Tag: Russia
The 2024 FREE Network Retreat: Economic Research and Capacity Building in Moldova
The 2024 FREE Network Retreat, held in Chisinau, Moldova on September 11-13, brought together representatives from the FREE Network institutes and other stakeholders, focusing on economic research and capacity building, especially in the context of Moldova’s EU accession efforts. The event featured general sessions on institutional development, special tracks on academic, administrative and communication topics, and a half-day conference on “Economic Research and Capacity Building“. Key discussions addressed challenges such as Moldova’s weak economic research infrastructure, policymaking gaps, and the need for capacity building. Several examples of Moldovan success stories were also highlighted. The event concluded with a call for strengthened collaboration and donor support towards economics education and fostering Moldova’s research and capacity-building landscape.
Introduction
The FREE Network Retreat is an annual event for researchers and administrators from the FREE Network institutes. The 2024 Retreat took place in Chisinau, Moldova, September 11-13 and was attended by representatives from BEROC (Belarus – currently in exile in Lithuania), BICEPS (Latvia), CenEA (Poland), ISET (Georgia), KSE (Ukraine) and SITE (Sweden). In addition, although not being a member of the FREE Network, the New Uzbekistan University in Tashkent and its Greater Eurasia Research Center (GEAR) were represented.
Like at previous retreats, there were two general sessions with a focus on the development of the individual institutes and the Network as a whole, and three tracks of special sessions on academic, administration and communication topics. The Retreat also involved a meeting of the FREE Network’s joint initiative The Forum for Research on Gender in Eastern Europe (FROGEE) – and a special side event on the integration of Ukrainian Refugees in Moldova.
An integral part of this year’s Retreat was the half-day conference, “Economic Research and Capacity Building”. Drawing on the FREE Network’s experience, the conference focused on how capacity building and research can facilitate the transformation of societies and economies, particularly within the Moldovan context, on its path towards EU-accession. In addition, it provided the FREE Network members an opportunity to share their experiences of capacity building, economic research and policymaking with Moldovan stakeholders.
The Conference was open to external participants interested in the topic, particularly policymakers, academics, and think tank representatives. It clearly illustrated the need to strengthen not only economic research and capacity building but also academic education in economics and related fields, improve the quality and access to data, and raise the level of competence in economics within the government and public sector in general.
A summary of the Conference discussions is provided below. For a full overview of the program and participants see the Appendix.
The Opening Session
The opening session started with the general observation that EU integration, in addition to being a political and security issue is primarily an economic issue with a need for economic research and analysis that can inform policy discussions and educate current and future stakeholders. Within this context, all the FREE Network institutes have considerable experience engaging in research and discussions of policy and policy reform within the region. With Moldova not (yet) represented in the FREE Network, the Conference served as a platform for the Network to learn and eventually engage in sustainable partnership(s).
The discussion then shifted to the Moldovan situation and the challenges ahead on the path to EU membership. Several challenges were identified: a lack of economic research, with most existing research being rather weak; missing connections between researchers and policymakers; a shortage of human resources; and generally weak institutions; as well as policies often being based on trial and error rather than evidence-based decision-making.
To address these challenges several actions were suggested including the need to strengthen research and independent economic thinking through capacity building; drawing on the experience of the countries that have joined the EU during the last two decades; developing international research cooperation through networks like the FREE Network; business-friendly practices and treating investors right while at the same time encouraging entrepreneurship and educating society on the importance of private and public investments.
The discussion also addressed activities supporting civil society undertaken by the EU and Sweden, respectively. Examples of activities include building partnerships and strong ecosystems for innovation and entrepreneurship, supporting reforms cutting red tape and improving the business climate in general as well as supporting the Academy of Economic Studies Moldova and the Association of Women in Business.
Research and Capacity Building – the Moldovan Perspective
The discussion started with a presentation of three Moldovan success stories. The first one is a recently launched program on media, gaming development and animation. Currently, 1,000 students are being enrolled. The program attracts Moldovans from all over the country as well as Moldovan students abroad who decided to terminate their studies abroad to go back to Moldova and enrol in the program. The success of the program is a good example of cooperation between industry, higher education institutions and the Ministry of Education opening up to new professions and programs that attract young people.
The second example is taken from the fashion industry. Traditionally Moldova has been a country where sewing takes place thanks to cheap labor. However, in recent years a “pipeline” of talent, design and brands has developed. As a result, the value added in the industry and export revenues as well as wages have increased.
The final example is the Moldovan tech industry. The tech industry has been at the forefront and could be considered the tiger of the Moldovan economy with growth rates of 30-40 percent per year. There are two main reasons behind this success: the rapidly developing Moldovan startup scene combined with a 7 percent single tax mechanism for the tech industry.
The discussion then turned to the role of research in policymaking. The first argument put forward focused on the impact (or rather the lack of impact) of research and analysis on Moldovan policymaking. As the examples above show, the Moldovan economy has the potential to develop – however, the policy discussion does not focus on the transition towards higher-value activities. On the contrary, even though Moldovan research highlights the role of transition to higher value-added, this argument has essentially been ignored in the policy debate that has been mostly characterized by rhetoric on job creation rather than transition to an economy that creates jobs within the high(er) value-added sectors. Unfortunately, this is not the only example of Moldovan policy discussions and decision-making ignoring the research perspective and outcomes. Among other examples mentioned is the recent tax reform experience and programs supporting Small and Medium Sized Enterprises. Currently, reforms are driven either by purely political reasons or by lobbying or by any other vested interests. There is essentially no impact assessment or any economic analysis underpinning the decisions. Due to the fact that policy initiatives neither are based on economic analysis nor on best practices, they are vulnerable to clientelism or corruption. The importance of rule of law was emphasized in light of Moldova’s anchoring to the EU and with reference to Latvia and the other Baltic states. It is a too important topic to be left to the lawyers and should hence be part of economic capacity building and research.
The second argument referred to access to reliable data needed for quality policy-oriented research. While the data collected by the National Bureau of Statistics in general is good, the main issue lies in accessing it. The Bureau does not have the resources to support researchers. To exacerbate the problem further, there seems to be no willingness among policymakers to address this issue. Given Moldova’s vulnerability to Russian disinformation and the increased pressure on Moldova, the issue of access to reliable data is even more pressing today than a few years ago.
To foster an informed policy debate and decision-making process taking evidence-based research into account, it would be desirable to create a platform to advocate the results of economic policy analysis where, e.g., policy papers and monitoring reports, could be presented and discussed by experts and decision-makers in the public and private sectors as well as the civil society.
The session continued with a discussion on human capital. The successful program attracting Georgians in the diaspora to return and work for the Georgian government, launched during the first decade of the 2000s, served as the point of departure for the discussion. The key to the success in Georgia was that the government was able to pay competitive salaries. This is one of the main challenges facing Moldova. Even though there have been some adjustments in government salaries during recent years, the government is still far from being anywhere close to paying the same salaries as the private sector in general and think tanks in particular. An understanding of this is important not only at the national level but also among donors. It was noted that there have been some adjustments in government salaries, but it has not been enough. Further, while the Moldovan diaspora are starting to return, they, however, have little governmental or political experience, which makes it difficult to involve them in, e.g. policymaking and development of support programs. It would be good to draw on experiences and best practices from other countries in the region – such as the Baltic states and Georgia – and use them as benchmarks, e.g., for the innovation ecosystem, incubators and accelerators.
Research and Capacity Building – the FREE Network Experience
The FREE Network institutes shared their experiences in capacity building and brain gain, developing an economics undergraduate program, research and policy impact, and network building through research.
ISET (Georgia) shared their experience on attracting talented economists in the Georgian diaspora back to Georgian academia, research, and government positions. The starting point was an initiative developed in collaboration with the donor community to establish a world-class economics school in the Caucasus – the International School of Economics (ISET). The school has developed from a small boutique school to a school with three academic programs (undergraduate and graduate) and about 700 enrolled students. ISET graduates are in high demand and are seen in the private and public sectors. The ISET Policy Institute plays a pivotal role in terms of contributing to evidence-based policymaking. Throughout the years more than 50 ISET graduates have been accepted in Ph.D. programs at top universities worldwide. Many of them have returned to Georgia and ISET after completing their Ph.D. Had not it been for opportunities offered by ISET and the Policy Institute, it is very unlikely that they would have returned. The FREE Network and the opportunities offered are a great resource for the ISET as well as for the ISET Policy Institute.
BEROC (Belarus – in exile in Lithuania since 2022) shared their experience on the process of creating and launching an undergraduate program in economics and business. BEROC started as a research center, but the idea to establish a Bachelor program in economics and business had been around for several years. As part of the re-organization and reformation of the European Humanities University (Belarusian, but in exile), the European Commission approached BEROC asking if it could develop an undergraduate program in economics and business for Belarusian students.
The challenge has been two-fold: first, in the current political situation, Belarusian people are “locked within the country” and for them it is much easier to go to Russia for studies. In addition, the cost of living and the tuition fee (although low by Baltic standards) provide additional barriers to potential students. Second, BEROC operates in exile themselves. Nevertheless, a Bachelor program in economics and business will be launched in October 2024 with the support of Belarusian business in exile. Thanks to cooperation with partners within the FREE Network the program is at the global frontier.
BICEPS (Latvia) provided an overview of how research can contribute to the policy agenda. BICEPS’s first policy reports, published more than 15 years ago, focused on the unsustainable Latvian economic growth and inflation levels at the time. These reports reached conclusions that, while correct ex-post, were contrary to those of the Latvian Central Bank. This divergence sparked substantial discussion at both the political level and in the media.
In the early 2010s, BICEPS was commissioned to produce the first-ever Latvian Competitiveness Report. This report has served as a foundation for policymaking and has left a lasting mark on the policy agenda. Furthermore, following BICEPS’s research on the shadow economy and the annual presentation of the shadow economy index, the Ministry of Finance, through public procurement, commissioned a 2021 project to develop a model addressing the impact of the shadow economy.
The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) Latvia and the EUROMOD tax-benefit microsimulation model are long-term projects run by BICEPS. Current projects include one focused on the impact of broadening the sugar tax base, a regional Global Entrepreneurship Monitor study, a project on road congestion tolls in cities and the development of sustainable agriculture in Africa.
CenEA (Poland) might be small in terms of people employed, but disproportionally big in terms of impact and presence in the Polish policy discussion. From the very beginning, CenEA has aimed at combining policy with solid economic research. The focus has primarily been in the areas of fiscal policy, ageing and health – with the latter two being major issues in Poland.
For CenEA, the FREE Network has been fundamental, both for funding and for building its credibility and position. CenEA has played an active role in terms of broadening and deepening the cooperation within the FREE Network. It has been very active in developing and coordinating the FROGEE project. The project (financed by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, SIDA) has run for six years and covered a wide range of topics within the field of gender equality. It has resulted in several FREE Policy Briefs, policy and research papers, and several conferences and workshops. In addition, the project has contributed to the development of tools and skills for both senior and junior researchers within the Network. Based on the success of the FROGEE project, new projects and initiatives within the Network have been developed.
SITE (Sweden) has taken the lead on the FREECE (the Forum for Research on Eastern Europe: Climate and Environment) project. The project has been around for eighteen months with a focus on the transition from an economy based on the production and consumption of fossil fuels to an economy based on the production and consumption of zero-carbon renewables. This will be a challenge for everyone, especially for countries throughout Eastern Europe that often rely on the extraction and consumption of fossil fuels for employment as well as for energy needs.
The FREECE project provides several opportunities to engage in policy-relevant research while at the same time filling a gap in the literature.
Initiatives and the Road Ahead
At the current stage of Moldovan economic and political development there is a higher demand for analysis and applied research, rather than general and theoretical research. In other words, policy relevance needs to be in focus. At the same time, such applied analysis and research need to involve well-educated human capital with relevant skills, such as university graduates. This puts focus on the role of universities and how they can reform.
The Moldova School of Economics initiative was launched approximately half a year ago. Among the first activities were public lectures on economic behaviour and public policies. In September, in cooperation with CERGE-EI in Prague, the first short economics course was launched. Currently, there are discussions with the Ministry of Education and the State University on developing the initiative into an actual program. So far, the response has been positive. The vision is to create the Moldova School of Economics into an initiative that reaches out not only to Chisinau and Moldova but to the wider region.
The session on this topic proceeded to discuss how the FREE Network could support Moldovan research and capacity building, focusing on its experience in implementing various projects. One potential starting point would be a summer school involving both the FREE Network and Moldovan economists living abroad. There are already contacts with members of the diaspora who have expressed a willingness to participate as faculty members, without compensation. Additionally, there is a need for shorter courses or executive classes aimed at individuals in ministries. Topics to be covered may include basic macroeconomic analysis, fiscal policy, and economic growth. It is also important to incorporate microeconomic subjects, such as the factors driving innovation and the development of economic clusters.
Concluding Comments
The FREE Network Retreat and conference has shown that many of the issues currently facing Moldova, have at least partly been addressed by the FREE Network members in their respective countries. Looking forward this should provide a good basis for cooperation between the Network and Moldovan partners. Three broadly defined areas for collaboration and partnerships were identified: (i) education and training: at the university level as well as for ministries and government agencies; (ii) creation and development of a good environment for research and policy analysis; (iii) communication and outreach.
The dialogue that has been initiated during the conference should continue and include a discussion on how to attract donors to support long-term cooperation that contributes to the needed strengthening of research and capacity building in Moldova.
Appendix
Conference Programme: Economic Research and Capacity Building
9.30 Conference Opening
- Torbjörn Becker, Director, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics
- Jānis Mažeiks, Ambassador of the European Union to the Republic of Moldova
- Katarina Fried, Ambassador of Sweden to the Republic of Moldova
10:00 Research and Capacity Building – the Moldovan perspective
- Doina Nistor, Chief of Party, Moldova Future Technologies Activity
- Adrian Lupușor, Executive Director, Independent Analytical Center Expert-Grup
- Kálmán Mizsei, EU Adviser to the Government of Moldova
10:50 Research and Capacity Building: The FREE Network Experience
- Tamar Sulukhia (ISET, Georgia): Capacity building and brain gain
- Dzmitry Kruk (BEROC, Belarus – in exile): Development of a new academic programme
- Marija Krūmiņa (BICEPS, Latvia): Research and policy impact
- Michal Myck (CenEA, Poland): Network building and the FROGEE experience
- Julius Andersson (SITE, Sweden): Network building and the FREECE experience
11:30 Initiatives and the Road Ahead
- Mihnea Constantinescu, Advisor to the Governor National Bank of Moldova
- Misha Zeldin-Gipsman, the Moldova School of Economics Initiative
12:10 Concluding Comments
- Torbjörn Becker, Director, SITE
- Kata Fredheim, Associate Professor, BICEPS and Stockholm School of Economics in Riga
12:20 Lunch and Networking
Conference moderator: Kata Fredheim, BICEPS and SSE Riga.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Belarus’s Progressing Economic Dependence on Russia and Its Implications
This policy brief examines the complexities surrounding Belarus’s economy as it deepens its economic dependence on Russia. Recent growth, driven by increased domestic demand and a resurgence in exports to Russia, has surpassed expectations. This trajectory is largely due to Belarus’s mounting dependence on Russia across trade, energy, finance, logistics, and other domains, a dependency that poses significant long-term risks and uncertainties. The Belarusian regime has begun to see this relationship not only as a lifeline but also as a potential source of economic enhancement. However, this approach may blur the lines between sustainable growth and short-term gains, fostering uncertainties about the true nature of this economic uptick. Hence, questions on whether this growth is viable or merely cyclical persist. The uncertainty and progressing dependence on Russia, in turn, imply numerous challenges for the political domain.
