Location: Ukraine

Torbjörn Becker on Sanctions Evasion Through Third Countries

Posted on October 1, 2025 | News

Aerial view of a busy winter port with cargo containers and cranes, illustrating sanctions evasion through third countries.

Aftonbladet reports that Russian drones shot down in Ukraine contained ball bearings marked “SKF”, despite strict sanctions banning such exports. The Gothenburg-based manufacturer SKF is prohibited from selling to Russia under EU sanctions. Yet, Aftonbladet discovered SKF-branded ball bearings from the company’s Chinese factory inside Russian military drones.

SKF denies producing these parts, stating they are counterfeits. However, according to Russian customs data and Corisk’s analysis, up to half a billion SEK worth of SKF-labeled products may have entered Russia via indirect or shadow trade routes.

“It is a violation of sanctions if you knowingly sell a product to, for example, Turkey, and you know that the Turkish company will send it on to Russia,” said Torbjörn Becker, Director of the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE), in an interview with Aftonbladet.

Becker also emphasized the complexity of tracing global supply chains. While counterfeit goods are common in sanctioned economies, he questioned whether Russia can replicate high-precision components like advanced ball bearings. Instead, Becker suggested that such copying might occur outside Russia before the products reach it through parallel trade networks.

To read the full investigation and Becker’s analysis, visit Aftonbladet and Göteborgs-Posten.

Further Reading

Sanctions on trade aim to disrupt Russia’s economic activity and military capabilities by restricting access to critical goods, technologies, and supply chains. These measures are designed to raise the cost of aggression and limit resources that sustain the war effort. Explore current research on trade sanctions in the Sanctions Portal Evidence Base.

Explore the main sanction packages imposed by Western allies after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Review Russian countermeasures, including retaliatory actions and domestic policies to reduce the sanctions’ impact. Visit the Timeline of Western Sanctions and Russian Countermeasures to learn more.

Mapping Ukrainian CSOs in the Nordic-Baltic Region: Areas of Advocacy and Common Challenges

Posted on September 29, 2025 | Policy Brief

Modern cityscape at dusk with illuminated glass tower in central Stockholm, symbolizing innovation and cooperation, related to mapping Ukrainian CSOs.

This policy brief maps Ukrainian civil society organizations (CSOs) active in the Nordic-Baltic region (NB8), based on a 2025 survey and discussions at the Nordic Ukraine Advocacy Summit. It highlights the diverse landscape of advocacy groups, ranging from long-established diaspora organizations to initiatives formed after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The analysis highlights key challenges, such as the lack of coordination mechanisms, uneven access to political platforms, and limited technical capacity. Closer cooperation with policymakers and donors would benefit both sides, utilizing CSOs’ expertise in facilitating better integration of displaced Ukrainians and improving inclusive policymaking. It is important to recognize the role of Ukrainian civil society not only as a facilitator in the immediate support efforts but also as a strategic partner in shaping Europe’s long-term peace architecture.

Introduction

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 caused a massive migration of Ukrainians settling across the EU, including the Nordic-Baltic region. This movement gave rise to a wide range of new initiatives, including advocacy, cultural diplomacy, support for integration, and humanitarian efforts. Alongside long-standing diaspora organisations, these newly formed groups quickly became vital actors mobilizing resources, amplifying Ukraine’s voice internationally, and contributing to host societies. In light of these dynamics, it is worthwhile to understand how these organizations operate and what challenges they face.

To this end, the Nordic Ukraine Forum, with the support of the Swedish Institute, conducted a Survey of Nordic-Baltic Ukrainian Civil Society Organisations 2025: Mapping Areas of Advocacy, Structures, and Common Challenges between March and May 2025 (Zubkovych et al., 2025). This study examined Ukrainian CSOs active in both the Nordic-Baltic region (NB8) and Ukraine, based on a structured survey of 17 organizations (from an initial pool of 42). Notably, the survey focused exclusively on organizations with advocacy for Ukraine as a main activity, excluding smaller initiatives dedicated primarily to humanitarian relief, such as collecting clothes or food. Additionally, the output of the survey has been supplemented by the discussions and outcomes from the Nordic Ukraine Advocacy Summit (NUAS), held in Oslo in June 2025, with 30 participating CSOs. Together, these sources provide a unique empirical overview of the role and activities of Ukrainian advocacy CSOs in the Nordic-Baltic region.

Survey Results

Areas of Advocacy

The survey covers Ukrainian advocacy organisations based in the Nordic-Baltic region, where Sweden-based organisations or initiatives made up over half of the total respondents. The survey represents both long-established diaspora organizations and newer initiatives formed in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. About one-fourth of CSOs were established before 2014 (the earliest in 1997), while the majority were founded after 2022, reflecting the urgent mobilization of diaspora communities during the war.

Surveyed CSOs represent a broad mix of leadership roles, gender, professions, languages, membership sizes, and funding models. Most remain volunteer-driven and rely on short-term or project-based funding. More detailed demographic and organizational profiles can be found in the report by Zubkovych et al., 2025. Survey results show that Ukrainian CSOs in the NB8 focus on a wide range of areas. The most common activities include advocacy for Ukraine’s military support, cultural diplomacy and education, as well as support for displaced Ukrainians and their integration (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Focus areas of Ukrainian CSOs in the Nordic-Baltic region

Source: Zubkovych et al., 2025.

Many organizations also prioritize working with media, countering disinformation, humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and advocacy for Ukraine’s EU integration, followed by legal aid, human rights, and gender issues.

Figure 2 presents the main types of activity through which Ukrainian CSOs pursue their objectives. As shown, Ukrainian CSOs perform their tasks by raising social media awareness (82%) and organizing events in support of Ukraine (82%). Other key activities include demonstrations, media outreach, and direct engagement with policymakers. These findings suggest the need to examine more closely which social media platforms are being used, especially given the increasing risks of disinformation and propaganda.

Figure 2. Types of activities of Ukrainian CSOs in the Nordic-Baltic region

Source: Zubkovych et al., 2025.

Main Challenges

At the same time, the survey reveals the main challenges that Ukrainian CSOs in the Nordic-Baltic region have been facing (Figure 3). In particular, the respondents mentioned the absence of structured coordination mechanisms, which leads to duplication of efforts and uneven visibility.

For instance, while several groups in Sweden and Norway focus on humanitarian aid, their activities often run parallel rather than in partnership. The lack of common platforms or umbrella networks reduces their collective influence and makes it more challenging to articulate shared priorities to governments and donors. Without stronger horizontal coordination, CSOs risk competing rather than complementing one another in their advocacy and support work.

Figure 3. Main challenges for Ukrainian CSOs

Source: Zubkovych et al., 2025.

Funding emerged as one of the most pressing issues in the survey. Most organizations reported reliance on short-term, project-based grants or donations. Many CSOs lack multi-year funding, which makes strategic planning and staff retention almost impossible. This precarious situation often leads to volunteer burnout and creates uncertainty about the future of their programs. Donor practices have unintentionally exacerbated this vulnerability by neglecting the long-term capacity-building needs of diaspora CSOs.

The survey further highlights significant disparities in institutional access. Larger CSOs, particularly those based in capital cities such as Stockholm, Oslo, and Helsinki, enjoy greater visibility and are more likely to receive invitations to political consultations. By contrast, smaller groups in regions often remain excluded from policy-making processes, despite being closer to affected communities. This imbalance risks creating unequal representation, where only a handful of well-resourced organizations shape public debate, while others remain invisible. Respondents from Baltic states also pointed out that while they are engaged in cultural diplomacy and integration activities, they struggle to gain recognition from national ministries or international donors. The result is a fragmented advocacy landscape, where not all voices are equally heard.

