Tag: Russia
Should the $60 Price Cap on Russian Oil Exports be Lowered?
Western governments have imposed a $60 price cap on Russian seaborne oil exports using Western services. To evade the policy, Russia has developed a “shadow fleet” which uses no such services. In this policy brief, we claim that the resulting segmentation of Russian oil exports dramatically modifies the conventional analysis of a price cap. Our research shows that lowering the cap would not hurt Russia as intended unless a robust expansion in non-Russian oil supply was to limit the induced increase in the world oil price. If this price increase is not limited, lowering the cap could even moderately increase Russian profits because shadow fleet sales would be more profitable. By contrast, policies that reduce some shadow fleet capacity would reduce Russian profits if undertaken while Russia still relies on some Western services.
In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU, the U.S., and other G7 countries (hereafter the West) ceased their imports of Russian oil, leading Russia to export more to India, Turkey, and China instead. In addition, the West imposed sanctions on oil exports from Russia, whose profits are instrumental in supporting its war.
Since more than 80 percent of Russia’s seaborne oil exports relied on the provision of Western services (CREA, 2023) (financial, operational, and commercial) the EU suggested banning the use of these Western services for all Russian seaborne exports. However, governments feared that this would cause a spike in the world oil price. As an alternative, the U.S. suggested a price cap, which the West ultimately imposed in December 2022, limiting Russian revenues from oil shipped using Western services to $60 per barrel.
Oil transported without Western services is exempt from the cap. Therefore, Russia has gradually assembled a “shadow fleet” that uses non-Western services in order to sell oil at prices above the cap.
The price cap on Russian oil is a new, insofar untested economic sanction, currently a subject of active public discussion, with experts recommending potential adjustments and application to more countries, and policymakers currently considering to tighten the price cap – see for example the January 2025 call by Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to lower the price cap below $60. The policy quickly piqued the interest of economists – see for example Spiro, Wachtmeister, and Gars’ (2024) comprehensive review of policy options to limit Russia’s ability to finance the war.
In their pioneering contribution to the literature, Johnson, Rachel, and Wolfram (2025) provide a rich analysis of the effects of the price cap, albeit under the assumption that the shadow fleet has a fixed capacity. In a recent working paper (Cardoso, Salant, and Daubanes, 2025), we present a new dynamic economic model that accounts for the expansion of the Russian shadow fleet. The model is calibrated to reproduce observed facts and used to simulate the effects of (1) various levels of the price cap, including the extreme case of a complete ban, (2) enforcement stringency, and (3) policies targeting the shadow fleet.
Perhaps surprisingly, our analysis shows that, in the absence of any increase in non-Russian oil supply, lowering the level of the price cap below $60 would benefit Russia. This includes lowering the cap to levels so low (below $34) that the policy amounts to a ban as Russia would prefer not to use Western services at all at these cap levels. More generally, the model reveals that a lower cap would have two opposite effects on Russia: On the one hand, it would reduce Russia’s profit (i.e., revenues net of production costs) from sales at the cap. On the other hand, since a lower cap would reduce Russia’s oil exports, it would increase the oil price and, therefore, Russia’s profit from sales through its shadow fleet. Our analysis yields a testable and intuitive condition under which the latter effect dominates the former, making a lower cap counterproductive. This condition depends on the shadow fleet capacity relative to Russian sales at the ceiling price.
Application of this condition shows that when sanctions were imposed, Russia’s shadow fleet capacity was already sufficiently high for Russia to benefit from a reduction in the price ceiling. Russia would even have benefited from a reduction in the cap if the West had prevented any expansion in Russia’s shadow fleet beyond its initial level. With no such limitation, Russia would continue to expand its fleet size regardless of the size of the cap reduction. This leads us to conclude that Russia would also benefit if an unanticipated reduction in the cap (or a complete ban) occurred subsequently.
It should be noted that in the absence of a non-Russian supply response, caps at different levels quantitatively impact Russian total profits in a similar way. For example, the $60 cap reduces Russian profits by about 25 percent compared to a scenario without sanctions, and a complete ban would have impacted Russia only slightly less.
The following figure shows a comparison of prices, shadow fleet capacity, and profits under a price cap sanction (solid lines), a service ban (dotted lines), and the absence of sanctions (grey dashed lines). The simulations assume no supply response from non-Russian producers (none occurred when the cap was first implemented). A lower cap cuts Russian exports and raises the global oil price, increasing Russian profits from its fleet sales. A non-Russian supply response would dampen this oil price spike and would, therefore, diminish the resulting revenue increase from Russian fleet sales.
Figure 1. Outcomes under different sanction scenarios
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Russia sometimes uses Western services to ship oil at a price above the cap, taking the risk that its shipments get sanctioned. Increasing the probability that cheating is punished lowers the price Russia expects to receive, with consequences identical to a reduction in the cap level.
By contrast, policies that reduce some capacity of the shadow fleet (“sidelining” some of its tankers) may harm Russia, even though they prompt Russia to rebuild its fleet rapidly. This happens, for example, if sidelining part of the fleet occurs while oil is also being sold at the ceiling, so that ceiling sales replace the lost fleet sales and there is no increase in the world oil price.
Conclusion
To conclude, we consider a variety of oil-market sanctions that have been have imposed on Russia to reduce the total export profits it uses to finance the war in Ukraine. As seen, tightening these sanctions is more effective if the induced increase in the world price can be significantly mitigated (if not entirely eliminated); otherwise, increased revenues from shadow fleet sales will weaken or undermine the intended effect of the tighter sanctions.
In one case we considered, no supplementary intervention is required for the sanction to be effective. Reducing Russia’s shadow fleet capacity when Russia is still selling at the ceiling price will induce an equal and offsetting increase in Russian sales at the ceiling, resulting in no increase in the world price.
However, other sanctions – lowering the ceiling, increasing its enforcement, or even reducing the shadow fleet capacity after Russian sales at the ceiling have ceased – will induce an increase in the world price sufficient to undermine the sanctions’ intended effect unless accompanied by a simultaneous expansion of non-Russian supply (presumably from the U.S. or OPEC) to dampen the increase in the world price. Supplemented in this way, the potency of each of these sanctions would be restored.
Overall, our results call attention to the need for complementary energy policies that would facilitate the response of non-Russian oil production to higher global prices.
References
- Cardoso, D. S., S. W. Salant, and J. Daubanes. (2025). The Dynamics of Evasion: The Price Cap on Russian Oil Exports and the Amassing of the Shadow Fleet. MIT CEEPR Working Paper 2025-05.
- Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air. (2023). December 2023 Monthly Analysis on Russian Fossil Fuel Exports and Sanctions.
- Johnson, S., L. Rachel, and C. Wolfram. (2025). A Theory of Price Caps on Non-Renewable Resources. NBER Working Paper No. 31347.
- Spiro, D., H. Wachtmeister, and J. Gars. (2024). Assessing the Impact of Oil Sanctions on Russia. SSRN Working Paper.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Agricultural Subsidies: The Case of Georgia
This brief explores the role of government subsidy programs in Georgia’s agricultural sector, with a focus on grapes, apples, and hazelnuts. These subsidies play a significant role in providing social assistance to the sector and in supporting farmers; however, their long-term impact on industry growth remains a subject of discussion. Key challenges include ensuring product quality, enhancing productivity, and expanding market opportunities, particularly regarding export market concentration and infrastructure constraints.
Introduction
Governments have historically intervened in agricultural markets under the pretext of promoting food security. At first, interventions aimed to provide affordable food for rapidly growing urban populations, afterwards more emphasis was put on enhancing agricultural productivity. Nowadays, agriculture remains a priority for policymakers due to its role in promoting inclusive growth and reducing poverty. Additionally, renewed concerns about food security have further driven these policy efforts (Gautam, 2015).
One of the key instruments of these interventions are subsidies in different forms – such as various input subsidies, price supports, and trade interventions. While their use has been widespread, the economic effectiveness of subsidies continues to be heavily debated. Economic theory suggests that subsidies are useful in resolving market failures; however, even in this case, the actual effect of subsidies is highly dependent on the specific implementation. Further, in many other cases, subsidies have led to distortions and have been detrimental to countries’ own economic interests (Gautam, 2015).
Another important concern arises from the political economy of subsidies use. Widening rural-urban income disparities create political pressure to implement measures that support the livelihoods of the large agricultural population. Subsidies, due to their visibility, are a convenient instrument to increase political support from this population group. Further, subsidies offer immediate or near-immediate gains to recipients, whereas public capital investments take longer to deliver results, therefore subsidies are often used as a political instrument. Since political decision-making is typically driven by short-term considerations, often aligned with electoral cycles, long-term investments do not always align with political incentives (Gautam, 2015).
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Box 1. Subsidies Subsidies are financial assistance provided by governments to support or promote specific sectors, industries, or activities within the economy. They can take various forms, including direct cash payments, tax relief, low-interest loans, and in-kind support, such as the provision of goods and services at below-market prices. Subsidies play a significant role as a tool in government expenditure policy. They influence resource allocation decisions, income distribution, and expenditure efficiency (Schwartz & Clements, 1999). |
In the case of Georgia, subsidies are the main instrument for support to the agricultural sector, with direct subsidies accounting on average 45 percent of total government expenditure in the sector (2014-2024). The government provides subsidies for most of the country’s main crops, including wheat, grapes, hazelnut, tangerines and apples.
Given the scope of this policy brief, only subsidies for major perennial crops – grapes, hazelnuts and apples – are discussed. This as as the wheat sector involves additional food security considerations and due to lack of data for tangerines. Among perennial crops grapes have the highest share of total production (46 percent, including both white and red grapes), followed by tangerines at 14 percent, apples at 10 percent, and hazelnuts at 8 percent (2023, Geostat).
This policy brief firstly explains the Georgian context in more detail, followed by sub-sections discussing each major perennial crop sector, ending with conclusions and policy recommendations.
The Georgian Context
Agriculture plays a crucial role in Georgia’s economy. As of 2024, 39 percent of the population resides in rural areas (Geostat, 2024), where agriculture serves as the primary source of income. The sector employs the largest share of the country’s workforce—17 percent (Geostat, 2023)—yet it contributes to only 7 percent of Georgia’s GDP (Geostat, 2023). At the same time, the disparity in income, and other major socio-economic indicators between the rural (agricultural) and urban population is large. For example, in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, the average monthly nominal earnings are 78 percent higher than the average for the rest of Georgia. Additionally, Tbilisi accounts for 70 percent of the total value added generated in the country (Geostat, 2023).
In recent year, the country has undertaken significant efforts to modernize and improve the agricultural sector, yet significant challenges remain. Georgian agriculture is largely characterized by small, fragmented family farms focused on subsistence farming with restricted market access. They are highly vulnerable to weather conditions, yet there is little awareness of or adoption of insurance and risk mitigation measures (State Audit Office of Georgia, 2023). Traditional farming methods remain dominant, with limited use of modern technology. Additionally, most farmers operate on a small scale and lack cooperation and coordination, further hindering efficiency and competitiveness. As a result, they often struggle with low productivity and have difficulty producing high-quality products in stable quantities. Lastly, a high dependency on the Russian market for most agricultural products poses significant risks, as Russia is not a stable trade partner.
Given this context, agricultural subsidies are a highly important topic in Georgia. The Georgian government implements various subsidy programs to support agricultural sectors such as fruit production, viticulture, hazelnut farming, and wheat production. These initiatives aim to promote the sales of grapes, non-standard apples, and tangerines, enhance hazelnut production, and ensure food security by subsidizing essential staples like wheat, particularly during the Covid-19 pandemic.
Starting from 2014 to 2024 (Figure 1), the share of subsidies in total agricultural expenditure has followed an increasing trend, ranging from 21.4 percent in 2014 to peaking at 67.5 percent in 2021. In 2024 the respective share is 54.1 percent. A decline occurred in 2022–2023, following the stabilization of the Covid-19 pandemic. Apart from this, the share of subsidies within agricultural expenditures has been increasing over the last ten years.
Figure 1. Total and subsidy expenditures on agriculture, million GEL (2014-2024)
Source: Geostat, 2025.
While these programs are designed to assist farmers and increase sales, how these subsidies support in addressing the mentioned structural challenges – therefore advancing the effectiveness of the sector – is under question.
The Grape Subsidy Programs
The grape subsidy programs in Georgia are primarily aimed at supporting viticulture in key wine-producing regions, such as Kakheti, Racha-Lechkhumi, and Kvemo Svaneti. These subsidies were designed to stabilize farmers’ incomes and ensure smooth harvests, to guarantee that even lower-quality grapes will be sold, particularly for grape varieties used in wine production. In general, the government uses two types of subsidies: direct and indirect. Direct subsidies involve paying farmers a certain amount of money per kilogram of grapes. Indirect subsidies are implemented through state-owned companies that are responsible for purchasing grapes from farmers.
Georgia’s grape subsidy program (direct subsidies) was introduced in 2008 and has been implemented every year except for in 2018 and 2019. Starting from 2014, the government provided substantial direct financial support to grape producers. However, starting in 2017, direct subsidies began to decline sharply, and by 2018–2019, the government announced that it would no longer directly subsidize the grape harvest. However, during this period, the state’s grape purchasing program remained in place, purchasing any surplus grapes left on the market after private acquisitions.
The Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 prompted a renewed surge in subsidies, with financial support reaching its highest levels in years. This elevated support continued until 2022 but was significantly reduced again in 2023 (by 63 percent), following a decline in production (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Grape production, subsidies and wine exports (2014-2023)
Source: Geostat, 2025.
Grape production has generally followed an upward trend, with record harvests in 2019 and 2020. Given the absence of direct subsidies in 2017 and 2018, the effect of subsidies on production levels is questionable. In more recent years, production has become more volatile, displaying a noticeable decline by 2023.
Wine exports, a crucial part of Georgia’s economy, have grown steadily, with volumes peaking in 2022, and persisting at high levels ever since. Export revenues have also increased consistently, reaching an all-time high in 2024, according to preliminary data.
The main destination for the Georgian wine sector is CIS countries. Russia accounts for the largest share among the CIS, with an average of 75.4 percent, between 2014-2024. Russia’s share has been increasing in recent years, reaching 85.8 percent in 2024 (among CIS countries). The average share of exports to the EU of total exports is 10 percent (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Wine exports by country groups (2014-2024)
Source: Geostat, 2025.
Although subsidies played a key role in revitalizing Georgia’s wine industry following the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially as grape production and processing have increased over the years, their long-term impact have been problematic (Ghvanidze, Bitsch, Hanf, & Svanidze, 2020). Since subsidies were introduced in 2008, Georgia’s grape market has become heavily distorted, with prices shaped by government support rather than supply and demand dynamics.
Even though a significant portion of government funding for the sector is allocated to subsidies, the way in which subsidies affect grape production levels is not obvious. Other sector insufficiencies, such as quality issues and exporting market diversification are inadequately addressed. Grape quality remains a key issue, as farmers lack incentives to improve production practices, knowing that the government will purchase their yield regardless. Additionally, Georgia’s heavy reliance on its main export partner, Russia, poses significant risks, and the share of exports to EU countries has not seen substantial growth. Overall, since the subsidies aim to stabilize producers’ income rather than to address structural issues in the sector, they may be considered social support.
The Apple Subsidy Program
The apple subsidy program in Georgia was introduced in 2014 to support the sale of non-standard apples after market prices dropped to a record low 0.02 GEL. Non-standard apples are damaged fruits that fall from trees due to wind, hail, or other natural factors. Typically unfit for direct consumption, these lower-quality apples are primarily used by factories to produce apple concentrate. The program aimed to stabilize prices and provide financial relief to farmers. Processing companies received financial support for each kilogram of non-standard apples purchased.
The program was discontinued between 2015 and 2019, before it resumed in 2020. The number of companies involved in purchasing non-standard apples for further processing ranges from 12 to15 over the years.
As for apple production levels, although there were significant production surges in 2016, 2018, and 2020, these increases have been volatile and unstable.
Figure 4. Apple production, subsidies and exports (2014-2023)
Source: Geostat, 2025.
In terms of exports, the volume increased sharply between 2018 and 2019, reaching its peak in 2021 before gradually declining. Most apple exports are directed to CIS countries, with Russia accounting for an average of 94 percent between 2018 and 2024. In contrast, the EU’s share remains minimal, averaging less than 1 percent, with no exports recorded to the EU in half of the considered years.
Figure 5. Apple exports by country group (2014-2024)
Source: Geostat, 2025.