New Issues on the Belarusian Economic Agenda
The Belarusian economy continues to surprise, displaying output growth substantially higher than previous forecasts (see e.g. BEROC, 2024). In 2024, the economy is projected to grow by around 4.0 percent. The growth is being driven by domestic demand, fueled by rising real wages and labor shortages. However, an underlying factor is the recent resurgence of exports to Russia. The unexpectedly high growth has allowed for the Belarusian economy to surpass pre-war output levels, at the moment defying earlier predictions of stagnation or decline.
Although the growth period has now extended beyond what could be considered a mere “recovery”, the overall picture – as suggested in Kruk (2024) – still appears relevant. Despite the upturn, the economy remains significantly behind the counterfactual ‘no sanctions, no war’ scenario (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. The Dynamics of Output (seasonally adjusted, index, 2018=100): Actual vs. Counterfactual
Moreover, all the risks to long-term growth associated with total dependence on Russia, potential contagion effects from Russia, etc. are still relevant (KAS, 2024; Bornukova, 2023).
At the same time, a prolonged period of growth gives grounds to think about recent trends also from the perspective of ongoing structural changes in the Belarusian economy. Can these changes, besides implying numerous risks, enhance Belarus’s growth potential and degree of sustainability? If so, to what extent, for how long, and under which conditions? With these questions in mind, it is important to gain a better understanding of what aspects of the Belarusian economy are being transformed due to the increased coupling with Russia and which effects, besides increased dependency and corresponding risks, this coupling generates. Are there any growth-enhancing effects? If so, how sustainable are they?
Belarus’s Growing Economic Dependence on Russia
Belarus’s economic dependence on Russia is reaching unprecedented levels, spanning various critical sectors, with new dimensions of reliance emerging in recent years. This dependence is deeply embedded in the trade, energy, financial, and technological sectors of the Belarusian economy, and recent geopolitical shifts have further intensified these connections.
One of the most evident signs of Belarus’s economic reliance on Russia is reflected in its foreign trade. Russian imports make up around 55-60 percent of all imports to Belarus, with a staggering 80 percent consisting of intermediate goods crucial for industrial production. Energy products, including crude oil and natural gas, form the largest part of these imports, with almost all of Belarus’s energy needs being met by Russia. Exports have also become increasingly concentrated to the Russian market. In 2022-2023 there were several periods when about 70 percent of Belarusian exports were directed to Russia, an increase from about 35-40 percent prior to 2022. This surge was driven by new opportunities for Belarusian firms on the Russian market following Western companies withdrawals. Although competition in the Russian market has since intensified, Russia still accounts for around 60-65 percent of Belarus’s total exports (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. The Evolution of Physical Volume of Exports (2018=100) and the Share of Exports to Russia (in percent)
A major new development since 2022 is Belarus’s reliance on Russia for transportation and logistics. Sanctions and the war in Ukraine have forced Belarus to abandon its traditional export routes through European ports, leaving Russian seaports as the only viable option for further exports. In 2023, Belarus secured around 14 million tons of port capacity in Russia, primarily for potash fertilizers and oil products exports. Although it is still below the needed volumes, this logistics dependency significantly exacerbates Belarus’s external trade dependency. Taking into account direct exports and imports to and from Russia, as well as mechanisms of logistics and transport control, Russia essentially “controls” up to 90 percent of Belarusian exports and about 80 percent of its imports.
Energy dependency is another critical factor to consider. Belarus imports over 80 percent of its energy resources from Russia, making it vulnerable to any shifts in Russian energy policy. In fact, Russian energy subsidies have played a crucial role in keeping Belarusian industries competitive. In 2022, when global energy prices spiked, the low and fixed price that Belarus paid for Russian gas and the steep discount on oil supplies translated into record-high energy subsidies. These amounted to billions of US dollars and shielded Belarus from the economic fallout other countries experienced due to rising energy prices. Although the value of these subsidies has somewhat decreased in 2023-2024, they remain significant and vital for Belarus.
Belarus’s fiscal situation has also become increasingly tied to Russia. After years of running budget deficits, Belarus achieved a budget surplus in 2023, largely due to Russian financial assistance. For instance, the budgetary item ‘gratuitous revenues’, which mainly includes reverse excise tax and other transfers from Russia, reached a historical high in 2023, securing revenues of around 3.0 percent of GDP. Without this external support, Belarus would likely face a severe fiscal deficit, forcing cuts in social spending and other areas. The scale of Russian financial aid has become a key factor in maintaining budgetary stability, imposing a serious risk for Belarus. Were Russia to restrict such financing, Belarus would almost instantly lose its fiscal stability.
In the monetary sphere, Belarus’s dependence on Russia manifests through the informal peg of the Belarusian ruble to the Russian ruble. Given the deep trade ties and shared currency use in bilateral transactions, Belarusian monetary policy is effectively constrained by Russian economic conditions. The Belarusian National Bank has little room for maneuver, as any nominal devaluation or appreciation of the ruble tends to self-correct through inflation or price adjustments tied to Russian trade. This linkage limits Belarus’s monetary sovereignty and aligns its inflation trajectory closely with Russia’s.
Belarus’s debt structure underscores this dependency further. Of the country’s roughly 17.0 billion US dollars in external debt, about 65 percent is owed directly to Russia or Russia-controlled entities like the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development. In 2022-2023, Russia granted Belarus a six-year deferment on debt repayments, providing crucial breathing room for the regime. This deferment, along with Belarus’s limited access to other international financial sources due to sanctions, has cemented Russia’s role as the primary creditor and financial lifeline for Belarus.
New dimensions of dependence have also emerged within infrastructure, technology, and cyberspace. As Belarus is cut off from Western technologies and financial systems, it increasingly relies on Russian alternatives. Belarus has adopted Russian software for critical functions such as tax administration, giving Moscow access to sensitive financial data. Similarly, with several Belarusian banks disconnected from SWIFT, the country has integrated into Russia’s financial messaging system, further entrenching its reliance on Russian infrastructure. Belarusian companies, particularly in sectors like accounting and logistics, have also shifted to using Russian business software, while consumers increasingly rely on Russian digital platforms for social networks, payments, and entertainment.
An Attempt to Spur Growth Through Coupling with Russia
From the perspective of macroeconomic stability and the traditional view on strengthening growth potential, Belarus’s progressing dependence on Russia is obviously an evil (Kruk, 2023; Kruk, 2024). However, the Belarusian regime sees it as a necessary trade-off, or a “lesser evil”. In 2021-2023, the coupling was done in exchange for economic survival. Firstly, production coupling allowed to counterweight the losses in output associated with sanctions (as niches were freed up in the Russian market) (Kruk & Lvovskiy, 2022). Secondly, the coupling was driven by pressure from Russia and a desire from Belarusian authorities to rapidly obtain some compensations if accepting Russia’s demands. For example, in 2022-2023, Belarusian enterprises were granted a credit line of 105 billion rubles within so-called import-substitution projects.
However, in 2024, coupling with Russia is beginning to look more like a purposeful strategy by the Belarusian economic authorities rather than just a survival strategy. The regime seems willing to sacrifice sustainability considerations in favor of strengthening the growth potential by ‘directive production coupling’, i.e. artificially shaping value-added chains between producers in Belarus (mainly state-owned enterprises) and Russia. For instance, the regime accepted the co-called Union programs for 2024-2026 (Turarbekova, 2024), which encompass numerous activities by the governments of Belarus and Russia aimed at securing ‘production coupling’ in sectors such as machine building, agricultural and automotive engineering, aviation industry, and elevator manufacturing. In some cases, the Belarusian party solely initiates such kind of sectoral activities. It seems that the authorities either accepted the dependency due to the lack of outside options, or they became more optimistic regarding the possibility to spur economic growth through coupling with Russia based on the experiences from the last couple of years. And to some extent, this logic might hold true.
As in the previous two years, the coupling with Russia may, in the short to medium term, more than compensate for certain institutional weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the Belarusian economy. The positive effects may even extend beyond mere cyclical impacts and, under certain conditions, contribute to a semblance of stability for a period of time. For example, economic growth in Belarus could reach some degree of stability under the following conditions:
- (a) if the war in Ukraine becomes protracted and military demand from Russia remains steady;
- (b) if the Russian economy continues to grow (albeit modestly) in an environment with limited competition in Russian commodity markets;
- (c) if specific tools and forms of support for the Belarusian economy remain in place.
Growth driven by a combination of these preconditions could be sufficiently stable as long as they persist. However, the existence of such a status quo is not inherently sustainable and could vanish at any moment. Each of these preconditions is highly unreliable and comes with its own set of determining factors. Thus, one cannot count on the preservation of the entire “package” of preconditions in the long term.
Conclusions
Belarus and its economic prospects are currently in a highly complex situation. The Belarusian economy has been steadily increasing its degree of coupling with Russia, with the ties strengthening both in the range of economic sectors involved and the depth of their integration.
From a long-term growth perspective, the unprecedented level of dependence on Russia is undoubtedly detrimental. In this regard, Kruk’s (2024) conclusion about the economic and political deadlocks remains entirely relevant.
However, as the past two years have shown, this situation can achieve a certain semblance of stability in the medium term. The Belarusian regime is increasingly viewing its coupling with Russia not only as a mechanism for economic survival but also as a means to enhance economic potential. In this way, the growing dependence on Russia, which brings substantial macroeconomic risks, is seen as an unavoidable cost entailed to the only available mechanism to sustain economic growth in Belarus.
How then, should we interpret the related fluctuations in Belarus’s economy? As an increase in economic potential (equilibrium growth rate) or as cyclical acceleration? Traditional economic logic encounters a contradiction here, as the line between equilibrium growth and cyclical fluctuations becomes blurred. An increase in economic potential should inherently be sustainable, whereas cyclical acceleration is inherently transient. Yet, how should we treat a mechanism that might be somewhat sustainable under certain conditions?
This contradiction creates numerous uncertainties, both strictly within the economic domain and beyond it. Economically, it diminishes the effectiveness of conventional macro forecasting tools, making them more dependent on ad-hoc assumptions. For example, if there is indeed an increase in potential, then macroeconomic projections generated without accounting for this channel (e.g. BEROC, 2024) would likely underestimate output growth while overestimating the risks of overheating and destabilization. Conversely, if the model assumes higher equilibrium growth but it proves unsustainable, the forecast could significantly overestimate growth while underestimating macroeconomic imbalances. In other words, the seemingly favorable situation could ultimately be a harbinger of a macroeconomic storm.
These uncertainties are even more pronounced in the political domain. Up to what threshold can an increasing economic dependency on Russia yield macroeconomic gains for the regime? What political consequences can arise if the strategy of coupling with Russia for growth enhancement fails? Can the progressing dependency on Russia undermine the regime politically? If political barriers for democratization are eliminated, what should and can be done to get rid of the dependence on Russia? Are the estimations and prescriptions in Hartwell et al. (2022) – which considers the perspectives of economic reconstruction for a democratic Belarus and the costs of eliminating the dependency on Russia in pre-war reality – still relevant today?
Answering such questions meaningfully using formal research tools ex-ante is nearly impossible. The dependence of macroeconomic sustainability on non-economic factors and motivations leaves little room for an accurate ex-ante diagnosis of the current state of affairs. Only ex-post will we likely be able to reliably assess which diagnosis is closer to the truth. This, in turn, means that we must accept an additional degree of uncertainty in today’s forecasts and projections. Similar challenges are faced by decision-makers in Belarus. As a result, the likelihood of incorrect economic and political decisions due to misdiagnosing the current situation is relatively high, even in the (more optimistic) scenario where the authorities recognize and account for these uncertainties. Such decisions, if made, could not only be costly but might even trigger rapid and drastic economic and political changes.
References
- BEROC. (2024). Macroeconomic Forecast for Belarus. 2024-2025 (in Russian). BEROC. https://beroc.org/publications/view/makroprognoz-dlya-belarusi-2024-2025/
- Bornukova, K. (2023). The Economic Dimension of the Russian Policy toward Belarus. In A. Moshes & R. Nizhnikau (Eds.), Russian Policy toward Belarus after 2020: At a Turning Point? (pp. 29–46). Lexington Books.
- Hartwell, C., Bornukova, K., Kruk, D., & Zoller-Rydzek, B. (2022). The Economic Reconstruction of Belarus: Next Steps after a Democratic Transition (EP/EXPO/AFET/FWC/2019-01/Lot1/R/03). European Parliament. Directorate General for External Policies. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_STU(2022)653663
- Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. (2024). EU Sanctions against the regime in Minsk (in Russian). https://www.kas.de/documents/285805/31503540/sanctions-6.pdf/4b6d787d-60fa-ba9a-9ff3-a546946dae31?version=1.0&t=1721109230965
- Kruk, D. (2024). Cognitive Dissonance on Belarus: Recovery and Adaptation or Stalemate? (Policy Brief Series). FREE Network. https://freepolicybriefs.org/2024/01/08/belarusian-economy-outlook/
- Kruk, D. (2023). What is Needed to Reinforce Macroeconomic Stability in Belarus? (In Russian) (85; BEROC Working Paper Series, p. 52). BEROC. https://beroc.org/publications/working_papers/chto-nuzhno-dlya-ukrepleniya-makroekonomicheskoy-stabilnosti-v-belarusi/
- Kruk, D., & Lvovskiy, L. (2022). Belarus Under War Sanctions (Policy Brief Series). FREE Network. https://freepolicybriefs.org/2022/10/17/belarus-under-sanctions/
- Turarbekova, R. (2024). The Union State: Belarus’ Increasing Dependence on Russia and the Risk of Sovereignty Erosion, 2020-2023 [SCEEUS Guest Commentary]. https://sceeus.se/en/publications/the-union-state-belarus-increasing-dependence-on-russia-and-the-risk-of-sovereignty-erosion-2020-2023/
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Moldova’s EU Integration and the Special Case of Transnistria
In the shadow of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, another East European country is actively working to secure its European future. After three years of negotiating cooperation agreements with the European Commission, Moldova finally obtained its EU candidate status and is now on track to join the EU as a member state. However, among many remaining obstacles on the path to full membership, one stands out as especially problematic: the region of Transnistria. The region, officially Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic, is an internationally unrecognized country and is rather seen as a region with which Russia has “special relations”, including a military presence in the region since 1992. This policy brief provides an overview of the current state of the Transnistrian economy and its relationships with Moldova, the EU, and Russia, arguing that Transnistria’s economy is de facto already integrated into the Moldovan and EU economies. It also points to the key challenges to resolve for a successful integration of Moldova into the EU.
Moldova’s EU Integration: The Moldovan Economy on its Path to EU Accession
On December 14th, 2023, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with Moldova, recognizing Moldova’s substantial progress when it comes to anti-corruption and de-oligarchisation reforms. The first intergovernmental conference was held on the 25th of June 2024, officially launching accession negotiations (European Council, 2024). On October 20th, 2024, Moldova will hold a referendum on enshrining Moldova’s EU ambitions in the constitution. However, several issues remain to be solved, for Moldova to enter the EU.
With a small and declining population of only about 2.5 million people and a GDP of 16.54 billion US dollars (2023), Moldova remains among the poorest countries in Eastern Europe. In 2023 the GDP per capita was 6600 US dollars in exchange rate terms (substantially higher if using PPP-adjusted measures; World Bank, 2024a). In the last decade, the largest share of its GDP, about 60 percent, stemmed from activities in the services sector, and about 20 and 10 percent from the industrial and agricultural sectors, respectively (Statista, 2024). Despite substantial economic growth in the last decade (3.3 percent on average between 2016 and 2021) and recent reforms (largely under the presidency of Maia Sandu), Moldova remains highly dependent on financial assistance from abroad and remittances, the latter contributing to about 15 – 35 percent of Moldova’s GDP in the last two decades (World Bank, 2024b).