Many organizations reported gaps in technical capacity, particularly a lack of specific skills in fundraising, project management, digital communication, lobbying, and public outreach. Additionally, the survey highlighted the dual role that Ukrainian CSOs currently play outside Ukraine. On one hand, they act as advocates for Ukraine internationally, lobbying for sanctions, military aid, and continued political support. On the other hand, they provide practical integration services for displaced Ukrainians, including legal counselling, language courses, housing support, and employment assistance. While both roles are crucial, this dual identity can create tensions. For instance, CSOs in Sweden and Finland reported that resources devoted to advocacy sometimes limited their ability to address integration needs, while groups in Estonia and Latvia noted that local integration demands risk overshadowing their transnational advocacy. Without clearer strategies or additional resources, CSOs may struggle to balance these functions effectively.

Conclusion

The survey of Ukrainian CSOs in the Nordic-Baltic region, combined with insights from NUAS 2025, highlights both their urgent needs and strategic opportunities.

For CSOs, strengthening coordination mechanisms is critical to reduce duplication and amplify their collective influence. Creating cross-border advocacy platforms and thematic working groups would help CSOs to better coordinate their activities, learn from others’ experience, and articulate common priorities. In particular, smaller CSOs would benefit from learning how to adopt effective communication strategies, diversify outreach through multiple platforms, and enhance engagement with local communities and institutional stakeholders.

At the same time, CSOs should invest in internal capacity: skills training in project management, advocacy, and digital communication can improve efficiency and increase funding opportunities. Finally, CSOs should balance their dual roles, such as supporting displaced Ukrainians locally while advocating for Ukraine internationally, by dividing responsibilities and tailoring strategies to avoid role conflict.

In turn, policymakers and donors may benefit from closer cooperation with Ukrainian CSOs. As documented by Anisimova et al.  (2025), Ukrainian CSOs and civil society actors have already stepped in to fill gaps left by the public sector in the Nordic-Baltic countries. They have been facilitating labor market integration by offering mentorship, language support, and professional networks; improving access to information and bridging communication barriers between displaced people, employers, and municipalities. By recognizing and making use of Ukrainian CSOs’ experience, NB8 governments can develop more efficient mechanisms for integrating displaced populations. Furthermore, wider interaction with CSOs – including small local ones, currently underrepresented in the policy dialogue – may help coordinate with local communities and ensure inclusive policy-making processes.

Ultimately, it is important to recognize the role of Ukrainian civil society not only as a facilitator in the immediate support efforts but also as a strategic partner in shaping Europe’s long-term peace architecture.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Liberal Values in Ukraine Days Before the 2022 Invasion

Posted on September 22, 2025 | Policy Brief

Monument in Kyiv at sunrise symbolizing Ukraine liberal values of freedom, democracy, and resilience.

Just weeks before Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, the European Social Survey completed the 10th round of data collection on public attitudes and beliefs in Ukraine. This policy brief examines regional variation in liberal values such as attitudes toward democracy and the EU, based on that data. While respondents in Eastern Ukraine were more skeptical of democracy and EU integration, they did not consistently reject liberal social values to a greater extent than respondents in other parts of the country. The most striking divide however, lies in institutional trust, which was significantly lower in Eastern Ukraine. This suggests that trust in institutions, which may have been further negatively impacted by prolonged exposure to violence since 2014, underlie the observed regional differences in attitudes towards democracy and the EU. Understanding these differences is vital for policymakers navigating Ukraine’s reform and EU accession process.

Introduction

It has been well documented that values in post-communist countries in Eastern Europe on average, tend to be more authoritarian, more nationalistic, more in favor of state intervention in the economy, and more skeptical towards sexual and ethnic minorities and foreigners than in Western Europe (e.g., Roland 2012). Behind the averages, however, there is substantial variation in values across subgroups of populations. Even before the onset of the full-scale Russian invasion, a discussion on regional Ukrainian differences in relation to democratic values, the wish for EU integration, and similar liberal attitudes existed, both in and outside of the country.

The path towards a closer relationship with Europe and the EU started already in 2014, but since February 2022, Ukraine has politically positioned itself even closer to the EU, and an EU accession process is now underway. However, for a successful reform process in Ukraine, how public opinion is shaped and whether attitudes and values converge towards those of the EU will be important (Olofsgård et al. 2024).

With this in mind, this policy brief provides a descriptive account of public liberal values in Ukraine by analyzing data from the 10th round of the European Social Survey (ESS) conducted just weeks before the full-scale invasion on the 22nd of February 2022. Some of the differences we observe are likely long-standing and related to differences in language preferences and cultural and informational exposure from Russia and the EU, respectively. Yet, given the exposure to instability and conflict in the eastern part of Ukraine since 2014, we also discuss the role that exposure to conflict may have played in explaining several attitudinal dimensions, including satisfaction with democracy, support for liberal social values, attitudes toward Europe and EU integration, as well as levels of trust.

Data

The ESS round 10 data was collected through face-to-face interviews in Ukraine between January 18th, 2022, and February 8th, 2022. The nationally representative survey focuses on public attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors and includes questions on opinions on democracy, the EU, and similar topics commonly considered to capture liberal views.

ESS Sample Characteristics

The sample consisted of more women than men (about 59 percent and 41 percent, respectively). While the Ukrainian population is well-educated, most still find it difficult (41 percent) or very difficult (32 percent) to live comfortably on their income. 11.5 percent of the sample was unemployed, while 31 percent were retired. Broken down by location, most average outcomes are similar, albeit with the East displaying somewhat lower levels of education and greater income difficulties (see Figure 1 for an illustration of what oblasts (regions) are included in each geographical unit). Unemployment was, however, substantially higher in the West (about 15 percent), while the share of retirees was lower (26 percent).

Some heterogeneity exists when it comes to belonging to a religious denomination. In the Central and South, around 63 percent state they belong to a church/mosque/synagogue, etc. The East is roughly at par with the national average (70 and 69.5 percent, respectively), while this figure is 82 percent in the Western part of the country. Similarly, there are major differences in the language one most often speaks at home. In the country as a whole, 13.4 percent stated they speak both Ukrainian and Russian at home. In the East, this figure was as high as 27.1 percent, displaying the duality in mother tongue in this part of Ukraine. The corresponding figure for the West was 3.3 percent. On the contrary, 92.4 percent marked that they most often speak only Ukrainian at home in the West, whereas this figure was only 5.2 percent in the East.

Figure 1. Geographical Classification of Ukraine’s Oblasts

Note: The map depicts the ESS coverage at the time of data collection, excluding Crimea and Sevastopol – illegally annexed by Russia since 2014.

Key Variables of Interest

To understand the views on liberal values, ESS responses to questions in the following areas have been considered:

  • I. Merits of democracy: satisfaction with the way democracy works; importance of living in a democratic country.
  • II. Liberal democratic values: agreement with statements such as “gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own lives as they wish”; attitudes towards the merits of obedience, respect for authority, and loyalty towards leaders; attitudes towards immigrants.
  • III. Opinions about Europe and the EU: support for further EU integration; emotional attachment to Europe; vote intention in a hypothetical EU referendum.

Regional Differences

There are some clear regional divides in attitudes toward democracy, liberal values, and EU integration across Ukraine in the weeks leading up to the full-scale Russian invasion. These differences are particularly pronounced between Eastern Ukraine and the Center, South, and West – though not uniformly in the same direction.

Figure 2. Attitudes toward democracy, liberal values, and EU integration across Ukraine

Source: Authors’ creation from ESS.

On democratic commitment, only 37 percent of respondents in the East considered it “extremely important” to live in a democratically governed country. This was about 16 percentage points lower than the national average. When categories were grouped into low, medium, and high importance, the East still trailed the national average by about 10 percentage points (about 67.5 and 75 percent, respectively). Similarly, satisfaction with democracy is the lowest among respondents from the East (about 6 percent compared to a national average, including the East, of 11 percent). Geographical differences are also evident in the responses to the question on whether it is acceptable for a country to have a strong leader above the law. A smaller share rejected this in the East (about 30 percent compared to the national average of 37 percent).