While apple production is highly vulnerable to weather conditions, the adoption of insurance remains low. The provided subsidy program supports farmers in producing lower-quality non-standard apples, thus limiting the incentives to enhance product quality, productivity, or production practices, as farmers rely on the government to purchase their produce regardless. Similar to the grape industry, government support in the apple market functions more as a social assistance rather than a tool for industry advancement.
The Hazelnut Subsidy Program
Georgia introduced the Hazelnut Production Support Program in 2022 to enhance competitiveness, assist farmers, and improve disease management. The program registered hazelnut orchards in a national cadaster, enabling better monitoring and targeted support, to subsidize the purchase of pesticides and agrochemicals essential for hazelnut care and cultivation. The program has continued in 2023 and 2024, with subsidies amounting 22 and 22.6 million GEL, respectively.
Hazelnut production in Georgia has been highly volatile in the past decade. The sector experienced its most severe crisis in 2017-2018 when fungal diseases and an Asian stink bug (Pharosana) invasion devastated yields. Consequently, both the quantity and quality of hazelnut production declined. In 2019, the production began to recover, peaking in 2021. However, unfavorable weather conditions resulted in a decline in 2022, with only a partial rebound in 2023.
Figure 6. Hazelnut production and exports (2014-2023)
Source: Geostat, 2025.
Hazelnut is mainly exported to EU countries, with an average share of 65.3 percent, between 2014 and 2024. The share of CIS countries in this period is 20.2 percent. However, the share exported to EU countries has been declining 2023 and 2024, to 52.4 and 56.7 percent, respectively.
Figure 7. Hazelnut exports by country group (2014-2024)
Source: Geostat, 2025.
The subsidy scheme in the hazelnut sector seems to be more targeted at the issues the sector is facing, compared to the other discussed programs. The effects are however yet to be explored as the program began in 2022. However, several challenges remain, such as insufficient technical facilities for drying and storing goods essential for ensuring the quality of products (Gelashvili, Deisadze & Seturidze, 2023).
Conclusion and Recommendations
Although the government of Georgia provides substantial support for the agricultural sector, it still suffers from various challenges. Product quality, high vulnerability to weather events and export dependency on unstable partners are major issues for the grape and apple sectors. Further, the effectiveness of the direct financial support and the corresponding incentives within these sectors can be questioned.
For these crops, the subsidy programs seem to function more as social assistance rather than tools for industry development. In the grape sector, guaranteed government purchases reduce incentives for farmers to improve grape quality. Similarly, the apple subsidy program encourages the cultivation of non-standard apples, as farmers rely on state-backed purchases rather than market-driven quality improvements. Apple production has also shown significant volatility over the years, further highlighting the sector’s instability.
Additionally, heavy dependence on Russia as a primary export market for these crops presents economic risks. Diversification, particularly to the EU, has remained limited.
As for the hazelnut sector, the subsidy program aims to address some of the structural challenges, while this sector also relies less on the Russian market. However, some issues with infrastructural equipment remain unresolved.
Overall, the share of subsidies in agriculture is very high; further, the design of the programs mainly prioritizes short-term income stability for farmers rather than long-term market competitiveness and sectoral development. To address the discussed systemic challenges, it is essential to develop targeted policies tailored to the specific needs of each sector. While the priorities may differ across each crop, several key areas require focused attention:
- Quality of Products – Enhancing product quality through ensuring food safety standards, improved farming and manufacturing practices, and better regulatory frameworks can help increase competitiveness in both domestic and international markets.
- Market Diversification – Strengthening ties with new international partners and improving branding strategies can help industries access new markets and reduce risks associated with economic or political fluctuations in dominant trade partners.
- Infrastructure Development – Poor infrastructure remains a challenge for the sector. Investments in post-harvest drying and storage facilities, as well as modern machinery and equipment, will enhance efficiency, reduce losses, and improve product quality.
- Adoption of innovative farming practices– Adopting innovative farming practices boosts productivity, lowers costs, and enhances sustainability. It helps farmers adapt to changing weather conditions, making agriculture more efficient, environmentally friendly, and resilient.
By addressing these fundamental issues, policies can play a role in contributing to the long-term stability and growth of the agricultural sector, ultimately strengthening the economy and increasing global competitiveness.
References
- Gautam, M. (2015). Agricultural Subsidies: Resurging Interest in a Perennial Debate. Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics.
- Gelashvili, S., Deisadze, S., & Seturidze, E. (2022). An Overview of the Georgian Wine Sector.
- Gelashvili, S., Deisadze, S., & Seturidze, E. (2023). Overview of the hazelnut sector in Georgia: past trends and the way forward. Tbilisi: ISET Policy Institute.
- Ghvanidze, S., Bitsch, L., Hanf, J. H., & Svanidze, M. (2020). “The Cradle of Wine Civilization” – Current Developments in the Wine Industry of the Caucasus. Caucasus Analytical Digest, 117, 9-15.
- Jayne, T., & Rashid, S. (2013). Input Subsidy Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Synthesis of Recent Evidence. Agricultural Economics, 44, 547-562.
- Schwartz, G., & Clements, B. (1999). Government subsidies. Journal of Economic Surveys, 13(2), 119-148. doi:10.1111/1467-6419.00079
- State Audit Office of Georgia. (2023). Audit Report on the Development and Management of the State Agricultural Insurance Program.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Energy Security at a Cost: The Ripple Effects of the Baltics’ Desynchronization from the BRELL Network
The Baltic States’ desynchronization from the BRELL network on February 7, 2025, cut ties with Russia and Belarus, ending electricity trade. Though the transition was smooth with no outages, recent underwater cable disruptions have highlighted vulnerabilities, raising energy security concerns. These events underscore the importance of both diversifying and decentralizing power systems, drawing lessons from Ukraine’s electricity market, which has remained operational despite sustained Russian attacks.
The Baltics’ power system was part of a large Russian-operated synchronous electricity system known as BRELL, which connected the electricity transmission systems of Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (Figure 1). The desynchronization from BRELL and the integration into the European grid have been discussed since 2007, when the Prime Ministers of the Baltic States declared desynchronization as the region’s strategic priority. In 2018, a decision was made to join the Continental European Synchronous Area through a connection with Poland, leading to significant investments – financially supported by the European Commission – to ensure adequate infrastructure. Fully committing to their priority, the Baltic’s desynchronized completely from BRELL on February 7th, 2025.
Figure 1. The BRELL power ring
Source: Karčiauskas (2023)
A Successful Physical (De)synchronization
The desynchronization process proceeded smoothly, with no blackouts. This success was anticipated, given the project’s meticulous planning over several years. A comparable example is Ukraine, which disconnected from the Russian and Belarusian power systems less than a month after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. Ukraine then synchronized with the Continental European power grid ENTSO-E, an event that had been in preparation since 2017.
After the desynchronization, the Baltic states temporarily operated in island mode, relying entirely on domestic generation for all grid operations. To maintain system stability, the commercial capacity of interconnectors with the Nordics (whose regional group is not part of the Continental European Synchronous Area) was reduced, ensuring they could serve as reserves in case of major generator outages. The NordBalt cable is one such connector linking Sweden’s SE4 region and Lithuania.
However, conditions are gradually returning to normal. As of February 17, 2025, 700 MW is now available for commercial trading, as shown in Figure 2. Despite this progress, the commercial trading capacity of the interconnector with Poland (the LitPol line) remains heavily restricted and is primarily used to maintain system stability.
Figure 2. Day-ahead commercial transfer capacities on the Nordic interconnectors around the desynchronization
Source: Nord Pool
The Baltic region’s synchronization with the European grid is currently achieved through a 400 kV overhead power line connecting Lithuania and Poland. A second link, the Harmony Link, an underground cable, is planned to become operational by 2030. This makes the existing interconnection an essential part of regional infrastructure and a potential security risk, particularly given the recent sabotage of cables in the Baltic Sea. In response to these threats, Lithuania has increased surveillance of the NordBalt cable. The country’s prime minister has estimated the cost of securing the Baltic cables at €32-34 million, seeking EU support for its funding. The government has also strengthened the protection measures. Initially, security was outsourced to a private security company, but plans are in place for the country’s Public Security Service (Viešojo saugumo tarnyba) to take over in spring 2025. Further, in preparation for the Baltics’ full desynchronization, the Polish Transmission System Operator deployed helicopters to patrol the interconnection, to enhance the security of the infrastructure.
From Trade Interruption to Infrastructure Sabotage
The most significant short-term impact of the desynchronization from the BRELL is the limitation of electricity trade for the Baltic states. The desynchronization has affected reserve balancing in the Baltic region, forcing the three states to rely more on their internal generation for system stability. This has resulted in reduced generation capacity for commercial trade, as the states must be prepared to again operate in island mode in case of an outage on the LitPol cable. Until February 19, 2025, the LitPol line remained unused for commercial trading. However, gradual increases are expected to eventually allow for 150 MW commercial trade between the Polish area and the Baltics, a significant reduction from the 500 MW previously available. This limited trading capacity could lead to higher prices in the Baltics, as the region is a net importer of electricity.
This is not the first time the Baltics have faced trade disruptions. In November 2020, after the construction of a Belarusian nuclear power plant near the Lithuanian border, Lithuania, followed by Latvia and Estonia, limited commercial electricity exchanges with Russia and Belarus. Furthermore, on May 15, 2022, electricity trade between Russia and Finland was halted, followed by the closure of the Kaliningrad-Lithuania connection the next day. While this event led to no blackouts, it clearly impacted the region’s price volatility (Lazarczyk & Le Coq, 2023).
Recently, the region has experienced sabotage to underwater interconnectors, significantly impacting electricity trade between the Nordics and the Baltics. On December 25, 2024, the Estlink 2 cable, one of two connections between Finland and Estonia, was cut, reducing transmission capacity between the two regions. Repair costs are expected to reach several million Euros. As disclosed via Nord Pool’s Urgent Market Message, repairs are expected to last until August 2025 – stressing the system. As Estlink 2 is offline, the Baltic system is not fully operating. If another major component fails, there may be insufficient capacity to maintain grid stability, increasing the risk of outages or the need for emergency interventions.
With the complete disconnection from the Russian and Belarusian power grids, Russia no longer has direct control over the Baltic electricity trade, effectively eliminating the risk of trade disruptions from Russia. However, a new energy threat has emerged: infrastructure sabotage. Although the perpetrators of recent sabotage incidents have not been clearly identified, both Lazarczyk & Le Coq (2023) and Fang et al. (2024) emphasize Russia’s strategic incentives to engage in such actions to maintain its geopolitical influence and discourage neighboring countries from reducing their energy dependence. Sabotaging critical infrastructure presents another efficient method of weaponizing electricity, particularly in the current context of limited Nord Pool imports and the Baltic States’ insufficient integration with the broader European grid.
From Diversification to Decentralization: Responses to Electricity Infrastructure Threats
The Baltic States have diversified their domestic energy supply sources to address the electricity infrastructure threat. In 2024, Estonia’s parliament approved the development of nuclear energy, with Fermi Energia planning to build two 300 MW light-water reactors. Other projects include a hydrogen-ready gas plant in Narva, which is expected to be completed by 2029, as well as an expansion of wind power capacity. While there was some support for extending the use of oil-fired plants in Estonia, their competitiveness has been undermined by high carbon prices and the closure of domestic oil fields. Elering, the Estonian Transmission system operator, has also begun long-term procurement to acquire 500 MW of new generation and storage for frequency management to ensure reserve capacity.
However, diversification alone will not be sufficient to address the challenges currently faced by the Baltic States. Incidents like the cutting of underwater cables underscore the growing need to decentralize the power system. Large, centralized power plants are more vulnerable to targeted attacks compared to decentralized energy systems. As a result, connected microgrids seem to be a viable solution for future energy resilience, as they can maintain functionality even when localized damage occurs. Again, Ukraine’s experience demonstrates the benefits of decentralization. Since the onset of the war, Ukraine has faced both physical and cyberattacks but has strengthened its energy resilience by decentralizing its system and expanding wind and solar power (Eurelectric, 2025). This approach has proven effective: while a single missile could destroy a nearly gigawatt-scale power plant, it would only damage an individual wind turbine or a small section of solar panels, significantly limiting the overall impact.
The desynchronization of the Baltic States from the BRELL network marked a complete break with Russia and Belarus, effectively ending any possibility of electricity trade between these countries and the Baltic region. This transition was successfully completed without any power outages. While the primary goal was to enhance energy security in the Baltics, several challenges remain, as highlighted in this policy brief. Recent disruptions to underwater cables, as well as Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s electricity market, underscore the urgent need for both diversification and decentralization to strengthen the region’s energy security. While energy supply diversification reduces supply chain dependencies, decentralization enhances resilience against targeted attacks, creating a more robust and flexible energy system.
References
- Eurelectric, 2025, Redefining Energy Security In the age of electricity, Lexicon.
- Fang, S., Jaffe, A. M., Loch-Temzelides, T., and C.L. Prete. (2024). Electricity grids and geopolitics: A game-theoretic analysis of the synchronization of the Baltic States’ electricity networks with Continental Europe. Energy Policy, 188, 114068.
- Karčiauskas, J. (2023). Lithuania External Relations Briefing: Synchronization of the Baltic Electricity Network and Breaking Dependence on Russian Energy Market. China CEE Institude Weekly Briefing 2023 Eylül, 4, 3.
- Lazarczyk, E. and Le Coq, C. (2023). Power coming for Russia and Baltic Sea region’s energy security, Energiforsk report.
- Lazarczyk, E. and Le Coq, C. (2022). Can the Baltic States Do Without Russian Electricity?, FREE Policy Brief.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Ukraine’s Fight Is Our Fight: The Need for Sustained International Commitment
We are at a critical juncture in the defense of Ukraine and the liberal world order. The war against Ukraine is not only a test of Europe’s resilience but also a critical moment for democratic nations to reaffirm their values through concrete action. This brief examines Western support to Ukraine in the broader context of international efforts, putting the order of magnitudes in perspective, and emphasizing the west’s superior capacity if the political will is there. Supporting Ukraine to victory is not just the morally right thing to do, but economically rational from a European perspective.
As the U.S. support to the long-term survival of Ukraine is becoming increasingly uncertain, European countries need to step up. This is a moral obligation, to help save lives in a democratic neighbor under attack from an autocratic regime. But it is also in the self-interest of European countries as the Russian regime is threatening the whole European security order. A Russian victory will embolden the Russian regime to push further, forcing European countries to dramatically increase defense spending, cause disruptions to global trade flows, and generate another wave of mass-migration. This brief builds on a recent report (Becker et al., 2025) in which we analyze current spending to support Ukraine, put that support in perspective to other recent political initiatives, and discuss alternative scenarios for the war outcome and their fiscal consequences. We argue that making sure that Ukraine wins the war is not only the morally right thing to do, but also the economically rational alternative.
The International Support to Ukraine
The total support provided to Ukraine by its coalition of Western democratic allies since the start of the full-scale invasion exceeded by October 2024 €200 billion. This assistance, that includes both financial, humanitarian and military support, can be categorized in various ways, and its development over time can be analyzed using data compiled by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. A summary table of their estimates of aggregate support is provided below.
A particularly relevant aspect in light of recent news is that approximately one-third of total disbursed aid has come from the United States. The U.S. has primarily contributed military assistance, accounting for roughly half of all military aid provided to Ukraine. In contrast, the European Union—comprising both EU institutions and bilateral contributions from member states—stands as the largest provider of financial support. This financial assistance is crucial for sustaining Ukraine’s societal functions and maintaining the state budget.
Table 1. International support to Ukraine, Feb 2022 – Oct 2024
Source: Trebesch et al. (2024).
Moreover, the EU has signaled a long-term commitment to provide, in the coming years, an amount comparable to what has already been given. This EU strategy ensures greater long-term stability and predictability, guaranteeing that Ukraine has reliable financial resources to sustain state operations in the years ahead. Consequently, while a potential shift in U.S. policy regarding future support could pose challenges, it would not necessarily be insurmountable.
What is crucial is that Ukraine’s allies remain adaptable, and that the broader coalition demonstrates the ability to adjust its commitments, as this will be essential for sustaining the necessary level of assistance moving forward.
Putting the Support in Perspective
To assess whether the support provided to Ukraine is truly substantial, it is essential to place it in context through meaningful comparisons. One approach is to examine it in historical terms, particularly in relation to past instances of large-scale military and financial assistance. A key historical benchmark is the Second World War, when military aid among the Allied powers played a decisive role in shaping the outcome of the conflict. Extensive resources were allocated to major military operations spanning multiple continents, with the United States and the United Kingdom, in particular, dedicating a significant share of their GDP to support their allies, including the Soviet Union, France, and other nations. As seen in Figure 1, by comparison, the current level of aid to Ukraine, while substantial and essential to its defense, remains considerably smaller in relation to GDP.
