserve balancing in the Baltic region, forcing the three states to rely more on their internal generation for system stability. This has resulted in reduced generation capacity for commercial trade, as the states must be prepared to again operate in island mode in case of an outage on the LitPol cable. Until February 19, 2025, the LitPol line remained unused for commercial trading. However, gradual increases are expected to eventually allow for 150 MW commercial trade between the Polish area and the Baltics, a significant reduction from the 500 MW previously available. This limited trading capacity could lead to higher prices in the Baltics, as the region is a net importer of electricity.

This is not the first time the Baltics have faced trade disruptions. In November 2020, after the construction of a Belarusian nuclear power plant near the Lithuanian border, Lithuania, followed by Latvia and Estonia, limited commercial electricity exchanges with Russia and Belarus. Furthermore, on May 15, 2022, electricity trade between Russia and Finland was halted, followed by the closure of the Kaliningrad-Lithuania connection the next day. While this event led to no blackouts, it clearly impacted the region’s price volatility (Lazarczyk & Le Coq, 2023).

Recently, the region has experienced sabotage to underwater interconnectors, significantly impacting electricity trade between the Nordics and the Baltics. On December 25, 2024, the Estlink 2 cable, one of two connections between Finland and Estonia, was cut, reducing transmission capacity between the two regions. Repair costs are expected to reach several million Euros. As disclosed via Nord Pool’s Urgent Market Message, repairs are expected to last until August 2025 – stressing the system. As Estlink 2 is offline, the Baltic system is not fully operating. If another major component fails, there may be insufficient capacity to maintain grid stability, increasing the risk of outages or the need for emergency interventions.

With the complete disconnection from the Russian and Belarusian power grids, Russia no longer has direct control over the Baltic electricity trade, effectively eliminating the risk of trade disruptions from Russia. However, a new energy threat has emerged: infrastructure sabotage. Although the perpetrators of recent sabotage incidents have not been clearly identified, both Lazarczyk & Le Coq (2023) and Fang et al. (2024) emphasize Russia’s strategic incentives to engage in such actions to maintain its geopolitical influence and discourage neighboring countries from reducing their energy dependence. Sabotaging critical infrastructure presents another efficient method of weaponizing electricity, particularly in the current context of limited Nord Pool imports and the Baltic States’ insufficient integration with the broader European grid.

From Diversification to Decentralization: Responses to Electricity Infrastructure Threats

The Baltic States have diversified their domestic energy supply sources to address the electricity infrastructure threat. In 2024, Estonia’s parliament approved the development of nuclear energy, with Fermi Energia planning to build two 300 MW light-water reactors. Other projects include a hydrogen-ready gas plant in Narva, which is expected to be completed by 2029, as well as an expansion of wind power capacity. While there was some support for extending the use of oil-fired plants in Estonia, their competitiveness has been undermined by high carbon prices and the closure of domestic oil fields. Elering, the Estonian Transmission system operator, has also begun long-term procurement to acquire 500 MW of new generation and storage for frequency management to ensure reserve capacity.

However, diversification alone will not be sufficient to address the challenges currently faced by the Baltic States. Incidents like the cutting of underwater cables underscore the growing need to decentralize the power system. Large, centralized power plants are more vulnerable to targeted attacks compared to decentralized energy systems. As a result, connected microgrids seem to be a viable solution for future energy resilience, as they can maintain functionality even when localized damage occurs. Again, Ukraine’s experience demonstrates the benefits of decentralization. Since the onset of the war, Ukraine has faced both physical and cyberattacks but has strengthened its energy resilience by decentralizing its system and expanding wind and solar power (Eurelectric, 2025). This approach has proven effective: while a single missile could destroy a nearly gigawatt-scale power plant, it would only damage an individual wind turbine or a small section of solar panels, significantly limiting the overall impact.