However, the East stood out in the other direction on some core liberal values, as depicted in Figure 2. It had the lowest share disagreeing with LGBT rights (31 percent vs. 40 percent nationally), the weakest support for teaching children obedience (17 percent), and the highest rejection of it (41 percent). Further, only 12 percent in the East agreed that “the country needs most loyalty towards its leaders,” compared to 26 percent nationally. This question could reflect one’s view on the current leadership, warranting some caution in the interpretation. On immigration, however, the East was less liberal: only 19 percent saw immigrants as having a positive impact, versus about 30 percent nationally.

The sharpest regional divide between the East and other regions concerns attitudes toward Europe and EU membership. In a hypothetical referendum, 73 percent of respondents in the East said they would vote to remain outside of the EU, compared to 47 percent in the South, 23 percent in the Central, and just 11 percent in the West. Support for further European unification was also substantially lower in the East, with only about 17 percent in favor of further unification, as compared to the almost 50 percent national average. Similarly, emotional attachment to Europe is substantially lower among respondents from the East, with nearly all respondents stating low or medium attachment only – figures that nearly invert those of respondents from the West of Ukraine.

The Role of Trust

Turning to the measures of trust, the East clearly stands out. Trust in the parliament, the police, political parties, politicians, and the legal system was substantially lower among respondents from the East (in the ranges of 5 to 15 percentage points more respondents answered they had a low level of trust in said institutions than the national average). When asked about trust in the United Nations, the East also stood out with more than 50 percent stating low trust compared to the national average of about 37. The same pattern holds also when asked about the European Parliament – 73 percent compared to the national average of about 44 percent – stated low trust. Respondents from the South also displayed lower levels of trust across all measures, but the deviations from the average are about half as big as the East.

When asked whether people can generally be trusted, or one can’t be too careful, the East did not stand out in this way, underpinning how distrust is strongly directed toward institutions, both national and international.

Conflict Exposure

Figure 3 details the conflict intensity in the last two years leading up to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As can be seen, incidents of violence are concentrated in the Donbass area, including the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. While not marked by similar levels of active conflict, Kharkiv oblast – also part of the East classification – borders areas with high levels of conflict intensity in the Donbass, as well as Russia in the east.

Figure 3. Conflict intensity in Ukraine, by raion

2020

 

2021

Source: Authors’ creation from Armed Conflict and Location Data.

It should be noted that the map also depicts strategic deployments and political unrest, such as demonstrations, explaining the prevalence of “conflict” also in a few other places in Ukraine prior to February 2022. The occurrences of such incidents are, however, far less than those in Luhansk oblast and Donetsk oblast at the time. An important piece of information is that the intensity pattern holds for the time Armed Conflict and Location Data for Ukraine has been available (2018), i.e. individuals situated in the East have been exposed to incidences of violence over a prolonged period of time.

This raises the question whether this exposure to violence may have contributed to increased differences in trust in institutions and support for democracy and the EU beyond what was already there before 2014. The most immediate effect probably comes from selective migration, i.e., that individuals who remain in the eastern regions in early 2022 despite the violence since 2014 may be those who, on average, are more skeptical of the Ukrainian government and its tilt away from the authoritarian Russia and towards the EU. But previous literature and recent studies on Ukraine suggest that there may also be a direct effect coming from exposure to violence on an individual’s attitudes. This relationship has recently been mapped by Obrizan (2025). A key finding is that military solutions are preferred in the segment of the population that has experienced hardship and personal losses since the full-scale invasion in 2022.

More generally, any kind of trust – including the interpersonal one – can be affected by exposure to conflict. The relationship is complicated, and in some instances, violence can cause more pro-social attitudes and behavior. An important distinction, however, is that exposure to violence amplifies the distinctions in attitudes and behavior towards members of in- and out-groups (Olofsgård, 2025). This suggests that conflict may have further increased the differences between the East of Ukraine and the rest of the country, if many residents in the former perceive national and western institutions as being dominated by groups they do not feel strong attachments to.

Further, terror management theory (e.g., Landau et al. 2004) suggests that fear induces support for charismatic and strong leadership. In a context where liberal democracy is not everywhere well enough entrenched, this may tilt over into support for more authoritarian leadership in response to attacks triggering stronger emotions of fear. Furthermore, work by Feldman and Stenner (1997) shows that the impact of perceived societal threat on triggering stronger authoritarian preferences can depend on authoritarian predispositions. The latter is measured by, e.g., looking at attitudes towards child rearing and emphasis on obedience. In the context of the finding above, this would imply that the impact of violence on authoritarian preferences would be weaker in the eastern parts of Ukraine, compared to the rest of the country, a potentially interesting avenue for future research.

Conclusions

The findings in this policy brief nuance simple narratives about regional divides in Ukraine. While dissatisfaction with democracy and skepticism toward the EU are more common in the East, this does not necessarily correspond to a general rejection of liberal social values. In some cases — such as attitudes toward child-rearing, authority, and LGBT rights — respondents from the East even express more liberal views than elsewhere.

Not explicitly discussed in the brief is the topic of mother tongue. The data shows that Russian speakers are less emotionally attached to Europe and less supportive of EU integration. Yet, there is no consistent evidence that Russian speakers are less committed to liberal democratic values overall. The effect of language is difficult to disentangle from geography, particularly given the concentration of Russian speakers in Eastern Ukraine.

What does stand out more clearly is that trust and the general view on institutions are substantially lower and more negative in the East. Respondents from the East consistently report lower trust in national and international political institutions. Interestingly, this pattern does not extend to generalized social trust — the East does not differ markedly from the rest of the country. This contrast suggests a more focused skepticism directed at formal institutions, rather than widespread social distrust. One possible explanation, as discussed in Olofsgård (2025), is that when exposed to conflict and violence, interpersonal trust may reflect confidence in one’s in-group, while institutional trust hinges on feeling represented within the broader political system. If respondents from the East perceive themselves as excluded from the national or European in-group, this could explain their lower levels of trust in both domestic and international institutions, and exposure to violence may have further amplified this. While signs of such alienation appear in the data, one should refrain from drawing too strong conclusions from this alone. Another possible explanation is that prolonged exposure to violence has eroded confidence in the government’s ability to protect citizens, and in the effectiveness of EU support, which would turn support away from the EU option preferred by the current government.  Future research on the effects of war exposure should more carefully disentangle the various aspects and forms of trust and how they relate to liberal values in Ukraine. Rebuilding institutional trust remains a key challenge. In this context, instilling peace and decentralizing political power may be essential for increasing trust in the Eastern part of the country, if that helps residents in the East to identify with public institutions. As Ukraine advances on its path toward EU membership, fostering a shared sense of national belonging will be critical in overcoming the narrative of an East–West divide when rebuilding the country.

References

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

How to Rebuild Ukraine with Security, EU Support, and Grants

Posted on September 4, 2025 | News

Silhouetted human capital migrants working on scaffolding at sunset, symbolizing labor market integration challenges.

A new review explains how to rebuild Ukraine after the destruction of war. It highlights the importance of lasting security, EU accession, and grant-based funding. The study breaks down costs, phases, and reforms to modernize the state and economy. The research is by Torbjörn Becker (SITE/SSE), Yuriy Gorodnichenko (UC Berkeley/CEPR), and Beatrice Weder di Mauro (CEPR/Geneva Graduate Institute/INSEAD).

The Scale of the Challenge

The war has left widespread human and material losses. The World Bank estimates $486 billion in recovery needs through 2023, with other figures running even higher. Therefore, plans to rebuild Ukraine must address the concentrated destruction in Donetsk and Kharkiv, where housing and infrastructure were hit hardest. In addition, more than 6 million refugees remain abroad, while millions are still displaced inside Ukraine. 

Building a Path to Recovery

First, the review gathers insights from hundreds of proposals into a clear plan. Moreover, to rebuild Ukraine, the authors stress linking recovery with EU accession, anticorruption, and private investment. Finally, they urge the use of grants instead of loans and recommend creating a single, empowered coordination body aligned with EU standards.