Figure 1. Historical comparisons
Source: Trebesch et al. (2024).
Another way to assess the scale of support to Ukraine is by comparing it to other major financial commitments made by governments in response to crises. While the aid allocated to Ukraine is significant in absolute terms, it remains relatively modest when measured against the scale of other programs, see Figure 2.
A recent example is the extensive subsidies provided to households and businesses to mitigate the impact of surging energy prices since 2022. Sgaravatti et al. (2021) concludes that most European countries implemented energy support measures amounting to between 3 and 6 percent of GDP. Specifically, Germany allocated €157 billion, France and Italy each committed €92 billion, the UK spent approximately €103 billion. These figures represent 5 to 10 times the amount of aid given to Ukraine so far, with some countries, such as Italy, allocating even greater relative sums. On average, EU countries have spent about five times more on energy subsidies than on Ukraine aid. Only the Nordic countries and Estonia have directed more resources toward Ukraine than toward energy-related support. Although not all allocated funds have been fully disbursed, the scale of these commitments underscores a clear political and financial willingness to address crises perceived as directly impacting domestic economies.
Figure 2. EU response to other shocks (billions of €)
Source: Trebesch et al. (2024).
Another relevant comparison is the Pandemic Recovery Fund, also known as Next Generation EU. With a commitment of over €800 billion, this fund represents the EU’s comprehensive response to the economic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. Again, the support to Ukraine appears comparatively small, about one seventh of the Pandemic Recovery Fund.
The support to Ukraine is also much smaller in comparison to the so-called “Eurozone bailout”, the financial assistance programs provided to several Eurozone member states (Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal) during the sovereign debt crisis between 2010 and 2012. The programs were designed to stabilize the economies hit hard by the crisis and to prevent the potential spread of instability throughout the Eurozone.
Overall, the scale of these commitments underscores a clear political and financial willingness and ability to address crises perceived as directly impacting domestic citizens. This raises the question of whether the relatively modest support for Ukraine reflects a lack of concern among European voters. However, this does not appear to be the case. In survey data from six countries – Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland – fielded in June 2024, most respondents express satisfaction with current aid levels, and a narrow majority in most countries even supports increasing aid (Eck and Michel, 2024).
A further illustration comes from the Eurobarometer survey conducted in the spring of 2024 which asked: “Which of the following [crises] has had the greatest influence on how you see the future?”. Respondents could choose between different crises, including those mentioned above, and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Figure 3 illustrates the total commitments made by EU countries for Ukraine up until October 31, 2024, compared to other previously discussed support measures, represented by the blue bars. The yellow bars, on the other hand, show a counterfactual allocation of these funds, based on public priorities as indicated in the Eurobarometer survey. Longer yellow bars indicate that a higher proportion of respondents perceived this crisis as having a greater negative impact on their outlook for the future. By comparing the actual commitments (blue bars) with this hypothetical allocation (yellow bars)—which reflects how resources might have been distributed if they aligned with the population’s stated priorities—it becomes evident that there is substantial public backing for maintaining a high level of support for Ukraine. The results show that the population prioritizes the situation in Ukraine above several other economic issues, including those that directly affect their own personal finances.
Figure 3. Support to Ukraine compared to other EU initiatives – what do voters think?
Source: Trebesch et al. (2024); Niinistö (2024); authors’ calculations.
The Costs of Not Supporting Ukraine
When discussing the costs of support to Ukraine it is important to understand what the correct counterfactual is. The Russian aggression causes costs for Europe irrespective of what actions we take. Those costs are most immediately felt in Ukraine, with devastating human suffering, the loss of lives, and a dramatic deterioration in all areas of human wellbeing. Also in the rest of Europe, though, the aggression has immediate costs, in the economic sphere primarily in the form of dramatically increased needs for defense spending, migration flows, and disruptions to global trade relationships. These costs are difficult to determine exactly, but they are likely to be substantially higher in the case of a Russian victory. Binder and Schularik (2024) estimate increased costs for defense, increased refugee reception and lost investment opportunities for the German industry at between 1-2 percent of GDP in the coming years. As they put it, the costs of ending aid to Ukraine are 10-20 times greater than continuing aid at Germany’s current level.
Any scenario involving continued Russian aggression would demand substantial and sustained economic investments in defense and deterrence across Europe. Clear historical parallels can be drawn looking at the difference in countries’ military spending during different periods of threat intensity. Average military spending in a number of Western countries during the Cold War (1949-1990) was about 4.1 percent of GDP, much higher in the U.S. but also in Germany, France and the UK. In the period after 1989-1991 (the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Soviet Union), the amounts fell significantly. The average for the same group of countries in this period is about 2 percent of GDP and only 1.75 percent if the U.S. is excluded.
Also after 1991 there is evidence of how perceived threats affect military spending. Figure 4 plots the change in military spending over GDP between 2014-2024 against the distance between capital cities and Moscow. The change varies between 0 (Cyprus) and around 2.25 (Poland) and shows a very clear positive correlation between increases in spending and proximity to Moscow. There has also in general been a substantial increase in military spending after 2022 in several European countries, but in a scenario where Russia wins the war, these will certainly have to be increased further and maintained at a high level for longer. An increase in annual military expenditure in relation to GDP in the order of one to two percentage points would mean EUR 200-400 billion per year for the EU, while the total EU support to Ukraine from 2022 to today is just over €100 billion.
Figure 4. Increase in military expenditures in relation to distance to Moscow
Source: SIPRI data, authors’ calculations.
A Russian victory would also have profound consequences for migration flows, with the most severe effects likely in the event of Ukraine’s surrender. The Kiel Institute estimates the cost of hosting Ukrainian refugees at €26.5 billion (4.2 percent of GDP) for Poland, one of the countries that received the largest flows. Beyond migration, a Russian victory would also reshape the global geopolitical order. Putin has framed the war as a broader conflict with the U.S. and its democratic allies, while an emerging alliance of Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China is positioning itself as an alternative to the Western-led system. A Ukrainian defeat would weaken the authority of the U.S., NATO, and the rules-based international order, potentially driving more nations in the Global South toward authoritarian powers for military and economic support. This shift could disrupt global trade, affect access to food, metals, and energy. Estimating the full economic impact of such a shift is difficult, but comparisons can be drawn with other global shocks. The European Union’s GDP experienced a significant contraction due to the Covid-19 pandemic, 5.9 percent contraction in real GDP according to Eurostat, 6.6 percent according to the European Central Bank. While the economy rebounded relatively quickly from the pandemic, a permanent geopolitical realignment caused by a Russian victory would likely have far more severe and lasting economic consequences.
Given that Ukraine is at the forefront of Russia’s aggression, its resilience serves as a critical test of Europe’s ability to withstand potential future threats. Thus, strengthening our own security and economic stability in the long term is inseparable from strengthening Ukraine’s resilience now. The fundamental difference lies in the long-term trajectory of these investments. In a scenario where Ukraine is victorious, military and financial aid during the war would eventually transition into reconstruction efforts and preparations for the country’s integration into the EU. This outcome is undeniably more favorable—both economically and in humanitarian terms—not only for Ukraine but for Europe as a whole. Therefore, an even more relevant question is whether the level of support is enough for Ukraine to win the war.
Is Sufficient Support Feasible?
Is it even reasonable to think that we in the West could be able to support Ukraine in such a way that they can militarily defeat Russia? Russia is spending more on its war industry than it has since the Cold War. In 2023, it spent about $110 billion (about 6 percent of GDP). By 2024, this figure is expected to have increased to about $140 billion (about 7 percent of GDP). These amounts are huge and represent a significant part of Russia’s state budget, but they are not sustainable as long as sanctions against Russia remain in place (SITE, 2024). For the EU, on the other hand, the sacrifices needed to match this expenditure would not be as great. The EU’s GDP is about ten times larger than Russia’s, which means that in absolute terms the equivalent amount is only 0.6-0.7 percent of the EU’s GDP. If the U.S. continues to contribute, the share falls to below 0.3 percent of GDP.
Despite the economic advantage of Ukraine’s allies over Russia, several factors could still shift the balance of power in Russia’s favor. One key issue is military production capacity—Russia has consistently outproduced Ukraine’s allies in ammunition and equipment. While Western economies have the resources to manufacture superior weaponry, actual production remains insufficient, requiring both increased capacity and political will. Another challenge is cost efficiency. Military purchasing power parity estimates suggest that Russia can produce approximately 2.5 times more military equipment per dollar than the EU, giving it a cost advantage in volume production. However, this does not fully compensate for its overall economic disadvantage, particularly when factoring in quality differences.
Manpower is also a critical factor. Russia’s larger population allows for sustained mobilization, but at a steep financial cost. Soldiers are recruited at a minimum monthly salary of $2,500, with additional bonuses bringing the first-year cost per recruit to three times the average Russian annual salary. Compensation for injured and fallen soldiers further strains state finances, with estimated payouts reaching 1.5 percent of Russia’s GDP between mid-2023 and mid-2024. Over time, these costs limit Russia’s ability to fund its war effort, making mass mobilization financially unsustainable.
Overall, advanced Western weaponry and superior economic capacity can match Russia’s advantage in manpower if the political will is there. Additionally, Russia’s already fragile demographic situation is deteriorating due to battlefield losses and wartime emigration. Any measure that weakens Russia’s economic capacity—particularly through sanctions and embargoes—diminishes the strategic advantage of its larger population and serves as a crucial complement to military and financial support for Ukraine.
Conclusion
Ukraine’s western allies have provided the country with substantial military and financial support since the onset of the full-scale invasion. Yet, relative to the gravity of the risks involved, previous responses to economic shocks, and citizens’ concerns about the situation, the support is insufficient. The costs of a Russian victory will be higher for Europe, even disregarding the human suffering involved. With U.S. support potentially waning, EU needs to pick up leadership.
References
- Becker, Torbjörn; and Anders Olofsgård; and Maria Perrotta Berlin; and Jesper Roine. (2025). “Svenskt Ukrainastöd i en internationell kontext: Offentligfinansiella effekter och framtidsscenarier”, Commissioned by the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council.
- Binder, J. & Schularick, M. (2024). “Was kostet es, die Ukraine nicht zu unterstützen?” Kiel Policy Brief No. 179.
- Eck, B & Michel, E. (2024). “Breaking the Stalemate: Europeans’ Preferences to Expand, Cut, or Sustain Support to Ukraine”, OSF Preprints, Center for Open Science.
- Niinistö, S. (2024) .“Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness” European Commission Report.
- Sgaravatti, G., S. Tagliapietra, C. Trasi and Zachmann, G. (2021). “National policies to shield consumers from rising energy prices”, Bruegel Datasets, first published 4 November 2021.
- SITE. (2024). “The Russian Economy in the Fog of War”. Commissioned by the Swedish Government.
- Trebesch, C., Antezza, A., Bushnell, K., Bomprezzi, P., Dyussimbinov, Y., Chambino, C., Ferrari, C., Frank, A., Frank, P., Franz, L., Gerland, C., Irto, G., Kharitonov, I., Kumar, B., Nishikawa, T., Rebinskaya, E., Schade, C., Schramm, S., & Weiser, L. (2024). “The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how?” Kiel Working Paper No. 2218. Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Breaking the Link: Costs and Benefits of Shutting Down Europe’s Last Gas Pipeline from Russia
Ukraine’s decision to halt Russian gas transit from January 1st, 2025, marks the end of decades of direct gas links between Europe and Russia. The EU is unlikely to face significant short-to-mid-term impacts, as Russian pipeline gas imports have already dropped sixfold since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, uneven exposure to this shock has already created internal tensions within the EU. Further, increased reliance on liquefied natural gas may also slow the green transition. In the region, Moldova faces severe supply challenges and Ukraine will lose transit revenues. Targeted support and stronger cooperation within the EU and with neighboring countries, especially EU candidates, will be essential. In turn, the halt will make Russia face not only financial but also geopolitical losses.
On January 1st, 2025, Ukraine halted the transit of Russian gas to Europe following the expiration of a five-year agreement between Russian Gazprom and Ukrainian Naftogaz, marking a major shift in Europe’s energy landscape. This decision ended decades of reliance on Ukrainian pipelines for Russian gas (see Figure 1). Despite Ukraine announcing its intent not to renew the agreement well in advance (Corbeau, 2023), uncertainty lingered until the contract’s final days. Similarly, the broader implications remain uncertain. This policy brief explores the short-, mid-, and long-term effects of this change on the region.
Figure 1. Russian pipeline network to Europe, 2022-2025
Source: Euromaidan Press
A “Political” Pipeline
The Ukrainian transit route has long been a key corridor for direct gas deliveries to Europe, playing a crucial role in shaping the EU energy security policy. However, this route has also been the site of major disruptions, particularly during the 2006 and 2009 gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine. These incidents exposed Europe’s reliance on transit routes and its vulnerability to geopolitical conflicts, prompting political responses despite the relatively localized impact. To address these vulnerabilities, the EU introduced measures aimed at diversifying energy sources and strengthening internal energy markets (see, e.g., Le Coq and Paltseva, 2012). Early efforts focused primarily on improving the internal energy market’s efficiency while diversification advanced slowly. This changed drastically during the gas crisis that began in mid-2021 and escalated with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. These events forced the EU to alter its gas import strategy, driving further investments in liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure and new pipelines, such as the Southern Gas Corridor enabling gas imports from Azerbaijan (see e.g., Regulation (EU) 2022/1032 and Regulation (EU) 2024/1789).
As a result, despite the significant burden of soaring energy prices and investment costs, the EU has made remarkable progress in reducing its reliance on Russian piped gas. Indeed, the share of Russian natural gas (both pipeline and LNG) in total EU gas imports, which increased 35 percent in 2015 to 41 percent in 2020, dropped to just 9 percent by 2023. However, the progress was non-uniform among member states (see Figure 2). In turn, by 2024, Russian gas via Ukraine accounted for just 5 percent of EU’s gas supply, with significant reliance limited to Austria, Hungary, and Slovakia (where it still made up between 65 percent and 78 percent of imports, and, between 12 percent and 22 percent of total energy consumption).
Figure 2. Share of Russian pipeline and LNG gas in total gas imports across the EU
Source: Eurostat, 2024. The gas imports include data for both pipeline and LNG imports. The 2024 gas imports data was unavailable at the time of writing this brief. However, several EU member states further decreased their consumption of Russian gas in 2024. For example, while Sweden and Finland were importing Russian LNG both in 2020 and 2023, possibly for re-export, as shown in Figure 1, they both stopped this practice from June 2024.
Further, Austrian data on imports from Russia is not available from Eurostat, and is, instead, compiled from Eurogas, IMF, and Austrian government data.
The Immediate Impact of the Transit Stop
The EU’s reduced reliance on Russian gas has significantly softened the immediate impact of the transit halt. Gas prices showed only a slight reaction, with no clear evidence linking the transit stop to price changes. Even if one would attribute the cumulative gas price increase over 2024 to the expectations of the pipeline shutdown only, the effect was much smaller than during the 2021 gas crisis or the sharp price spikes of 2022, as illustrated in Figure 3. Ample storage levels – 71.8% as of January 01.2025, well within acceptable levels for this time of the year – have further limited the immediate impact.
Figure 3. EU gas prices, 2021-2025
Effectively, the only part of the region facing an immediate and significant impact due to the termination of the gas transit deal has been Moldova. The pro-Russian separatist region of Transnistria, previously fully reliant on subsidized Russian gas via Ukraine and representing 70 percent of Moldovan gas consumption, has been cut off since January 1, 2025, due to the lack of alternative routes. This has also significantly affected the right-bank-of-Dniester Moldova as 80 percent of its electricity supply was previously provided by the Russian gas-based MGRES plant in Transnistria (Anisimova, 2024). In response, Chisinau declared a state of emergency in the energy sector, introducing energy-saving measures and rationing. In turn, Transnistria halted most industrial production and faced widespread blackouts (Kieff, 2025).
The Mid-Term Costs and Benefits for Involved Parties
In the mid-term, the impact will likely broaden and take various forms. Moldova, Ukraine, and Europe are expected to face primarily financial consequences, while Russia will also bear significant geopolitical costs.
Moldova will continue to be the most affected country. Russia could attempt to reroute gas to Transnistria via Turkstream and reversed flow on the Trans-Balkan pipeline. However, since this route briefly passes through Ukraine before reaching Moldova, it would require a transit agreement, an unlikely scenario under current conditions.