The COVID-19 pandemic and refugee flows caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have only intensified this dependence. Furthermore, these events excavated existing vulnerabilities in the Moldovan economy, such as high inflation and soaring energy and food prices, which depressed households’ disposable incomes and consumption, while war-related uncertainty contributed to weaker investment (World Bank, 2024c).
The Contested Region of Transnistria – Challenge for Moldova’s EU Integration
In addition to Moldova’s economic challenges, the country also faces a particular and unusual problem; it does not fully control its territory. The Transnistrian region in the North-West of the country (at the South-Western border of Ukraine) constitutes about 12 percent of Moldova’s territory. The region has a population of about 350 000 people, mostly Russian-speaking Moldovans, Russians, and Ukrainians.
Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, a movement for self-determination for the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic resulted in a self-declaration of its independence on the 2nd of September 1990. More specifically, the alleged suppression of the Russian language and threats of unification between Moldova and Romania were the main stated reasons for the Transnistrian movement for self-determination, which in turn led to the civil armed conflict in 1992 and a following ceasefire agreement (Government of Republic of Moldova, 1992). The main points of the agreement concern the stationing of Russia’s 14th Army in Transnistria, the establishment of a demilitarized security zone, and the removal of restrictions on the movement of people, goods, and services between Moldova and Transnistria. As of 1992, Transnistria is de-facto an entity under “Russia’s effective control” (Roșa, 2021).
Over the years, the interpretations of the conflict have become more controversial, ranging from the local elite’s perspectives to assertions of an entirely artificial conflict fueled by malign Russian influence (Tofilat and Parlicov, 2020).
Notably, the Moldovan government has never officially recognized Transnistria as an occupied territory (see Article 11 of the Moldovan constitution stating “The Republic of Moldova – a Neutral State (1) The Republic of Moldova proclaims its permanent neutrality. (2) The Republic of Moldova shall not allow the dispersal of foreign military troops on its territory” (Constitute, 2024)).
Furthermore, the European Council’s official recognition of Transnistria as an “occupied territory” on March 15, 2022, underscores the EU’s stance on the matter and highlights Russia’s pivotal role in providing political, economic, and military support to Transnistria (PACE, 2022).
The Transnistrian Economy: Main Indicators and Weaknesses
Despite Russia’s central role in Transnistria, the region’s economy is, in practice, substantially integrated into the Moldovan and EU economies. This fact should be considered at various levels of decision-making when discussing Moldova’s EU accession.
As depicted in Figure 1, economic activity in Transnistria has been quite “stable” in the last decade. GDP per capita has remained around 2000 US dollars, 2,5 times lower than Moldova’s GDP per capita in 2021.
Figure 1. Moldovan and Transnistrian GDP per capita, in thousand USD
However, one must be careful when estimating and interpreting Transnistrian economic indicators in dollar terms. The local currency is the Transnistrian ruble which is not recognized anywhere in the world except in Russia. Its real value is thus highly uncertain as there is no market for this currency. Moreover, only Russian banks are authorized to open accounts and conduct transactions in the currency, demonstrating yet another significant weakness for Transnistria as a potential independent state, particularly given the current global ban on most Russian banks. As such, the official exchange rate for US dollars should be taken with a grain of salt. At the same time, there are no alternative statistics as the Pridnestrovian Republican Bank is the only source for relevant data on Transnistria.
Another distinctive feature of Transnistria is the substantial reliance on remittances from abroad (see Figure 2). In 2021, remittances amounted to 143.7 million US dollars, constituting 15.5 percent of GDP in 2021 (if relying on the official exchange rate for US dollars, as published by the Pridnestrovian Republican Bank).
Figure 2. Remittances to/from Transnistria, in million USD
Figure 2 illustrates a notable trend of increasing dependency on remittances in recent years, particularly on remittances originating from CIS countries, chiefly Russia and Ukraine.
In terms of reliance on Russia, this dependency is not a concern when it comes to Transnistria’s exports. Foreign trade data from recent years indicates that the Transnistrian economy no longer relies on exports to Russia. As seen in Figure 3, the share of exports to Russia has been constantly declining since 2014 and amounted to merely 9.2 percent in 2021. At the same time, exports to the EU, Moldova and Ukraine collectively accounted for about 80 percent in 2021. The primary commodities driving Transnistrian exports were metal products, amounting to 337.3 million US dollars in 2021, followed by electricity supplies at 130.1 million US dollars. Additionally, food products and raw materials contributed 87.6 million US dollars to Transnistrian exports in the same period.
Figure 3. Transnistrian exports by destination countries, in percent
These figures highlight the significant integration of the Transnistrian economy into the European market and, to some extent, indicate the strong potential to further align in this direction.
The increase in Transnistria’s exports to the EU in recent years can be largely attributed to the implementation of mandatory registration of Transnistrian enterprises in Moldova in 2006 as a prerequisite for engaging in foreign economic activities (EUBAM, 2017). Consequently, Moldova has exercised full control over Transnistrian exports and partial control over its imports since 2006.
However, Transnistria remains reliant on Russia for its imports, particularly in the energy sector. In contrast to the export structure, Russia’s share in Transnistrian imports was significantly larger in 2021. About 45 percent of the imports originated from Russia in 2021, and mostly constituted of fuel and energy goods (447.0 million US dollars) and metal imports (254.3 million US dollars), quite typical for a transition economy.
Figure 4. Transnistrian imports by origin countries, in percent
Transnistria’s Energy Dependence on Russia
The biggest challenge for Transnistria, as well as for Moldova, is the large fuel and energy dependence on Russia, mostly in the form of natural gas.
For many years, gas has been supplied to Transnistria effectively for free, often in the form of a so-called “gas subsidy” (Roșa, 2021). This gas flows through Transnistria to Moldova, effectively accumulating a gas debt. Typically, Gazprom supplies gas to Moldovagaz, which in turn distributes gas to Moldovan consumers and to Tiraspol-Transgaz in Transnistria. Tiraspol-Transgaz then resell the gas at subsidized tariffs to local Transnistrian households and businesses. This included providing gas to the Moldovan State Regional Power Station, also known as MGRES – the largest power plant in Moldova. MGRES, in turn, exports electricity, further highlighting the interconnectedness of energy distribution between the Transnistrian region and the rest of Moldova.
Figure 5. Export/import of fuel and energy products from/to Transnistria, in million USD
The revenue generated from energy exports to Moldova has been deposited into a so-called special gas account and subsequently channeled directly into the Transnistrian budget in the form of loans from Tiraspol-Transgaz. In this way the Transnistrian government has covered more than 30 percent of their total budgetary expenditures over the last ten-year period. This further points to Transnistria’s’ fiscal inefficiencies and highlights its precarious dependency on gas from the Russian Federation.
In the last few years there have however been repeated disruptions in the gas supply and continuous disputes about prices and how much Moldovagaz owes Gazprom. De jure Tiraspol-Transgaz operates as a subsidiary of Moldovagaz, but de facto its assets were effectively nationalized by the separatist authorities in Transnistria (Tofilat and Parlicov, 2020). These unclarities has led to multiple conflicts over who owes the built-up gas debt. Given the ownership structure the debt is often seen as “Moldovan debt to Russia” (see e.g., Miller, 2023), albeit created by Transnistrian authorities. According to Gazprom, the outstanding amount owed by Moldovagaz to Gazprom stood at approximately 8 billion USD at the end of 2019 (Gazprom, 2024). This corresponds to about 7 times of Transnistria’s GDP. The Moldavian assessment of the debt is about two orders of magnitude lower (Gotev, 2023).
The disagreement on the debt amount was the official reason for the gas supply to be drastically reduced in October 2022. From December 2022 to March 2023, Russia’s Gazprom supplied gas only to Transnistria and it was not until March 2023 that supplies to the rest of Moldova were resumed. Since then, there have been shifts back and forth with Moldova mainly buying gas from Moldovan state-owned Energocom, which imports gas from suppliers other than Gazprom (Całus, 2023; Tanas, 2023). Understanding all turns and events is at times challenging due to lack of transparency in dealings.
Currently, despite Gazprom’s debt claims, the entirety of Transnistria’s gas is still being provided by Russia. While this is a relatively “cheap” investment from the Russian perspective, its impact on Moldova is large, as highlighted by Tofilat and Parlicov (2020) “the bottomline costs for Russia with maintaining Transnistria as its main instrument of influence in Moldova was at most USD 1 billion—not too expensive for twenty-seven years of influence in a European country of 3 million people”.
Corruption in Transnistria – Who is the Real “Sheriff”?
Another obstacle hindering a resolution of the Transnistrian conflict is the near complete monopoly of political and economic power held by Transnistria’s former President Igor Smirnov (1991-2011), through his strong ties to the Sheriff corporation. The corporation, established in 1993 by two former members of Transnistria’s “special services” (Ilya Kazmaly and Victor Gushan), was enabled by Transnistria’s former president, Igor Smirnov. For instance, the Sheriff company was exempt from paying customs duties and was permitted to monopolize trade, oil, and telecommunications in Transnistria. In return, the company supported Smirnov’s party during his presidency. For more on the conflict between Transnistria’s power clans and their relationships with Russia, see Hedenskog and Roine (2009) and Wesolowsky (2021).
The Sheriff company encompasses supermarkets, gas stations, construction firms, hotels, a mobile phone network, bakeries, a distillery, and a mini media empire comprising radio and TV stations. Presently, the company is reported to exert control over approximately 60 percent of the region’s economy (Wesolowsky, 2021).
A straightforward illustration of Sheriff’s political influence is the establishment of the Sheriff football team. For the team, Victor Gushan constructed the Sheriff sports complex, the largest football stadium in Moldova, accommodating
12 746 spectators. This investment in sports infrastructure is notable, especially considering that the total population of Transnistria is only approximately 350 000, and that the region is fairy poor. A similar example concerns the allocation of a land plot of 6.4 hectares to the company “to expand the construction of sports complex for long-term use under a simplified privatization procedure” signed directly by the former president.
While these details may seem peripheral to broader problems, they illustrate how some vested interests in the Transnistrian region may not be keen to change towards a society based on the rule-of-law, increased transparency and a market-oriented economy.
Moldova’s Options for Resolving the Transnistrian Conflict in EU Integration
As Moldova grapples with both the consequences of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and the prolonged “frozen” conflict with Transnistria, its economy remains vulnerable. With the recent attainment of EU candidate status, it’s essential for the Moldovan government to map out ways to solve the conflict despite strong interest from powerful political and economic groups in preserving the status quo.
While the perspectives of resolving the Transnistrian conflict obviously hinge on Russian troops withdrawing from the region, Moldova would also need to address a wide range of economic issues. The Transnistrian economy faces numerous critical structural challenges including a persistent negative foreign trade balance, an unsustainable banking system, and pervasive corruption. Notably, the dominant oligarchic entity, the Sheriff company, exercises monopolistic political and economic influence, striving to preserve the status quo for Transnistria. The obvious unviability of the local currency due to its artificial nature and a complete dependency on Russia’s banking system are additional challenges to be solved for Moldova to be able to integrate Transnistria properly into its economy. Therefore, introducing additional measures such as restricting access to remittances in Transnistria, and imposing personal sanctions on elite groups could help Moldova in establishing economic control over the region.
Furthermore, while the Transnistrian region de-facto has strong economic ties with the Moldovan and European markets in terms of exports, its heavy reliance on Russian gas imports remains a significant vulnerability.
When integrating Transnistria and severing its ties with Russia, Moldova would also need to resolve the issues arising from its reliance on the electricity produced at MGRES using subsidized Russian gas. Natural gas bought at market prices would make Moldovan electricity highly costly, presenting financial challenges to Moldova, and effectively destroying the competitive advantage and important source of revenue in the Transnistrian region. Moreover, alternative electricity routes to Moldova are yet to be completed (with an estimated cost of approximately 27 million EUR).
These and other issues need to be dealt with for a successful Moldovan transition into the EU. Although these challenges are highly important from a Moldovan point of view, and even more so from a Transnistrian perspective, it should be emphasized that these issues are, in economic terms, relatively small for the EU. Given that the EU has opened the way for Moldovan accession, it should be ready to step up financially to help Moldova solve these issues and stay on the membership path.
References
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Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Russia in Africa: What the Literature Reveals and Why It Matters
Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia has become increasingly isolated. In an attempt to counter Western powers’ efforts to suppress its economy and soft power impacts, Russia has tried to increase its influence in other parts of the world. In particular, Russia is increasingly active in Africa, having become a key partner to several African regimes, typically operating in areas with weak institutions and governments. Additionally, Russia’s approach has a different focus and objectives compared to other foreign actors, which may have both short and long term consequences for the continent’s development. Deepening our understanding of Russia’s distinct approach alongside those of other global actors, as well as the future implications of their involvement on the continent is, thus, of crucial importance.
Introduction
The new Foreign Policy Concept, adopted by the Russian government in March 2023, dedicates, for the first time, a separate section to Africa. The previous versions of the policy grouped North Africa with the Middle East and contained only a single paragraph, kept unchanged over time, about Sub-Saharan Africa. In the midst of its war against Ukraine, Russia is getting serious about Africa. What do we know about the reasons for and implications of this trend?
A relatively large literature in economics, political science, international relations, and other related fields has dealt with the Soviet Union’s engagement with African regimes (see overviews in Morris, 1973 and Ramani, 2023). However, the number of studies following the evolution of these relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union is significantly smaller, reflecting Russia’s strategic withdrawal from the region between 1990 and 2015. Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s increased interest in and engagement on the African continent has been increasingly discussed by security analysts and think tanks (see for instance Siegel, 2021; Stanyard, Vircoulon and Rademeyer, 2023; Jones, et al., 2021). Primarily highlighted are Russia’s interest in mineral deposits, its large-scale arms’ exports to African regimes, its dominance on the nuclear energy market with resulting dependency on Russian nuclear fuels, and its ambition to undermine Western capacities by the spread of Russian propaganda and anti-Western sentiments (Lindén, 2023). Each of these dimensions carries potentially profound and far-reaching implications for the continent’s development, as underscored by various strands of literature. Research contributions on this specific new trend are however still very limited and predominantly of a qualitative and exploratory nature.
There is, however, substantial general knowledge about the various forms that foreign interests can take, including trade, investment, development aid, propaganda, election interference, and involvement in conflicts, and their potential consequences for development. This brief presents an overview of selected literature that most closely relates to foreign influence in Africa.
Background: Theories of Foreign Policy
Two contrasting approaches are used to describe the way countries engage with the international community. The first one is the so-called realist perspective, which emphasizes the role of power, national interests, and security in shaping foreign policy (Mearsheimer, 1995). In this model, countries act in their self-interest, and often in competition or even conflict with other countries. Strategic alliances and a willingness to use force to advance one’s interests are contemplated under this perspective. The second approach is the idealist perspective, in which foreign policy is used to promote democratic values, human rights, and international cooperation, prioritizing tools such as diplomacy, international law, and multilateral institutions (Lancaster, 2008). For countries at the receiving end of major powers’ foreign policy agendas, and particularly for developing countries, the implications from the contrasting approaches will be widely different. While even a realist foreign policy may ostensibly incorporate concerns about the welfare and development of its allies, these are often not more than a thin disguise for the ultimate objective of buying political support and commercial advantages. A genuine interest in the welfare and development of receiving partners only finds a place under the idealist perspective, although even idealism is at times claimed to “greenwash” state actors’ own interests (Delmas and Burbano, 2011). While this claim has some substance to it, such accusations can also stem from the anti-western rhetoric typically pursued by Russia and aimed at undermining the credibility of actors with good intentions.