Key Research Findings

Recovery unfolds in three phases: emergency relief, restoring essential services, and long-term modernization tied to EU accession. Policymakers should prioritize grants over loans to avoid debt traps and attract private foreign direct investment with risk-sharing and war insurance. Ukraine must rebuild energy and housing sustainably, replacing old fossil-based systems and inefficient Soviet-era structures. Finally, rule-of-law reforms, transparent procurement, and community involvement play a critical role in preventing corruption and securing investor confidence.

Looking Ahead for Ukraine’s Future

To rebuild Ukraine, policymakers must secure the country militarily while tying reforms closely to EU accession. A lean EU-linked agency should coordinate funding and enforce conditions. Investment in education, reintegration of veterans, and energy efficiency will be essential to protect long-term growth. Future research can identify which incentives are most effective in bringing back refugees and foreign investors. 

Meet the Researchers

  • Torbjörn Becker: Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics. 
  • Yuriy Gorodnichenko: University of California, Berkeley; Centre for Economic Policy Research. 
  • Beatrice Weder di Mauro: Centre for Economic Policy Research; Geneva Graduate Institute; INSEAD.

Read The Full Report

Explore the full findings and detailed analysis in the complete report on the Annual Review of Economics website. You can also learn more about the impact of sanctions on Russia through SITE’s project, Sanctions on Russia & the Russian Economy.

Corporate Complicity: Global Firms Funded Russia with $20B in 2024

Posted on August 29, 2025 | News

Destroyed city street with damaged buildings and construction cranes — symbolizing the consequences of war and corporate complicity in conflict zones.

A new report by the KSE Institute and B4Ukraine reveals that many global corporations continued doing business in Russia throughout 2024. These companies paid $20 billion in taxes to the Russian government, indirectly helping fund the war. This corporate complicity has drawn widespread criticism for undermining sanctions and supporting aggression.

Global Business and War: A Dangerous Link

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the international response included economic sanctions and public pressure for firms to exit Russia. Yet as of mid-2025, only 12% of global firms had fully withdrawn. 1377 firms or 33% have officially declared that they are completely shutting down, or have announced they are temporarily reducing operations, but haven’t yet fully exited. A staggering 55% remain active in Russia, paying taxes, generating profit, and keeping operations running.

Many companies claim to have paused or scaled back operations. However, their tax contributions tell another story. In 2024 alone, foreign firms earned $201 billion in Russia and paid $20 billion in taxes—enough to fund more than one million soldiers based on Russia’s $18,400 recruitment bonus per soldier.

Why Companies Choose to Stay

Some firms chose profits over principles. The finance and consumer goods sectors led the way, with banks and brands like PepsiCo, Nestlé, and Mars topping revenue and tax lists. Despite early promises to leave, many companies either delayed their exit or quietly expanded. Others, like Mondelez and Coca-Cola, have been accused of masking their continued presence with rebranding or shifting operations to subsidiaries.

Key Research Findings on Corporate Complicity

  • In 2024, foreign companies earned $201 billion and paid $20 billion in taxes to Russia.
  • Only 12% of firms fully exited the Russian market; 55% stayed.
  • U.S. and EU firms paid more than $3.8 billion in profit taxes combined.
  • The finance and consumer sectors were the top contributors to the Russian war economy.

Western Values Undermined by Business-as-Usual

The report argues that continued business in Russia by Western firms directly undermines their governments’ aid to Ukraine. Companies headquartered in the U.S., Germany, and France are among the largest contributors to Russia’s tax base.

The report highlights that increasing numbers of foreign firms have stopped publishing their financial reports, a trend particularly noticeable among large corporations. Of the 100 largest foreign companies operating in Russia in 2021, 86 disclosed their financials in 2023. This number has halved in 2024 to just 43. The decision not to disclose financial statements may reflect an effort by companies to avoid further reputational damage linked to the scale of their economic support for the war effort.

Read the Full Report

Explore the full findings and detailed analysis by reading the complete report on the Kyiv School of Economics website. Additionally, you can view more policy briefs from the KSE Institute on the FREE Network’s website.

Learn More About the Russian War Economy and Sanctions

To learn more about Western sanctions and Russia’s countermeasures, visit the Sanctions Timeline. And for details on sanctions imposed on Russia and their effects, see the Evidence Base section of the sanctions portal. Explore more policy briefs on sanctioning Russia here.

Russian War Economy Faces Slowdown Despite Resilience

Posted on August 21, 2025 | News

Russian war economy under pressure symbolized by ruble coin squeezed in pliers

Since 2022, the Russian economy has surprised many with its resilience under Western sanctions. Growth was fueled by wartime spending and high energy revenues. Now, signs suggest this “war bump” is fading. In a recent Financial Times interview, Elina Ribakova explains why the Russian war economy faces serious challenges ahead. Elina Ribakova is vice-president for foreign policy at the Kyiv School of Economics. She spoke with Sam Fleming, economics editor at the Financial Times.

Sanctions and Short-Term Resilience

When Western nations imposed sanctions on Russia, many expected a collapse. Instead, wartime spending and high oil revenues propped up growth. Ribakova notes that Russia’s ability to redirect resources into military production created a temporary boom. But this resilience came at the cost of long-term growth in the Russian war economy.

Why the Russian War Economy Is Slowing

Russia is now hitting hard limits. Labor shortages, soaring inflation, and overstretched industrial capacity are beginning to bite. Ribakova points out that unemployment has fallen to unsustainably low levels, while non-military sectors are stagnating. Even the defense industry, once booming, is showing signs of strain across the Russian war economy.

China’s Critical Role

One reason Russia has endured sanctions is its growing reliance on China. Ribakova highlights how Chinese exports—from consumer goods to vital military components—have allowed Moscow to sustain its war economy. Yet this partnership is highly lopsided: for China, Russia is a marginal partner; for Russia, China is a lifeline.

The Postwar Challenge

Looking ahead, Ribakova warns that ending the war will not mean an easy recovery. Russia faces deep demographic challenges, heavy reliance on military production, and decades of failed economic diversification. Rebuilding a sustainable postwar economy may prove “devastatingly hard” for the Russian war economy.

Listen to the Original Interview

The slowdown of the Russian war economy is more than an economic story; it shapes global energy markets, security, and geopolitics. To hear the full conversation and Ribakova’s detailed analysis, listen to the original Financial Times interview here.

Learn More About the Russian War Economy and Sanctions

To learn more about Western sanctions and Russia’s countermeasures, visit the Sanctions Timeline. And for details on sanctions imposed on Russia and their effects, see the Evidence Base section of the sanctions portal. Explore more policy briefs on sanctioning Russia here.

European Security Needs Ukraine’s Lessons to Deter Russia

Posted on July 14, 2025 | News

German army soldiers boarding military helicopters during field operations, highlighting their role in strengthening European security.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has shattered Europe’s long-held belief in lasting peace. The continent now faces its most serious security crisis since World War II. In response, Ukraine’s battlefield-tested innovations offer a powerful blueprint for a stronger and more resilient European defense system.

In their latest report, “Rethinking European Security in the Face of the Russian Threat,” authors from the KSE Institute, Olena Bilousova, Pavlo Shkurenko, Kateryna Olkhovyk, Elina Ribakova, and Lucas Risinger, outline how Europe can integrate Ukraine into its defense strategy to build lasting protection and deterrence against future aggression.

Europe’s Wake-Up Call on Security

For decades, Europe’s defense relied heavily on U.S. military power. But with Washington’s commitment increasingly uncertain, European nations must prepare to defend themselves. Years of underinvestment have left defense industries underdeveloped and ammunition stockpiles dangerously low.

Meanwhile, Russia continues to expand its military capabilities well beyond the war in Ukraine. This shifting landscape makes Ukraine’s role, both as a frontline defender and a hub of defense innovation, indispensable to Europe’s long-term security.

How Ukraine Became a Model for European Defense

For over three years, Ukraine has resisted a larger, nuclear-armed aggressor through speed, adaptability, and rapid technological innovation. From AI-driven battlefield systems to anti-drone warfare, Ukraine demonstrates how creativity and decentralization can offset limited resources.

Europe can learn from Ukraine’s experience to modernize its own defense systems and close existing capability gaps.