Alternatively, the Trans-Balkan route could be used to import gas from Azerbaijan or LNG from Turkey and Greece (Halser and Skaug, 2024). However, this would require political will from both Moldova and Transnistria, and involve substantial costs, likely unaffordable singlehandedly for Moldova or Transnistria, especially as the latter has long received Russian gas for free. Financial, as well as infrastructural support from the EU could help address these challenges.
Ukraine faces an annual loss of transit fees due to the halted agreement amounting to approximately $450 million/year. Formally, the loss should have been around $1.2 billion annually but Russia payed only for 15 bcm/a of gas transit since 2022, instead of 40 bcm/a under the ship-or-pay transit agreement, citing Ukraine’s refusal to transit gas via the Russia-occupied Sokhranivka entry point. This dispute is in international arbitration but is unlikely to be resolved before the war ends (see Reley, 2025). The absence of a transit gas flow could also undermine the competitiveness of Ukraine’s gas storage services for the EU (Ukraine’s Naftogaz has Europe’s largest underground facilities with a capacity of 30.9bcm, 10bcm of which is available to foreign traders.)
At the same time, the option of renewing the transit agreement could boost Ukraine’s leverage in future talks with Russia. However, this leverage weakens with the EU’s ability to cope with its remaining reliance on Russian gas – greater diversification in EU imports would reduce the importance of Russian pipelines and, consequently, Ukraine’s bargaining position.
Europe’s mid-term impact from the transit halt will be non-uniform, with Austria, Slovakia, and Hungary facing the highest energy bill increases. However, the effect is expected to be limited due to its well-connected internal energy market, which can absorb shocks and distribute shortages across member states. The shortage is likely to be compensated by increased LNG purchases, which would somewhat increase gas prices due to the current LNG market rigidity. However, with LNG supply capacity increasing already in 2025 and projected to grow by 40 percent by 2028 without a matching rise in demand (IEEFA, 2024), the price increase is not going to last long.
However, the EU may also face a political cost. Expectations of price increases and Slovakia’s loss of transit fees could strain the EU unity, as differing energy dependencies risk deepening intra-EU tensions and complicating policy coordination (see, e.g., here and here). This underscores the importance of Europe’s “one voice” energy policy, which has gained momentum in recent years.
Russia faces significant financial and geopolitical losses from the transit halt. Financially, it risks losing approximately $6.5 billion annually in revenue at current prices (Keliauskaitė and Zachmann, 2024) unless flows are redirected. While temporary price increases – for the sales of Russian gas via Turkstream, and Russian LNG exports to Europe, could offset some of these losses – these are not going to last.
The greater impact lies in Russia’s diminished geopolitical leverage. Historically, Russia has used gas as a political tool, leveraging its dominant position and access to multiple pipeline routes to exert influence over transit countries and dependent nations. This influence would now be lost. Further, with the loss of a Ukrainian transit, Russia’s pipeline connection to EU gas markets now relies solely on Turkey, increasing its dependency on Turkey and potentially altering its alliance dynamics due to higher transit costs. Additionally, as Azerbaijani gas emerges as a viable alternative for Europe, Russia’s bargaining power in its geopolitical relations with Azerbaijan is likely to weaken further. This erosion of influence marks a significant shift in Russia’s regional energy strategy.
Long-Term Effects: Increased Dependence on LNG and the Green Transition
The halt of the Russian gas transit is facilitating the implementation of the RePowerEU goal of fully eliminating EU Russian fossil fuels dependency by 2027. However, its long-term effects, particularly on the timing and success of the green transition, warrant attention. Natural gas is widely considered a transitional fuel, essential for maintaining energy reliability in an energy system relying heavily on intermittent renewables. For the green transition to succeed, it is critical to avoid infrastructure lock-ins, displacement of low-carbon technologies, and the creation of stranded assets.
The shift from Russian gas to the LNG market will likely require substantial infrastructure investments in the EU and LNG-producing countries, increasing the risk of long-term dependency. Geopolitical dynamics add further complexity – e.g., the U.S., which supplied 50 percent of Europe’s LNG in 2023, has advocated for long-term purchasing agreements that could delay green technology adoption and extend the EU’s reliance on fossil fuels. This is already a reality as some EU member states having signed long-term gas contracts with Qatar, lasting beyond 2050, which may hinder efforts to accelerate the green transition.
Conclusion
The impact of the gas transit halt varies depending on whether it is seen from a short-, medium-, or long-term perspective. While all parties involved face losses, the impact of the halt on the EU is drastically different from what it could have been a few years ago due to the dramatic efforts undertaken in the last few years. Further, there are also potential benefits to consider. Notably, the EU has the opportunity to play a crucial role in reducing the economic and political burdens on neighboring countries, particularly those seeking EU membership. By offering targeted financial support and promoting deeper cooperation, the EU can help these nations manage the challenges posed by the halt. In turn, the halt will imply not only financial but also geopolitical losses for Russia.
References
- Anisimova, A. (2024). Moldova’s EU integration and the special case of Transnistria. FREE Policy Brief. Retrieved January 11, 2025, from https://freepolicybriefs.org/2024/10/14/moldovas-eu-integration/
- Corbeau, A. (2024). Swapping Azeri gas for Russian supplies: No easy fix for Europe. Center on Global Energy Policy. Retrieved January 11, 2025, from https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/swapping-azeri-gas-for-russian-supplies-no-easy-fix-for-europe/
- Halser, P., & Skaug, B. (2024). Supply shift: End of Ukraine gas transit sets the stage for LNG and pipeline diversions. Rystad Energy. Retrieved January 11, 2025, from https://www.rystadenergy.com/news/end-of-ukraine-gas-transit-lng-and-pipeline
- Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA). (2024). Global LNG outlook 2024–2028. Retrieved January 11, 2025, from https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2024-06/067.%20IEEFA%2C%20Global%20LNG%20Outlook%202024-2028.pdf
- Keliauskaitė, D., & Zachmann, G. (2024). The end of Russian gas transit via Ukraine and options for the EU. Bruegel. Retrieved January 11, 2025, from https://www.bruegel.org/analysis/end-russian-gas-transit-ukraine-and-options-eu
- Kieff, T. (2025). An energy crisis provides opportunity in Moldova. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Retrieved January 11, 2025, from https://www.csis.org/analysis/energy-crisis-provides-opportunity-moldova
- Le Coq, C., & Paltseva, E. (2012). Buyer power as a tool for EU energy security. FREE Policy Brief. Retrieved January 11, 2025, from https://freepolicybriefs.org/2012/06/07/buyer-power-as-a-tool-for-eu-energy-security/
- Reley, M. (2025). The end of the affair? The transit of Russian gas across Ukraine. International Center for Defense and Security. Retrieved January 11, 2025, from https://icds.ee/en/the-end-of-the-affair-the-transit-of-russian-gas-across-ukraine/
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
What decision did Ukraine make regarding Russian pipeline gas transit? How has the EU’s reliance on Russian pipeline gas changed since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? What are the potential consequences of the EU’s increased reliance on liquefied natural gas (LNG) following the decline in Russian pipeline gas imports? Read the policy brief “Breaking the Link: Costs and Benefits of Halting Russian Pipeline Gas to Europe” to explore the impact of halting Russian pipeline gas transit on Europe, Ukraine, and energy security.
The 2024 FREE Network Retreat: Economic Research and Capacity Building in Moldova
The 2024 FREE Network Retreat, held in Chisinau, Moldova on September 11-13, brought together representatives from the FREE Network institutes and other stakeholders, focusing on economic research and capacity building, especially in the context of Moldova’s EU accession efforts. The event featured general sessions on institutional development, special tracks on academic, administrative and communication topics, and a half-day conference on “Economic Research and Capacity Building“. Key discussions addressed challenges such as Moldova’s weak economic research infrastructure, policymaking gaps, and the need for capacity building. Several examples of Moldovan success stories were also highlighted. The event concluded with a call for strengthened collaboration and donor support towards economics education and fostering Moldova’s research and capacity-building landscape.
Introduction
The FREE Network Retreat is an annual event for researchers and administrators from the FREE Network institutes. The 2024 Retreat took place in Chisinau, Moldova, September 11-13 and was attended by representatives from BEROC (Belarus – currently in exile in Lithuania), BICEPS (Latvia), CenEA (Poland), ISET (Georgia), KSE (Ukraine) and SITE (Sweden). In addition, although not being a member of the FREE Network, the New Uzbekistan University in Tashkent and its Greater Eurasia Research Center (GEAR) were represented.
Like at previous retreats, there were two general sessions with a focus on the development of the individual institutes and the Network as a whole, and three tracks of special sessions on academic, administration and communication topics. The Retreat also involved a meeting of the FREE Network’s joint initiative The Forum for Research on Gender in Eastern Europe (FROGEE) – and a special side event on the integration of Ukrainian Refugees in Moldova.
An integral part of this year’s Retreat was the half-day conference, “Economic Research and Capacity Building”. Drawing on the FREE Network’s experience, the conference focused on how capacity building and research can facilitate the transformation of societies and economies, particularly within the Moldovan context, on its path towards EU-accession. In addition, it provided the FREE Network members an opportunity to share their experiences of capacity building, economic research and policymaking with Moldovan stakeholders.
The Conference was open to external participants interested in the topic, particularly policymakers, academics, and think tank representatives. It clearly illustrated the need to strengthen not only economic research and capacity building but also academic education in economics and related fields, improve the quality and access to data, and raise the level of competence in economics within the government and public sector in general.
A summary of the Conference discussions is provided below. For a full overview of the program and participants see the Appendix.
The Opening Session
The opening session started with the general observation that EU integration, in addition to being a political and security issue is primarily an economic issue with a need for economic research and analysis that can inform policy discussions and educate current and future stakeholders. Within this context, all the FREE Network institutes have considerable experience engaging in research and discussions of policy and policy reform within the region. With Moldova not (yet) represented in the FREE Network, the Conference served as a platform for the Network to learn and eventually engage in sustainable partnership(s).
The discussion then shifted to the Moldovan situation and the challenges ahead on the path to EU membership. Several challenges were identified: a lack of economic research, with most existing research being rather weak; missing connections between researchers and policymakers; a shortage of human resources; and generally weak institutions; as well as policies often being based on trial and error rather than evidence-based decision-making.
To address these challenges several actions were suggested including the need to strengthen research and independent economic thinking through capacity building; drawing on the experience of the countries that have joined the EU during the last two decades; developing international research cooperation through networks like the FREE Network; business-friendly practices and treating investors right while at the same time encouraging entrepreneurship and educating society on the importance of private and public investments.
The discussion also addressed activities supporting civil society undertaken by the EU and Sweden, respectively. Examples of activities include building partnerships and strong ecosystems for innovation and entrepreneurship, supporting reforms cutting red tape and improving the business climate in general as well as supporting the Academy of Economic Studies Moldova and the Association of Women in Business.
Research and Capacity Building – the Moldovan Perspective
The discussion started with a presentation of three Moldovan success stories. The first one is a recently launched program on media, gaming development and animation. Currently, 1,000 students are being enrolled. The program attracts Moldovans from all over the country as well as Moldovan students abroad who decided to terminate their studies abroad to go back to Moldova and enrol in the program. The success of the program is a good example of cooperation between industry, higher education institutions and the Ministry of Education opening up to new professions and programs that attract young people.
The second example is taken from the fashion industry. Traditionally Moldova has been a country where sewing takes place thanks to cheap labor. However, in recent years a “pipeline” of talent, design and brands has developed. As a result, the value added in the industry and export revenues as well as wages have increased.
The final example is the Moldovan tech industry. The tech industry has been at the forefront and could be considered the tiger of the Moldovan economy with growth rates of 30-40 percent per year. There are two main reasons behind this success: the rapidly developing Moldovan startup scene combined with a 7 percent single tax mechanism for the tech industry.
The discussion then turned to the role of research in policymaking. The first argument put forward focused on the impact (or rather the lack of impact) of research and analysis on Moldovan policymaking. As the examples above show, the Moldovan economy has the potential to develop – however, the policy discussion does not focus on the transition towards higher-value activities. On the contrary, even though Moldovan research highlights the role of transition to higher value-added, this argument has essentially been ignored in the policy debate that has been mostly characterized by rhetoric on job creation rather than transition to an economy that creates jobs within the high(er) value-added sectors. Unfortunately, this is not the only example of Moldovan policy discussions and decision-making ignoring the research perspective and outcomes. Among other examples mentioned is the recent tax reform experience and programs supporting Small and Medium Sized Enterprises. Currently, reforms are driven either by purely political reasons or by lobbying or by any other vested interests. There is essentially no impact assessment or any economic analysis underpinning the decisions. Due to the fact that policy initiatives neither are based on economic analysis nor on best practices, they are vulnerable to clientelism or corruption. The importance of rule of law was emphasized in light of Moldova’s anchoring to the EU and with reference to Latvia and the other Baltic states. It is a too important topic to be left to the lawyers and should hence be part of economic capacity building and research.
The second argument referred to access to reliable data needed for quality policy-oriented research. While the data collected by the National Bureau of Statistics in general is good, the main issue lies in accessing it. The Bureau does not have the resources to support researchers. To exacerbate the problem further, there seems to be no willingness among policymakers to address this issue. Given Moldova’s vulnerability to Russian disinformation and the increased pressure on Moldova, the issue of access to reliable data is even more pressing today than a few years ago.
To foster an informed policy debate and decision-making process taking evidence-based research into account, it would be desirable to create a platform to advocate the results of economic policy analysis where, e.g., policy papers and monitoring reports, could be presented and discussed by experts and decision-makers in the public and private sectors as well as the civil society.
The session continued with a discussion on human capital. The successful program attracting Georgians in the diaspora to return and work for the Georgian government, launched during the first decade of the 2000s, served as the point of departure for the discussion. The key to the success in Georgia was that the government was able to pay competitive salaries. This is one of the main challenges facing Moldova. Even though there have been some adjustments in government salaries during recent years, the government is still far from being anywhere close to paying the same salaries as the private sector in general and think tanks in particular. An understanding of this is important not only at the national level but also among donors. It was noted that there have been some adjustments in government salaries, but it has not been enough. Further, while the Moldovan diaspora are starting to return, they, however, have little governmental or political experience, which makes it difficult to involve them in, e.g. policymaking and development of support programs. It would be good to draw on experiences and best practices from other countries in the region – such as the Baltic states and Georgia – and use them as benchmarks, e.g., for the innovation ecosystem, incubators and accelerators.
Research and Capacity Building – the FREE Network Experience
The FREE Network institutes shared their experiences in capacity building and brain gain, developing an economics undergraduate program, research and policy impact, and network building through research.
ISET (Georgia) shared their experience on attracting talented economists in the Georgian diaspora back to Georgian academia, research, and government positions. The starting point was an initiative developed in collaboration with the donor community to establish a world-class economics school in the Caucasus – the International School of Economics (ISET). The school has developed from a small boutique school to a school with three academic programs (undergraduate and graduate) and about 700 enrolled students. ISET graduates are in high demand and are seen in the private and public sectors. The ISET Policy Institute plays a pivotal role in terms of contributing to evidence-based policymaking. Throughout the years more than 50 ISET graduates have been accepted in Ph.D. programs at top universities worldwide. Many of them have returned to Georgia and ISET after completing their Ph.D. Had not it been for opportunities offered by ISET and the Policy Institute, it is very unlikely that they would have returned. The FREE Network and the opportunities offered are a great resource for the ISET as well as for the ISET Policy Institute.
BEROC (Belarus – in exile in Lithuania since 2022) shared their experience on the process of creating and launching an undergraduate program in economics and business. BEROC started as a research center, but the idea to establish a Bachelor program in economics and business had been around for several years. As part of the re-organization and reformation of the European Humanities University (Belarusian, but in exile), the European Commission approached BEROC asking if it could develop an undergraduate program in economics and business for Belarusian students.
The challenge has been two-fold: first, in the current political situation, Belarusian people are “locked within the country” and for them it is much easier to go to Russia for studies. In addition, the cost of living and the tuition fee (although low by Baltic standards) provide additional barriers to potential students. Second, BEROC operates in exile themselves. Nevertheless, a Bachelor program in economics and business will be launched in October 2024 with the support of Belarusian business in exile. Thanks to cooperation with partners within the FREE Network the program is at the global frontier.