In practice, most countries’ foreign policies incorporate elements of both realism and idealism, although the balance between the two may vary. Some countries may have a predominantly realist approach, while others may prioritize idealist goals. Additionally, the same country may shift its approach over time, depending on changing circumstances and priorities. Idealism may be more prominent during periods of stability and prosperity, when countries have the resources and political will to pursue more ambitious foreign policy goals. Realism tends to become more prominent in times of crisis, when countries face serious threats to their national security or economic well-being. Historical examples of the latter are the aftermath of World War II, the Cold War, and even the 2008 global financial crisis (Roberts, 2020).
Comparative Analysis of Foreign Influence
A few studies, recent enough to encompass Russia’s renewed interest in Africa post-2015 but not enough to cover the current day resurgence, explicitly compare the strategy of different actors and their long-term influence. Trunkos (2021) develops a new soft power measure for the time-period 1995–2015, to test the commonly accepted claim in the political science literature that American soft power use has been declining while Russian and Chinese soft power use has been increasing. In the author’s own words, “the findings indicate that surprisingly the US is still using more soft power than Russia and China. The data analysis also reveals that the US is leading in economic soft power actions over China and in military soft power actions over Russia as well.”
Castaneda Dower et al. (2021) take a longer-term perspective and categorize African countries into two blocs one Western-leaning and one pro-Soviet, based on a game-theoretical model of alliances. This categorization aligns well with UN voting patterns during the Cold War, but it does not predict alignment as effectively in the post-Cold War period. The study finds no significant difference in average GDP growth between the two blocs for the period from 1990 to 2016. However, the bloc with Western-like characteristics shows higher levels of inequality and greater reliance on the market economy – as opposed to the planned one. It also has higher human capital, more gender parity (in education), and better democracy scores, but lower infrastructure capital compared to the other bloc.
Another strand of literature has looked into the deep changes that have occurred over time within the global development architecture, highlighting changes in donor and partner motivations after the end of the Cold War (Boschini and Olofsgård, 2007; Frot, Olofsgård and Perrotta Berlin, 2014), through the Arab Spring (Challand, 2014), and more recently under the emergence of new actors, chiefly China (Blair, Marty and Roessler, 2021). Studies in this area aim to highlight what implications the varying ideologies and motivation for cooperation in the donor countries have for countries at the receiving end. Competing aid regimes generate soft power through public diplomacy, often in the form of branding (for instance through putting origin “flags” on aid projects or investments). This type of positive association has been shown to generate ‘positive affect’ toward donors (Andrabi and Das, 2010), and to strengthen recipients’ perceptions of the models of governance and development that such donors promote – liberal democracy, for example, or free market capitalism (Blair, Marty and Roessler, 2021).
Emerging Players on the African Stage
An extensive literature has examined the various facets of established power actors’ presence on the continent, spanning foreign aid, diplomatic relations, and military involvement, revealing significant impacts on local economic development through multiple channels. The United States, along with other former colonial powers and major Western donors, plays a particularly prominent role in this context. Against this background, recent research has increasingly focused on the rise of new actors, and in particular China’s expanding role as a donor and investor in Africa (Bluhm, 2018; Brautigam, 2008; Brazys, Elkink and Kelly, 2017; Dreher et al. 2018). While the consensus is still unclear on whether China’s approach to aid attracts support among African citizens (Lekorwe et al. 2016; Blair, Marty, and Roessler, 2021), recent research also shows that Chinese aid exacerbates corruption and undermines collective bargaining in recipient countries (Isaksson and Kotsadam 2018a; 2018b).
As mentioned, there are as yet very few recent articles concerned with the reasons for Russia’s renewed interest in Africa (see Marten, 2019; Akinlolu and Ogunnubi, 2021; Ramani, 2023), and even fewer analyzing the potential impacts from it. One working paper, not citable due to the authors’ wishes, has quantitatively mapped and explicitly analyzed the impact of Russian military presence (in particular, of the Wagner Group) in Africa. The study found that the infamous paramilitary group faces fewer repercussions for human rights violations and commits more lethal actions than the state actors that employ them. In another recent study on the Central African Republic (CAR), Gang et al. (2023) found not only mortality levels in CAR to be four times higher than what estimated by the UN but also that Wagner mercenaries have contributed to “increased difficulties of survival” for the population in affected areas. Pardyak, M. (2022) explores the communication strategies employed by the key actors in the war, specifically focusing on how these strategies are received in African societies. Based on the analysis of over 140 media articles published in several African countries up to 15 October 2022, complemented by street surveys in Cairo, and in-depth interviews with Egyptians and Sudanese migrants, the study concludes that Russia’s multipolar perspective on the international order is more widely supported in Africa than Western strategies.
When viewed in a historical context, however, Russia’s actions reflect a longstanding adherence to a realist approach in its foreign policy endeavors. Throughout its trajectory, Russia has consistently prioritized national security and economic interests, frequently leveraging military and economic means to safeguard these interests (Tsygankov and Tsygankov, 2010). Presently, amid mounting pressures from the Western democratic world following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia finds itself increasingly reliant on a realist approach. While the Chinese engagement in Africa is also characterized by realist principles, it’s important to emphasize that the Russian approach diverges from that of China. China is focused on a long-term presence, infrastructure building and investments. It has no interest in democracy and human rights, is efficient and cheap though not always loved (Isaksson and Kotsadam, 2018b). Russia’s interest is more short term and opportunistic, seeking out countries rich in natural resources with unstable governments and weak institutions, such as Libya, Sudan, Mozambique, the Central African Republic, Mali, Burkina Faso and Madagascar. Russia typically targets undemocratic elites or military juntas, offering political support, military equipment sales, and security cooperation (in particular through the Wagner Group) in exchange for access to natural resources, concession rights and influence. State of the art research on a previous period (Berman et al., 2017, spanning 1997 to 2010), although not exclusively focused on Russia, finds that rents from mineral contracts, captured by swings in global mineral prices for a causal interpretation, lead to a higher likelihood of local conflicts, and furthermore that the control of mining areas by rebel groups can escalate violence beyond the local level.
Russia is pursuing a range of strategic goals that include diplomatic legitimization, media influence, military presence, elite influence, arms export, and shaping voting patterns in international organizations (Lindén, 2023). Like China, Russia is uninterested in democracy or human rights. Moreover, what Russia stands for is in stark contrast to the Western model. Russia embodies autocracy and backward revisionist values (for instance in areas such as attitudes to gender equality and the sustainability agenda) while the West generally promotes democracy and progressive inclusive solutions (Lindén, 2023). What also especially characterizes Russia is the particular attraction towards the presence of anti-West sentiment, which it fuels through populistic anti-colonial disinformation and propaganda. This approach has been criticized for potentially weakening democratic norms and sidelining African agency (Akinlolu and Ogunnubi, 2021). Additionally, Russia’s disregard for the socio-political realities in Africa, typically associated with a self-interested realist approach, can lead to ineffective engagement and unintended negative consequences, undermining the long-term sustainability of both social and economic developments in the region.
Conclusion
Many African countries find themselves in a delicate balancing act, as they cannot afford to push away Russia nor displease their historical Western partners. This attempt to balance between actors poses several risks and potentially detrimental consequences, including reduced development cooperation, slower democratization, limited progress on human rights, and increased conflicts. Additionally, Russia’s growing presence in Africa can have implications for the interests and policies of the European Union (EU) and its member states as well as global actors, including impacts on migration, terrorism, the energy sector as well as on trade and aid flows.
In light of the diverse strategies foreign powers use in their relations with African countries and the significant impact these strategies have, it is crucial to deepen our understanding of foreign engagements in Africa. By examining Russia’s distinct approach alongside those of other global actors, we can gain valuable insights into the complex dynamics shaping the continent’s political, economic, and social landscape, both now and in the future. Expanding research in this area is not only desirable but essential for informing policy and development strategies.
References
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- Andrabi, T., & Das, J. (2010). In Aid We Trust: Hearts and Minds and the Pakistan Earthquake of 2005. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, (5440).
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- Blair, R. A., Marty, R., and Roessler, P. (2021). Foreign Aid and Soft Power: Great Power Competition in Africa in the Early Twenty-first Century. British Journal of Political Science, 52(3), 1355–1376. doi:10.1017/S0007123421000193
- Bluhm, R., et al. (2018). Connective Financing: Chinese Infrastructure Projects and the Diffusion of Economic Activity in Developing Countries. AidData Working Paper 64.
- Boschini, A., and Olofsgård, A. (2007). Foreign aid: An instrument for fighting communism? The Journal of Development Studies, 43(4), 622-648. DOI: 10.1080/00220380701259707
- Brautigam, D. (2009). The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Castaneda Dower, P., Gokmen, G., Le Breton, M., & Weber, S. (2021). Did the Cold War Produce Development Clusters in Africa? (Working Papers; No. 2021:10).
- Delmas, M. A. and Burbano, V. C. (2011). The Drivers of Greenwashing. California Management Review, 54(1), 64-87.
- Dreher, A., et al. (2018). Apples and dragon fruits: The determinants of aid and other forms of state financing from China to Africa. International Studies Quarterly, 62(1), 182–194.
- Frot, E., Olofsgård, A., and Perrotta Berlin, M. (2014). Aid Effectiveness in Times of Political Change: Lessons from the Post-Communist Transition. World Development, 56, 127-138. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.10.016
- Isaksson, A-S., and Kotsadam, A. (2018a). Chinese aid and local corruption. Journal of Public Economics, 159, 146–159.
- Isaksson, A-S., and Kotsadam, A. (2018b). Racing to the bottom? Chinese development projects and trade union involvement in Africa. World Development, 106, 284–298.
- Jones, S. G., Doxsee, C., Katz, B., McQueen, E. and Moye, J. (2021). Russia’s Corporate Soldiers. The Global Expansion of Russia’s Private Military Companies. A Report of the CSIS Transnational Threats Project. CSIS. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/210721_Jones_Russia%27s_Corporate_Soldiers.pdf?VersionId=7fy3TGV3HqDtRKoe8vDq2J2GGVz7N586
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- Lancaster, C. (2008). Foreign aid: Diplomacy, development, domestic politics. University of Chicago Press.
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- Lindén, K. (2023). Russia’s relations with Africa: Small, military-oriented and with destabilising effects. FOI Memo 8090. https://www.foi.se/rapportsammanfattning?reportNo=FOI%20Memo%208090
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Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Why the National Bank of Georgia Is Ditching Dollars for Gold
The National Bank of Georgia (NBG) recently acquired 7 tons of high-quality monetary gold valued at 500 million dollars, constituting approximately 11 percent of the banks’ total reserves. This marked the first occasion that Georgia acquired gold for its reserves since regaining its independence. The acquisition is a significant event, prompted by the NBG’s stated aim to enhance diversification amidst increased global geopolitical risks. However, diversification is just one of the reasons many countries are extensively purchasing gold. Another reason for increasing gold reserves is to lessen one’s reliance on the US dollar and to protect against sanctions, as seen with Russia and Belarus following the annexation of Crimea. While the NBG’s gold acquisition aligns with economic rationale, recent domestic developments suggest other motives. Actions like sanctions on political figures, anti-Western rhetoric, and recent legislation (the Law of Transparency of Foreign Influence), diverging Georgia from an EU pathway call for speculation that the gold purchase is driven by fear a of potential sanctions and as a preparedness strategy.
Introduction
The National Bank of Georgia (NBG) has broken new ground by adding gold to the country’s international reserves for the first time ever. Georgia has thus become the first country in the South Caucasus to purchase gold for its reserves. In line with its Board’s decision on March 1, 2024, the NBG procured 7 tons of the highest quality (999.9) monetary gold. The acquisition, valued at 500 million US dollars, took the form of internationally standardized gold bars, purchased from the London gold bar market and currently stored in London. Presently, the acquired gold represents approximately 11 percent of the NBG’s international reserves (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. NBG’s Official Reserve Assets and Other Foreign Currency Assets, 2023-2024.
The NBG emphasizes in its official statement that the acquisition of gold is not merely symbolic but rather reflects a deliberate strategy of diversifying NBG’s portfolio and enhancing its resilience to external shocks. The NBG’s decision was made during a period marked by significant economic and political events both within and outside Georgia. Key among these were global and regional geopolitical tensions that amplified concerns about economic downturns and rising inflation. The Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 led to stagflation across many countries, including Georgia. Despite some recovery in GDP, high inflation continued into 2021. Furthermore, the Russian war on Ukraine disrupted supply chains, and pushed global inflation to a 24-year high 8.7 percent in 2022. In response, stringent monetary policies aimed at controlling inflation were implemented across both developing and advanced economies. Looking ahead, there is an expectation of a shift toward more expansionary monetary policies that should help lower interest rates (and lower yields on assets held by central banks). These global conditions provide context for the NBG’s strategic focus on diversification.
However, alongside these economic events, Georgia also faces significant political challenges. Since the beginning of Russia’s war in Ukraine in 2022, political tensions in Georgia have escalated. Notable actions such as the U.S. imposing sanctions on influential Georgian figures, including judges and the former chief prosecutor, have, among other things, intensified scrutiny into the Russian influence in Georgia. Concerns about the independence of the Central Bank, which changed the rule of handling sanctions applications for Georgia’s citizens, and legislative initiatives like the Law of Transparency of Foreign Influence, which undermines Georgia’s EU accession ambitions, have triggered reactions from the country’s partners and massive public protests. Moreover, anti-Western rhetoric from the ruling party has raised concerns. In addition, the parliament of Georgia recently approved an amendment to the Tax Cide, a so-called ‘law on offshores’. The opaque nature of the law, as well as the context and speed at which it was advanced, sparked outcry and conjecture about its true purpose. These elements lead to speculation that the decision to purchase gold may be motivated by a desire for greater autonomy or a fear of potential sanctions, rather than purely economic reasons.
In the context of the above, this policy brief seeks to explore the motivations behind gold acquisitions by Central Banks, drawing on the experiences of both developed and developing countries. It aims to review existing literature that explores various reasons for gold acquisitions, providing a comprehensive analysis of economic and potentially non-economic factors influencing such decisions.
The Return of Gold in Global Finance
Over the past decade, central bank gold reserves have significantly increased, reversing a 40-year trend of decline. The shift that began around the time of the 2008-09 Global Financial Crisis is depicted in Figures 2 and 3, highlighting the transition from a pre-crisis period of more countries selling gold, to a post-crisis period where more countries have been purchasing gold.
Figure 2. Gold Holdings in Official Reserve Assets, 1999-2022 (million fine Troy ounces).
Figure 3. Number of Countries Purchasing/Selling Monetary Gold, 2000-2021 (at least 1 metric ton of gold in a given year).
In 2023, central banks added a considerable amount of gold to their reserves. The largest purchases have been reported for China, Poland, and Singapore, with these nations collectively dominating the gold buying landscape during the year.
China is one of the top buyers of gold worldwide. In 2023, the People’s Bank of China emerged as the top gold purchaser globally, adding a record 225 tonnes to its reserves, the highest yearly increase since at least 1977, bringing its total gold reserves to 2,235 tonnes. Despite this significant addition, gold still represents only 4 percent of China’s extensive international reserves.
The National Bank of Poland was another significant buyer in 2023, acquiring 130 tonnes of gold, which boosted its reserves by 57 percent to 359 tonnes, surpassing its initial target and reaching the bank’s highest recorded annual level.
Other central banks, including the Monetary Authority of Singapore, the Central Bank of Libya, and the Czech National Bank, also increased their gold holdings, albeit on a smaller scale. These purchases reflect a broader trend of central banks diversifying their reserves and enhancing financial security amidst global economic uncertainties.
Conversely, the National Bank of Kazakhstan and the Central Bank of Uzbekistan were notable sellers, actively managing their substantial gold reserves in response to domestic production and market conditions. The Central Bank of Bolivia and the Central Bank of Turkey also reduced their gold holdings, primarily to address domestic financial needs.