Key Research Insights

  • Combat-tested technologies: Ukraine’s AI-based DELTA systems and digital command tools provide models for next-generation European defense.
  • Cost-effective innovation: Interceptor drones and low-cost countermeasures can neutralize expensive Russian weapons at scale.
  • Decentralized procurement: Streamlined processes speed up the delivery of critical battlefield tools and reduce bureaucratic delays.
  • Strategic integration: Including Ukraine in European defense programs enhances deterrence and joint security across the continent.

Building a Future-Ready European Defense

The report calls for full integration of Ukraine into Europe’s defense ecosystem — from procurement and research to industrial planning. This includes:

  • Granting Ukraine access to EU defense funds
  • Embedding Ukrainian military expertise in European training programs
  • Co-producing weapons and defense technologies

Such integration would not only bolster European security but also make rearmament faster, more affordable, and more coordinated across the EU and its partners.

Meet the Researchers

  • Olena Bilousova: KSE Institute
  • Pavlo Shkurenko: KSE Institute
  • Kateryna Olkhovyk: KSE Institute
  • Elina Ribakova: KSE Institute
  • Lucas Risinger: KSE Institute

Read the Full Report

Explore the complete findings and recommendations in the full report on the KSE Institute website. You can also explore more policy briefs covering conflict and sanctions in the FREE Network’s policy briefs section.

The Case for Seizing Russian State Assets

Posted on June 18, 2025 | Policy Brief

Facade of the Central Bank of Russia with Russian flag, symbolizing the debate around seizing Russian state assets to support Ukraine.

This brief examines the legal and economic arguments in the ongoing debate over whether to confiscate Russian state assets frozen in Western democracies and redirect them toward supporting Ukraine’s resilience and reconstruction. It also outlines concrete proposals for how such a measure could be undertaken in compliance with international law and with manageable economic consequences.

At the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, substantial Russian state assets held in Western countries were frozen. While not all countries have disclosed precise figures, estimates place the total between $290–330 billion, most of it held within European jurisdictions. These numbers can be put in perspective to the total global support to Ukraine so far, €267 billion according to the Kiel Institute’s Ukraine Support Tracker. A lively discussion has emerged around the legal, economic, and political feasibility of seizing these assets to support Ukraine. As evident, this would constitute a very substantial addition to the support for the country. Thus far, agreement has only been reached on utilizing the returns on the assets to service a $50 billion loan to Ukraine under the Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) mechanism. It has been argued that $50 billion should be enough, but Western contributions to the defence of Ukraine have been around €80 billion per year. The ERA is thus only a partial and very short-term financial solution for Ukraine, while a €300 billion fund based on the seizure of the assets would last perhaps 3-5 years. In short, the size of the fund matter and the principal amount is significantly larger than the fund that has been set up based solely on taxing the returns of the frozen assets.

This brief survey’s the main areas of contention and proposes viable pathways forward. It focuses on the legal and economic dimensions, setting aside moral arguments—which are broadly accepted given Russia’s unprovoked aggression and the destruction it has caused. Ultimately, the question is a political one: whether the legal justification and economic trade-offs favour asset seizure over other financing methods.

The Legal Arguments

Opposition to seizure often cites the principle of sovereign immunity. Yet, international law permits exceptions through countermeasures—acts that would otherwise be unlawful but are allowed in response to grave violations by another state. Additionally, asset confiscation may be lawful when enforcing international judgments (other possible legal avenues are for instance explored in Webb (2024), though in the end deemed as less likely to gain traction and legal approval). In both cases, the goal is to induce compliance with international obligations and secure reparations. A further legal basis lies in the doctrine of collective self-defense, which permits states not directly attacked to aid those that are, in response to unlawful aggression (Vlasyuk, 2024).

Critics often note that countermeasures should be temporary and reversible. However, as Vlasyuk (2024) points out, international law qualifies reversibility as being required only “as far as possible.” This implies that in cases of severe violations—where reversible countermeasures have failed—non-reversible actions may be justified. One proposed mechanism ties the frozen assets to future war reparations, allowing permanent transfers only if Russia refuses to comply with a future reparations ruling. Since reparation should go to the victim of Russia’s aggression, it also means that it is Ukraine that has the ultimate claim on the frozen Russian assets. This implies that any decision of confiscation and governance structure for transferring funds to Ukraine should be made with the consent of Ukraine. Put differently; even if the money is in Western financial institutions, there are good reasons to make sure the resources are used according to Ukrainian preferences.

The Economic Arguments

The principal economic concerns surrounding asset seizure are its potential impact on confidence in European capital markets, including risks of capital flight, increased interest rates, and diminished credibility of the euro. There are also fears of reciprocal actions by Russia against remaining Western investments.

These concerns, however, are increasingly overstated. The major shock to financial markets occurred when the assets were first frozen; any anticipated impact should now be fully priced in. Moreover, a viable reserve currency must be supported by convertibility, sound economic governance, and rule of law—features absent in countries like China, Gulf states, or most other emerging economies. The yen and Swiss franc lack either scale or stability. Despite previous sanctions and the 2022 asset freeze, the dollar and euro still account for around 80 percent of global foreign exchange reserves (The International Working Group on Russian Sanctions, 2023). Given the current crisis of confidence in U.S. fiscal governance, the euro remains especially robust.

The extraordinary nature of the situation also diminishes fears of setting a destabilizing precedent. Investors alarmed by this measure may not be long-term assets to Western markets but rather criminal states or individuals that should not be protected by the West’s financial and legal systems. More broadly, it signals to authoritarian regimes that aggressive actions will carry financial consequences. Western firms still operating in Russia have had ample time to disinvest, and those that remain should not constrain public policy.

Importantly, the costs of inaction must be considered. Financing Ukraine through increased public borrowing could raise interest rates across the eurozone and widen yield spreads between fiscally stronger and weaker member states. Seizing Russian assets, by contrast, may be economically safer, more equitable, and legally sound (International Working Group on Russian Sanctions, 2023).

Suggested Approaches

Several proposals aim to facilitate asset transfer in ways consistent with international law and economic stability.

Zelikow (2025) proposes the establishment of a trust fund to lawfully assume custody of frozen assets. This fund—grounded in the legal doctrine of countermeasures—would not represent outright confiscation but a conditional hold. Assets would remain Russia’s property until disbursed to victims of its aggression. A board of trustees would oversee disbursements—for example, servicing ERA loans or financing reconstruction. In this proposal, the fund would broadly define “victims” to include Ukraine and neighbouring states that have borne costs, such as accommodating refugees. This can perhaps help build political support among Western countries for the trust fund, but it has the obvious drawback that it may imply less support to Ukraine. Zelikow (2025) argues that institutions like the Bank of England or World Bank could manage the fund, given past experience with similar arrangements, potentially issuing bonds backed by the assets to accelerate support.

Vlasyuk (2024) proposes a multilateral treaty among coalition states recognizing Russia’s grave breaches of international law. This would provide a unified legal basis for transferring central bank assets to Ukraine via a compensation fund. National legislation would follow—similar to the U.S. REPO Act—tailored narrowly to address such violations. These laws should include safeguards, such as provisions to suspend asset seizure if hostilities end and reparations are paid.

Dixon et al. (2024) propose a “reparation loan” backed by Ukraine’s reparations claims. The EU or G7 would lend to Ukraine, using these claims as collateral. If Russia fails to pay after a ruling by a UN-backed claims commission, the frozen assets could be seized. This approach aligns well with the requirement for reversibility in countermeasures and may also reassure financial markets.

Conclusions

In summary, compelling legal arguments support the transfer or confiscation of Russian state assets under international law. Meanwhile, fears of damaging economic consequences appear increasingly unfounded. Any meaningful support for Ukraine—whether through asset seizure or public borrowing—will carry financial implications. However, using Russian rather than Western taxpayer resources is both morally and politically compelling.