The desynchronization of the Baltic States from the BRELL network marked a complete break with Russia and Belarus, effectively ending any possibility of electricity trade between these countries and the Baltic region. This transition was successfully completed without any power outages. While the primary goal was to enhance energy security in the Baltics, several challenges remain, as highlighted in this policy brief. Recent disruptions to underwater cables, as well as Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s electricity market, underscore the urgent need for both diversification and decentralization to strengthen the region’s energy security. While energy supply diversification reduces supply chain dependencies, decentralization enhances resilience against targeted attacks, creating a more robust and flexible energy system.

References

  • Eurelectric, 2025, Redefining Energy Security In the age of electricity, Lexicon.
  • Fang, S., Jaffe, A. M., Loch-Temzelides, T., and C.L. Prete. (2024). Electricity grids and geopolitics: A game-theoretic analysis of the synchronization of the Baltic States’ electricity networks with Continental Europe. Energy Policy, 188, 114068.
  • Karčiauskas, J. (2023). Lithuania External Relations Briefing: Synchronization of the Baltic Electricity Network and Breaking Dependence on Russian Energy Market. China CEE Institude Weekly Briefing 2023 Eylül, 4, 3.
  • Lazarczyk, E. and Le Coq, C. (2023). Power coming for Russia and Baltic Sea region’s energy security, Energiforsk report.
  • Lazarczyk, E. and Le Coq, C. (2022). Can the Baltic States Do Without Russian Electricity?, FREE Policy Brief.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Ukraine’s Fight Is Our Fight: The Need for Sustained International Commitment

Posted on February 24, 2025 | Policy Brief

A large Ukrainian flag being carried by a crowd of demonstrators in Lithuania, symbolizing Ukraine International Commitment and global solidarity against aggression.

We are at a critical juncture in the defense of Ukraine and the liberal world order. The war against Ukraine is not only a test of Europe’s resilience but also a critical moment for democratic nations to reaffirm their values through concrete action. This brief examines Western support to Ukraine in the broader context of international efforts, putting the order of magnitudes in perspective, and emphasizing the west’s superior capacity if the political will is there. Supporting Ukraine to victory is not just the morally right thing to do, but economically rational from a European perspective.

As the U.S. support to the long-term survival of Ukraine is becoming increasingly uncertain, European countries need to step up. This is a moral obligation, to help save lives in a democratic neighbor under attack from an autocratic regime. But it is also in the self-interest of European countries as the Russian regime is threatening the whole European security order. A Russian victory will embolden the Russian regime to push further, forcing European countries to dramatically increase defense spending, cause disruptions to global trade flows, and generate another wave of mass-migration. This brief builds on a recent report (Becker et al., 2025) in which we analyze current spending to support Ukraine, put that support in perspective to other recent political initiatives, and discuss alternative scenarios for the war outcome and their fiscal consequences. We argue that making sure that Ukraine wins the war is not only the morally right thing to do, but also the economically rational alternative.

The International Support to Ukraine

The total support provided to Ukraine by its coalition of Western democratic allies since the start of the full-scale invasion exceeded by October 2024 €200 billion. This assistance, which includes both financial, humanitarian, and military support, can be categorized in various ways, and its development over time can be analyzed using data compiled by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. A summary table of their estimates of aggregate support is provided below.

A particularly relevant aspect in light of recent news is that approximately one-third of total disbursed aid has come from the United States. The U.S. has primarily contributed military assistance, accounting for roughly half of all military aid provided to Ukraine. In contrast, the European Union—comprising both EU institutions and bilateral contributions from member states—stands as the largest provider of financial support. This financial assistance is crucial for sustaining Ukraine’s societal functions and maintaining the state budget.

Table 1. International support to Ukraine, Feb 2022 – Oct 2024

Source: Trebesch et al. (2024).

Moreover, the EU has signaled a long-term commitment to provide, in the coming years, an amount comparable to what has already been given. This EU strategy ensures greater long-term stability and predictability, guaranteeing that Ukraine has reliable financial resources to sustain state operations in the years ahead. Consequently, while a potential shift in U.S. policy regarding future support could pose challenges, it would not necessarily be insurmountable.

What is crucial is that Ukraine’s allies remain adaptable, and that the broader coalition demonstrates the ability to adjust its commitments, as this will be essential for sustaining the necessary level of assistance moving forward.