The U.S. continues to hold the world’s largest gold reserve (25.4 percent of total gold reserves), which underscores the metal’s enduring appeal as a store of value among the world’s leading economies. The U.S. is followed by Germany at 10.5 percent, and Italy and France at 7.6 percent respectively. At present, around one-eighth of the world’s currency reserves comprise of gold, with central banks collectively holding 20 percent of the global gold supply (NBG, 2024).
Why Central Banks are Buying Gold Again
A 2023 World Gold Council survey (on central banks revealed five key motivations for holding gold reserves: (1) historical precedent (77 percent of respondents), (2) crisis resilience (74 percent), (3) long-term value preservation (74 percent), (4) portfolio diversification (70 percent), and (5) sovereign risk mitigation (68 percent). Notably, emerging markets placed a higher emphasis (61 percent) on gold as a “geopolitical diversifier“ compared to developed economies (45 percent).
However, the increasing use of the SWIFT system for sanctions enforcement (e.g., Iran in 2015 and Russia in 2022) has introduced a new factor influencing gold purchases of some governments: safeguarding against sanctions (Arslanalp, Eichengreen and Simpson-Bell, 2023).
In addition, Arslanalp, Eichengreen, and Simpson-Bell (2023) conclude that central banks’ decisions to acquire gold are primarily driven by the following factors; inflation, the use of floating exchange rates, a nation’s fiscal stability, the threat of sanctions, and the degree of trade openness (see Figure 4).
Figure 4. Determinants of Gold Shares in Emerging Market and Developing Economies.
Gold as a Hedging Instrument
Gold is considered a safe haven and an attractive asset in periods of significant economic, financial, and geopolitical uncertainty (Beckman, Berger, & Czudaj, 2019). This is particularly relevant when returns on reserve currencies are low, a scenario prevalent in recent years.
A hedge against inflation: Inflation presents a significant challenge for central banks, as it erodes the purchasing power of a nation’s currency. Gold has been a long-standing consideration for central banks as a potential inflation hedge. Its price often exhibits an inverse relationship with the value of the US dollar, meaning it tends to appreciate as the dollar depreciates. This phenomenon can be attributed to two primary factors: (1) increased demand during inflationary periods; and (2) gold tends to have intrinsic value unlike currencies (Stonex Bullion, 2024).
Diversification of portfolio: Diversification is a cornerstone principle of portfolio management. It involves allocating investments across various asset classes to mitigate risk. Gold, with its negative correlation to traditional assets like stocks and bonds, can be a valuable tool for portfolio diversification. In simpler terms, when stock prices decline, gold prices often move in the opposite direction, offering a potential hedge against market downturns (see Figure 5).
Figure 5. How Gold Performs During Recession, 1970-2022.
Hedge against geopolitical risks: de Besten, Di Casola and Habib (2023) suggest that geopolitical factors may have influenced gold acquisitions for some central banks in 2022. A positive correlation appears to exist between changes in a country’s gold reserves and its geopolitical proximity to China and Russia (compared to the U.S.) for countries actively acquiring gold reserves. This pattern is particularly evident in Belarus and some Central Asian economies, suggesting they may have increased their gold holdings based on geopolitical considerations.
Low or Negative Interest Rates: When interest rates on major reserve currencies like the US dollar are low or negative, it reduces the opportunity cost of holding gold (gold is a passive asset that does not generate periodic income, dividends, and interest benefits). In other words, gold becomes a more attractive option compared to traditional investments that offer minimal or no returns. The prevailing low-interest rate environment, particularly for major reserve currencies like the US dollar, has diminished the opportunity cost of holding gold.
This phenomenon applies to both advanced economies and emerging market economies (EMDEs). Notably, EMDEs with significant dollar-denominated debt are particularly sensitive to fluctuations in US interest rates. Arslanalp, Eichengreen, and Simpson-Bell (2023) conclude that reserve managers are increasingly incorporating gold into their portfolios when returns on reserve currencies are low. Figure 6 illustrates the inverse relationship between the price of gold and the inflation-adjusted 10-year yield.
Figure 6. Gold Price and Inflation-Adjusted 10-Year Yield.
In addition to its aforementioned advantages, gold offers central banks a long-term investment opportunity despite its lack of interest payments, unlike traditional securities. While gold exhibits short-term price volatility, its historical price trend suggests a long-term upward trajectory (see Figure 7).
Figure 7. Gold Price per Troy Ounce (approximately 31.1 grams), in USD.
Gold as a Safeguard Against Sanctions
Gold is perceived as a secure and desirable reserve asset in situations where countries face financial sanctions or the risk of asset freezes and seizures (see Table 1). The decision by G7 countries to freeze the foreign exchange reserves of the Bank of Russia in 2022 highlighted the importance of holding reserves in a form less vulnerable to sanctions. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Bank of Russia intensified its gold purchases. By 2021, it had confirmed that its gold reserves were fully vaulted domestically. The imposition of sanctions on Russia, which restrict banks from engaging in most transactions with Russian counterparts and limit the Bank of Russia’s access to international financial markets, further underscores the appeal of gold as a safeguard.
While the recent sanctions imposed by G7 countries, which limit Russian banks from conducting most business with their counterparts and restrict the Bank of Russia from accessing its reserves in foreign banks, are an extreme example, similar sanctions have previously impacted or threatened financial operations of other nations’ central banks and governments. This situation raises the question of whether the risk of sanctions has influenced the observed trend of countries’ increasing their gold reserves (IMF, International Financial Statistics, 2022).
Table 1. Top 10 Annual Increases in the Share of Gold in Reserves, 2000-2021.
As outlined in Arslanalp, Eichengreen and Simpson-Bell (2023), there were eight active diversifiers into gold in 2021, each purchasing at least 1 million troy ounces (Kazakhstan, Belarus, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Hungary, Iraq, Argentina, Qatar), exhibiting distinct international economic or political concerns. Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Uzbekistan maintain ties with Russia through the Eurasian Economic Union. Turkey has faced sanctions from both the European Union and the U.S. Iraq has experienced disputes with the U.S., while Hungary has faced similar issues with the European Union. In 2017-21, Qatar was subjected to a travel and economic embargo by Saudi Arabia and neighboring countries. Argentina may have had concerns about asset seizures by foreign courts due to sovereign debt disputes.
Furthermore, according to the Economist (2022), gold is costly to transport, store, and protect. It is expensive to use in transactions and doesn’t earn interest. However, it can be lent out like currencies in a central bank’s reserves. When lent out or used in swaps (where gold is exchanged for currency at agreed dates), it can generate returns. But banks prefer gold to be stored in specific places like the Bank of England or the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which brings back the risk of sanctions. For instance, During the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the subsequent hostage crisis, the United States froze Iranian assets, including the gold reserves held in U.S. banks (Arslanalp, Eichengreen and Simpson-Bell, 2023). The National Bank of Georgia intends to transport its acquired gold from England to Georgia for storage, which could potentially reduce storage costs, but further decrease liquidity.
Arslanalp, Eichengreen, and Simpson-Bell (2023) conclude that since the early 2000s, half of the significant year-over-year increases in central bank gold reserves can be attributed to the threat of sanctions. By examining an indicator that tracks financial sanctions by major economies like the United States, United Kingdom, European Union, and Japan, all key issuers of reserve currencies, the authors have confirmed a positive correlation between such sanctions and the proportion of reserves held in gold. Furthermore, their findings suggest that multilateral sanctions imposed by these countries collectively have a more pronounced effect on increasing gold reserves than unilateral sanctions. This is likely because unilateral sanctions allow room for shifting reserves into the currencies of other non-sanctioning nations, whereas multilateral sanctions increase the risks associated with holding foreign exchange reserves, thus making gold a more attractive option.
The NBG’s Historic Decision
The National Bank of Georgia’s (NBG) recent acquisition of gold for its reserves is likely motivated by a desire to diversify its portfolio and hedge against inflation and geopolitical risks. However, recent developments in Georgia raise questions about the timing of this policy decision, bringing political considerations into the picture.
Among these developments is the 2023 suspension of the IMF program for Georgia, due to concerns about the NBG’s governance (Intellinews, 2023). The amendments to the NBG law in June 2023, which created a new First Deputy and Acting Governor position – superseding the existing succession framework – contradicted IMF Safeguards recommendations and raised concerns about increased political influence (International Monetary Fund, 2024). How the recent gold purchase reflect on the future of IMF cooperation is thus a relevant question to ask.
Another ground for concern is the recent approval by the Georgian Parliament of the anti-democratic “Foreign Influence Transparency” law and the anti-Western rhetoric of the ruling party, which have sparked intensive public protests. European partners warn that the law will not align with Georgia’s European Union aspirations and that it could potentially hinder the country’s advancement on the EU pathway. Rather, the law might distance Georgia from the EU. This law has also increased the concerns for further sanctions on members of the ruling party, government officials, and individuals engaging in anti-West and anti-EU propaganda.
Furthermore, the recent amendment of the Tax Code, the so-called “offshores law” allows for tax-free funds transfers from offshore zones to Georgia. This, combined with other developments, raises questions about whether the government is preparing for potential sanctions, should its relationship with Russia continue to strengthen.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this policy brief highlights that central banks’ acquisition of gold reserves, especially in emerging economies, is motivated by a combination of economic and political factors. The economic incentives include the need for portfolio diversification and protection against inflation and geopolitical instabilities, a trend that became more pronounced following the 2008 global financial crisis. Politically, the accumulation of gold serves as a strategic move to lessen dependency on the U.S. dollar and as a defensive measure against potential international sanctions, as highlighted by the post-2014 geopolitical shifts following Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
In 2024, Georgia purchased gold for the first time since regaining its independence. While its gold purchasing strategy seems to align with these economic motives, the recent domestic political dynamics suggest a deeper, possibly strategic political rationale by the National Bank of Georgia. The imposition of U.S. sanctions on key figures, and recent legislative actions deviating from European Union standards, all amidst increasing anti-Western sentiment, indicate that the NBG’s gold acquisitions might also be driven by a quest for greater safeguard against potential future sanctions. Thus, while economic reasons for the purchase are significant, the political underpinnings in the NBG’s recent actions raise numerous unanswered questions.
References
- Arslanalp, S., Eichengreen, B., & Simpson-Bell, C. (2023). Gold as International Reserves: A Barbarous Relic No More? IMF Working Papers.
- Beckman, J., Berger, T., & Czudaj, R. (2019). Gold Price Dynamics and the Role of Uncertainty. Quantitative Finance , 663-681.
- Bhutada G. (2022). Does Gold’s Value Increase During Recessions? Elements Visualcapitalist.
- de Besten, T., Di Casola, P., & Habib M. M. (2023). Geopolitical fragmentation risks and international currencies. The international role of the euro.
- The Economist. (2022). Why gold has lost some of its investment allure. https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2022/01/08/why-gold-has-lost-some-of-its-investment-allure
- International Monetary Fund (2024). Georgia: 2024 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by the Executive Director for Georgia. IMF Country Reports 24/135
- Intellinews. (2023). https://www.intellinews.com/georgia-s-national-bank-president-confirms-suspension-of-imf-programme-294545/
- StoneX Bullion (2024). Why Central Banks Buy Gold.
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Navigating Market Exits: Companies’ Responses to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 led to widespread international condemnation. As governments imposed sanctions on Russian businesses and individuals tied to the war, international companies doing business in Russia came under increasing pressure to withdraw from Russia voluntarily. In the first part of this policy brief, we show what kind of companies decided to leave the Russian market using data collected by the LeaveRussia project. In the second part, we focus on prominent Swedish businesses which announced a withdrawal from Russia, but whose products were later found available in the country by investigative journalists from Dagens Nyheter (DN). We collect the stock prices for these companies when available and show how investors respond to these news.
Business Withdrawal from Russia
The global economy is highly interconnected, and Russia forms an important part. Prior to the invasion, Russia ranked 13th in the world in terms of global goods exports value and 22nd in terms of imports (Schwarzenberg, 2023). In the months following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s imports dropped sharply (about 50 percent according to Sonnenfeld et al., 2022). Before February 24th, Russia’s main trading partners were China, the European Union (in particular, Germany and the Netherlands) and Belarus (as illustrated in Figure 1). While there is some evidence of Russia shifting away from Western countries and towards China following the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the resulting sanctions, Western democracies still made up about 60 percent of Russia’s trade in 2020 (Schwarzenberg, 2023). In the same year, Sweden’s exports to Russia accounted for 1.4 percent of Sweden’s total goods exports, of which 59 percent were in the machinery, transportation and telecommunications sectors. 1.3 percent of Swedish imports were from Russia (Stockholms Handelskammare, 2022).
Figure 1. Changes in trade with Russia, 2013-2020.
In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2024, Western governments imposed strict trade and financial sanctions on Russian businesses and individuals involved in the war (see S&P Global, 2024). These sanctions are designed to hamper Russia’s war effort by reducing its ability to fight and finance the war. The sanctions make it illegal for, e.g., European companies to sell certain products to Russia as well as to import select Russian goods (Council of the European Union, 2024). Even though sanctions do not cover all trade with Russia, many foreign businesses have been pressured to pull out of Russia in an act of solidarity. The decision by these businesses to leave is voluntary and could reflect their concerns over possible consumer backlash. It is not uncommon for consumers to put pressure on businesses in times of geopolitical conflict. For instance, Pandya and Venkatesan (2016) find that U.S. consumers were less likely to buy French-sounding products when the relationship between both countries deteriorated.
The LeaveRussia Project
The LeaveRussia project, from the Kyiv School of Economics Institute (KSE Institute), systematically tracks foreign companies’ responses to the Russian invasion. The database covers a selection of companies that have either made statements regarding their operations in Russia, and/or are a large global player (“major companies and world-famous brands”), and/or have been mentioned in relation to leaving/waiting/withdrawing from Russia in major media outlets such as Reuters, Bloomberg, Financial times etc. (LeaveRussia, 2024). As of April 5th, 2024, the list contains 3342 firms, the companies’ decision to leave, exit or remain in the Russian market, the date of their announced action, and company details such as revenue, industry etc. The following chart uses publicly available data from the LeaveRussia project to illustrate patterns in business withdrawals from Russia following the invasion of Ukraine.
Figure 2a shows the number of foreign companies in Russia in the LeaveRussia dataset by their country of headquarters. Figure 2b shows the share of these companies that have announced a withdrawal from Russia by April 2024, by their country of headquarters.
Figure 2a. Total number of companies by country.
Figure 2b. Share of withdrawals, by country.
Some countries (e.g. Canada, the US and the UK) that had a large presence in Russia prior to the war have also seen a large number of withdrawals following the invasion. Other European countries, however, have seen only a modest share of withdrawals (for instance, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands and Slovakia). Companies headquartered in countries that have not imposed any sanctions on Russia following the invasion, such as Belarus, China, India, Iran etc., show no signs of withdrawing from the Russian market. In fact, the share of companies considered by the KSE to be “digging in” (i.e., companies that either declared they’d remain in Russia or who did not announce a withdrawal or downscaling as of 31st of March 2024) is 75 percent for more than 25 countries, including not only the aforementioned, but also countries such as Argentina, Moldova, Serbia and Turkey.
Withdrawal Determinants
The decision for companies to exit the market may range from consumer pressure to act in solidarity with Ukraine, to companies’ perceived risk from operating on the Russian market (Kiesel and Kolaric, 2023). Out of the 3342 companies in the LeaveRussia project’s database, about 42 percent have, as of April 5th, 2024, exited or stated an intention to exit the Russian market. This number increases only slightly to 49 percent when considering only companies headquartered in democratic (an Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index score of 7 or higher) countries within the EU. Figure 3 shows the number of companies that announced their exit from the Russian market, by month. A clear majority of companies announce their withdrawal in the first 6 months following the invasion.
Figure 3. Number of foreign companies announcing an exit from the Russian market, 2022-2024.