What is now needed is coordinated political will and a practical, legally sound mechanism to operationalize asset transfers. With sound governance, such a step would not only finance Ukraine’s recovery but reinforce the international legal order and deter future aggression. An arrangement that makes sure all resources go to Ukraine—and not toward covering losses incurred by supporting Western countries—should be prioritized.

References

  • Dixon, H., Buchheit, L. C., & Singh, D. (2024). Ukrainian reparation loan: How it would work. The International Working Group on Russian Sanctions.
  • The International Working Group on Russian Sanctions. (2023). Working Group paper #15. Stanford University.
  • Vlasyuk, A. (2024). Legal report on confiscation of Russian state assets for the reconstruction of Ukraine. KSE Institute.
  • Webb, P. (2024). Legal options for confiscation of Russian state assets to support the reconstruction of Ukraine. European Parliament.
  • Zelikow, P. (2025). A fresh look at the Russian assets: A proposal for international resolution of sanctioned accounts (Hoover Institution Essay). Hoover Institution Press.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

Beyond North Africa: Ukraine’s Agricultural Engagements with Sub-Saharan Partners

Posted on June 12, 2025 | Policy Brief

Farmworkers harvesting leafy vegetables in a lush green field with mountains in the background, illustrating hands-on labor central to Ukraine's agricultural engagements.

In recent years, the global agricultural landscape has shifted dramatically, shaped by the intersecting crises of climate change, food insecurity, geopolitical tensions, and technological disruption. Against this backdrop, Ukraine and Sub-Saharan Africa have emerged as two regions uniquely positioned to build a complementary partnership in the agri-food sector – one that not only addresses immediate humanitarian and trade challenges but also lays the groundwork for long-term sustainable development. As Ukraine looks to diversify its agricultural partnerships beyond traditional European and Asian markets, Ukraine’s agricultural engagements with Africa offer both a growing consumer base and an investment frontier where Ukraine’s expertise and surplus production capacity can meet critical demand. This policy brief explores how Ukraine’s agricultural engagements with certain African countries can deepen cooperation across the agricultural value chain. Drawing on in-depth regional analyses conducted by the Kyiv School of Economics Agrocenter (Martyshev, Stolnikovych & Piddubnyi, 2024a–d), the discussion considers strategic sectors, regional particularities, and policy innovations essential for a robust and mutually beneficial partnership.

Ukraine Agricultural Engagements with Africa: Opportunities for Growth and Partnership

Ukraine is one of the world’s most productive agricultural exporters, supplying significant volumes of wheat, corn, sunflower oil, and other essential staples. Africa, by contrast, is grappling with an array of food production and security challenges. In many regions, agricultural productivity remains stubbornly low, constrained by underinvestment, poor infrastructure, limited irrigation, climate volatility, and outdated farming techniques. Yet, Africa’s demographic trends suggest a rapidly growing demand for food. Urbanization is accelerating, dietary preferences are shifting, and consumers are increasingly looking beyond subsistence crops toward diversified and processed foods. These dynamics set the stage for Ukraine to serve not just as a food exporter, but also as a strategic partner in Africa’s agricultural transformation.

In a series of recent regional reports by the Kyiv School of Economics Agrocenter, all titled Cooperation Between Ukraine and African Countries in Agriculture, (Martyshev, Stolnikovych & Piddubnyi, 2024a,b,c,d), the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE) explored the mutually beneficial opportunities for collaboration between Ukraine and Africa in the agricultural sector. The full reports covering Central, East, Southern, and West Africa are available at https://agrocenter.kse.ua. This brief summarizes the key findings and insights drawn from those reports.

Data and Methods

A standardized analytical framework across four African regions, Central, East, Southern, and West Africa, focusing on three major countries in each region, was applied. The objective was to, through data-drive insights, assess the potential for agricultural cooperation with Ukraine in food security, trade, production systems, and policy environments.

  • Food security analysis relies on indicators from FAOSTAT and the World Bank, including prevalence of undernourishment, dietary energy adequacy, and trends in malnutrition from 2000 to 2022.
  • Trade analysis uses data from UN Comtrade, ITC Trade Map, Ukrainian customs, and national sources to evaluate import-export flows, Ukraine’s market share, and commodity dependencies, particularly in cereals and vegetable oils.
  • Agricultural sector profiling includes employment, GDP contribution, key crop and livestock outputs, and irrigation coverage. Data are drawn from FAOSTAT, national agricultural statistics, and World Development Indicators.
  • Infrastructure and technology assessments are based on literature reviews and secondary sources evaluating the state of storage, logistics, irrigation, and mechanization. Attention is given to adoption of modern tools like drones and ICT platforms.
  • Policy and institutional reviews focus on national agricultural strategies, trade policies, food security programs, and land tenure systems, using official government documents and donor evaluations.
  • For East and West Africa, findings were also informed by stakeholder input from KSE Agrocenter webinars held in 2024, involving local policymakers, researchers, and trade representatives.

This mixed-methods approach enabled a comparative, region-specific understanding of agri-food challenges and opportunities relevant to Ukraine’s engagement in Africa.

Empirical Findings and Policy Recommendations

Trade: A Nascent but Promising Relationship

The trade relationship between Ukraine and Africa, while still developing, shows considerable potential. Based on empirical trade flow data, Ukraine’s primary exports to Africa include cereals like wheat and corn, along with vegetable oils. Imports from Africa, however, are minimal, revealing the one-sided nature of current trade. This asymmetry is due to limited diversification, logistical barriers, and underdeveloped bilateral trade frameworks. Trade activity is concentrated in North and West Africa, while countries in Central, Eastern and Southern Africa receive fewer Ukrainian goods. Engagement with regional trade blocs such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the East African Community (EAC) presents both regulatory hurdles and strategic entry points.

Based on observed trade gaps, the policy recommendation is to expand Ukraine’s access to African markets by negotiating preferential trade agreements and eliminating non-tariff barriers. Appointing agrarian attachés in African capitals can facilitate market entry, monitor regional regulations, and promote Ukrainian products in regional fairs and business forums.

Joint Investment Opportunities

Based on field-level evidence and investment data, agriculture in Central and East Africa is constrained by severe infrastructure deficits. Post-harvest losses, driven by the absence of proper storage, cold chains, and road networks, are estimated to cost billions in lost output annually. The strategic proposal is for Ukraine to co-invest in building post-harvest systems, leveraging its expertise in grain storage and export logistics. Ukrainian firms could collaborate with African partners on silos, warehouses, and cold storage tailored to tropical climates.

Food processing also represents a high-potential area. Many East African countries impose protective tariffs on processed food imports to stimulate local industry. Based on these findings, the policy recommendation is for Ukraine to establish agro-processing joint ventures that align with local industrial policies. These ventures would stimulate employment, reduce food imports, and strengthen Ukraine’s position in value-added agriculture abroad.

Technology Transfer Potential

Empirical assessments reveal that low mechanization, climate volatility, and limited access to agri-tech remain persistent barriers to productivity in much of sub-Saharan Africa. Ukraine, with its advanced capabilities in precision agriculture, can provide high-impact technologies such as satellite-based soil monitoring, drones for crop surveillance, and automated irrigation systems. For example, in parts of Southern Africa like Zambia and Namibia, where rainfall is unpredictable, these technologies can help stabilize crop yields and reduce risk for smallholder farmers.

The strategic proposal is for Ukrainian firms to develop demonstration farms and pilot projects that showcase these innovations. Based on successful models from Eastern Europe, these pilots could serve as training grounds for local agronomists and as proof-of-concept for scalable investment.

Regional Variability and Context-Specific Cooperation

Central Africa (e.g., the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Angola, Cameroon)

Based on food security metrics, Central Africa faces some of the highest levels of undernourishment on the continent. In DRC for example, more than one-third of the population is chronically underfed. Political instability and unclear land rights further hinder agricultural investment.

The strategic recommendation is to continue and scale humanitarian programs like “Grain from Ukraine,” while also offering technical support in veterinary services for cattle and poultry sectors, particularly in Angola and Cameroon. Ukrainian expertise in land reform and extension services could also help unlock investment in rural farming.