BICEPS (Latvia) provided an overview of how research can contribute to the policy agenda. BICEPS’s first policy reports, published more than 15 years ago, focused on the unsustainable Latvian economic growth and inflation levels at the time. These reports reached conclusions that, while correct ex-post, were contrary to those of the Latvian Central Bank. This divergence sparked substantial discussion at both the political level and in the media.
In the early 2010s, BICEPS was commissioned to produce the first-ever Latvian Competitiveness Report. This report has served as a foundation for policymaking and has left a lasting mark on the policy agenda. Furthermore, following BICEPS’s research on the shadow economy and the annual presentation of the shadow economy index, the Ministry of Finance, through public procurement, commissioned a 2021 project to develop a model addressing the impact of the shadow economy.
The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) Latvia and the EUROMOD tax-benefit microsimulation model are long-term projects run by BICEPS. Current projects include one focused on the impact of broadening the sugar tax base, a regional Global Entrepreneurship Monitor study, a project on road congestion tolls in cities and the development of sustainable agriculture in Africa.
CenEA (Poland) might be small in terms of people employed, but disproportionally big in terms of impact and presence in the Polish policy discussion. From the very beginning, CenEA has aimed at combining policy with solid economic research. The focus has primarily been in the areas of fiscal policy, ageing and health – with the latter two being major issues in Poland.
For CenEA, the FREE Network has been fundamental, both for funding and for building its credibility and position. CenEA has played an active role in terms of broadening and deepening the cooperation within the FREE Network. It has been very active in developing and coordinating the FROGEE project. The project (financed by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, SIDA) has run for six years and covered a wide range of topics within the field of gender equality. It has resulted in several FREE Policy Briefs, policy and research papers, and several conferences and workshops. In addition, the project has contributed to the development of tools and skills for both senior and junior researchers within the Network. Based on the success of the FROGEE project, new projects and initiatives within the Network have been developed.
SITE (Sweden) has taken the lead on the FREECE (the Forum for Research on Eastern Europe: Climate and Environment) project. The project has been around for eighteen months with a focus on the transition from an economy based on the production and consumption of fossil fuels to an economy based on the production and consumption of zero-carbon renewables. This will be a challenge for everyone, especially for countries throughout Eastern Europe that often rely on the extraction and consumption of fossil fuels for employment as well as for energy needs.
The FREECE project provides several opportunities to engage in policy-relevant research while at the same time filling a gap in the literature.
Initiatives and the Road Ahead
At the current stage of Moldovan economic and political development there is a higher demand for analysis and applied research, rather than general and theoretical research. In other words, policy relevance needs to be in focus. At the same time, such applied analysis and research need to involve well-educated human capital with relevant skills, such as university graduates. This puts focus on the role of universities and how they can reform.
The Moldova School of Economics initiative was launched approximately half a year ago. Among the first activities were public lectures on economic behaviour and public policies. In September, in cooperation with CERGE-EI in Prague, the first short economics course was launched. Currently, there are discussions with the Ministry of Education and the State University on developing the initiative into an actual program. So far, the response has been positive. The vision is to create the Moldova School of Economics into an initiative that reaches out not only to Chisinau and Moldova but to the wider region.
The session on this topic proceeded to discuss how the FREE Network could support Moldovan research and capacity building, focusing on its experience in implementing various projects. One potential starting point would be a summer school involving both the FREE Network and Moldovan economists living abroad. There are already contacts with members of the diaspora who have expressed a willingness to participate as faculty members, without compensation. Additionally, there is a need for shorter courses or executive classes aimed at individuals in ministries. Topics to be covered may include basic macroeconomic analysis, fiscal policy, and economic growth. It is also important to incorporate microeconomic subjects, such as the factors driving innovation and the development of economic clusters.
Concluding Comments
The FREE Network Retreat and conference has shown that many of the issues currently facing Moldova, have at least partly been addressed by the FREE Network members in their respective countries. Looking forward this should provide a good basis for cooperation between the Network and Moldovan partners. Three broadly defined areas for collaboration and partnerships were identified: (i) education and training: at the university level as well as for ministries and government agencies; (ii) creation and development of a good environment for research and policy analysis; (iii) communication and outreach.
The dialogue that has been initiated during the conference should continue and include a discussion on how to attract donors to support long-term cooperation that contributes to the needed strengthening of research and capacity building in Moldova.
Appendix
Conference Programme: Economic Research and Capacity Building
9.30 Conference Opening
- Torbjörn Becker, Director, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics
- Jānis Mažeiks, Ambassador of the European Union to the Republic of Moldova
- Katarina Fried, Ambassador of Sweden to the Republic of Moldova
10:00 Research and Capacity Building – the Moldovan perspective
- Doina Nistor, Chief of Party, Moldova Future Technologies Activity
- Adrian Lupușor, Executive Director, Independent Analytical Center Expert-Grup
- Kálmán Mizsei, EU Adviser to the Government of Moldova
10:50 Research and Capacity Building: The FREE Network Experience
- Tamar Sulukhia (ISET, Georgia): Capacity building and brain gain
- Dzmitry Kruk (BEROC, Belarus – in exile): Development of a new academic programme
- Marija Krūmiņa (BICEPS, Latvia): Research and policy impact
- Michal Myck (CenEA, Poland): Network building and the FROGEE experience
- Julius Andersson (SITE, Sweden): Network building and the FREECE experience
11:30 Initiatives and the Road Ahead
- Mihnea Constantinescu, Advisor to the Governor National Bank of Moldova
- Misha Zeldin-Gipsman, the Moldova School of Economics Initiative
12:10 Concluding Comments
- Torbjörn Becker, Director, SITE
- Kata Fredheim, Associate Professor, BICEPS and Stockholm School of Economics in Riga
12:20 Lunch and Networking
Conference moderator: Kata Fredheim, BICEPS and SSE Riga.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Belarus’s Progressing Economic Dependence on Russia and Its Implications
This policy brief examines the complexities surrounding Belarus’s economy as it deepens its economic dependence on Russia. Recent growth, driven by increased domestic demand and a resurgence in exports to Russia, has surpassed expectations. This trajectory is largely due to Belarus’s mounting dependence on Russia across trade, energy, finance, logistics, and other domains, a dependency that poses significant long-term risks and uncertainties. The Belarusian regime has begun to see this relationship not only as a lifeline but also as a potential source of economic enhancement. However, this approach may blur the lines between sustainable growth and short-term gains, fostering uncertainties about the true nature of this economic uptick. Hence, questions on whether this growth is viable or merely cyclical persist. The uncertainty and progressing dependence on Russia, in turn, imply numerous challenges for the political domain.
New Issues on the Belarusian Economic Agenda
The Belarusian economy continues to surprise, displaying output growth substantially higher than previous forecasts (see e.g. BEROC, 2024). In 2024, the economy is projected to grow by around 4.0 percent. The growth is being driven by domestic demand, fueled by rising real wages and labor shortages. However, an underlying factor is the recent resurgence of exports to Russia. The unexpectedly high growth has allowed for the Belarusian economy to surpass pre-war output levels, at the moment defying earlier predictions of stagnation or decline.
Although the growth period has now extended beyond what could be considered a mere “recovery”, the overall picture – as suggested in Kruk (2024) – still appears relevant. Despite the upturn, the economy remains significantly behind the counterfactual ‘no sanctions, no war’ scenario (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. The Dynamics of Output (seasonally adjusted, index, 2018=100): Actual vs. Counterfactual
Source: Own estimations based on Belstat data. Note: The counterfactual scenario assumes that the Belarusian economy continued to grow uniformly from Q2 2021 to the present, at a sluggish growth rate of 1 percent per annum (a conservative estimate of the potential growth rate before the sanctions were implemented (Kruk & Lvovskiy, 2022)).
Moreover, all the risks to long-term growth associated with total dependence on Russia, potential contagion effects from Russia, etc. are still relevant (KAS, 2024; Bornukova, 2023).
At the same time, a prolonged period of growth gives grounds to think about recent trends also from the perspective of ongoing structural changes in the Belarusian economy. Can these changes, besides implying numerous risks, enhance Belarus’s growth potential and degree of sustainability? If so, to what extent, for how long, and under which conditions? With these questions in mind, it is important to gain a better understanding of what aspects of the Belarusian economy are being transformed due to the increased coupling with Russia and which effects, besides increased dependency and corresponding risks, this coupling generates. Are there any growth-enhancing effects? If so, how sustainable are they?
Belarus’s Growing Economic Dependence on Russia
Belarus’s economic dependence on Russia is reaching unprecedented levels, spanning various critical sectors, with new dimensions of reliance emerging in recent years. This dependence is deeply embedded in the trade, energy, financial, and technological sectors of the Belarusian economy, and recent geopolitical shifts have further intensified these connections.
One of the most evident signs of Belarus’s economic reliance on Russia is reflected in its foreign trade. Russian imports make up around 55-60 percent of all imports to Belarus, with a staggering 80 percent consisting of intermediate goods crucial for industrial production. Energy products, including crude oil and natural gas, form the largest part of these imports, with almost all of Belarus’s energy needs being met by Russia. Exports have also become increasingly concentrated to the Russian market. In 2022-2023 there were several periods when about 70 percent of Belarusian exports were directed to Russia, an increase from about 35-40 percent prior to 2022. This surge was driven by new opportunities for Belarusian firms on the Russian market following Western companies withdrawals. Although competition in the Russian market has since intensified, Russia still accounts for around 60-65 percent of Belarus’s total exports (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. The Evolution of Physical Volume of Exports (2018=100) and the Share of Exports to Russia (in percent)
Source: Own estimations based on data from the National Bank of Belarus.
A major new development since 2022 is Belarus’s reliance on Russia for transportation and logistics. Sanctions and the war in Ukraine have forced Belarus to abandon its traditional export routes through European ports, leaving Russian seaports as the only viable option for further exports. In 2023, Belarus secured around 14 million tons of port capacity in Russia, primarily for potash fertilizers and oil products exports. Although it is still below the needed volumes, this logistics dependency significantly exacerbates Belarus’s external trade dependency. Taking into account direct exports and imports to and from Russia, as well as mechanisms of logistics and transport control, Russia essentially “controls” up to 90 percent of Belarusian exports and about 80 percent of its imports.
Energy dependency is another critical factor to consider. Belarus imports over 80 percent of its energy resources from Russia, making it vulnerable to any shifts in Russian energy policy. In fact, Russian energy subsidies have played a crucial role in keeping Belarusian industries competitive. In 2022, when global energy prices spiked, the low and fixed price that Belarus paid for Russian gas and the steep discount on oil supplies translated into record-high energy subsidies. These amounted to billions of US dollars and shielded Belarus from the economic fallout other countries experienced due to rising energy prices. Although the value of these subsidies has somewhat decreased in 2023-2024, they remain significant and vital for Belarus.
Belarus’s fiscal situation has also become increasingly tied to Russia. After years of running budget deficits, Belarus achieved a budget surplus in 2023, largely due to Russian financial assistance. For instance, the budgetary item ‘gratuitous revenues’, which mainly includes reverse excise tax and other transfers from Russia, reached a historical high in 2023, securing revenues of around 3.0 percent of GDP. Without this external support, Belarus would likely face a severe fiscal deficit, forcing cuts in social spending and other areas. The scale of Russian financial aid has become a key factor in maintaining budgetary stability, imposing a serious risk for Belarus. Were Russia to restrict such financing, Belarus would almost instantly lose its fiscal stability.
In the monetary sphere, Belarus’s dependence on Russia manifests through the informal peg of the Belarusian ruble to the Russian ruble. Given the deep trade ties and shared currency use in bilateral transactions, Belarusian monetary policy is effectively constrained by Russian economic conditions. The Belarusian National Bank has little room for maneuver, as any nominal devaluation or appreciation of the ruble tends to self-correct through inflation or price adjustments tied to Russian trade. This linkage limits Belarus’s monetary sovereignty and aligns its inflation trajectory closely with Russia’s.
Belarus’s debt structure underscores this dependency further. Of the country’s roughly 17.0 billion US dollars in external debt, about 65 percent is owed directly to Russia or Russia-controlled entities like the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development. In 2022-2023, Russia granted Belarus a six-year deferment on debt repayments, providing crucial breathing room for the regime. This deferment, along with Belarus’s limited access to other international financial sources due to sanctions, has cemented Russia’s role as the primary creditor and financial lifeline for Belarus.
New dimensions of dependence have also emerged within infrastructure, technology, and cyberspace. As Belarus is cut off from Western technologies and financial systems, it increasingly relies on Russian alternatives. Belarus has adopted Russian software for critical functions such as tax administration, giving Moscow access to sensitive financial data. Similarly, with several Belarusian banks disconnected from SWIFT, the country has integrated into Russia’s financial messaging system, further entrenching its reliance on Russian infrastructure. Belarusian companies, particularly in sectors like accounting and logistics, have also shifted to using Russian business software, while consumers increasingly rely on Russian digital platforms for social networks, payments, and entertainment.
An Attempt to Spur Growth Through Coupling with Russia
From the perspective of macroeconomic stability and the traditional view on strengthening growth potential, Belarus’s progressing dependence on Russia is obviously an evil (Kruk, 2023; Kruk, 2024). However, the Belarusian regime sees it as a necessary trade-off, or a “lesser evil”. In 2021-2023, the coupling was done in exchange for economic survival. Firstly, production coupling allowed to counterweight the losses in output associated with sanctions (as niches were freed up in the Russian market) (Kruk & Lvovskiy, 2022). Secondly, the coupling was driven by pressure from Russia and a desire from Belarusian authorities to rapidly obtain some compensations if accepting Russia’s demands. For example, in 2022-2023, Belarusian enterprises were granted a credit line of 105 billion rubles within so-called import-substitution projects.
However, in 2024, coupling with Russia is beginning to look more like a purposeful strategy by the Belarusian economic authorities rather than just a survival strategy. The regime seems willing to sacrifice sustainability considerations in favor of strengthening the growth potential by ‘directive production coupling’, i.e. artificially shaping value-added chains between producers in Belarus (mainly state-owned enterprises) and Russia. For instance, the regime accepted the co-called Union programs for 2024-2026 (Turarbekova, 2024), which encompass numerous activities by the governments of Belarus and Russia aimed at securing ‘production coupling’ in sectors such as machine building, agricultural and automotive engineering, aviation industry, and elevator manufacturing. In some cases, the Belarusian party solely initiates such kind of sectoral activities. It seems that the authorities either accepted the dependency due to the lack of outside options, or they became more optimistic regarding the possibility to spur economic growth through coupling with Russia based on the experiences from the last couple of years. And to some extent, this logic might hold true.
As in the previous two years, the coupling with Russia may, in the short to medium term, more than compensate for certain institutional weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the Belarusian economy. The positive effects may even extend beyond mere cyclical impacts and, under certain conditions, contribute to a semblance of stability for a period of time. For example, economic growth in Belarus could reach some degree of stability under the following conditions:
- (a) if the war in Ukraine becomes protracted and military demand from Russia remains steady;
- (b) if the Russian economy continues to grow (albeit modestly) in an environment with limited competition in Russian commodity markets;
- (c) if specific tools and forms of support for the Belarusian economy remain in place.
Growth driven by a combination of these preconditions could be sufficiently stable as long as they persist. However, the existence of such a status quo is not inherently sustainable and could vanish at any moment. Each of these preconditions is highly unreliable and comes with its own set of determining factors. Thus, one cannot count on the preservation of the entire “package” of preconditions in the long term.
Conclusions
Belarus and its economic prospects are currently in a highly complex situation. The Belarusian economy has been steadily increasing its degree of coupling with Russia, with the ties strengthening both in the range of economic sectors involved and the depth of their integration.
From a long-term growth perspective, the unprecedented level of dependence on Russia is undoubtedly detrimental. In this regard, Kruk’s (2024) conclusion about the economic and political deadlocks remains entirely relevant.
However, as the past two years have shown, this situation can achieve a certain semblance of stability in the medium term. The Belarusian regime is increasingly viewing its coupling with Russia not only as a mechanism for economic survival but also as a means to enhance economic potential. In this way, the growing dependence on Russia, which brings substantial macroeconomic risks, is seen as an unavoidable cost entailed to the only available mechanism to sustain economic growth in Belarus.
How then, should we interpret the related fluctuations in Belarus’s economy? As an increase in economic potential (equilibrium growth rate) or as cyclical acceleration? Traditional economic logic encounters a contradiction here, as the line between equilibrium growth and cyclical fluctuations becomes blurred. An increase in economic potential should inherently be sustainable, whereas cyclical acceleration is inherently transient. Yet, how should we treat a mechanism that might be somewhat sustainable under certain conditions?