Similarly to the location of companies’ headquarters, the decision to exit the Russian market varies by industry. Figure 4 a depicts the top 15 industries with the highest share of announced withdrawals from the Russian market among industries with at least 10 companies. Most companies with high levels of withdrawals are found in consumer-sensitive industries such as the entertainment sector, tourism and hospitality, advertising etc.
Figure 4a. Top 15 industries in terms of withdrawal shares.
Figure 4b. Bottom 15 industries in terms of withdrawal shares.
In contrast, Figure 4b details the industries with the lowest share of companies opting to withdraw from the Russian market. Only around 10 percent of firms in the “Defense” and “Marine Transportation” industries chose to withdraw. Two-thirds of firms within the “Energy, oil and gas” and “Metals and Mining” sectors have chosen to remain in business in Russia following the war in Ukraine.
Several sectors have been identified as crucial in supplying the Russian military with necessary components to sustain their military aggression against Ukraine, mainly electronics, communications, automotives and related categories. We find that many of these sectors are among those with the lowest share of companies withdrawing from Russia. Companies for which Russia constitute a large market share have more to lose from exiting than others. Another reason for not exiting the market relates to the current legal hurdles of corporate withdrawal from Russia (Doherty, 2023). Others may simply not have made public announcements or operate within an industry dominated by smaller companies that are not on the radar of the LeaveRussia project. Nonetheless, Bilousova et al. (2024) detail that products from companies within the sanction’s coalition continue to be found in Russian military equipment destroyed in Ukraine. This is due to insufficient due diligence by companies as well as loopholes in the sanctions regime such as re-exporting via neighboring countries, tampering with declaration forms or challenges in jurisdictional enforcement due to lengthy supply chains, among others. (Olofsgård and Smitt Meyer, 2023).
And Those Who Didn’t Leave After All
The data from the LeaveRussia project details if and when foreign businesses announce that they will leave Russia. However, products from companies that have announced a departure from the Russian market continue to be found in the country, including in military components (Bilousova, 2024). In autumn 2023, investigative journalists from the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter exposed 14 Swedish companies whose goods were found entering Russia, in most cases contrary to the companies’ public claims (Dagens Nyheter, 2023; Tidningen Näringslivet, 2023). For this series of articles, the journalists used data from Russian customs and verified it with information from numerous Swedish companies, covering the time period up until December 2022. This entailed reviewing thousands of export records from Swedish companies either directly to Russia or via neighboring countries such as Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. All transactions mentioned in the article series have been confirmed with the respective companies, who were also contacted by DN prior to publication (Dagens Nyheter, 2023b). DNs journalists also acted as businessmen, interacting with intermediaries in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, exposing re-routing of Swedish goods from a company stated to have cut all exports to Russia in the wake of the invasion (Dagens Nyheter, 2023d).
For Sweden headquartered companies exposed in DN and that are traded on the Swedish Stock Exchange, we collect their stock prices and trading volume. Our data includes information on each stock’s average price, turnover, number of trades by date from around the date of the DN publications as well as the date of each company’s prior public announcement of exiting Russia. Table 1 details the companies who were exposed of doing direct or indirect business with Russia by DN and who had announced an exit from the Russian market previously. In their article series, DN also shows that goods from the following companies entered Russia; AriVislanda, Assa Abloy, Atlas Copco, Getinge, Scania, Securitas Tetra Pak, and Väderstad. Most of the companies exposed by DN operate within industries displaying low withdrawal shares.
Table 1. Select Swedish companies’, time of exit announcement and exposure in Dagens Nyheter and stock names.
In Figure 5, we show the average stock price and trades-weighted average stock price of the Swedish companies in Table 1 around the time when the companies announced that they are leaving Russia.
Figure 5. Average stock price of companies in Table 1 around Russian exit announcements.
There appears to be an immediate increase in stock prices after firms announced their exit from the Russian market. Stock prices, however, reverse their gains over the next couple of days. In general, stock prices are volatile, and we also see similar-sized movements immediately before the announcement. Due to this volatility and the fact that we cannot rule out other shocks impacting these stock prices at the same time, it is difficult to attribute any movements in the stock prices to the firms’ decisions to leave Russia.
The academic evidence on investors’ reactions to firms divesting from Russia is mixed. Using a sample of less than 300 high-profile firms with operations in Russia compiled by researchers at the Yale Chief Executive Leadership Institute, Glambosky and Peterburgsky (2022) find that firms that divest within 10 days after the invasion experience negative returns, but then recover within a two-week period. Companies announcing divesting at a later stage do not experience initial stock price declines. In contrast, Kiesel and Kolaric (2023) use data from the LeaveRussia project to find positive stock price returns to firms’ announcements of leaving Russia, while there appears to be no significant investor reaction to firms’ decisions to stay in Russia.
When considering the effect from DN’s publications, the picture is almost mirrored, with the simple and trades-weighted average stock prices dipping in the days following the negative media exposure before not only recovering, but actually increasing. Similar caveats apply to the interpretation of this chart. In addition, the DN publication occurred shortly after the Hamas attacks on Israel on October 7 and Israel’s subsequent war on Gaza. While conflict and uncertainty typically dampen the stock market, the events in the Middle East initially caused little reaction on the stock market (Sharma, 2023).
Figure 6. Average stock price for companies listed in Table 1 around the time of DN exposure.
Discussion
As discussed in Becker et al. (2024), creating incentives and ensuring companies follow suit with the current sanctions’ regime should be a priority if we want to end Russia’s war on Ukraine and undermine its wider geopolitical ambitions. Nevertheless, Bilousova et al. (2024), and Olofsgård and Smitt Meyer (2023), highlight that there is ample evidence of sanctions evasions, including for products that are directly contributing to Russia’s military capacity. Even in countries that have a strong political commitment to the sanctions’ regime, enforcement is weak. For instance, in Sweden, it is not illegal to try and evade sanctions according to the Swedish Chamber of Commerce (2024). There is little coordination between the numerous law enforcement agencies that are responsible for sanction enforcement and there have been very few investigations into sanctions violations.
Absent effective sanctions enforcement and for the many industries not covered by sanctions, can we rely on businesses to put profits second and voluntarily withdraw from Russia? Immediately after the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as news stories about the brutality of the war proliferated, many international companies did announce that they will be leaving Russia. However, a more systematic look at data collected by the LeaveRussia project and KSE Institute reveals that more than two years into the war, less than half of companies based in Western democracies intend to distance themselves from the Russian market. A closer look at companies who are continuing operations in Russia reveals that they tend to be in sectors that are crucial for the Russian economy and war effort, such as energy, mining, electronics and industrial equipment. Many of these companies are probably seeing the war as a business opportunity and are reluctant to put human lives before their bottom line (Sonnenfeld and Tian, 2022).
Whether companies who announce that they are leaving Russia actually do leave is difficult to independently verify. A series of articles published in a prominent Swedish newspaper (Dagens Nyheter) last autumn revealed that goods from 14 major Swedish firms continue to be available in Russia, despite most of these firms publicly announcing their withdrawal from the country. The companies’ reactions to the exposé were mixed. A few companies, such as Scania and SSAB, have decided to cut all exports to the intermediaries exposed by the undercover journalists (for instance, in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan). Other companies stated that they are currently investigating DN’s claims or that the exports exposed in the DN articles were final or delayed orders that were accepted before the company decided to withdraw from Russia. Another company, Trelleborg – a leading company within polymer solutions for a variety of industry purposes – reacted to the DN exposure by backtracking from its earlier commitment to exit the Russian market (Dagens Nyheter 2023b, 2023d). Wider reaction to these revelations was muted. Looking at changes in stock prices for the exposed companies, we find little evidence that investors are punishing companies for not honoring their public commitment to withdraw from Russia.
In an environment, where businesses themselves withdraw at low rates and investors do not shy away from companies contradicting their own claims, the need for stronger enforcement of sanctions seems more pressing than ever.
References
- Becker, T., Fredheim, K., Gars, J., Hilgenstock, B., Katinas, P., Le Coq, C., Mylovanov, T., Olofsgård, A., Perrotta Berlin, M., Pavytska, Y., Ribakova, E., Shapoval, N., Spiro, D. and Wachtmeister, H. (2024). Sanctions on Russia: Getting the Facts Right. FREE Policy Brief. https://freepolicybriefs.org/2024/03/14/sanctions-russia-war-ukraine/
- Bilousova, O., Hilgenstock, B., Ribakova, E., Shapoval, N., Vlasyuk, A. and Vlasiuk, V. (2024). CHALLENGES OF EXPORT CONTROLS ENFORCEMENT HOW RUSSIA CONTINUES TO IMPORT COMPONENTS FOR ITS MILITARY PRODUCTION. Yermak-McFaul International Working Group on Russian Sanctions & KSE Institute. https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Challenges-of-Export-Controls-Enforcement.pdf
- Council of the European Union. (2023). Sanctions against Russia explained. European Council. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia/sanctions-against-russia-explained/#services
- Dagens Nyheter. (2023a). DN avslöjar: Wallenbergs gruvjätte gjorde affärer med ryskgrundat bolag – efter krigsutbrottet.
- Dagens Nyheter. (2023b). DN avslöjar: Svenska storbolagen i affärer med Rvssland – trots löftena.
- Dagens Nyheter. (2023c). Svenska miljardbolaget svek löftet – sålde till ryska hamnprojekt.
- Dagens Nyheter (2023d). Mellanhanden avslöjar: Så levereras stålet från SSAB till Ryssland.
- Doherty, B. (2023). Business in Russia: Why some firms haven’t left. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/worklife/article/20230918-business-in-russia-why-some-firms-havent-left
- Glambosky, M. and Peterburgsky, S. (2022). Corporate activism during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Economics Letters, 217, 110650. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110650
- Kiesel, F. and Kolaric, S. (2023) Should I stay or should I go? Stock market reactions to companies’ decisions in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Forthcoming. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4088159
- LeaveRussia Project. (2024). https://leave-russia.org/our-methodology
- Lehne, J. (2022). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I1EFcZdj2Gw
- Olofsgård, A. and Smitt Meyer, C. (2024) How to Undermine Russia’s War Capacity: Insights from Development Day 2023. FREE Policy Brief. https://freepolicybriefs.org/2024/01/15/undermine-russias-war-capacity/
- Pandya, S. S., and Venkatesan, R. (2016) French roast: consumer response to international conflict—evidence from supermarket scanner data. Review of Economics and Statistics, 98(1), 42-56.
- Runfola, D., Rogers, L., Habib, J., Horn, S., Murphy, S., Miller, D., Day, H., Troup, L., Fornatora, D., Spage, N., Pupkiewicz, K., Roth, M., Rivera, C., Altman, C., Schruer, I., McLaughlin, T., Biddle, R., Ritchey, R., Topness, E., Turner, J., Updike, S., Buckman, H., Simpson, N., Lin, J., Anderson, A., Baier, H., Crittenden, M., Dowker, E., Fuhrig, S., Goodman, S., Grimsley, G., Layko, R., Melville, G., Mulder, M., Oberman, R., Panganiban, J., Peck, A., Seitz, L., Shea, S., Slevin, H., Yougerman, R. and Hobbs, L. (2020). geoBoundaries: A global database of political administrative boundaries. Plos One, 15(4), e0231866.
- Schwarzenberg. A. (2023). Russia’s Trade and Investment Role in the Global Economy. Congressional Research Services, Report IF12066. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12066
- Sharma, R. (2023). Why markets are relatively calm in the geopolitical storm. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/d194a8a2-60c1-4afe-83bf-44e529e16d40
- Sonnenfeld, J. and Tian, S. (2022). Some of the Biggest Companies Are Leaving Russia. Others Just Can’t Quit Putin. Here’s a List. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/04/07/opinion/companies-ukraine-boycott.html
- Sonnenfeld, J., Tian, S., Sokolowski, F., Wyrebkowski, M., and Kasprowicz, M. (2022). Business Retreats and Sanctions Are Crippling the Russian Economy. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4167193
- Stockholms Handelskammare. (2022). Regionala handelsmönster med Ryssland. https://www.mynewsdesk.com/se/stockholmshandelskammare/documents/siffror-se-ru-punkt-pdf-420259
- Swedish Chamber of Commerce. (2024). Förslag på åtgärder mot kringgående av sanktioner. https://www.kommerskollegium.se/globalassets/publikationer/rapporter/2024/forslag-pa-atgarder-mot-kringgaenden-av-sanktioner.pdf
- S&P Global. (2024). Sanctions against Russia – a timeline. https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-headlines/sanctions-against-russia-8211-a-timeline-69602559
- Tidningen Näringslivet (2023). Svensk export till Rysslands grannar rusar. https://www.tn.se/naringsliv/30641/svensk-export-till-rysslands-grannar-rusar/
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Using the Financial System to Enforce Export Controls
Soon after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in mid-2022, Russian imports of battlefield goods subject to export controls have sharply risen, reaching levels close to those prior to Russia’s military intervention. This surge, which includes items from Western producers, highlights ongoing challenges in enforcing export controls and preventing the flow of critical components to Russia’s military industry. Imports are facilitated through channels in mainland China, Hong Kong, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. Additionally, countries like Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and the Kyrgyz Republic have also experienced significant increases in imports from EU and coalition countries, likely destined for Russia.
Benjamin Hilgenstock and Anna Vlasyuk from the KSE Institute, and Elina Ribakova and Guntram B. Wolff from Bruegel have written a working paper that explores how battlefield products banned under the existing sanctions regime continue to reach Russia. A significant portion of these goods originates from companies headquartered in sanctioned countries, and they are often routed through third countries with multiple intermediaries involved in the process. Despite efforts to restrict imports, foreign components in Russian weapons primarily come from Western companies, indicating that substitution is not readily achievable.
Learn more about the role of export controls, the challenges of export control implementation, and the financial system’s role in improving export controls in the latest working paper published by the experts from FREE Network sister institute – KSE Institute and Bruegel (see here).
Sanctions on Russia: Getting the Facts Right
The important strategic role that sanctions play in the efforts to constrain Russia’s geopolitical ambitions and end its brutal war on Ukraine is often questioned and diminished in the public debate. This policy brief, authored by a collective of experts from various countries, shares insights on the complexities surrounding the use of sanctions against Russia, in light of its illegal aggression towards Ukraine. The aim is to facilitate a public discussion based on facts and reduce the risk that the debate falls prey to the information war.
Sanctions are a pivotal component in the array of strategies deployed to address the threat posed by Russia to the rule-based international order. Contrary to views minimizing their impact, evidence and research suggest that sanctions, particularly those targeting Russian energy exports, have significantly affected Russia’s macroeconomic stability [1,2,3]. Between 2022 and 2023:
- merchandise exports fell by 28 percent,
- the trade surplus decreased by 62 percent,
- and the current account surplus dropped by 79 percent (see the Bank of Russia’s external sector statistics here).
Although 2022 represents an extraordinarily high baseline due to the delayed impacts of energy sanctions, the $190 billion decrease in foreign currency inflows during this time has already made a significant difference for Russia. This amount is equivalent to about two years of Russia’s current military spending, or around 10 percent of Russia’s yearly GDP, depending on the figures. Our estimates suggest that Russia’s losses due to the oil price cap and import embargo alone amount to several percent of its GDP [3,4]. These losses have contributed to the ruble’s continued weakness and have forced Russian authorities to sharply increase interest rates, which will have painful ripple effects throughout the economy in the coming months and years. Furthermore, the international sanctions coalition’s freezing of about $300 billion of the Bank of Russia’s reserves has significantly curtailed the central bank’s ability to manage the Russian economy in this era of war and sanctions.