East Africa (e.g., Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania)

Agricultural productivity is improving in East Africa, but gaps remain. Based on infrastructure and yield data, the region struggles with limited access to farm machinery, irrigation systems, and post-harvest technology. The policy recommendation is to focus on joint research, agricultural education, and training programs that address these specific bottlenecks. Ukrainian institutions could work with African universities to design curricula on crop science, data-driven farming, and agri-business entrepreneurship. Mobile extension services and remote learning platforms could further boost rural outreach.

Southern Africa (e.g., South Africa, Botswana, Namibia)

This region has a more developed agricultural sector with export orientation and mechanization. However, environmental and political factors, such as energy shortages and water scarcity, threaten sustainability. Based on these empirical conditions, the strategic proposal is for Ukraine to engage through agri-consulting and technology partnerships. High-value inputs like hybrid seeds and automated irrigation systems can address local constraints, while cooperation on renewable energy solutions for farming could provide long-term stability.

West Africa (e.g., Nigeria, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire)

According to population and consumption data, West Africa faces mounting pressure on food systems. Despite improving domestic output, infrastructure deficits and policy inconsistency limit food availability. Based on these findings, the strategic recommendation is to invest in logistics infrastructure, such as road and rail links to key ports and warehouses, as well as to diversify the region’s agricultural base. Ukrainian seed companies could introduce crops like barley and legumes, adapted to regional climates, to reduce dependence on cocoa and palm oil.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the partnership between Ukraine and Sub-Saharan Africa in the agricultural sector is not merely a matter of commerce; it is a strategic opportunity with tangible benefits for both sides. Ukraine, as a breadbasket with advanced agri-tech capabilities, can play a pivotal role in enhancing food systems in parts of Africa where food insecurity remains acute, particularly in regions such as the Horn of Africa (e.g., Somalia and Ethiopia), the Sahel (e.g., Niger and Mali) and Central Africa (e.g., the Democratic Republic of the Congo). At the same time, many African nations offer Ukraine access to growing consumer markets, underutilized arable land, and increasing geopolitical relevance in a rapidly evolving global landscape.

To realize this vision, both sides must commit to a comprehensive, long-term strategy built on trust, transparency, and mutual benefit. The road ahead is complex but filled with promise. With smart investments, targeted diplomacy, and collaborative innovation, Ukraine and Africa can co-author a new chapter in global agriculture, one defined not by scarcity and dependency, but by resilience, growth, and shared prosperity.

References

Central Africa

  • Martyshev, P., Stolnikovych, H., Piddubnyi, I. (2024a). Cooperation between Ukraine and African countries in agriculture: Central Africa. Center for Food and Land Use Research at Kyiv School of Economics.
  • Abia, W. A., Shum, C. E., Fomboh, R. N., Ntungwe, E., & Ageh, M. T. (2016). Agriculture in Cameroon: Proposed Strategies to Sustain Productivity. International Journal for Research in Agricultural Research, 2(2), 1–14.
  • Africa24. (2024, January 25). Cameroon reduces state fees for agricultural enterprises by 92%.
  • African Development Bank. (2022). Cameroon – Agricultural Production Support Program (PARPAC).
  • African Development Bank. (2023). Angola – Agriculture Sector Reform Program (ASRP).
  • African Development Bank. (2024). African Economic Outlook 2024: Driving Africa’s Transformation.
  • Arsene, M. B., & Mwine Fyama, J. N. (2021). Potential threats to agricultural food production and farmers’ coping strategies in the marshlands of Kabare in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Cogent Food & Agriculture, 7(1), 1933747.
  • Binswanger-Mkhize, H. P. (2008). Empowering Rural People for Their Own Development. FAO.
  • Boko, M. I., Niang, A., Nyong, C., et al. (2007). Africa Climate Change: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. IPCC, Fourth Assessment Report.
  • CAADP. (2013). Agriculture Investment Opportunities Brief: CAADP Investment Facilitation Programme – DRC.

East Africa

  • Martyshev, P., Stolnikovych, H., Piddubnyi, I. (2024b). Cooperation between Ukraine and African countries in agriculture: East Africa. Center for Food and Land Use Research at Kyiv School of Economics.
  • Achandi, E., Mujawamariya, G., Agboh-Noameshie, A., et al. (2018). Women’s access to agricultural technologies in rice production and processing hubs: A comparative analysis. Journal of Rural Studies, 60, 188–198.
  • African Development Bank. (2024). African Economic Outlook 2024.
  • Ayenew, M., & Arquitt, S. (2018). Kenya Agricultural Performance and Targets. CCGA Policy Brief No. 2.
  • Bekabil, U. T. (2014). Review of challenges in Ethiopia. Journal of Natural Sciences Research, 4(18), 70–77.
  • Casaburi, L., Kremer, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2016). Contract farming and agricultural productivity in Western Kenya. In S. Edwards et al. (Eds.), African Successes, Vol IV. University of Chicago Press.
  • Charles, G., Jeppesen, S., Kamau, P., & Kragelund, P. (2016). Food-processing sector study. Forum for Development Studies, 44(1), 109–131.
  • FAO. (2015–2016). AQUASTAT Country Profiles – Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania.
  • Government of Kenya. (2007). Kenya Vision 2030.
  • Government of Tanzania. (2015). Agricultural Sector Development Strategy II (ASDS II).
  • Kashindi, G. (2020). Local agricultural production in Kenya. KAS African Law Study Library, 7.
  • Laichena, J., Kiptoo, E., et al. (2022). Kenya agricultural policy profile. IWMI/CGIAR.

Southern Africa

  • Martyshev, P., Stolnikovych, H., Piddubnyi, I. (2024c). Cooperation between Ukraine and African countries in agriculture: South Africa. Center for Food and Land Use Research at Kyiv School of Economics.
  • Acquah, B. K. (2004). In Shaping the Future of African Agriculture for Development. AAAE.
  • AgriSA. (2024). Key Issues for South African Agriculture.
  • Bank of Namibia. (2017). Feeding Namibia: Agricultural Productivity and Industrialisation.
  • Commission on Restitution of Land Rights. (2021). Strategic Plan 2021–2024.
  • Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development. (2022, 2024). Agriculture and Agro-Processing Master Plan; State Land Lease and Disposal Policy.
  • Department of Rural Development and Land Reform. (2013). NARYSEC Booklet.
  • Financial and Fiscal Commission. (2021). Strategic Plan 2020–2025.
  • Fortunato, A., & Enciso, S. (2023). Food for Growth: Namibia’s Agriculture Sector. Harvard Growth Lab.
  • Giesel, C. (2023). Agriculture Challenges in South Africa. Bizcommunity.
  • GIZ. (2020). Sector Brief: Namibia Agriculture.
  • Government of Namibia. (2004–2017). Vision 2030, Agriculture Policy, Development Plans, and Cooperative Policy.
  • Namibia Statistics Agency & UNICEF. (2021). Multidimensional Poverty Index Report.

West Africa

  • Martyshev, P., Stolnikovych, H., Piddubnyi, I. (2024d). Cooperation between Ukraine and African countries in agriculture: West Africa. Center for Food and Land Use Research at Kyiv School of Economics, https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/COOPERATION-BETWEEN-UKRAINE-AND-AFRICAN-COUNTRIES-IN-AGRICULTURE-WEST-AFRICA-.pdf
  • Banson, K., Nguyen, N., & Bosch, O. (2014, 2015). Systems Research and Behavioral Science.
  • Diallo, S., Fofana, I., & Diallo, M. (2020). AGRODEP Working Paper 0041. IFPRI.
  • FAO. (2005–2016). AQUASTAT Country Profiles – Ghana, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire.
  • FAOSTAT. (2023). Food, Beverages and Tobacco Data.
  • FMARD. (2022). National Rice Development Strategy II (2020–2030).
  • Ghana Business News. (2009). The Challenge of Agriculture in Ghana.
  • Jalloh, A., Nelson, G., Thomas, T., et al. (2013). West African Agriculture and Climate Change. IFPRI Monograph.
  • JICA. (2023). Côte d’Ivoire Country Analysis Paper (JCAP).
  • King, C. (2008). Community resilience in agri-ecological systems. Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 25(1), 111.
  • Kouassi, J-L., Gyau, A., et al. (2021). Land, 10(4), 429.
  • NEPAD. (2003). Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security.
  • Nitag Consults Ltd. (2009). Agricultural Development Review.
  • Olukunle, O. (2013). Challenges and Prospects of Agriculture in Nigeria. Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development, 4(16).
  • USDA. (2023). Nigeria Grain and Feed Update (GAIN Report NI2023-0008).