This contradiction creates numerous uncertainties, both strictly within the economic domain and beyond it. Economically, it diminishes the effectiveness of conventional macro forecasting tools, making them more dependent on ad-hoc assumptions. For example, if there is indeed an increase in potential, then macroeconomic projections generated without accounting for this channel (e.g. BEROC, 2024) would likely underestimate output growth while overestimating the risks of overheating and destabilization. Conversely, if the model assumes higher equilibrium growth but it proves unsustainable, the forecast could significantly overestimate growth while underestimating macroeconomic imbalances. In other words, the seemingly favorable situation could ultimately be a harbinger of a macroeconomic storm.
These uncertainties are even more pronounced in the political domain. Up to what threshold can an increasing economic dependency on Russia yield macroeconomic gains for the regime? What political consequences can arise if the strategy of coupling with Russia for growth enhancement fails? Can the progressing dependency on Russia undermine the regime politically? If political barriers for democratization are eliminated, what should and can be done to get rid of the dependence on Russia? Are the estimations and prescriptions in Hartwell et al. (2022) – which considers the perspectives of economic reconstruction for a democratic Belarus and the costs of eliminating the dependency on Russia in pre-war reality – still relevant today?
Answering such questions meaningfully using formal research tools ex-ante is nearly impossible. The dependence of macroeconomic sustainability on non-economic factors and motivations leaves little room for an accurate ex-ante diagnosis of the current state of affairs. Only ex-post will we likely be able to reliably assess which diagnosis is closer to the truth. This, in turn, means that we must accept an additional degree of uncertainty in today’s forecasts and projections. Similar challenges are faced by decision-makers in Belarus. As a result, the likelihood of incorrect economic and political decisions due to misdiagnosing the current situation is relatively high, even in the (more optimistic) scenario where the authorities recognize and account for these uncertainties. Such decisions, if made, could not only be costly but might even trigger rapid and drastic economic and political changes.
References
- BEROC. (2024). Macroeconomic Forecast for Belarus. 2024-2025 (in Russian). BEROC. https://beroc.org/publications/view/makroprognoz-dlya-belarusi-2024-2025/
- Bornukova, K. (2023). The Economic Dimension of the Russian Policy toward Belarus. In A. Moshes & R. Nizhnikau (Eds.), Russian Policy toward Belarus after 2020: At a Turning Point? (pp. 29–46). Lexington Books.
- Hartwell, C., Bornukova, K., Kruk, D., & Zoller-Rydzek, B. (2022). The Economic Reconstruction of Belarus: Next Steps after a Democratic Transition (EP/EXPO/AFET/FWC/2019-01/Lot1/R/03). European Parliament. Directorate General for External Policies. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_STU(2022)653663
- Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. (2024). EU Sanctions against the regime in Minsk (in Russian). https://www.kas.de/documents/285805/31503540/sanctions-6.pdf/4b6d787d-60fa-ba9a-9ff3-a546946dae31?version=1.0&t=1721109230965
- Kruk, D. (2024). Cognitive Dissonance on Belarus: Recovery and Adaptation or Stalemate? (Policy Brief Series). FREE Network. https://freepolicybriefs.org/2024/01/08/belarusian-economy-outlook/
- Kruk, D. (2023). What is Needed to Reinforce Macroeconomic Stability in Belarus? (In Russian) (85; BEROC Working Paper Series, p. 52). BEROC. https://beroc.org/publications/working_papers/chto-nuzhno-dlya-ukrepleniya-makroekonomicheskoy-stabilnosti-v-belarusi/
- Kruk, D., & Lvovskiy, L. (2022). Belarus Under War Sanctions (Policy Brief Series). FREE Network. https://freepolicybriefs.org/2022/10/17/belarus-under-sanctions/
- Turarbekova, R. (2024). The Union State: Belarus’ Increasing Dependence on Russia and the Risk of Sovereignty Erosion, 2020-2023 [SCEEUS Guest Commentary]. https://sceeus.se/en/publications/the-union-state-belarus-increasing-dependence-on-russia-and-the-risk-of-sovereignty-erosion-2020-2023/
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Moldova’s EU Integration and the Special Case of Transnistria
In the shadow of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, another East European country is actively working to secure its European future. After three years of negotiating cooperation agreements with the European Commission, Moldova finally obtained its EU candidate status and is now on track to join the EU as a member state. However, among many remaining obstacles on the path to full membership, one stands out as especially problematic: the region of Transnistria. The region, officially Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic, is an internationally unrecognized country and is rather seen as a region with which Russia has “special relations”, including a military presence in the region since 1992. This policy brief provides an overview of the current state of the Transnistrian economy and its relationships with Moldova, the EU, and Russia, arguing that Transnistria’s economy is de facto already integrated into the Moldovan and EU economies. It also points to the key challenges to resolve for a successful integration of Moldova into the EU.
Moldova’s EU Integration: The Moldovan Economy on its Path to EU Accession
On December 14th, 2023, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Moldova, recognizing Moldova’s substantial progress when it comes to anti-corruption and de-oligarchisation reforms. The first intergovernmental conference was held on the 25th of June 2024, officially launching accession negotiations (European Council, 2024). On October 20th, 2024, Moldova will hold a referendum on enshrining Moldova’s EU ambitions in the constitution. However, several issues remain to be solved, for Moldova to enter the EU.
With a small and declining population of only about 2.5 million people and a GDP of 16.54 billion US dollars (2023), Moldova remains among the poorest countries in Eastern Europe. In 2023 the GDP per capita was 6600 US dollars in exchange rate terms (substantially higher if using PPP-adjusted measures; World Bank, 2024a). In the last decade, the largest share of its GDP, about 60 percent, stemmed from activities in the services sector, and about 20 and 10 percent from the industrial and agricultural sectors, respectively (Statista, 2024). Despite substantial economic growth in the last decade (3.3 percent on average between 2016 and 2021) and recent reforms (largely under the presidency of Maia Sandu), Moldova remains highly dependent on financial assistance from abroad and remittances, the latter contributing to about 15 – 35 percent of Moldova’s GDP in the last two decades (World Bank, 2024b).
The COVID-19 pandemic and refugee flows caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have only intensified this dependence. Furthermore, these events excavated existing vulnerabilities in the Moldovan economy, such as high inflation and soaring energy and food prices, which depressed households’ disposable incomes and consumption, while war-related uncertainty contributed to weaker investment (World Bank, 2024c).
The Contested Region of Transnistria – Challenge for Moldova’s EU Integration
In addition to Moldova’s economic challenges, the country also faces a particular and unusual problem; it does not fully control its territory. The Transnistrian region in the North-West of the country (at the South-Western border of Ukraine) constitutes about 12 percent of Moldova’s territory. The region has a population of about 350 000 people, mostly Russian-speaking Moldovans, Russians, and Ukrainians.
Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, a movement for self-determination for the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic resulted in a self-declaration of its independence on the 2nd of September 1990. More specifically, the alleged suppression of the Russian language and threats of unification between Moldova and Romania were the main stated reasons for the Transnistrian movement for self-determination, which in turn led to the civil armed conflict in 1992 and a following ceasefire agreement (Government of Republic of Moldova, 1992). The main points of the agreement concern the stationing of Russia’s 14th Army in Transnistria, the establishment of a demilitarized security zone, and the removal of restrictions on the movement of people, goods, and services between Moldova and Transnistria. As of 1992, Transnistria is de-facto an entity under “Russia’s effective control” (Roșa, 2021).
Over the years, the interpretations of the conflict have become more controversial, ranging from the local elite’s perspectives to assertions of an entirely artificial conflict fueled by malign Russian influence (Tofilat and Parlicov, 2020).
Notably, the Moldovan government has never officially recognized Transnistria as an occupied territory (see Article 11 of the Moldovan constitution stating “The Republic of Moldova – a Neutral State (1) The Republic of Moldova proclaims its permanent neutrality. (2) The Republic of Moldova shall not allow the dispersal of foreign military troops on its territory” (Constitute, 2024)).
Furthermore, the European Council’s official recognition of Transnistria as an “occupied territory” on March 15, 2022, underscores the EU’s stance on the matter and highlights Russia’s pivotal role in providing political, economic, and military support to Transnistria (PACE, 2022).
The Transnistrian Economy: Main Indicators and Weaknesses
Despite Russia’s central role in Transnistria, the region’s economy is, in practice, substantially integrated into the Moldovan and EU economies. This fact should be considered at various levels of decision-making when discussing Moldova’s EU accession.
As depicted in Figure 1, economic activity in Transnistria has been quite “stable” in the last decade. GDP per capita has remained around 2000 US dollars, 2,5 times lower than Moldova’s GDP per capita in 2021.
Figure 1. Moldovan and Transnistrian GDP per capita, in thousand USD
Source: Data from World Bank, 2024; Pridnestrovian Republican Bank, 2024a. Note: since 2022 the Pridnestrovian Republican Bank has suspended publishing official statistics on macroeconomic indicators.
However, one must be careful when estimating and interpreting Transnistrian economic indicators in dollar terms. The local currency is the Transnistrian ruble which is not recognized anywhere in the world except in Russia. Its real value is thus highly uncertain as there is no market for this currency. Moreover, only Russian banks are authorized to open accounts and conduct transactions in the currency, demonstrating yet another significant weakness for Transnistria as a potential independent state, particularly given the current global ban on most Russian banks. As such, the official exchange rate for US dollars should be taken with a grain of salt. At the same time, there are no alternative statistics as the Pridnestrovian Republican Bank is the only source for relevant data on Transnistria.
Another distinctive feature of Transnistria is the substantial reliance on remittances from abroad (see Figure 2). In 2021, remittances amounted to 143.7 million US dollars, constituting 15.5 percent of GDP in 2021 (if relying on the official exchange rate for US dollars, as published by the Pridnestrovian Republican Bank).
Figure 2. Remittances to/from Transnistria, in million USD
Source: Data from the Pridnestrovian Republican Bank (2024b). Note: CIS denotes the Commonwealth of Independent States and all other countries.
Figure 2 illustrates a notable trend of increasing dependency on remittances in recent years, particularly on remittances originating from CIS countries, chiefly Russia and Ukraine.
In terms of reliance on Russia, this dependency is not a concern when it comes to Transnistria’s exports. Foreign trade data from recent years indicates that the Transnistrian economy no longer relies on exports to Russia. As seen in Figure 3, the share of exports to Russia has been constantly declining since 2014 and amounted to merely 9.2 percent in 2021. At the same time, exports to the EU, Moldova and Ukraine collectively accounted for about 80 percent in 2021. The primary commodities driving Transnistrian exports were metal products, amounting to 337.3 million US dollars in 2021, followed by electricity supplies at 130.1 million US dollars. Additionally, food products and raw materials contributed 87.6 million US dollars to Transnistrian exports in the same period.
Figure 3. Transnistrian exports by destination countries, in percent
Source: Data from the Pridnestrovian Republican Bank Bulletins (2024c).
These figures highlight the significant integration of the Transnistrian economy into the European market and, to some extent, indicate the strong potential to further align in this direction.
The increase in Transnistria’s exports to the EU in recent years can be largely attributed to the implementation of mandatory registration of Transnistrian enterprises in Moldova in 2006 as a prerequisite for engaging in foreign economic activities (EUBAM, 2017). Consequently, Moldova has exercised full control over Transnistrian exports and partial control over its imports since 2006.
However, Transnistria remains reliant on Russia for its imports, particularly in the energy sector. In contrast to the export structure, Russia’s share in Transnistrian imports was significantly larger in 2021. About 45 percent of the imports originated from Russia in 2021, and mostly constituted of fuel and energy goods (447.0 million US dollars) and metal imports (254.3 million US dollars), quite typical for a transition economy.
Figure 4. Transnistrian imports by origin countries, in percent
Source: Data from the Pridnestrovian Republican Bank Bulletins (2024c).
Transnistria’s Energy Dependence on Russia
The biggest challenge for Transnistria, as well as for Moldova, is the large fuel and energy dependence on Russia, mostly in the form of natural gas.
For many years, gas has been supplied to Transnistria effectively for free, often in the form of a so-called “gas subsidy” (Roșa, 2021). This gas flows through Transnistria to Moldova, effectively accumulating a gas debt. Typically, Gazprom supplies gas to Moldovagaz, which in turn distributes gas to Moldovan consumers and to Tiraspol-Transgaz in Transnistria. Tiraspol-Transgaz then resell the gas at subsidized tariffs to local Transnistrian households and businesses. This included providing gas to the Moldovan State Regional Power Station, also known as MGRES – the largest power plant in Moldova. MGRES, in turn, exports electricity, further highlighting the interconnectedness of energy distribution between the Transnistrian region and the rest of Moldova.
Figure 5. Export/import of fuel and energy products from/to Transnistria, in million USD
Source: Data from the Pridnestrovian Republican Bank Bulletins (2024c). Note: Data for 2017 and 2018 unavailable.
The revenue generated from energy exports to Moldova has been deposited into a so-called special gas account and subsequently channeled directly into the Transnistrian budget in the form of loans from Tiraspol-Transgaz. In this way the Transnistrian government has covered more than 30 percent of their total budgetary expenditures over the last ten-year period. This further points to Transnistria’s’ fiscal inefficiencies and highlights its precarious dependency on gas from the Russian Federation.
In the last few years there have however been repeated disruptions in the gas supply and continuous disputes about prices and how much Moldovagaz owes Gazprom. De jure Tiraspol-Transgaz operates as a subsidiary of Moldovagaz, but de facto its assets were effectively nationalized by the separatist authorities in Transnistria (Tofilat and Parlicov, 2020). These unclarities has led to multiple conflicts over who owes the built-up gas debt. Given the ownership structure the debt is often seen as “Moldovan debt to Russia” (see e.g., Miller, 2023), albeit created by Transnistrian authorities. According to Gazprom, the outstanding amount owed by Moldovagaz to Gazprom stood at approximately 8 billion USD at the end of 2019 (Gazprom, 2024). This corresponds to about 7 times of Transnistria’s GDP. The Moldavian assessment of the debt is about two orders of magnitude lower (Gotev, 2023).
The disagreement on the debt amount was the official reason for the gas supply to be drastically reduced in October 2022. From December 2022 to March 2023, Russia’s Gazprom supplied gas only to Transnistria and it was not until March 2023 that supplies to the rest of Moldova were resumed. Since then, there have been shifts back and forth with Moldova mainly buying gas from Moldovan state-owned Energocom, which imports gas from suppliers other than Gazprom (Całus, 2023; Tanas, 2023). Understanding all turns and events is at times challenging due to lack of transparency in dealings.
Currently, despite Gazprom’s debt claims, the entirety of Transnistria’s gas is still being provided by Russia. While this is a relatively “cheap” investment from the Russian perspective, its impact on Moldova is large, as highlighted by Tofilat and Parlicov (2020) “the bottomline costs for Russia with maintaining Transnistria as its main instrument of influence in Moldova was at most USD 1 billion—not too expensive for twenty-seven years of influence in a European country of 3 million people”.
Corruption in Transnistria – Who is the Real “Sheriff”?
Another obstacle hindering a resolution of the Transnistrian conflict is the near complete monopoly of political and economic power held by Transnistria’s former President Igor Smirnov (1991-2011), through his strong ties to the Sheriff corporation. The corporation, established in 1993 by two former members of Transnistria’s “special services” (Ilya Kazmaly and Victor Gushan), was enabled by Transnistria’s former president, Igor Smirnov. For instance, the Sheriff company was exempt from paying customs duties and was permitted to monopolize trade, oil, and telecommunications in Transnistria. In return, the company supported Smirnov’s party during his presidency. For more on the conflict between Transnistria’s power clans and their relationships with Russia, see Hedenskog and Roine (2009) and Wesolowsky (2021).
The Sheriff company encompasses supermarkets, gas stations, construction firms, hotels, a mobile phone network, bakeries, a distillery, and a mini media empire comprising radio and TV stations. Presently, the company is reported to exert control over approximately 60 percent of the region’s economy (Wesolowsky, 2021).
A straightforward illustration of Sheriff’s political influence is the establishment of the Sheriff football team. For the team, Victor Gushan constructed the Sheriff sports complex, the largest football stadium in Moldova, accommodating
12 746 spectators. This investment in sports infrastructure is notable, especially considering that the total population of Transnistria is only approximately 350 000, and that the region is fairy poor. A similar example concerns the allocation of a land plot of 6.4 hectares to the company “to expand the construction of sports complex for long-term use under a simplified privatization procedure” signed directly by the former president.