Sanctions Enforcement
Addressing the enforcement of sanctions, it is crucial to acknowledge the extensive and continuous work undertaken by governments, think tanks, and the private sector to identify and close loopholes that facilitate sanctions evasion. Suggesting that such efforts are futile, often with arguments that lack solid evidence, potentially undermines these contributions, and furthermore provides (perhaps unintended) support to those advocating for a dismantling of the sanctions regime. We do not deny that several key aspects are facing challenges, from the oil price cap to export controls on military and dual-use goods. However, the path forward is to step up efforts and strengthen the implementation and enforcement – not to abandon the strategy altogether. Yes, Russia’s shadow fleet threatens the fundamental mechanism of the oil sanctions and, namely its reliance on Western services [4,5,6]. However, recent actions by the U.S. Treasury Department have shown that the sanctioning coalition can in fact weaken Russia’s ability to work around the energy sanctions. Specifically, the approach to designate (i.e., sanction) individual tankers has effectively removed them from the Russian oil trade. More vessels could be targeted in a similar way to gradually step-up the pressure on Russia [7]. While Russia continues to have access to many products identified as critical for the military industry (for instance semiconductors) [8], it has been shown that Russia pays significant mark-ups for these goods to compensate for the many layers of intermediaries involved in circumvention schemes. Sanctions, even when imperfect, thus still work as trade barriers. In addition to existing efforts and undertakings, companies which help Russia evade export controls can be sanctioned, even when registered in countries outside of the sanctioning coalition. Furthermore, compliance efforts within, and against, western companies, who remain extremely important for Russia, can be stepped up.
The Russian Economy
Many recent newspaper articles have been centered around the theme of Russia’s surprisingly resilient economy. We find these articles to generally be superficial and missing a key point: Russia is transitioning to a war economy, driven by massive and unsustainable public spending. In 2024, military spending is projected to boost Russia’s GDP growth by at least 2.5 percentage points, driven by a planned $100 billion in defense expenditures [9]. However, seeing this for what it is, namely war-spending, raises significant concerns about the sustainability of this growth, as it eats into existing reserves and crowds out investments in areas with a larger long-term growth potential. The massive spending also feeds inflation in consumer prices and wages, in particular as private investment levels are low and the labor market is short on competent labor. This puts pressure on monetary policy causing the central bank to increase interest rates even further, to compensate for the overly stimulating fiscal policy.
Further, it is important to bear in mind that, beyond this stimulus, the Russian economy is characterised by fundamental weaknesses. Russia has for many years dealt with anaemic growth due to low productivity gains and unfavourable demographics. Since the first round of sanctions was imposed on Russia, following its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, growth has hovered at around 1 percent per year on average – abysmal for an emerging market with catch-up potential. More recently, current sanctions and war expenditures have made Russia dramatically underperform compared to other oil-exporting countries [10]. Moreover, none of the normal (non-war related) growth fundamentals is likely to improve. Rather, the military aggression and the ensuing sanctions have made things worse. Hundreds of thousands of Russians have been killed or wounded in the war; many more have left the country to either escape the Putin regime or mobilization. Those leaving are often the younger and better educated, worsening the already dire demographic situation, and reinforcing the labor market inefficiencies. Additionally, with the country largely cut off from the world’s most important financial markets, investments in the Russian economy are completely insufficient [11].
As a result, Russia will be increasingly dependent on fossil fuel extraction and exports, a strategy that holds limited promise as considerations related to climate change continue to gain importance. With the loss of the European market, either due to sanctions or Putin’s failed attempt to weaponize gas flows to Europe, Russia finds itself dependent on a limited number of buyers for its oil and gas. Such dependency compels Russia to accept painful discounts and increases its exposure to market risks and price fluctuations [12].
The Cost of Sanctions
Sanctions have not been without costs for the countries imposing them. Nonetheless, the sanctioning countries are in a much better position than Russia. Any sanction strategy is necessarily a tradeoff between maximizing the sanctioned country’s economic loss while minimizing the loss to the sanctioning countries [9], but there are at least two qualifications to bear in mind. The first is that some sanctions imply very low losses – if any – while others may carry limited short term losses but longer term gains. This includes the oil-price cap that allows many importing countries to buy Russian oil at a discount [3], and policies to reduce energy demand, which squeezes Russia’s oil-income [13]. These policies may also initially hurt sanctioning countries, but in the long term facilitate an investment in energy self-sufficiency. Similarly, trade sanctions also imply some protection of one’s own industry, meaning that such sanctions may in fact bring benefits to the sanctioning countries – at least in the short run. The second qualification is that, in cases where sanctions do imply a cost to the sanctioning countries, the question is what cost is reasonable. Russia’s economy is many times smaller than, for instance, the EU’s economy. This gives the EU a strategic advantage akin to that in Texas hold’em poker: going dollar for dollar and euro for euro, Russia is bound to go bankrupt. Currently, Russia allocates a significantly larger portion of its GDP to its war machine than most sanctioning countries spend on their defense. That alone suggests sanctioning countries may want to go beyond dollar for dollar as it is cheaper to stop Russia economically today than on a future battlefield. This points to the bigger question: what would be the future cost of not sanctioning Russia today? Many accredit the weak response from the West to the annexation of Crimea in 2014 as part of the explanation behind Putin’s decision to pursue the current full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Similarly, an unwillingness to bear limited costs today may entail much more substantial costs tomorrow.
When discussing the cost of sanctions, one must also take into account Russia’s counter moves and whether they are credible [14]. Often, they are not [3, 15]. Fear-inducing platitudes, such that China and Russia will reshape the global financial system to insulate themselves from the West’s economic statecraft tools, circulate broadly. We do not deny that these countries are undertaking measures in this direction, but it is much harder to do so in practice than in political speeches. For instance, moving away from the U.S. dollar (and the Euro) in international trade (aside from in bilateral trade relations that are roughly balanced) is highly challenging. In such a trade, conducted without the U.S. dollar, one side of the bargain will end up with a large amount of currency that it does not need and cannot exchange, at scale, for hard currency. As long as a transaction is conducted in U.S. dollar, the U.S. financial system is involved via corresponding accounts, and the threat of secondary sanctions remains powerful. We have seen examples of this in recent months, following President Biden’s executive order on December 22, 2023.
One of Many Tools
Finally, we and other proponents of sanctions do not view them as a panacea, or an alternative to the essential military and financial support that Ukraine requires. Rather, we maintain that sanctions are a critical component of a multi-pronged strategy aimed at halting Putin’s unlawful and aggressive war against Ukraine, a war that threatens not only Ukraine, but peace, liberty, and prosperity across Europe. The necessity for sanctions becomes clear when considering the alternative: a Russian regime with access to $300 billion in the central bank’s reserves, the ability to earn billions more from fossil fuel exports, and to freely acquire advanced Western technology for its military operations against Ukrainian civilians. In fact, the less successful the economic statecraft measures are, the greater the need for military and financial aid to Ukraine becomes, alongside broader indirect costs such as increased defense spending, higher interest rates, and inflation in sanctioning countries. A case in point is the West’s provision of vital – yet expensive – air defense systems to Ukraine, required to counteract Russian missiles and drones, which in turn are enabled by access to Western technology. Abandoning sanctions would only exacerbate this type of challenges.
Conclusion
The discourse on sanctions against Russia necessitates a nuanced understanding of their role within the context of the broader strategy against Russia. It is critical to understand that shallow statements and misinformed opinions become part of the information war, and that the effectiveness of sanctions also depends on all stakeholders’ perceptions about the sanctioning regime’s effectiveness and long run sustainability. Supporting Ukraine in its struggle against the Russian aggression is not a matter of choosing between material support and sanctions; rather, Ukraine’s allies must employ all available tools to ensure Ukraine’s victory. While sanctions alone are not a cure-all, they are indispensable in the concerted effort to support Ukraine and restore peace and stability in the region. The way forward is thus to make the sanctions even more effective and to strengthen the enforcement, not to abandon them.
References
[1] “Russia Chartbook”. KSE Institute, February 2024
[2] “One year of sanctions: Russia’s oil export revenues cut by EUR 34 bn”. Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air, December 2023
[3] “The Price Cap on Russian Oil: A Quantitative Analysis”. Wachtmeister, H., Gars, J. and Spiro, D, July 2023
[4] Spiro, D. Gars, J, and Wachtmeister, H. (2023). “The effects of an EU import and shipping embargo on Russian oil income,” mimeo
[5] “Energy Sanctions: Four Key Steps to Constrain Russia in 2024 and Beyond”. International Working Group on Russian Sanctions & KSE Institute, February 2024
[6] “Tracking the impacts of G7 & EU’s sanctions on Russian oil”. Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air
[7] “Russia Oil Tracker”. KSE Institute, February 2024
[8] “Challenges of Export Controls Enforcement: How Russia Continues to Import Components for Its Military Production”. International Working Group on Russian Sanctions & KSE Institute, January 2024
[9] “Russia Plans Huge Defense Spending Hike in 2024 as War Drags”. Bloomberg, September 2023
[10] “Sanctions and Russia’s War: Limiting Putin’s Capabilities”. U.S. Department of the Treasury, December 2023
[11] “World Investment Report 2023”. UNCTAD
[12] “Russia-China energy relations since 24 February: Consequences and options for Europe”. Swedish Institute of International Affairs, June 2023
[13] Gars, J., Spiro, D. and Wachtmeister, H. (2022). “The effect of European fuel-tax cuts on the oil income of Russia”. Nature Energy, 7(10), pp.989-997
[14] Spiro, D. (2023). “Economic Warfare”. Available at SSRN 4445359
[15] Gars, J., Spiro, D. and Wachtmeister, H., (2023). “Were Russia’s threats of reduced oil exports credible?”. Working paper
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Russian Wheat Policies and Georgia’s Strategic Trade Policies
Russia is known for periodically halting its grain exports to impact global wheat prices. This has become a significant policy concern in recent years, most notably during the Covid-19 pandemic and in the wake of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Georgia heavily depends on wheat imports, and over 95 percent of its wheat has historically been sourced from Russia. Despite Russia’s periodic bans and restrictions on wheat exports occurring every 2-3 years, Georgia is yet to effectively diversify its sources of wheat imports. This policy brief analyses the impact of Russia’s most recent wheat policies on Georgia’s wheat market, examines Georgia’s response, and provides policy recommendations in this regard.
In June 2023, the Georgian government introduced a temporary import duty on wheat flour imported from Russia in response to requests from the Georgian Flour Producers Association. The association began advocating for an import duty after Russia, in 2021, imposed a so-called “floating tariff” on wheat which made it relatively more expensive to import wheat in comparison to wheat flour. As a result of the “floating tariff” on wheat, wheat flour imports skyrocketed and almost fully substituted wheat imports. Eventually, many Georgian mills shut down and local wheat producers struggled to sell domestically produced wheat. Such an increase in flour imports raises the risk of completely replacing domestically produced flour with flour imported from Russia.
To address the above, the government has implemented a temporary import duty of 200 GEL (75 USD) per ton on wheat flour imported from Russia (the average import price ranges between 225 USD/ton and 435 USD/ton). In turn, millers have agreed to purchase 1 kilogram of wheat from Georgian farmers for 0.7 GEL (0.3 USD). This policy measure is in effect until March 1, 2024.
The Georgian Flour Producers Association advocates for an extension of the temporary import duty beyond March 1, 2024, to uphold fair competition in the wheat and flour market. According to the Georgian Flour Producers Association, an extension is desirable due to the following (Resonance daily, 2024):
- Under the import duty, fair competition between wheat flour and wheat has been restored, and Georgian mills have resumed their operations.
- Following the government intervention, farmers have successfully sold over 50,000 tons (on average half of the annual production) of domestically produced wheat. The Ministry of Environmental Protection and Agriculture has reported a 60 percent increase in local wheat production over the past two years, with expectations of sustained growth.
- Wheat imports have resumed, with Georgia importing 20,000 to 25,000 tons of wheat monthly, while prior to the government intervention, the average monthly wheat imports amounted to 15,337 tons (in 2022). Additionally, 8,000 to 12,000 tons of wheat flour, on average, are also imported monthly, while in the absence of government intervention, wheat flour imports surged to over 15,000 tons (in 2022).
- Post-intervention, the price of 100 kilograms of first-quality flour has remained stable, ranging from 45 to 49 GEL. Consequently, the price of bread has not increased but remains steady.
- The import duty has generated an additional 20 million GEL in government revenue.
- Through the efforts of the mills, the country now enjoys a steady and strategically managed supply of wheat, in accordance with UN recommendations. Coupled with the seasonal harvest of Georgian wheat, this ensures complete food security in any unforeseen critical scenario.
While many arguments support the decision to preserve the import duty on wheat flour, in order to make an informed decision on that matter, it is essential to thoroughly assess production, trade and price dynamics in the wheat market in Georgia. Additionally, to design adequate trade policy measures, one has also to consider the issue in a broader perspective and assess the risks associated with a high dependency on Russian wheat, especially given Russia’s history of imposing wheat export restrictions.
Russian Policy on the Wheat Market
Russia has long been one of the dominant players on the global wheat market, and its periodic decisions to halt grain exports have heavily affected international wheat prices (see Table 1). This concern became especially stringent in recent years, during the Covid-19 pandemic and Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Table 1. Russia’s policy interventions in the wheat market and their estimated impact on wheat prices, 2007-2023.
One of Russia’s most recent interventions in the wheat market is its withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative – an agreement between Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, and the United Nations (UN) during the Russian invasion of Ukraine on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian ports. While Georgia doesn’t directly import wheat from Ukraine and isn’t immediately threatened by famine, Russia’s export policies regarding wheat have raised significant food security concerns in the country. Georgia heavily depends on wheat imports from Russia, with over 95 percent of its wheat historically being sourced from there. Despite Russia’s recurrent bans and restrictions on wheat exports every 2-3 years, Georgia is yet to successfully diversify its import sources.
The Georgian Wheat Market in Figures
Domestic Production
Historically, Georgia’s agricultural sector has struggled to achieve a large-scale and sufficient wheat production due to the prevalence of small-sized farms. However, over the past decade, Georgian domestic wheat production has shown significant growth (see Figure 1). This growth has been particularly sizeable in recent years, with production increasing by 32 and 53 percent in 2021 and 2022, respectively, as compared to 2020.
Figure 1. Wheat production in Georgia, 2014-2022.
Such increase in local production positively contributes to the self-sufficiency ratio, which increased from 7 percent in 2014 to 22 percent in 2022, in turn implying higher food security levels.
Wheat Imports
Before the introduction of Russia’s floating tariff on wheat, wheat flour imports to Georgia were almost non-existent. However, after the floating tariff was imposed on wheat, imports of wheat flour increased more than 20 times – from 743 tons in January 2021 to 15,086 tons in May 2023 – peaking at 23,651 tons in August 2022 (see Figure 2). At the same time wheat imports declined by almost 60 percent, from 29,397 tons in January 2021 to 12,133 tons in May 2023, with the smallest import quantity being 2,743 tons in May 2022 (as depicted in Figure 2).
Figure 2. Georgian wheat and wheat flour imports, 2021-2023.
After the introduction of the temporary import duty on wheat flour in June 2023, wheat imports have picked up, although not reaching the levels seen in 2021. Similarly, wheat flour imports have declined while remaining at higher levels than in 2021. This indicates a change in Georgia’s wheat market dynamics. Historically, Georgia predominantly imported wheat; now it imports both wheat and wheat flour. This shift must be considered in future policy design, as it has implications for domestic wheat farmers and mills.
The continued wheat flour imports, despite the temporary import duty imposed by the Georgian Government can likely be attributed to a smaller price gap between wheat and wheat flour import prices (see Table 2).
Table 2. Average import prices of wheat and wheat flour in Georgia, 2021-2023.