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.

AI in the Energy Transition – Insights from Energy Talk 2025

Posted on June 2, 2025 | Policy Brief

Wind turbines on rolling hills under clear sky, symbolizing AI Energy Transition to sustainable power.

As flexibility needs and energy security concerns grow, artificial intelligence (AI) is playing an increasingly central role in managing, optimizing, and securing energy systems. At the 2025 Energy Talk: AI and the Future of Energy, organized by the Stockholm Institute for Transition Economics (SITE) in collaboration with Energiforsk, several key experts and innovators showcased how AI is shaping the energy system, from household-level optimization to national infrastructure forecasting and regulation. The discussions highlighted AI’s potential to enhance efficiency, resilience, and user responsiveness, while also raising critical issues around data governance, cybersecurity, and value distribution. This policy brief summarizes the main takeaways from the event.

AI as an Actor in Energy Networks

AI is now embedded in everything from electricity generation forecasts to district heating systems and real-time price optimization. As Chloé Le Coq, Research Fellow at SITE and Professor at Paris Panthéon-Assas University, noted in her opening remarks, this marks not just a technological upgrade but a systemic shift in how energy systems operate. Where systems were once reactive, AI opens the door to adaptive, self-learning networks that can respond dynamically to demand and supply. Examples shared at the 2025 Energy Talk showed how this transformation is already underway across Europe.

In the Baltic region, AI is contributing to a broader transformation of the energy system. Dzintars Jaunziems, Advisor for Energy and Climate Policy at Latvijas Banka and Assistant Professor at Riga Technical University, explained that the region has undergone several major transitions over the past three decades by building liberalized market economies and opening energy markets. More recently, the Baltics have halted energy imports from Russia, fully disconnected from the BRELL grid, and completed synchronization with the EU electricity network.

Against this backdrop, AI is now supporting the Baltics’ transition from fossil fuels to renewables. In grid operations, AI is used to assess overhead lines and remotely monitor systems in real-time. It also optimizes transmission capacity and supports renewable energy forecasting, particularly for solar generation. In district heating, digital twin technologies are being introduced, while in the mobility sector, AI helps manage electric vehicle (EV) charging and route planning. The region has one of the highest smart meter penetration rates in Europe, although full-scale utilization is still pending.

In Ukraine, AI plays a crucial role in managing the energy system—both in daily operations and in maintaining resilience during wartime. Andrii Starzhynskyi, co-founder and CEO of a-Gnostics, presented several examples of how AI is already deeply embedded in the sector. Since 2018, machine learning has been used to forecast electricity consumption and generation with over 98 percent accuracy. This fully automated system also enables predictive maintenance by detecting failures in critical equipment such as transformers. One example is an app that analyses the sound of machines to detect faults early and prevent breakdowns.

AI also supports automated decision-making around electricity flows—for instance, whether to buy, sell, or store solar-generated electricity. At a-Gnostics, multiple AI models—primarily based on time series data—are used to manage and coordinate forecasts across different applications. According to Starzhynskyi, these solutions are already used daily by customers in sectors such as mining, agritech, energy production, and energy trading.

AI is also being used at the household level to enhance energy system efficiency. Björn Berg, CEO of Ngenic, presented how their system integrates AI in real time to control and optimize heat pumps, using live data rather than historical averages. Reported benefits include over 20 percent energy savings, fewer boiler starts, and reduced system losses. Berg noted that if optimization were scaled to one million heat pumps, the aggregate impact could exceed the output of Sweden’s three nuclear reactors—highlighting the potential of household-level AI integration at scale. At the same time, he pointed to current forecasting limitations, referencing a recent two-gigawatt prediction error as a reminder that learning models still need improvement.

Infrastructure, Governance, and Cybersecurity

The shift in how energy systems operate today also adds complexity. As energy systems become more decentralized, with growing integration of intermittent sources, and data volumes expand rapidly, new governance challenges emerge. Key questions include: Who owns the data and the algorithms? How can we ensure fairness, accountability, and cybersecurity?

Filip Kjellgren, Strategic Initiative Developer Energy at AI Sweden, shared how interactive visualization tools are making future energy needs more accessible to individuals. Traditional methods, such as static bar charts, often fail to engage. In contrast, tools like the so-called Behovskartan allow users to explore different demand scenarios and, visualize, and test assumptions such as reduced fossil fuel use. Kjellgren emphasized that while solar and wind installations are expanding rapidly due to falling costs, public resistance to local infrastructure remains strong—often stronger than for other infrastructure projects. In this context, AI-driven visualizations can help bridge the gap between energy system planning and public acceptance, improving both actual and perceived fairness and facilitating green transition.

Figure 1. Behovskartan

Source: Printscreen from behovskartan.se

Similarly, Michael Karlsson, Programme Coordinator Heat & Power at Energiforsk, introduced the organization’s newly launched AI cluster—an initiative designed to disseminate research and applied insights about AI in the energy sector through webinars, seminars, and other outreach activities. He also highlighted the limited involvement of energy economists in AI projects and called for greater interdisciplinary collaboration to close that gap and broaden the field.

These highlighted initiatives set the stage for a panel discussion focused on the broader policy and structural questions facing AI in energy systems. As AI becomes embedded in critical infrastructure, concerns have been raised about the controls over data and algorithms that drive energy decisions. Speakers warned against relying on proprietary “black-box” models, calling instead for open-source alternatives and domestic oversight. The discussion also highlighted the importance of building national capabilities to avoid overdependence on international actors with limited public accountability and at times questionable agendas. Legal frameworks were seen as lagging technological development—particularly regarding new forms of data, such as sound recordings from equipment, which are not clearly covered in existing regulations.

Cybersecurity and system resilience emerged as recurring themes. AI can help detect anomalies, anticipate grid stress, and support decentralized energy configurations. One example illustrates how AI can detect abnormal behavior in connected devices—so-called Internet of Things (IoT) components—by analyzing how equipment behaves in real-time, rather than relying solely on code-level protections. Several participants stressed the need to build resilience into infrastructure design. In the case of cyber-attacks or physical disruption—like those experienced by Ukraine—systems should be capable of switching to “island mode”, operating autonomously during crisis. Others pointed to privacy-preserving data architectures, where AI models are deployed to the data, avoiding the need to centralize sensitive information—an approach already used in sectors like healthcare and finance.

The panel also raised the question of fairness: Who benefits from AI in the energy sector? While large industrial users are already reaping the rewards, such as a farm that significantly lowered its electricity costs using AI-based forecasting, it remains unclear whether smaller consumers are seeing comparable gains. In regulated systems, efficiency improvements may translate into lower tariffs; however, several speakers noted that public acceptance of AI will depend on whether consumers can clearly perceive and share the benefits. Ultimately, the long-term legitimacy of AI will depend on how these gains are distributed in practice.

Concluding Remarks

The 2025 Energy Talk AI and the Future of Energy made clear that AI is no longer a future consideration—it is already transforming how energy is produced, distributed, and consumed. From national-level forecasting to household-level optimization and strategic planning, AI is increasingly present in every part of the energy system. Yet, as participants emphasized, its rapid deployment has outpaced both regulation and public awareness. Successfully integrating AI into the energy system requires a broader policy dialogue—one that goes beyond the technical regulation to address economic and social matters. The Energy Talk brought these intersecting areas into focus and highlighted the need for broader conversations on AI in energy.

Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.