Putting the Support in Perspective

To assess whether the support provided to Ukraine is truly substantial, it is essential to place it in context through meaningful comparisons. One approach is to examine it in historical terms, particularly in relation to past instances of large-scale military and financial assistance. A key historical benchmark is the Second World War, when military aid among the Allied powers played a decisive role in shaping the outcome of the conflict. Extensive resources were allocated to major military operations spanning multiple continents, with the United States and the United Kingdom, in particular, dedicating a significant share of their GDP to support their allies, including the Soviet Union, France, and other nations.  As seen in Figure 1, by comparison, the current level of aid to Ukraine, while substantial and essential to its defense, remains considerably smaller in relation to GDP.

Figure 1. Historical comparisons

Source: Trebesch et al. (2024).

Another way to assess the scale of support to Ukraine is by comparing it to other major financial commitments made by governments in response to crises. While the aid allocated to Ukraine is significant in absolute terms, it remains relatively modest when measured against the scale of other programs, see Figure 2.

A recent example is the extensive subsidies provided to households and businesses to mitigate the impact of surging energy prices since 2022.  Sgaravatti et al. (2021) concludes that most European countries implemented energy support measures amounting to between 3 and 6 percent of GDP. Specifically, Germany allocated €157 billion, France and Italy each committed €92 billion, the UK spent approximately €103 billion. These figures represent 5 to 10 times the amount of aid given to Ukraine so far, with some countries, such as Italy, allocating even greater relative sums. On average, EU countries have spent about five times more on energy subsidies than on Ukraine aid. Only the Nordic countries and Estonia have directed more resources toward Ukraine than toward energy-related support. Although not all allocated funds have been fully disbursed, the scale of these commitments underscores a clear political and financial willingness to address crises perceived as directly impacting domestic economies.

Figure 2. EU response to other shocks (billions of €)

Source: Trebesch et al. (2024).

Another relevant comparison is the Pandemic Recovery Fund, also known as Next Generation EU. With a commitment of over €800 billion, this fund represents the EU’s comprehensive response to the economic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. Again, the support to Ukraine appears comparatively small, about one seventh of the Pandemic Recovery Fund.

The support to Ukraine is also much smaller in comparison to the so-called “Eurozone bailout”, the financial assistance programs provided to several Eurozone member states (Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal) during the sovereign debt crisis between 2010 and 2012. The programs were designed to stabilize the economies hit hard by the crisis and to prevent the potential spread of instability throughout the Eurozone.

Overall, the scale of these commitments underscores a clear political and financial willingness and ability to address crises perceived as directly impacting domestic citizens. This raises the question of whether the relatively modest support for Ukraine reflects a lack of concern among European voters. However, this does not appear to be the case. In survey data from six countries – Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland – fielded in June 2024, most respondents express satisfaction with current aid levels, and a narrow majority in most countries even supports increasing aid (Eck and Michel, 2024).

A further illustration comes from the Eurobarometer survey conducted in the spring of 2024 which asked: “Which of the following [crises] has had the greatest influence on how you see the future?”. Respondents could choose between different crises, including those mentioned above, and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Figure 3 illustrates the total commitments made by EU countries for Ukraine up until October 31, 2024, compared to other previously discussed support measures, represented by the blue bars. The yellow bars, on the other hand, show a counterfactual allocation of these funds, based on public priorities as indicated in the Eurobarometer survey. Longer yellow bars indicate that a higher proportion of respondents perceived this crisis as having a greater negative impact on their outlook for the future. By comparing the actual commitments (blue bars) with this hypothetical allocation (yellow bars)—which reflects how resources might have been distributed if they aligned with the population’s stated priorities—it becomes evident that there is substantial public backing for maintaining a high level of support for Ukraine. The results show that the population prioritizes the situation in Ukraine above several other economic issues, including those that directly affect their own personal finances.

Figure 3. Support to Ukraine compared to other EU initiatives – what do voters think?

Source: Trebesch et al. (2024); Niinistö (2024); authors’ calculations.