While these details may seem peripheral to broader problems, they illustrate how some vested interests in the Transnistrian region may not be keen to change towards a society based on the rule-of-law, increased transparency and a market-oriented economy.
Moldova’s Options for Resolving the Transnistrian Conflict in EU Integration
As Moldova grapples with both the consequences of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and the prolonged “frozen” conflict with Transnistria, its economy remains vulnerable. With the recent attainment of EU candidate status, it’s essential for the Moldovan government to map out ways to solve the conflict despite strong interest from powerful political and economic groups in preserving the status quo.
While the perspectives of resolving the Transnistrian conflict obviously hinge on Russian troops withdrawing from the region, Moldova would also need to address a wide range of economic issues. The Transnistrian economy faces numerous critical structural challenges including a persistent negative foreign trade balance, an unsustainable banking system, and pervasive corruption. Notably, the dominant oligarchic entity, the Sheriff company, exercises monopolistic political and economic influence, striving to preserve the status quo for Transnistria. The obvious unviability of the local currency due to its artificial nature and a complete dependency on Russia’s banking system are additional challenges to be solved for Moldova to be able to integrate Transnistria properly into its economy. Therefore, introducing additional measures such as restricting access to remittances in Transnistria, and imposing personal sanctions on elite groups could help Moldova in establishing economic control over the region.
Furthermore, while the Transnistrian region de-facto has strong economic ties with the Moldovan and European markets in terms of exports, its heavy reliance on Russian gas imports remains a significant vulnerability.
When integrating Transnistria and severing its ties with Russia, Moldova would also need to resolve the issues arising from its reliance on the electricity produced at MGRES using subsidized Russian gas. Natural gas bought at market prices would make Moldovan electricity highly costly, presenting financial challenges to Moldova, and effectively destroying the competitive advantage and important source of revenue in the Transnistrian region. Moreover, alternative electricity routes to Moldova are yet to be completed (with an estimated cost of approximately 27 million EUR).
These and other issues need to be dealt with for a successful Moldovan transition into the EU. Although these challenges are highly important from a Moldovan point of view, and even more so from a Transnistrian perspective, it should be emphasized that these issues are, in economic terms, relatively small for the EU. Given that the EU has opened the way for Moldovan accession, it should be ready to step up financially to help Moldova solve these issues and stay on the membership path.
References
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- Constitute. (2024). Constitution of Moldova (Republic of) 1994 (revision 2016). Https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Moldova_2016
- European Council. (2024, June 25). EU opens accession negotiations with Moldova. https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-opens-accession-negotiations-moldova-2024-06-25_en
- European Parliament. (2022, June 23). Grant EU candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova without delay. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20220616IPR33216/grant-eu-candidate-status-to-ukraine-and-moldova-without-delay-meps-demand
- European Union Border Assistance Mission to Republic of Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM). (2017). ENPI 2008 C2008 3821 RAP East EUBAM 6. https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2017-03/enpi_2008_c2008_3821_rap_east_eubam_6.pdf
- Gazprom. (2024). Gazprom financial report for Q4/2019. https://www.gazprom.ru/f/posts/77/885487/gazprom-ifrs-2019-12m-ru.pdf
- Gotev, G. (2023, September 7). Moldova puts its debt to Gazprom at $8.6 million, Russia disagrees. EURACTIV. https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/moldova-puts-its-debt-to-gazprom-at-8-6-million-russia-disagrees/
- Government of Republic of Moldova. (1992, July 21). Agreement on Principles of Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Conflict in the Transnistrian Region of Moldovan Republic. https://gov.md/sites/default/files/1992-07-21-ru-moscow-agr_on_principles_of_peaceful_settlem.pdf
- Hedenskog, J., & Roine, J. (2009). Transnistrien. En Ekonomisk och Säkerhetspolitisk Analys. Utrikesdepartementet/Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Sweden. Stockholm, 40 p.
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- Pridnestrovian Republican Bank (2024c). Pridnestrovian Republican Bank Bulletins. https://www.cbpmr.net/content.php?Id=28&lang=ru
- Racz, A. (2016, April 8). The Frozen Conflicts of the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood and Their Impact on the Respect of Human Rights. European Parliament Think Tank. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_STU(2016)578001
- Roșa, V. (2021, October 18). The Transnistrian Conflict: 30 Years Searching for a Settlement. SCEEUS Reports on Human Rights and Security in Eastern Europe No.4. https://sceeus.se/publikationer/the-transnistrian-conflict-30-years-searching-for-a-settlement/
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- Tanas, A. (2023, March 21). Moldova resumes gas purchases from Russia’s Gazprom -Moldovagaz head. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/moldova-resumes-gas-purchases-russias-gazprom-moldovagaz-head-2023-03-21/
- Tofilat, S., & Parlicov, V. (2020, August 14). Russian Gas and the Financing of Separatism in Moldova. The Kremlin’s Influence Quarterly #2. https://www.4freerussia.org/russian-gas-and-the-financing-of-separatism-in-moldova/
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Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Russia in Africa: What the Literature Reveals and Why It Matters
Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has become increasingly isolated. In an attempt to counter Western powers’ efforts to suppress its economy and soft power impacts, Russia has tried to increase its influence in other parts of the world. In particular, Russia is increasingly active in Africa, having become a key partner to several African regimes, typically operating in areas with weak institutions and governments. Additionally, Russia’s approach has a different focus and objectives compared to other foreign actors, which may have both short and long term consequences for the continent’s development. Deepening our understanding of Russia’s distinct approach alongside those of other global actors, as well as the future implications of their involvement on the continent is, thus, of crucial importance.
Introduction
The new Foreign Policy Concept, adopted by the Russian government in March 2023, dedicates, for the first time, a separate section to Africa. The previous versions of the policy grouped North Africa with the Middle East and contained only a single paragraph, kept unchanged over time, about Sub-Saharan Africa. In the midst of its war against Ukraine, Russia is getting serious about Africa. What do we know about the reasons for and implications of this trend?
A relatively large literature in economics, political science, international relations, and other related fields has dealt with the Soviet Union’s engagement with African regimes (see overviews in Morris, 1973 and Ramani, 2023). However, the number of studies following the evolution of these relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union is significantly smaller, reflecting Russia’s strategic withdrawal from the region between 1990 and 2015. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s increased interest in and engagement on the African continent has been increasingly discussed by security analysts and think tanks (see for instance Siegel, 2021; Stanyard, Vircoulon and Rademeyer, 2023; Jones, et al., 2021). Primarily highlighted are Russia’s interest in mineral deposits, its large-scale arms’ exports to African regimes, its dominance on the nuclear energy market with resulting dependency on Russian nuclear fuels, and its ambition to undermine Western capacities by the spread of Russian propaganda and anti-Western sentiments (Lindén, 2023). Each of these dimensions carries potentially profound and far-reaching implications for the continent’s development, as underscored by various strands of literature. Research contributions on this specific new trend are however still very limited and predominantly of a qualitative and exploratory nature.
There is, however, substantial general knowledge about the various forms that foreign interests can take, including trade, investment, development aid, propaganda, election interference, and involvement in conflicts, and their potential consequences for development. This brief presents an overview of selected literature that most closely relates to foreign influence in Africa.
Background: Theories of Foreign Policy
Two contrasting approaches are used to describe the way countries engage with the international community. The first one is the so-called realist perspective, which emphasizes the role of power, national interests, and security in shaping foreign policy (Mearsheimer, 1995). In this model, countries act in their self-interest, and often in competition or even conflict with other countries. Strategic alliances and a willingness to use force to advance one’s interests are contemplated under this perspective. The second approach is the idealist perspective, in which foreign policy is used to promote democratic values, human rights, and international cooperation, prioritizing tools such as diplomacy, international law, and multilateral institutions (Lancaster, 2008). For countries at the receiving end of major powers’ foreign policy agendas, and particularly for developing countries, the implications from the contrasting approaches will be widely different. While even a realist foreign policy may ostensibly incorporate concerns about the welfare and development of its allies, these are often not more than a thin disguise for the ultimate objective of buying political support and commercial advantages. A genuine interest in the welfare and development of receiving partners only finds a place under the idealist perspective, although even idealism is at times claimed to “greenwash” state actors’ own interests (Delmas and Burbano, 2011). While this claim has some substance to it, such accusations can also stem from the anti-western rhetoric typically pursued by Russia and aimed at undermining the credibility of actors with good intentions.
In practice, most countries’ foreign policies incorporate elements of both realism and idealism, although the balance between the two may vary. Some countries may have a predominantly realist approach, while others may prioritize idealist goals. Additionally, the same country may shift its approach over time, depending on changing circumstances and priorities. Idealism may be more prominent during periods of stability and prosperity, when countries have the resources and political will to pursue more ambitious foreign policy goals. Realism tends to become more prominent in times of crisis, when countries face serious threats to their national security or economic well-being. Historical examples of the latter are the aftermath of World War II, the Cold War, and even the 2008 global financial crisis (Roberts, 2020).
Comparative Analysis of Foreign Influence
A few studies, recent enough to encompass Russia’s renewed interest in Africa post-2015 but not enough to cover the current day resurgence, explicitly compare the strategy of different actors and their long-term influence. Trunkos (2021) develops a new soft power measure for the time-period 1995–2015, to test the commonly accepted claim in the political science literature that American soft power use has been declining while Russian and Chinese soft power use has been increasing. In the author’s own words, “the findings indicate that surprisingly the US is still using more soft power than Russia and China. The data analysis also reveals that the US is leading in economic soft power actions over China and in military soft power actions over Russia as well.”
Castaneda Dower et al. (2021) take a longer-term perspective and categorize African countries into two blocs one Western-leaning and one pro-Soviet, based on a game-theoretical model of alliances. This categorization aligns well with UN voting patterns during the Cold War, but it does not predict alignment as effectively in the post-Cold War period. The study finds no significant difference in average GDP growth between the two blocs for the period from 1990 to 2016. However, the bloc with Western-like characteristics shows higher levels of inequality and greater reliance on the market economy – as opposed to the planned one. It also has higher human capital, more gender parity (in education), and better democracy scores, but lower infrastructure capital compared to the other bloc.
Another strand of literature has looked into the deep changes that have occurred over time within the global development architecture, highlighting changes in donor and partner motivations after the end of the Cold War (Boschini and Olofsgård, 2007; Frot, Olofsgård and Perrotta Berlin, 2014), through the Arab Spring (Challand, 2014), and more recently under the emergence of new actors, chiefly China (Blair, Marty and Roessler, 2021). Studies in this area aim to highlight what implications the varying ideologies and motivation for cooperation in the donor countries have for countries at the receiving end. Competing aid regimes generate soft power through public diplomacy, often in the form of branding (for instance through putting origin “flags” on aid projects or investments). This type of positive association has been shown to generate ‘positive affect’ toward donors (Andrabi and Das, 2010), and to strengthen recipients’ perceptions of the models of governance and development that such donors promote – liberal democracy, for example, or free market capitalism (Blair, Marty and Roessler, 2021).
Emerging Players on the African Stage
An extensive literature has examined the various facets of established power actors’ presence on the continent, spanning foreign aid, diplomatic relations, and military involvement, revealing significant impacts on local economic development through multiple channels. The United States, along with other former colonial powers and major Western donors, plays a particularly prominent role in this context. Against this background, recent research has increasingly focused on the rise of new actors, and in particular China’s expanding role as a donor and investor in Africa (Bluhm, 2018; Brautigam, 2008; Brazys, Elkink and Kelly, 2017; Dreher et al. 2018). While the consensus is still unclear on whether China’s approach to aid attracts support among African citizens (Lekorwe et al. 2016; Blair, Marty, and Roessler, 2021), recent research also shows that Chinese aid exacerbates corruption and undermines collective bargaining in recipient countries (Isaksson and Kotsadam 2018a; 2018b).
As mentioned, there are as yet very few recent articles concerned with the reasons for Russia’s renewed interest in Africa (see Marten, 2019; Akinlolu and Ogunnubi, 2021; Ramani, 2023), and even fewer analyzing the potential impacts from it. One working paper, not citable due to the authors’ wishes, has quantitatively mapped and explicitly analyzed the impact of Russian military presence (in particular, of the Wagner Group) in Africa. The study found that the infamous paramilitary group faces fewer repercussions for human rights violations and commits more lethal actions than the state actors that employ them. In another recent study on the Central African Republic (CAR), Gang et al. (2023) found not only mortality levels in CAR to be four times higher than what estimated by the UN but also that Wagner mercenaries have contributed to “increased difficulties of survival” for the population in affected areas. Pardyak, M. (2022) explores the communication strategies employed by the key actors in the war, specifically focusing on how these strategies are received in African societies. Based on the analysis of over 140 media articles published in several African countries up to 15 October 2022, complemented by street surveys in Cairo, and in-depth interviews with Egyptians and Sudanese migrants, the study concludes that Russia’s multipolar perspective on the international order is more widely supported in Africa than Western strategies.
When viewed in a historical context, however, Russia’s actions reflect a longstanding adherence to a realist approach in its foreign policy endeavors. Throughout its trajectory, Russia has consistently prioritized national security and economic interests, frequently leveraging military and economic means to safeguard these interests (Tsygankov and Tsygankov, 2010). Presently, amid mounting pressures from the Western democratic world following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia finds itself increasingly reliant on a realist approach. While the Chinese engagement in Africa is also characterized by realist principles, it’s important to emphasize that the Russian approach diverges from that of China. China is focused on a long-term presence, infrastructure building and investments. It has no interest in democracy and human rights, is efficient and cheap though not always loved (Isaksson and Kotsadam, 2018b). Russia’s interest is more short term and opportunistic, seeking out countries rich in natural resources with unstable governments and weak institutions, such as Libya, Sudan, Mozambique, the Central African Republic, Mali, Burkina Faso and Madagascar. Russia typically targets undemocratic elites or military juntas, offering political support, military equipment sales, and security cooperation (in particular through the Wagner Group) in exchange for access to natural resources, concession rights and influence. State of the art research on a previous period (Berman et al., 2017, spanning 1997 to 2010), although not exclusively focused on Russia, finds that rents from mineral contracts, captured by swings in global mineral prices for a causal interpretation, lead to a higher likelihood of local conflicts, and furthermore that the control of mining areas by rebel groups can escalate violence beyond the local level.
Russia is pursuing a range of strategic goals that include diplomatic legitimization, media influence, military presence, elite influence, arms export, and shaping voting patterns in international organizations (Lindén, 2023). Like China, Russia is uninterested in democracy or human rights. Moreover, what Russia stands for is in stark contrast to the Western model. Russia embodies autocracy and backward revisionist values (for instance in areas such as attitudes to gender equality and the sustainability agenda) while the West generally promotes democracy and progressive inclusive solutions (Lindén, 2023). What also especially characterizes Russia is the particular attraction towards the presence of anti-West sentiment, which it fuels through populistic anti-colonial disinformation and propaganda. This approach has been criticized for potentially weakening democratic norms and sidelining African agency (Akinlolu and Ogunnubi, 2021). Additionally, Russia’s disregard for the socio-political realities in Africa, typically associated with a self-interested realist approach, can lead to ineffective engagement and unintended negative consequences, undermining the long-term sustainability of both social and economic developments in the region.
Conclusion
Many African countries find themselves in a delicate balancing act, as they cannot afford to push away Russia nor displease their historical Western partners. This attempt to balance between actors poses several risks and potentially detrimental consequences, including reduced development cooperation, slower democratization, limited progress on human rights, and increased conflicts. Additionally, Russia’s growing presence in Africa can have implications for the interests and policies of the European Union (EU) and its member states as well as global actors, including impacts on migration, terrorism, the energy sector as well as on trade and aid flows.
In light of the diverse strategies foreign powers use in their relations with African countries and the significant impact these strategies have, it is crucial to deepen our understanding of foreign engagements in Africa. By examining Russia’s distinct approach alongside those of other global actors, we can gain valuable insights into the complex dynamics shaping the continent’s political, economic, and social landscape, both now and in the future. Expanding research in this area is not only desirable but essential for informing policy and development strategies.