In 2021, prior to Russia’s introduction of a floating tariff on wheat, the import price of wheat flour in Georgia was 24 percent higher than the import price of wheat. After the introduction of the floating tariff, importing wheat became more expensive, and the import price gap between wheat flour and wheat decreased to 22 percent by the end of 2021. Subsequently, in 2022, this gap further narrowed, and by the first half of 2023, the import price of wheat flour was 5 percent lower than the import price of wheat. This significant decrease in the price gap resulted in nearly full substitution of wheat imports with wheat flour imports. After the introduction of the import duty on wheat flour and as international wheat prices declined, a marginal positive price gap has reappeared, amounting to just 1 percent. As it stands, importing wheat flour remains more advantageous than importing wheat.
Price Effects
Russia’s floating tariff on wheat led to increased bread and wheat flour prices in 2021-2022. In June 2022, bread prices experienced the most significant surge, increasing by 36 percent, while wheat flour prices reached their peak in September 2022 with a year-on-year increase of 41 percent (see Figure 3). The primary reason for this was the record increase in wheat prices, leading to a corresponding surge in wheat flour prices in 2022. This spike occurred as the world price of wheat reached its highest point in five years.
Figure 3. Annual change in bread and wheat flour prices, 2021-2023.
Nevertheless, in 2023 bread and wheat flour prices decreased, indicating that the import duty on wheat flour did not lead to increased prices. This could partially be explained by the fact that mills pay farmers 0.5 GEL/kg, which is lower than agreed price of 0.7 GEL/kg. Another and more crucial factor is the decline in global wheat prices. They began their descent in June 2022 and have since maintained a downward trajectory. This decrease, combined with increased local production, has so far acted as a barrier to any new bread and wheat flour price increases.
The Way Forward
The question that must be addressed is whether the import duty on wheat flour imported from Russia should be extended.
The import duty may have contributed to increased local production as higher import duties can incentivize local businesses to invest in expanding their production capacity or improving their technology to meet an increased demand. It is however essential to note that the impact of import duties on local production varies depending on the level of domestic competition, the availability of inputs (high quality seed, fertilizer etc.), technological capabilities, and government policies beyond import duties (such as investment incentives, infrastructure development, and regulatory environment). Additionally, import duties can also lead to retaliatory measures from trading partners, affecting overall trade dynamics – potentially incurring unintended consequences. Therefore, while import duties can contribute to an increased local production under certain conditions, it is just one of many factors influencing production dynamics.
Secondly, as previously detailed, the import duty has so far not resulted in increased bread prices. However, the effect of an import tariff on retail prices depends on various factors, including elasticity of demand and supply, market, competitiveness, and the extent to which the tariff is passed on to consumers by importers and retailers. Since demand for bread is inelastic, one has to keep in mind that the importers and retailers can fully pass on the increased cost from an import tariff to consumers.
Given that the floating tariff and the import duty make wheat and wheat flour imports to Georgia more expensive, one should expect future bread price increases. This unless international wheat prices continue to decline and/or producers agree to reduce their profit margins or make supply chain changes. Therefore, an extension of the import duty might be a suitable solution in the short and medium-term, but it should not be seen as a permanent solution.
To limit the risks of food scarcity in Georgia in the long run, it is essential to design strategies helping the country to reduce its dependency on Russian wheat and wheat flour. Some measures to achieve this objective may include:
Further supporting local production. Encourage investment in domestic agriculture to increase the productivity and quality of wheat production in Georgia. This can be achieved through subsidies, incentives for modern farming techniques, and access to credit for farmers.
Improving the quality of local production. Currently, most of the domestically produced wheat is unsuitable for milling into wheat flour. A significant portion of domestically produced wheat is of poor quality and instead used for feeding livestock. It is essential to invest in research and development to improve the quality of domestically produced wheat. This includes developing wheat varieties that are resistant to diseases and better suited for local growing conditions.
Seeking alternative markets for import diversification. One alternative for Georgia may be to focus on the Kazakh and Ukrainian markets (once the war is over) and negotiate possible ways to decrease the cost of transporting wheat to Georgia with state and private sector representatives.
Reducing the Georgian dependence on Russian wheat imports requires a multifaceted approach that addresses various aspects of agricultural policy, trade diversification, and domestic production capacity.
References
Resonance daily. (2024). The Association of Wheat and Flour Producers of Georgia requests an extension of the import tax on imported flour. https://www.resonancedaily.com/index.php?id_rub=4&id_artc=197847
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.
Trending? Social Media Attention on Russia’s War in Ukraine
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is one of the most important geopolitical events of the 21st century. For almost two years, international news outlets have been covering the war, often providing daily or even hourly updates. But what is the level of public interest and public engagement in countries around the world? When does the war capture an international audience’s attention and what are the events that supplant it? This brief uses data on X (formerly Twitter) trends in 62 countries to address these questions.
The competition for attention is a defining feature of our information landscape. From the relentless stream of social media updates to the myriad of news articles vying for our clicks, individuals are constantly bombarded with information, each competing for a slice of their limited attention. Amidst this cacophony of voices, certain topics rise to the forefront, capturing the collective consciousness and dominating public discourse.
Russia’s war in Ukraine has, for obvious reasons, commanded significant media coverage over the past two years. It has been described as a hybrid war, where conventional military tactics are increasingly combined with non-traditional methods. This includes an information war, fought with narratives to manipulate people’s perceptions, spread falsehoods, or enlist support. To a large extent, this information war has taken place on social media. On the one hand, social media platforms have been used to spread disinformation and propaganda. For example, we’ve seen the spread of false narratives about the causes of the war, the actions of the different parties involved, and the suffering of the Ukrainian people. But on the other hand, social media has also been used to counter this disinformation, with fact-checking initiatives and grassroots efforts to promote accurate information.
This policy brief analyses the prominence of the war in social media discourse. While the content on traditional media outlets provides a snapshot of the supply of information, platforms like X/Twitter offer a unique window into the broader population’s demand for that information and how they evolve over time. Whether or not hashtags related to Russia’s war in Ukraine are trending in a given country, depends not just on the public’s interest in the war relative to other events in the news, but also on the level of interest relative to sport, music, television, and cats. By tracking the prevalence of trending hashtags, we can gain insights into the public’s engagement with Russia’s war in Ukraine, going beyond traditional media narratives and high-level governmental discussions to uncover the conversations and sentiments that shape broader public opinion.
The X/Twitter data suggest that in most countries, social media attention in the Russian war on Ukraine has been short-lived and sporadic. On February 24, 2022, Ukraine-related hashtags were trending in 100 percent of the countries in our dataset. Two weeks later, on March 9, 2022, they were trending in only 3 percent of the countries. We find that geographical proximity to the conflict is a strong predictor of social media interest. Related hashtags trend most frequently in Eastern, Central and Northern Europe. We also document spikes in interest around events that link a country to the war in Ukraine: announcements of military assistance or visits by Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyj. Finally, we compare the hashtags trending in NATO countries to those trending in countries that either sided with Russia or abstained from voting in a critical UN resolution and show significant differences between the two groups.
Data and Methodology
The source for our dataset is archive.twitter-trending.com – a website that records trending hashtags on X/Twitter across countries and over time. We scrape this website to collect (i) the five highest volume topics in each country on each day and (ii) the five longest-trending topics in each country on each day (these two categories can overlap). Our sample consists of the 62 countries available on the website and covers the timeframe July 2021 to December 2023. From this, we construct a country-by-day panel dataset with 55,862 observations.
We identify 11 topic categories that collectively account for the overwhelming majority of trending topics related to Russia’s war in Ukraine. These topics and their relative frequency are shown in Figure 1. The three dominant categories are “Ukraine”, “Russia” and ”Putin”. We use Google’s translation software to translate non-English tweets which account for a significant fraction of the dataset.
Figure 1. Frequency of hashtags in 11 category topics.
Figure 1 shows that it is more common for war-related topics to be among the highest volume topics on a given day than among the longest trending topics. This suggests that these topics attract a lot of interest in a narrow timeframe (e.g. when news breaks) but are relatively less likely to remain prominent over a whole day. Despite this difference, we find that the distinction between highest-volume and longest-trending does not affect any of the patterns we observe when comparing across countries or time. For simplicity, the results shown below all use the highest-volume measure.
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of the X/Twitter data. Firstly, the population actively using X/Twitter is not representative of the overall population. Secondly, the composition of users may differ across countries which complicates cross-country comparisons. Trending hashtags provide an indicator of public interest that is informative only because we do not have high frequency, nationally representative surveys that are comparable across countries. Finally, we are only able to observe the top-five hashtags in a country on any given day. In principle, a war-related topic could increase in absolute volume from one day to the next, while still being crowded out of the top five.
Geographic Variation in Attention
Social media attention to the war in Ukraine varies greatly across countries. The map in Figure 2 shows the proportion of days when any hashtag from the considered categories was among the top-five most tweeted, for each country in the database since the start of the war. Interest has, on average, been higher in Europe as well as in Anglo-Saxon countries. In contrast, other regions of the world exhibited less sustained interest, as indicated by the lower frequency of related hashtags among the top-five most tweeted topics.
Figure 2. Prevalence of war-related hashtags.
To some extent, this heterogeneity is explained by distance. Figure 3 plots the frequency of war-related trends against geographical proximity to the conflict zone (represented by the distance from each country’s capital to the city of Kharkiv in eastern Ukraine, a major point of focus during the ongoing war). The relationship is clearly negative, suggesting that physical distance from the crisis reduces the intensity of online discourse and public interest. Unsurprisingly, the number of related trends is highest in countries directly or indirectly involved in the conflict – Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus – as well as in Latvia which borders both Russia and Belarus.
Figure 3. Frequency of war-related hashtags and distance from Kharkiv.
Variation in Attention Over Time
Over the past two years, the war has sustained a relatively high intensity. By contrast, global attention on X/Twitter has been more sporadic, spiking around specific events. This is shown in Figure 4, which plots the day-to-day variation in the number of battle events as recorded by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) (in blue) as well as the share of countries where war-related tweets are trending (in orange). Attention was highest at the time of the invasion in February 2022 and the days of the Wagner Group rebellion in June 2023. Overall, the correlation between twitter trends and conflict intensity is positive but relatively weak.
Figure 4. Frequency of war-related hashtags and intensity of conflict.
Attention also reacts to other major global events. Figure 5 compares the number of top-five trending hashtags related to the categories of interest in each country on two specific dates: February 24, 2022, the day of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and October 7, 2023, the day of a Hamas terror attack on Israel. On the day of the Russian invasion, the majority of countries in our sample exhibited the highest value. In contrast, on the day of the Hamas attack, related hashtags were trending almost nowhere outside Ukraine and Russia, indicating that global attention and engagement with this new ongoing crisis significantly overshadowed the focus on the situation in Ukraine. This shift in attention demonstrates how breaking news can capture the public’s interest and divert focus from ongoing crises, affecting the level of engagement on social media and potentially influencing the global response and discourse surrounding these events.
Figure 5. Map of prevalence of war-related hashtags on two different dates.
While some events impact attention globally, others affect the salience of the conflict for a specific country. Figure 6 shows that people pay more attention to the war when there is a tangible connection to their own country. The panel on the left shows that war-related topics were more likely to trend in a country around the days where the country announced an aid package for Ukraine (military, financial or humanitarian). It shows an increasing trend in the preceding days and a peak on the day of the announcement. The panel on the right shows that war-related topics were more likely to trend in a country around the days of a visit from President Zelenskyj. This effect is large in magnitude but only lasts for around three days.
Figure 6. Likelihood of hashtags trending in relation to country-specific event.
While the events above act as drivers of attention, it is also interesting to consider what causes war-related topics to drop out of the top five trending topics. We distinguish between two reasons why war-related hashtags could stop trending: (i) a loss of interest that results in a reduction in the absolute number of related tweets (ii) the rise of other topics that displace war-related tweets from the top five. Figure 7 focuses on days where war-related topics dropped out and compares the volume of tweets on the last day where they were in the top five, to the threshold they would have had to surpass in order to make the top five on the subsequent day. In cases where the threshold is lower than the previously observed volume of tweets (a ratio of less than 1), the topic would have kept trending had it sustained its volumes, and one can conclude there was an absolute loss of interest. In cases where the ratio is greater than one, it is possible that the topic sustained its previous volume of tweets but was crowded-out by the rise of a new trending topic. Figure 7plots the histogram of this ratio. 73 percent of the cases are in the first category (loss of attention) and 27 percent are in the possible crowding out category. This provides further evidence to suggest that attention to the war on social media is typically fleeting.
Figure 7. Loss of attention vs crowding out.
We also examine the content of discussions on the first day after war-related hashtags drop out of the top five. The word cloud in Figure 8 suggests that on such days, people primarily discuss entertainment topics like music and football.
Figure 8. Word cloud of hashtags trending on days war-related categories drop out.
Content and Context of War-Related Discourse
In addition to providing insight into the level of engagement, hashtag analysis can also reveal the content and context of popular discourse surrounding the war. By examining words trending on the same days as those from our 11 categories, we can gain a better understanding of the topics people are discussing and how the conversation varies across different regions. Figure 9 illustrates this through word clouds, showing the language used in NATO countries on the left and in countries that abstained or voted against the United Nations General Assembly Resolution ES-11/1 on the right. This resolution, dated March 2, 2022, condemned the brutal invasion of Ukraine and demanded that Russia immediately withdraw its forces and comply with international law.
This exercise allows us to compare the dominant themes and narratives in these two groups of countries and observe any differences in public perception and discourse regarding the conflict. The prevalence of cryptocurrency and NFT (non-fungible tokens) references in the word cloud on the right is suggestive of how economic interests and alternative financial systems could be relevant for the positions of countries that abstained or voted against the resolution, and how this might affect their involvement or response to the conflict. On the left, words like “NATO”, ”Biden”, and ”Trump” clearly stand out, suggesting that these topics are central to the discourse on the war in NATO countries. This could indicate a focus on geopolitical alliances, international cooperation, and the role of key political figures in shaping the response to the conflict. Interestingly, “Putin” is very prominent in the left word cloud while “Russia” and “Russian” are more prominent on the right. This could indicate that Putin is seen and discussed as the primary antagonist in NATO countries.
Figure 9. Word cloud of hashtags in NATO countries vs Russia-friendly countries.
Conclusion
This brief uses X/Twitter trends as a barometer of public interest in Russia’s war in Ukraine. We show how attention fluctuates over time in response to developments in the conflict, to other breaking news, and to local events that make the conflict salient for a domestic audience. We also provide descriptive evidence on the variation across geographical regions and among different groups of countries. Additionally, we analyse the instance where Ukraine-related topics stop trending and find suggestive evidence that this is typically due to a gradual loss of interest rather than crowding out by new distracting trends.
Public attention and engagement drive policy in democratic countries, and the sustained support of its democratic allies is vital for Ukraine during this critical time. Understanding the patterns and influences of public attention is crucial for developing effective strategies to sustain engagement and support. This can be achieved for example by regularly highlighting the ongoing significance and bearing of Russia’s war against Ukraine, even as other events dominate the headlines. Emphasizing the impact of the conflict on individuals and communities, as well as its broader implications for international relations and global security, can help sustain public interest and engagement.
References
- ACLED. Ukraine Conflict Monitor. https://acleddata.com/ukraine-conflict-monitor/
- Trebesch, C., Antezza, A., Bushnell, K., Bomprezzi, P., Dyussimbinov, Y., Frank, A., Frank, P., Franz, L., Kharitonov, I., Kumar, B., Rebinskaya, E., Schade, C., Schramm, S., and Weiser, L. (2023). The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how? Kiel Working Paper, 2218, 1-75.
- Twitter Trending Archive. Scraped on ##/12/2023. https://archive.twitter-trending.com/
Disclaimer: Opinions expressed in policy briefs and other publications are those of the authors; they do not necessarily reflect those of the FREE Network and its research institutes.