The Costs of Not Supporting Ukraine

When discussing the costs of support to Ukraine it is important to understand what the correct counterfactual is. The Russian aggression causes costs for Europe irrespective of what actions we take. Those costs are most immediately felt in Ukraine, with devastating human suffering, the loss of lives, and a dramatic deterioration in all areas of human wellbeing. Also in the rest of Europe, though, the aggression has immediate costs, in the economic sphere primarily in the form of dramatically increased needs for defense spending, migration flows, and disruptions to global trade relationships. These costs are difficult to determine exactly, but they are likely to be substantially higher in the case of a Russian victory. Binder and Schularik (2024) estimate increased costs for defense, increased refugee reception and lost investment opportunities for the German industry at between 1-2 percent of GDP in the coming years. As they put it, the costs of ending aid to Ukraine are 10-20 times greater than continuing aid at Germany’s current level.

Any scenario involving continued Russian aggression would demand substantial and sustained economic investments in defense and deterrence across Europe. Clear historical parallels can be drawn looking at the difference in countries’ military spending during different periods of threat intensity. Average military spending in a number of Western countries during the Cold War (1949-1990) was about 4.1 percent of GDP, much higher in the U.S. but also in Germany, France and the UK. In the period after 1989-1991 (the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Soviet Union), the amounts fell significantly. The average for the same group of countries in this period is about 2 percent of GDP and only 1.75 percent if the U.S. is excluded.

Also after 1991 there is evidence of how perceived threats affect military spending. Figure 4 plots the change in military spending over GDP between 2014-2024 against the distance between capital cities and Moscow. The change varies between 0 (Cyprus) and around 2.25 (Poland) and shows a very clear positive correlation between increases in spending and proximity to Moscow.  There has also in general been a substantial increase in military spending after 2022 in several European countries, but in a scenario where Russia wins the war, these will certainly have to be increased further and maintained at a high level for longer.  An increase in annual military expenditure in relation to GDP in the order of one to two percentage points would mean EUR 200-400 billion per year for the EU, while the total EU support to Ukraine from 2022 to today is just over €100 billion.

Figure 4. Increase in military expenditures in relation to distance to Moscow

Source: SIPRI data, authors’ calculations.

A Russian victory would also have profound consequences for migration flows, with the most severe effects likely in the event of Ukraine’s surrender. The Kiel Institute estimates the cost of hosting Ukrainian refugees at €26.5 billion (4.2 percent of GDP) for Poland, one of the countries that received the largest flows. Beyond migration, a Russian victory would also reshape the global geopolitical order. Putin has framed the war as a broader conflict with the U.S. and its democratic allies, while an emerging alliance of Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China is positioning itself as an alternative to the Western-led system. A Ukrainian defeat would weaken the authority of the U.S., NATO, and the rules-based international order, potentially driving more nations in the Global South toward authoritarian powers for military and economic support. This shift could disrupt global trade, affect access to food, metals, and energy. Estimating the full economic impact of such a shift is difficult, but comparisons can be drawn with other global shocks. The European Union’s GDP experienced a significant contraction due to the Covid-19 pandemic, 5.9 percent contraction in real GDP according to Eurostat, 6.6 percent according to the European Central Bank. While the economy rebounded relatively quickly from the pandemic, a permanent geopolitical realignment caused by a Russian victory would likely have far more severe and lasting economic consequences.

Given that Ukraine is at the forefront of Russia’s aggression, its resilience serves as a critical test of Europe’s ability to withstand potential future threats. Thus, strengthening our own security and economic stability in the long term is inseparable from strengthening Ukraine’s resilience now. The fundamental difference lies in the long-term trajectory of these investments. In a scenario where Ukraine is victorious, military and financial aid during the war would eventually transition into reconstruction efforts and preparations for the country’s integration into the EU. This outcome is undeniably more favorable—both economically and in humanitarian terms—not only for Ukraine but for Europe as a whole. Therefore, an even more relevant question is whether the level of support is enough for Ukraine to win the war.

Is Sufficient Support Feasible?