References
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Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Why the National Bank of Georgia Is Ditching Dollars for Gold
The National Bank of Georgia (NBG) recently acquired 7 tons of high-quality monetary gold valued at 500 million dollars, constituting approximately 11 percent of the banks’ total reserves. This marked the first occasion that Georgia acquired gold for its reserves since regaining its independence. The acquisition is a significant event, prompted by the NBG’s stated aim to enhance diversification amidst increased global geopolitical risks. However, diversification is just one of the reasons many countries are extensively purchasing gold. Another reason for increasing gold reserves is to lessen one’s reliance on the US dollar and to protect against sanctions, as seen with Russia and Belarus following the annexation of Crimea. While the NBG’s gold acquisition aligns with economic rationale, recent domestic developments suggest other motives. Actions like sanctions on political figures, anti-Western rhetoric, and recent legislation (the Law of Transparency of Foreign Influence), diverging Georgia from an EU pathway call for speculation that the gold purchase is driven by fear a of potential sanctions and as a preparedness strategy.
Introduction
The National Bank of Georgia (NBG) has broken new ground by adding gold to the country’s international reserves for the first time ever. Georgia has thus become the first country in the South Caucasus to purchase gold for its reserves. In line with its Board’s decision on March 1, 2024, the NBG procured 7 tons of the highest quality (999.9) monetary gold. The acquisition, valued at 500 million US dollars, took the form of internationally standardized gold bars, purchased from the London gold bar market and currently stored in London. Presently, the acquired gold represents approximately 11 percent of the NBG’s international reserves (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. NBG’s Official Reserve Assets and Other Foreign Currency Assets, 2023-2024.
Source: The National Bank of Georgia.
The NBG emphasizes in its official statement that the acquisition of gold is not merely symbolic but rather reflects a deliberate strategy of diversifying NBG’s portfolio and enhancing its resilience to external shocks. The NBG’s decision was made during a period marked by significant economic and political events both within and outside Georgia. Key among these were global and regional geopolitical tensions that amplified concerns about economic downturns and rising inflation. The Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 led to stagflation across many countries, including Georgia. Despite some recovery in GDP, high inflation continued into 2021. Furthermore, the Russian war on Ukraine disrupted supply chains, and pushed global inflation to a 24-year high 8.7 percent in 2022. In response, stringent monetary policies aimed at controlling inflation were implemented across both developing and advanced economies. Looking ahead, there is an expectation of a shift toward more expansionary monetary policies that should help lower interest rates (and lower yields on assets held by central banks). These global conditions provide context for the NBG’s strategic focus on diversification.
However, alongside these economic events, Georgia also faces significant political challenges. Since the beginning of Russia’s war in Ukraine in 2022, political tensions in Georgia have escalated. Notable actions such as the U.S. imposing sanctions on influential Georgian figures, including judges and the former chief prosecutor, have, among other things, intensified scrutiny into the Russian influence in Georgia. Concerns about the independence of the Central Bank, which changed the rule of handling sanctions applications for Georgia’s citizens, and legislative initiatives like the Law of Transparency of Foreign Influence, which undermines Georgia’s EU accession ambitions, have triggered reactions from the country’s partners and massive public protests. Moreover, anti-Western rhetoric from the ruling party has raised concerns. In addition, the parliament of Georgia recently approved an amendment to the Tax Cide, a so-called ‘law on offshores’. The opaque nature of the law, as well as the context and speed at which it was advanced, sparked outcry and conjecture about its true purpose. These elements lead to speculation that the decision to purchase gold may be motivated by a desire for greater autonomy or a fear of potential sanctions, rather than purely economic reasons.
In the context of the above, this policy brief seeks to explore the motivations behind gold acquisitions by Central Banks, drawing on the experiences of both developed and developing countries. It aims to review existing literature that explores various reasons for gold acquisitions, providing a comprehensive analysis of economic and potentially non-economic factors influencing such decisions.
The Return of Gold in Global Finance
Over the past decade, central bank gold reserves have significantly increased, reversing a 40-year trend of decline. The shift that began around the time of the 2008-09 Global Financial Crisis is depicted in Figures 2 and 3, highlighting the transition from a pre-crisis period of more countries selling gold, to a post-crisis period where more countries have been purchasing gold.
Figure 2. Gold Holdings in Official Reserve Assets, 1999-2022 (million fine Troy ounces).
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.
Figure 3. Number of Countries Purchasing/Selling Monetary Gold, 2000-2021 (at least 1 metric ton of gold in a given year).
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.
In 2023, central banks added a considerable amount of gold to their reserves. The largest purchases have been reported for China, Poland, and Singapore, with these nations collectively dominating the gold buying landscape during the year.
China is one of the top buyers of gold worldwide. In 2023, the People’s Bank of China emerged as the top gold purchaser globally, adding a record 225 tonnes to its reserves, the highest yearly increase since at least 1977, bringing its total gold reserves to 2,235 tonnes. Despite this significant addition, gold still represents only 4 percent of China’s extensive international reserves.
The National Bank of Poland was another significant buyer in 2023, acquiring 130 tonnes of gold, which boosted its reserves by 57 percent to 359 tonnes, surpassing its initial target and reaching the bank’s highest recorded annual level.
Other central banks, including the Monetary Authority of Singapore, the Central Bank of Libya, and the Czech National Bank, also increased their gold holdings, albeit on a smaller scale. These purchases reflect a broader trend of central banks diversifying their reserves and enhancing financial security amidst global economic uncertainties.
Conversely, the National Bank of Kazakhstan and the Central Bank of Uzbekistan were notable sellers, actively managing their substantial gold reserves in response to domestic production and market conditions. The Central Bank of Bolivia and the Central Bank of Turkey also reduced their gold holdings, primarily to address domestic financial needs.
The U.S. continues to hold the world’s largest gold reserve (25.4 percent of total gold reserves), which underscores the metal’s enduring appeal as a store of value among the world’s leading economies. The U.S. is followed by Germany at 10.5 percent, and Italy and France at 7.6 percent respectively. At present, around one-eighth of the world’s currency reserves comprise of gold, with central banks collectively holding 20 percent of the global gold supply (NBG, 2024).
Why Central Banks are Buying Gold Again
A 2023 World Gold Council survey (on central banks revealed five key motivations for holding gold reserves: (1) historical precedent (77 percent of respondents), (2) crisis resilience (74 percent), (3) long-term value preservation (74 percent), (4) portfolio diversification (70 percent), and (5) sovereign risk mitigation (68 percent). Notably, emerging markets placed a higher emphasis (61 percent) on gold as a “geopolitical diversifier“ compared to developed economies (45 percent).
However, the increasing use of the SWIFT system for sanctions enforcement (e.g., Iran in 2015 and Russia in 2022) has introduced a new factor influencing gold purchases of some governments: safeguarding against sanctions (Arslanalp, Eichengreen and Simpson-Bell, 2023).
In addition, Arslanalp, Eichengreen, and Simpson-Bell (2023) conclude that central banks’ decisions to acquire gold are primarily driven by the following factors; inflation, the use of floating exchange rates, a nation’s fiscal stability, the threat of sanctions, and the degree of trade openness (see Figure 4).
Figure 4. Determinants of Gold Shares in Emerging Market and Developing Economies.
Source: Arslanalp, Eichengreen, and Simpson-Bell (2023).
Gold as a Hedging Instrument
Gold is considered a safe haven and an attractive asset in periods of significant economic, financial, and geopolitical uncertainty (Beckman, Berger, & Czudaj, 2019). This is particularly relevant when returns on reserve currencies are low, a scenario prevalent in recent years.
A hedge against inflation: Inflation presents a significant challenge for central banks, as it erodes the purchasing power of a nation’s currency. Gold has been a long-standing consideration for central banks as a potential inflation hedge. Its price often exhibits an inverse relationship with the value of the US dollar, meaning it tends to appreciate as the dollar depreciates. This phenomenon can be attributed to two primary factors: (1) increased demand during inflationary periods; and (2) gold tends to have intrinsic value unlike currencies (Stonex Bullion, 2024).
Diversification of portfolio: Diversification is a cornerstone principle of portfolio management. It involves allocating investments across various asset classes to mitigate risk. Gold, with its negative correlation to traditional assets like stocks and bonds, can be a valuable tool for portfolio diversification. In simpler terms, when stock prices decline, gold prices often move in the opposite direction, offering a potential hedge against market downturns (see Figure 5).
Figure 5. How Gold Performs During Recession, 1970-2022.
Source: Bhutada (2022).
Hedge against geopolitical risks: de Besten, Di Casola and Habib (2023) suggest that geopolitical factors may have influenced gold acquisitions for some central banks in 2022. A positive correlation appears to exist between changes in a country’s gold reserves and its geopolitical proximity to China and Russia (compared to the U.S.) for countries actively acquiring gold reserves. This pattern is particularly evident in Belarus and some Central Asian economies, suggesting they may have increased their gold holdings based on geopolitical considerations.
Low or Negative Interest Rates: When interest rates on major reserve currencies like the US dollar are low or negative, it reduces the opportunity cost of holding gold (gold is a passive asset that does not generate periodic income, dividends, and interest benefits). In other words, gold becomes a more attractive option compared to traditional investments that offer minimal or no returns. The prevailing low-interest rate environment, particularly for major reserve currencies like the US dollar, has diminished the opportunity cost of holding gold.
This phenomenon applies to both advanced economies and emerging market economies (EMDEs). Notably, EMDEs with significant dollar-denominated debt are particularly sensitive to fluctuations in US interest rates. Arslanalp, Eichengreen, and Simpson-Bell (2023) conclude that reserve managers are increasingly incorporating gold into their portfolios when returns on reserve currencies are low. Figure 6 illustrates the inverse relationship between the price of gold and the inflation-adjusted 10-year yield.
Figure 6. Gold Price and Inflation-Adjusted 10-Year Yield.
Source: Bloomberg, U.S. Global Investors.
In addition to its aforementioned advantages, gold offers central banks a long-term investment opportunity despite its lack of interest payments, unlike traditional securities. While gold exhibits short-term price volatility, its historical price trend suggests a long-term upward trajectory (see Figure 7).
Figure 7. Gold Price per Troy Ounce (approximately 31.1 grams), in USD.
Source: World Gold Council.
Gold as a Safeguard Against Sanctions
Gold is perceived as a secure and desirable reserve asset in situations where countries face financial sanctions or the risk of asset freezes and seizures (see Table 1). The decision by G7 countries to freeze the foreign exchange reserves of the Bank of Russia in 2022 highlighted the importance of holding reserves in a form less vulnerable to sanctions. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Bank of Russia intensified its gold purchases. By 2021, it had confirmed that its gold reserves were fully vaulted domestically. The imposition of sanctions on Russia, which restrict banks from engaging in most transactions with Russian counterparts and limit the Bank of Russia’s access to international financial markets, further underscores the appeal of gold as a safeguard.
While the recent sanctions imposed by G7 countries, which limit Russian banks from conducting most business with their counterparts and restrict the Bank of Russia from accessing its reserves in foreign banks, are an extreme example, similar sanctions have previously impacted or threatened financial operations of other nations’ central banks and governments. This situation raises the question of whether the risk of sanctions has influenced the observed trend of countries’ increasing their gold reserves (IMF, International Financial Statistics, 2022).
Table 1. Top 10 Annual Increases in the Share of Gold in Reserves, 2000-2021.
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics; Global Sanctions Database (GSDB). Note: Excludes countries with central bank gold purchases from domestic producers.
As outlined in Arslanalp, Eichengreen and Simpson-Bell (2023), there were eight active diversifiers into gold in 2021, each purchasing at least 1 million troy ounces (Kazakhstan, Belarus, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Hungary, Iraq, Argentina, Qatar), exhibiting distinct international economic or political concerns. Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Uzbekistan maintain ties with Russia through the Eurasian Economic Union. Turkey has faced sanctions from both the European Union and the U.S. Iraq has experienced disputes with the U.S., while Hungary has faced similar issues with the European Union. In 2017-21, Qatar was subjected to a travel and economic embargo by Saudi Arabia and neighboring countries. Argentina may have had concerns about asset seizures by foreign courts due to sovereign debt disputes.
Furthermore, according to the Economist (2022), gold is costly to transport, store, and protect. It is expensive to use in transactions and doesn’t earn interest. However, it can be lent out like currencies in a central bank’s reserves. When lent out or used in swaps (where gold is exchanged for currency at agreed dates), it can generate returns. But banks prefer gold to be stored in specific places like the Bank of England or the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which brings back the risk of sanctions. For instance, During the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the subsequent hostage crisis, the United States froze Iranian assets, including the gold reserves held in U.S. banks (Arslanalp, Eichengreen and Simpson-Bell, 2023). The National Bank of Georgia intends to transport its acquired gold from England to Georgia for storage, which could potentially reduce storage costs, but further decrease liquidity.
Arslanalp, Eichengreen, and Simpson-Bell (2023) conclude that since the early 2000s, half of the significant year-over-year increases in central bank gold reserves can be attributed to the threat of sanctions. By examining an indicator that tracks financial sanctions by major economies like the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, and Japan, all key issuers of reserve currencies, the authors have confirmed a positive correlation between such sanctions and the proportion of reserves held in gold. Furthermore, their findings suggest that multilateral sanctions imposed by these countries collectively have a more pronounced effect on increasing gold reserves than unilateral sanctions. This is likely because unilateral sanctions allow room for shifting reserves into the currencies of other non-sanctioning nations, whereas multilateral sanctions increase the risks associated with holding foreign exchange reserves, thus making gold a more attractive option.
The NBG’s Historic Decision
The National Bank of Georgia’s (NBG) recent acquisition of gold for its reserves is likely motivated by a desire to diversify its portfolio and hedge against inflation and geopolitical risks. However, recent developments in Georgia raise questions about the timing of this policy decision, bringing political considerations into the picture.
Among these developments is the 2023 suspension of the IMF program for Georgia, due to concerns about the NBG’s governance (Intellinews, 2023). The amendments to the NBG law in June 2023, which created a new First Deputy and Acting Governor position – superseding the existing succession framework – contradicted IMF Safeguards recommendations and raised concerns about increased political influence (International Monetary Fund, 2024). How the recent gold purchase reflect on the future of IMF cooperation is thus a relevant question to ask.
Another ground for concern is the recent approval by the Georgian Parliament of the anti-democratic “Foreign Influence Transparency” law and the anti-Western rhetoric of the ruling party, which have sparked intensive public protests. European partners warn that the law will not align with Georgia’s European Union aspirations and that it could potentially hinder the country’s advancement on the EU pathway. Rather, the law might distance Georgia from the EU. This law has also increased the concerns for further sanctions on members of the ruling party, government officials, and individuals engaging in anti-West and anti-EU propaganda.
Furthermore, the recent amendment of the Tax Code, the so-called “offshores law” allows for tax-free funds transfers from offshore zones to Georgia. This, combined with other developments, raises questions about whether the government is preparing for potential sanctions, should its relationship with Russia continue to strengthen.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this policy brief highlights that central banks’ acquisition of gold reserves, especially in emerging economies, is motivated by a combination of economic and political factors. The economic incentives include the need for portfolio diversification and protection against inflation and geopolitical instabilities, a trend that became more pronounced following the 2008 global financial crisis. Politically, the accumulation of gold serves as a strategic move to lessen dependency on the U.S. dollar and as a defensive measure against potential international sanctions, as highlighted by the post-2014 geopolitical shifts following Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
In 2024, Georgia purchased gold for the first time since regaining its independence. While its gold purchasing strategy seems to align with these economic motives, the recent domestic political dynamics suggest a deeper, possibly strategic political rationale by the National Bank of Georgia. The imposition of U.S. sanctions on key figures, and recent legislative actions deviating from European Union standards, all amidst increasing anti-Western sentiment, indicate that the NBG’s gold acquisitions might also be driven by a quest for greater safeguard against potential future sanctions. Thus, while economic reasons for the purchase are significant, the political underpinnings in the NBG’s recent actions raise numerous unanswered questions.
References
- Arslanalp, S., Eichengreen, B., & Simpson-Bell, C. (2023). Gold as International Reserves: A Barbarous Relic No More? IMF Working Papers.
- Beckman, J., Berger, T., & Czudaj, R. (2019). Gold Price Dynamics and the Role of Uncertainty. Quantitative Finance , 663-681.
- Bhutada G. (2022). Does Gold’s Value Increase During Recessions? Elements Visualcapitalist.
- de Besten, T., Di Casola, P., & Habib M. M. (2023). Geopolitical fragmentation risks and international currencies. The international role of the euro.
- The Economist. (2022). Why gold has lost some of its investment allure. https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2022/01/08/why-gold-has-lost-some-of-its-investment-allure
- International Monetary Fund (2024). Georgia: 2024 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Georgia. IMF Country Reports 24/135
- Intellinews. (2023). https://www.intellinews.com/georgia-s-national-bank-president-confirms-suspension-of-imf-programme-294545/
- StoneX Bullion (2024). Why Central Banks Buy Gold.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.