Is it even reasonable to think that we in the West could be able to support Ukraine in such a way that they can militarily defeat Russia? Russia is spending more on its war industry than it has since the Cold War. In 2023, it spent about $110 billion (about 6 percent of GDP). By 2024, this figure is expected to have increased to about $140 billion (about 7 percent of GDP). These amounts are huge and represent a significant part of Russia’s state budget, but they are not sustainable as long as sanctions against Russia remain in place (SITE, 2024). For the EU, on the other hand, the sacrifices needed to match this expenditure would not be as great. The EU’s GDP is about ten times larger than Russia’s, which means that in absolute terms the equivalent amount is only 0.6-0.7 percent of the EU’s GDP. If the U.S. continues to contribute, the share falls to below 0.3 percent of GDP.

Despite the economic advantage of Ukraine’s allies over Russia, several factors could still shift the balance of power in Russia’s favor. One key issue is military production capacity—Russia has consistently outproduced Ukraine’s allies in ammunition and equipment. While Western economies have the resources to manufacture superior weaponry, actual production remains insufficient, requiring both increased capacity and political will. Another challenge is cost efficiency. Military purchasing power parity estimates suggest that Russia can produce approximately 2.5 times more military equipment per dollar than the EU, giving it a cost advantage in volume production. However, this does not fully compensate for its overall economic disadvantage, particularly when factoring in quality differences.

Manpower is also a critical factor. Russia’s larger population allows for sustained mobilization, but at a steep financial cost. Soldiers are recruited at a minimum monthly salary of $2,500, with additional bonuses bringing the first-year cost per recruit to three times the average Russian annual salary. Compensation for injured and fallen soldiers further strains state finances, with estimated payouts reaching 1.5 percent of Russia’s GDP between mid-2023 and mid-2024. Over time, these costs limit Russia’s ability to fund its war effort, making mass mobilization financially unsustainable.

Overall, advanced Western weaponry and superior economic capacity can match Russia’s advantage in manpower if the political will is there. Additionally, Russia’s already fragile demographic situation is deteriorating due to battlefield losses and wartime emigration. Any measure that weakens Russia’s economic capacity—particularly through sanctions and embargoes—diminishes the strategic advantage of its larger population and serves as a crucial complement to military and financial support for Ukraine.

Conclusion

Ukraine’s western allies have provided the country with substantial military and financial support since the onset of the full-scale invasion. Yet, relative to the gravity of the risks involved, previous responses to economic shocks, and citizens’ concerns about the situation, the support is insufficient. The costs of a Russian victory will be higher for Europe, even disregarding the human suffering involved. With U.S. support potentially waning, EU needs to pick up leadership.

References

  • Becker, Torbjörn; and Anders Olofsgård; and Maria Perrotta Berlin; and Jesper Roine. (2025). “Svenskt Ukrainastöd i en internationell kontext: Offentligfinansiella effekter och framtidsscenarier”, Commissioned by the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council.
  • Binder, J. & Schularick, M. (2024). “Was kostet es, die Ukraine nicht zu unterstützen?” Kiel Policy Brief No. 179.
  • Eck, B & Michel, E. (2024). “Breaking the Stalemate: Europeans’ Preferences to Expand, Cut, or Sustain Support to Ukraine”, OSF Preprints, Center for Open Science.
  • Niinistö, S. (2024) .“Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness” European Commission Report.
  • Sgaravatti, G., S. Tagliapietra, C. Trasi and Zachmann, G. (2021). “National policies to shield consumers from rising energy prices”, Bruegel Datasets, first published 4 November 2021.
  • SITE. (2024). “The Russian Economy in the Fog of War”. Commissioned by the Swedish Government.
  • Trebesch, C., Antezza, A., Bushnell, K., Bomprezzi, P., Dyussimbinov, Y., Chambino, C., Ferrari, C., Frank, A., Frank, P., Franz, L., Gerland, C., Irto, G., Kharitonov, I., Kumar, B., Nishikawa, T., Rebinskaya, E., Schade, C., Schramm, S., & Weiser, L. (2024). “The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how?” Kiel Working Paper No. 2218. Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.